Solving the Problem of Free Will for Libertarianism

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Table of Contents

Introduction
Discussion
Conclusion
Reference

Introduction

Libertarians argue that people are, indeed, free. A libertarians views on free will tend to fall into one of two camps: the principle of alternate possibilities (AP) or the principle of ultimate authorship (UA). AP conceptualizes the idea that one would have acted differently. On the other hand, UA hypothesizes that when determining who should be held accountable for an actions consequences, it all depends on the individual (Mumford & Anjum, 2015). This brings about the problem of free will for libertarianism.

Discussion

The problem occurs if the focus is placed only on necessity and possibility. According to proponents of modal dualism, each modality can only take on one of these interpretations (Mumford & Anjum, 2015). Individuals implicit support for modal dualism limits their ability for free choice. This demonstrates that the AP or AU principles can be followed, but not both. In libertarianism, the tension between what is required and what is possible is expressed in the first person, which leads to two problems. For AP, a problem arises when one contends that, assuming his or her actions are required, there would be no alternative way to carry them out (Mumford & Anjum, 2015). Thus, it would appear he or she has very little control over the current circumstances, hence no AP. For UA, when the outcomes of my choices are ultimately determined by external factors, one would seem to have very little say in the matter. Hence, he or she would lack UA.

The article helps solve these two problems. In their discussion, Mumford and Anjum (2015) argue that agents may be libertarian APs and UAs while still adhering to the laws of causation. This position is plausible, as they use the paradigm of causal dispositionalism to show that distinguishing determinism from causality is possible at both the conceptual and ontological levels. However, this depends on an accurate understanding of the dispositional modality within causation. In such an instance, dispositional modality could provide a description of a phenomenon it generates but does not control. Agents would preserve their causal connection while displaying both AP and UA.

Conclusion

Overall, the free will conundrum may be solved if an understanding of causation and agency is expanded to include the dispositional modality. In fact, the causal dispositionalism paradigm would show that determinism and causality can be separated both conceptually and ontologically by having a clear understanding of the dispositional mode of causation.

Reference

Mumford, S., & Anjum, R. (2015). Freedom and control: On the modality of free will. American Philosophical Quarterly, 52(1), 1-11.

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Solving the Problem of Free Will for Libertarianism

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