Peace of Westphalia: Basis of International Relations

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Table of Contents

Introduction
Outcomes of the Peace of Westphalia
Principles, laid in the treaties
Contemporary views
Balance of Power
Compromises
Concept of democratic peace
Conclusion
References
Footnotes

Introduction

First of all it should be mentioned, that the Peace of Westphalia is regarded as the first statute, defining the character of international relations for the following centuries within more than two states. The Peace of Westphalia submits to the pair of agreements, the Treaty of Osnabrück and the Treaty of Münster, concluded on May 15 and October 24 of 1648 correspondingly, which ended both the Thirty Years’ War and the Eighty Years’ War.¹ The agreements included the Holy Roman Emperor, Ferdinand III Habsburg, the other German princes, Spain, France, Sweden and plenipotentiaries of the Dutch Republic. The Treaty of the Pyrenees, concluded in 1659, terminating the war between France and Spain, is also often regarded as part of the overall accord.

Outcomes of the Peace of Westphalia

The France with Ludwig XIV at the head placed the predominant position in the international relations. Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs were its main opponents, but they were weakened by the Thirty Years’ War, and humbled by the provisions of the Peace of Westphalia. Moreover, Spain, after the new unsuccessful war with France had to cede the county of Rusillion and Arras according to The Treaty of the Pyrenees. But Ludwig was not satisfied with these successes, and wishing not only to widen his possessions, but also become the unrestricted reign of the whole Europe, as he was in France. The condition of the French army, perfect in both qualitative and quantitative measure motivated him to undertake the number of wars, and gave hope for the fulfillment of this hope. The other European states could not let Ludwig to bring to life his plans to disturb the political balance in Europe, and created powerful coalitions to confront him. This significantly interrupted Ludwig’s plans (Brown, 2001).

Ludwig led four wars, two of which were aimed to capture Spanish Netherlands (Belgium). It means the possibility of threat for England, and also the superiority in North sea, the threat for Netherlands’ domination, which did not participate in the Thirty Years’ war, and raised its power. Holland, bewaring to have powerful France instead of weak Spain as a neighbor, concluded coalitions against France, attracting Sweden and England. Ludwig’s military successes appeared insufficient. According to the peace of Aachen (1668), France got just several frontier fortresses (Gross, 1948).

Strong commercial rivalry existed between England and Holland. France aggravated the contradictions between England and Spain for the monopoly of trading with America. German empire was fictive. Austria aims to dominate in Germany. Sweden is France’s ally. And Turkey with Poland are Austrian ones. France’s aim is not to allow the union of sea states (England, Holland), to isolate its opponents, by capturing Spanish trade way. 1660 – restoring of Stewards in England. Karl II brakes the union with Madrid, and helps Portugal, and French king Ludwig gets the opportunity to make pressure on Netherlands. The war between England and Holland started in 1664. Netherlands are defeated it, and lose part of the colonies in America, which were called the New England later. Phillip dies in 1665. 1667 – The war against Spain, during which South Netherlands had been captured by the French army. Spain and Holland stop war actions, and create the tripartite political union with Sweden. Then, Ludwig stops his troops, and concludes peace with Spain. Ludwig decided to revenge Holland severely. He interrupted Sweden and England from concluding the union with Holland, and invaded Holland with huge army in 1672 and reached Amsterdam. Hollanders could not resist, and to save the country broke the dams, which surrounded Holland from the side of the sea. The water flooded all the law-lying locations, and the French were made to retreat (Gross, 1948).

Wilhelm the king of Orange created the new coalition, which united all the German lands, and Spain. Ludwig fought this coalition very successfully. As Friedrich -Wilhelm, elector of Brandenburg, was the most dangerous, Ludwig, in order to divert his forces from the theater of war actions, persuaded Sweden to attack Brandenburg possessions from Pomerania. Friedrich hurried to defend Brandenburg, defeated Swedes, and captured part of Pomerania. Since that war lasted approximately 4 years, and ended in 1679. It ended with almost no results. France keeps territory in Flandreau, but Netherlands do not lose independence. They got all their cities, captured by France, back, and France turns the whole Europe against itself (Krasner, 1995).

While France strengthened more and more, German empire, divided into lots of independent territories, weakened more and more. This weakness pushed Ludwig to rambling expansion, leading by the principle of capture. Ludwig captures the cities of Rheine, and also Strasburg. In 1684 Germany Concluded normal treaty with him, according to which declared all the captures, just in order he did not start new ones. In1683 French army conquers Luxemburg, which causes conflict with Vienna. Poland defeats Turkey and Turkish power starts falling. Austria starts leading active anti-France policy. Wilhelm the king of Orange concluded the third coalition against Ludwig. Almost all Western Europe participated in it: German emperor, Spain, Sweden, Holland, Savoy, German and Italian rulers. Only England was on Ludwig’s side, but when English king Jacob II was deposed, and Wilhelm the king of Orange became the king, England became France’s enemy. Ludwig’s capture of Pyrenean lands became the start of the third war, which lasted for ten years (1688-1697). The struggle was persistent, and exhausted both sides, and ended with the Peace of Ryswick ². According to the provisions of this agreement Ludwig left Strasburg and other captured cities, but was obliged to declare Wilhelm the king of Orange as the king of England. The dawn of French power started. Though, France ceded not too much, this war ended with all the claims for the dominance of France in Europe (Gross, 1948).

Principles, laid in the treaties

Getting back to the Peace of Westphalia, it would be necessary to emphasize, that it is regarded as one the first great European or world charter. To it is usually featured the significance and distinction of being the first of numerous efforts to institute something resembling world unity on the foundation of states applying unrestricted autonomy over certain lands and subordinated to no possible authority.

The Thirty Years’ War had its origin, at any rate partially, in a religious disagreement or, as one might say, in religious prejudice. The Peace of Westphalia sanctified the standard of toleration by founding the equality among Protestant and Catholic states and by offering some maintains for religious minorities. To be sure, the standard of liberty of principles was related only partly and lacking reciprocity. The religious Peace of Augsburg of 1555 and the rule cujus regio ejus religio were corroborated. With a view to lessening the lot of religious minorities, though, the Treaty of Osnabruck offered that questions who in 1627 had been eliminated from the free realize of their religion, other than of their sovereign, were by the Peace guaranteed the right of performing private reverence, and of educating children, at home or overseas, in conventionality with their own confidence; they were not to bear in any social aptitude nor to be denied religious interment, but were to be at freedom to emigrate, trading their lands and realty or leaving them to be run by others (Osiander, 2001).

The principle of religious parity was set as part of the peace under an worldwide guarantee. The Peace of Westphalia thereby stated an example of far-reaching significance. The Constitution of the Germanic Confederation of June 8, 1815, which grounds part of the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna of June 9, 1815, specifies in Article XVI that the distinction between the Christian religions should origin no differentiation in the enjoyment by their supporters of civil and political rights, and, in addition, that the German Diet should reflect on the funding of civil rights to Jews on condition that they suppose all civic duties incumbent on other citizen (Osiander, 2001).

In addition to the guarantee, the Settlement of Westphalia formulated certain extremely interesting rules for the peaceful settlement of disputes and collective sanctions against aggressors. Thus the Treaty of Miinster, in Articles 113 and 124 stipulates that:

if it happens that any point should be violated, the Offended shall before all things exhort the Offender not to come to any Hostility, submitting the Cause to a friendly Composition, or the ordinary Proceedings of Justice. Nevertheless, if for the space of three years the Difference cannot be terminated, by any of those means, all and every one of those concerned in this Transaction shall be obliged to join the injured Party, and assist him with Counsel and Force to repel the Injury, being first advertised by the Injured that gentle Means and Justice prevailed nothing; but without prejudice, nevertheless, to every one’s Jurisdiction, and the Administration of Justice conformable to the Laws of each Prince and State; and it shall not be permitted to any State of the Empire to pursue his Right by Force and Arms; but if any difference has happened or happens for the future (between the states of the Empire), every one shall try the means of ordinary Justice, and the Contravener shall be regarded as an Infringer of the Peace. That which has been determined (between the States of the Empire) by Sentence of the Judge, shall be put in execution, without distinction of Condition, as the Laws of the Empire enjoin touching the Execution of arrests and Sentences (Osiander, 2001).

Lots of scientists have declared that the global system of states, multinational corporations and organizations which exists today began in 1648 at the Peace of Westphalia. Both the grounds and the consequence of this view have been assaulted by revisionist academics and politicians alike, with revisionists perplexed the meaning of the Peace, and commentators and politicians attacking the Westphalian System of sovereign nation-states. (McGrew, Lewis, 1992)

Contemporary views

The Westphalian System, primarily stated by the provisions of the treaties concluded in Westphalia in 1648 is used as a tag by academics to define the system of states which the world is based on of today. In 1998, a Symposium on the lifelong political significance of the Peace of Westphalia, then–NATO Secretary General Javier Solana stated that “humankind and democratic system were two standards fundamentally unrelated to the primary Westphalian organization” and charged a criticism that “the Westphalian system had its restrictions. For one, the standard of dominion it relied on also shaped the basis for rivalry, not society of states; omission, not incorporation.” (Linklater, 1975)

In 2000, then–German minister of foreign affairs Joschka Fischer submitted to the Peace of Westphalia in his Humboldt Speech, which disputed that the system of European politics set up by Westphalia was outmoded: “The center of the notion of Europe after 1945 was and still is a refusal of the European balance-of-power attitude and the hegemonic ambitions of personage states that had emerged tracking the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, a rejection which took the form of closer meshing of vital interests and the transfer of nation-state self-governing rights to supranational European foundations.” (Richmond, 2002).

In the outcome of the 11 March 2004 Madrid attacks, Lewis ‘Atiyyatullah, who asserts to symbolize the terrorist network al-Qaeda, affirmed that “the global system built-up by the West since the Treaty of Westphalia will collapse; and a new global arrangement will rise under the control of a powerful Islamic state”. It has also been maintained that globalization is bringing a development of the global system past the autonomous Westphalian state. (Richmond, 2002)

Nevertheless, European nationalists and American paleoconservatives represented by Pat Buchanan grasp a constructive view of the Westphalian state. Followers of the Westphalian state notion resist socialism and some forms of capitalism for challenging the nation state. A major argument of Buchanan’s political vocation, for instance, has been attacking globalization, critical theory, neo-conservatism, and other ideas he regards as disadvantageous to today’s developed states.

Since the late 1990s, the notion of Westphalian independence has been brought into additional matter by a range of definite and projected military interferences in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan among others. (Richmond, 2002)

Few of these, taking into account the interventions in Yugoslavia have been rationalized as concerned interference, intended at avoiding approaching genocide or large-scale loss of life. Neo-conservatism particularly has enhanced this line of judging further, to assert that a lack of democracy may prefigure future humanitarian disasters, or that democracy declares a human right on its own.

There is, however, debate about whether recent violations of state independence, such as the 2003 Iraq War, really reproduced these higher standards, or whether the real explanation was simply that of self-defense, which is more dependable with the conventional view of Westphalian dominion. A new notion of dependent independence seems to be promising in worldwide law, but it has not yet achieved the point of legal legality. (Richmond, 2002)

The supplementary denigration of Westphalian sovereignty happens in relation to supposedly failed states, of which Afghanistan (before the invasion of NATO forces in 2001) is often regarded as an example. In this case, it is debated that no dominion exists and that worldwide interference is justified on compassionate positions and by the hazards posed by failed states to neighboring states and the world in general. Nevertheless, the 2001 incursion was validated more honestly on the bases of self-defense, as a reaction to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US. Some of the current argues over Somalia is also being radiated in these same terms (Richmond, 2002).

Balance of Power

The main precious fact for the theorists of international relations, that the Peace of Westphalia is of, is that it stated the first formal paradigm of international relations in the world. It is the balance of power. The brief explanation of this concept states, that peace is maintained while all the actors of the international arena are equally powerful (or equally weak). The fact is, this concept is rather dangerous for peace in the long-term perspective. Any balance tends to be violated or interrupted. When one becomes more powerful in comparison with the others, he tries to turn this disparity into his own profit. Thus, taking into account the ambitions of medieval kings and emperors, the peace could not be maintained for a long time, and this tendency outlined in the following capturing wars among European states (Grimes, 1956).

Within a balance of power system, a state may choose to engage in either balancing or bandwagoning behavior. In a time of war, the decision to balance or to bandwagon may well determine the survival of the state. The fact is the rules for boundaries and independence elated only European states, and in no way touched the colonies. Thus, the place for the colonial wars was left. It became the first historical lesson on the division of the world, which stated, that the power and authority must be applied only within the borders of particular state.

Autonomy, declared by the provisions of the treaties concluded in Westphalia, means that no exterior actor applies power within the boundaries of the state. Territorial abuses of the Westphalian model engage the formation of power arrangements that are not coterminous with physical boundaries. Examples comprise the British Commonwealth (but not colonial empires in which power and territory are coterminous, even if territories of land are not neighboring), the European Union, Antarctica, Andorra, and the Exclusive Economic Zone for the oceans. Some trustworthy acts within a particular area are determined by actors within that area, but others are decided by extra-territorial bodies, such as the European Court. Most of these attempts to create power arrangements that surpass territory have failed, but that has not discouraged governors from formulating new institutional forms: the Westphalian model has not limited the imagination (Grimes, A.P., 1956).

Infringements of the standard of independence, in which an exterior actor is able to implement some trustworthy arrangement within the territory of a state, have been more recurrent than those of territoriality, but not always as realizable. The most modest way in which independence can be conciliated is if some external actor alters conceptions of legitimate action that are held by groups within a given polity. Autonomy can also be transgressed if rulers agree to authority structures that are managed by external actors, or if more influential actors impose foundations, policies, or staff on weaker states. Examples of disobediences of independence include the pressure of the Catholic Church on advances about the legality of birth control and abortion.

Compromises

Compromises of Westphalia have occurred in four ways-through principles, contracting, coercion, and imposition. These four modalities are differentiated by whether the actions of one actor depend on that of another and by whether at least one of the actors is better off and none worse off. In meetings, rulers enter into concords, such as human rights agreements, from which they expect some gain, but their actions are not dependent on what others do. In constricting, rulers agree to break Westphalian standards, but only if they are offered some benefit, such as a overseas loan. In compulsion, the monarchs of more powerful states make weaker ones worse off by engaging in realistic threats to which the aim might or might not comply. In obligation, the objective is so weak that it has no alternative but to comply with the preferences of the stronger. Conferences, agreements, compulsion, and annoyance have all been permanent prototypes of actions in the international system, and thus lots of states have not kowtowed to the Westphalian model. (Krasner, 1995) Every major peace treaty since 1648- Westphalia, Utrecht, Vienna, Versailles, and Helsinki-has infringed the Westphalian model in one way or another. It happened so, because of the inconsistency of this model, and the principles itself can not be stated. Mechanism of the observation, and punishment for the violation should be declared. Compromising the Westphalian model is always available as a policy option as there is no influence configuration to prevent it: nothing can prevent rulers from misbehaving against the household autonomy of other states or making authority systems that surpass territory. In the international system, institutions are less constraining and more fluid, more subject to challenge and change than in more settled circumstances. The mechanisms for locking in particular institutional forms, such as socialization, positive reinforcement between structures and agents, or path-dependent processes, are weaker at the international level than in well-established domestic polities. This is even true for the Westphalian state which is taken to be the core institutional form of the modern international system. In international politics, nothing is ever off the table. Rather than being regarded as an empirical regularity in which territoriality and autonomy are accurate descriptions of most if not all states, or as an analytic assumption that regards central decision-makers as capable of independently formulating policies subject only to constraints imposed by the international system, the Westphalian model is better conceptualized as a convention or reference point that might or might not determine the behavior of policymakers who are also motivated by material interests, security and national ideals, and whose ability to influence outcomes depends upon their power. All states are not the same. Some have closely approximated the Westphalian model. Others have not. Some non-Westphalian forms of political organization, such as empires, tribes, and trading leagues, have disappeared, but at the same time the principles of Westphalia are frequently ignored. The following section of this article traces some of the confusion about the nature of sovereignty to the fact that the term has been used in several different ways. Then the mechanisms through which the principles of territoriality and autonomy have been violated-inventions, contracting, coercion, and imposition-are explicated. This is followed by a discussion of why the Westphalian model has both persisted and been frequently violated. In the conclusion, I argue that it would be constructive to recognize how fragile the Westphalian model has been, not only because violations of the principles of territoriality and autonomy will take place in any event, but also because compromising Westphalia is sometimes the best way to achieve peace and stability (Krasner, 1995).

Concept of democratic peace

Most researchers note that the idea of democratic peace, primarily stated in the provisions of Westphalian Peace, is the most perspective paradigm for the long-term perspective. The principles of democratic peace, declared in the treaties stay the most sufficient rules of diplomacy and international relations, but XX century showed that alongside with democracies, formal and non-liberal democracies appeared. All the conclusions and decisions of the heads of states are based on the provisions of eternity and non-changeability of the main principles of intergovernmental relations – the striving of the states to enlarging of the power in the conditions of unsafe world, inevitability of rivalry, and necessity of the observation of the principle of the balance of power between / among Superpowers. The sate of peace is not so the result of democratic culture, or the system of checks and balances, as the result of the existence of powerful international unions and common potential of containment of potential aggressors (Brown, 2001).

Another argument against TDP (Theory of Democratic Peace), that opponents give, is that during cold war, in order to prevent the spread of communism, the USA embargoed leftists legitimate states by the policy of arm-twisting, and helping totalitarian right governments come to power (Brown, 2001).

Conclusion

Thus, the Peace of Westphalia appeared rather innovative treaty for that period, and stated the character of the relations among sates, which was innovative itself. The articles of the treaties stated the principles of interstate relations and cooperation, which are still actual, and are applied by the institutions and politics. Another point is that, the TDP takes its origin in the treaties of the Peace of Westphalia, but this theory has its opponents, and is considered to be imperfect.

References

Brown. C., 2001. Understanding International Relations. Palgrave Macmillan; 2Rev Ed edition
Ceadel, M. 1996 The Origins of War Prevention: The British Peace Movement and International Relations, 1730-1854. Oxford: Oxford University
Doyle, Michael W. 1983 Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 3.
Dunne, Tim. (2005): Liberalism The Globalisation of World Politics. Oxford University Press, 2^nd edn, 2001
Gross, L. 1948. The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948. The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 42, No. 1.
Grimes, A.P., 1956. The Pragmatic Course of Liberalism. The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 3.
Haskins, C. H, Robert, H. L., 1920 Some Problems of the Peace Conference. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Krasner, Stephen D. 1995 Compromising Westphalia International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3.
McGrew, A.G, Lewis, P., 1992. Global Politics: Globalization and the Nation-State. Polity publishers.
Osiander, A. 2001. Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth. International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 2.
Panke, D., Risse, T. 2006 Classical Liberalism in IR” in “International Relations Theory, edited by Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 89-108.
Richmond, O. P. 2002 Maintaining Order, Making Peace. New York: Palgrave.
Schmitt, C. 2007 The concept of the political. University of Chicago press.
Schweller, Randall L. 1992 Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific? World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 2.
Linklater, A 1975. Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era. Polity Press publishing.

Footnotes

The Thirty Years’ War was fought mainly on the territory of Germany, and involved most of European continental powers. Although it was a religious conflict between Protestants and Catholics, the rivalry between the Habsburg dynasty and other powers was a more central motive^,as shown by the fact that Catholic France under the de facto rule of Cardinal Richelieu supported the Protestant side in order to weaken the Habsburgs.
The Treaty of Ryswick was signed on 20 September 1697 and named after Ryswick (also known as Rijswijk) in the Dutch Republic. The treaty settled the War of the Grand Alliance, which pitted France against the Grand Alliance of England, Spain, the Holy Roman Empire and the United Provinces.

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