Racial Resentment in the United States

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Table of Contents

Introduction
Presentation and Definition of Concepts
Measurement
Hypotheses
Method
Descriptive Results
Inferential Results
Discussion and Conclusion
Work Cited

Introduction

A measurement of symbolic racism developed for the American National Election Studies is the racial resentment measure. Since its creation, it has been regarded as the leading indicator of symbolic racism. It has also been referred to be the most widely used indicator of racial animosity. The three foundations of the scale are denial of continuing discrimination against African Americans, anti-black sentiment, and conviction that African Americans have not adopted the Protestant work ethic. African Americans do not uphold American norms like Protestant morality and a strong work ethic, according to the theory of racial resentment as new racism, which claims that it is less a conviction in the fundamental inadequacy of African Americans. As a result, the racial resentment scale’s declared goal was to determine whether White Americans were generally sympathetic to Black Americans.

I examine whether the relationship between racial resentment and a variety of economic policy attitudes is conditional on individuals’ income level. I find that the relationship between racial resentment and opposition to redistribution is weaker for lower-income whites than for whites with higher incomes. When it comes to redistributive preferences, economic self-interest tempers the influence of racial resentment for lower-income whites. For whites with higher incomes, however, the influence of racial resentment on redistributive preferences is significantly more enormous. This indicates that in the absence of directly benefiting from a redistributive policy, whites will oppose it if they harbor racial antipathy.

The knowledge of how racial resentment affects views toward redistribution is now more nuanced. White people who are racially resentful will always be against redistributive measures, regardless of their own economic situation. The results of this study, however, show that racial animosity influences higher-income whites’ political beliefs in addition to being present among them. Support for redistribution dwindles among middle-class and even upper-class whites when racial prejudice is still present. The impact of racial animosity on whites’ political participation rates can be very significant; therefore, it merits attention. Whites with higher incomes are also more likely to vote than their less wealthy peers.

Presentation and Definition of Concepts

Understanding white racial attitudes and how they affect political decision-making in terms of management for particular policies, politicians, and how individuals are appraised is made possible by using the concept of Racial resentment. A more subtle kind of racism called racial resentment masquerades as the conviction that Black individuals transgress American workplace morals. The foundation of racial resentment is the notion that Black people’s political and social standing is the result of the lack of structural problems.

The denial of ongoing discrimination is one issue that is frequently used to gauge racial animosity. This type of thinking completely ignores how, at the government’s insistence, institutional injustice within Black communities has been developed as a result of slavery and oppression over many decades. On the other hand, traditional racism is the viewpoint that Blacks are inferior to Whites by birth. Racial resentment demonstrates how white people transitioned from unsubtle racial discrimination to a more nuanced and covert version known as racial bitterness.

Resistance to wealth redistribution, such as welfare for the poor, has been connected to racial animosity. The level of economic disparity in the US has dramatically increased. The majority of American families have seen their wages stagnate while living costs, consumer debt, and student loan debt have increased. The majority of Americans prefer a more equitable allocation of resources, mindful of the widening gap between the wealthiest and the rest of society. However, Americans disagree on how to combat economic disparity. Some people advocate for government action to eliminate economic disparity, while others are opposed.

I start out by assuming that I can comprehend the viewpoints of people who are most hostile to redistribution. The racialization of redistributive politics must be taken into account. Opponents of equitable redistribution have frequently attempted to connect the concept of allocation to demeaning racial stereotypes for more than five decades. People of color, notably African-Americans, have frequently been portrayed as dysfunctional and unethical workers. This experience implies that the concept of redistribution itself has been segregated and that, as a result, white people who have racial hostility or resentment have grown more hostile to all government redistribution initiatives.

Measurement

Several specific measures are looked at in relation to opinions toward redistributive policies. The variables that I want to hypothesize about are black_link as my dependent variable and racial_resentment_scale; additional variables related to the economic part of the question. The first question arose asks if people support the government’s efforts to reduce economic inequality. The 2016 NES includes a further question that inquires about peoples’ opinions on whether or not the government needs to lessen economic disparities (Pollock and Edwards). These evaluations concentrate on the public’s support or opposition to the equalization principle.

Other measures concentrate on particular cases where the government can redistribute wealth. These include viewpoints on the minimum wage increase, job and money commitments, and support for initiatives that assist the desperate.

The association between choices on a non-political subject unrelated to beliefs about the scope of society and government welfare and racial animosity. More precisely, the study discovers that when college players are identified as black, racially resentful whites are more inclined to reject their obtaining money for participating in their sport. This implies that racial animosity is motivated by racial attitudes rather than attitudes toward the government or welfare programs. The items on the standard racial resentment scale do not have a high correlation with measurements of principled conservatism, according to another investigation of the scale.

Reactions to the propositions on the racial resentment scale are associated with unfair redistributive practices. Even when the assistance receivers are portrayed in the same way, people with higher degrees of racial resentment tend to think that black people on welfare are less deserving of sympathy than white benefit recipients. Similar to this, those with higher degrees of racial animosity give white applicants who are portrayed as hardworking more unemployment insurance than black applicants and give black candidates far less compensation than white applicants who are characterized as unreliable employees. Instead of equating racial effect with economic individualism, the racial resentment measure actually measures racial effect.

Income is referred to in this examination of the elements that influence redistributive preferences as a part of class-based or socioeconomic self-interest. I rely on self-reported average earnings to do this. Income serves as a somewhat crude stand-in for this idea, but it also provides insight into the realities of redistributive policies in everyday life. Generally speaking, those with higher earnings are less supportive of various redistributive initiatives.

Furthermore, there is reason to suspect that this hostility to redistribution is not merely a result of principled conservatism or moral individualism that just so happens to coincide with racist laws. Even when whites embrace the idea that everyone should put in hard work and sustain themselves independently of the government, these individuals usually are more likely to show antipathy against black welfare claimants than white ones. The lack of a strong correlation between measures of fundamental conservatism and racial resentment suggests that the standard measure of racial resentment is actually reflecting levels of racial antipathy rather than confounding racial hostility with fundamental conservatism.

Together, the research shows how racial animosity has a significant impact on American politics in general and on redistribution preferences in particular. So, on the surface, it could appear that the racist redistribution narrative has succeeded in what it set out to do. However, it is essential to keep in mind that the association between redistributive preferences and racial animosity may have broader and bolder implications. The consequence is that both more and less wealthy persons’ preferences for redistribution will be influenced by racial prejudice.

Hypotheses

The null hypothesis claims that racial resentment does not play a part in how life is affected by what happens to blacks. This study investigates if racial animosity and hostility to egalitarian redistribution are related. It also looks at whether people with relatively greater earnings are more likely to harbor racial hatred and oppose redistribution. However, this strategy makes the assumption that there are enough people with racial resentment across all economic levels to produce valid results. Of course, numerous reports of racist views have focused emphasis on people who are considered to be working class or have lower incomes. The more wealthy are less likely to harbor racial animosity, which has garnered less attention. Some may question if the wealthy are likely to have such beliefs.

Another notion is that opinions toward the redistribution principle and racial resentment are related. Although most people would prefer a society with less economic disparity, some of them continue to vehemently oppose redistributive laws that could achieve this goal due to racial hostility. I investigate the impact of racial resentment on resistance to the redistribution concept as a way to test my assumption. More precisely, I investigate whether whites with substantially higher earnings will be more affected by racial animosity since economic self-interest will not operate as a cross-pressure.

There is no question that redistributive policies have become associated with racism in the eyes of many citizens, despite the fact that it is still difficult to pinpoint the exact impact of discourse connecting redistribution to racial animus. A consistent, underlying perspective that serves as the foundation for evaluative judgments is racial resentment. It is frequently predicated on the idea that systematic racism is mainly caused by variations in work ethics and that African-Americans no longer experience significant discrimination. With this point of view, whites believe that African-Americans petition the public for special privileges and that government redistribution schemes reward the unqualified for their lack of work. So it seems to reason that the impact of racial prejudice on opinions of programs for the poor is well supported.

Method

The NES is appropriate for the study’s goals since it asks questions about opinions toward income distribution, racial animosity, and personal redistributive policies. Additionally, it includes specific questions about redistributive policies spanning several study years, allowing me to examine the link over time between racial resentment and sentiments toward redistribution (Pollock and Edwards). I use personal wealth and cultural politics as the two leading independent variables to investigate the conditional impact of racial resentment on economic and political priorities.

To answer the main question, I divided the income variable into three groups: low, middle, and high, and then computed the mean difference of racial animosity for each category. The total mean of racial animosity was 0.61 (sd = 0.27) for reduced individuals (under $5,000-$34,999), 0.59 (sd = 0.28) for middle-income individuals (between $35,000 and $79,999), and 0.54 (sd = 0.29) for high-income individuals (between $80,000 and $250,000. Although the increased group’s average is marginally lower than the others, there is minimal variation between the three groups; throughout all income levels, there is racial animosity.

Support for Redistribution

One of the groups most likely to support economic measures that would redistribute wealth is Whites with higher incomes and lower levels of racial anger. Conversely, whites who hold more racial animosity show a propensity to be against redistribution. This shows that their opposition to egalitarianism is motivated by racial hostility. African-Americans are thought to be less dedicated to great labor and just need to strive harder if they want a higher standard of living, according to racially resentful whites. This idea appears to be the foundation of their aversion to redistribution.

Descriptive Results

The null hypothesis was refuted during the study since the connections between these phenomena are apparent and are shown across the research. The impact of racial resentment is more significant for more prosperous people in comparison to their less advantaged peers when it refers to the government guaranteeing jobs and good quality of living. In all three NES waves, the association coefficient is negative; however, it was only significant in 2016.

However, compared to previous years, racial resentment had a more noticeable impact in 2012. This is consistent with a tendency that was observed in the area of help to the poor, where lower-income whites’ racial animosity was likewise more pronounced in 2012 than in previous years. Although the exact cause of this pattern’s emergence for two distinct redistributive policy preferences in 2012 remains unknown, I believe it may be connected to the racial spillover effect seen under the Obama administration. White responses to the country’s first black president at the time led to the racialization of even non-racial matters.

Income affects how racial anger manifests itself; racial animosity has a significant impact on support for raising the minimum wage among people with higher salaries. This pattern is noteworthy in part because all workers, irrespective of race, are impacted by the minimum wage. In comparison to other redistributive measures like help for the needy, it is also a less racially biased strategy. Whites who are wealthier nonetheless experience racial resentment to a greater extent. This research confirms a crucial lesson regarding the circumstances under which racial animosity is most likely to have a significant impact. When racially angry persons have greater access to resources and do not see a significant direct return from a progressive taxation policy, racial resentment is likely to be most influential.

Inferential Results

It is clear that racial animosity and money correlate; the marginal impact of racial animus by income is plotted in the figure below to show how these two variables are related. Racial anger has minimal impact on low-income people. For residents at the lowest end of the income spectrum, the dashed line depicting an impact size of zero lies within the coefficient of determination. This suggests that economic self-interest is at play; raising the salaries of lower-income people would be financially advantageous. In contrast, people with comparatively greater earnings are far more affected by racial prejudice. Those with higher incomes are particularly affected by racial prejudice. This is what one could anticipate if racial influences and economic self-interest both had an impact on people’s opinions regarding redistribution.

*Figure. Effect of Racial Resentment on Support for Redistribution.*

The only way to assist residents in avoiding financial difficulty is through programs that assist those living in poverty. Government-backed job assurances also offer a way to make sure that people avoid unemployment and poverty by finding employment. A modern revival of this concept is offered through pilot job guarantee initiatives in places with high unemployment levels. This form of regulation would, in theory, apply to all people, regardless of color. One could anticipate that racial resentment would be connected to opposition to this strategy if the distribution of wealth has become as racially tinged as some.

However, as suggested by the hypothesis, one may also anticipate that the impact of racial animosity could differ depending on a person’s economic consciousness. Racial resentment may affect higher-income individuals more than lower-income individuals, who may face greater employment volatility because they may feel more comfortable with their job security.

Discussion and Conclusion

In this analysis, I confirm that racial animosity is invariably associated with opposition to a range of redistributive measures. This includes the historically racialized provision of aid to the needy. It also contains widely favored measures like raising the minimum wage and ensuring job security. Resentment over governmental attempts to redistribute income is also associated with racism. Furthermore, I discover that those with higher incomes consistently choose redistributive policies that are more strongly influenced by racial anger than people with lower incomes. This has held true for numerous years and various redistributive strategies.

First, there is evidence that racial anger can be cross-pressured by economic self-interest. Whites with lesser incomes may still harbor racial prejudice, but in particular situations, this prejudice has less of an impact. This might point to a cynical approach to overcoming racial divides: avoid talking about racial concerns and concentrate on economic matters that can unite people of various racial backgrounds. The analysis’s second discovery, however, may likely refute that idea. The second realization is that racial resentment in white people may become unchecked if they are not in a position to gain from redistribution. Whites with higher incomes who oppose redistributive measures do so for reasons other than just promoting their own economic self-interest.

All of this emphasizes how challenging it will be to reduce economic disparity in the United States as long as racial tensions and political climate remain prominent. When redistributive programs first became popular, the race was far less of a factor in most white Americans’ views due to the political climate. In this background, white Americans perceived these programs as redistributing resources from a small number of wealthy people to a large number of people who, like themselves, have limited resources. However, after initiatives to increase African-Americans’ availability to redistribution of wealth programs, rhetorical initiatives painted them as unworthy of this accessibility.

Work Cited

Pollock, Philip B., and Barry C. Edwards. An IBM SPSS Companion to Political Analysis: Sixth Edition. Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications, 2003.

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