Intelligence Community Challenges

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Challenges that the Intelligence Community faces

The Intelligence Community (IC) is charged with the responsibility of providing information to the heads of states and security agents on security threats prior to their occurrence (Buzan 2008, 321). The IC is composed of highly trained crime detectives with the ability to detect crime before it occurs. It is composed of the military and civilians.

The security officers in charge of providing global security rely greatly on the IC’s reports to combat terrorism and protect citizens around the world. The IC in the US was formed in response to the overwhelming fear of nuclear weapons during the Cold War. Since its establishment in 1947, the IC has faced numerous challenges that limit its effective working (Goodman and Berkowitz 1994, 306).

However, the challenges were severe in early days of its establishment though they still prevail even in the contemporary times. The major challenges facing the IC are described below:

Information Sharing

One of the setbacks facing the intelligence community is shortfall in sharing of information (George 2004, 386). The challenge is attributed to issues such as organizational complexity and duplication of duties. The different organs creating the IC are reluctant of attending committee meetings on security issues. This reluctance in turn leads to failure in communication, hence the shortfall in information sharing.

There have been calls from various security institutions insisting for unity and cohesion amongst the departments that make the IC (Lefebvre 2003, 532). The Hoover Commission’s report on intelligence also identified shortfalls in information sharing as a major challenge facing the IC and emphasized cohesion and unity in the departments to combat the challenge (Grabo 2004, 130).

The problem of sharing information is compounded by the view that different people have different interpretation of information sharing coupled with the competition that overwhelms the various departments that make up the IC as some compete to control the information obtained from various sources (Grabo 2004, 136).

Due to lack of external checks, monopoly in control and dissemination of information has greatly characterized the IC.

Duplication of Effort and lack of proper skills

Duplication of efforts is yet another challenge that affects the IC. The problem of duplication of efforts is complicated by the complexity of the IC and the technological advancement contemporarily (Lefebvre 2003, 527). With the introduction of alternative analysis, which is aimed at eliminating assumption, it is alleged that resources are wasted through duplication of duties (George 2004, 387).

Alternative analysis calls for deep analysis of data before making a conclusion on its correctness. However, the intelligence community tends to focus only on data that can easily confirm their initial findings and hypotheses at the expense of analyzing the data profoundly for consistency and correctness (Lefebvre 2003, 536). This aspect leads to incorrect predictions, and thus unreliable predictions.

Staff turnover is also a serious issue facing the IC. Most trained personnel leave the IC after a short while due to lack of proper incentives (George 2004, 388). Losing such experienced personnel is a blow to the IC since the cost of recruiting new personnel is high.

The remaining personnel, who choose to continue working with the IC, rarely receive continuous training and updates to equip them with skills regarding changes in legislature and technology (George 2004, 390).

Oversight

Reliable oversight mechanism is important to make the IC effective in the ever-changing crime environment (Lefebvre 2003, 53). However, the IC’s management has faced criticism due to poor management and coordination.

In addition to poor management, the IC lacks proper oversight and external checks, thus making it hard for the body to meet its targets (Lefebvre 2003, 532). Lack of proper oversight mechanisms may lead to unreliability of data, and thus inaccurate security threat predictions.

The problem of lack of oversight is prevalent in most intelligence communities. For example, in the US, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) has been governing the intelligence community since the 1970s (Grabo 2004, 139). Due to the changing nature of crime and the increased terrorist activities, FISA is now overwhelmed and it cannot control crime effectively.

Changes in legislature are not consistent with the intelligence community. This aspect leads to lack of public confidence in the intelligence community and law enforcement bodies. In addition, proper guidelines are lacking to outline the procedure of handling information from individual citizens that may be important in combating crime (Grabo 2004, 141).

How do we change our Cold War analytical thinking? How will this impact the intelligence community and the way we currently conduct business?

It is important to note that the need for a sound intelligence community arose after the Cold War due to the fear of attacks through nuclear weapons (O’Hern 2008, 245). The intelligence community faces numerous challenges that limit its operations.

Since its formation in 1947, its focus has been to counter the attacks by the Soviet Union, and this perception is misguided given the contemporary developments and the evolving nature of crime (Barger 2004, 25). In other words, the intelligence community has not changed its focus to accommodate the current security needs.

The modern intelligence community has remained unchanged for a long time as it is based on the security requirements of the Cold War (O’Hern 2008, 248). The training offered to the military and civilians in the intelligence community is only based on the Cold War threats (Barger 2004, 27).

It does not consider the changes in security threats that have so far developed. There have been great changes in certain areas, which require special attention. The key role of the IC at the time was to combat the threat caused by the Soviet Union.

Since then, the world has undergone great technological advancements leading to new types of weapons (O’Hern 2008, 246). The innovative types of weapons today are not detectable through the traditional technology that the IC continues to invoke in the course of dispensing its mandate. Training ought to be matched with the current developments in technology and crime.

The IC personnel should be trained on the emerging novel types of crimes. Incentives in the form of salary increment for long serving personnel should be availed to reduce staff turnover and retain the experienced personnel. Continuous training should also be availed to all personnel in order to curb the innovative crime.

With the current developments in technology, there is a need for an intelligence community with premeditated potential, viz. it must be capable of developing durable and sound strategies towards achieving the present complex goals and recognize political and social developments influencing the hazards that recline all over the world.

Reports by various committees on intelligence point to poor management and coordination within the IC (O’Hern 2008, 248). The structure that was originally established during the Cold War is still in place. The various departments forming the entire IC are not united, as they should be. As a way of breaking this tradition, a well-managed intelligence community to handle security issues effectively is paramount.

The various organizations that make the IC need to be integrated coupled with enhancing communication. By doing so, the IC will work effectively and duplication of efforts will be minimized. Alternative analysis will be improved due to the improved integration and communication leading to better prediction.

In addition to the aforementioned strategies, the IC needs to be flexible in nature to match both the new human and technological resources with the currently broad forms of terrorism (Barger 2004, 26). It should focus not only on the nuclear weapons, but also on other biological and chemical weapons that continue to emerge with time.

Flexibility of the IC is another factor that cannot be ignored when evaluating ways of improving the IC (Barger 2004, 28). The IC should be flexible to be in a position to respond to the ever-changing security threats. The structure and organization of the IC should be reformed to take in the current security threats. The reforms should be accompanied by legislatures that empower the IC.

Therefore, the IC should shift its view of threats from the Cold War perspective to security needs in the rapidly changing world. Rapid measures aimed at improving the IC should be implemented if the community is to work effectively today and in the future.

Certain changes in the IC are necessary if the community is expected to produce the desired results as regards crime detection and provision of the necessary advice to the security personnel. Therefore, training should match the current technology to keep the IC ahead of the terrorists (Barger 2004, 29).

Reference List

Barger, Deborah. 2004. “It Is Time to Transform, Not Reform, US Intelligence.” SAIS Review 24, no.1 (March): 23-31.

Buzan, Barry. 2008. People, States & Fear: An agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era. Wivenhoe Park: ECPR Press.

George, Roger. 2004. “Fixing the problem of analytical mind-sets: Alternative analysis.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17, no.3 (August): 385-404.

Goodman, Allan, and Bruce Berkowitz. 1994. “Intelligence without the Cold War.” Intelligence and National Security 9, no.2 (January): 301-319.

Grabo, Cynthia. 2004. Anticipating surprise: Analysis for strategic warning. Lanham: University Press of America.

Lefebvre, Stephane. 2003. “The difficulties and dilemmas of international intelligence cooperation.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 16, no.4 (February): 527-542.

O’Hern, Steven. 2008. Intelligence Wars: Lessons from Baghdad. New York: Prometheus Books.

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