Institutional Accountability: Dispersion of Power and Delegation of Responsibilities

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Introduction

Governance and accountability is a critical concept to the development of states. Accountability in governance is a vital practice. It encourages effectiveness in discharge of duties and equitable allocation of resources. Accountability in different institutions has a close link with the way power is distributed in organizations. The loci of power in institutions are useful parameters for assessing the level of accountability in the organizations.

Decentralization of power is highly encouraged in most liberal democracies across the world. Decentralization of power is manifested in a number of managerial practices in institutions like the delegation of the organizations duties and responsibilities (Brinkerhoff et al. 2009).

This paper looks into the aspects of centralization and decentralization of power in different institutions and how these two aspects of governance encourage accountability. In this paper, it is argued that institutions accountability is better attained through dispersion of power and the delegation of the organizations responsibilities rather than through centralization of power and control.

Accountable governance in liberal democracies

Having mentioned liberal democracies, it is imperative to explain how the distribution of power encourages accountability in such nations. One vital characteristic of liberal democracies in the todays world is the high decentralization of power.

Power and ability to make decisions in such countries do not lie in the hands of some individuals. Liberal states decisions are made through consultations between different arms of the government. This means that different arms of the government discuss, consult with each other and deliberate on the issues before the final decision is reached (Ezzamel et al. 2007).

Decisions reached through consultation and deliberations are better weighed than those that are made unilaterally. Different bodies which deliberate on the issues and come up with certain suggestions are also involved in the implementation of such decisions (Brinkerhoff et al. 2009). Therefore, there is a low possibility of manipulating decisions in the middle phases of implementation.

This encourages checks, ensuring that there is a balance in the implementation process. It is easy to detect anomalies in the implementation of the decisions because of the many observers monitoring the process.

Up to this point, it is imperative to say that liberal democracies encourage institutions accountability. Powers are decentralized from the top governance, leaving institutions with no other option, but to implement such structures (Mulgan,2003).

Having talked about liberal democracies, it is vital to mention autocratic governance. Autocratic governance is the least desired form government in the modern society. Autocracy means the centralization of power.

A few individuals are vested with decision making power, leaving other people as mere enforcers of the decisions reached. Channels of deliberating on issues are closed making most people rubber-stamp these decisions. The quality of decisions is put in jeopardy. Therefore, the level of accountability is often low in regimes which do not embrace democracy (Trechsel,2010).

Governance and accountability in decentralized institutions

Research shows that most people in the world are against the centralized system of governance. There are several reasons for the resentment. One of the strongest reasons is that centralized governance kills institutional accountability through the encouragement of unilateral decision making (Ezzamel et al. 2007). In centralized governance, there is one locus of power.

Institutional functions are coordinated from a single point. In some instances, all the powers to make key decisions are left under the control of one individual. The result of this is that one person takes advantage of the power to make certain decisions, which might not be favourable to the whole country/institution (Kaler,2002).

A deep look into the modern practices of institutional management shows that most organizations embrace decentralized structure of management.

Delegation of authority and responsibility can be traced in a wider range of institutions. This is one form of decentralizing power and encouraging sharing of organizational power and responsibilities. This practice is replicated at almost all levels of governance in countries that embrace democracy. Notable examples can be traced in the United States, Western Europe, and Australia (Curtin, Mair& Papadopoulos, 2010).

These are the benchmark regions in as far as institutions accountability is concerned. The question that should be asked is how the decentralization of power and delegation of responsibilities contributes to a higher accountability. Another issue that should be discussed at this point is how the centralization of power and responsibilities kills institutional accountability.

These questions can be sufficiently answered by taking a deeper look into institutions administration from two perspectives centralized and decentralized governance (Schillemanns, 2008).

Decentralized institutional governance: its role in bringing about accountability

Steets (2010) observed that institutional accountability was often measured by the level at which institutions planed and assigned resources effectively in order to get the desired results. Accountability means that employees in an institution embrace ethics in their work (Shearer, 2002). The application of decentralized principles in organizations entails the redistribution of authority in institutions management.

In such institutions, power is shared among different people. Therefore, decisions are not made by a single authority. Each department is given powers to come up with their own suggestions that may be efficient. Each section of an organization has a head who leads it in coming up with decisions and implementing them using the available resources. Perhaps, one point should be noted here.

Decentralized authority does not mean that there is no centre of power. Numerous centres of power exist within an organization. However, each centre of power is given autonomy in a number of duties.

This is where the aspect of responsibility starts. Leaders of departments work closely with the organizations members. Institutional workers keep close checks on each other and on the overall duties that are assigned to them (Kaler,2002).

Organizational tasks are not left in the hands of a few individuals but distributed among other segments of the organization. Leaving the task of decision making to fewer people has numerous consequences on institutions administration. One of the effects is that centralization of authority and responsibility causes flooding. Flooding encourages haphazardness in the discharge of institutional duties.

In such situations, it is easy for an institution to attain improved performance. In delegation, institutional responsibilities are assigned to people across the institution in such a way that no person is left with a wide load of work. This exercise depends on the abilities and skills of the institutions workers. Therefore, it is easy to narrow on a person whenever anomalies occur in the institution.

However, anomalies rarely occur because every individual is involved in the institutions production. Institutions are seen in terms of their ability to serve the society and not in terms of power and dominance (Hood,2010). Power is a minor element in situations where there is a higher delegation of duties and responsibilities. In other words, power is replaced by responsibility.

People work hard to accomplish their tasks as they are responsible for any task assigned to them. Most organizations in liberal democracies thrive in the global economy due to high levels of performance. The highest level of performance comes from the fact that there is a high level of organizational responsibility due to delegation of duties and responsibilities (Steets, 2010).

According to Behn (2001), a number of people argue that accountability can still be attained in institutions that have centralized operations. Their argument is that centralization promotes bureaucracy, which in turn encourages accountability in institutions. While there is some weight in the argument, the biggest portion of the argument is refuted.

This comes from the numerous study outcomes. Those results show that bureaucracy does not encourage accountability. Most functions in bureaucratic institutions are centralized. Delegation of responsibility is a rare practice in such institutions.

Conclusion

Institutional accountability is closely associated with decentralized systems of governance. This system of governance is synonymous with liberal democracies. Liberal democracies encourage the decentralization of power and delegation of administrative responsibility. Most institutions in liberal democracies embrace the democratic principles of management.

These principles include delegation of institutional power and responsibilities. This system governance is synonymous with autocratic regimes. In such regimes, institutions accountability is quite low due to the failure to enhance delegation of authorities.

Institutions power is also highly centralized. From this discussion, it is imperative to say that there is a close relation between decentralization of institutions power and attainment of institutions accountability.

Reference List

Behn, R D 2001, Rethinking democratic accountability, Brookings Inst. Press, Washington, D.C.

Brinkerhoff, D W, Johnson, R W, Hill, R, Merrill, S, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute & Army War College (U.S.) 2009, Guide to rebuilding governance in stability operations: A role for the military, Army War College, U.S.

Curtin, D, Mair, P& Papadopoulos, Y 2010, Accountability and European Governance, Routledge, New York.

Ezzamel, M, Robson, K, Stapleton, P & McLean, C 2007, Discourse and institutional change: Giving accounts and accountability, Management Accounting Research, vol. 18, no. 2, 150-171.

Hood, C 2010, Accountability and Transparency: Siamese Twins, Matching Parts, Awkward Couple?,West European Politics, vol. 33 no. 5, 989-1009.

Kaler, J 2002, Responsibility, accountability and governance, Business Ethics: A European Review, vol. 11 no. 4, 327-334.

Mulgan, R G 2003, Holding power to account: Accountability in modern democracies, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.

Schillemanns, T 2008, Accountability in the Shadow of Hierarchy: The Horizontal Accountability of Agencies, Public Organization Review, vol. 8 no. 2, 175-194.

Shearer, T 2002, Ethics and Accountability: From the For-Itself to the For-the-Other, Accounting, Organizations and Society, vol. 27 no 6, 541-573.

Steets, J 2010,Accountability in public policy partnerships, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, Hampshire.

Trechsel, A H 2010, Reflexive Accountability and Direct Democracy, West European Politics, vol. 33 no. 5, 10501064.

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