Manchuria Crisis: The USSR and China Interest in the Area

Do you need this or any other assignment done for you from scratch?
We have qualified writers to help you.
We assure you a quality paper that is 100% free from plagiarism and AI.
You can choose either format of your choice ( Apa, Mla, Havard, Chicago, or any other)

NB: We do not resell your papers. Upon ordering, we do an original paper exclusively for you.

NB: All your data is kept safe from the public.

Click Here To Order Now!

The World War II was the time, when conflicts and tensions among countries began to be more aggressive and the undecided problem s went on the surface. Unsolved problems and undiscussed issued appeared and the leaders of the countries, taking into account the war time in most cases tried to solve the problems through the military forces. Manchuria is the province of China, which the center of quarrels for many years. In my paper I will discuss some of the issues between China and USSR. over Northeastern territory (Manchuria) during 1944-1946. During these years public opinion was particularly shocked over the provisions of the Yalta Agreement, which restored to the Soviet Union the same sort of special rights and privileges that the young Soviet Government had renounced shortly after the October Revolution. Expressions of anger erupted in the Chinese press over the readiness of the U.S. and Great Britain to give in to Russian demands that violated China’s territorial integrity.

The core issue for the quarrel was the territory of Manchuria, the North-East of China. Being the historical territory of China, it was also the industrial center of it, which supported the country with agricultural and industrial products. China had lost a lot in the war, and the Manchuria territory was a great support for it in general. Considering the importance of the Manchuria territory for China, it may be noticed:

During 1944-45 it produced 8.5 times more pig iron than had ever been produced in single year in china proper, 2.5 times more electric power, and 8.5 times more cement. Manchuria in 1944 also harvested 3,549,000 tons of soybeans; if that amount had been available to Nationalist China in the postwar period, it would have generated annually through exports some US $60 million to $90 million in foreign exchange. And Manchuria’s 144 lumber mills would largely have eliminated the need for imports of foreign lumber.1

So, from the information, which was given, it is perfectly seen that the Manchuria area is an important economic area, which brings a great deal of advantages and powers to the country, which possesses it. The conflicts began in 1930s, when Japan wanted to provide its influence on the Manchuria area. The intentions of Japan were visible, the territory is rich in natural resources and to occupy it, Japanese government had to use it in its needs during the war with China. Being the strategically important area, China did not want to pass Manchuria to Japan without war, and the conflict appeared, the result of which was Japan occupation of the desired territory of Manchuria.

In 1944-1945 the war conclusion was already predictable and the main question was the postwar period and the reparations, which had to be provided by the loosing part. Great Britain, The USA and the USSR were the most powerful countries, which had to decide the completed outcome of the war. Having come to the agreement, the Yalta Agreement of February 11, 1945 was signed. All the countries followed their own interests, and tried to implement them in the agreement. The main act, which was supported by all sides, was the entrance of the war by the USSR with Japan. In accordance with the Yalta Agreement of February 11, 1945, the USSR entered the war against Japan on August 9, 1945.

It was significant for the USA to have the USSR the participant of the war against Japan. Moreover, the USA supported the USSR will to have the strategically important territories of Outer Mongolia and Manchuria. At the same time, the USA supported the Chinese government in its war against Japan.2 The war started on the second day after the Hiroshima bombing. Russian troops had just begun entering Manchuria when Japanese surrendered on August 14, the same day that the Soviet and Chinese Governments announced the conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship and alliance between the two countries. During the negotiations, Stalin had allegedly assured the Chinese representative that forces would be withdrawn from Manchuria within three months after a Japanese surrender.

In fact, the surrender of the Japanese army so soon did not meet the USSR plans, and the anger of Stalin can be understood. The problems in the question of the Far East were not decided yet, and the continuation of war could give some time to Stalin to decide them. Only 30% of Manchuria was occupied by the USSR army at the time of Japan surrender announcement. Japanese remained to control North Korea, South Sakhalin, Kuril Islands, and some other territories, which according to the agreement, had to be occupied by the soviet army.3 Moreover, analyzing the events on the East, it may be concluded that a great deal of power and techniques was spend on the desired war, which finished, without being provided.

The Chinese Communists were in a position to take maximum advantage of the period from min-August to min-November while the Russians occupied the cities and major lines of communications in the Northeast and no one controlled the countryside. During this period, CCP forces entered Manchuria with the acquiescence if not the active cooperation of the Soviet occupation forces.

By November, 1945, Soviet withdrawal from Manchuria would have meant the immediate occupation of much of the region by the Chinese Communists. Therefore, while the Manchurian “crisis” was thus developing, the KMT Government, or at least elements within it, launched a propaganda campaign against alleged Soviet cooperation with the Chinese Communists. The Soviets were also denounced for removing and shipping to the U.S.S.R. supplies, equipment, and machinery from Manchuria industrial and mining enterprises. This was an accepted means of extracting war reparations from a defeated country, except that all such installations and equipment in the former Japanese-occupied areas of China were supposed to revert to Chinese ownership.

Returning to the desires of the USA and the USSR, it may be said that they were opposite. The USA did not want the creation of the powerful union of the USSR and China, as such union could cause a lot of problems to the USA, as it wanted to remain the most powerful country in the world and be able to influence the international economical and political relations in the countries. Considering the Soviet Union desires, it wanted to prevent the increase power of the USA and China, which was one of the competitors of the USSR. Moreover, the Soviet Union plans were much deeper, Stalin wanted to create a powerful security barrier, which could protect it from Japan aggression. Furthermore, Stalin wanted “to create the conditions for protecting Soviet power in East Asia and the Pacific and strengthen the Soviet Union’s global geographical position.”4 Moreover, the USA and the Soviet Union supported opposite powers in China, which were the members of the civil war there: the United States supported the Nationalist government, while the Soviet Union provided their support to the similar Communist regime.

In fact, Manchuria is a greatly important area, which historically belonged to China, but was involved in the Japan-China conflict, and at that time Manchuria was occupied by Japanese forces. The situation in Japan troubled Stalin, but in fact he was more involved in the Chinese question, which could become the main course of instability in region. First of all, there was no the only government in China, as was not before the war as well. The Chinese government at the end of the war still did not control the whole territory of its country. Manchuria remained under the Soviet Union control. The main apprehension, which China felt, was the uncertainty in the territory questions. It was apprehensive that Soviet Union will care more about the Manchuria as the part of the question of the Japan division, but not about the unity of the Chinese territories. It could be offered that Stalin could provide the secret agreement with the USA about the interests of the USSR and the USA in the China, as it was provided de facto before by them in reference to Germany, which was divided into Eastern and Western sectors. Such agreement could be possible, as Manchuria was important area for Soviet Union, and it had great plans for it in future.5

The Soviet Union intentions were also supported by the fact that Manchurian citizens welcomed soviet forces, when they were entering its territory in the day of the war announcement to Japan.6 Moreover, the interests of there great countries met on the territory of Manchuria, but only Soviet Union and China were interested directly in land. The USA was interested in the civil war in China, which had to be provided in the country, as the powers were structured in such a way that the collision had to be provided. Dwelling upon the civil war in China it can be mentioned that by such events development, China was ruined even more, as first, it did not have any time to renew its powers, and, second, the national question was important: Nationalists and Communists were faced in the struggle, and after it the Communist regime was provided on the territory of China.

The Manchuria was one of the main reasons of the civil was appearance. In fact, the occupation of Manchuria by Soviet forces was the reason, as if Manchuria was free from any army, China could start the reconstruction after war and could pay all attention to this reconstruction. The inability to restore the country, as the main economic and industrial area was occupied, the attention of China powers had to be concentrated on some issues, and it was the civil war, which put the spot on the question which party is dominant in the area, Nationalists or Communists. If it can be offered that Nationalists still governed the country after the war and could control the territory of Manchuria, the life in China would never be so optimistic. Directing all the power to the restoration of the country, people’s interests could be avoided in the case. The inability of China to use the Manchuria resources, the country was faced with a number of problems, such as “the shortage of raw materials and fuel, it could not produce the consumer goods as desperately needed after eight years of war.”7 The inability to produce the national products, China had to turn to import of huge amount of products, which affected the national industries in such spheres as cotton, rice and other productions. Moreover, the other damaging reason of the inability to use Manchuria as the source of the resources was the inflation, which took place in the country. The war time in the world and China’s participation in the processes led to the fact that 65-70% of the spending, provided by the government was directed to the military sphere, and the biggest part of it was directed to the war events in Manchuria. Furthermore, the financing of the civil war also demanded for great costs, and the Chinese government had nothing to do but to type additional amount of paper money. The measures of taxation were severed, that allowed the government to cover some spending in the military sphere. The hyperinflation appeared which influenced all the spheres in the society, as well as people particular.8

All the mentioned problems in the country were the outcomes of China inability to provide the control over the Manchuria area. The problems could be easily avoided if Manchuria was not occupied by Soviet Union’s army. Considering the fact of the Soviet Union occupation of Manchuria it is significant to notice that the USSR did not agree for the war with Japan till it was not sure that its interests in relation to Manchuria will be met by the agreement with China. On the 10th of August, 1945 the Soviet-China agreement was provided. The USSR officially recognized Xinjiang and Manchuria the Chinese territories. At the result of the change, which was provided after the agreement signing, the Chinese part had to recognize the independence of Outer Mongolia (which was officially considered as the part of China according to Soviet-Chinese agreement of 1925)9 in the case if during the referendum the Mongolian citizens will announce their agreement to the current issue. According to the agreement from 1945, the USSR got the right to use the Chinese Eastern Railway (CER), and, moreover, received the same rights in the reference to the South Manchuria Railway. These two railways were united into one, which was renamed into Chinese Changchun Railway and was followed by the control of the USSR and China. Such act was rather important for the USSR as it received the right of the long term lease of facilities, which were situated in Port Arthur and Darren.10

In Soviet-China agreement from 1945 the question about the situation in China and about he relations of the USSR with China Communists was deliberately avoided. But about the logics of the agreement, the USSR did not have to prevent the Nationalists government to maintain control under Manchuria after its release from Japanese invasion. At the same time the Nationalists government did not have the opportunities to maintain its power under Manchuria as there was the lack of the military staff and the opportunities for the quick shift them to the North were also limited. The Chinese Communists, vice versa, were based closer to the Manchuria area and had a real opportunity to provide their power in region after its emancipation from Japan occupation, in the case if the Soviet Union headquarters could allow that. The close presence of Communists to Manchuria was one of the main tensions, used by Stalin on Nationalists government. The USSR threatened to withdraw military forces, which could give the way to Communists in the area.11

In the appeared situation, the USA was for the establishing of the principal of open doors in China, including Manchuria. The Soviet Union was afraid that it would not be able to compete with western countries and objected to the opening of Manchuria. Washington tried to insure the Nationalists government to counteract Moscow’s intentions to assure the exclusion of economical interests of other countries in Manchuria. Till the may 1946 the Nationalists powers were already able to confront China Communists in the case of Soviet Union army leaving Manchuria. The USSR became to withdraw their army from Manchuria, and their place was occupied by China Communists. The collisions were renewed between the government and Communist military forces. In spite of the fact that Chinese government provided their control under the main cities and railway roads of Manchuria, their base stations were blocked by Communists.12 There is a great deal of suggestions how the situation could develop if Nationalists could provide their control under Manchuria from the very beginning, but it is universally agreed that they still would not be able to maintain their control under the whole country and be able to suppress Communists influence in the region. But still, the Soviet occupation of Manchuria is called one of the main reasons of the government power collapse.

The role of the USA in the civil war in China was not visible, but still, the USA carefully followed the situation and tried to maintain its wills in the region. The desires of the USA in the region were reduced to four principles:

First, China should come to an agreement with Russia to prevent Russia from interfering after the war; second, China should get back all her territories taken by Japan and other powers, including Hong Kong; third, the Nationalist government should be supported as the only regime capable of unifying China; and finally, American foreign policy in the Far East should be predicted on a close working relation between China and the United States.13

These United States’ desires contradicted to Chinese Communist powers and the Soviet Unions intentions, which were also directed to China. The USSR wanted to make Manchuria the main strategic region, which had to serve as the security barrier from Japan. Providing the Communist politics in the Soviet Union, Stalin supported the Communists in China, without proclaiming their agreement universally. In addition to said, the USA, after the Pearl Harbor paid more attention to China as they wanted to male it as the main scene for the military acts in reference to Japan. So, the USA provided financial and military support to Nationalists. In fact, it may be said that China became the country, where the interests of two great countries in the world met. The USA supported Nationalists and tried to be insured with their help in future, while the Soviet Union was more directed to the Communists. Providing international politics in the direction of China before the Manchuria area occupation, “Nationalists accepted Russian economic and military privileges in Manchuria, but in return they received from Stalin the promise of Soviet disinterest in Chinese internal affairs, in other words a commitment not to support the China Communist Party.”14

In conclusion, taking into consideration everything mentioned above, it can be stated that Manchuria was an area, where the interests of different countries were met. The USA did not provide its direct interest in the very territories, but at the same time with the help of the influence, which it could provide on it wanted to follow its desires to prevent the coalition of such powerful countries as The Soviet Union and China, which in future could create a powerful unity, which could prevent the USA plans to become the only powerful country in the world, which provides its influence on the Far East region. The interests of China were obvious, being the historical region of it, Manchuria was occupied by Japan and the only desire of China was to take its land back. The interest of both Japan and China in Manchuria was provoked by the fact that it was the strategic region, full of industrial and natural resources, which could help the owning country to restore its losses after the World War II. The USSR was also interested in the resource nature of the region, but it was more interested in the geographical location of the region, where the USSR wanted to create a security barrier on the way of Japan to Soviet territories. Moreover, the possession of the Manchuria area by the USSR could be the reason and the supporter in providing the influence on the Far East territory.

Reference List

Beloff, Max. Soviet policy in the Far East, 1944-1951. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953.

Best, Antony. International history of the twentieth century and beyond. Oxford: Routledge, 2008.

Eastman, Lloyd E. Seeds of destruction: Nationalist China in war and revolution, 1937-1949. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1984.

Foran. John. Taking power: on the origins of Third World revolutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Heinzig, Dieter. The Soviet Union and communist China, 1945-1950: the arduous road to the alliance. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004.

Hooton, E. R. The greatest tumult: the Chinese civil war, 1936-49. Dulles: Brassey’s, 1991.

Kotkin, Stephen & Bruce A. Elleman. Mongolia in the twentieth century: landlocked cosmopolitan. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000.

Trotsky, Léon. Problems of the Chinese revolution. Saint Paul: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1966.

Tuchman, Barbara Wertheim. Stilwell and the American experience in China, 1911-45. New York: Grove Press, 2001.

Westad, Odd Arne. Decisive encounters: the Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2003.

Footnotes

  1. John Foran, Taking power: on the origins of Third World revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 55.
  2. Dieter Heinzig, The Soviet Union and communist China, 1945-1950: the arduous road to the alliance (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 51.
  3. Léon Trotsky, Problems of the Chinese revolution (Saint Paul: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1966), 380.
  4. Heinzig, Problems of the Chinese revolution, 52.
  5. Heinzig, Problems of the Chinese revolution, 53.
  6. Max Beloff, Soviet policy in the Far East, 1944-1951 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), 38.
  7. Lloyd E. Eastman, Seeds of destruction: Nationalist China in war and revolution, 1937-1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), 224.
  8. Eastman, Seeds of destruction: Nationalist China in war and revolution, 1937-1949, 225.
  9. Stephen Kotkin & Bruce A. Elleman, Mongolia in the twentieth century: landlocked cosmopolitan (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 121.
  10. E. R. Hooton, The greatest tumult: the Chinese civil war, 1936-49 (Dulles: Brassey’s, 1991), 105.
  11. Hooton, The greatest tumult: the Chinese civil war, 106.
  12. Odd Arne Westad, Decisive encounters: the Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950 (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2003), 42.
  13. Barbara Wertheim Tuchman, Stilwell and the American experience in China, 1911-45 (New York: Grove Press, 2001), 353.
  14. Antony Best. Best, Antony, International history of the twentieth century and beyond (Oxford: Routledge, 2008), 250.
Do you need this or any other assignment done for you from scratch?
We have qualified writers to help you.
We assure you a quality paper that is 100% free from plagiarism and AI.
You can choose either format of your choice ( Apa, Mla, Havard, Chicago, or any other)

NB: We do not resell your papers. Upon ordering, we do an original paper exclusively for you.

NB: All your data is kept safe from the public.

Click Here To Order Now!