The Sane Deep-Self View: Concept of Susan Woolf

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The sane deep-self view is a concept proposed by the philosopher Susan Wolf. The essence of this phenomenon is closely related to moral responsibility. The researcher defines criteria that allow us to determine to what extent a person is able to accept the consequences of his actions at different levels of consciousness. The concept developed by Susan Wolf reflects the relationship between free will and responsibility.

The sane deep-self view suggests that people can be guilty of an act if their will directs their behavior, and deep-self awareness adequately interacts with the outside world. Free will, although perceived by ordinary consciousness as an empirically obvious fact, the philosophical explication of this concept plunges into the depths of metaphysics. This phenomenon from the position of responsibility, according to Susan Wolf, occupies an exceptional place in the causally ordered world. It can only be the cause of events but never the consequence of anything.

The tirade, which includes the concepts of free will, responsibility, and determinism from Susan Wolf’s perspective, is a system of interrelated factors that largely influence one another (Wolf 2007). The notion of free will is central to this problematic complex, which includes two interrelated questions:

are free will and moral responsibility compatible,
whether free will and determinism are compatible (Deery 2002). These questions are constructed, with some amendments and refinements of wording, according to the

The questions are constructed with some corrections and refinements of wording according to a scheme that is in use in modern philosophical literature. Susan Wolf answers this question by saying that free will is compatible with moral responsibility; moreover, it is a necessary condition of the latter. That said, determinism, whether probabilistic or rigidly unambiguous, does not excludes the possibility of free will.

These questions and possible answers form a compact and, at the same time, fairly complete typology of alternative conceptual approaches that have emerged in this field of research. At the same time, researchers who give the same answer to the same question can draw different conclusions from their common recognition of the compatibility of the elements of the triad. Consequently, such scholars may be supporters of different concepts. The discussion between different approaches is of an abstract-academic nature only as long as the practical consequences of one or another solution to the problems are not addressed.

However, such consequences are inevitable because each theoretical concept of free will offers its own particular interpretation of the nature and content of human values and its own vision of the driving forces and mechanisms of human behavior. The latter is the source of different approaches in the development of means and methods of moral and legal education, social management, propaganda, advertising, and psychotherapy. Defects, in theory, are fraught with errors in practice, and although this connection is not always straightforward, it nevertheless serves as a real incentive to search for a true, rationally grounded (Frankfurt 1969). Thus, uniform for all concept of free will in its correlation with moral responsibility and the principle of determinism.

Responsibility is a special socio-psychological and value-normative phenomenon, the essence of which is to subordinate the motives and actions of people to the requirements of custom, morality, law, administrative or professional code. In its subjective hypostasis, it is the experience of duty or obligation before some objectively impersonal or personalized instance with spiritual authority or punitive force. According to Susan Wolf, several factors are indispensable for the imputation of responsibility to the individual and the basis for “accountability” and sanctions in case of violation of the obligations imposed on him (Wolf 2007).First, these include the principle sanctity of that person, the criteria of which may vary from community to community and from situation to situation. Second, the dependence of his decisions and actions on the individual has a great influence. In this case, the measure of responsibility is determined by the extent to which people are free from external factors in their decisions and actions.

As for freedom of action, which is a potential objective opportunity for the subject to translate into deeds his desires or imputed duties, the specified condition of responsibility, in fact, no one questions. Indeed, in force majeure circumstances, people cannot foresee and take preventive measures in order to act in accordance with their desires or obligations. This is generally recognized as a sufficient basis for absolving oneself of responsibility for the wrong acts or omissions (Aristotle and McMahon). There may also be intractable obstacles, partially restricting the individual’s freedom of action, which to some extent, reduces the responsibility for the results of the activity.

Free will is the ability of the subject to make certain decisions entirely arbitrarily without reliance on innate or acquired needs, desires, or values. According to the prevailing Susan Wolf, the denial of the reality of free will calls into question the very existence of the institution of responsibility. Behind this reasoning is the idea that recognizing the secondary nature of the human will, its decisions a consequence of some external cause, removes responsibility from the acting subject and shifts it into the causal chain. Feelings of duty, moral responsibility, guilt, approval and condemnation, experiencing objectivity, absoluteness, categoricalness of moral demand lend themselves to causal explanation. The same can be concluded about ordinary motives and feelings–the desire for wealth, power, the pursuit of happiness and pleasure.

Against the idea of free will as a condition of responsibility, there are arguments that can be reduced to several ideas. Philosophers claim that the institution of responsibility is impossible without free will, and therefore, the reality of the phenomenon of free will should be recognized – this is a logically flawed inference. Even if one accepts that predeterminism, which excludes free will, does lead to such negative consequences, this does not evidence that it is false.

Another counterargument is that the fictitiousness of free will is quite compatible with the existence and functioning of moral and legal responsibility. Moreover, in determining a subject’s responsibility for the decisions he or she makes and the acts he or she does, the factors determining behavior are usually taken into account and affect the bottom line. If one is assumed to act of free will, then their decisions are not subject to either positive or negative evaluation. Thus, the main conclusion built from the mentioned ideas is that moral consciousness is ascribed such properties and abilities that are alien to the world of natural causality.

A strong argument usually advanced against the concept of free will is a reference to determinism as a universal principle of being, which denies the place of free will as an absolutely independent principle that generates something out of nothing. Since the principle of determinism is firmly rooted in philosophy and science, the main effort of proponents of the idea of free will is not to refute determinism in general but to interpret it in a way that is compatible with this idea (Nagel 1987). In order to find a place for free will in the causal world, the concept of Susan Woolf was put forward in philosophy.

Often a, free will is seen as a kind of essential property of the individual, self-evident and reliably experienced. The commonplace reflection of moral consciousness, which does not delve into the nuances of philosophical analysis, captures the fact that a reasonable, sane person is, in principle, capable of making their decisions (Aristotle and McMahon). It does not depend on someone else’s influences or any circumstances, and in the same situation, the decisions could have been different. Introspection shows that the human self is never empty, it carries with it innate and acquired.

Attitudes are embodied in different situations in various motives, decisions, and actions. The fact that people are capable of making decisions on their own, of choosing the way of acting in this or that situation, does not mean that the choice is made freely.

The concept of the self is a special spiritual essence not included in the world’s. Determinism is not having any value preferences formed before the act of choosing. Standing above values, above good and evil, and nevertheless capable of making choices or assuming the significant things. All components of the human spirit, behavior, life activity, and interpersonal communication cannot be adequately described and explained in terms of pandering without reference to the concept of free will. It is impossible to say whether a person is guilty or not, given only the persistence of the relevant values. This explains why it often seems impossible to predict people’s tactics since decision-making depends not only on initial factors but also on a conscious and volitional analysis of the context of the situation.

Thus, the concept of free will in terms of responsibility, described by Susan Wolf, excludes deterministic human activities such as education, propaganda, and advertising. The sane deep-self view assumes a free, unprejudiced assumption of values, not excluding the total absence of supra-individual, generally meaningful criteria of good and evil. This approach looks at responsibility without neglecting morality as a regulator of interpersonal relations and as a social institution.

References

Aristotle, and John H. McMahon. 2018. The Metaphysics. Dover Publications.

Frankfurt, Harry G. 1969. Frankfurt, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.” Thatmarcusfamily. Web.

Nagel, Thomas. 1987. “Free Will.” Lauren Alpert. Web.

Deery, Osin. 2002. Notes on Harry Frankfurt and Susan Wolf. Oxford.

Wolf, Susan. 2007. “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility.” rationalites-contemporaines. Web.

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The Sane Deep-Self View: Concept of Susan Woolf

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