The Death of the U.S.S. Maine

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Table of Contents

Failure Analysis and Forensic Metallurgy
The Initial Investigation and Two Versions
The Second Attempt to Investigate the Case
The Third Attempt to Investigate the Case
The Final Attempt and Experiments
Conclusion
Reference

Failure Analysis and Forensic Metallurgy

One of the most mysterious events in the history of the U.S. navy was the explosion of The U.S.S. Maine in the harbor of Havana, Cuba. It happened on February 15, 1898, and had severe consequences for the country (Ross, 2002). More specifically, it led to public outrage because of the numerous victims and, consequently, the beginning of the Spanish-American war. The most significant condition, which contributed to this reaction, was the fact that The U.S.S. Maine was a 6,682-ton battleship viewed as the best among others (Ross, 2002). Meanwhile, the perception of Spain as an aggressor stemmed from the assumption that the ship was destroyed by a Spanish mine. Even though the conflict between the United States and Spain lasted only six months and resulted in the formers victory, the circumstances of the matter remained unrevealed for many years. Various investigation teams attempted to learn the truth about this occasion, but most of them fail because of the lack of expertise complemented by specific external factors presenting major obstacles in this regard.

The Initial Investigation and Two Versions

At first, the investigation team consisting of Captain William Sampson and four naval officers developed two ideas of why the explosion happened. They were a terrorist attack of Spain struggling with revolts in Cuba and a tragic accident due to mechanical problems of the ship (Ross, 2002). Nevertheless, the investigators decided that the version with a Spanish mine was more probable, and the examination of the wreckage was primarily intended for confirming this stance. Moreover, there was much pressure from citizens and the government, and the formers anger contributed to this opinion. In addition, the divers selected for the team did not have any experience in investigating similar events, and their knowledge did not allow giving a clear picture of this occasion. The gear was also limited by the technological development of the time, and they could not see farther than 18 inches (Ross, 2002). Their conclusion was based on a flap of metal from the ship painted green, which was the evidence of its belonging to it. The investigators decided that only a Spanish mine could push it with such force inwards, and this fact was sufficient for them.

The Second Attempt to Investigate the Case

The above stance was incorrect due to the limits of time and pressure, but the investigation continued only thirteen years after the explosion. The remains of the battleship were still in Cuba and supposed to be removed from the place, but the U.S. government insisted on additional examinations (Ross, 2002). The new team was led by William B. Ferguson, and their efforts were better coordinated and, therefore, more efficient than those of Sampsons officers. Thus, they started with correctly identifying the parts of the ship, taking pictures of the wreckage, and making accurate diagrams (Ross, 2002). They also found a new detail, which was a flap of steel bent inwards, which they called section 1. In this way, the team arrived at the same conclusion that a Spanish mine was the reason for the explosion. However, if Sampsons investigators were wrong because they did not have enough experience, knowledge, and gear, Ferguson and his colleagues were guided by political considerations. According to them, the acceptance of the U.S. navys failure to ensure the safety of its employees was less desirable than blaming Spain, so they did not risk claiming it.

The Third Attempt to Investigate the Case

The following attempt to investigate the explosion occurred in 1974 and was led by Hyman Rickover. In contrast to the first two teams, his employees were experienced in examining such events as the team consisted solely of engineers and researchers. In addition, they were not limited by any political restrictions and, therefore, could be more objective in their conclusions (Ross, 2002). They used all the materials gathered over the course of the two previous investigations, including photos and diagrams, and organized them in order to present a clear picture of the event. More specifically, they focused on the locations of The U.S.S. Maines parts after the explosion. Their success in accurately identifying them was sufficient for evaluating the initial two versions. Thus, they decided that the explosion of a mine was impossible because of the considerations of the wreckage and its characteristics. The reason for this conclusion was the lack of marks, which it would necessarily leave on the hull. The condition of section 1 also did not have any signs of this nature as it was smooth. Hence, their final version was the combustion of coal in the bunker.

The Final Attempt and Experiments

The final investigation was organized to eliminate the gaps in the findings of the previous group of specialists, which were connected to the absence of physical evidence concerning the elaborated version. First, they focused on recreating the events in the location known as the 6-inch reserve magazine, in which section 1 was found (Ross, 2002). It allows us to compare it with a comparable battleship, The U.S.S. Olympia, and conclude on the possibility of an internal explosion in the bulkhead wall under similar circumstances. Second, the researchers discussed it with Otto Jons, an engineer familiar with the case of The U.S.S. Maine (Ross, 2002). Third, they conducted an experiment in the hyperdynamic testing labs with other specialists, which consisted of the recreation of a small model of section 1 and manipulations in a circulating water channel (Ross, 2002). It showed that this part could be moved to the center of the battleship by rushing water rather than a mine. In this way, their results confirmed that the cause of the explosion was a tragic accident and not an explosion of a Spanish mine, as it was believed previously by other teams.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the metallurgical findings, alongside photos and other materials connected to the explosion of The U.S.S. Maine from the failure analysis happened to be sufficient for proving the cause of this case. In this way, the possibility of a terrorist attack was excluded as no evidence to support this version was found by the four teams over the history of the investigation. The first attempt made by Captain William Sampson and his officers helped formulate the possible reason for the event and provided a flap of metal painted green attributed to the battleship. The second team managed to take pictures and make accurate diagrams and find a flap of steel bent inwards, which also belonged to it. Thus, the materials were used to locate the wreckage by their followers in 1974, who came to the conclusion that the possibility of the explosion due to a Spanish mine can be excluded because of the lack of corresponding marks on the hull. Finally, the fourth team conducted scientific research and experiment and proved that the rushing water was the reason why the researchers found section 1 in the center of the ship.

Reference

Ross, R. (2002). Unsolved history: The death of The U.S.S. Maine. Discovery Channel.

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