What were the implications of Germany’s reunification for France and how did Francois Mitterrand respond to it

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Introduction

Francois Mitterrand was born in France at a place called Jarnac in the year 1916. He rose to become the 21^st president of France and the longest serving president that France has ever had. During his formative years, he was a student at the Paris University where he studied political science and law. During the Second World War, Mitterrand served in the French army as a soldier.

He was discharged after he was injured during the war. Francoise Mitterrand was known to be a very controversial figure in France politics. However, regardless of this fact, he was able to be elected as the first left wing president of France leading through his Socialist party. Before his election as the French president, Mitterrand had held different ministerial positions for a long time.

He had thus established himself as a political heavy weight in France. Mitterrand’s presidency was full of controversies, which were mostly unearthed after his retirement. It was revealed that, during his time as the president, he formed an anti-terror unit to monitor and obtain information from journalists as a way of keeping his family life secretive.

This group was later found to have engaged in an illegal tapping and eavesdropping exercise as part of their duty to hide the president’s secrets. The paper presents the implications of Germany’s reunification for France showing how Francois Mitterrand responded to it. However, it will first offer the challenges that France encountered at the dawn of the reunification.

The Challenges that France Faced in the Wake of German Reunification

While under Charles De Gaul and Francois Mitterrand, France had developed into one of the strongest European economies. However, under the Gaullist policies, it was meant to be the strongest European power. Francois Mitterrand was working towards a European integration, which eventually became the European Union.

The French people were opposed to German reunification because they felt that a fast unification, as it was happening in the year 1989-1990, would complicate matters for the French agenda in Europe (Sarotte 2011, p. 257). Eastern Germany was an impoverished nation under the communist policies that had held back its development for so many years. The Soviet Union was the main benefactor for East Germany.

For some time, it had withdrawn its support to the nation. Even with the support that it was supposed to offer, its efforts in Germany were very poor thus making East Germany suffer the fate of many communist states (Larrabee 1989, p. 38). The economic and monetary unification that France was vouching for would therefore be jeopardised if Germany would be unified.

Eastern Germany was so left behind in terms of development that even its housing structures were those of 1949. It would therefore require massive injection of capital to raise its status for the country to be integrated in the envisaged European Union.

This matter was a great challenge to France because it would be more expensive to undertake the integration with East and West Germany as one nation. According to Blitz(2009), those fears were confirmed after the integration because, to date, the Western part of Germany that was previously the more prosperous of the two has always had to transfer funds for the development of the eastern part of Germany (p. 2).

Such were the fears of the French people that an early integration would destabilise their plans for a unified European community. France’s opposition to Germany reunification was informed by the fact that the Soviet Union’s president Mikhail Gorbachev had informed it (France) that it would lead to a security risk (Tiersky 1995, p. 8).

Gorbachev had indicated that the unification of Germany would lead to a coup de tat in the Soviet Union. It would lead to disintegration of the member states. According to Tiersky (1995), this case would pose a very challenging problem to the whole Eastern European block of countries as well as to France (p. 9). Therefore, France had to be very careful in its approach towards German unification.

The prospect of security risks led to the French government opting for a distant approach towards German reunification, which was later on interpreted as being opposed to Germany’s reunification. The stability of the region and France’s domination of the regions both economically and politically gave France a good reason to have fear on the reunification (Newman 2010, p. 155).

Although it cannot be rightly concluded that France was opposed to German reunification, it can be rightly proved that France had great reservations on this issue. The prospect of the Eastern Europe collapsing posed a very great challenge to Frances’ economy as well as its security as Meirs (2002, p. 211) reveals. French leadership was seen to be divided on whether to support the reunification or not.

The then French President Francois Mitterrand observed this move through the sent out mixed signals. President Mitterrand would verbally support the reunification. Nevertheless, his actions would relay a different message.

This strategy was played out when Mitterrand would visit East Germany as a way of supporting its existence as well as visit President Gorbachev whose country (the Soviet Union) controlled East Germany (Cogan 2011, p. 258). Although France was hesitant towards German unification, it was just a matter of time before the two countries were reunified.

Mitterrand recognised that this would take place eventually, and was anxious for this reason that a unified Germany should be well integrated into the European Community before it was unified. The most challenging bit for France to cope with was the timing for the unification because France rather preferred a delayed reunification of the two countries though it did not have a plan for the same.

The delayed reunification was based on France’s need to keep Germany in a certain control so that Germany does not have total control of its affairs and those of the region. The French people insisted that Germany joins the Euro currency when it is formed.

The Bundesbank was an independent entity that had succeeded for a long time in controlling inflation by giving short-term interest rates thus making it a strong bank of influence within Europe. It was very independent of the government, a fact that made it a target of politicians who felt its interest rates were not appropriate (Morys 2003, p. 3).

Thus, the main challenge that this condition faced was whether Germany would abide by it and thus the uncertainties (Jabko 2010, p. 324). France had for a long time resisted American influence in Europe. Mitterrand started leaning towards forming a strong relationship with Germany thus seeking to have control of the unification so that it happens according to his terms (Fitchett 1996).

Belikins (2011) posits that the Americans supported the reunification. As France did, they opted for a slow process whose conclusion did not have timelines (p. 664). This issue was a challenge to France because it (France) hinged Germany’s reunification to some of its programs. Any uncertainties would mean uncertainties on its ambitious programs.

According to Sarrote (2011), France did not have any underlying problems with German reunification. All it did was just to follow in the path of the other leader’s opinion. France did not need to have its own opinion on the issue. (p. 258). Another challenge that France faced was during the negotiations for a unified Germany.

The then German Chancellor Helmut Kohl surprised everyone when he came out with a ten-point road map that was outside the negotiations being carried out. This case definitely threw France and other countries into a spin because that move was much unexpected and hence a challenge to France because it strived to have control of the situation. Being caught off guard was the least it expected (Ver Net 1992, p. 658).

The devaluation of the mark would surely affect the franc (outflows of capital towards Germany plus increase of German exports towards France). France rushed to create the monetary union. Jacques Delors planned it in 1988. Apart from sharing economic power with Germany, France took the move with the hope that further political integration would ensue.

Was German Reunification a Threat to Francois Mitterrand?

Francois Mitterrand had modelled France along the Gaullist policies in that he wanted to make France the superpower of Europe. In doing so, he aligned France to America and therefore became America’s ally in Europe. Francois-led France was still living in the after World War II fear. One of the biggest fears was the emergence of Germany to its pre-war capabilities.

The abilities of Germany were seen in the way the West Germany economy had been developed based on its strength that was equal to countries such as Britain and France. Mitterrand’s fears were that, if Germany was allowed to reunite, it would become even more powerful than before. Mitterrand had an ally to this case in Britain’s Margaret Thatcher who was also totally and openly opposed to the reunification of Germany.

According to Blitz(2009), Mitterrand was fearful of Germany reunification where he was quoted in lately unclassified documents as having told Thatcher that a unified Germany would be much worse that the Hitler’s Germany.(p. 9).Its enemies had not forgotten Germany’s military prowess during the war. This knowledge did not escape Mitterrand who himself fought in the war as a prisoner of it at some point.

Therefore, Mitterrand had genuine fears that Germany’s reunification was a threat that had to be controlled before it got out of control. To this fact, history was on his side. Thus, he had all the reasons to fear. Going back to the period after the First World War, European nations adopted an appeasement policy towards Germany, which had suffered war reparations disbursement as the then main aggressor.

Germany took advantage of this situation to reorganise its military for further war thus leading to the Second World War. Therefore, Mitterrand worked against chances that could lead to the same mistake that led to the Second World War. Francois Mitterrand had come up with a grand scheme of how he envisioned the construction of Europe (Sarrote 2011, p. 258).

The vision that Mitterrand had was the backbone of France’s foreign policy. France, being the major power then, did not want to cede that control to another power, or have it diluted. According to the New York Times of 7^th December 1989, Mitterrand is quoted after a meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev as saying that the reunification of Germany would pose a danger to the delicate balance in Europe (Neith 1989, p. 22).

This balance simply meant it would interfere with the already set power structures in Europe. France had cut a niche for itself as a powerhouse in Europe. Mitterrand felt that this balance was going to be disturbed by the entry of Germany, which would equally be a powerhouse.

In his address after meeting Gorbachev in Kremlin, Mitterrand stated that the unification of Germany was a danger to the European stability and that European stability was a priority (Neith, 1989, p. 22). Being the president of France, Mitterrand was individually threatened by the situation because it would water down his powers on the European stage. He therefore had to work hard to either stop or slow down the reunification.

One of Mitterrand’s goals for Europe was the integration of European countries in to a single block. This deliverable was Mitterrand’s dream as he was determined to see it materialise. This integration would be slowed down if Germany were to reunite because of the economic conditions of East Germany.

How was the French Foreign Policy Affected by the Reunification?

The reunification of Germany as it happened in the period 1989-1990 had so many ramifications to Europe because it led to the tipping of power balances in Europe. The French government was one of the most affected entities in the whole power play because of the central role it had given itself in the European affairs.

Under Francois Mitterrand, France as the biggest power in Europe then bestowed on itself the onus of setting the agenda for Europe thus entrenching it in its foreign affairs policy (Meirs 2002, p. 196).

The change in the situation led to a change in the French foreign policy, which was the backbone of Mitterrand’s approach towards the leadership of Europe. Moisi (1981) finds that French foreign policy was to be at the forefront of Europe to provide leadership as much as possible (p. 349).

This strategy had to change with the entry of a united Germany, which was going to hold sway in many matters that the French had monopolised long before. The French foreign policy had therefore to change and accommodate a unified Germany and the changes that it would come as a result.

French foreign policy up to that point was that Germany should not be reunited because it would pose a threat to the European bloc of countries. This stance however had to change because Germany became reunited and had therefore to be accorded all the full respect.

The French foreign policy on the integration of the European countries therefore had to change, with the process being done with the inclusion of a united Germany as Tiersky(1992, p. 136) reveals. German integration within Europe was the outmost priority of France prior to the reunification.

Only after releasing East Germany would the reunification happen, which would later on accommodate Germany when it becomes reunified. This policy had to change in that the reunification of Germany and the integration of Europe had to happen at the same time. France had to start viewing Germany as an equal partner with equal influence (Irondell 2008, p. 156).

This view had to happen with a change of policy about foreign matters. Before the reunification of Germany, France had a lot of say in matters to do with Germany by virtue of it being one of the four powers that controlled Germany’s sovereignty. Germany’s reunification therefore changed matters when it came to interaction between the two countries because, from then onwards, they became equals.

America too added a new dimension to the reunification equation when it started considering Germany ahead of France after a while because Germany had great financial muscles because of a strong mark. This perception however had to change after the integration of European countries into using one currency (Euro).

The reunification of Germany was just part of a domino effect taking place in Europe especially with the collapse of the Soviet Union and other communist states because it would lead to freeing up of many other states that would join an integrated Europe (Sarrote 2012).

At the same time, the European countries were moving into integration, which meant a new approach to the way things were to be handled at the foreign desk. The French foreign affairs policy was Gaullist in nature in that it put France at the centre of all European matters in terms of diplomacy as well as security.

France therefore moved its focus away from Europe and started strengthening its tie with its allies outside Europe (Belkin 2011, p. 670). It moved its influence where it could be better felt by bringing its former colonies closer to it. This influence can be seen when France moved to strengthen regimes it supported such as the Habyarimana regime in Rwanda and others in North Africa.

This movement should be noted as a search for places where it could influence without so much competition (Vernet 1992, p. 657). The French foreign policy moved from being the leader to being the member but only after integrating the European countries to form a European commission.

France changed the way it viewed other countries because it realised with time that it had lost its position as America’s most preferred ally due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, which led to the collapse of the cold war too. With this crumple, France usefulness had been diminished. Its importance on some crucial matters no longer counted. Thus, it had to reinvent itself.

According to Belkin, France moved from its approach of pushing agenda on its own to adopt a policy that would allow it to influence the European Union in driving its agenda for Europe and the world at large. The change of approach here is the hand in glove approach whereby the European Union is used to drive France’s agenda on the big stage (p.672).

How did this Development Fit in with France’s Plan to have an Integrated and Independent Europe?

France powers, though partially diminished with the entry of Germany as an alternative power, remained a force to reckon with within Europe (Irondell 2008, p. 157). To consolidate its position within Europe, it spearheaded the formation of a monetary and economic union between countries in Europe.

France led other countries to the formation of the European Commission, which brought European countries’ membership as an economic zone and an exclusive club. This strategy enabled France to retain some of its influence that was lost during the unification of Germany and the breakdown of the Soviet Union.

France was still able to instil order in Europe by waving the admission carrot to non-member countries that wished to join the union or commission. According to Schaefer (2012, p. 175), France remained one of the leading countries in Europe politically because it was still strong economically and politically.

The change in foreign policy did not therefore change much in France’s operations on the European stage because they were not drastic. The entry of Germany on to the European stage as a unified country can be viewed as having cut France’s powers to some extent. Previously, France had a so much say when it came to European matters. However, with the entry of Germany, this say became limited.

It has to do with a shared platform of power because Germany was equally powerful. France’s plan to have an integrated Europe remained on course as planned because it was able to bring many European countries under the economic commission as well as under the European Union.

This plan remained as it had been set before. It was therefore achieved. France’s change in diplomacy did not change its vision for Europe so much although it is known to have caused a change to its approach towards matters to do with Europe. Whereas it controlled everything previously, the entry of Germany led it to use its influence on other forums such as the European Union.

According to Pyeongeok (2006),France took the earliest opportunity to commit Germany to a monetary union as a way of controlling the Germans (p. 113). The German mark had become one of the strongest currencies in Europe if not on the world stage. Therefore, if allowed to continue, it would greatly undermine the French people’s efforts to call shots on matters integration.

In their smart way through their president Francois Mitterrand, the French citizens committed the Germans into entering the monetary union that would see all countries use the same currency. This strategy was in tandem with the French foreign policy of spearheading the European integration, which it was able to achieve. Although France remained economically strong, it could no longer call all the shots in Europe.

It therefore had to work with Germany in putting the European house in order. France had to start working with Germany as a partner and more so an equal collaborate (Belkin 2010, p. 178). It had to pull the Germans on its side for it to achieve anything on the European stage because Germany was very strong politically and economically and that it was able to pull strings here and there even without the input of the French.

Therefore, for France to achieve its European dream, it started working together with Germany. The Breakdown of the Soviet Union and subsequent disintegration of the communist regimes led to a shift in power from France. The entry of Eastern Europe states into the European Union further weakened France’s hold on to power because it simply empowered other nations from Eastern Europe at the expense of France.

Although France had envisioned an integrated Europe, its vision was based on the opinion that it would be at the helm and control of other countries as it used before but now in an organised manner. This issue though did not happen entirely as France had planned, but still achieved the intended result.

According to Belkin (2011), there was a shift in power when other Eastern European countries became independent to join the European Union (p. 672). The U.S, which was France’s greatest ally, also shifted its position in Europe by making new allies for strategic reasons. Previously, France was America’s best ally after the world war and during the cold war era because of France’s strategic placement on the European stage.

This link had to change because the collapse of the cold war saw a great shift in alliances with former communist countries opening up to western ideologies by moving away from communism to capitalism way of governance (Belikin 2010, p. 202). This move affected France so much because it could not be viewed anymore as the focal point in the European matters.

This perception however did not change France’s resolutions. It remained influential on the European stage. To date, France’s influence still looms large because many changes are dependent on France’s backing for them to happen. France remains one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. It therefore has veto powers to pull.

This strategy has worked well for its foreign policy because many countries in Europe would always want it to be on its side when it comes to matters on the world stage. France’s seat at the United Nations has given it enormous powers to wield on the world stage. It has thus used its powers to influence the decisions of bodies such as the United Nations as well as NATO.

This move has remained in tandem with its foreign policy of influencing the happenings on the European stage as well as on the world stage (Belkin 2010, p. 202). Although France had planned to have an independent and integrated Europe, it could not achieve all because of the power changes that happened later.

For instance, Americans started moving away from France thus acquiring new allies from the former communist regimes for strategic purposes. This strategy can be viewed as a move to undermine France resolution for a unified Europe. Brown (1983) finds that, to the Americans, a unified Europe could be too powerful as it could have a lot of influence on world matters at the expense of America (p. 6).

Therefore, America’s move to get new allies greatly undermined France’s wish for a unified Europe. France had viewed Germany’s reunification as a threat to Europe’s integration. The threat that was later to be discarded.

Germany’s reunification later played a big role in the integration of Europe and the allayed fears that it could derail it. Although Germany was to be integrated in Europe, this union was to happen later on and not immediately. However as Sarrote (2012) puts it, the success of Europe’s integration depended on Germany reunification. Europe’s integration could not work out without Germany’s involvement.

However, according to Francois Mitterrand, he had hoped to rope in Germany later (p. 76). However, as things turned out, Germany’s reunification happened together with the supposed integration of the European Union.

German’s reunification can also be seen as a blessing to France’s efforts to build a strong European community because, since Germany reunified, it has been able to take a big role on the European stage in matters to do with the integration of other European countries into the Euro zone.

Germany’s entry into the big stage came with advantages of its partnership with France in ensuring a strong and integrated Europe. Germany eased some burden off France because France was initially taking care of so many things that were a bit strenuous to it. Germany’s cooperation with France simply enabled it(France) to move forward its ideas on integration.

Once the idea was sold to Germany, it became a common purpose now for the two countries to take care (Jabko 2010, p. 321). Germany has been a partner with France on matters to do with Europe.

This collaboration should therefore be positively upheld from its reunification position. In the recent times, Germany has been at the forefront of leading the European world in terms of taking care of the financial crisis faced by other countries. Germany has been at the head during Greece financial meltdown where was looked upon to provide leadership as well as financial aid to the Greek economy.

Francois Mitterrand’s Decisions

His Opposition to German Reunification

Francois Mitterrand was opposed to German reunification because of many reasons that he only knew about because he was never explicit in his opposition to the situation. In the many times he spoke in public, he was in favour of Germany’s reunification. However, in private, he voiced his views in total opposition of the same.

Mitterrand’s opposition to Germany’s reunification can be attributed to two factors: personal pride as a French leader and outside pressure. Mitterrand as the French president had his pride in being the leader of the strongest western allied European power from where a lot of supremacy came in deciding the course of Europe (Tiersky 1992, p. 322).

Therefore, his opposition to German reunification can be attributed to his own desire for self-preservation of powers that came with being a French president. Mitterrand pursued the Gaullist policy that sought to influence the course of Europe’s progress on the world stage. He therefore took it personally to fulfil that dream, which on the other hand was being threatened by the reunification of Germany (Cogan 2011, p. 258).

Germany’s reunification would definitely tilt the balance of power to topple France from the top, which would be hurtful to the French leadership especially to Mitterrand. The second decision that made Francois Mitterrand oppose the Germany reunification was the post world war fear that almost everyone had about Germany.

Both leaders and citizens feared that a united Germany would go back to reclaim its lost territory and assume its pre-war status. The fear of Germany falling back to its Hitler days could not be ignored (Pyeongeok 2006, p. 114). This revelation explains the mortal fear that not only he had on a unified Germany but also the fear that was shared by many other European citizens.

The ability of Germany to cause chaos and destabilise the world peace was known. No world leader was ready for another world war if it was to come by Germany reunification. This position informed his decision to oppose reunification of Germany because of the threats it posed in case it was reunified.

Although the thought of Germany going back into another war can be described as alarmist to some extent and a veil for Mitterrand’s opposition to Germany’s reunification, Mitterrand nevertheless used it successfully to woo Margaret Thatcher, the British prime minister, to his side of the viewpoint.

His pursuit for Integration

Mitterrand’s pursuit for integration was meant to place France at the top of the European table to enable France to dictate the pace of Europe’s development. Mitterrand had a grand plan for Europe’s construction. He could only implement it if he was in a position to influence the political and economic arena of Europe. He designed a plan for integration so that he would tie countries in Europe to a single economic block.

From this point, he could therefore influence economic and political decisions made concerning Europe. This power led him to pursue policy of integration to the extent that he felt Germany should not be reunited then so that his policy is not derailed. America had come out as a strong country after the war. It was seen to be influencing so many matters that were then happening in Europe.

This over reliance on America for directions seemed to upset Mitterrand who prided himself of being French. He therefore mooted the idea of integration to come up with a strong European block that would control the affairs of Europe from within it. Although integration was seen to be threatened by the German reunification, it eventually happened without a hitch.

So much was Mitterrand’s pursuit of integration that he made sure it happened even after the reunification of Germany. This strategy according to the writer was more of a personal ambition than pressure from outside.

Mitterrand’s Support for Reunification

Mitterrand’s support for reunification was based on pressure from outside. Were it within his powers, Germany would not have reunified (Pyeongeok 2006, p.116). The reunification of Germany was based on so many factors held by the four powers that held Germans’ fate in their hands. The four major powers, which had a say in Germany’s sovereignty were America, Soviet Republic, Britain, and Russia.

These four countries had divided Germany between them. The three capitalist nations controlled West Germany while the Soviet Republic controlled the East Germany. Therefore, any decision on the reunification of Germany would be decided by the four countries and that any opposition to the same would be required to have a majority support of the four countries.

At the same time, he had the support of Gorbachev who was not so committed to the continued separation of Germany against the will of its people. Therefore, Mitterrand had to accept the fact and move with the tide. It can therefore be stated that Mitterrand’s decision to support the reunification of Germany was due to external pressures from what other countries were doing.

The main person who had the key to the reunification was Gorbachev because he held the reigns of East Germany. Therefore, the moment he let go East Germany, nothing could stop the reunification. Thus, it was a matter beyond Mitterrand. Although it can be concluded that it was beyond Mitterrand to accept Germany’s unification, he also had a role that he should be credited with playing (Pyeongeok 2006, p. 116).

He made sure that Germans dropped their Mark to join the use of the euro. This strategy was one of the conditions he set and agreed with Helmut Kohl who was the then Chancellor for West Germany. The initiative by Mitterrand to force Germans to drop the Mark was informed by the fact that the Mark had been used for a long time to determine the value of the Franc thus coming out as punishment on the French people.

Therefore, it can be said that the decision to support Germany’s reunification was also based on its dropping of its currency and entering the currency union that used the euro. Therefore, it was not so much support as it was further integration and control of Germany’s economic power since France had suffered from a strong deutschemark, which seemed to control the Franc.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Francois Mitterrand can be described as a smart leader who not only led his party and country for a long time but also one who left a very big impact on the politics and economy of Europe. Mitterrand had a grand plan for Europe that he hoped would make the European block the strongest political and economic block in the world.

Although he did not make it to block the reunification of Germany, he took it within his strides by accepting the inevitable and using it to achieve his dreams of having a European union. The structures for the European Union as envisaged by Mitterrand are still at work. The union has taken in with an ongoing plan of admitting new members.

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