Planning for Terrorist Events: Case Study

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Table of Contents

Introduction
Aim
Objectives
Main Body of the Case Study
Recommendations
Conclusion
References

Introduction

In the present day, terrorism is an international threat that requires efficient response and prevention. The research will be dedicated to the terrorist attacks of November 13, 2015, that occurred in Paris and led to the death of 130 people. They may be regarded as one of the deadliest peacetime mass killings in modern French history. At the same time, it had a number of distinguishing characteristics, such as new tactics, coordination from abroad, and new motives that guided attackers. In this case, the analysis of the incident with its potential causes and related responses is highly essential for the prevention of terrorist acts in the future.

Aim

The aim of this research is to review of Parisian terrorist attacks of November 13, 2015, the potential factors of their occurrence, and the efficiency of security forces and special agencies’ response in order to develop recommendations for the prevention of terrorist acts during FIFA World Cup in Qatar in 2022. Through the analysis of available sources and terrorism-related materials, the case study will lead to the understanding of the main factors of modern terrorism and how they may be addressed for attack prevention.

Objectives

To review the terrorist attacks that occurred in Paris in 2015
To review the potential reasons for these attacks
To assess what counter-extremism measures could be applied to prevent these terrorist acts.
To review the response of France’s forces and evaluate its efficiency
To provide several recommendations for the prevention of attacks during the FIFA World Cup 2022 in Qatar

Main Body of the Case Study

What Happened

Terrorist attacks that took place across Paris on the Friday evening of November 13, 2015, may be regarded as the deadliest targeted and coordinated peacetime mass killing in modern French history. It involved the simultaneous hitting of a stadium, a concert hall, restaurants, and bars by suicide bombers and gunmen of the Islamic State group (“Paris attacks: What happened on the night,” 2015). The first three explosions were committed near the Stade de France stadium when a friendly match between Germany and France took place (France 24, 2021). Subsequently, there was a series of gun attacks around popular nightlife locations: in Rue Albert near Le Carillon bar and Le Petit Cambodge restaurant, in Rue de la Fontaine au Roi near La Casa Nostra pizzeria, and in Rue de Charonne near La Belle Equipe bar (“Paris attacks: What happened on the night,” 2015). One more suicide bomber detonated an explosive device on the Boulevard Voltaire being at Le Comptoir Voltaire restaurant.

However, the most devastating and tragic consequences followed the attack at the Bataclan concert hall, where the performance of an American rock group took place. Three terrorists with Kalashnikov-type assault rifles stormed inside and opened fire on the crowd. All in all, the terrorist attacks of November 13 led to the death of 130 civilians, and hundreds of people were wounded (“Paris attacks: What happened on the night,” 2015). However, regardless of the fact that the French government took unprecedented measures to arrest or liquidate terrorists involved in this mass killing and ensure the safety of its citizens, another attack was nevertheless organized. In 2016, three suicide bombers who were connected with the Paris attacks committed the worst terrorist act in Belgian history, killing more than 30 and wounding approximately 270 people at Brussel’s metro train and airport (France 24, 2021). While the coordinators of all attacks were arrested, law enforcement investigation has continued till the present day.

Potential Reasons

On the basis of terrorists’ behavior, the evidence of those who survived, and law enforcement agencies results of the attack’s investigation, it is possible to conclude that all attackers were directly or indirectly connected with the Islamic State (IS). IS, also known as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham Dawlat al-‘Iraq al-Islamiyya, Dawlat al Islamiya fi Iraq wa al-Sham (DAISh), is a brutal terrorist organization of Sunni Islamists included in the list of terrorist groups in 2014 (Home Office, 2020). Being active in Syria and Iraq, IS “adheres to a global jihadist ideology, following an extreme interpretation of Islam, which is anti-Western and promotes sectarian violence” (Home Office, 2020, p. 15). In particular, its purpose is to establish a state that will be governed by Sharia law with extortion and violence imposed on people.

At the same time, while IS operates in the Middle Eastern region, it aims to expand the sphere of its influence and demonstrate power in Western countries as well. In this case, it attracts foreign fighters through its recruiters who target predominantly Muslim communities and spread radical ideas. Considering the biographies of terrorists who committed attacks in Paris, all of them are of Arabian-Muslim origin but were born and raised in France and Belgium in Muslim communities (“Paris attacks: Who were the attackers?” 2016). Moreover, a considerable number of them were recruited by IS coordinators and sent to Syria, where they strengthened their beliefs in the righteousness of radical activities, violence, and terror and received all necessary instruction related to further attacks in Europe. Thus, it is possible to assume that the attacks of November 13 were committed by the members of the IS group on the basis of their religious beliefs in order to spread fear, demonstrate their attitude to Western values, and kill innocent people.

At the same time, religious beliefs cannot be regarded as the only reason why attackers joined IS. According to Europol (n.d.), recent attacks demonstrated new modus operandi and characteristics, such as the planning of strategic actions by a large international network controlled from abroad and the interconnectedness of the terrorist threat and other security-related issues, including weapon trafficking, mass migration, and document counterfeiting. In this case, IS received an opportunity to send its fighters and recruiters to Europe as refugees and migrants. Moreover, many terrorists are motivated not only by religious zeal but also by social aspects, such as peer pressure, role modeling, and the desire to be viewed as military heroes. Finally, many attackers had a criminal history, substance abuse, and multiple mental health disorders. For instance, according to local men, Brahim and Salah Abdelslam, the coordinators of the attacks, were “big smokers, big drinkers, but not radicals” (“Paris attacks: Who were the attackers?” 2016, para. 29). Moreover, they lived as ordinary young people, owned a business, and Brahim once saved children in a fire accident. Thus, the reasons for terrorist attacks may be regarded as more complex than ideological and cultural. All in all, they may be presented as social aspects and religious beliefs that may be perceived by economically neglected individuals for the commitment to well-planned terrorist acts conducted from abroad.

Counter Extremism Intervention

It goes without saying that the measures of counter-extremism that could potentially prevent attacks in Paris were possible at that time. On the one hand, the prevention of Islamist Extremism is a highly challenging process due to its multiple dimensions and aspects. In other words, it should target immigrant families changing almost all spheres of life in the country and focusing on newcomers at the same time (“National program to prevent Islamist Extremism,” n.d.). The promotion of people’s integration into European society should start with schools and social services and continue through employment and equal human rights to minimize the threat of being recruited by terrorist groups who promise better opportunities. In general, discriminated individuals without jobs and income are particularly vulnerable to radicalization.

Moreover, it is essential to remember that extremism does not correspond to Islam. That is why for governmental authorities, it was possible to strengthen the cooperation with mosque communities to ensure the prevention of extremism through appropriate religious education, counter-radicalization training, and the spread of awareness concerning terrorism (“National program to prevent Islamist Extremism,” n.d.). At the same time, while terrorist groups actively use the Internet and social media platforms for recruitment, it was possible to integrate countermeasures for the spread of awareness and education. Moreover, media platform operators should be involved in counter-radicalization activities as well. For instance, they should report criminal content and potentially dangerous messages.

The prevalent number of terrorists that committed attacks in Paris had criminal history – they were arrested and imprisoned for both terrorism-related and other crimes. In prisons, radical ideas are spread, and people who do not have an opportunity to choose the environment perceive and accept them rapidly (HSAC, 2016). Thus, in order to prevent radicalization there, the government could establish a program of Muslim chaplaincy in prisons (“National program to prevent Islamist Extremism,” n.d.). On the one hand, France aimed to integrate Muslim citizens and make European values familiar to them. On the other hand, being under the obligation to consider people’s freedoms and rights to cultural peculiarities and the choice of religion, the government had chosen an inappropriate strategy. In particular, it aimed to delineate religious beliefs and control Islam through a series of laws and regulations that were viewed as discriminating and offensive to Muslims (Francois, 2020). At the same time, the government did not provide all the necessary support for Muslim communities leaving their suburbs isolated and neglected (HSAC, 2016). That is why the government was not fully supported by Muslim organizations for the development and efficient implementation of counter-extremism measures.

Finally, the security of border control and police should be strengthened as well, considering the activities of IS connected with the recruitment of foreign fighters and previous terrorist acts organized by this group. Thus, all perpetrators, especially those connected with attempts to cross the border and travel to Syria to join IS should be put under thorough control with the use of modern technologies to make it more efficient. However, French authorities relied more on human intelligence rather than technological one and did not consider the possibility of thorough planning and the use of particular tactics, such as the attraction of attention of security forces to one location while attacking others by terrorists.

Response by Emergency Services and Special Forces

Regardless of multiple errors related to counter-extremism measures, the response of French emergency services and special forces may be regarded as efficient. First of all, the majority of responding agencies could cooperate, coordinate their actions quickly, and share information regardless of the absence of a traditional incident command system (HSAC, 2016). At the same time, France’s Standardized Information Numeric System (SINUS) allowed to track all victims by collecting and sharing data in real-time through its digital database (HSAC, 2016). Moreover, the country’s Ministry of Health created the Health Emergencies Crisis Management Centre (HECMC) to coordinate the mobilization and performance of all medical facilities involved in the response (Philippe et al., 2016). Several intervention zones with their own evacuation systems and emergency unit teams were organized in which resources were distributed in accordance with victims’ needs.

At the same time, special forces began investigations directly after the attacks gathering evidence and interviewing witnesses. For instance, investigators found a terrorist’s cell phone that allowed to detect the attackers’ last location with the use of geolocation services (HSAC, 2016). Moreover, technological intelligence, rapid sharing of information, and the official permission of raids, house checks, and intrusions helped security forces and special agencies arrest the associates of the attacks and find an apartment of a suspected mastermind who was liquidated. The only attacker who survived were traced and arrested several months later.

“Lesson Learned” for Preparations for FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022

It goes without saying that France’s experience and response to terrorist acts may be helpful for Qatar during its preparations for FIFA World Cup. The security of this region may be regarded as the event’s major concern due to the proximity of terrorist groups’ potential locations. On the one hand, efficient measures presuppose the creation existence of a counter-extremism program that should be implemented in advance and contribute to the prevention of radicalization in the country. On the other hand, “lesson learned” may refer to the security measures that may be currently developed and applied for the protection of citizens and guests. They should imply the existence of an emergency operations center that may guarantee the mobilization of all agencies in the case of attacks. Their members should have terrorism-related training to know how to act in the most appropriate way with the understanding of personal responsibility for their actions.

In addition, it will be incorrect to rely mainly on human intelligence and the preparedness of people. In this case, preventative measures should include technological intelligence, data sharing in real-time, and the implementation of digital devices, such as ground cameras and drones with cameras, to facilitate control over all important locations. Moreover, border control should be strengthened, and everyone who enters the country should be registered and put in the system, where data will be instantly shared between security and other agencies. In addition, control over social media platforms may be strengthened as well to detect potentially hazardous content and messages – this procedure will allow to prevent terrorist attacks as well.

Recommendations

For FIFA World Cup 2022 in Qatar, it is essential to create an emergency operations center that will be responsible for the mobilization of all agencies in the case of any incident, provide training for their members, use technological intelligence that will allow data collection and sharing, implement devices for control, strengthen border control, and monitor potentially hazardous content related to terrorism in the Internet.

Conclusion

In 2015, terrorists committed several attacks in Paris that led to the death of 130 people. Their actions were controlled by IS terrorist groups characterized by the extreme interpretation of Islam and the intentions to spread violence in Western countries. In general, France could undertake efficient measures in order to counter the extremism and radicalization of its Muslim citizens. However, its negligence to their well-being and the governmental control of religious norms caused a lack of support by Muslim communities essential for terrorism prevention. Nevertheless, the response of security forces and other agencies was efficient and allowed them to make particular conclusions for the future.

References

Europol. (n.d.). Terrorism: Islamic State going global.Web.

France 24. (2021). November 2015 attacks: A timeline of the night that shook the French capital.Web.

Francois, M. (2020). France’s treatment of its Muslim citizens is the true measure of its republican values.Time. Web.

Home Office. (2020) Proscribed terrorist organizations. Home Office, 1-22.

HSAC. (2016). The attacks on Paris; Lessons learned [PDF document]. Web.

National programme to prevent Islamist Extremism. (n.d.). 1-7.

Paris attacks: What happened on the night. (2015). Web.

Paris attacks: Who were the attackers? (2016). Web.

Philippe, J. M., Brahic, O., Carli, P., Tourtier, J. P., Riou, B., & Vallet, B. (2016). French Ministry of Health’s response to Paris attacks of 13 November 2015.Critical Care, 20(1), 1-3. Web.

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