Was the American Use of the Atomic Bomb Against Japan in 1945 the Final Act of WW2 or the Signal That the Cold War Was About to Begin

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Table of Contents

Introduction
The Use of the Atomic Bomb as the Sign of the Cold War
Another interpretation of the hypothesis
The U.S. and the Soviet Union: Sworn Friends or Sworn Enemies?
Conclusion: In Search for the Truth
Bibliography
Footnotes

Introduction

Known as one of the world’s greatest bloodbath, the World War II is also notorious for the first use of an atomic bomb as a weapon of mass destruction. As a matter of fact, restricting the amount of choices concerning the reasons that made the United States government attack Japan would be an insult to the history of the world in general and the history of the relationships between Japan and the United States in particular.

Therefore, to evaluate the reasons that guided the American government in their successful attempt at mass genocide of the residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, one must consider not only the political implications behind the actions of the U.S. government, but also the specifics of the relationships between the two states, the influence of the U.S. and Japan in the WWII, the peculiarities of the American and especially the Japanese culture, as well as the numerous details concerning the outbreak of the Cold War.¹

Despite the ace that every single piece of the existing evidence points at the fact that the United States were either intending to stress their participation I the WWII or to display their military power to the USSR, it can be assumed that the reasons behind the notorious Hiroshima and Nagasaki attack was an attempt to eliminate the slightest possibility of having the WWII going any longer, which would have necessarily appeared in Japan due to the peculiarities of the Japanese culture unless a sudden attack would have distracted them.

The Use of the Atomic Bomb as the Sign of the Cold War

Considering the arguments “pro”: the plausibility

There is no secret that there always was an element of competition in the relationships between the USSR and the USA². According to what Crockatt says, the fact that the U.S. dropped the bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to prove their economic and political world dominance is clear-cut. As Crockatt explains, the means that the U.S. chose to prove their point were predetermined by the differences in which the two states fought for their dominance.

According to Crockatt, the differences in the way that the two states envisioned their concept of power defined the specifics of the approaches that the two states undertook in order to seize the power over the economic space. While the USSR preferred to adopt a more localized approach, the USA tended to encompass the opportunities provided by the entire world, and the situation with Japan was one of these opportunities.

Because of the differences in the attitudes towards Japan, the bellicose one of the United States and the peaceful one of the Soviet Union, the attack of Hiroshima and Nagasaki triggered the start of the Cold War between the USA and the USSR, as Crockatt explains: “The Soviet Union remained neutral towards Japan and declared war only after the dropping of the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945.”³

Indeed, there are a number of facts that indicate the willingness of the USA to demonstrate its power to the USSR. There could not be a better moment for showing the military strength of the United States, since the Soviet union was clearly in the process of healing its wounds after taking part in one of the greatest bloodsheds in the world history; America, meanwhile, was not harmed in the twists and turns of war, since, first, the USA only entered the war in 1945, as the war ended, and, second, was separated from Europe by the Atlantic Ocean and, therefore, could not become another battlefield.

With that being said, the USA clearly had an opportunity to defeat the Soviet Union in their chase for the world economic dominance. The fact that the USA possessed the weapon of such power of destruction meant that the U.S. became the superior state whom the USSR would not be able to compete with: “The Soviets did not have the atom bomb, but the Americans did, and that caused insecurity.”⁴

According to the given point of view, the mere fact that the USA showed its martial potential was enough to start the Cold War⁵.

The above-mentioned viewpoint has all rights to exist; moreover, seeing how the tension in the relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union escalated after the given incident,⁶ the version of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as the pretext for starting the Cold war becomes especially plausible.⁷

It can be assumed that the USA failed to show their entire military strength in the course of the WWII, as they managed to enter the process only as the WWII was getting to an end – in contrast to the Soviet Union, which displayed its military potential to the full, and, needless to say, made a great impression on the rest of the world.

Therefore, by dropping the atomic bombs on the Japanese cities, the United States technically showed that their military power was just as huge and threatening as the one of the USSR: “Sherwin demonstrates how the US decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan frew out of the Anglo-American thinking about its use as a diplomatic tool in peacetime as well as a winning weapon in wartime.”⁸

Concerning the arguments “counter”: the doubt

To address the hypothesis concerning the assassination of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki dwellers as an attempt to introduce the dominance of the USA into the USA–USSR relationships., it is necessary to consider the latter in detail. According to Boyle, the fight for the title of the superior nation has been lasting since both empires became powerful enough⁹.

With all due respect to Boyle’s research, however, it must be admitted that his account of the specifics of the USSR policies leaves much to be desired in terms of accuracy. It seem that Boyle makes a typical mistake by considering each action of the U.S. government as the response towards the ones of the USSR.

Therefore, Boyle’s interpretation can be easily questioned, which picks the question whether the Little Boy and the Fat Man were a response to the USSR policies. Nogee’s work, on the contrary, offers much more introspective into the way in which the Soviet Union operated. Even though Nogee’s focus is on the USSR instead of its relationships with the USA, and, moreover, on the USSR of the post-WWII period, Nogee manages to capture the specifics of the state’s policy quite well.

According to Nogee, the USSR leader of the WWII era, Stalin never actually considered the United States’ demonstration of what an atomic explosion was capable of as an actual threat to the safety of Russia and the allied states.¹⁰ Moreover. Nogee makes it clear that starting a direct confrontation was more than undesirable for both states, since both the UA and the USSR were devastated after the WWII.

When considering the numerous signals that showed the start of the Cold War, one has to mention that the attack of the Japanese cities as another attempt to re-state the obvious would have been rather useless.¹¹ According to what the existing sources say, by the end of the WWII, it was clear that the Cold War was brewing and that the U.S. and the USSR were going to divide the world into their spheres of influence.¹²

The Use of the Atomic Bomb as the Signal of the End of the WWII

The idea that the USA used atomic bomb as the means to bring the WWII to an end is another common interpretation of the incident.

What speaks in favor of the hypothesis: Truman’s policy

Despite the fact that at present, the interpretations of the USA assassination of the residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki gears towards the idea that the given action can be interpreted as the attempt of the United States to declare the end of the World War II.

When talking about the reasons for the United States to attack Japan, one must specify that on the given time slot, the reins of power were quickly passed over from Franklin Delano Roosevelt to Harry S. Truman, who had no other choice but to follow the track blazed by his predecessor. Meanwhile, in accordance with to the score of the Yalta Conference, the U.S. was waiting for the USSR to enter the Pacific War.

In addition, a number of German cities were incinerated prior to the attacks of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in a vengeful attempt to make Germany feel the power of the Allies.

To make the matters worse, the testing of the A-bombs in the USA has just ended by that point, which must have brought Truman to the conclusion that threatening Japan by wiping Hiroshima and Nagasaki off the face of the earth would be a logical ending to the WWII. Dukes states in a very straightforward manner that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki helped bring the victory day closer:

The dropping of A-bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 9 August brought VJ Day more quickly than had been previously hoped and feared. There was just time for the Soviet Union to fulfil its promise of declaring war against Japan three months after VE Day.¹³

What speaks against it: the end of the War

However, there is also enough evidence that shows the opposite to the aforementioned ideas. Indeed, the link between the fact of genocide in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the end of the WWII can seem somewhat farfetched.

Another interpretation of the hypothesis

The traditional idea of seeing the USA assassination of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki dwellers as an attempt to draw the line in the WWII can also be viewed in a different light. While it can be considered that the act of dropping atomic bombs on the cities can be interpreted as the way of showing the power and influence of the USA as the state that ended the World War II, there is also a different way of interpreting the given step.

The latter, however, requires an introspective into the peculiarities of the Japanese culture. According to the existing sources, even as the outcome of a battle becomes clearly unfavorable for the Japanese, the bushido code of conduct does not allow the Japanese warriors to cease the fire and give up; on the contrary, according to the bushido principles, fighting until the last soldier falls dead is the most appropriate tactics.

Therefore, it is logical to suppose that even after Hitler’s suicide, the war would have been going on as the code of bushido dictates. While the rest of the states that the Tripartite Alliance consisted of surrendered with the leader of the Alliance having been killed, the Japanese soldiers would have been fighting until the very last of them would have fallen breathless. Therefore, the World War would have been even longer and bloodier than it was, which the rest of the world, including the USSR and the Allies, would have hardly take¹⁴n.

As history shows, culture plays great role in developing and solving international conflicts. For instance, as Kegley and Wittkopf show, cultural specifics predetermine largely the economic relationships between such states as, say, USA and China.¹⁵ The same can be applied to the conflicts between the states.

In the given case, the fact that the Japanese government would have not ceased their attempts at fighting the enemy so easily is brought to people’s attention. Indeed, according to bushido, the Japanese code of a warrior’s conduct, a soldier is supposed to fight till the end even when the opponent seems to be superior.

Therefore, it can be assumed that, unless the USA had demoralized the Japanese, the WWII would have been continuing for quite long after the surrender of Germany. As a result, the consequences of the WWII would have been even more deplorable for the Allies, as well as for Germany, Japan and Italy. While Japan would have suffered most, the rest of the states would have also driven their economical and financial resources to an absolute zero.

The U.S. and the Soviet Union: Sworn Friends or Sworn Enemies?

While the two states have been maintaining moderately friendly relationship, there has always been some kind of tension between them, as if the two were constantly trying to win over the other one. Indeed, if considering the way in which the specifics of one culture is portrayed in the other state, it becomes obvious that each of the two countries have always been trying to take over the opponent. For instance, according to English, even in mass media of each of the states, the portrayal of the other one was rather negative.¹⁶

For instance, in Russian media, the portrayal of the Capitalist USA world was far from being positive.¹⁷ The given attitude, however, had not grown into anything spectacular until the Cold War; it seemed that the two states realized that, once they clash, they might get harmed greatly; in the process.

Therefore, it can hardly be considered that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was a deliberate attempt at starting the Cold War; the U.S. should have known that, even after the WWII, the USSR would have still be able to rebuff the attack efficiently enough¹⁸.

In fact, at certain point, the development of the notorious atomic bomb was planned as a joint attempt of the USA and the USSR to enhance their influence in the world, as McCauley explains.¹⁹ The given supposition can be supported by the fact that, according to some sources, the Soviet Union was the first to come up with an idea of a hydrogen bomb.²⁰

Conclusion: In Search for the Truth

Truly, it would be wrong to believe that nowadays, more than sixty years after the WWII was ended, it is possible to reconstruct the implications behind the actions of each of the states that took part in the WWII.

However, by analyzing the factors that influenced these actions, as well as learning about the position that the U.S. took in the World War, one can possibly figure out if the action of dropping atomic bombs on Japan was the sign of the triumph of the Allies or the beginning of the Cold War. While some of the sources contradict each other, it is possible to learn the truth about the notorious Hiroshima and Nagasaki attack.

Even though the connection between Hiroshima, Nagasaki and the Cold War might seem rather loose, it is necessary to admit that by dropping the bomb on these Japanese cities, the United States have shown their military strength, which was very timely in the light of the beginning of the Cold War.

Even though there is little to no evidence showing the effect that the given action had on the U.S. reputation in the Eastern Europe, one has to admit that the Hiroshima and Nagasaki incident was rather well-timed. Indeed, considering the consequences, one has to acknowledge the fact that the U.S. has shown its military potential, therefore, making it clear to the Soviet Union that the United States were able to fend for themselves.

Meanwhile, the act of brushing millions of the Japanese off the face of the Earth could be viewed as the attempt of the American government to draw the line in the WWII and make it clear that the Allies won.²¹ Indeed, the given action can be translated as a manifestation of the end of the WWII and the fact that fascism was finally defeated.

The reasons for the American government to undertake the given measure, on the other hand, are rather obscure; since it was not Japan, but Germany who was at the helm of the Tripartite Alliance, it would have been much more logical to use Germany as the venue of their vengeful act.

The role of Japan in the WWII could not be described as the definitive one; Italy had practically similar share of influence in the Axis Pact. The choice of the location for the Little Boy and the Fat Man was sporadic, which meant that the United States was going to draw the final line in the WWII.

With that being said, it is reasonable to suggest that, even though the attack of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with an atomic bomb triggered an increase in the U.S. authority, the given effect was sporadic rather than planned; by attacking Japan, the U.S. clearly intended to show that it also had its share of the triumph that the victory triggered.

Considering the policy of the American government at the time, one must admit that the idea of bombing Japan as the means to threaten the government of the Soviet Union seems much like a last-minute choice, which would have been rather untypical of the U.S. government.

As the existing evidence says, making Japan surrender was crucial to the outcome of the WWII mostly because of the specifics of the Japanese culture; with its specific code of honor, the residents of the latter would have not seized their actions until they had lost each of their soldier. Demoralization seemed a viable strategy to adopt, which the USA did by using an atomic bomb.

Bibliography

Bell, PMH, The world since 1945, London, Hodder Arnold, 2001.

Boyle, PG, American-Soviet relations, London, Routledge, 1993.

Carlton, D and HM Levine, The Cold War debated, New York, McGraw Hill, 1988.

Crockatt, R The fifty years war: the United States and the Soviet Union in world politics, 1941-1991, London, Routledge, 2002.

Dobson, AP and S Marsh, US foreign policy since 1945, 2nd edn, London, Routledge, 2006.

Dockrill, S Advances in Cold War history (ed.), London, Palgrave, 2006.

Dockrill, S and G Hughes, Advances in Cold War history, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

Dukes, P, The superpowers. A short history, London, Routledge, 2000.

English R D, Russia and the idea of the West, New York, Columbia University Press, 2000.

Gaddis, JL, The Cold War, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 2007.

Kegley, C and ER Wittkopf, World politics: trend and transformation, 9th edn, Belmont, CA, Wadsworth, 2003.

Kennedy-Pipe, C, Russia and the world, 1917-1991, London: Arnold, 1998.

Leffler, MP and DS Painter, The origins of the Cold War (ed.), London, Routledge, 2002.

Light, M, The Soviet theory of international relations, Brighton, Wheatsheaf Books, 1988.

Lightbody, B, The Cold War, London, Routledge, 1999.

McCauley, M, The origins of the Cold War, London, Longman, 1995.

McCauley, M, Russia, America & the Cold War 1949-1991, London, Longman, 1998.

Nogee, JL and RH Donaldson, Soviet foreign policy since WW2, Oxford, Pergamon, 1984.

Painter, DS, The Cold War: an international history, London, Routledge, 2002.

Roberts, G, The Soviet Union in world politics, London, Routledge, 1999.

Stephen, EA and DG Brinkley, Rise to globalism, 8th edn, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1997.

Zubok, VM, A failed empire: the Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2007.

Footnotes

1. Carlton, D and HM Levine, The Cold War debated, New York, McGraw Hill, 1988, 4.

2. Light, M, The Soviet theory of international relations, Brighton, Wheatsheaf Books, 1988, 11.

3. R Crockatt, The fifty years war: the United States and the Soviet Union in world politics, 1941-1991, London, Routledge, 2002, 40.

4. A P Dobson and S Marsh, US foreign policy since 1945, 2nd edn, London, Routledge, 2006, p. 20.

5. Dockrill, S and G Hughes, Advances in Cold War history, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, 5.

6. Stephen, EA and DG Brinkley, Rise to globalism, 8th edn, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1997, 11.

7. Lightbody, B, The Cold War, London, Routledge, 1999, 7.

8. Leffler, MP and DS Painter, The origins of the Cold War (ed.), London, Routledge, 2002, 4.

9. Boyle, PG, American-Soviet relations, London, Routledge, 1993.

10. Nogee, JL and RH Donaldson, Soviet foreign policy since WW2, Oxford, Pergamon, 1984.

11. Zubok, VM, A failed empire: the Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2007, 19.

12. Gaddis, JL, The Cold War, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 2007, 7.

13. Dukes, P, The superpowers. A short history, London, Routledge, 2000, p. 72.

14. Dockrill, S Advances in Cold War history (ed.), London, Palgrave, 2006, 4.

15.Kegley, C and ER Wittkopf, World politics: trend and transformation, 9th edn, Belmont, CA, Wadsworth, 2003, 3.

16. English R D, Russia and the idea of the West, New York, Columbia University Press, 2000, 6.

17. Kennedy-Pipe, C, Russia and the world, 1917-1991, London: Arnold, 1998, 5.

18. McCauley, M, Russia, America & the Cold War 1949-1991, London, Longman, 1998., 9.

19. McCauley, M, The origins of the Cold War, London, Longman, 1995, 127.

20. Painter, DS, The Cold War: an international history, London, Routledge, 2002, 41.

21. Bell, PMH, The world since 1945, London, Hodder Arnold, 2001, 3.

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