United States Foreign Policy 1790s to 1850s

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Table of Contents

Introduction
The New Economy and why the expansion started
Expansion in The Early Years from 1770 to 1850
Relations with Native Indians and Other People
The Mexican War
References

Introduction

American History in the period of 1780 to 1850 was very turbulent. The US nation was still young and needed money to finance the American Revolution. It lacked the industrial setup and resources and still needed the support of Britain, and it was called the Atlantic economy.

The New Economy and why the expansion started

In early 1770, the US was still an ‘Under Developed Country’ with no connection with the rest of the world and no means for trade. Moreover, the distance between the US and Europe was huge, and the US was essentially isolated from the rest of the world. The American Revolution had not fundamentally altered economic relations between the UK and the US; however, radically, the political relation had altered. The Atlantic traffic of trade and migration had been only temporarily interrupted by the upheaval of the American and French Wars. Although Americans had renounced their allegiance to the British King, they could not disentangle themselves from that intricate web of relations across the ocean, which had sustained them on the new continent since the first settlements. However persistent their feud with the mother country, however, determined to insulate themselves from the European world’s slow stain, Americans were unable to withdraw into economic isolation; and they accepted whatever trading terms they could get with the British Empire. The British, for their part, having finally recognized an independent republic in North America, made the best of it by annexing the United States, along with the South American republics, to their informal trading empire. Canning’s famous proposal for a joint declaration warning the European Powers of the Atlantic world was based on a shrewd understanding of the potentialities of Anglo-American cooperation, and fitted the facts of economic strategy in the Atlantic better than the unilateral Monroe Doctrine which followed from his initiative. It was not just that without the cooperation of the Royal Navy, that Doctrine was little more than a rhetorical flourish. Old kingdom and new republic shared an unprecedented community of interests. This community of interests began with a complimentary exchange of raw materials for manufactures, which ensured that Britain and the United States should be each other’s best customers in an age when overseas trade, for the United States especially, provided the principal nourishment for economic growth. The relation was not, however, simply that of trade between two closed economies. The United Kingdom outside the normal definition of international trade: a matter, rather, of inter-regional relations within a single economy embracing the entire Atlantic basin (Reynolds, 1999).

The essential feature of this special relationship, which makes it appropriate to think in such terms, was this. The growth of the Atlantic basin was conditioned, not merely by trade, but by a flow of what economists call the factors of production across the Atlantic into more profitable relations with markets and natural resources. Capital, labor, enterprise, and technology moved west, on a vast scale, and with the unique facility, to new American land. That phenomenal twin migration of peoples and of confidence deserves more than the glancing treatment it usually receives at the hands of general historians; it is a central fact of American growth, and it relates, not merely to American, but to Atlantic expansion, to a single Atlantic economy. In the early nineteenth century, the United States was what in modern jargon would be called an “underdeveloped country,” characterized by a plenitude of land and natural resources, but lack the capital, the techniques, and, in this case, the labor to develop them. The land was rich and seemingly limitless. It could become a cornucopia of farm produce, raw cotton, and wheat, beef, and pork, such as was increasingly in demand in Western Europe where urban populations provided expanding markets for cheap clothing and provisions. But to subdue the wilderness needed more strong arms, more hatchets, knives, and clothing, more plows, machinery and hardware, better breeds of cattle, sheep, and crops, more canals and railways than Americans could command. These resources, in terms of emigrant labor, technical skills, durable and consumers’ goods, commercial credits, and long-term investment capital, had to be provided from abroad, from the more fully developed countries of Western Europe where there was a surplus of labor released from the land, technical skills, and accumulated capital ready for investment overseas. American growth was determined by the European demand for primary commodities, combined with the European supply of those resources that made their increasing production possible. The American frontier was regarded as a frontier of the European continent. The concept has economic meaning, not as a romantic “frontier” of settlement, but as the exploitation of virgin land in a single diversified, Atlantic economy (Reynolds, 1999).

In that economy, Western Europe very largely meant a rapidly industrializing Great Britain, with its demand for raw cotton, timber, and foodstuffs, its growing urban population, and its rapidly accumulating capital in the hands of risk-taking entrepreneurs. The Atlantic economy was, in fact, characterized by relations between a “metropolitan unit,” chiefly Great Britain, and a “colonial” unit, North America, chiefly the United States. Until the frontier of a settlement reached the High Plains, an informal Anglo-American partnership continued to direct the growth of the Atlantic basin if the Americans benefited from British, as well as continental aid, the British people found in North America an important means of adjusting to the conditions of modern industrial society (Reynolds 1999).

The ancient facts of economic geography continued to determine Atlantic growth. The settlement of the American interior merely shifted the field of operations westwards. The conflict between a continental and an Atlantic outlook, between the perimeter and the base, the province and the metropolis, is as old as the history of America itself. This conflict set up important tensions contributing to the American Revolution. The success of that Revolution did not remove those tensions; political control might shift from Whitehall and Westminster to Philadelphia and the Potomac, but when the United States herself began to colonize, her seaboard cities inherited the role hitherto performed by Britain. And if with emancipation from Britain, political control shifted across the Atlantic, the British by no means abdicated all their functions in this great westward movement. In the economic, and, as will be seen, to some extent in the cultural sphere, they continued to play the role of a sleeping partner (Reynolds,1999).

This partnership was between British interests and American interests of the eastern seaboard. It was, in fact, an Atlantic affair. So integrated was the Atlantic economy that it is tempting to draw the boundary between its two great regions, not at the Atlantic Ocean, but at the Appalachians. It would be inaccurate to think of the British as contributing directly to the settlement of the Mississippi Valley. Few emigrants had the temperament, capital, or skill to survive the backcountry, and the native settler’s credit and supplies were provided within the United States. But these were made available by the inflow to the eastern seaboard of British commercial credits and investment capital, of immigrant labor shipped by the agencies of British trade routes, and of British immigrant technicians. The force behind continental expansion derived from an oceanic partnership in which New York and Liverpool, Boston, and London, New England, and northern Old England, together with supplied the energy and confidence behind the westward thrust (Reynolds, 1999).

Expansion in The Early Years from 1770 to 1850

To facilitate the expansion, the US government passed two notable ordinances: Ordinance of 1785 and Ordinance of 1787 that were enacted as laws. The 1785 Ordinance allowed the survey of land in the Ohio River that was west of the Appalachian mountains, eastern Mississippi river, and southern Canada, and this was called the ‘Old Northwest,’ and sale of land was allowed. This area now covers the states of Wisconsin, Indiana, Ohio, Michigan, Minnesota, and Illinois. The second Ordinance that was passed in 1787 banned the use of slaves in the region of the North West, and the common English laws were prescribed. The government also put up conditions for making the territories into the States of the US. The government gave land free for veterans of the American Revolution and encouraged the migration of people to the West (Reynolds, 1999).

Relations with Native Indians and Other People

A number of native Indian tribes were living in the area of the North West, and the government assured them that their lands and ancestral rights would be protected. But the government was creating contradictions by encouraging people to settle in these regions, and there was a massive clash of interests. Feeling threatened, the normally warring tribes of the Indians united to form a confederation and decided to fight against the Whites. The Indians did not have gunpowder or muskets, but only bows and arrows, and they could move fast and knew the land. They succeeded in defeating the settlers on many occasions. Finally, General Anthony Wayne defeated the confederation in 1794 at the Battle of Fallen Timbers and forced the native Indians to sign the Treaty of Greenville in 1795. Large areas of the Ohio valley were opened to the settlers, and many pioneers arrived in droves. By 1809, the valley was full of these settlers. The reckless expansion farther into the new territories further strained the relations with the native Indians, who deeply resented this invasion of their lands by the Americans. They were reorganizing their warriors, and frequent skirmishes and ambushes were the order of the day, and by 1809, they were ready for another war. Some notable Shawnee warriors such as the Tecumseh and Tensketawh attempted to unite all the tribes and refuse to cede any territory to the Americans, and reject any forms of trade with the Americans. A confrontation occurred in 1811 in the village of Prophetstown between white soldiers and the native Indians. There was also a war in 1812 between the Indians and the whites, which the Indians lost and thus ended all Indian resistance in the Old Northwest regions. Tecumseh, who had used the British as allies were killed in 1813 in the Battle of the Thames. In 1814, a large force of Creeks was defeated by Andrew Jackson in Alabama at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend. By 1830, different Indian tribes such as the Cherokees, Choctaws, Seminoles, Chicksaws, and others were defeated, and their lands were seized, and the areas the was west of Mississippi were annexed. The Indians gradually adapted to the American way of life, and all resistance was gone when they were sequestered in special Indian reservation areas (Reynolds, 1999).

The Mexican War

The struggle between the United States and Mexico exposed a massive economic, social, and political chasm between two diverse cultures separated by a common border. The Americans, 20 million strong, were hard-driving, egalitarian, vigorous people. They fervently believed the ‘Manifest Destiny’ of the United States was ordained by God to stretch from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Theirs was a society based on a democracy founded on British common law, the European Enlightenment, and a secular government (Reynolds, 1999).

Pitted against this dynamic force was an older, more traditional, aristocratic society of seven million Mexicans racked by endemic factionalism and revolt. Mexico had a received religion, structured castes, and a monarchical-styled political system that was wont to pose as a democracy. It was a land divided by race, caste, and a massive economic gulf between rich landowners, with their palatial haciendas and the mass of landless peasants. There was a burgeoning nationalism among the elite and a spirit of machismo resistance to invaders among many of the people, yet among the landless and the indigenous Indians, who had little stake in the country, there was apathy and indifference (Reynolds, 1999).

American relations with Spain were often less than cordial, and Mexico’s successful battle for independence had been welcomed by its neighbor to the north. After almost 300 years of putative rule, the Spanish frontier north of the Rio Grande was sparsely settled and economically unproductive. Catholic missions in Texas had been abandoned, and the few scattered towns were inhabited by the Mestizos, the new blend of Spaniards and Indians who formed the largest race in Mexico. The curse of these Borderlands were the roaming bands of Apaches, Comanches, Kiowas, Kickapoos, and other predatory tribes, who swooped down on Mexican settlements to loot and kill. A parsimonious Spanish government offered little help against these raiders, and the succeeding Mexican authorities offered even less. In the twilight of their rule, the Spanish, viewing the wreckage of their northern frontier, where the raiding nomads had virtually depopulated Mexican settlements as far south as Chihuahua City, had what they believed to be a brilliant idea. They believed the voracious, land-hungry Americans might be encouraged to settle in Texas. Crude but tough, the Americans could create a buffer state between the barbarous tribes and northern Mexico. They would let the norteamericanos fight the raiders, while south of the Rio Grande, the Mexican states of Chihuahua, Coahuila, and Tamaulipas would prosper (Reynolds, 1999).

In 1821, impresario Steven F. Austin was given a massive land grant to bring Americans to settle. The Spaniards required only that the immigrants should accept the Catholic religion and swear allegiance to Spain. Within a few years, thousands of Americans had swarmed into the new lands, and when Mexico gained its independence in 1824, the new government allowed this influx to continue. In 1830, a government survey determined that in Texas, the Anglos outnumbered the Mexicans by four to one, and the disparity was rapidly increasing. Fearing a loss of control, in April 1830, the Mexican government ended immigration and placed heavy taxation on imports and exports in Texas. The near-bankrupt government in Mexico City also observed the growing export trade in cotton, beef, and other commodities, and saw in Texas a new source of revenue, so they sent soldiers and customs officials to the burgeoning Texas ports to collect taxes on all exports. Texan and American ship owners, who had created the trade but had no voice in the government, quickly asserted their right to smuggle. Soon their schooners sailed past Mexican customhouses, sometimes exchanging gunfire, and the increasing friction led to bloody skirmishes between Texan militia and Mexican regulars (Reynolds, 1999).

In an effort to redress grievances, Texas settlers called a convention and chose Stephen F. Austin to travel to Mexico City with proposals that they hoped would end the conflicts. After long wrangling with the Mexican government, Austin was imprisoned for treason. After two years in confinement, he was released on Christmas Day 1834 and returned to Texas. Santa Anna, now dictator of Mexico, abrogated the liberal Mexican constitution of 1824 and ordered that all Texans be disarmed. The Texans refused to give up their weapons, and clashes again broke out between the Anglo settlers and the Mexican soldiers. From 1836 until 1843, Mexican warships attempted to blockade Texas ports and strangle the young republic’s commerce. Texas retaliated by commissioning privateers. Later, they created a regular navy that wrecked Mexican seaborne trade, aided revolutionists in the Yucatan, and on occasion held Mexican Gulf Coast ports for ransom. In May 1843, the sail-driven Texan flotilla fought two sea battles against a steam-driven Mexican fleet off the port of Campeche in the Yucatan. The main strength of the Mexican fleet lay in two modern British-built steamers manned by officers of the Royal Navy on long-term leave. Many of the gunners and engine mechanics were hired British Navy veterans. When the two forces collided, it marked the first battle between sail-driven and steam-driven warships. Tactically the battles were indecisive, although the Texans had few casualties while the Mexicans suffered many dead and wounded. Like Jutland in 1916, albeit on a much smaller scale, this encounter proved to be a massive strategic victory for Texas. The Mexican fleet never again attempted to blockade the Texas coast or launch a seaborne invasion from Matamoros or Vera Cruz (Reynolds, 1999).

The growing pressure from American expansionist politicians to annex Texas was alarming Mexicans. Early in 1845, when outgoing President John Tyler signed a joint resolution by Congress to make Texas part of the American union, Mexico severed diplomatic relations. A Mexican diplomatic note warned Tyler that annexation of Texas ‘would be equivalent to a declaration of war against the Mexican Republic.’ Great Britain and France, both interested in gaining an economic foothold in the Texas Republic, attempted to foil annexation with the American Union. The British charge d’affaires in Austin, Captain Charles Elliot, proposed a compromise to the two antagonistic countries. He told the Texan president, Anson Jones, that if he concluded a treaty with Mexico pledging that Texas would never annex itself to the United States, Britain and France would pressure the Mexican government to recognize Texas’ independence. The Texan government, virtually bankrupt and tired of all the hostilities, rejected the proposal and pursued a policy seeking security in annexation (Reynolds, 1999).

In February 1845, James K. Polk was inaugurated as president. Physically frail but strong in purpose, Polk presided over a nation that was bursting at the seams. Immigrants were pouring into the country from Europe, and Americans were streaming west by the thousand to lands claimed either by the Mexicans or, in the case of Oregon, by the British. Pressure from businessmen and landless farmers demanded that the western territories be either purchased or taken by force. There were, however, obstacles. Russia was probing the west coast of North America with the intention of expanding its Alaskan possessions, but the British posed the major threat to American ambitions, with a dispute over the boundaries of the Oregon Territory that threatened conflict. In November 1845, Polk sent John M. Slidell to Mexico City with an offer to buy all Mexican lands from the Texas border to the Pacific Ocean. He offered $25,000,000. As part of the deal, the American government would also pay American citizens the claims they held against Mexico. The Americans considered this offer to be more than fair. After all, Texas had maintained its independence for a decade and the other western lands were mostly vacant except for scattered Indian tribes and American squatters. Furthermore, the Americans claimed that these lands were only nominally held by Mexico, whose government was unable to exercise any authority over them (Reynolds, 1999).

Another cause of contention between the two countries was the claims Americans had against the Mexican government. These involved incidents of arbitrary seizure of American ships in Mexican ports, confiscation of American goods by corrupt customs officials, unjust imprisonment of American citizens, and the murders of other Americans. A mediation of the claims had been heard in a Prussian court in 1838, at which time the American claimants had been awarded millions of dollars. But Mexico was bankrupt, with an unstable government which within the first quarter-century of independence had seen more than 30 different political administrations. Not surprisingly, after a few payments, Mexico defaulted on the bulk of the claims. To Mexicans, their penury was a further humiliation, and they allowed their pride to cloud their judgment of potential American military strength. Some Mexicans, perhaps blinded by national pride, felt confident that their army, more than 20,000 strong, was well enough equipped and trained to easily defeat the 7,000 American regulars who were scattered in small posts along the western frontier. This, perhaps, was the most fateful illusion of all. The issues between the two neighbors might have been solved peacefully if more reason and less passion had prevailed, but Mexican intransigence and American aggressiveness combined to lead the two nations to a war (Reynolds, 1999).

References

Reynolds, Bradley M. (1999), ‘Reynolds’ Guide to American History to 1877′, McGraw Hill College Div

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