Labor Law Case: Clark v. Missouri

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Table of Contents

Undisputed facts
Analysis of the Plaintiff’s position
Analysis of the Defendant’s position
History of the court’s resolution
Works Cited

Undisputed facts

The plaintiff, Clark, was employed as a section hand by the defendant, Missouri, Kansas, and Texas Railway Company (M.K &T). He had worked for the defendant in this position for about four years. During this time, he had been called to assist in clearing wreckage and taking care of the property in the carriage on several occasions. He had not been called to bring back Texas steer before. The accident that is the subject of the suit happened in Warren County, near Marthasville. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was under the control of the defendant. It was on the morning of May 10, 1897. It was around 6 AM, and still dark as the sun had not come up. It was a cold morning and foggy. As a result of the fog, visibility was poor, and it was difficult to see very far (Clark V M.K & T).

The defendant was in the business of transportation and frequently transported cattle from points in Missouri to other parts of the country. On this morning, the train was transporting a consignment of Texas cattle, of a class known as the Texas Steer. This was not the first time that the defendant was transporting Texas steers, and had done this before on innumerable occasions over the years (Clark V M.K & T).

There was a wreck involving the defendant’s train, and one of the cars containing the Steers was broken. The steers contained in that car escaped. Some of them did not go very far, they remained near the wreck. However, many of them escaped and ran in different directions, with most of the steers running towards the East. One of the steers was seen running to the West. The plaintiff was one of the gang members of the section gang that had been put in charge of this section of the rail by the defendant. Other members of the section gang were; Otto Housman, who was the gang’s foreman, and George and Jim, who were his two sons (Clark V M.K & T).

Most of the steers were successfully put back into the station without incident, but one of them remained out. This is the steer that had run off to the West. The steer that had run off the West belonged to the class of cattle known as the Texas Steer. The Texas Steer has had a reputation for being vicious and dangerous. They belonged to the class of animals known as ferae naturae. Their viciousness is aggravated by excitement, injury, or an attack, and in this state, they became more dangerous and vicious than usual. These facts were common knowledge, and people often talked about the Texas Steer in these terms (Clark V M.K & T).

The train’s conductor went to Otto Housman’s house and woke him up. He told him about the steer and that he should be careful, so they don’t hurt him. The section gang was called to assist in bringing back the steers which had escaped and put them back into the defendant’s station. Otto Housman called the plaintiff and his two sons and told them that one of the steers had gone off towards the West. He then ordered them to go after it, and they complied with this order. The plaintiff armed himself with a club about seven feet long and went off after the steer in the company of Jim and George. The three set off on foot, and they followed tracks along the railway. Along the way, they met two German girls and told them about the steer. They did not seem to understand what they were being told, and the plaintiff told them to be careful (Clark V M.K & T).

After walking for about two miles, the three-section guards saw the steer grazing in a field that was approximately two yards from the track along which they were walking. The search party went into the field after the steer, and it seemed to act wild. It ran onto the track, and they followed it towards Marthasville. Jim was in front, and George followed him. The last in line was the plaintiff. As they moved along, Jim suddenly shouted a warning that the steer was coming and jumped off the track onto the Northside. Clark heard this shout from Jim and saw him jumping off the track. George also jumped off, but when the plaintiff saw the steer, it was very near him. Its head was tucked down, and it was moving as fast as it could (Clark V M.K & T).

When the plaintiff moved to the north, the beast also moved towards that direction. When he moved to the south, it did the same, and he hit it with the club. After hitting the steer, it ran past him towards North, and he ran down the railroad embankment. Its side was so steep that he could not stop himself, and neither could he change his course. He jumped into a muddy pit about seven feet down at the bed of the embankment. He got stuck in the mud, and his knee was injured as a result (Clark V M.K & T).

Analysis of the Plaintiff’s position

Mr. Clark (the Plaintiff) sought to prove that the negligence of the defendant caused his injury and that he took due care that is expected of him as a reasonable human being to avoid the injury. The success or failure of the plaintiff’s rested on proof of whether the defendant knew that the Texas steer was vicious and failed to warn him of that danger.

The position of the law is that if the defendant knew the Texas steer was a class of dangerous and vicious animals and failed to warn the plaintiff, then it is liable in negligence for the defendant’s injuries. However, this liability is also hinged on the ignorance of the plaintiff about this fact. Mr. Clark should not have knowledge of the steers’ viciousness, for this would remove the requirement on the defendant to issue a warning to him.

To prove the defendant’s knowledge about the nature of the Texas steers, the plaintiff drew on its experience in transporting the animals and also on information that he considered to be common knowledge. This piece of information was extracted from the defendant’s abandoned answer. The claim that the viciousness of the Texas steer was common= knowledge imputed knowledge of the same on the plaintiff. Proof of knowledge by the plaintiff about this would prevent him from succeeding against the defendant. He, therefore, sought to use only parts of the defendant’s answer that suited him and denied that he had ever heard of the nature of Texas steer before. Another strategy used to avoid this difficulty was to separate the steer that attacked him from the rest of the steers of the same class. The plaintiff pleaded that the defendant had knowledge about this specific steer, and he did not.

Separating the steer from the rest implied that this particular steer was different, and therefore, even if it was proved that he had knowledge about Texas steers generally, he did not know about the one that attacked him. This contention was based on the fact that the other steers had been peaceful, and only this one had behaved wildly when approached. The defendant, therefore, should have warned him about the danger involved in going after this steer. To prove that he received no warning, Clark denied hearing the foreman’s warning to be careful. He also denied warning the German girls about the nature of the steer in the fields. The plaintiff agreed that he heard Jim’s warning but denied being warned by George.

The principle of assumption of risk acted against the plaintiff. It states that if one knows of the risk involved in certain types of work but, nevertheless, takes it up, he should not recover if that risk causes injury to him. Clark’s case was faced with many difficulties. First, if he conceded that rounding up steers was part of his duties as a section hand, then the law presumes that he took the risk associated with it upon himself. To overcome this, Clark’s attorneys pleaded that this was not one of his tasks as a section hand. They argued that this was out of the ordinary and involved extra risks, which the employer should have warned him about.

The problem with this argument is that if the task that Clark performed was proved not to be part of his duties as a section guard, then the law prevented him from succeeding against his employer. If the order given to him by the foreman was something that he did not have the authority to give, then Clark cannot claim the defendant was responsible for his injuries. The only way Clark could succeed was by showing that though this was part of his job, the risk involved was not ordinary to the tasks he was ordered to perform. This danger was also unknown to him, but it was known to the defendant. In addition to this, the defendant, with this knowledge, negligently and carelessly sent him to undertake the dangerous task. This, he tried to do by separating the steer that attacked him from the others. He sought to prove that this particular steer was more wild and vicious than the others and that it posed an extraordinary danger to him.

In addition to the above, if the said warnings were actually given, they could not have changed anything. These warnings did not prepare Clark adequately for the danger that lay ahead of him. It was still dark and foggy. This made it difficult for Clark to see the approaching beast, and he did not have enough time to jump off the track before it reached him. The warnings did not allow him to prepare for the muddy pit into which he fell and injured his knee.

Analysis of the Defendant’s position

The defendant, in its case, tried to prove the absence of negligence on its part. It also sought to show that the plaintiff assumed a risk known to him and that his conduct contributed to the injury. To prove that it was not negligent in its conduct, the defendant brought evidence to show that it warned the plaintiff about the danger involved in pursuing the steer that had runoff. The foreman told the three men to be careful as they went after the steer. Whether they heard this warning or not was in contention. The plaintiff also received warnings from Jim, and George is also reported to have repeated this warning.

These contentions show that the defendant knew of the risk involved, but they also show that Clark received warnings of the danger before he encountered it. These should have enabled him to know that the steer was likely to charge if approached. If the defendant shows that the plaintiff knew of the risk that he voluntarily assumed it, then the law discharged it from the alleged liability for the plaintiff’s injuries.

The law does not allow a litigant to use parts of his adversary’s statement that benefit him and leave those that are prejudicial to him. The law demands everything to be considered as a whole. Against this backdrop, the defendant argued that if the plaintiff claimed the defendant knew about the viciousness of the steer because that knowledge was common to everyone, then this knowledge must also be imputed on him.

This argument advanced the position that the plaintiff must have been aware of the dangerous nature of the steers and was, therefore, not allowed to recover from his employer for his injuries. He had taken up the task of going after the steer, well knowing the danger to which he exposed himself. Clark’s knowledge was also exhibited by his conduct. The fact that he carried a club with him and the warnings he issued to the German girls show that he was well aware of the dangerous nature of the beast he was going after. It is strange that the courts below were not persuaded by this evidence.

The defendant’s argument that the plaintiff contributed to the injury by his conduct is backed by sound evidence. Even though the plaintiff denies having prior knowledge of the nature of the Texas steer, his demeanor in court and actions on that day show that he was lying. He knew that he was going after a dangerous animal, which would turn vicious if provoked. In spite of knowing this, Clark waited until the steer was very close to him and hit it. His companions were closer to the animal than he was and managed to jump off the track, yet he claimed not to have had enough time to do the same. In addition to this, he only jumped off after the animal had run past m=him, and the danger was gone. The acts of the plaintiff were not consistent with those of a reasonable man under the same circumstances. He, therefore, contributed to the injuries he sustained and cannot recover from his employers.

History of the court’s resolution

The court that heard the case as a court of the first instance was the circuit court, which decided in favor of Mr. Clark. The rail company appealed, and the St. Louis Court of Appeal also made a decision in favor of Mr. Clark. It affirmed the decision of the circuit court, but one of the justices opined that the decision contradicted some decisions of the Supreme Court. The Missouri Supreme Court is the highest court in the state (Supreme Court, 1), and the case was certified to it for re-hearing and determination.

After re-hearing the case, the Supreme Court overturned the decisions of the courts below and found in favor of the rail company. The court found that the giving or failure to give a warning to the plaintiff would not have affected the outcome in any way. It was Clark’s own conduct that caused the injury and not the defendant’s failure to give a warning. He failed to move away when the steer approached him and only jumped when the danger was gone. It also found that none of the parties had any prior knowledge about the steer that attacked Clark. In consequence, the plaintiff did not have a claim against the railway company. Another finding that the court made was that a carrier of goods is not required to know the nature of the goods that it carries. In this grain, even if the defendant, by the nature and experience of its business, knew the nature of Texas steers, it could not have had knowledge about that one steer that attacked the plaintiff.

The Supreme Court held that the Supreme Court of Missouri is under a duty to re-hear and make decisions on causes whose jurisdiction arises out of the ordinary process of appeal. The other holding was that all persons have notice of the propensity of dangerous animals to cause harm. Therefore, whoever keeps them is responsible for the damage they cause, without the requirement to expressly prove knowledge of such facts. Proof of scienter is required in the case of domestic animals. The court also held that a person who seeks to rely on an admission by the opposite party must do so in totality and not in parts. It further held that when a person is faced with imminent danger, his/her conduct is not judged as harshly as when such danger was not present.

The Supreme Court, in my opinion, correctly analyzed the evidence before it and came to the correct findings in accordance with the law. Upon close examination of the plaintiff’s conduct, one can only come to the conclusion that it was contrary to that of a reasonable person faced with the same conditions. He clearly contributed to the injury that he suffered. In addition to this, the defendant transported thousands of steers in its course of duty. It could not reasonably be expected to have intimate knowledge about the nature of each steer that it carried in its freight. For this reason, the court was correct in concluding that neither of the parties had knowledge as to the nature of that particular steer. The law of the day prohibited recovery of the plaintiff under the circumstances, and consequently, the court was correct in rejecting his claims.

Would the Court’s decision prevail today?

The Law has changed since this case was decided. This decision would, therefore, not hold in modern times. Under the Federal Employers Liability Act (1), contributory negligence does not prevent a claimant from succeeding against the defendant. The percentage of contribution reduces the plaintiff’s claim proportionately. If the case was decided under the Act, Clark would have recovered in proportion to his contribution. He would not have been absolutely barred from recovering. The fellow-servant rule would also not apply under FELA, and even if fellow employees had caused the injury, Clark would still recover damages from his employers.

Works Cited

Clark V Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company (M.K & T), 179 Mo. 66; 77 S.W. 882, 1903. Print.

Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq., (1908). Print.

Supreme Court 2012. Web.

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