Russian-Chienese Relations in Putin’s World’ by Stent

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Table of Contents

Introduction
Main body
Conclusion
References
Footnotes

Introduction

Putin’s World: Russia Against the West and with the Rest covers the topic of resurgent Russia under the leadership of its President Putin from 2000 to this day. Although the book covers multiple aspects of Putin’s policies and their importance in reinforcing Russia’s role in the world, the primary focus of the text is still on international relations. One of the central topics of the book is the Russian-Chinese relationship and its development during Putin’s years in power. The author describes the close relationship between the two countries as one of the most significant aspects of Putin’s foreign policy, reinforced by the “strong ties” between Putin and Xi Jinping.¹ The book identifies “absolute sovereignty,” economic and geopolitical cooperation, and anti-Western agenda as common points shared by Russia and China, but the omission of military collaboration, logical blunders, and historical inaccuracies diminish its overall quality.

Main body

One of the book’s most notable successes in covering Russian-Chinese relationship during Putin’s years in power is correctly identifying the common political approach shared by Russian and Chinese ruling elites. In essence, this common approach consists in similar views on the national states and their sovereignty in the contemporary world. The author takes specific care to note that Russia and China alike are “both supporters of the concept of “absolute sovereignty”.² This approach means that both countries view themselves as self-sufficient powers that participate in mutually beneficial partnerships based on purely pragmatic considerations rather than form close long-term bonds based on a shared vision. This assessment is in line with the thinking of other scholars, who point that “neither China nor Russia stands for anything more than its own narrow self-interest”.³ This approach allows them to maintain the freedom of maneuver in the increasingly turbulent international affairs without being constrained by any long-term political commitments. Thus, Putin utilizes the idea of “absolute sovereignty” to build a mutually beneficial, but still situational partnership with China, and this observation on Stent’s part finds support in the writings of other authors.

Another vital aspect of Russian-Chinese relations under Putin is the economic and geopolitical cooperation between the two countries. Increasingly tight economic ties with China allowed Putin’s Russia to partially balance its “troubled relationship with Europe and the United States”.⁴ Additionally, the two countries both have far-reaching geopolitical interests in Central Asia. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization emerged in 2001 with an explicit purpose of managing those. So far, this organization proved successful in balancing Russia’s and Chinese interests in Central Asia: while China exercises its economic power, “Russia retains predominant political influence”.⁵ Other scholars also recognize this trend toward cooperation rather than rivalry in the region. For instance, in 2014, the two countries declared their intention to unite “Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU) and the New Silk Road,” Russian and Chinese economic and geopolitical projects in Central Asia.⁶ Apparently, Putin proves able to balance China’s much stronger economy through political means. By noting this, Stent correctly identifies yet another aspect of Russian-Chinese relations under Putin: their economic and geopolitical cooperation not only in bilateral relations but in the entire region of Central Asia.

Finally, the book also offers another astute observation regarding the Russian-Chinese relationship during Putin’s years in power: the common anti-Western agenda of both countries. Challenging the globalist worldview has been the staple of Putin’s rhetoric ever since his speech in the 2007 Munich Security Conference Putin chastised the US “for its aggressive and destabilizing foreign policy” and made a case for a multipolar world without a single hegemon.⁷ Other authors have also noted Putin’s propensity to criticize the West in general and the USA in particular for the “destabilizing effect of the recent decision-making”.⁸ China under Xi Jinping has also opposed the existing “Western-dominated international political and economic order”.⁹ This opposition to the international dominance of the West is yet another common denominator shared by both countries. The common adversary makes China a “vitally important strategic ally on the global scene” for Russia, and Putin’s rhetoric seems to confirm that.¹⁰ As a result, the two leaders and their countries have a common political agenda in international relations. Pointing to this anti-western sentiment as one more factor influencing Russian-Chinese political interaction is another advantage of Stent’s book.

However, Putin’s World is not free of disadvantages either, and one of those is the author’s scant coverage of the military cooperation between Russia and China. Admittedly, the author mentions that China remains the second-largest customer of the Russian military-industrial complex, referring to the 2015 deal “to sell China Su-35S fighter jets and S-400 surface-to-air missiles”.¹¹ However, the book only mentions this fact in the section attributed to the economic ties between the two nations, as if one may reduce the military cooperation between Russian and China to purely economic interactions. The author only alludes to the common Russian-Chinese military exercises, Vostok-2018, in the last chapter, and does little to put it into historical context.¹² In contrast, Frankopan provides this context in his book, and in light of this, the exercises reveal their actual significance. They are not only the largest foreign exercise with the presence of the People’s Liberation Army but also the “biggest war games orchestrated by Moscow since 1981”.¹³ As one can see, the military cooperation between China and Putin’s Russia is unprecedented in history, and not paying it enough attention it a downside.

Another disadvantage of Stent’s book is that the author does not always follow her logic. When discussing the perspectives of cooperation between Russia and China, she notes that they are not allies in the strictest sense because of their common adherence to the concept of “absolute sovereignty.” According to her, the partnership between Putin’s Russia and Xi’s China does not involve “shared values and a commitment to a common strategy in the way NATO or the EU do”.¹⁴ This assessment, however, directly contradicts Stent’s analysis of the EU and its solidarity. When mentioning Russia’s alleged assassination of former double agent Sergey Skripal, she notes that many nations had expelled Russian diplomats suspected of spying. However, she immediately admits that “some EU members, such as Austria and Slovakia, refused to follow suit”.¹⁵ Thus, the common vision supposedly shared by the EU does not prevent its member countries from following their pragmatic interests, which means they are not that different from Russia and China pursuing practical partnerships. In this light, Stent’s emphasis on the shared vision of the US looks unsupported and unconvincing.

The last but not least of the book’s downsides is the number of historical blunders that the author could have easily avoided. An especially notable example comes in Chapter 8 when Stent discusses the historical roots of Russian mistrust toward China and the concept of the “yellow peril.” According to the author, the fear of the “yellow menace” comes from “Genghis Khan and his twelfth-century marauders imposed the Mongol yoke that oppressed the Russian people for centuries”.¹⁶ However, it is easy for everyone to learn that Mongols have only conquered Russia in the 13^th century, and this happened years after Genghis Khan’s death. Such factual blunders severely undermine the author’s credibility in the eyes of the audience and detract from the overall quality of the book, making it read as a popular brochure rather than a reliable study.

Conclusion

As one can see, Putin’s World: Russia Against the West and with the Rest, offers several valuable insights into relations between China and Putin’s Russia but is not free from serious shortcomings. The book’s author correctly identifies common approaches to the international relations practiced in both countries, such as the idea of “absolute sovereignty” and the opposition to the West. Stent is also correct in pointing that Russian and China manage to cooperate rather than compete in Central Asia, at least so far. These observations are in line with the position of other scholars of the matter. However, Stent largely ignores the military cooperation between the two nations despite the fact that it has reached unprecedented heights under Putin. Apart from that, the author’s assessment that Russia and China do not have unity of purpose while the Western alliances, such as the EU, contradicts the facts listed in the book. Finally, historical blunders on Stent’s part do not help in establishing the author’s credibility in the eyes of the audience.

References

Chang, Gordon C. “China and Russia: An Axis of Weak States.” World Affairs 176, no. 6 (2014): 17-29.
Frankopan, Peter. The New Silk Roads: The Present and Future of the World. L: Bloomsbury, 2018. Epub.
Kaczmarski, Marcin, and Witold Rodkiewicz. “Russia’s Greater Eurasia and China’s New Silk Road: Adaptation instead of Competition.” OSW Commentary 219 (2016): 1-7.
Stent, Angela. Putin’s World: Russia Against the West and with the Rest. NY: Twelve Books, 2019. Epub.
Solomentseva, Anastasia. “The ‘Rise’ of China in the Eyes of Russia: A Source of Threats or New Opportunities?” Connections 14, no. 1 (2014): 3-40.

Footnotes

Angela Stent, Putin’s World: Russia Against the West and with the Rest (NY: Twelve Books, 2019), chap. 8, Epub.
Stent, Putin’s World, chap. 8.
Gordon C. Chang, “China and Russia: An Axis of Weak States,” World Affairs 176, no. 6 (2014): 28.
Stent, Putin’s World, chap. 13.
Ibid., chap. 8.
Marcin Kaczmarski, and Witold Rodkiewicz, “Russia’s Greater Eurasia and China’s New Silk Road: Adaptation instead of Competition,” OSW Commentary 219 (2016): 2.
Stent, Putin’s World, chap. 11.
Peter Frankopan, The New Silk Roads: The Present and Future of the World (L: Bloomsbury, 2018), chap. 4, Epub.
Stent, Putin’s World, chap. 8.
Anastasia Solomentseva, “The ‘Rise’ of China in the Eyes of Russia: A Source of Threats or New Opportunities?” Connections 14, no. 1 (2014): 38.
Stent, Putin’s World, chap. 8.
Ibid., chap. 13.
Frankopan, Silk Roads, chap. 5.
Stent, Putin’s World, chap. 13.
Stent, Putin’s World, chap. 13.
Ibid., chap. 8.

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