Texas Blackout on 14 February 2021: Disaster Analysis

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Introduction

The Texas Blackout was a major power crisis suffered by the state of Texas in February 2021. It occurred during three huge winter storms that swept the US around 14th February 2021. The storms led to the worst failure of energy infrastructure, operated by the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), in the history of the state of Texas, causing food, heat, and water shortages. Between the 14th and 18th of February, ice, snow, and freezing temperatures afflicted the state.

San Antonio, Houston, and Dallas had record low temperatures at 5, 13, and -2°F, respectively (Peter & Kenneth, 2022). From February 14th through to February 16th, imposed blackouts on millions of ERCOT clients prevented measuring the actual power demand. Nonetheless, estimated electricity demands corresponded to peak demands typically experienced in a 4-hour period in August but now for 72 successive hours (Peter & Kenneth, 2022). Management efforts began on February 12 with the issuance of a disaster declaration by Governor Abbot. This was followed by a mobilization of the state’s various departments, including the Texas Military Departments, for assistance, including snow clearance for motorists who were stranded. Various other measures, including a federal emergency declaration, followed the worsening of the crisis. This paper analyses the blackout and illustrates it as one of the worst disasters in modern history.

Nature and Location of the Disaster

The blackouts were due to technological/manmade and natural causes, various technological/manmade reasons were given by the media and the state governor, while the immediate weather was the natural contributor. Some of the scapegoats that the mainstream and news headlines put the blame on include Thermal generators, wind generators, Texas inter-connection opposition, natural gas suppliers, ERCOT market rules, and the ERCOT management. While each could have their fair share of duty, none was solely responsible. It was possible to avoid some of the problems, and overall, considerable debate has been prompted on the possibility of reforms.

Systematic failure, Powerplant failure, and immediate weather have also been attributed to have caused the blackout. Most homes in Texas rarely experience low temperatures and thus are poorly insulated and have ineffective electric resistance heaters, resulting in high electricity demand. In addition, the state’s power equipment is not winterized, which makes them susceptible to long periods of cold weather. Facilities generating natural gas had fuel shortages and suffered freezing of equipment.

Initially, the state’s management attributed the power outages to renewable energy sources, pointing to the unreliability of frozen turbines. Nonetheless, only 23% of the power output of Texas is powered by wind (City of Austin Office of the City Auditor, 2021). Other energy source equipment, including natural gas power generating facilities, either had mechanical failures or were freezing were responsible. The state’s Governor would later accept that nuclear power plants, coal, and natural gas failures contributed to the blackout. The natural gas power loss accounted for five times more than the wind power loss (City of Austin Office of the City Auditor, 2021). The power loss led to the disabling of some compression that was responsible for piping gas through pipes, this led to a lack of supply to gas plants leading to more faults.

The Number of Human Casualties and Amount of Property Loss

The number of human casualties and those left vulnerable was overwhelming. At worst, around 4.5 million metered clients had power outages, including a considerable proportion of clients in certain counties around Houston, Austin, and Fort Worth (City of Austin Office of the City Auditor, 2021). The most affected by outages were in Houston, Dallas, and Austin, each accounting for over 300,000 metered clients having no power, approximately 700,000 persons in every city (City of Austin Office of the City Auditor, 2021). Before the freeze and all through, there was little communication from the state’s leaders on the preparation and overall expectations.

Resources needed to offer help were also scarce, leaving people suffering indefinitely in wait for power and even water to resume. Most Texans are reliant on electricity to heat their homes (City of Austin Office of the City Auditor, 2021). Even those with gas-fired furnaces in their homes could not use them, as most modern furnaces utilize electric controls. Manual control fireplaces and simple gas furnaces were still working; some took refuge in friends’ homes while others went to hotels or warming stations. Unsalted and unplowed roads prove challenging for persons to change locations, specifically for the elderly.

With the interruption of gas and power, many homes had temperatures fall to unsafe levels (Peter & Kenneth, 2022). Others used risky ways to heat their homes, such as indoor fires, which increased fire risks. Using gas ovens and staying warm in cars also increased carbon monoxide poisoning risk. Texas is known to have a substantial homeless population; thus, it is undoubtedly true that the storm’s impact on the population was severe and even challenging to quantify.

The Social and Economic Demographics and Vulnerabilities in the Area of the Disaster

People and communities were affected differently by the disaster. Therefore, the Texas 2021 winter storm and the ensuing blackout offer an opportunity to scrutinize the extent to which the disaster was disproportionate across diverse incomes, ethnicities, and race subpopulations. The winter storm worsened pre-existing disparities among Texans, such as inadequate resources and poor infrastructure. According to experts, low-income communities and people of color were disproportionately affected by burst pipes and blackouts (City of Austin Office of the City Auditor, 2021). This would mean they will be hit the hardest even in their journey to recovery. Additionally, it happened during the COVID-19 pandemic that disproportionately hit Latino communities.

Their recovery from the worst weather to ever hit them is coupled with the devastating COVID-19 effects. Specifically, the negative impacts include more deaths among these populations (Peter & Kenneth, 2022). The Institute for Diversity and Inclusion in Emergency Management documents that there are easily identifiable inequalities rooted in racism, entrenched in the anti-poverty mindset of the country(Peter & Kenneth, 2022). This was seen as low-income families could not stock up on essentials, afford precautions such as food or renter insurance, or even have access to transportation.

Emergency teams tried to rescue the situation, with the Federal Emergency Management Agency deploying blankets, generators, and bottled water pallets to Texans (City of Austin Office of the City Auditor, 2021). On the other hand, advocacy groups took it upon themselves to shelter the underprivileged and deliver groceries and meals to families that couldn’t afford them. More than 40 families in Austin had food delivered to them by the Austin Justice Coalition (Peter & Kenneth, 2022). The storm hit families of all ethnicities and races, with even affluent neighborhoods experiencing power outages. Low-income families and families of color were hit most as they usually do not own a car to seek temporary shelter (Peter & Kenneth, 2022). They even lack funds to help in their recovery, including hunting for groceries and food.

The Government(s) Having Jurisdictional Responsibility and Involvement in The Disaster Response and Recovery Effort

Both the federal and state governments had jurisdictional responsibility and were involved in response and recovery efforts. Texas was unprepared to respond to the winter storm as it had not adequately planned or anticipated a severe or extensive storm. While the fact that it was an exceptionally severe storm is true, inadequate preparation on the part of the state led to a disorganized and less efficient response. Additionally, the city has failed to implement multiple previous recommendations that would have led to better storm response and has also failed to prioritize community resilience and disaster preparedness historically.

Despite the challenges and shortcomings, the state and the federal government used their juridical responsibility to get involved in disaster recovery and response efforts. The state and the city of Austin assumed the National Incident Management System (NIMS), which has a standard approach to calamity and emergency response. NIMs offer a context with which to prevent, respond, recover, and prepare for disaster. The state’s emergency operations relied on the NIMS standards.

The response and recovery effort entailed the state, including the City of Austin and Travis Emergency Operations Center (EOC), getting activated on 12th February. The EOC is the hub that serves as the coordination and communication center for emergency response during hazards and emergencies. The Governor’s efforts in coordination with the city’s management and the Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM) are responsible for conducting EOC. During the storm, the EOC was overstretched as it had already been activated for about a year owing to the COVID-19 pandemic.

HSEM has multiple responsibilities regarding emergencies and disasters in the country, such as preparing, and planning for emergencies, coordinating emergency recovery and response, and educating the public regarding preparedness. The Governor, due to the overstretched nature of the resources in the county, requested the situation be declared a federal disaster. President Joe Biden declared it a Federal disaster, attracting aid and recovery efforts from all over the country.

Unique Risk Factors and Public Safety Planning Challenges Associated with The Disaster

The disaster can be associated with various public safety planning challenges and unique risk factors. Important among them is the power consumption of Texas state. The Senate passed Senate Bill 7 in 1991, introducing competition into retail and wholesale markets in ERCOT. This was to help provide the needed electrical load to the growing population. However, as the population grew, the electrical load seemed to rise higher than anticipated. The average daily growth in 2021 was 42% higher than in 2002(Peter & Kenneth, 2022). The day before, the power outages triggered by the storm recorded the greatest average daily ERCOT has ever witnessed(Peter & Kenneth, 2022). Power system peaks provide an excellent way to assess the strain of the available electricity capacity. While data showed that the peak loads experienced during the winter storm were high, they still were not the levels usually witnessed in summer(Peter & Kenneth, 2022). Nonetheless, the grid’s stability depends on demand relative to the available capacity.

In Texas, the summer anticipation peak leads to planned maintenance being carried out more in the winter when the demand is usually lower. In addition, the power system by ERCOT has been built to withstand peak loads in summer, which typically last three to four hours on any day. Nonetheless, during the winter storm for many days, there was a load spike to peak levels, which would need a different type of reserve ability.

The Involvement of Non-Profit and For-Profit Actors in The Response and Recovery Effort

Nonprofits, for-profit companies, and the community were involved in recovery efforts and offering aid. Nonprofits particularly helped in donation efforts. Among them was Mutual Aid Houston, a Black, indigenous, and colored people abolitionist who collected funds and relief aid and was overwhelmed with donations to the point that they were not collecting anymore. Other organizations included the West Street Recovery, Houseless Organization Coalition, and Houston Food Bank.

As far as the community response is concerned, community centers, local churches, and other locations offered warming stations for affected persons and requested monetary and physical donations. For-profit companies partnered with celebrities, including Reese Witherspoon and Beyoncé, to offer donation links to their followers on social media. Mather McConaughey, for example, raised $7.7 million through a virtual benefit concert: We’re Texas (City of Austin Office of the City Auditor, 2021). Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, a congresswoman, planned a fundraiser to offer water, shelter, and food to the affected Texans and, on its initial day, raised $2 million (City of Austin Office of the City Auditor, 2021). She also had a trip to Houston with volunteers to help with recovery.

The Major Planning and Policy Issues Raised

The disaster resulted in the identification of major planning and policy issues. The statewide Texas power outages indicated the electric supply’s susceptibility as a critical safety and economic function. Subsequently, major policy and planning issues have been raised. Most of these have emphasized the inadequacy of preparedness and lack of mitigation effort pointing to Texas’s unique regulatory environment. The unique regulatory environment has been faulted for inadequacy in ensuring specific procedures, such as weatherization at essential generation amenities, are carried out. The Texas electric grid is also isolated from the national grid, and thus it is excused from the regulation of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission that applies to interstate commerce.

Generally, the critical security and resilience (CISR) federal policy framework has received little attention. This non-regulatory framework offers guidance and authority for various voluntary private-public partnerships to encourage national CISR goals such as grid resilience. Failing to provide the needed attention to CISR exemplifies a lack of mitigation measures. Though the aftermath response and recovery were swift, the ensuing problems would have been avoided had the state been adequately prepared and put in place recovery efforts, such as winterizing its gas and electric systems.

The Disaster Planning the Community Had Undertaken Prior to The Incident

The state had not taken adequate planning before the disaster, this led to a disorganized and ineffectual response. The county’s disaster preparedness and planning efforts also failed to put enough measures in place to ensure enough resources, including supplies and staffing, to respond to intricate disasters such as the storm effectively. While there was a diligent response from the city staff to the disaster.

The shortcomings had the effect of leaving the staff under immense strain as they tried to address the multiple challenges faced by the county as the infrastructure failed and the storm continually intensified. Another critical failure in the city planning measures in the days leading to the disaster is inadequate communication by the city. This left residents without vital information that would have helped in their safety. Furthermore, the disaster preparedness and planning efforts were not equity-focused. Consequently, the county’s response to the storm and the blackout did not effectively serve all residents, including vulnerable populations such as homeless seniors and even people of color.

Conclusion

The county was not ready to respond to the power blackouts and the winter storms as it had not adequately planned or anticipated the widespread disaster that ensued. Moreover, there was a failure on the authority’s part to act on multiple lessons it had learned before. It had not funded or prioritized community resilience and disaster preparedness. The responses of the city to the power blackout were thus compromised. The county management faced particular issues while responding to the power blackouts, including facilities not prepared to serve as resilience hubs, warming centers, and shelters. Inadequate staffing and lack of needed supplies to effectively respond to the winter storm.

To ensure the city is effectively planned for potential storms, all previous recommendations need to be implemented in the future. In addition, policymakers, community organizations, the private sector, and response agencies must come together. They should formulate and operationalize plans to improve critical facilities’ and community organizations’ resilience. Expand the capabilities of communities to respond to disasters, nurture an environment for disaster preparedness in the community, and incentivize mitigation efforts. Other implementation plans that should be considered include expanding the utilization of inventory tracking systems. Identification of basic supplies that should be readily available, recognition of distribution and storage capabilities to hold supplies, and distinguishing of departments that offer functions that are essential to recovery measures in the county.

References

City of Austin Office of the City Auditor. (2021). Disaster preparedness the city was unprepared to respond to winter storm uri. City of Austin Office of the City Auditor, 3-5. Web.

Peter, H., & Kenneth, B. M. (2022). The texas deep freeze of february 2021: What happened and lessons learned?Rice University, 2-5. Web.

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