Private and Public Property

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Property is mostly regarded as any physical or insubstantial entity that is possessed by an individual or jointly by a certain community. “Depending on the nature of the property, an owner of property has the right to consume, sell, rent, mortgage, transfer, exchange or destroy their property, and/or to exclude others from doing these things” (Kirzner, 2006). Most philosophers classify property into two (private and public). Private property is the type of property possessed by legal individuals or business bodies. It is also important to note that this is not like personal possessions owned by an individual. On the other hand, public property is the type of property mostly owned by governments or the public which is available for all. As shown by Kirzner (2006) though, “freedom of philosophy can be summed up in two words that are private property”. He says “respect for private property entails other features of a liberal capitalist society; liberty, rule of law, and strict limits on government power” (Kirzner, 2006).

In an article by Arneson (1991), Locker further expounds on the issue of property by putting it in the context of an unmarried person. He says private property is superfluous, in the event it makes public property an opposition in terms. The author says the word public property is non inclusive and incoherent. The main reason for this, he says, is that property which can be exploited by anybody should not be regarded to as property because collectiveness can’t own. Arneson (1991) says “to call it property when it does not function as such is to subvert the concept into something that induces rather than averts conflict. What is typically called public property is actually de facto private property”. The author is of the opinion that property should only be private which means the public is supposed to do anything they wish except harming others in non compliant ways. This the author puts in the context of self ownership/self benefit which constitutes a disparagement of the theories that talk about property. Central to his argument, the author actually tries to present an incomplete explanation of the self ownership principle. In explaining this, he includes its harmony with particular weight on the insinuations for the rationalization of private property possession.

Sanders (1987) on the other hand asserts that all theories dealing with the behaviors of people either individually or communally are expected to touch on the issue of property. Many theories can either be more or less precise on the issue of property and some can even ignore this subject for certain logical purposes. “Even though they may successfully avoid making particular assumptions or pronouncements about property, these theories are likely to have strong implications for our understanding of it” (Sanders, 1987).

According to Arneson, “self-ownership is the moral principle that one ought to be left free to do whatever one chooses so long as, non-consenting other persons are not thereby harmed, in specified ways”. This principle as explained by Arneson is introduction for a tradition involving political liberalization that starts with Locke and ends with Nozick. Arneson clarifies this principle when he contrasts it with a principle of self benefit. He also develops its insinuation for necessary private-property possession. Again these insinuations are not sufficient than are supposed to be. Arneson (1991) explains that, “the principle is indeterminate in ways that undermine its claim to adequacy”.

In the first part the author concentrates on bearing in mind alternatives of two or three-person state of nature scenes. Here he imagines people staying in an area lacking governance or any sort of developed communal authority. At first, a supposition is done on the fact that land is plentiful, not in short supply. Arneson explains that, his intend is to talk about the issue of self ownership in a sympathetic approach. He goes further and says he wants to explain the idea “in the hope that understanding the elusive idea better will help criticize it more effectively and assess it more definitively” (Arneson, 1991). In the second part, the author concentrates on working out the insinuations of the self ownership principle by contrasting it with self benefit principles. In this regard, Arneson states that “moral rules should be so constructed that, if the rules are obeyed, the acts of each person benefit or harm only himself, except as he himself chooses to confer or exchange the benefits of his acts” (Arneson, 1991). Here it is evident that the two principles give way to disagreeing insinuations in regard to justifiable property possession.

This principle is applicable only to certain instances of liberty and not in maximizing utility. This is evidence that it emphasizes on self ownership which is different from utilitarianism and self interest concepts in utility maximization. The author explains this by saying, self ownership is not that he has all the rights over his body as will be favorable to the long run maximizing of his own utility, “nor that he has such rights over his body as he would have agreed to, along with others, in a hypothetical bargaining situation, in which each agent is striving to maximize her own long-run utility” (Arneson, 1991). In regard to this position, its appreciation can be easily done if the focus is shifted to the anti-paternalist insinuation of self ownership principles. The author says in self ownership, he has moral rights to behave voluntarily even in manners having devastating expectable results for his own welfare. He goes further to explain that, other people concerned with his plight do not have any moral right of restricting his liberty of engagement in such behavior. This he says also applies to situations in which his right to conduct himself in self destructive ways is a right he would have decided to renounce, as a lucid contractor, for the purpose of his utility maximization.

On the other hand the author asserts that in the Lockean tradition, “each person has the right not to be harmed by others (in specified ways) without prior consent, in a range of cases, or without full compensation in another range of cases” (Arneson, 1991).

In regard to property, Arneson comes up with an interesting explanation based on “harm to others”. He states that “negative psychic externalities do not count as harm unless either the actions that cause them are maliciously motivated or fall under the headings of invasion of privacy or public indecency” (Arneson, 1991). In this sense, the author uses Nozick’s example of a person recording another person’s bedroom actions without his knowledge or consent. This person goes ahead to display the pictures publicly. On this issue the author tries to show that private-property offers relief on unnecessary psychic externalities.

The writer also looks into the matter of “asymmetric treatment of positive and negative externalities. By this he brings forth the idea of public “goods and bads”. He says a good is public to the degree that consumption is non rival for all members” (Arneson, 1991). He explains that the exclusion of an individual from consuming it is unfeasible as long as any individual member of the public is involved in the consumption of the good. He goes further to say all members are supposed to consume the good equally. “The intuition here is that if a public good is being supplied, an extra consumer of it always leaves none the less for others to consume, so that act of consumption cannot plausibly be thought to harm anybody” (Anderson, 1991). The most significant point on public property then is that consuming it is non rival.

The writer also explains that the kind of hurts brought about by reasonable rivalry is not harmful. However, he says the principle of self ownership together with its harmony do not suggest in which circumstances, an individual’s right of non-harm must carry the effect of compensation subsequently. This is as illustrated from the conditions where it should assume the appearance of this right devoid of an individual’s prior approval.

In the last parts of the journal the author talks about self ownership and property possession. He expounds on the issue of self ownership together with its harmony for justification of property owning. He says “land is abundant; land is scarce and there will be many successive generations of persons all of whom have rights that must be considered” (Arneson, 1991). He starts by explaining a state-of-nature scene where the self owning principle and its harmony is assumed as applicable and no one in the beginning possesses extra rights over any other person to any meticulous piece of earth. The writer also shows that “appropriation of a piece of the earth is permissible in circumstances of scarcity only if non-appropriators are appropriately compensated for the lost opportunity to appropriate that piece” (Arneson, 1991). He also explains that, in scarcity, any individual appropriating a section of the earth making it private will harm other people. These are people who could have gained from using this section. In this sense he means the type of self owning is supposed to be public and not private owning.

Sanders, also has a say on the theory of property ownership (Lockean theory); he explains that this theory is based on 2 dissimilar lines of dispute. This he says later converges into individualistic right for the acquisition and keeping of property. He asserts that, the meeting point is critical. “The convergence forms a complex argument that yields the conclusions in question, conclusions that neither argument alone could support” (Sanders, 1987). The theory explained by Locke shows that the very intricate argument yielding the rights also brings forth restrictions on what an individual may obtain and retain. This he says comes to be especially significant. Conversely, this author tends to turn his concentration on the theological and practical kind of argument.

Theologically, he argues that “God created mankind and because of this it is clear evidence that it is Gods will that mankind should exist. If mankind is to continue existing however, certain conditions must be met” (Sanders, 1987). When creating nature Sanders says He (God) made the means for a human being of fulfilling the divine-will as made apparent. The author goes further and states that if human beings are to gain from nature, they can only benefit individually. If they are to flourish he says nature must be accessed by individualistic use and this is the part that introduces private property.

The author is of the idea that God created everybody equal as He did not create others to be persons in charge of others. To him, God created everybody with every right and accountability to supplement his or her own well-being. As shown by the author it is true that God created every person with his/her own body which means He gave everybody a justifiable maintenance to the labor of the body. “If one takes what is one’s own and exercises it upon or mixes it with God’s general gift to mankind (nature), one does only what gods wills (Sanders, 1987). He also articulates that human beings cannot possibly flourish unless individuals prosper and these ones can only do so when they get the direct right to use God’s means to survive. As much as the Lockean theory on property is not that much intertwined with theology, he felt this was the best way to add an important strand to the theory.

An interesting bit of complication is introduced in the theory when the author employs the move towards justice in the acquiring of property. As shown by Sanders, “ownership of property originates from one’s mixing of labor with that property” (Sanders, 1987). In this theory, it seems a naïve explanation might show that developing property embodies total ownership of the property. A principle (Locke’s provisio), is introduced here which is aimed at taking care of the idea that a misappropriation should leave “enough and as good left in common for others. One version of the provisio, if applied consistently would make all past appropriations disallowed once a single person’s situations were worsened by an appropriation” (Sanders, 1987). Generally this principle depends on how severely the proviso is understood. He further asks “whether persons in this world where there are no more accessible and useful un-owned objects are indeed worsened, citing numerous empirical considerations favoring private property vis-à-vis its satisfaction of the proviso” (Sanders, 1987).

Further ahead, the writer is of the idea that human beings in this era have property rights in nature and specifically earth. However the author portrays to us the fact that this property will still be needed by people in future, “whose currently nonexistent members cannot ask us to protect their interests. Clearly present property rights are morally significant. But how can fundamental interests of future persons possibly be weighed against current fundamental rights?” (Sanders 1987) This query is of instantaneous significance. Present environmental laws frequently limit people’s rights to build up property and make use of resources. However a number of theories show that this is an easy question; since rights possess an extraordinary moral position. “Claims based on rights simply trump claims of need, utility, or interest” (Sanders, 1987).

Even if the property theory shown by Arneson and Sanders is unquestionably significant, nobody appears to agree on precisely what he was trying to put across. Many criticize his uncertainty. On the other hand those who agree with him have interpreted the theory in noticeably different ways. Evidently, it is not easy to come up with the interpretation of the Locke’s property theory in order to effectually end the controversy. Conversely, the uncertainty in this theory does not imply that it is deficient in significant insights. In fact the theory has a very strong significant insight based on unilateral appropriation. This is the idea that “individuals can do on their own to establish rights over natural resources that others have a moral duty to respect” (Arneson, 1991).

In the part by Sanders, the theory was evidently written in theological terms. Argument on the Christian aspect of the Lockean theory is of late very popular although the characteristics of this theory can be deduced as somewhat metaphorically. This is the reason why a lot of theorists tend to put them aside. Therefore, if this theory is to become pertinent in the current pluralistic community a secular account of the theory must be found.

Given the weight and debate over the theory of unilateral appropriation, it is important to interpret the variety of theories which have been coined out of it. These have been initiated to try justifying private property rights. Anybody who claims to disprove the appropriation centered justifiability of property rights should attend to every potentially applicable edition of it. As a matter of fact this is not the first writer to talk about the appropriation of property. But still he uses this to say property rights encompass moral fastening constraints over others. Once more, it evidently has superior weight over any social environment whatsoever. The writer’s argument has had massive authority making it an opening spot for about all discussions on the justifiability of the appropriation of property rights.

Reference list

Arneson, Richard. Lockean Self-Ownership: Towards a Demolition. Political studies 39, 1 (1991): 36-54.

Kirzner, Martin. Public and private property. Philosophical concepts on property 4, 1 (2006): 12-24.

Sanders, John. Justice and the Initial Acquisition of property. Harvard Journal of Law and Public policy 10, 2 (1987): 367-99.

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Private and Public Property

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