The Egyptian Revolution

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Table of Contents

Introduction
Before the Revolution
After the Revolution
Conclusion
Works Cited

Introduction

For 30 years, Egypt enjoyed a despicable stability under Hosni Mubarak until February 11, 2011 who, after eighteen days of mass street protests, was forced to step down unconditionally. The revolution that began on January 25th until 11th of February the same year unearthed the political and economic disparity that existed and ensured the continuity of his rule (Abu Hatab 14).

Seemingly, the revolution was a success as far as removing Mubarak from power is concerned. However, few literatures exist on the issues that led to the revolution in the first place. The research paper highlights the economic reasons such as unemployment that led to the fall of the Mubarak regime. Further, it reveals the future challenges that the current authority faces in establishing trust by the people in matters of economy.

Before the Revolution

After Anwar Sadat’s assassination, Hosni Mubarak came into power in Egypt with everyone in the country expressing optimism and trust in the new administration. In the first years of his rule, Mubarak expressed tolerance, but this was short-lived, as it culminated to an authoritarian rule. Civil rights were restricted, political rights were thrown out of the window, and there was a unilateral amendment of the party law with the repression of any vocal political opponents.

There were reports that the elections in 1990 and 1995 (Abdelhamid, and el-Baradei 37), as well as those in 2000 were altered to allow the National Democratic Party (NDP), the ruling party at the time, a simple majority in parliament. The party laws only favoured a candidate in the ruling party from running for the presidency. A state of emergency had been in existence since 1981. It prohibited strikes, mass unions, and riots in the name of national security.

Despite these restrictive regulations, Egypt experienced considerable riots and strikes in the years 2004. This was a manifest of the growing social discontent in the country (Beinin 56). The series of labour strikes continued after this period. They had a mass effect on the government, as they seemed more effective in driving a point than the calls by the opposition leaders.

The financial crisis that occurred led to mass labour unrests in the year 2010 particularly in the private sector, which had been profoundly affected. In these protests, a large number of people came out to demand their rights. This surpassed those who had assembled in the previous political protests. This signifies that the problems they had were not political but socio-economic.

When the first regime came to power after independence, it formulated strategies such as agricultural projects to improve yields and infrastructural development, as well as economic sustainability (O’Brien 14). However, successive regimes have lived short of the public expectations with revolts marking the history of the nation since independence.

Professor Kandeel, an economist and development advisor at Georgetown University, states that there was a financial and economic mismanagement of the country by the government with accumulation of the public debts and a struggling economy (1). The international community was lenient on the country with the IMF forgiving the debt owed the government in the late 1990s with the American government doing the same.

After the intervention, Egypt’s economy grew steadily between 1990 and 2009 at an average rate of 4.5% annually. Despite this growth, Kandeel claims that the beneficiaries were the wealthy people and those in power with development being unbalanced and marginal (1). He states that, before the 1990s, the nation was marked by poverty especially in the 83 million residents, and that poverty doubled since 1982.

In 2009, for example, the poverty level stood at 18 million people, which was a fifth of the population, below the poverty line with the middle class also having to struggle because of unemployment. On the other end of the line were the rich regime leaders, their associates, and rich businesspersons who constituted only a small fraction of the population, but with the most say in the government of the day (Kandeel 5).

The social problems did not develop only in the period of Mubarak’s reign, but were also evident in times of Anwar Al-Sadat and the first leader Gamel Abdel Nasser. These parties have a substantial share of blame behind the poor performance of the world’s economy and the rising standards of living. In the period of 1990 and 2009, the rate of unemployment was about 11% throughout the country. This was much higher than the reported. In the late 2010, it stood at 2.3 million people (Kandeel 6).

The returning expatriates from other Arab states, such as Tunisia, experiencing political upheavals also aggravated the riots. Kandeel goes ahead to emphasize that, since these people returning mainly from Libya could not make a living, and there was no economic activity immediately available to them, the unemployment rate was set to raise causing further upheavals in the already polarised nation (7).

In his report, Shmuel, the director of studies at the institute for policy and strategy in Herzliya, Israel, claims that deep economic unease accompanied by social discomfort led to the revolts that spread across the Arabic world including Egypt (1). He goes ahead to explain that the leadership was ailing with the withdrawal of the traditional support that the west has always provided following previous revolutions (Shmuel 8).

In the last decade, leading up to the revolution, the purchasing power of the ordinary Egyptians had been declining. The consumer peak index (CPI) rocketed and peaked in late 2008 hitting 23.6% in August of that year. The driving force included the high food prices observed (Jones et al 12). The wages and salaries of the workers however remained constant with some in the private and public sector declining and retrenchment taking place.

The rising cost of living meant that the Egyptians were not able to afford the rising cost of food. The inflation led to volatile environments with people expressing discontent at the management of the crisis by the government. The middle class slipped into low class status with those in the least class having to deal with the worst economic times of their time.

It is reported that the prevalence of absolute poverty was at 23.4% in 2008/2009 period, which was an increase from the 16.7% incidence observed in 2001/2001 (World Bank 54). This is a reversal of the gain made in the late 1990s.

The government tried to reduce the burden on the people by continually financing the food subsidy system in place already despite its being expensive. By raising the salaries of civil servants, the measures were not enough to roll back the negative effects. They served to worsen further the inflation rather than improving the purchasing power. The revolt therefore was continually gaining momentum. It only needed an incident to trigger it. This opportunity was provided in the form of the popular Arab revolt.

After the Revolution

After the president stepped down, the military (the supreme council of the armed forces) took control of the government and provided transitional rule to this Arab state with Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi taking charge. Tantawi was the defence minister whose role was to rule the country until parliamentary elections were held with the election of Egypt’s newest president.

The aims of the military council to facilitate parliamentary elections did not mention any economic reforms. It mainly consisted of people appointed by the former president. This raises the question of commitment on the part of this authority in the betterment of the living standards of the ordinary people in terms of securing employment.

The indication that the constitution was to be amended with little, if any, public or political involvement is one such factor of credibility for this authority. This is true considering that there was little room for women in the constitutional reform and the rush in which the referendum followed the proposed change thus giving little time for a consultation and public debate.

The council seemed to ignore the public, as it did not honor the protesters’ demands for the release of political prisoners or the end of the long lasting emergency law. Other issues not addressed included the lack of investigations into the murder of protesters and the amnesty demanded.

Despite the change in regime labor unrest continued with the council approving a law on the 24th of March that banned any unrest besides punishing anyone participating in them. This dimmed the gains that had seemingly been made by the revolution. There was also a growing concern on how the money allocated for transition would be used (Cassarino, and Tocci 3).

In June 2012, a candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohammed Morsi won the presidential elections beginning the struggle for power with the ruling military council. Both exhibited a power struggle with the parliament coming in the way. In August the same year, the defence minister who briefly acted as the president was forced into retirement.

This was a positive indicator for the people. The president also chose to visit China first to cement the trade collaboration to the surprise of the West. The Obama administration had previously counselled a debt of one billion dollars owed by the republic of Egypt. The cost of living is still high with an employment rate remaining high. However, people are trying to adjust in the new leadership.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the history of the popular Egypt revolt is critical to master in understanding the future for this country. Dissatisfied with existing political, social, and economic injustices in the country, and following the popular Arabic revolt, the Egyptians took to the streets demanding their rights. They inspired to make political and social changes. Their drive included the raised cost of living, the continuing political intolerance, and the feeling of betrayal by the high social class that had governed them for 30 years.

Change was achieved, but this seemed like a mirage since the resulting authority did not seem to make any favourable change. Oppression continued under this new rule with most of the promises made going unfulfilled. After the elections, the Muslim Brotherhood winner, Morsi, is yet to be tested. The economy is yet to recover with signs of rough times ahead.

Works Cited

Abdelhamid, Daisy, and Laila el-Baradei. “Reforming the Pay System for Government Employees in Egypt.” ERF Working Paper 151.149(2009): 1-41. Print.

Abdulbaki, Lisbon. “Democracy and the re- consolidation of authoritarian rule in Egypt.” Contemporary Arab Affairs 1.3(2008): 445-463. Print.

Abu Hatab, Assem “Egypt within the Framework of the Global Financial Crisis: Impact, Response and Way Forward.” IJMES 2.1(2009): 8-25. Print.

Beinin, Joel. Neo-liberal Structural Adjustment, Political Demobilization, and Neoauthoritarianism in Egypt, The Arab State and Neo-Liberal Globalization, The Restructuring of State Power in the Middle East. Ithaca: Ithaca Press, 2009. Print.

Cassarino, John, and Nicole Tocci. Rethinking the EU’s Mediterranean Policies Post-1/11, IAI Working Papers, 1106, 2011. Web.

Jones, Nemron et al. Impact of the Economic Crisis and Food and Fuel Price Volatility on Children and Women in the MENA Region. Working Paper No. 310, ODI and UNICEF, 2009. Web.

Kandeel, Amal. “Egypt at a Crossroads.” Middle East Policy 18.2(2011): 5-7. Print.

O’Brien, Perez. “An Economic Appraisal of the Egyptian Revolution.” The Journal of Development Studies 1.1(2002):14-46. Print.

Shmuel, Bar. “America’s Fading Middle East Influence.” Policy Review 1.1(2011): 23-56. Print.

World Bank. Arab Republic of Egypt Poverty Assessment Update, 2009. Web.

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