Libya: Challenges of Transitioning to Democracy

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Table of Contents

The Issue of Transitioning to Democracy
The Case of Libya
The Path to Democracy in Tunisia
The Experience of Egypt
Pakistan on the Way to Democracy
Comparing Transition to Democracy in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, and Pakistan
Perspectives of Libya’s Development as a Democratic State
Conclusion
Works Cited

The nation’s paths to democracy are discussed here, with reference to the term “transition.” Nations must overcome significant changes in politics and ideology, and these aspects can prolong the process and bring many associated challenges. The problem is that those nations that did not start the transition to democracy during the twentieth century can potentially face many barriers to success in the process because of a long history of developing through dictatorship (Masoud 76). Libya is one such nation, where dictator rule damaged any possible premise of democracy.

Muammar Qaddafi was killed in 2011, the dramatic outcome of the armed conflict that went on for several months (Blanchard 3). While the killing of Qaddafi was perceived as the end of decades of dictatorship and the beginning of a new political era (Boduszyński and Pickard 87), the expected political changes were not observed in the country. Currently, Libya is only still transitioning to democracy, and its path is more complicated than the trajectory taken by countries like Tunisia, Egypt, and Pakistan.

The important question is why Libya’s transition to democracy is associated with more barriers than was the case of these nations, who won their democracy as a result of similar political conflicts. It is important to discuss how Libya’s struggle against dictatorship prevented the country from quick political changes and how this nation’s transition to democracy is different from the experiences of Tunisia, Egypt, and Pakistan.

The Issue of Transitioning to Democracy

The transition to democracy is viewed by researchers as a process during which leaders need to realize certain changes in political, legislative, and social systems in order to guarantee the democratic development of the state (Heydemann 195; Ishay 374). Thus, just because a dictator is removed does not mean the situation can immediately lead to democracy; certain concerted efforts must be made. The state must pass through the problematic period of transitioning to a new political order, an idea that is practical in nature.

According to Diamond, et al., “The so-called concept of transitions to democracy is not really a concept, and it certainly wasn’t a paradigm; it was just a category or a set of ideas about how democracy might happen” (89). Therefore, a series of democratic transitions should include concrete practical steps, including “expansion of the middle class,” stabilization of “new democratic institutions,” a focus on economic development and accentuation of social values and human rights, as well as the development of “higher standards of education” (Abdelali 200). To succeed and build a democratic state, countries such as Libya should rely on the experience of states that have completed the process of transitioning to a new order and then analyze what patterns might work and what steps to take.

The Case of Libya

Qaddafi spent nearly forty years building his authoritarian regime, and during that time the country seemed to not change significantly in terms of economic and social progress. Boose assumes that Qaddafi’s dictatorship was based on developing the scenario when people “were focused on their survival and not concerned with government” (313). As a result, the country had no strong political and social leaders to oppose Qaddafi. Therefore, the failure to achieve democratic progress in Libya was a result of the absence of “sustained opposition or pro-democracy movements that lead to a meaningful transition to democracy” (Boose 313).

After Qaddafi’s death, society faced new problems of developing new governmental institutions and rebuilding the structure of the state, because the transition to democracy would be impossible with remaining references to the political legacy of the dictator (Boduszyński and Pickard 87). Heydemann agrees with other researchers that the problems Libya had with transitioning to democracy were based on the fact that the country has no developed state apparatus (197). In addition, the country has no developed civil society to continue reforms that were initiated after Qaddafi’s death.

Currently, Libya has installed a system known as an electoral democracy, but this type of democracy cannot be regarded as liberal. The problem is that in Libya, military force is still influential, and military rule can impact elections in the country (Dalacoura 67). Instead of focusing on the development of rule of law in Libya, political parties concentrate on the fight for certain spheres of impact in the country (Darwisheh 12). However, the problem is that Libya has no developed tradition of an effective political competition based on a system of fair elections (Omar 68).

As a result, involved parties cannot collaborate in their work on the constitution, and they demonstrate the presence of “persisting problems in political culture” while discussing political issues that need to be resolved (Omar 77). While explaining challenges experienced by Libya on its path to developing a civil society and an effective system of elections, Omar notes that “most of the public do not understand the relative benefits of elected and appointed bodies, and it seems short-sighted to bind the prospects of the democratic transition to the shifting opinion of an uninformed electorate” (78). Therefore, it is important to note that the Libya’s problem also rests in the lack of the population’s education and experience which are necessary to adequately assess and compare the current political order with the desired democratic system and then to draw relative conclusions.

It is possible to conclude that the population in Libya could not win its struggle against Qaddafi without the support of international forces and various active interventions. It is thus important to refer to Boose’s words, who stated that the revolution in Libya “was more of a domino effect from Tunisia and Egypt” (314). The reason is that Libya had no adequate basis to initiate and conduct such a democratic revolution by means of civilians or to focus on achieving further future outcomes.

As a result, the current achievements of this country, on its path to democracy, are not many in comparison to Tunisia or to other countries like Egypt and Pakistan (Blanchard 8). The absence of strong opposition to authoritarian powers explains why Libya’s path to democracy is so riddled with barriers. There exist no civil society organizations in the country. There are no strong democratic leaders who can direct the nation to democracy while referring to and relying on previous experiences because, in contrast to Tunisia and Egypt, Libya has no such examples in either its immediate or distant past (Boduszyński and Pickard 88).

From this perspective, it is important to compare the milestones and barriers that were overcome by Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, and Pakistan when they turned toward democracy. In order to understand the nature and background of both similarities and differences in these states’ paths, it is necessary to discuss each case separately.

The Path to Democracy in Tunisia

The Arab Spring had its start in Tunisia where the transition to democracy was based on developing the revolution in order to overthrow the regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. The story of Tunisia’s struggle against its dictator is viewed as a successful one because this state demonstrated solid progress toward democracy (Lesch 63). Furthermore, Boose notes that “the Tunisian state was among the most progressive among the Arab world” (314). Other researchers also support this vision. According to Bellin, “Tunisia appears to be going in a more promising direction, making real progress toward building the foundations of democracy” (2).

In spite of the fact that Ben Ali’s regime was based on the elites, government institutions in the country were not corrupted as significantly as they were in other states living under similar authoritarian regimes (Darwisheh 3). According to Bellin, the elite can play a key role when it is time to rebuild governmental institutions.

The researcher states that “at critical junctures when long-standing political institutions have broken down (such as right after the overthrow of an authoritarian regime), there is a moment when human agency plays a pivotal role in determining a country’s political trajectory” (Bellin 2). From this perspective, the elite in Tunisia can be perceived as a support system for the further implementation of democratic improvements in the political system of the country.

In reference to the above ideas, it is also important to note that the work of government entities in Tunisia was challenged after the collapse of Ben Ali’s regime, but these institutions could “easily be shaped democratically, rather than having to build and create democratic institutions out of nothing” (Boose 313). Researchers also state that the success of the revolution in Tunisia is anchored in the fact that the military took a neutral position—and that the opposing forces did not significantly influence the process (Darwisheh 3; Lesch 65).

Thus, according to Lesch, “The small Tunisian military remained outside of politics and developed a reputation for integrity” (Lesch 65). In this context, the leaders who took power in Tunisia were able to build the groundwork for the development of a democratic state. In addition, success in establishing the new government was also based on valuable dialogue between parties (Bellin 24). Consequently, the determined position of the military and dialogue between political parties contributed critical momentum to the Tunisian transition to democracy.

The Experience of Egypt

In Egypt, the majority of the population supported the Arab Spring ideals, and Hosni Mubarak ultimately chose to resign under the impact of mass protests. It was expected that the developed civil society in the country would influence further progress toward democracy (Masoud 82). However, after February 2011, political groups had significant differences in their visions of the state’s democratic path. The social division also affected development of the country’s new political order (Stepan and Linz 23). Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that the Egyptian’s transition to democracy was more complicated compared to the Tunisian scenario, certain critical results were achieved.

Egyptians demonstrated their interest in the establishment of a democratic government even by way of significant changes that could be associated not only with political changes but also with religious and social alterations (Masoud 83). As a result, in 2013, a new wave of challenge and struggle against the ruling regime was observed, and the military combined efforts to oppose the Muslim Brotherhood. Consequently, Mohammed Mursi, regarded by the international community as a democratic leader, was arrested.

In his turn, Abdel Fatah al-Sisi took the position of president of the country (Lesch 63). On one hand, the transformational outcomes of the revolution were negative because the current regime in Egypt was achieved as a result of a military coup (Heydemann 198). On the other hand, Islamists’ principles proclaimed by representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood were deemed by society to be radical and accused of preventing the country from following the path to democratic reforms (Ishay 375). Therefore, at the current time, it is still too early to draw stark conclusions regarding democratic achievements in Egypt.

Although democratic development in Egypt is associated with many challenges, it is possible to also point out and concentrate on remarkable positive changes in the country. The democratic reform here was focused on achieving “political contestation, freedom of speech, and police accountability” among other tasks (Dalacoura 73).

Furthermore, political leaders in Egypt focused on strengthening security in order to guarantee the stabilization of powers in the country. Still, the process was affected by a new uprising and coup; as a result, it is almost impossible to forecast true stability in Egypt in the near future, even though Abdel Fatah al-Sisi has emphasized the country’s focus on continuing democratic reforms. It will be critical to observe going forward how this Egyptian leader will balance the army’s strong position with the development of a fresh democratic course for the country.

Pakistan on the Way to Democracy

The process of transitioning to democracy is also important to discuss in regards to the experiences of Pakistan. The country’s path to this dramatic change was long because the first democratic principles were proclaimed in the 1940s, but the realization of these edicts became possible only in 2013 (Shah 1009). Of course, the military played a critical role in the country’s development, and from 1999 to 2007, Pakistan was headed by the authoritarian leader General Pervez Musharraf. A critical change in regime was achieved finally in 2008, the result of the Pakistan People’s Party’s activities.

What is more important is that the military coup led to the destabilization of the government, and it became impossible to expect development of a democratic leadership for the country (Shah 1008). In spite of the fact that the regime leaded by the Pakistan People’s Party changed out the Musharraf regime, the population still did not observe any real differences in terms of democracy.

The true transition to democracy was realized only in 2013 when the new government, oriented to democratization, proclaimed the beginning of its first reforms. Currently, state leaders work to overcome problems with corruption, to strengthen the governance, to address economic shortages and social problems, and to increase public trust in their democratic government (Shah 1010). These steps are important in order to finish the process of successfully transitioning to democracy.

Comparing Transition to Democracy in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, and Pakistan

The full-scale civil war in Libya prevented the country from rapidly achieving democracy and also added to the further destruction of state institutions (Heydemann 193; Omar 77). The development of violent conflict in Libya demonstrated that the state did not follow the scenario that was observed in Tunisia or in Egypt. In comparison to Libya, Tunisia had a background solid enough to order quick change to the prevailing political order in the country’s move to a democratic platform.

According to Boose, the advantages for Tunisia lie in the fact that it “has the Arab world’s best education system, a large middle class, and very robust civil society rooted in a strong labor movement” (314). In her work, Bellin added more factors to this list, stating that the fact that Tunisian society “is ethnically homogeneous, and the country is closely linked economically to Europe” also contributed to the state’s progress (1). Libya can also be cited as boasting a homogeneous society, but this fact did not prevent the population from being involved in the violent civil war.

Differences that are typical of Libya’s and Tunisia’s paths to democracy can also be found in the first steps that were taken in both states post-revolution. Although military conflicts preceded the change to democracy in both nations, more attention should be paid to the discussion of initial efforts that were made to maintain order and achieve success (Boose 313).

In Tunisia, the first elections to the National Constitutional Assembly that were conducted after the revolution were comparably “free and fair” (Bellin 5). On the contrary, in Libya, two free elections did not produce any results that served to “erect a functioning state amid the ruins of Qaddafi’s regime” (Masoud 76). The problem is in the fact that the last parliamentary elections were conducted in Libya in the 1960s (Blanchard 12; Omar 77). The state’s political structure was not prepared for such significant changes in the political order, and there was no background to support dramatic transitions to the new rule.

One more difference is the approach to developing the civil society in these states. In their work, Stepan and Linz pay attention to the fact that Tunisia achieved better results while transitioning to democracy because the idea of the civil society or state was actively developed across the country (19). This idea stood in opposition to the vision of the religious state. On the contrary, after the Egyptian revolution, the principles of the religious state began to play more vital roles in the country in comparison to the ideas of the civil state.

However, Stepan and Linz also note that although the civil society “can play a vital role in the destruction of an authoritarian regime … for the construction of a democracy, one needs a political society” (23). The religious forces remained powerful even after deposing Qaddafi, and Libya became the arena for a struggle between Islamists and anti-Islamists despite the fact that society there is rather homogenous.

Following the pattern of Egypt in developing conflicts based on religious principles, fighting between the representatives of opposing political camps developed into a civil war (Dalacoura 65); as a result, while evaluating the current rule in the country, Masoud states that “Libya seems not to include anything resembling a functioning democracy” (76). State leaders should overcome the consequences of civil war and then propose rules based on democratic principles in order to stabilize the situation in the country.

It is also important to note that in Tunisia, the parties and new political leaders demonstrated an ability to collaborate while making decisions regarding the state’s political structure and development of its constitution (Boose 314). In 2013, the parties agreed that the country would develop according to the principles of the presidential-parliamentary system. They also achieved a working consensus regarding the development of the constitutional process (Bellin 5).

In Libya, the consequences of the revolution were opposite because the collapse of the dictatorship revealed the impossibility of getting political actors to collaborate or to achieve any consensus in their work. Lesch notes that Libya “had to start virtually from zero to create political structures and parties” because, during the years of dictatorship, the parties could not develop appropriately (67). As a result, Libya needs more time to complete its transition to democracy and to restructure toward a political system model that is working well for both Tunisia and Egypt.

It is possible to explain the prolonged transitional period observed in Libya via references to its past and to the absence of specific skills in political leaders which are necessary to promote radical change in the state. Boduszyński and Pickard pay attention to the fact that in contrast to “the less sweeping turnovers that occurred in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen, Libya has experienced a nearly complete rejection of all things past” (87). From this point, numerous perspectives became open to Libya, but currently, state leaders do not have the required capabilities to achieve any remarkable results, and more efforts should be made in order to change the situation.

In comparing the outcomes of revolution in Libya and Egypt, it is possible to state that Egypt succeeded in conducting legislative and presidential elections during the first months after the 2011 revolt. Then, in 2012, a draft of the new constitution was adopted (Lesch 67). In spite of the fact that the new regime proposed another draft of the constitution in 2014, it is possible to focus on efforts made by political leaders who came after Mubarak in order to assure the legislature in the country.

Nevertheless, the problem lies in the “extreme polarization” of social and political forces in Egypt (Lesch 68). The innate conflict between Islamists and liberals requires seeking deeper solutions, and in this case, it is possible to expect a successful transition to democracy. Libya can refer to the experiences of Egypt while regulating social and religious conflicts in the country. It is also possible to refer to the experience of Pakistan while continuing in the transitional process in Libya, because the risks of retaining democracy as the core target even without achieving it for many years can become a reality for the country, as it was in the case of Pakistan.

Perspectives of Libya’s Development as a Democratic State

While referring to the progress of Tunisia, Egypt, and Pakistan as states that continue to build their democracies, it is possible to apply certain recommendations to the case of Libya in its quest to become a democratic state. The success of Tunisia in achieving initial results on its road to democracy demonstrates the importance of education and of the formation of civil society for the country’s progress.

Therefore, the experience of Tunisia in its transition indicates that the population of Libya requires the civic education in order to avoid the situation when the government substitutes the principles of liberal democracy with false norms that are oriented to guaranteeing and providing power only to certain political actors (Omar 69).

From this perspective, the largest percentage of citizens in the country should have access to general education, and moreover, the public should be educated regarding consequences of a variety of political courses. The focus should be on increasing the public’s awareness regarding their social positions and regarding the many benefits of democracy (Masoud 76). These changes are important in order to prepare the population of Libya to participate in what should be competitive and transparent democratic elections.

However, in order to guarantee that succeeding elections will be fair and credible, it is necessary to pay more attention to institutionalization in Libya. This practice is important to achieving success in realizing the constitutional process and in stabilizing the situation across the country. The newly developed regime in Libya should be institutionalized in order to accentuate the role of governmental institutions in the state’s progress. The problem again lies in the fact that Libya does not so far have stable governmental institutions installed and in the fact that the country cannot follow the patterns of Egypt and Pakistan where institutionalization is only just developing (Heydemann 193).

The political leaders’ task is to build new institutions in a timely manner since this factor is fundamental for the successful transition to democracy. According to Boduszyński and Pickard, “Libya lacks the legal and political frameworks that could support elections and public engagement in the constitution-making process” (89). As a result, institutionalization and the building of a strong political framework are the first important steps that should be taken in order to succeed in conducting democratic elections and in adopting the constitution.

The next step that Libya should take is to conduct elections according to the principles of liberal democracy. The elections that followed the military conflict post-2011 did not help to realize the main goal of achieving democracy in the state, and that caused the transitional period to be prolonged (Darwisheh 14). It is important to note that in Tunisia, elections provided the public with an opportunity to test how democratic rules could work in practice.

In Egypt, elections indicated faults and problems in the existing political system; therefore, the current goal for the country is to revise the approach in play in order to elect presidents to the General National Congress (Boduszyński and Pickard 88). Libya should also focus on the fact that society in the country is comparably homogeneous, and it is possible to expect positive changes on the path to democracy while involving civilians in the process of electing government representatives.

The other step is a focus on development of the constitution. In spite of the fact that Tunisia, Egypt, and Pakistan did not succeed in adopting a new constitution, that only drafts were approved, the constitution-building process should be discussed as important for any transition to democracy. Libya should concentrate on leading this process to its logical end. In addition, state leaders need to focus on maintaining security in the country in order to create a strong foundation for further change (Blanchard 4). The examples of Tunisia, Egypt, and Pakistan also emphasize the importance of gaining international support and of the development of economic relations; therefore, Libya needs to gain benefits by developing stable governmental institutions and by focusing on building connections with foreign countries.

Conclusion

The transition to democracy is a process that brings with it many obstacles; however, it seems that Libya faced even more significant challenges than did other Arab states and Pakistan during its move toward democracy. The problem is in the fact that in contrast to Tunisia and Egypt, the revolution in Libya quickly transformed into a violent military conflict. The army was also an important force in Pakistan, but in Libya, the conflict developed into civil war, which in turn resulted in devastation and crisis.

As a result of the war, it was found that Libya had no real pattern in place toward developing as a liberal or a democratic state. In this context, the country’s path is similar to Pakistan’s, but the actual situation in the country was even more complicated. In Tunisia, the institutional base was prepared for change, and there were in Egypt and Pakistan the building blocks for democratic development.

In Libya, however, the rule of Qaddafi destroyed the political system, as well as the governmental system, and the transition to democracy remained a question for further debates. In order to overcome the current barriers and to achieve positive results in developing a new political order, Libya needs to refer to the experiences of Tunisia, Egypt, and Pakistan. Thus, attention must be paid to institutionalization, to the development of civil society, and to the completion of the constitution-building process.

Works Cited

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Shah, Aqil. “Constraining Consolidation: Military Politics and Democracy in Pakistan (2007–2013).” Democratization 21.6 (2014): 1007-1033. Print.

Stepan, Alfred, and Juan Linz. “Democratization Theory and the ‘Arab Spring’.” Journal of Democracy 24.2 (2013): 15-30. Print.

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