The United Arab Emirates Success in Yemen

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Table of Contents

The General Relationship between the UAE and Yemen
Factors that led to UAE’s Success in Yemen Interventions
Contribution to the Current Theory
References

The General Relationship between the UAE and Yemen

Although the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is small in size, it has emerged as one of the most significant forces in the Middle East. Prior to 2011, the UAR had a comparatively conventional relationship with Ali Abdullah Saleh’s Sanaa regime (Clausen, 2018). Since the early 2000s, UAE’s involvement in discussions related to Yemen’s security reform increased; this led to the development of new security and military elite clustered around Saleh’s family members (Clausen, 2018). The Arab Spring uprising spread rapidly to Yemen in 2011, with several protesters emerging against Saleh’s regime (Clausen, 2018). The Yemeni Civil War took ground in 2015, with Saudi Arabia and UAE involving themselves in the war.

The UAE became part of a Saudi-led coalition, responding to calls from Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who requested military support after being ousted by the Houthi movement due to political and economic grievances. Dogan-Akkas (2021) identifies the Yemeni Civil War as an Arab Spring outcome and an element that triggered significant conflicts and disagreements among the states within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The UAE became heavily invested in intervening in the war in Yemen and made huge strides towards ending the war. When the UAE entered Yemen for intervention, its primary mission was to manage its most essential foreign policy priority. The Emirati de facto ruler and crown prince Mohammed bin Zayed decided that joining forces with its immediate neighbor would help to strengthen forces and make them stronger (Clausen, 2019). Therefore, it carved out a niche together with Saudi Arabia to achieve its end objective.

Although the UAE withdrew its forces from Yemen recently, it achieved great success in its intervention and reaped many benefits. The UAE can claim to have been successful in its intervention in Yemen because of different factors. These include establishing a solid footing in the south and learning a lot about projecting its power in a country that was marred with war (Clausen, 2019). This paper examines the factors that led to the UAE’s success in the Yemen intervention.

Factors that led to UAE’s Success in Yemen Interventions

The UAE worked hard to manage its relations with Washington and made this its a most significant priority. The Emiratis aligned with the American administration, especially on the Iran policy and the Saudi government, an approach distinguished as bandwagoning (Dogan-Akkas, 2021). Bandwagoning relates to the act of abiding by a powerful opponent’s foreign policy choices to avoid or prevent military or political clashes concerning regional affairs (Dogan-Akkas, 2021). According to Dogan-Akkas (2021), the bandwagoning approach with the US in the course of these interventions allowed UAE’s forces to take part in the global military operations and better their military influence gradually worldwide. This approach provided the UAE with an opportunity to succeed in the intervention without any potential opponent state threats. It also provided the country with a chance to reinforce its roles and ties prior to progressing to a state where it could openly publicize its conflicts with an influential neighbor state.

The UAE also used the buck-passing strategy to ensure its success in the intervention. Dogan-Akkas (2021) identifies the above-mentioned method as a deterrence approach typified by war as its default recourse. The UAE’s policymakers attained its objectives in Yemen by merchandising the underlying war conditions; this, in turn, reinforced its economic role instead of accomplishing its military coalition’s tasks. As a small power, the UAE used a great power approach to acquire a dominant power position over the intervention. The UAE also combined its economic goals and its internal power consolidation in Yemen to succeed. The country’s motivation to engage in foreign policy approaches was to acquire dominance by reinforcing Yemen’s security (Dogan-Akkas, 2021). This approach would guarantee power balance, which would, in turn, generate significant economic gains for the UAE.

Furthermore, the UAE recognized the main threats to its security convergence in Yemen. It, therefore, reinforced the main drivers of its foreign policy through the Muslim Brotherhood. The Emiratis feared the Brotherhood’s alternative blueprint and the challenges that it posed to its monarchies (Clausen, 2018). Therefore, in Yemen, the UAE put implemented systematic efforts to weaken the Islah, which was the Yemeni version of the Brotherhood and the primary partner of the Hadi government. Weakening the Islah proved successful because Islah played a crucial role in enhancing and increasing the war in Yemen (Clausen, 2018). The UAE also worked to weaken the actions of Qatar, which supported groups that were aligned with the Brotherhood, including Islah (Clausen, 2018). All the above-mentioned efforts resulted in successful interventions in Yemen.

The UAE also supported Tariq Saleh, who was the nephew of president Ali Abdullah Saleh. Abdulla Saleh was the one who led the military units that were loyal to his deceased uncle. Tariq and other Saleh members had complex relations with Islah (Clausen, 2018). Therefore, the UAE viewed the Tariq support as another tool to counter Brotherhood within the region. The UAE also viewed the Saleh clan as potential leaders in post-war Yemen. The country realized that this would be beneficial because they would be solely dependent on the UAE’s support which would symbolize the uprising’s failure.

In its intervention in Yemen, the UAE realized that it had two crucial enemies that it needed to fight. These were the Houthis and the Al-Qaeda in the Arabia Peninsula (AQAP) (Dogan-Akkas, 2021). Therefore, the UEA increased its efforts to fight these two forces and pursue peace in the region. It started doing this by creating a cessation of the Houthis’ expansion to its southern region. By doing this, the UAE ensured that it diminished the Houthis’ territorial power and control, as seen in the events that happened in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea (Clausen, 2018). Some of the UAE’s strategies to ensure success included a mix of coercive and peaceful tactics. The UAE was also determined to oppose the AQAP and the Islamic State in Yemen (ISY) (Clausen, 2018). Opposing and countering the AQAP was both a means and an end in itself. The local militias that the Emiratis mobilized to counter the AQAP became valuable tools for the country to project its power in southern Yemen. The country also successfully positioned itself as the US’s local partner in counterterrorism operations. As a result, it was successful in controlling these two state-armed groups.

Another factor that led to UAE’s successful intervention in Yemen was third-party involvement. Regan (2002) states that “If a third party agreed to enforce the terms of a peace treaty, negotiations always succeeded regardless of the initial goals, ideology, or ethnicity of the participants.” In the case of the Yemeni intervention, the UAE was the third party. Its success can be credited to the involvement of third parties in events such as coalitions and war. Many thought that after the UAE withdrew from Yemen, its intervention efforts would not be successful. However, to date, it is still apparent that the UAE had significant influence over military intervention. The UAE military intervention was catalyzed by various factors. First, the UAE made intervention efforts when the Houthis moved to the south, thus creating a firm foundation in the south (Clausen, 2019). This move proved to be more potent despite UAE’s intervention in a foreign country. Another factor that contributed to UAE’s success in Yemen was power management. The state made efforts to balance powers between states like the US and Saudi Arabia.

Contribution to the Current Theory

These episodes support the theory that the UAE was successful in its intervention in Yemen. This is because the UAE did not just use political forces to become successful but also an economic development model. This model is premised on the UAE’s position as a logistic hub for international and regional trade (Dogan-Akkas, 2021). Therefore, maritime security is of significant interest, especially in the U-shaped region surrounding the Arabian Peninsula that encompasses the Gulf of Aden, the Oman and Arabian seas, and the Persian Gulf. In Yemen, this economic development model translated to the UAE achieving massive influence over the ports and other surrounding regions on the country’s western and southern coasts. The UAE premised its strategy on its connections to the southern actors such as the Southern Transitional Council (Clausen, 2019). The Emiratis also mobilized, equipped, and trained southern militia to help counter the deadliest enemies.

Additionally, in 2019, the UAE realized that its involvement in Yemen was costlier than beneficial and that this negative ratio would worsen in the future. Therefore, in 2019, the UAE announced a partial withdrawal of its forces from Yemen (Dogan-Akkas, 2021). Despite this withdrawal, the UAE continued to maintain its presence in the south of Yemen and majorly focused on counterterrorism (Dogan-Akkas, 2021). These continued efforts to fight terrorism and war in Yemen have proven that the UAE is a powerful force that resulted in successful interventions in Yemen. The UAE had a massive influence in South Yemen and has maintained this influence despite withdrawing its forces (Dogan-Akkas, 2021). The country became skilled at mobilizing, equipping, and training local militia and using them to project and exercise its powers regionally. Although some may view UAE’s withdrawal from Yemen as a failure, this withdrawal drove its success even further.

First, this withdrawal further isolated Saudi Arabia in Yemen and increased the external pressure on the country. It also weakened the Saudi-led forces in terms of arms, resources, and skilled troops (Carvalho Pinto, 2014). It further degraded Saudi’s operational capacity to conduct effective military operations. These moves left Saudi Arabia with few options in Yemen, including to continue fighting to shift the balance of power, strengthen their counterparts before negotiating peace with the Houthis, or push the Yemeni government to sign a peace agreement with the rebels (Dogan-Akkas, 2021). Saudi Arabia, therefore, chose to push the government toward peace talks which resulted at the end of the war. Had the UAE not withdrawn from Yemen, these events would not have occurred. Contrarily, these episodes contradict Walter’s (1997) view that civil war negotiations seldom conclude in fruitful peace settlements as indicated by UAE’s withdrawal strategy coerced Saudi Arabia to initiate peace talks which, in turn, led to the Civil War’s cessation.

In conclusion, over the years, the UAE has worked hard and has risen to become one of the most respected players in war and conflict interventions. In the Yemen conflict, the UAE put in place effective strategies that drove its success. Even after its withdrawal from Yemen in 2019, the UAE continued to influence how the war in Yemen would turn out significantly. Not only did this earn the country respect and prominence, but it also placed it at the top of the hierarchy as among the most influential nations in counter-terrorism.

References

Clausen, M. L. (2019). Justifying military intervention: Yemen as a failed state. Third World Quarterly, 40(3), 488-502. Web.

Clausen, M. L. (2018). Competing for control over the state: The case of Yemen. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 29(3), 560-578. Web.

Dogan-Akkas, B. (2021). The UAE’s foreign policymaking in Yemen: From bandwagoning to buck-passing.Third World Quarterly, 42(4), 717–735. Web.

Regan, P. M. (2002). Third-party interventions and the duration of intrastate conflicts. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46(1), 55–73. Web.

Walter, B. F. (1997). The critical barrier to Civil War settlement. International Organization, 51(3), 335–364. Web.

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The United Arab Emirates Success in Yemen

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