North Korea’s Policy: A Threat for North-East Asian and Southeast Asian Regions

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Introduction

Within the past few months it has been evident that North Korea has put the North East Asian and South East Asian regions on edge due to its threat of attacking South Korea, turning Seoul into what it has described as a sea of fire and launching a nuclear strike on either nearby U.S. bases or on the United States itself.

The country has pursued a distinctly anti-U.S. stance and has reportedly developed a weapons program that is meant to discourage any attacks on its soil creating a situation where war is a distinct possibility within the next few weeks.

Despite the considerable level of tension in the region, this paper assumes that war is not imminent given that North Korea’s actions are meant not to attack any foreign entity such as South Korea, the U.S. or any of the bases of the U.S. in Asia but to ensure the continued survival of the state in the form of the authoritarian regime that is currently in power.

It is based on this assumption that this paper will examine the domestic agenda of North Korea, its foreign policy agenda and the foreign policy of its closest ally, China. Such an examination will reveal that tensions within the region are nothing more than rhetoric and that it is unlikely that China would support its ally given its current foreign policy.

Reason behind North Korea’s Domestic Policy Agenda

From a trade and international relations perspective, it is at times assumed that North Korea’s apparent pursuit of nuclear weapons and its bellicose rhetoric aimed at the U.S. seemingly reflects a regime that does not abide by logic and rationality as the cornerstones of its foreign relations policy. However, it should be noted that under the theory of realism one of the primary concerns of the state is survival.

While it may seem that North Korea’s actions are apparently detrimental towards the state’s continued survival, this is actually far from the truth. What this section will show is how North Korea’s bellicose rhetoric, combined with its pursuit for nuclear weapons, is in fact a method that has been intentionally implemented to control its population rather than as an actual means of aggression against other states.

In his analysis of North Korea, Moore (2006) explains that its political structure, governing bodies and various councils are heavily steeped in the policies that were put into practice by North Korea’s founder Kim Il Sung.

Many of those in power are conservative traditionalists who view the concept of “liberal change” as detrimental towards the continued survival of a state that utilizes “independence from outside influence” as the cornerstone of its governance (Moore 2006, p.1).

Moore (2006) even goes so far to say that North Korea’s political government espouses a form of “ultra conservatism” wherein the concept of change, that is not conducive towards the promotion of the values and principles of Kim Il Sung or mandated by the government, is viewed as detrimental towards the continued survival of the state.

As a result, this has given rise to preventive measures within the country in the form of considerable control on internet connectivity (i.e. only a handful of approved government officials are allowed to have access to the internet), communication (while the country has a mobile phone network, calls made to locations outside of the country cannot be made), merchandise that enters into the country as well as the types of activities that local citizens are allowed to participate in (meaning that there are severe restrictions on personal freedoms wherein people are not allowed to actively question the activities of the state).

In fact, such a level of control has impacted the news media within North Korea, which is heavily censored by the government, to the point that only pro-government news stories are allowed to be televised.

For the article “Change in North Korea” (2013), control over the news network is essential for the North Korean government since this allows them to create a state of affairs where fear of possible invasion keeps the local population docile and dependent on the government for protection in what they perceive to be considerable outside threats to their safety (Change in North Korea 2013, 1).

The article “Government and Politics” (2013) explains this by stating that survival for North Korea’s government is not perceived primarily as the state continuing to prosper economically or that its people are not placed in danger, rather, survival is viewed as preserving the current status quo within the country (Government and Politics 2013, pp. 29-33).

The government actively attempts to prevent ‘liberal ideas” from western methods of governance and society from seeping into the country so as to prevent the local population from being “corrupted”. This is to ensure that “jutche” (self reliance) principles and the leaders that espouse them continue to remain at the forefront of North Korea’s existence.

Another way of viewing this issue is from the point of view of the article “Cutting Off the Kim Family Cash” (2013) who explains that control and enforced ignorance (in the form of media and information control) helps to ensure that the North Korean population does not orient itself towards the development of more democratic ideals (Cutting Off the Kim Family Cash 2013, 1).

Studies such as those seen in the article “Fallout” (2013) explain that North Korea’s current behavior is a classic example of an authoritarian state whose government is attempting to remain in power no matter what (Fallout 2013, p. 41).

What must be understood is that this predilection to remain in power through whatever means possible is explained by Fackler (2013) as being due to historical evidence showing how government officials from authoritarian regimes were often convicted and sentenced to jail once democratic systems of governance were put in place resulting in them being held accountable for the various restrictions on freedoms and atrocities that they had committed while in power.

Fackler (2013) explains that it is the concept of accountability that encourages these regimes to continue along a path of governance that attempts to curb “dangerous changes” since this endangers those who are in power (Fackler 2013, 1).

This has given rise to a foreign policy agenda which focuses on preventing “liberalist notions” from arising within the local population to the extent that North Korea and its leaders have been accused numerous times by the United Nations and several other states of human rights abuses.

Such accusations further discourages the country from allowing foreign influences from affecting its local population since the leaders of the country know that once they let a democratic foothold establish itself within the country their positions and very lives would be in danger.

North Korea’s Foreign Policy Agenda

The work of Hoislag (2010) explains that despite what amounts to erratic action and decisions, states are actually rational decision makers and pursue a policy that they believe would result in a better and more advantageous position for the state (Hoislag, 2010, p. 641).

However, the study of Nikitin(2013) shows that sometimes this pursuit of a more advantageous position is in part influenced by those in power who pursue what they believe is the most advantageous position yet such an orientation may not be the best path for the general citizenry (Nikitin 2013, pp. 13-16).

What this means in the case of North Korean, when taking the section on domestic policy into consideration, is that its leadership is pursuing a path that focuses on what they believe would be best in their eyes and not necessarily what would be best for the people.

In the study “North Korea” (2012), it can be seen that North Korea’s foreign policy agenda of developing nuclear arms is meant as a deterrent towards undue or even forceful interference from outside parties in North Korea’s domestic affairs (North Korea 2012, pp. 1-23).

Weitz (2013) states that developing nuclear arms is a way in which North Korea’s leaders ensure that its authoritarian government continues to remain in power through the suppression of rights and liberties within the country (Weitz 2013, p. 2).

In fact, studies such as those by Stone (2013) point to the fact that since states are rational actors North Korea would know that any nuclear attack on the U.S. or its allies would result in the country being turned into a nuclear wasteland as a direct result of a retaliatory strike from the U.S. Its rhetoric and various claims are meant to discourage direct interference in its domestic affairs and nothing more (Stone 2013, pp. 893-894).

In fact, it should be noted that this is not the first time that such a strategy has been utilized in present day international affairs.

The case of Iran for instance, who is also developing their own weapons program, has been stated by studies such as those by the article “With fresh sanctions looming, Pyongyang threatens to end armistice” (2013) as being a deterrence towards outside influence in the country’s internal affairs (With fresh sanctions looming, Pyongyang threatens to end armistice 2013, pp. 6-9).

For researchers such as Browne (2013), the actions of North Korea and Iran in the development of nuclear arms while having a decidedly aggressive stance against their neighbors and the U.S. is due to their hesitance in being incorporated into the current international system and all that comes with it.

This encompasses the development of liberal ideas, the influx of foreign news media and the development of the realization among members of the North Korean population that they have been abused and suppressed by their government in comparison to the rest of the world.

It is due to this that advocates such as Browne (2013) explain that North Korea’s aggression and threats to go to war are merely a means of preventing further interference in its domestic policy (Browne 2013, 1). Browne (2013) explains that the North Korean government is attempting to make Kim Jong Un look like a hardliner that will take any stance necessary in order to prevent the interference of either the U.N or the U.S. in its domestic affairs.

It is based on this that the next section will examine China’s foreign policy agenda to further cement the assumption of this paper that war is unlikely in the Korean peninsula due to China’s foreign policy objective of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states.

Examining China’s Foreign Policy

To understand China foreign policy regarding regional security issues, an examination of its 2002 position paper on security issues was conducted.

This position paper which was released by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs details that China views nuclear proliferation and terrorist activities as detrimental towards continued regional and economic stability and, as such, must be dealt with in order to ensure peace (China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002: 1).

Based on such a stance, the position paper explains that China advocates the use of institutions as a means of promoting regional or international cooperation in order to mitigate the problems of terrorism and nuclear proliferation.

Such actions though, as explained by China, should be tempered by an attitude of non-interference in the internal affairs of states given China’s history of adverse consequences coming about as a result of foreign interference in its domestic affairs (China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002: 1).

Such a case can be seen when examining the manner in which China chose to side with the United Nations in imposing additional sanctions on North Korea (Luzyanin 2010, p. 14).

While it may be true that China and North Korea are economic, military and diplomatic partners, the fact remains that the distinct shift in the way in which North Korea has chosen to act internationally has caused severe concern on the part of China and, as a result, has changed its views regarding the manner in which North Korea must be treated (Aris 2009, pp. 451-467).

The reason behind this is quite simple, North Korea is endangering not only China’s economic activities with South Korea which is a major trading partner but has created significant regional tensions to the extent that it may find itself being drawn into a conflict that it wants no part of (Aris 2009, pp. 451-467).

To better understand the position of China in regards to regional security and cooperation, the following points need to be taken into consideration:

China places a considerable emphasis on respect for sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs given its history with various foreign powers (Boyko, Dylevsky, Komov&Korotkov 2010, pp. 34-43)
It advocates the use of international institutions as mediums for cooperation due to its focus on creating a level playing field for all the states concerned (Grogan 2009, p. 685).
Security cooperation for China is based on concepts related to mutual benefit, mutual trust as well as shared action when it comes to regional security (Bader 2009, pp. 1-16).

Taking such factors into consideration, it is likely that in the case of North Korea, China would side with the United Nations in order to prevent North Korea’s actions from escalating to a point that regional conflict is inevitable.

Security Concept of Mutual Benefit, Action, Trust, Equality and Coordination

Further investigation into the issue of regional security issues reveals that China believes that regional security issues needs to be dealt with utilizing trans-national cooperation. As a result, they believe that U.N. lead initiatives or those done through regional institutions such as the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) are positive practices that should be espoused in order to deal with issues affecting specific regions.

Thus, for China, mutual cooperation is key in problems related to regional security and as a result it is likely that China would agree to the formation of a cooperative regional security arrangement that focuses on ensuring peace in the region (Rajiv 2011, p. 1).

Before proceeding, it should be noted that one of the views of China is that the origin of the conflict between North and South Korea is connected to the gap in development between the two and, as such, should be resolved in order to create peace in the region (Huhua 2010, pp. 965-982).

Conclusion

When taking into consideration the various studies on North Korea’s domestic agenda with the studies on its foreign policy objectives, it thus becomes clear that in the case of North Korea, China and the Korean peninsula, war is not imminent given that its actions are meant not to attack any foreign entity but to ensure the continued survival of the state in the form of the authoritarian regime that is currently in power.

This study has shown that North Korea, a rational actor in international relations, knows full well that it cannot match the military might of the U.S. and it had no plans to do so from the very beginning. The country is merely trying to deter other countries from implementing any form of “aggressive democratization” that would endanger the current authoritarian regime.

Thus, despite the continued aggressive rhetoric against the U.S. and its focus on developing a nuclear program, such actions are merely there as a “hands off sign” for other countries such as the U.S. that would attempt to democratize the society of North Korea.

Preventing Regional Conflict in North East Asia. The Asian Cooperative Association Proposal

Mission Statement

It is the belief of this organization that international institutions can, and often do, serve a vital role in international affairs through their capacity to instil cooperation, collaboration and information sharing in order to deal with regional or global problems.

With the various problems in the Asian region brought about through conflict and regional aggression, it becomes more important than ever to establish long lasting ties of cooperation in terms of information sharing and joint diplomatic practices in order to ensure continued peace and stability within Asia.

Through such an effort, it is expected that a system will arise that would enable various countries that are a part of the institution to address regional security concerns in a collaborative manner that they otherwise would not have been capable of addressing on their own.

It is based on this that the Asian Cooperative Association (A.C.A) will focuses on developing regional linkages in developing better security cooperation and the establishment of treaties of regional assistance.

It will attempt to ensure stability and reduce regional threats through diplomatic and security efforts encompassing mutual assistance and cooperation in order to handle internal and external threats to peace. Its end goal is to ensure that the Asian region develops along a path of peace and stability thereby ensuring progressive economic activity and mutual assistance between states.

Scope

The scope of this institution focuses first on the concept of non-interference in order to create a peaceful method of co-existence between states. What this means is that members of the institution will respect the domestic affairs of individual states and will not actively nor subversively attempt to interfere in them. The reasoning behind this approach is connected to the necessity of incorporating China into the institution.

Based on historical and recent accounts of China’s domestic and foreign policy, it can be seen that China prefers to manage its own internal affairs and not have outsiders influence them. This is due to a long history of outside interference resulting in adverse consequences within the country.

It is based on this that when establishing an institution that requires China to be a major member, it is necessary to establish mutual non-interference in the internal affairs of states as one of the primary tenets of the organization. Interference in the form of multilateral action is only done should a state present a valid threat to regional security and stability that could adversely impact member states of the institution.

Once a valid threat has been identified, the institute will take diplomatic steps as a primary method of resolving the conflict and will exhaust all other possible remedies with direct military intervention being the last action that will be considered.

Thus, this institution will focus primarily on cooperative regional security arrangements, resource and intelligence sharing, adherence to regional conflict prevention and joint diplomatic efforts in ensuring regional stability.

The following encompasses the distinct views that will be adhered to by the institution:

Regional security and stability is of paramount importance and, as such, is the primary concern of the institution with all its members adhering to the outlined actions regarding cooperation in order to mitigate any regional security concerns

That it views unilateral interventions in any country as fueling tensions in the area thus contributing to the problem of nuclear proliferation and regional instability. Thus, the institution will utilize only multilateral action when regional security concerns have been identified, however, if none have been identified the institution will not take any active effort to interfere in a country’s domestic or foreign policy initiatives.

This institution believes that regional security can only be obtained through concerted actions via institutions as mediums for intervention.

This can help to resolve issues related to nuclear proliferation and regional instability. Not only that, it is the believe of the institution that poverty, hardship and a lack of sufficient cooperative agreements is the main reason behind regional conflicts and, as a result, a concerted effort must be focused on resolving these particular “evils” in order to prevent any future conflict.

The last view of the institution encompasses its belief that unilateral armed intervention, especially in the case of the U.S., would not resolve any regional security dilemmas or would actually resolve the issue of regional conflict. Instead, the institute believes that such actions would actually contribute to regional tensions and, as a result, multilateral action is perceived as the best method of resolving regional conflict.

Membership

Due to the necessity of having China be the main participating member in this organization, China would be hesitant if not outright unwilling to enter into a cooperative arrangement/agreement if a single state were to become the leader in such an endeavour. The reason behind this hesitance is connected to its neoliberalist stance and the fact that it has preferred to utilize institutions as a means of fostering cooperation and agreements between states.

As such, in order to have China which would act as the linchpin in this institution, it would be necessary to have an institution firmly in the control of a non-partisan party that would not hijack it for their own ends.

This comes in the form of the United Nations who could help in establishing the necessary guidance and leadership structure to enable the institution to function without any fear of “hijacking” taking place. Thus, membership for this endeavor will encompass China and various state actors in Asia such as Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Indonesia etc.

However, the leadership of this institution shall originate from the U.N. in the form of a regularly assigned (i.e. once every 5 years) chairman who shall help to guide the institution and ensure that cooperative initiatives occur.

It should also be noted that the representatives of each country within the institution must be composed of a high ranking individual within their respective department of foreign affairs in order to ensure that a competent individual represents the interests of the individual members.

Funding

Funding for this organization will originate from the member states that are part of the institution with each member contributing a certain amount per year for the institutions annual operational budget.

Aside from this, the institution will also be open to receiving donations from private individuals or from states that are not a part of the institution. However, such donations are dependent on the provision that it does not coincide with any attempt at bribing the institution from coming to a decision regarding a particular regional dilemma.

Proposed Activities

For the institution, its activities will focus on the mitigating the following specific activities:

Regional instability
Regional Aggression
International Terrorism

These intended activities will be done under the framework of ensuring that a country’s territories are not used in actions that result in adverse consequences for their neighbours within the Asian region. Various forms of cooperative agreements, intelligence sharing and assistance will also be implemented to ensure safety and security within the region.

When it comes to ensuring peace and stability in the region, member states of the institution will focus on creating annual joint military exercises in order to foster a sense of camaraderie among their respective armed forces. By doing so, this ensures that when situations arise where joint military action is required, the joint forces can easily cooperate in order to tackle the apparent regional security threat.

The last activity of the organization will take the form of creating a “watchdog” subsidiary whose express purpose is monitor areas of potential conflict and make recommendations based on their observations.

By having a secondary subsidiary organization monitor various “hotspots” within North East Asia, this would enable the various countries that are part of the organization to immediately determine what actions need to be implemented in order to mitigate conflict and ensure regional stability.

Not only that, a watchdog organization can help to determine where potential problems may occur before they happen and recommend preventive measures be implemented before they get out of hand.

Reference List

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Boyko, S, Dylevsky, I, Komov, S, &Korotkov, S 2010, ‘Military-Political Aspects of Ensuring Information Security in the Area of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’, Military Thought, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 34-43.

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Huhua, C 2010, ‘Urban-rural income disparity and urbanization: What Is the role of spatial distribution of ethnic groups? A case study of Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region in western China’, Regional Studies, vol. 44, no. 8, pp. 965-982

Luzyanin, S 2010, ‘China and Its “Close Surroundings”: Regional and Bilateral Relations’, Far Eastern Affairs, vol. 38, no. 3, p. 14.

Moore, TG 2006, ‘Cooperating to Compete: East Asian regionalism in Chinese foreign policy’, Conference Papers — American Political Science Association, p. 1.

Nikitin, M 2013, ‘Nuclear Testing’, Congressional Research Service: Report, pp. 13-16, International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center.

‘North Korea’ 2012, Country Report. North Korea, vol. 1, pp. 1-23, Business Source Premier.

Rajiv R 2011, ‘China and the concept of non-interference’. Web.

Stone, R 2013, ‘North Korea’s Blast Poses Riddles and Challenges’, Science, vol. 339, no. 6122, pp. 893-894, Academic Search Premier.

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