Offense-Defense and National Security Theories

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Outline

This paper answers three questions, namely, what are the arguments for beginning the study of “modern” history in the 17th century? What is Offense-Defense Theory? and what are the essential differences between ‘dynastic’ and ‘national’ wars?

The paper outlines the reasons why the 17th century is considered as the start of Modern history based on the advancements made by mankind in the field of political philosophy, science, cultural and social values in that period. The paper traces the effects of works of political philosophers like John Locke and Thomas Hobbes in developing the foundations for the establishment of modern democratic states, the groundbreaking Peace of Westphalia that ushered in the concept of modern nation-states, and the revolutionary effects of the various scientific discoveries of those times.

The paper next explains the offense-defense theory in terms of its three hypotheses, namely that nations resort to offensive action when conquest is easy, that they try to consolidate their gains by repeatedly resorting to offense. This invokes strong defensive action by their adversary. Others resort to the offense when they perceive themselves to be vulnerable. This leads to the concept of preventive wars.

Lastly, the paper addresses the differences between dynastic wars and national wars. The essential difference outlined is that dynastic wars were fought for the interests of the ruler while national wars were fought in the interest of the nation. Dynastic wars did not evoke feelings of nationalism, while national wars did. Dynastic armies were feudal and hierarchical in nature, while national armies were more secular and non-feudal in nature.

What are the arguments for beginning the study of “modern” history in the 17th century?

Ans. The Renaissance period beginning in Europe from 14th to the 17th century, brought in cultural, educational, and scientific reforms to the society and launched a social, cultural, political, and military revolution that characterizes the modern age today. Military revolution in warfare took place in the 17th century with the introduction of standing armies, and formal civil administration of the armies came into vogue. The 17th century saw the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which firmly established the concept of nation-states comprising of shared ethnicity and religion with clearly demarcated geographical boundaries. The political philosophies of Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651) and John Locke’s Two Treatise of Government (1689) became the capstone works for the establishment of modern democratic states, including the United States. Advances in science by eminent personalities such as Rene Descartes, Galileo, Huygens, Kepler, Leibniz, Pascal, and Isaac Newton, to name a few, ushered in a scientific revolution that led to the invention of the mechanical calculator, flintlock musket, telescopes, logarithms, calculus, etc. Economists such as John Law introduced the concepts of modern finance, and central banking was introduced in France. Printing presses became sufficiently advanced to launch the first-ever newspaper, Relation in Germany, in 1609. Thus the basic contours of modern life in politics, governance, economics, society, and culture as known today had their beginnings in the events, personalities, and discoveries of the 17th century and hence the periodization of ‘modern’ history beginning in the 17th century is correct.

The Offense-Defense Theory

Ans. Strategy is nothing but a plan that is pervaded by a paradoxical logic encompassing “the conduct and consequences of human relations in the context of actual or possible armed conflict”. The Offense-Defense theory is one such strategy, which posits that wars are most likely when conquest is easy. States that have greater offensive opportunities will try and capitalize on such capabilities and expand their territories as such a move is likely to produce greater payoffs. States may also go on the offensive if they assess themselves to be vulnerable. In this case, the recourse to offense is to get over the feeling of insecurity; hence the maxim ‘Offense is the best Defense’. The aim of such defensive expansion is to extend the boundaries of own state to more favorable defensible lines, which would serve as a deterrent for any state from committing offensive action. Any state that has a greater sense of insecurity will also take action to resist states that pursue offensive action. The need to offset their perceived disadvantage in terms of capability may lead such states to employ preemptive strikes or embark upon preventive wars. International anarchies can make states fearful about their security and force them to act in ways that make their fears self-fulfilling, and since security comes first, restraint and moral values become secondary. States that employ offense dominance tend to use the approach more frequently as the initial positive payoffs reinforce the utility of offensive action as it makes conquests easier with every successful outcome. World War I was a direct result of German expansion and its counter resistance by other European powers. In World War II, Germany yet again resorted to offensive action to expand its territories that was countered initially by defensive action by the allies and later by offensive action.

What are the essential differences between ‘dynastic’ and ‘national’ wars?

Ans. Dynastic wars or wars by the kings and monarchs were fought between opposing kings or monarchs for the purpose of expansion or defense of respective dynasty’s lands, riches, or status. Dynastic wars were also fought for religious reasons. In dynastic wars, there was no feeling of nationalism. People fought the wars because the ruler ordered them to do so. The subjects obeyed the ruler’s wishes due to tradition, practice, sentiments of loyalty, and at times out of fear of retribution. The decision to go to war in dynastic times rarely included the wishes of the people, the ruler and his council being unilateral arbitrators. Dynastic wars were the norm for the most part of human history until the advent of modern nation-states, when monarchies began getting replaced by democracies or some other form of representative government. In Europe, the American and the French revolution displaced the three-hundred-year histories of dynastic warfare with national wars. National wars evoked a feeling of nationalism amongst the people of the nation and have been fought with genuine support of the people for their cause. The objective of a National war is to advance the interests of a national state, while that of a dynastic war was to advance the interests of the ruler of the dynasty. National wars are the wars of the people, in effect achieving democratization of war. Dynastic wars were fought by dynastic armies whose composition and structure was feudal and hierarchical, wherein the nobility occupied the top echelons, and the nobility decided who could rise up the hierarchy. In national wars, armies lost their feudal character, became secular where even a commoner could aspire to rise to a high post. These are the essential differences between dynastic and national wars.

Bibliography

  1. Addington, Larry H. The Patterns of War Since the Eighteenth Century. NY: Taylor & Francis, 1984.
  2. Clausezwitz, Carl Von, and Anatol Rapoport. On War. NY: Penguin, 1982.
  3. Doyle, Michael. Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism and Socialism. NY: Norton, 1997.
  4. Evera, Stephen Van. Causes of War. NY: Cornell University Press, 1999.
  5. Luttwak, Edward M. Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001.
  6. Rothenberg, Gunther E. “Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus Adolphus, Raimondo Montecuccoli and the Military Revolution of the Seventeenth Century.” In Makers of Modern Strategy, by Peter Paret, Gordon Alexandar Craig and Gilbert Felix, 941. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
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