Oversight and the Expansion of the Five Eyes

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Introduction

Intelligence gathering remains one of the critical responsibilities of a government in its effort to protect the country from external aggression and internal security threats. Each country has its unique way of gathering, processing, and utilizing data that is meant to plan and execute various actions meant to protect national borders and security of all the resident. Sometimes there is a need for countries to share intelligence to ensure that the significantly neutralize security threats, especially those emanating from beyond the borders. Five Eyes, often abbreviated as FVEY, is one such multilateral corporation that brings together Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States in an effort to gather and share intelligence as a means of protecting their national borders.¹ It is believed to be the oldest and the most powerful intelligence gathering community in the world.

The five member countries signed the UKUSA treaty, which meant that they would cooperate in signals intelligence gathering. Initially, the five countries were selected because at the time, they were the most powerful English speaking countries in the world.² There was the fear that the next major global war might be defined by the language spoken in each nation. These countries also believed that as Anglophones, it was in their interest to have a joint corporation in cracking codes being shared by countries considered unfriendly to them. Since then, Five Eyes has been growing steadily and its mandate has also remained dynamic to reflect the perceived threats to national security at every given point of its existence. In this study, the researcher seeks to answer the following central research question:

Central Research Question (CRQ): The expansion of the Five Eyes, and how effective is the oversight of the Five Eyes

The origins of Five Eyes can be traced back to the Atlantic Charter of 1941 when the United States and the United Kingdom set goals for a new world order after the independence. According to Krieger, Garcia, Riley, and Atkins, the United States had not formally joined the war, but it was secretly supporting the Grand Alliance.³ Although it was in the interest of the two countries to include the Soviet Union and other powerful European nations, the two countries realized that they shared the same socio-economic and political ideologies that they wanted to spread around the word.⁴ They were both democracies that believed in capitalism as the most stable ideology that should define the new world order after the war. In the previous wars, these countries had learned the importance of intelligence gathering as a means of understanding plans of the enemy. Knowing the intended actions of an enemy makes it possible to plan and execute strategies that would neutralize the threat.

When the Second World War ended, UKUSA agreement started attracting some friendly countries. It was also in the interest of the two founding nations to include friendly nations into this corporation for signal intelligence. It was a way of expanding the capacity of the entity to gather more information to help fight the enemy. Australia, Canada, and New Zealand were soon included in the organization not only because they were English-speaking democracies but also because of their strategic locations in North America and Europe and the fact that they had also embraced capitalism. Murray and Gecelovsky explain that Five Eyes has been expanding both in terms of the number of participating countries and the capacity to gather intelligence.⁵ It is necessary to explain each case.

UKUSA agreement was transformed into Five Eyes soon after the three additional countries joined the two founding nations. The number of eyes has been increasing with each additional country that joins the corporation. Nine Eyes was introduced to include additional countries of Denmark, France, Norway, and the Netherlands.⁶ The corporation was expanded further to 14 eyes, which brought in Germany, Belgium, Spain, Italy, and Sweden. According to Leuprecht and McNorton, the increase in the number of countries into the alliance was necessitated by the need to share intelligence with all or at least most of the NATO member states.⁷ Some countries such as Israel, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore have also expressed their interest to join the alliance.

In terms of the capacity, this entity has moved beyond the traditional signals intelligence (SIGINT) which was its primary mandate at inception. Currently, it is also involved in geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) as well as human intelligence (HUMINT) in an effort to fight both the domestic and foreign threats. The corporation is also operating and gathering intelligence in countries which are not its members. For instance, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which is one of the most powerful institutions within this alliance, is operating in almost every country in the world.

The oversight of the Five Eyes has remained highly effective. Major acts of terrorism within the member states, such as the September 11, 2001 terror attack on the United States generally exposed the weakness of the intelligence alliance.⁸ However, it is important to note that this attack was made possible because of the failure of internal security agencies in the United States to share critical information. Activities of the terrorists had already been brought to the attention of the CIA, but by that time, it lacked closed working relationship with Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other local law enforcement agencies that would have followed up the issue to neutralize the threat.⁹ The alliance has neutralized numerous security threats, most of which are not shared publicly because of their sensitive nature.

This paper is structured into several sections. The first section introduces the topic and explains the central research question. The second section is chapter 1 that explains the expansion of Five Eyes, from its inception to the period of Cold War, War on Terror, and after. The second chapter discusses the governance system of the Five Eyes in relation to its expansion. Chapter 3 provides an analysis oversight mechanism of the Five Eyes and the establishment of the Five Eyes intelligence oversight and review council. The last part of the paper is a conclusion that provides a summary of the findings made.

The Expansion of the Five Eyes

Intelligence has always been a critical tool in war both in the ancient times and in modern society. According to Cawthon, Breed-Wrisley, and Schroder, knowing the plans and capacity of an enemy helps a country to put in place offensive and counter-offensive measures in place.¹⁰ The importance of intelligence was laid bare during World War I and World War II.¹¹ It emerged that neutralizing the enemy required the relevant forces to understand their strategy and their strength. In the wars that were fought during the Cold War, such as Gulf War and Vietnam War, intelligence was a critical tool for all the parties involved. It explains why the Five Eyes has continued to grow and its capacity increased even after the Cold War.

As mentioned above, Five Eyes has been expanding in terms of its capacity to gather intelligence across the world and the number of nations involved. As the threat to the member states evolve, there has been a growing need to expand the mandate of this intelligence alliance and to redirect it to focus on the threat. Soon after the Second War, the five member states defined specific goals that had to be achieved immediately after the war had ended. Although the threat of another world war has remained slim, each individual countries face varying threats both internally and externally.¹² Annexation of Crimea from Ukraine by Russia and the continued military operations of Russia in Ukraine is a clear demonstration that individual nations around the world still face a major threat of military attacks from unfriendly countries. There is also the threat of China attacking Taiwan, which is a major concern to most members of this military alliance. These concerns have made it necessary for the alliance to expand as a way of protecting each member states and their allies around the world.

The Intended Purpose of Expansion

Five Eyes is currently the oldest and most powerful multinational intelligence alliance that sees to protect its member states from both internal and external threats. According to Ordóñez and Lytras, the United Kingdom and the United States realized that there was a need to have a powerful espionage system that could enable them to monitor activities in enemy territories so that they could effectively determine the appropriate plans to respond to the threat.¹³ It is necessary to understand the primary goal of the expansion, from the time of inception to the current state.

The Inception

Five Eyes alliance traces its history to the regular meetings that were held by the US and British code-breakers at Bletchley Park. Hale and Anderson record that the first meetings started in February 1941.¹⁴ During this period, Nazi Germany was making quick gains in parts of Western Europe. It was evident that the Germans were well coordinated and with a superior army. They also had an intelligence agency that provided them with critical information meant for planning. The United States had not formally joined the war, but had always maintained a close relations with the United Kingdom. It is necessary to explain the purpose of the alliance at the inception.

The United Kingdom, under the leadership of Winston Churchill, was facing an unprecedented challenge when World War II broke out. At that time, it was perceived as one of the most powerful countries in the world. He knew that the other two powerhouses in Europe were Germany and the Soviet Union. Churchill had a major problem with both countries and did not trust their leaders. On the one hand, Nazi Germany, under the strong leadership of Adolf Hitler, was overly aggressive and keen on becoming the only dominant power in the world.¹⁵ He had the means and determination to do so, which was worrying to the British and the rest of the global community that did not align with Germany. On the other hand, Soviet Union- under the leadership of Joseph Stalin- was in battle with the west as it championed for communism as the appropriate world order, instead of capitalism. The size of the country and its military capacity also showed that it had the means and determination to achieve its goal.

Winston Churchill found himself in an awkward position of trying to deal with two powerful dictators who posed equal threats to the country and the global community. When it became apparent that Hitler’s interests were more dangerous and posed an immediate threat, Churchill tried to engage Soviet Union so that they could form a united front against Germany, as Otto explains.¹⁶ However, Stalin did not trust Churchill, and even considered him an enemy. It was not until Hitler attacked the Soviet Union, and almost defeated it, that Stalin realized that Germany was the enemy. The decision of Stalin joining Churchill to fight Hitler was not a voluntary one, and neither was it based on shared ideas. Fair argues that the alliance was purely based on shared fears and it emerged that the two nations faced a common powerful enemy.¹⁷

The United Kingdom, then a super-power, needed an equally powerful partner that it could trust. The United States was the obvious choice because of many reasons. The two nations shared a similar socio-political and economic ideologies of democracy and capitalism.¹⁸ They were both speaking the same language, unlike some of the European allies such as France. Churchill knew that although Soviet Union was finally forced to fight alongside the United Kingdom, it was a temporary alliance meant to neutralize a common enemy.¹⁹ The United Kingdom still viewed Soviet Union as a long-term enemy that needed to be monitored and managed.

At its inception, the UKUSA agreement’s primary purpose was to break codes shared by both the real enemy (Germany and its allies) and the perceived enemy, which at that time was Soviet Union. During this period, armies around the world had embraced the practice of using codes when sharing messages or issuing instructions.²⁰ These codes were meant to limit the ability of the enemy to understand the message in case it landed in their hands. The UK and the US were interested in determining the plans of both Nazi Germany and Soviet Union forces. The code breaking practice was a massive success as these two nations were able to intercept and interpret messages shared by enemy camps.

The Pearl Harbor attack meant that the United States had to officially join the war, although it had been supporting the Grand Alliance secretly before then. At this stage, the UKUSA agreement became even more critical in helping plan the war. The purpose remained the collection of intelligence, especially those sent as codes, to interpret them, and inform the relevant authorities about plans of the enemy. According to Kearns and Young, the United Kingdom and the United States made an effort to ensure that the existence and activities of this intelligence alliance remained as secretive as possible.²¹ As the war neared its end, it became apparent that Germany and Japan, the most powerful enemies at that time, could no longer pose any major threat to the Grand Alliance nations and the global community. However, a new threat emerged almost immediately, in the form of Soviet Union, just as Winston Churchill had feared.

Cold War

Events before and during the Second World War led to the emergence of Cold War. According to Krieger, Garcia, Riley, and Atkins, Cold War refers to the political and ideological rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union, the two countries that emerged as Super Powers after the war.²² Before the World War II, there was an already deeply-rooted lack of trust between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom, which was the United States’ greatest ally. When the war ended, Russia failed to reveal the truth about the death of Adolf Hitler, which was a sign that it did not trust the UK and the US.²³ As a super-power, the Soviet Union saw an opportunity to spread its ideology of communism around the world. At the same time, the United Stated and the United Kingdom believed that a perfect opportunity had presented itself for them to spread capitalism. A collision course was clearly defined between the two forces, which would eventually become the Cold War.

Intelligence gathering became critical during this period, even more important than it was during the World War II. Fingar defines this war as ‘the war of intelligence’ as each block made an effort to understand what the enemy was doing.²⁴ It was the golden era of espionage and counter-espionage that had the United States and its allies on one side, and the Soviet Union and its allies on another. According to Stejskal, both sides invested heavily on intelligence gathering.²⁵ It was during this period that UKUAS was expanded to Five Eyes, when Canada, Australia, and New Zealand joined the alliance. These nations identified with the ideology of the western block, and they considered Soviet Union and its communist ideology as a threat to the world order.

Five Eyes achieved rapid growth during the Cold War when both nations started the arms race, especially in nuclear weapon. As tension between the Eastern and Western block blocks intensified, it became evident that the two forces would go to war at any moment. According to Jameson, Joines, Tyler, and Vogel, Soviet Union, under Joseph Stalin, had vowed not to make the same mistake it did when handling Hitler.²⁶ As such, the nation started creating a large pool of weapons of mass destruction. The same trend was taking place in the United States as the country significantly increased its stockpile of nuclear warheads.

The purpose of the expansion of this intelligence agency was to enable the western block to know when the enemy was planning to launch an attack. Lomas explains that both the United States and the Soviet Union knew the devastating impact of a nuclear attack.²⁷ They knew that in case of a nuclear war, countries involved would be completely destroyed, which meant that it would be a zero-sum war. However, there was a belief that the country that attacked first would have an opportunity to destroy the enemy before that enemy could launch its nuclear attack. There was a need to constantly watch actions and decisions of the enemy.

It was at the early stages of the Cold War the United States established the CIA. The US defined it as a civilian authority, to ensure that it was not viewed as a military agency, and assigned it the specific responsibility of gathering foreign intelligence. For the better part of the Cold War, the Soviet Union remained the primary target of the activities of CIA. It was tasked with infiltrating the Soviet military and political system, determining its strengths and weaknesses, and most importantly, determining the enemy’s plans and any intensions to attack the United States. It was also involved with counterintelligence activities to help monitor the enemy’s intelligence gathering strategies and capabilities. CIA worked closely with military agencies in the United States such as the National Security Agency (NSA), National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to share intelligence.²⁸ All these agencies form part of the instruments that the United States uses to gather intelligence and share with Five Eyes member states.

As the rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union intensified, it became necessary for the other member states to enhance their role of gathering intelligence about the enemy and its allies. The United Kingdom has been using Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Defense Intelligence (DI), Security Service (M15), and Secret Intelligence Service (M16) to help in gathering intelligence.²⁹ These agencies work both within the United Kingdom and in foreign nations. In Canada, the Canadian Forces Intelligence Command (CFINTCOM), Communications Security Establishment (CSE), Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) have remained active in gathering intelligence. The Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), the Defense Intelligence Organization (DIO), Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organization (AGO), and Australian Signals Directorate (ASD) have the responsibility of gathering intelligence for the country and members of the alliance.³⁰ In New Zealand, the Directorate of Defense Intelligence and Security (DDIS), Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB), and New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) play these roles.³¹ These agencies are expected to share intelligence that they gather to help protect member states in the alliance.

During the Cold War, the Five Eye and Soviets Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB), which was the Committee for State Security, are credited with stopping the nuclear war, as some scholars argue. Although it is true that these agencies heightened the rivalry of the two blocks, they provided critical information that assured each camp that the other was not making direct attempt to attack the other militarily.³² They provided the assurance that each block needed to avoid push the nuclear button, though they were responsible for the arms race. Instead of the United States engaging the Soviet Union in direct military confrontation, which would have resulted in World War 3, they chose to engage in proxy wars. Gulf War, Vietnam War, Korean War, and Cuban Revolution, are some of the platforms where these two enemies engaged in proxy-wars. Five Eyes played the critical role of intelligence gathering during these wars. Cold War ended in 1990 when the Berlin Wall collapsed, and a year later, the Soviet Union was dissolved.

War on Terror

The decade, from 1991 when the Soviet Union was dissolved to 2001, the United States and its allies enjoyed a long period of global peace and economic progress. Although Russia emerged as a powerful nation from the Soviet Union, it did not pose as much threat as the Soviet Union. The Five Eyes remained active during this period, and their intelligence indicated that there was a new threat, the extremist Islamic groups in the Middle East.³³ Having come from a period of eminent nuclear war, the threat posed by a small group of extremists with minimal military and financial threat was easy to ignore. However, this proved a costly mistake when on September 11, 2001, Al Qaeda conducted a successful attack on the United States soil, killing more than 3,000 people and wounding many more³⁴. Figure 1.1 below shows the World Trade Center complex on fire. It was a reminder that the threat had evolved, and it was necessary to confront it.

Figure 1.1. World Trade Center on Fire

Following the attack, the United States declared the Global War on Terrorism, often referred to as war on terror. Intelligence that had been gathered by various agencies within the Five Eyes revealed that some governments in the Middle East were providing both financial and military support to these terrorists. Al Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and Levant were identified as the most dangerous extremist groups that had to be destroyed. Afghanistan and Pakistan had been identified as the nations that had provided support for these terrorists. The United States and its allies made the decision to attack Afghanistan and dethrone the rulers who were supporting these global criminals.

The CIA and other foreign intelligence agencies within the Five Eyes alliance had to redefine their primary goals. They had to change from primarily spying on the communist states to identifying activities of the terrorists, their hideouts, financiers, sympathizers, and other enablers. The intelligence agency had to expand because of the new role. Unlike the previous task that involved surveillance of a nation and its departments, the agents had to focus on smaller units and individuals specifically involved with acts of terrorism.³⁶ The task was made complex because the targeted countries were not as developed as the former enemy states in the Eastern blocks. Some of the places where these terror groups practiced and got stations were remote mountains that could not be easily accessed. Small and Jansen explain that the agents could be easily detected if they made an effort to access these places physically.³⁷ The military forces could also be detected from a distance, making it easy for the enemy to plan and launch a counter-attack.

The work of the surveillance community in the Five Eyes was made even more complex because of the racial differences. According to Blaxland, Fielding, and Gellerfy, most of the agents of this alliance were their own citizens, with a few dissidents from the targeted countries.³⁸ It meant that most of the agents were Europeans, with a few minorities, especially Africans and Asians. It was easy for the locals to identify these foreigners, which made it difficult for them to collect the needed information from the targeted sources. Cornish explains that the first task that the leadership of individual agencies within the Five Eyes had to take was a massive recruitment.³⁹ They had to expand the number of agents to include as many local Arabs as possible. They could easily infiltrate the regions that were controlled by the enemy and gather intelligence needed to plan attacks.

One of the primary purposes of the newly recruited agents was to help identify the leadership of these terror organizations. Cheung argues that it was a general belief that if the leaders were eliminated, these organization would lose focus, financing, and proper coordination, which would automatically lead to their collapse.⁴⁰ It soon emerged that Osama bin Laden was the overall leader of Al Qaeda and all its associated terror groups in the Middle East and parts of North Africa. Abū Muṣʻab Zarqāwī was identified as the leader of Islamic State for Iraq and Levant (ISIL). Several of their major lieutenants, financers, and major enablers were also identified.

The intelligence community had another critical role of identifying the location of these terrorists and facilitating their elimination. According to Carment and Sands, location and elimination of the top leaders of these groups proved to be the most challenging task for Five Eyes agents.⁴¹ The Afghan regime was quickly crushed and a new leadership installed soon after the arrival of American forces and that of its allies. Several militants were also killed in Afghanistan and Pakistan, including high ranking members of the two terror outfits. However, finding and eliminating the two leaders, which was the responsibility of the intelligence community, remained a major challenge. It was not until on June 7, 2006, that the ISIS leader was eliminated in a targeted attack.⁴² That was almost 5 years after the US invasion of the region.

The ultimate goal of the war on terror was to neutralize Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al Qaeda, and all his lieutenants. President George W. Bush started the war when he was only a few months into office. Although he served two complete terms, he was unable to find and eliminate bin Laden by the time he was leaving office in 2008.⁴³ The responsibility of neutralizing this major threat was passed on to President Barack Obama. The pressure on intelligence agencies within the Five Eyes continue to grow as the inability to locate and capture or neutralize bin Laden was becoming a global embarrassment to the United States and its allies. It took these agencies almost 10 years to successfully locate and facilitate an attack that eventually neutralized Osama bin Laden.⁴⁴ At that time, bin Laden was planning a 10-year anniversary to celebrate their successful attack on the United States. The agencies have remained active in the Middle East as it is believed that despite the elimination of the leaders of these terror groups, the threat of attack emanating from the region is yet to be completely eliminated.

Current Threats

The United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand still face numerous internal and external security threats that need the intelligence agencies to be expanded. Externally, the traditional enemies in the Eastern bloc are getting more powerful. Russia still has one of the largest nuclear stockpiles in the world, and it is getting more aggressive, as is currently witnessed with its attack on Ukraine after annexing Crimea from it. However, China is currently viewed as the greatest threat to the western countries. Besides its growing military power, China has emerged as a strong economic powerhouse in the world. It is currently the second-largest global economy and the leading exporter in the world, surpassing the United States.⁴⁵ It is aggressively making an effort to influence the new world order through political and economic partnerships with countries in Europe, South America, parts of Asia, and Africa. It is also the most powerful ally of Russia, both militarily and economically.

China, unlike Soviet Union, pursued economic power before flexing its military muscle. With a population of over 1.4 billion people and a strong economic alliance with many nations around the world, China can easily afford to ignore diplomatic threats of the United States and its allies. China has also emerged as a more advanced enemy in intelligence gathering when compared with Russia. It uses technology companies such as Huawei to collect data from all over the world. It has also been infiltrating Five Eyes’ agencies, especially in New Zealand that has recently taken a softer stance on China compared to the other allies. Addressing the new problem that is a powerful China requires the expansion and enhanced capabilities of the agencies in this intelligence alliance.

A new problem has also emerged in these countries in the form of home-grown terrorism. Several cases have been reported in the United States of individuals, born and brought up in the United States, identifying with Al Qaeda and ISIL, and executing attacks in solidarity with the terrorists. Some of these homegrown terrorists have never travelled out of the country. They include individuals such as Omar Mateen, Rizwan Farook, Tashfeen Malik, Dzhkohar Tsarnaev, and Tamerlan Tsarnaev.⁴⁶ The other four member states of this intelligence alliance are facing a similar problem. There has been a growing need for each state to conduct surveillance on its citizens to make it possible to identify these criminals and terrorists, and to neutralize the threat that they pose to the national security as early as possible. However, in these leading democracies, strong privacy laws limits the governments’ ability to arbitrarily conduct surveillance on its citizens without a court order. Five Eyes has become instrumental collecting data about citizens of these states. For instance, CIA can collect data about British citizens considered to pose national or international threat. It will not need a court order to do so. It will then share the information with relevant British intelligence authorities that are not allowed to conduct such surveillance on its citizens. The British or Canadian authority would also do the same in the United States and then share that data with FBI without having to obtain a court order. This strategy is meant to help fight homegrown terrorism and other forms of crime within the member states. These capabilities have made Five Eyes to be viewed as a supra-national intelligence organization.⁴⁷ Experts argue that the intelligence alliance has remained highly effective and very powerful because of these evolutionary tendencies. It is able to assess the current threat, determine the best way to deal with it, and redefine its operational activities appropriately. That is why it has continued to attract numerous other powerful nations that understands its significance in fighting various security threats within their borders.

Technical Capacity in Collection of Data and Other Operations

Five Eyes’ technical capacity in data collection and other operations has evolved significantly from the time of code-breaking during the First World War to the use of advanced technologies in the modern era. Echelon was one of the initial technical surveillance programs that emerged in the early years of the Cold War. This program focused on collecting signal intelligence for the member states. Initially, this system was meant to intercept military and diplomatic signals from the Soviet Union and its allies in the Eastern bloc.⁴⁸ The signal would be intercepted, decoded, and then the message passed to the relevant military agencies to warn them accordingly and make them plan effectively. Allen, Hodges, and Lindley-French argue that Echelon was one the most important surveillance programs during the Cold War.⁴⁹ It later evolved into an industrial espionage and mass surveillance tool that was used to intercept commercial and private communications, especially in countries considered unfriendly to the west. The radome with a satellite uplink, shown in figure 1.2 below, was widely used to intercept the signals.

Figure 1.2. A radome with a satellite uplink at RAF Menwith Hill

The technical capacity in data collection of Five Eyes was enhanced by the introduction of surveillance satellites. In 2009, NSA and its partners in Five Eyes alliance, launched a spy satellite, shown in figure 1.3 below, which is operated from Menwith Hill.⁵¹ The goal of this satellite was to intercept signals flowing across various commercial satellite uplinks. It was a demonstration of the commitment of this intelligence community to enhance its capabilities beyond military surveillance. The need to take this radical approach was necessitated by the belief that some large global corporations in hostile nations, especially in Russia and China, were involved in activities that sabotaged the security of member states of the alliance. For instance, Huawei has widely been accused of spying for China. This new technological capability made it possible for the United States and its allies to determine the kind of information that this commercial firm was sharing with its government. It was an effective tool that would help the western allies to know how to engage and treat some of these large foreign multinational corporations.

Figure 1.3. A spy satellite

It is also evident that the technical capacity in data collection for Five Eyes has gone beyond signal intelligence targeting military operations. A new trend emerged where these agencies also focused on geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT). These new operational capabilities have made it possible to monitor activities of the enemy. For instance, geospatial intelligence enabled the United States to identify and effectively warn its allies against the aggressive strategies that China was employing in South China Sea. This technology enabled the United States to know that China was militarizing islands in these region and creating artificial islands where none existed before as a way of taking control of the region. GEOINT was also critical in enabling the western allies to know that Russia was planning to invade Ukraine. The satellites were able to observe the piling up of military personnel and equipment in Russian regions that bordered Ukraine. These capabilities enables these countries to know the activities of the enemy through surveillance of the physical activities within the borders of the hostile country.

Governance System of the Five Eyes in Correlation to Its Expansion

Five Eyes, just like any organization, must have a governance system to coordinate its activities. According to Small and Jansen, the multinational intelligence agency has been operating in a highly secretive manner, and for some time, some of the members even denied its existence.⁵³ However, as its mandate increased in the face of formidable enemies such as Soviet Union, terrorism, and China, it became apparent that the involved states could not hide its existence any more. Its operations still remain highly secretive but its governance system in correlation to its expansion is becoming evident.

The Central Command: Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council (FIORC)

Five Eyes brings together local and international foreign agencies in the five primary countries. For a long time, it was difficult to determine how these numerous agencies were coordinated.⁵⁴ What was known by the global community was that these intelligence agencies were sharing intelligence, especially that which related to security of the member states or its allies. However, the regular meetings of intelligence chiefs and top military leaders in the five countries have made it possible to define the government structure of the organization. According to Beirman, one of the things that make this organization unique is that it lacks a central command.⁵⁵ There is no single office where each of the agencies identified in the previous chapter report to regularly. Similarly, there is no entity that issues a common instruction that all the agencies have to follow.

Instead of a central command unit, the member states created Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council. The council brings together top representatives of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Treasury in each of the member states.⁵⁶ The defense ministry or department is primarily focused on intelligence that is meant to enhance security of member states by identifying the threat and determining the appropriate way to neutralize it. The foreign affairs ministry or department is meant to fight for the overall interest of each member states in the global community and find possible threats to the same. The treasure ministry or department focuses on trade and financial interest of member states. Top government officials representing these departments or ministries in the five countries regularly meet, but they have never admitted that they are meeting as Five Eyes top representatives. FIORC is responsible for any expansion programs at Five Eyes. The secretariat has the responsibility of assessing the current capacity against intelligence needs. It will then provide an advice to the members about the extent of the shortage and the level of expansion needed. It is necessary to discuss the organs of FIORC and the governance structure.

Executive Secretariat

The clearest sign that Five Eyes is a structured intelligence sharing community was shown in September 2016, when the Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council was created. It brought together specific intelligence and security agencies in each of the five countries. As defined in its Charter, this is a council of equals, focused on identifying a common security and development threats and finding common ways of neutralizing them. The council defines itself as a non-political intelligence oversight entity meant to coordinate activities intelligence agencies in each of the countries. There was a need to ensure that the secretariat, that brings together the head of the sic agencies discussed below, is as apolitical as possible so that their mandate and capabilities would not be affected when there was a regime change in each country.

The head of the secretariat is held on a rotational basis, from one country to another. The headquarters of the secretariat is in the United States, though its meetings can be held in any of the five member states. The charter explains that the secretariat is a forum that makes it possible for intelligence agencies to exchange views and knowledge on issues of mutual interest and to compare best practices in intelligence gathering. It is the entity that acts as a linkage of all the numerous intelligence agencies in the identified countries.

It is important to note that the secretariat is expected to maintain close contact with political offices in the five countries. This is important because they will advise the political leaders about the threat that their nations face, critical decisions that need to be taken to neutralize them, and opportunities that they can take advantage of around the world. They are also expected to advise the political leaders on intelligence that they can share with other nations and those that should be acted upon silently.⁵⁷ It is the responsibility of the secretariat to encourage transparency among all the intelligence agencies in the community. As explained in its charter, the fundamental principle that defines the efficiency of Five Eyes is trust. It means that if a member state is in disagreement with a common stance taken by member states, it should clearly state so instead of acting in secrecy. The secretariat is answerable to the council, and it is expected to make regular reports to council members. It is necessary to briefly discuss each of the six intelligence and security agencies that form the council of this intelligence community.

The Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security of Australia

Australia has six intelligence agencies with specific roles and responsibilities. These agencies include Australian Geospatial-Intelligence Organization (AGO), Australian Signals Directorate (ASD), Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), Office of National Intelligence (ONI), Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO), and Defense Intelligence Organization (DIO).⁵⁸ Each of these agencies fall under different government departments with distinctive roles and responsibilities. The Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security of Australia has the mandate of reviewing activities of these agencies and facilitating close coordination.

The oversight role that was given to this authority was meant to ensure that it can offer guidance to any of the intelligence agencies, especially when it is necessary to collect specific data about an identified threat. Although each of the six agencies are independent, the Inspector General is given the oversight mandate, which enables it to place direct requests to any of them. As the agency that is central to Australia’s intelligence community, it is the representative of this country at the council of the Five Eyes. It is the entity that receives intelligence gathered by other countries and shares it with internal agencies within the country. It also has the responsibility of sharing intelligence gathered by the Australian agencies with the members of the council.

The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency of Canada

NSIRA was created as an independent agency and given a mandate to review intelligence and national security activities of various government agencies, and to ensure that these activities are necessary, lawful, and reasonable. The agency was also given a mandate to receive public complaints relating to activities of national security agencies, and to conduct investigation about the same, as John reports.⁵⁹ It was granted statutory powers that enable it to have access to information gathered by individual intelligence and security agencies. It is expected to make regular reports to the Prime Minister about activities of the intelligence community and how effective they are in gathering relevant information meant to enhance national security. It will also report about possible major weaknesses in any of the intelligence agencies, and how the identified issues can be addressed.

The critical oversight role that was given to NSIRA made it necessary for it to be part of the intelligence council of the Five Eyes. It has regular and unlimited access to information that is collected by intelligence agencies in Canada. As a member of the council, it is expected to share the intelligence with members of the community. It also has a critical role of sharing weaknesses of the local agencies in intelligence gathering with the council. At the same time, it can also share best practices that local agencies have embraced to enhance their capabilities.⁶⁰ Sharing that information helps the council to develop and embrace better strategies of gathering intelligence.

The Office of the Intelligence Commissioner of Canada

It is important to note that Canada has two representatives in the Five Eyes council. The Office of the Intelligence Commissioner of Canada was also included in the council, besides the NSIRA discussed above, because of its unique position in the Canadian intelligence community. This office has a quasi-judicial review powers of all intelligence services in the country.⁶¹ Before any of the Canadian intelligence and security agencies can engage in any espionage activities, the commissioner will have to be involved. The commissioner will then review the nature of the espionage, the goal that is to be achieved, possible threats to the agents and the country, the legality, benefits, and any other issue of interest relating to that activity. It will then determine if the benefits outweigh risks or vice versa. The advice provided by the commissioner will define whether the espionage activity will be conducted or abolished.

The commissioner plays the same legal advisory role at the Five Eyes council. It enables the intelligence community to understand the legal structures in non-member states which are of interest to the community. For instance, when it is necessary to collect intelligence from China or Russia, which are classified as non-friendly nations, the commission can advise the intelligence community on how to circumvent laws in the identified nations. It will assess possible threats both to the agents and nations involved. It will then provide recommendations on how the needed intelligence can be gathered without exposing the agents to unnecessary threats, and the involved nations to diplomatic challenges.

The Commissioner of Intelligence Warrants of New Zealand

The Office of the Commissioner of Intelligence Warrants was created to help assess the need for local intelligence agencies to collect intelligence from citizens or local organizations.⁶² The government understands the need to balance between the need to collect intelligence and the importance of respecting privacy rights of its citizens. According to Campanella and Marta, while citizens highly value their privacy, they also expect the government to ensure that they are safe and protected from any form of attack.⁶³ Security of a country and its citizens tend to supersede privacy needs.

The commissioner is expected to review major cases of espionage that needs to be conducted by relevant security and intelligent organs in the country. It has to be satisfied that there is a proper security justification for the intelligence to be gathered, especially when privacy of New Zealanders will be compromised. It has the power to stop an agency from gathering information about citizens or organizations if it feels that there is no proper justification to do so. It oversight role in guiding intelligence collection in New Zealand made it be considered as part of the FIORC agencies. Being a member of the council will enable it to understand the need to collect data in various instances that would otherwise appear unjustifiable. It will be convinced, at the international level, of the need to investigate specific organizations or individuals considered to pose a major threat locally or to member states.⁶⁴ The presence of this commissioner at the council is viewed as an attempt to limit or eliminate hurdles that can affect intelligence gathering in the country.

The Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security of New Zealand

The Inspector-General of Intelligence is the officer who has the oversight and review roles in the intelligence and security sector in the country. It has a supervisory role over the other intelligence and security agencies in the country. It also has the responsibility of reviewing the legality of activities of the security and intelligent agencies. Of the Commissioner of Intelligence Warrants flags off a specific espionage activity as being unlawful, this agency will conduct a further investigation to determine the legality.⁶⁵ It will then instruct the relevant agency to cease the investigation, in case it is convinced that the espionage is illegal or unwarranted. However, it also has the powers to explain to the Commissioner of Intelligence Warrants the significance of the espionage and why it is necessary to allow it to proceed. This office is also responsible for reviewing intelligence gathered by different agencies in the country and ensuring that it is shared among the relevant authorities. It was included in the council because of the fact that it has access to all intelligence gathered in the country. It is the only agency that has the capacity to share intelligence collected in New Zealand with member states in this intelligence community. It also receives intelligence from this community and shares it with relevant agencies within the country.

The Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office of the United Kingdom

In the United Kingdom, the Investigatory Powers of Commissioner’s Office has the oversight powers in the intelligence and security community. According to Testerman and Freed, this agency has the mandate to oversee how intelligence agencies use their investigatory powers with the aim of ensuring that they act in accordance with law of the land and interests of the public.⁶⁶ The office was created by Investigatory Powers Act of 2016 to help ensure that all the security and intelligence agencies in the country act in accordance with the law and in the best interest of citizens of this country.⁶⁷ One of the issues that the commissioner was expected to address was the concern that some of the intelligence agencies were ignoring privacy laws in their investigative activities. There was a growing concern among members of the public that the government was too concerned about intelligence gathering, some of which did not benefit the country, at the expense of their privacy.

The commissioner was given the oversight powers over the intelligence agencies in the country. It means that its mandate allows it to have access to intelligence gathered by any of these agencies, their current investigatory activities, and the plans that they have. Although the individual intelligence agencies in the United Kingdom are independent, they are expected to work closely with this office and to take into consideration the recommendations it provides. Through this office, security and intelligence organs in the country can easily share data and avoid duplication of work. It is the representative of the United Kingdom’s intelligence community in the FIORC. It shares with the commission the intelligence that has been gathered in the United Kingdom. It also receives intelligence that is relevant to the United Kingdom from the other partners, and shares the same with relevant authorities within the country.

The Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community of the United States

The Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community of the United States was created by the Inspector General Act of 1978.⁶⁸ It was given the mandate to independently conduct audits, inspections, investigations and reviews in the intelligence community with the goal of promoting effectiveness, efficiency, and integration. It also focuses on identifying and eliminating wastes, fraud, and mismanagement in the federal government. The United States has numerous intelligence agencies, as had been discussed in the previous chapter. Each of these agencies operate independently but with similar goals of protecting the United States from all forms of attack and maintaining law and order.

These individual agencies have to find a way of maintaining a proper coordination of their activities to achieve the best outcome. Through such coordinated approaches, they learn to share their intelligence and avoid duplication of works. Paulussen and Scheinin believe that through such strategies, these intelligence agencies are able to reduce the amount of money that they spend in gathering and processing information from various sources.⁶⁹ The Office of the Inspector General of Intelligence Community, which is within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, is responsible for creating the platform that is needed for the agencies to share data and coordinate their activities. Although it lacks the power to direct or dictate activities of individual agencies such as the FBI or CIA, it helps the two work autonomously but in a way that enables them to share intelligence.

The central role that this office plays in the intelligence community in the United States made it the most appropriate entity to represent the country in the Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council. The United States has several civilian and military intelligence agencies gathering information both locally and internationally. As Vernon observes, it may not be possible for all of the local agencies to be represented in the council.⁷⁰ The fact that the Office of the Inspector General of Intelligence Community is the focal point for all these agencies, it is best placed to represent them in this international community. It shares information collected by individual agencies in the United States with other members of the Five Eyes community. It also receives intelligence from the foreign agencies within the community and shares it with relevant authorities within the United States. It is also important to note that council has its headquarters at this office.

Governance System of Five Eyes in the United States

The United States is the most powerful member of this alliance, with an intelligence network that spans the entire global community. According to Lindsay, the United States Intelligence Community remains the most advanced intelligence gathering community in the world.⁷¹ Activities of this community is coordinated by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence under the leadership of the Director of National Intelligence.⁷² Figure 2.1 below shows the seal of the United States Intelligence Community. The community brings together the military intelligence, civilian intelligence, and intelligence agencies. A report by Blistène shows currently, there are 1271 government agencies and 1931 private entities working in more than 10,000 locations within the country.⁷³ The report also shows that this community has more than 850,000 active military and civilian agents working locally and in different parts of the world.

Figure 2.1. US Intelligence Community Seal

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence has the oversight role over the individual agencies within this community. However, each of the individual agencies operate independently and are all responsible for the collection of intelligence in specific field. Olson explains that although the ODNI has the mandate to oversight and to access intelligence gathered by each agency, there is a level of governance freedom that is granted to each of the members of this community to ensure that they can operate freely and effectively.⁷⁵

The Office of Naval Intelligence is the oldest member of the United States Intelligence Community. Founded in 1882, it had the primary responsibility of gathering intelligence for the United States Army.⁷⁶ Its roles and responsibilities has been evolving over time, but it remains the agency that is responsible for providing naval intelligence for the community. It mostly focuses on gathering intelligence about naval activities of foreign nations, especially those classified as hostile countries. It provides intelligence about the enemy strength, advances in strategies, plans, and any other activity that may be of interest to the country and its allies. Its activities are directly governed and sponsored by the United States Navy.

Bureau of Intelligence and Research is another powerful agency in the country’s intelligence community. Having been founded in 1945, it is regarded as the oldest civilian intelligence agency.⁷⁷ At the time of its establishment, the United States had developed a deep interest in gathering foreign intelligence to help it plan effectively. The UKUSA agreement had also been signed, and these were the agencies that were expected to help in gathering intelligence. Governed under the Department of State, it is responsible for providing intelligence that defines the United States foreign policy and diplomacy. Most of its activities are conducted outside the country in utmost secrecy. The Department of Defense has the power to determine when to increase or reduce the number of agents in active duties in this agency.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is a well-known and the most powerful civilian intelligence agency in the world. Often referred to as the Company, the Agency, or the CIA, this agency was established in 1947 as a federal agency mandated to gather, process, and interpret information of national security from around the world.⁷⁸ This agency has shaped human intelligence (HUMINT) as it is known today. It uses a team of highly skilled agents who are stations in different parts of the world as United States spies. It lacks law enforcement functions but closely coordinates with agencies such as FBI when it is necessary to arrest an individual considered to pose a threat within the country. Its domestic functions are limited as it is expected to primarily focus on foreign state and non-state actors considered to pose a threat to the United States National Security. What makes this agency very powerful is that although it reports to the Director of National Intelligence, it is an independent organization without any parent organization that it has to report to and that has to regulate its activities. The director of the CIA has the powers to define the number of agents that should be in active duty from time to time, as the situation may demand.

The National Security Agency is another powerful intelligence agency that is mandated to monitor, collect, and process information at a global scale for purposes of domestic and foreign intelligence. It also specializes on counterintelligence activities using signals intelligence (SIGINT). Figure 2.2 below shows a satellite that this agencies uses in its signal intelligence activities. The authority is responsible for the protection of information systems and communications network in the United States.⁷⁹ Most of its activities that focus on gathering intelligence from the enemy is often done in a clandestine way to avoid a detection by the enemy. It regular reports informs the decision that the US Department of Defense takes in addressing foreign threats to national security or the security of its allies around the world. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) also works closely with NSA and uses the same strategies of collecting data and they are both within the Department of Defense.

Figure 2.2. NSA satellite collecting geospatial intelligence

The community has several other intelligence agencies that play different roles of gathering domestic and foreign intelligence that relates to the country’s security and its installations around the world. They include the Coast Guard Intelligence (CGI), Sixteenth Air Force (16 AF), Central Security Service (CSS), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Military Intelligence Corps (MIC), Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (OICI), and Marine Corps Intelligence (MCI).⁸¹ Others include Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA), Intelligence Branch (IB), Office of National Security Intelligence (ONSI), Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), and National Space Intelligence Center (NSIC).⁸² Most of these agencies are fully or semi-autonomous, and depending on the assignment given to them and their budget, they may increase or reduce their workforce and infrastructure to achieve the intended goal.

Governance System of Five Eyes in the United Kingdom

The United Kingdom has the second-most advance intelligence community in this alliance, and the country has been keen on expanding its capabilities to reduce its reliance on the United States intelligence community. Different government agencies are responsible for governance and expansion activities of intelligence agencies that fall within their jurisdiction. The agencies in the UK are classified into three categories, which include intelligence and security agencies, military agencies, and domestic intelligence agencies.⁸³ It is necessary to discuss each of these groups to understand how they are governed and expansion strategies.

The intelligence and security agencies include the Secret Intelligence Service (M16)-which is one of the most powerful intelligence agencies in the world, and Government Communications Headquarters, both of which fall in the Foreign office.⁸⁴ M16 mostly focuses on gathering of foreign intelligence while GCHQ focuses on gathering signal intelligence both locally and internationally. The Security Service, often referred to as M15, is a counter espionage and counter terrorism intelligence agency that works under the Home Office. Its primary responsibility is to gather intelligence needed by the security agencies to plan and execute attacks meant to neutralize threats. Military intelligence has one agency the Defense Intelligence, which works under the Ministry of Defense. Its primary mandate is to gather and analyze military intelligence to help in the planning of military activities.

All domestic intelligence and security agencies in the country are under the Home Office, which is responsible for maintaining internal security, law and order, and other enforcement activities. National Crime Agency (NCA) is one such agency that primarily focused on gathering intelligence about organized crime.⁸⁵ Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) is assigned the role of protecting critical infrastructure and fighting terrorism in the country. Gangmasters and Labor Abuse Authority (GLAA), National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB), National Ballistics Intelligence Service (NBIS), and National Domestic Extremism and Disorder Intelligence Unit (NDEDIU) are the other major agencies meant to fight various forms of crime in the country.⁸⁶ Some of their reports are shared with members of Five Eyes when considered relevant to do so.

Governance System of Five Eyes in Canada

Canada has also been keen on maintaining an intelligence community meant to gather information relating to threats to national security. Samuels explains that Canada does not have sophisticated foreign intelligence agencies such as those in the United States and the United Kingdom.⁸⁷ However, it has local agencies meant to gather intelligence at a domestic level. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) is currently the primary intelligence agency in this country.⁸⁸ It has the mandate to collect and process intelligence on national security threats emanating within the country and abroad. It is expected to provide advice to the relevant ministries on security issues based on data gathered. The government has always limited the expansion of the agency, but sometimes its agents would be increased when there is an eminent threat to the country.⁸⁹ It is important to note that Canadian military agencies heavily rely on intelligence from United States on threats from hostile nations.

Governance System of Five Eyes in Australia and New Zealand

The security agencies in Australia and New Zealand were discussed in sections above. The Australian Secret Intelligence Service has the primary mandate of collecting overseas intelligence. As a HUMINT agency, it uses agents strategically located in different parts of the world, especially in hostile nations and those of socio-economic interest to Australia. The information it provides is critical to the decisions that the Australian government makes, especially those that relate to foreign policies. It works closely with the other military and civilian intelligence agencies in the country to gather and process data.

It is necessary to note that New Zealand is currently considered the weak link in the Five Eyes Community.⁹⁰ It has been taking a favorable stance towards China at a time when the other 4 member states consider the same country as the biggest security and economic threat. It explains why New Zealand has failed to have a robust intelligence agency that focuses on China and Russia, which are currently considered the most powerful foes to the western countries. The New Zealand Intelligence Community (NZIC) has several agencies, most of which focus on collecting threat to national security at local and regional level. The country lacks an elaborate intelligence system capable of collecting data at a global scale.

Analysis Oversight Mechanisms of the Five Eyes

The September 11 terrorist attack in the United States redefined the approach that the intelligence community in the five countries take when addressing threats to national security. Shultz explains that for a long time, many of the western countries believed that the primary threat to national security was state actors, especially from powerful but hostile nations such as Russia and China.⁹¹ However, this event demonstrated that organized criminal gangs can also pose a serious threat to national security, especially when they have access to critical national infrastructure. As such, the United States and its allies in the Five Eyes community opted to significantly expand their capabilities. However, the expansion has attracted the attention of the legislative and judicial agencies within the member states, especially after the 2013 report by Edward Snowden revealed that sometimes these agencies spy on their own citizens.⁹²

The report was an indication that this intelligence community was breaking the law. According to Jameson, Joines, Tyler, and Vogel, in the United States and the member states of Five Eyes, intelligence agencies are legally required to seek permission from the court before they can conduct surveillance on a citizen.⁹³ There must be a proper justification before the relevant agency can be allowed to conduct the surveillance. The magnitude of data gathered by these agencies make it almost impossible to constantly get the approval of courts. The revelation showed that these agencies have even been spying on top judicial, legislative, and executive members of the government. It became apparent that the entity had unique powers that allowed it to break the law without detection.

The Need for Oversight

When analyzing the oversight mechanism of the Five Eyes and the establishment of the oversight council, it is necessary to start by explaining the need for that oversight. Konstantopoulos explains that for many decades, this multinational intelligence community operated without a proper oversight and in utmost secrecy.⁹⁴ It was better for it to work without an oversight as it meant that it had limitless powers to conduct surveillance. However, when investigations revealed that the entity was breaking the law, the community had to accept some form of oversight. Orbach believes that there are four main processes that gave rise to the phenomenon: competition, coercion, normative persuasion, and acculturation.⁹⁵ It is necessary to discuss each to understand why an oversight authority had to be created.

Competition was one of the major forces that made it necessary for the Five Eyes community to redefine its operations and have an oversight authority. For a long time, this intelligence community has remained as the dominant and the most powerful intelligence alliance in the world. It still holds the position of the largest and most powerful intelligence community.⁹⁶ However, other nations are also forming alliances of their own, especially in countries that consider Western countries as a threat to their national security and economic progress. One notable alliance is that between China and Russia, the two leading nations in the Eastern bloc that have always considered the United States and its allies as a threat to their existence.⁹⁷ Figure 3.1 below shows some of the Russian spies who were arrested in the United States.

The two nations are the largest and most powerful communist states both militarily and economically. They have formed an alliance to bolster their military and intelligence capabilities. This alliance of the hostile states poses a major security threat to the Five Eyes, which meant that they had to redefine their operations. Having an oversight authority was considered one of the ways of redefining its operations. It was seen as a strategy that would create a centralized command center to oversee activities of the various intelligence agencies. The oversight authority could also warn member agencies of the possible threat that they need to give a greater focus. It would help to effectively counter the growing powers of the hostile countries.

Figure 3.1. Russian spies living in the US

Coercion was probably the most important factor that created the need to have an oversight authority in the intelligence community. For more than six decades, the powers and specific strategies used by the intelligence agencies within the Five Eyes community remained unknown to many. Their activities were and reports were highly classified and were not accessible to many, especially those outside the top executive positions in fields relating to security and intelligence.⁹⁹ Judicial officers and legislative officials, including the legislators themselves, were not aware that these agencies were conducting surveillance on their citizens, and that they were victims of the breach of privacy. When Edward Snowden released the dossier in 2013, there was an instant reaction from members of the public, the judicial service, and members of the legislative arm of the government. The leak revealed that there was a major loophole that had to be addressed to protect rights of their citizens.

The government of the United Kingdom acknowledged that there had been cases where it was necessary to conduct surveillance on citizens as a means of enhancing national security. Although the United States intelligence community did not directly admit to breaking the law, it accepted that there was a need to have an oversight in intelligence gathering. The intelligence communities in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand also faced coercion from the legislature and the judicial arms of the government. Members of the public also wanted an assurance that the government would not subject them to surveillance arbitrarily without proper justification and a court order. They wanted to be sure that their right to privacy was protected as much as possible.¹⁰⁰ The intelligence community could no longer ignore the pressure that was coming from these different directions. The fact that senior judiciary officials, legislators, and government officials were identified as some of the victims of the arbitrary surveillance increased the pressure to reform the intelligence community.

Normative persuasion is another possible explanation why Five Eyes introduced an oversight authority in its operation. According to Mickolus, normative influence refers to a behavioral change towards what the social system and norms deem necessary.¹⁰¹ It is a case where an individual or an entity changes in order to conform to specific norms or to fit in a given system. It is important to note that the behavioral change in this case is forced, not voluntary. Given an opportunity, an individual or an organization would prefer behaving in a different way. However, their need to be accepted within a given community or a social circle forces them to change their behavior. Five Eyes intelligence community operated for six decades without any proper oversight authority.

Individual agencies could gather data deemed relevant, based on their mandate and budget, and share their findings with other members of the community to help enhance national within the member states. They would have preferred operating in secrecy and without any limitations. However, they had to change, based on the changes within the community. Soon after the Second World War and during the period of Cold War, the society in western countries felt that increased surveillance was necessary to help enhance the threat to national security. However, the perception that Russia can invade the United States at any time is changing, and with the change comes the need for increased privacy. Many people feel that there is a need to limit surveillance on citizens, especially when there is no proper justification to do so. The intelligence community has been persuaded to conform to the new social need. It has been forced to have an oversight authority to help put in check, activities of individual intelligence agencies within the community.

Acculturation is the last factor that is attributed to the creation of an oversight authority in this community. The global community is changing because of changes brought about by technology, increased interaction, and many other factors. Unlike in the past, the digital era has ushered a new practice where people rely on technology in many ways. Although many people still hold bank accounts, money has transformed from the physical to digital currency that can be transferred from one account to another using a mobile phone, a laptop, an iPad, or related gadgets.¹⁰² A new norm has also emerged where people prefer storing their data in their emails, computers, or specific databases. Dating has moved from physical settings to the online platforms.

Many people are also working from home instead of going to physical offices or workstations. It is also possible to order food or any item through online platforms and make the payment digitally. Almost every aspect of life for many people has gone digital. As such, privacy has become a major concern to many people. They know that if someone finds an unauthorized access to their private lives through digital surveillance, all their secrets can be revealed to the entire world. There is also the threat of losing their resources, especially if the intelligence agent is a rogue officer with access to one’s bank accounts. These changes have introduced a new culture in the United States and other western countries where people highly value their privacy. It has forced the intelligence community to conform to the new culture and redefine its operational strategies.

Establishment of the Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council

The emerging challenges discussed above forced Five Eyes member states to establish an oversight authority to help regulate activities of this intelligence community. Five Eyes Intelligence Oversight and Review Council (FIORC) was established in September 2016 with the goal of promoting good practices, conducting oversight, coordinating activities of different agencies, and ensuring that activities done by the agency are in line with existing laws and regulations in the member states.¹⁰³ The member states acknowledged that as the community continued to expand, it was becoming important to put in place measures that will ensure that public trust and support is maintained. The Charter that created the council, outlined specific goals that the community had to achieve in light of the emerging threats, methods of data collection and analysis that were needed, and how the community could work as a unit to confront specific challenges. FIORC defined specific phases, in line with the oversight demands in the member states, which mass surveillance had to follow, especially if it targeted citizens of the member states. It identified 8 phases, as discussed below, that the individual intelligence agencies had to follow.

Strategic planning was identified as the first step in this 8-staged process. Before any agency can focus on the collection of HUMINT, SIGINT, or any other form of intelligence, there has to be a proper planning. The relevant authority is expected to start by identifying the intelligence priorities.¹⁰⁴ These priorities will often be defined by the pressing security concern in a country. For instance, the United States is currently concerned about activities of Chinese technology companies, such as Huawei, in collection of sensitive data from the United States and its allies.¹⁰⁵ CIA will need to clearly define this threat, identify the pattern that it is taking, and determine how it can work with both local agencies, such as FBI, and foreign entities to determine activities of these Chinese corporation.

Having a clearly defined plan makes the execution process simpler. It helps to define specific roles of various agents and organizations, how activities will be coordinated, possible threats and how to neutralize them, and contingency plans, in case they would be necessary. Each intelligence agency has the mandate and freedom to conduct strategic planning independently, and can only engage other agencies of FIORC secretariat if it is deemed necessary. It is necessary to reiterate that the 8 steps that FIORC has stipulated are suggested best practices, and that it does not have the authority to force individual agencies within this intelligence community to embrace them.

Application process is a new phase that most of the intelligence agencies did not have to follow in the past. According to Hutchings and Treverton, FIORC currently require its agencies to make application for a warrant in case the goal is to collect bulk intelligence, especially when it involves mass collection of data from unsuspecting citizens.¹⁰⁶ This is the stage where the agency seeks for permission to collect intelligence in a process that may breach privacy laws and regulations. In many cases, the authorization may need to be obtained from the relevant ministry or government departments. It means that intelligence agencies under the Department of Defense will get the permission from the top leadership of this department, while those under the Department of States will also need to do the same with their respective authorities.

In some cases, the approval may have to come from a court of law. It means that the relevant agency will have to explain to the court the need for the surveillance, how it will be conducted, the level of privacy breach, and any other relevant information. The agency must convince the court that there is a legitimate need to conduct the surveillance, especially the need to maintain national security and protect socio-political and economic interests of the country. Some of the agencies are structured in a way that enables them to easily bypass this stage. CIA is one such agency because it does not have affiliation to any government department. It is an independent civilian agency that focuses on collecting intelligence beneficial to the United States from foreign countries. The fact that its operations are mainly outside of the borders of the parent country means that it cannot be easily accused of privacy breaches back at home.¹⁰⁷ Regulating such an agency has been a challenge, but at the same time it is beneficial because it can bypass legal hurdles in the collection of critical intelligence for the community.

Authorization and approval is now a requirement that individual agencies have to observe. Once an application is made, the agency must wait for the relevant authority to approve the request. If the request was made to the head of the ministry or government department, the same entity is expected to give an approval so that the intelligence collection can continue. If the warrant has to come from a court of law, then the agency has to wait for the judge to give the approval. It is important to note that the relevant government department or a judge can fail to give an approval or authorization for intelligence collection.¹⁰⁸ When the approving body realizes that there is no proper justification to warrant the surveillance, it will reject the request. It can also reject the request if the level of threat explained is not worth the level of privacy breaches that is expected.

In case the warrant is not issued, the intelligence agency is required to stop all the activities and to avoid the temptation to use alternative means to circumvent the law. The goal is to ensure that activities of these intelligence agencies do not go against the law. CIA enjoys a special privilege because it does not require any ministerial approval or authorization from judicial commissioners. Unless its agents are focusing on an internal issue that cannot be handled by national intelligence agencies, there is always no need for the entity to get an approval before proceeding with its investigations.

Collection and filtering is the next step in this suggested best practice. When the individual agency has obtained the necessary authorization, it can then proceed with the process of data collection. Different agencies use various strategies to gather data from the relevant authorities. For instance, some agencies would tap fiber optic backbone cable or an internet service provider to gather the needed intelligence.¹⁰⁹ The practice is common when an agency is interested in gathering intelligence from individuals believed to be planning an attack and coordinating their activities through telephone communications. Sometimes it may be necessary for the intelligence agencies to break into the home, office, or hotel room of a suspect to plant a listening device. Such extreme strategies poses a serious threat to both the agents involved and the targeted individual. It explains why it is important to get an authorization from the courts or other relevant agencies. Riordan emphasizes that in such extreme cases, the agency should act within the limits of the warrant provided.¹¹⁰ For instance, if the warrant allowed the agents to plant a listening device, planting a device meant to collect video and other images will be a breach of the warrant. Acting within the law is meant to ensure that data collected by the agency would be admissible in a court of law.

Data processing is the next phase once data has been gathered from relevant sources. The collected intelligence needs to be processed, tagged, and stored in a secure database. According to May and Marwaha, when handling bulk data, it may be a complex process to go through it to select those that are relevant for the organization.¹¹¹ For instance, SIGINT that is tapped from various telecommunication platforms may contain numerous information that is irrelevant to the investigation. Traditionally, agents would be tasked with listening to the communication to identify relevant contents. It is a time-consuming process that requires a large number of officers, especially when collecting data from numerous sources. Technologies have been developed to help in processing large data. Using machines learning, it is possible to train computer system to identify information of interest. These machines can be trained to target specific words, phrases, and codes that may indicate issues of interest.

Once a segment of the data is signaled by the system, human experts can then conduct a further investigation of their contents to determine if they may be of interest. When collecting GEOINT, the same challenge of gathering mass data, most of which may be irrelevant, would arise. The satellites that these agencies use are in constant motion, and they capture all physical activities on earth in areas they pass through.¹¹² Most of the data captured through such a process may not be of interest to the security intelligence. However, the use of artificial intelligence (AI) is currently making it easier to process such large data more efficiently and with the use of fewer agents.

Analysis of the data is needed once it is processed and stored in secure databases

Hoverd, Nelson, and Bradley explain that the primary purpose of gathering intelligence is to help top military generals and security organs to make informed decisions meant to enhance national security.¹¹³ Once data is collected and processed as being of interest, a clear meaning has to be developed to understand how a country needed to respond to it. When GEOINT reveals Russian troops are gathering near the border with Ukraine, it may mean that it is a normal military drill because they have not crossed the border. However, the United States intelligence community interpreted that as final steps towards Russian invasion of Ukraine. The conclusion was made because supportive HUMINT and SIGINT had indicated that there were advanced plans by Russia to attack Ukraine.¹¹⁴ When aerial photos indicated that Russian troops and heavy artillery were gathering along the country’s border with Ukraine, it was easy to conclude that Russia was making final preparations to attack Ukraine.

The United States and its allies within the Five Eyes, Nine Eyes, and Fourteen Eyes expressed their concerns to the international community and informed the world that Russia was in advanced stages of its plan to attack Ukraine. Although Russia tried to refute these claims when they were first reported, it did not take long before president Putin declared a special military operation in Ukraine, and the military personnel and hardware crossed into the Ukrainian border. It was an indication that the analysis of data collected by the American forces led to accurate diagnosis of the impending attack. Accurate analysis of the situation considered to be a threat to national security is critical because it defines the decision that is made by various security organs.

Review and evaluation in the next step in this proposed best practice when data has been analyzed. At this stage, various issues will need to be reviewed by the relevant agency. First, it will need to determine if the primary goal of the intelligence process was realized. The team will need to determine if the process made it possible for the agency to collect data that would enable the relevant security agencies to neutralize the identified threats. If the primary goal was not realized, there should be a detailed account of specific factors that made it difficult to achieve these goals. Watt explains that if the failure was caused by internal weaknesses, there should be a mechanism that should be put in place to address it.¹¹⁵ In case the failure was caused by external forces, the agents involved should provide an explanation of ways in which such obstacles can be managed.

The review and evaluation process also involves determining if the entire process was done in accordance with the law. It is possible that some steps taken went against the law or violated individuals’ privacy beyond what the judicial commission authorized. The team should explain how such mistakes should be avoided in future to ensure that such processes are in line with the laws of the land. A report about the effectiveness of the methodology of data collection should also be provided at this stage. This is meant to facilitate a continuous improvement of the intelligence gathering strategies.

Reporting is the final stage of the best practice that is proposed by FIORC to individual intelligence agencies. Once data has been collected, processed, and interpreted, it should be shared with the relevant agencies that need to use it to make strategic and tactical decisions. The intelligence will only be worthwhile if it is used to give an edge to agencies of the member states over their rivals in the global economic environment and local or foreign security threat. The agency should know the kind of information that needs to be shared with different entities. For instance, when it is establish that a piece of intelligence only affects the United Kingdom, and that sharing it with New Zealand, which currently has a close working relationship with China, may compromise the security of the UK, then the intelligence may need to be shared selectively.

The CIA triad, shown in figure 3.2 below, shows three factors that have to be taken into account when reporting such highly classified information. Confidentiality is the first factor, which means that the information should be safe from intentional or accidental disclosure, as Brady explains.¹¹⁶ Measures should be placed to protect the data from accidental leaks or planned attacks. Integrity is the second factor which requires that the information should be free from intentional or accidental modification.¹¹⁷ The information presented should be as truthful as it can be, and the agency should eliminate the possibility that the intelligence provided is not what was collected and processed. The last requirement is the availability of data, which dictates that the intelligence should be made available to the relevant authorities when needed. The agency should also have a clear system that enables it to discard data once it has been used to ensure that it is not accessed by an enemy.

Figure 3.2. CIA Triad

The Oversight Mechanisms of the Five Eyes

The sensitive nature of the activities conducted by intelligence agencies and the fact that sometimes it involves a breach of privacy made it necessary to have oversight mechanisms. According to Smith and West, traditionally, activities of the individual intelligence agencies in each of the Five Eyes countries were overseen by the executive.¹¹⁹ However, that has changed because of the need to have effective oversight mechanisms. There are two main oversight mechanisms that currently govern activities of intelligence agencies in each of these countries. The first one is that currently, the mandate and jurisdiction of most of these intelligence agencies within the five countries are governed by statues, as opposed to executive orders.¹²⁰

The statue defines the powers of each agency, how they are expected to conduct their activities, the supervisory tasks needed, a mechanism of reporting, and how to address possible excesses. It means that the autonomy that the intelligence agencies enjoyed is currently put on check. Although there is a general perception that the CIA has remained a powerful intelligence agency that is not under a proper judicial or legislative agency, the fact that most of its operations are outside the country meant that many Americans do not feel threatened by it.

The second oversight mechanism that has been created in the intelligence community within the five countries is the creation of non-executive oversight authorities. A significant number of these agencies are currently answerable to the judicial and legislative agencies. Barton explains that there are specialized congressional and parliamentary committees that oversee operations of some of these agencies.¹²¹ In all the five countries, independent commissioners and inspectors-general offices have been created to guide the activities of these agencies. It is also becoming common to have judicial oversight to help regulate the intelligence community. The creation of independent national security legislation reviewers has also been seen as an additional oversight mechanism. These steps were taken to ensure that these agencies win back public trust and support. Citizens are convinced that actions taken by these intelligence agencies will be scrutinized by their representatives and judicial officers. It creates a reassurance that as these agencies work to promote national security, they will not arbitrarily breach one’s right to privacy or break national laws.

Implications of Establishment of FIORC

The establishment of FIORC has had a major implication on the normal activities of intelligence agencies in the five countries. According to Farrell and Newman, the establishment of FIORC has created a sense of coordinated approach of activities in the intelligence community.¹²² In the past, individual agencies had to conduct their activities independently and then determine which information was worth sharing with member states. However, this entity has created a central command system where activities of individual agencies are coordinated. FIORC has also provided best practices for the individual agencies meant to improve their work. Through this entity, the agencies can share challenges that they face in their operation and have a platform for finding a common solution.

New intelligence gathering practices can easily be shared by the agencies within the community through the secretariat of the regular council meetings. It has also made it easy for the intelligence agencies in the five countries to share data in real time, especially when facing a major threat such as terrorism or acts of aggression.¹²³ The creation of FIORC also helped in addressing concerns of the judicial agencies, legislative bodies, and members of the public about breaches to privacy by these intelligence agencies. This agency was created in response to the concern that had been created against the intelligence agencies. Its existence is meant to restore trust in these communities. It was a reminder that there was an oversight authority that would not allow the intelligence community to arbitrarily breach existing laws in their effort to gather intelligence.

Conclusion

The intelligence community plays a critical role in enhancing national security and defining a country’s foreign policies. The United States has been keen on developing a powerful intelligence community that can help inform its military, economic, social, and political decisions. It explains why it came together with the United Kingdom to form UKUSA agreement as a platform to share intelligence gathered in the two countries. These two nations soon saw the need to expand their intelligence community beyond the two nations. They invited Canada, Australia, and New Zealand primarily because they had a similar political ideology and a perceived common enemy. They were also Anglophones, which defined them as a community that should define common interest. It led to the establishment of Five Eyes intelligence community.

Five Eyes has been expanding since the end of the Second World War. Immediately after the global war, Cold War broke out between the United States and its capitalistic allies on the one side and the Soviet Union and its communist allies on the other side. Deni explains that this was a period of massive arms’ race as each bloc focused on improving their weapons to neutralize the threat as soon as possible in case a war broke out.¹²⁴ The rapid growth of nuclear war led to massive concerns as their capabilities were immense. Five Eyes found it critical to monitor every activity of the Russian forces and its allies to help handle the threat. GEOINT, HUMINT, and SIGNINT became critical in determining the plans and physical activities of the enemy. The community continued to invest in technology and human resource to facilitate its intelligence and counterintelligence activities.

When Cold War ended, a new threat in the form of terrorism emerged. When the United States and its allies declared war on terror, it meant that the capacity of Five Eyes had to be expanded. There was a need to track down the terrorists, especially in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. The agencies had the task of conducting geospatial intelligence, human intelligence, and signal intelligence in the enemies’ home ground. Agencies such as CIA and NSA had to recruit locals that could blend well in this country. As such, the number of agents working for these organization had to increase significantly. As Five Eyes was dealing with terror threat that operated in foreign countries, especially in the Middle East, a new security challenge emerged in the form of homegrown terrorism. Once again, the individual agencies within the Five Eyes community had to expand their operations to address the new threat.¹²⁵ It meant that the intelligence agencies had to conduct surveillance on their own citizens, sometimes without a warrant. It was the only way of identifying and neutralizing the threat in time.

The expansion of Five Eyes, especially the need to conduct surveillance on a country’s own citizens in a way that breaches privacy laws, made it necessary to have an oversight. At the regional level, FIORC was established to promote best practices among the agencies within the intelligence community. This office made it possible for the agencies to share data in a coordinated manner, especially when trying to neutralize a common threat. It has also created an image that the intelligence community is currently under some form of supervision.

Oversight roles over the individual intelligence agencies have been strengthened at a national level because FIORC has no power to dictate how its member agencies operate. In all of the five countries, some of these intelligence agencies are under statutes, which defines how they need to operate and report their findings. Some of them are currently answerable to judicial commissions while other work under the supervision of congressional and parliamentary commissions. The oversight was created to help create integrity in the community and to ensure that there is public trust and support. It is apparent that as new threats such as China and North Korea get bolder and more powerful, Five Eyes will continue to expand.

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Footnotes

Rungsawatdisap Phūangthō̜ng, Infiltrating Society: The Thai Military’s Internal Security Affairs (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2021), 27-45.
Alaina Roberts, I’ve Been Here All the While: Black Freedom on Native Land (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2021), 33-52.
Miriam Krieger, Lynne Garcia, John Riley and Will Atkins, eds. American Defense Policy. 9th ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2021), 61-87.
James Behuniak, John Dewey and Daoist Thought (Albany: SUNY Press State University of New York, 2019), 71-88.
Robert Murray and Paul Gecelovsky, The Palgrave Handbook of Canada in International Affairs (Cham Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021) 12-49.
Tamara Small and Harold Jansen, Digital Politics in Canada: Promises and Realities (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2020), 21-51.
Christian Leuprecht and Hayley McNorton, Intelligence as Democratic Statecraft: Accountability and Governance of Civil-Intelligence Relations across the Five Eyes Security Community – the United States United Kingdom Canada Australia and New Zealand (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 11-28.
Christian Leuprecht and Hayley McNorton, Intelligence as Democratic Statecraft, 31-44.
Anthony Wells, Between Five Eyes: 50 Years of Intelligence Sharing (Havertown: Casemate, 2020), 55-82.
Scott Cawthon, Kira Breed-Wrisley and Claudia Schroder, The Silver Eyes (London: Scholastic, 2020). 91-112.
Scott Cawthon, Kira Breed-Wrisley and Claudia Schroder. The Silver Eyes. 101-121.
Dennis Molinaro, The Bridge in the Parks: The Five Eyes and Cold War Counter-Intelligence (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2021), 11-34.
Patricia Ordóñez and Miltiadis Lytras, Global Challenges and Strategic Disruptors in Asian Businesses and Economies (Hershey: Business Science Reference, 2021), 78-99.
Geoffrey Hale and Greg Anderson, Navigating a Changing World: Canada’s International Policies in an Age of Uncertainties (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2021), 27-45.
Gus Otto, “Ethics and Morality in the U.S. Government and How the Intelligence Community Must Respond.” American Intelligence Journal 36, no. 2 (2019), 54-60.
Gus Otto, “Ethics and Morality in the U.S., 58-60.
Jeffrey Fair, “Polycentricity in the United States Intelligence Community.” American Intelligence Journal 36, no. 1 (2019), 52-57.
Richard Shultz, Transforming US Intelligence for Irregular War: Task Force 714 in Iraq (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2020), 21-44.
Richard Shultz, Transforming US Intelligence for Irregular War. 11-19.
Mariusz Kamiński, “Intelligence Sources in the Process of Collection of Information by the U.S. Intelligence Community.” International & National Studies 21, no. 1 (2019), 2-105.
Erin Kearns and Joseph Young. Tortured Logic: Why Some Americans Support the Use of Torture in Counterterrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2020), 56-79.
Miriam Krieger et al. American Defense Policy. 9th ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2021), 90-106.
Avner Barnea, We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2021), 12-39.
Thomas Fingar, From Mandate to Blueprint: Lessons from Intelligence Reform (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2021) 31-67.
James Stejskal, Appointment in Tehran (Philadelphia: Casemate, 2021), 61-78.
Jessica Jameson et al. Facilitating Interdisciplinary Collaboration among the Intelligence Community Academy and Industry (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2020), 53-86.
Dan Lomas, “Spies, Lies, and Algorithms: The History and Future of American Intelligence Get Access Arrow Spies, Lies, And Algorithms: The History and Future of American intelligence.” International Affairs 98, no. 3 (2022), 1084-1085.
Dan Lomas, Spies, Lies, and Algorithms, 1084-1085.
William Kelly, “The President and Intelligence Communities.” American Intelligence Journal, 36, no. 2 (2019), 95-98.
Stejskal, James. Appointment in Tehran, 21-46.
Ray Takeyh, “Did the US Intelligence Community Lose Iran?” Global Politics and Strategy 63, no. 2 (2021), 155-170.
Ray Takeyh, Did the US Intelligence Community Lose Iran? 19-33.
Charlotte Yelamos, Michael Goodman and Mark Stout. “Intelligence and Culture: An Introduction.” Intelligence and National Security 37, no. 4 (2022), 475-481.
Ryan Shaffer, “A History of the Egyptian Intelligence Service: A History of the Mukhabarat, 1910–2009.” Journal of Intelligence History 18, no. 1 (2019), 112-114.
Peter Bergen, September 11 attacks (New York: Cengage, 2022), 6-7
Alaina Roberts, I’ve Been Here All the While: Black Freedom on Native Land (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2021), 31-52.
Tamara Small and Harold Jansen, Digital Politics in Canada: Promises and Realities (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2020), 60-89.
Charles Blaxland, Marcus Fielding and Thea Gellerfy, Niche Wars: Australia in Afghanistan and Iraq 2001-2014 (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2020), 19-38.
Paul Cornish, The Oxford Handbook of Cyber Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 31-43.
Anthony Cheung, Can Hong Kong Exceptionalism Last? Dilemmas of Governance and Public Administration Over Five Decades 1970s-2020 (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press, 2021), 53-75.
David Carment and Christopher Sands, Canada-Us Relations: Sovereignty or Shared Institutions? (Cham Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 81-103.
William Nolte, “US Intelligence and Its Future: Aligning With a New and Complex Environment.” Intelligence and National Security 34, no. 4 (2019), 615-618.
Alaina Roberts, I’ve Been Here All the While, 90-114.
Roger George, “Intelligence in the National Security Enterprise: An Introduction.” Journal of APF Command and Staff College 4, no. 1 (2021), 161-166.
James Behuniak, John Dewey and Daoist Thought, 31-54.
Darcie Rives-East, Surveillance and Terror in Post-9. 44-49.
Chia-Jui Cheng, A New Global Economic Order New Challenges to International Trade Law (Boston: Brill, 2021), 79-118.
Duncan Williams, American Sutra: Buddhism and the World War Ii Japanese American Experience (New York: Harvard University Press, 2019), 21-39.
John Allen, Ben Hodges and Julian Lindley-French, Future War and the Defence of Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 67-99.
Ryan Gallagher, “Inside Menwith Hill: The NSA’s British Base at the Heart of U.S. Targeted Killing.” The Intercept. 1-6.
Geoff Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice. 6th ed. (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022), 27-58.
Ryan Gallagher, Inside Menwith Hill, 64-87.
Tamara Small and Harold Jansen, Digital Politics in Canada: Promises and Realities (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2020), 55-97.
William Bratton, China’s Rise Asia’s Decline Asia’s Difficult Outlook under China’s Shadow (New York: Marshall Cavendish Intern, 2021), 113-128.
David Beirman, Tourism Crises and Destination Recovery (London: Sage Publications, 2021), 45-81.
Andrew Boyd, British Naval Intelligence through the Twentieth Century (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2020), 32-58.
Ross Anderson, Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems. 3rd ed. (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2020), 99-125.
Michael Clarke et al. The Palgrave Handbook of National Security (Cham Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022), 78-99.
Russell John, Cataclysm a Classic Science Fiction Novel (London: Alien Ebooks, 2021), 71-113.
Marian Leighton, Two American Crusades: Actors and Factors in the Cold War and the Global War on Terrorism (Irvine: Universal, 2020), 48-71.
Sarah Carlson, In the Dark of War: A Cia Officer’s Inside Account of the U.S. Evacuation from Libya (New York: Fidelis Books, 2020), 41-63.
Jonathan Stevenson, A Drop of Treason: Philip Agee and His Exposure of the CIA (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2021), 38-52.
Edoardo Campanella and Dassù Marta, Anglo Nostalgia: The Politics of Emotion in a Fractured West (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 56-74.
Bill Macdonald, Intrepid’s Last Secrets: Then and Now: History, Spies and Lies (London: Friesen Press, 2019), 3-29.
Kenneth Conboy, Spies on the Mekong: CIA Clandestine Operations in Laos (New York: Casemate, 2021), 84-115.
Jeff Testerman and Daniel Freed. Call Me Commander: A Former Intelligence Officer and the Journalists Who Uncovered His Scheme to Fleece America (Lincoln Nebraska: Potomac Books, 2021), 35-49.
Chris Wright, Fragments: The Rules of Reality have Changed (London: Omni UK Publishing, 2019). 94-120.
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