US Intelligence Fault in Persian Gulf War I and II

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Table of Contents

Introduction
The US Intelligence Flaws
Combat Organization
Intelligence Planning before the Storm
The Iraq War
Conclusion
Reference

Introduction

The Persian Gulf War in 1991 was triggered by the decision by Iraq to invade Kuwait on basis that it was historically part of it. The interest of Iraq was disputed as being imperial and that the only interest was the rich oil fields Kuwait had. These could have helped Iraq effectively take control of the region considering that oil has a fetches a lot of revenue. The move aggravated the international community, since despite the deadline issued by the UN Security Council for Iraq to vacate Kuwait; Iraq did not honor it. The US led a coalition of thirty two nations among them Arab nations and some western countries. The coalition launched air attacks to demolish the Iraqi military in what was called the operation desert storm. Iraqi retaliated by launch ballistic missiles to its neighbors but still lost. The second Persian Gulf War of 2003 was more of an extension of the desert storm. Also called the Iraq war, the 2003 invasion pod Iraq was basically Britain idea as Iraq had failed to act in accordance with the directive of UN Security Council armistice terms to allow weapon inspection.

The US Intelligence Flaws

Following the operation desert storm, the US together with its coalition allies was hailed for the victory in Iraq. It was in fact regarded as the greatest military activity in history. However despite the famed accomplishments, there were some obvious intelligence faults that were evident though they were not taken seriously. In fact these mistakes could have helped evoke the second Persian Gulf War (Coia, 1995, para 4). The wartime military men noted some problems in the operations of the US intelligence systems that were backing the coalition. The commanders reported that the system’s resources ware not adequate enough to support the war at all the levels of command.

The US Marine Corps identified some crucial shortages in the US intelligence’s functional sector and hence started reviewing its system. The I Marine Expeditionary Force commandants were greatly dissatisfied by the service and support they had been receiving from the US intelligence team (Coia, 1995, para 4). Actually lacking a major resource like quality intelligence would be a great frustration to the fighters especially when the commanders were sure that the support capacity was present. So basically what was wrong with the intelligence system that could have been carried to the second gulf war? There are several flaws as will be described below

Combat Organization

essentially, the surest way of creating efficient working combination during war was to order movement only when sufficient information about the opponent’s proceeding have been obtained (Cox, 2005, p. 5). It’s very difficult for one to say that he/she can do the job when he/she is ignorant of the adversaries. Yet, obtaining this decisive information is an extremely difficult undertaking not to say impossible! Considering this in mind, what did I MEF bring to the table? The Marine Corps brought together all the aspects of intelligence into one entity referred to as surveillance, Reconnaissance and intelligence grouping (SRIG) (Coia, 1995, para 6). This was a directive from Alfred Gray, the Commandant General, whose idea was to consolidate the elements and form and organization in which intelligence assets from all over the marine forces create a unified, synergetic, vivacious collector and disseminator of intelligence.

Information operation was very essential tool in the attack (Cox, 2005, p. 5). The mission of the SRIG was among other things to offer surveillance, intelligence, and tactical trick and communication in support of the MEF commands and other backers. Better technology is one of the reasons that the US based their decision to attack. At the begriming of the desert storm, the IMEF speculative capacity to carry out the intelligence operations in the theater was very appropriate (Coia, 1995, para 8). Regardless of the fact that there was not doctrinal backing, the Marine Corps build an intelligence organization that seemed competent enough to provide reliable combat support (Hunton, 2007, p. 12). Conceptually, backing the organization would not overpower units with enormous data volumes since the MAFC was combined with multi-choice receiving information and offer the MAGTF important intelligence products. Nonetheless the commandant in the first SRIG could not possibly envisage the utter enormity of task MEF commandeer was to give him. The variables to be deal with under the combined war would make planning exceedingly difficult.

Intelligence Planning before the Storm

The US military was confident that there was a comprehensible and unmistakable plan for the intelligence schemers of the Gulf war (Hunton, 2007, p. 12). Lieutenant General Boomer believed that the greatest threat to Iraqi was corps level artillery, short range missiles and indirect fire weaponry. The likely retaliation from Iraq would be the possible release of chemical fires on ground war. G-2 was directed to build and execute collection plan founded on that guidance. The requirements that were put upon the I MEF G-2 were so overwhelming (Coia, 1995, para 12). Together with the first SRIG, they had to offer support to their commanding general demands and the needs of MEF whom were going to carry out a massive marine assault since the 1945 Okinawa battle.

The planning was too widespread for MEF G-2. These dealing with marine intelligence were enormously braved to meet the back up necessities stemming from all command levels since of the immaturely constructed SRIG organization and substantial in-theater limitations and constraints (Coia, 1995, para 14). Though enough measures were taken to correct the existing restrictions and drawbacks and MEF G-2 was then satisfying some intelligence needs by the bringing of the desert storm, momentous impediments still existed as the operations peaked when ground phase was launched.

The Iraq War

The above brief evaluation of the situation on the ground prior and during the Persian Gulf War is very critical to the US foreign policy (Hunton, 2007, p. 15). Basically the information from the US intelligence plays a big role in policy making. When it came to 2003, the US and Britain still decide to go to war with Iraq claiming that it had forfeited the US demands of allowing inspection of weapon. This comes down to the idea of having sufficient information about the enemy before making the move (Woodward, 2007, p. 56). Many of the nations that had supported the previous attacks in 1991 were basically opposed to the move but the US claimed that it had collected enough evidence that Iraq was a threat to international security.

The attacks on the US twin towers in 2001 seem to have been a player to the move. However President Bush claimed that he based his decision on the facts presented by the UD intelligence system. First, it was claimed that Iraq was attempting to make nuclear weapons; second, Iraq was building a nuclear weapon plant; third, the US would try to graft Iraq to family of nations and fourth, Iraq was used to deceiving the world (Coia, 1995, para 4).

Having failed to live up to the condition of the cease fire in desert storm, the US saw it worth to take action. Iraq was accused of giving false information to the world and that only force could reveal the truth, this was the decision by the congress. Some of the US security officer posed like the UN security personnel to obtain information from Iraq (Mandeles et al, 1996, p. 45). However, in spite of the attempt by Iraq to declare that it had no mass destruction artillery in December 2002 and the report by the UN that it had found no sign of the suspected weapons, the US still insisted on attacking (Woodward, 2007, p. 56). This was in regardless of opposition from its former allies in desert storm and with sole backing from Britain. This shows that the US intelligence failed to provide proper information about the enemy because after the war, no weapons were found after all.

The MEF operations were this time not overwhelmed by the war and demands from various commands though a lot of lives were lost on both sides. The planning of the intelligence was not competent in this case (Mandeles et al, 1996, p. 45). The expectations were extremely exaggerated to justify that attacks.

Conclusion

The Persian Gulf Wars presented the faults in the US intelligence system. The poor structure that was not responsive to the needs of the fighters – commandants and their subordinates. The testing of the operations was not sufficient. This resulted into an operation that was characterized by insufficient manning, poor training and coordination. The information environment is very important for the commanders. The decision to go the war is very important. However of more importance is the situation during the war. Poor coordination can result into devastating outcomes.

Reference

Coia, R.E. 1995. A Critical Analysis of the I MEF Intelligence Performances in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. A Report to Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Web.

Cox, L.J. 2005. Information Operations in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom—What Went Wrong? US Army School of Advanced Military Studies Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, AY 2005–06, 1–123. Web.

Hunton, C.T. 2007. The War of Ideas and the Role of Information Operations in Counter Insurgency. Monograph, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Mandeles, M.D., Hone, T & Terry, S.S. 1996. Managing “Command and Control” In the Persian Gulf War. Greenwood Publishing Group.

Woodward, B. (2007). State Of Denial: Bush at War. Simon & Schuster. New York.

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