Observation and Theory in Aristotle’s Scientific Practice

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Table of Contents

Relationship Between Observation and Theory
Observation and Data
The Irrelevance of Observation
Figures and Phenomena
Works Cited

Relationship Between Observation and Theory

Most of the evidence scientists such as Aristotle rely on comes from creating and gathering empirical data. As a logical empiricist of the 20th century, Aristotle accepts his concern while at the same time criticizing some of his presumptions and goals. As a result, Aristotle is largely responsible for the standard philosophical literature in this paper. The empirical evidence provided by Aristotle plays crucial and philosophically intriguing roles in other domains. These other domains include scientific discovery, development of experimental techniques, and application of scientific ideas to real-world issues, thus forming the grounds for this paper.

Empiricism is a scientific theory that places a strong focus on observation and experience rather than just reasoning and thought. Thus, the empiricist interpretation of the nature of reason departs significantly from the traditional philosophical perspective. First of all, Aristotle’s method of thinking is what is now known as deductive reasoning, which involves using logic to draw conclusions about specific occurrences based on previously acquired general information. Although Aristotle, like empiricists, believes that the senses are of the highest significance for acquiring knowledge, he believes that reasoning is how individuals come to it (Aristotle 1). By drawing conclusions about occurrences based on experimentation and observation, or what has come to be known as the scientific method, one learns about the world.

Aristotle focuses on the distinction between the unobservable and observables, the content and structure of observation reports, and the epistemic importance of observational evidence for the theories he aims to access. His philosophical work in this tradition aims to conceptually separate observation and theory to increase the possibility of observation becoming the sole basis for evaluating theories. Aristotle also provides information on how empirical facts are evaluated, produced, and used in practice (Husson 866). He continues to explain that these empirical facts strongly relate to the logic and languages of science in the philosophical literature. As a result, Aristotle generally abandons the ideal of a wholly empirical basis for scientific knowledge and adopts a view of science in which practical and theoretical logic is fruitfully combined.

Aristotle highly acknowledges that observation plays a distinctive role in the epistemology of science. Through observation, the “tribunal of experience” judges scientific theories and ideas (Faerna 1). Additionally, Aristotle states that the evidential value of observation largely depends on the sensitivity of observation to the phenomenon it is meant to explore. However, this statement depends on the validity of any theoretical assumptions on which observation sensitivity is predicated. For example, one can dispute theoretical assertions concerning whether a thermometer reading can indicate the temperature of the patient well enough to count against or in favor of the prediction.

From this example, one can contest the usage of a certain thermometer reading to support a prediction on the temperature of the patient. Aristotle adds that even if other investigators refuse to support this theoretical statement expressly, their usage of the thermometer reading is often weakened by their untruth (Moore 340). Therefore, all applications and observations of observational data are theory-laden. The thermometer example demonstrates the assertion by Aristotle that seeing is a theory-laden venture and applies just as well to equipment-made observations.

He highlights the harm and challenges that would occur if the theoretical presumptions underlying the outcomes were true. After all, his empirical research results are mostly combined with theorizing due to these presumptions. Besides, the ability of a scientist to draw on previous assumptions to recognize any number written in a lab notebook as the patient’s temperature is limited. However, philosophers, including Aristotle, have embraced a more composite conception of the empirical and theoretical facts intertwined. In complex empiricism, an immaculate separation between model and data is impossible. Additionally, the impure empirical data, which refers to the evidence that considers the opinions of scientists, reveals more about the world than it could if the world was pure.

One topic that Aristotle generally agrees with is the nature of scientific hypotheses, especially the one about describing a theory. In addition, his conventional and syntactic approach to theory states that a theory is a collection of logically constructed sentences requiring the addition of correspondence rules to be understood. When a theory is constructed in this way, it includes the general-most explanatory and predictive laws, such as minimum generalizations that describe more particular experimental and natural phenomena. An example of these experimental and natural phenomena is the ideal gas equations describing the relationship between pressure and temperature.

On the contrary, the semantic perspective describes the theory as the space of states that can be described as either two things. One, the theory, or two, the collection of mathematical models permitted by the theory. However, many other descriptions are a lot more inclusive and ecumenical concerning what a scientific theory incorporates or constitutes. According to Aristotle, the Standard Model of particle physics is a theoretical framework that involves what he refers to as “theoretical cores” (Husson 866). These theoretical cores combine mathematical structures, verbal narratives, and comparisons with empirical references. Aristotle considers all these perspectives about the nature of scientific hypotheses in his research.

As a philosopher, Aristotle traces the contours of classical philosophical engagement with issues surrounding observation and theory in science. From these issues, Aristotle seeks to clearly distinguish between the unobservable and observable in order to separate the observational from the theoretical (Aristotle 1). He also talks about a more contemporary scholarship that accepts the combination of empirical and theoretical methods in creating valuable scientific findings. He combines these empirical and theoretical methods by replacing the primacy of observation. The replacement of observational primacy occurs through human sensory perception with the help of an instrument-inclusive concept of data production.

Despite theory testing predominating in much of the standard philosophical literature on observation, most of this discussion concerning the role of observation in theory testing also applies to the invention and modification of theories. Moreover, his discussion about theory testing concerns applying these theories to different tasks such as medicine, engineering, and other practical endeavors.

Observation and Data

At least from the time of Aristotle, who lists several sources of observable evidence, including animal dissection, reasoning from observations has been an important part of scientific activity. Long ago, Francis Bacon claimed that the best approach to learning about nature was through experiences. He studied observations and the outcomes of experiences in order to refine and create scientific theories. Among others, Aristotle placed a high priority on the use of observational data in scientific discovery (Aristotle 1). However, until the 20th century, other logical empiricists revolutionized philosophical thought regarding scientific discovery. Unlike Aristotle, these philosophers should have discussed observation more extensively, detailed, or in the way Aristotle is accustomed to.

The focus on the logic of observation reports rather than the things or events observed is one evident significant change that is distinctive of the linguistic revolution in philosophy. This focus makes sense, given the presumption that a scientific theory is a collection of statements, claims, propositions, statements, and other sentence-like structures that can be evaluated against empirical data. These comparisons are believed to be understood in terms of inferential relations.

If inferential relationships only exist between sentence-like structures, then theories must be evaluated against both sentences and propositions. These propositions and sentences are employed to report for observations rather than against observations or the things observed (Barukčić 130).

Based on the philosophy of Aristotle, the process of testing a theory constitutes comparing two observational sentences. These observations describe particular observations made in the field or a lab and sentences that the theory should predict as true. To do this, observation sentences that define relevant sensory deliverances must be delivered. In addition, these observation sentences must utilize laws or law-like generalizations, descriptions of the starting conditions, correspondence rules, and supplementary hypotheses. It is, therefore, crucial to clarify and distinguish the meaning of observational sentences.

The Irrelevance of Observation

Observers use magnifying glasses, telescopes, and microscopes to see objects that cannot be seen clearly or are too small or far to be seen. Similar to these, amplification equipment is used to collect small noises. However, if observing something is the same as perceiving it, then the uses of these tools are limited while supplementing the senses that are considered observational. Aristotle and other philosophers concur that a person can see the moons found on planet Jupiter using a telescope or listen to a heartbeat using a stethoscope (Gerson 200). However, van Fraassen of The Scientific Image is a noteworthy exception.

According to van Fraassen, something being observable means that if the object exists, it should be seen by any creature, like human beings. According to van Fraassen, the moons of Jupiter can therefore be observed since astronauts can also vividly see them from up close (Barukčić 130). However, van Fraassen also states that microscopic entities are merely observable to human beings and other beings like them. This is because human beings cannot position themselves strategically to notice these objects when they are right in front of them. On the other hand, Aristotle disagrees with Van Fraassen’s perspective of being overly restrictive.

On the spectrum of ever-more-complicated instrumentation, there is a variation in the willingness of Aristotle and other philosophers to draw the line between what counts as observable and unobservable. The assumption that high-energy physicists like Aristotle “observe” particles or particle interactions when they look at bubble chamber photographs is highly unnatural. Moreover, saying that these physicists ‘‘observe’’ particles when they look at uninspected digital visualizations of energy depositions left in calorimeters is also unnatural, especially to philosophers who enjoy using microscopes and telescopes. The assumptions of these philosophers are based on the reasonable aspect that people can only witness what they can see by looking, hear by listening and feel by touching (Barukčić 130).

Looking at and directing a gaze toward something and seeing charged particles travel through a detector is impossible for researchers. Instead, researchers observe and view chamber tracks, bubble chamber images, and calorimeter data visualizations.

Figures and Phenomena

Unlike philosophical works, scientific publications seldom use words like “observation reports” and “observation.” Philosophers who accept the usage of these words are free to see typical observational examples as members of a vast, varied, and expanding family of data creation techniques. Thus, Philosophers can focus on the epistemic significance of the characteristics that distinguish family members rather than deciding which procedures to categorize as observational and which ones qualify as observable. Therefore, they can concentrate on issues such as the various problems that data generated by certain approaches can be used to address. Other issues include the steps that must be taken in order to use these data effectively and the veracity of the conclusions they draw.

Lastly, in an earlier paradigm, the direct approach to these facts is to serve as the immediate basis of research upon which the structure of scientific knowledge may be constructed. Due to their independence from non-empirical beliefs, observations might serve as the basis for impartial negotiation when a dispute develops between groups with divergent ideological devotions and objectively resolve the issue. This viewpoint holds that propagandists may have to answer to the publicly available substance of theory as well as value-free observations. In addition, other scientists operating in opposing paradigms could at least resort to the same observations.

Apart from Aristotle, Lavoisier and Priestley identify common grounds in these findings even while initially having divergent ideas. Thus, the scientific methods and empiricism have moved significantly away from Aristotle’s classical philosophy. The two approaches stress distinct methods of information acquisition, namely deliberation and observation, which are based on their respective conceptions of reason, the human soul, and intelligence.

Works Cited

Aristotle. “Nicomachean ethics.” Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, 2018. Web.

Barukčić, Ilija. “Aristotle’s law of contradiction and Einstein’s special theory of relativity.” Journal of Drug Delivery and Therapeutics 9.2 2019: 125–143. Web.

Faerna, Ángel. “In Search of Lost Body: On Pragmatism, Experience, and Language.” The Journal of the Central-European Pragmatism Forum. Vol. 9. No. 2. 2018.

Gerson, L. P. “Aristotle the platonist.” Platonism and Naturalism, 2020, pp. 197–223. Web.

Husson, M. “Jacqueline Feke. Ptolemy’s philosophy: Mathematics as a way of Life. Xi + 234 pp., illus., bibl., index. Princeton, N.J./Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2018. $39.50 (cloth). Paper and E-book available.” Isis, vol. 111, no. 4, 2020, pp. 866-867. Web.

Moore, Christopher. “Aristotle on Philosophy.” Metaphilosophy, vol. 50, no. 3, 2019, pp. 339–360.

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