Homeland Security Regarding the 9/11 Report

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Regulatory barriers that led to the 9/11 terror attack

The problems with the intelligence agencies

The intelligent agencies struggled throughout the years prior to 9/11 on the collection of intelligence data and the analysis of the transformations of transnational terrorist activities. The intelligence agencies suffered from a number of intelligence priority areas, limited budgets, bureaucratic and outmoded structures as well as tight regulatory frameworks. The mentioned factors led to an insufficient collection of intelligent data on terrorism as well as an inadequate response to the new challenges of terrorist activities.

Even though there were overwhelming indications of terrorist threats and activities within the US, no security agencies tried any initiative to prevent or disrupt the terrorist activities (George and Bruce 102). The CIA that attempted to collect intelligent information on terrorism and counter the terror activities outside US was limited in terms of their capabilities.

Lack of information sharing between the law enforcement and intelligence agencies

Lack of information sharing between the law enforcement and intelligence agencies was cited as the major obstacle that led to lack of detection and eventual occurrence of the terror attacks. According to intelligence sources, the September 11, 2001, attack was largely attributed to the failure of the US intelligence agencies to provide adequate information to the security and law enforcement agencies due to poor coordination between the agencies (Shlapentokh and Woods 120). The barriers that existed between the agencies did not allow free discussion of security issues and sharing of the information.

According to security policy makers, appropriate coordination and sharing of information between the agencies could have led to a coherent comprehension of the emergent plan. However, descent opinions argued that the plot could have been detected without any expert intelligence and sharing of information. Nevertheless, the fact that most of the intelligence data had not been shared could have contributed to the failure of the security agencies to prevent the attack. Studies indicated that prior to September 11, 2001 intelligent agencies were not in a position to sufficiently share pertinent counterterrorism information (George and Bruce 107). The breakdown in communications between the security agencies was due to several factors including variations in their missions, legal authorities and cultures.

The multifaceted arrangement of constitutional philosophies, laws, guiding principles and practices led to the blockade of information from one security agency to the other. Lack of information sharing had a long-standing history between the security agencies though legislative amendments undertaken to be part of the solution to the problem. One of the legislations is the National Security Act that forbids the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from law enforcement powers.

Moreover, the act does not allow the CIA, which is central in the detection of terrorism from having internal security functions. Further, the legislations regulated the extent in which such intelligence agencies could conduct their investigations within the country. The lapses in the investigations and law enforcement capabilities contributed significantly on the concealment of terrorists who by year two thousand had already travelled into the American soil. Moreover, the legislations such as the Foreign Intelligent Surveillance Act (FISA) controlled the level of foreign intelligence electronic surveillance investigations (George and Bruce 118).

On the other hand, the electronic surveillance on internal criminal investigations was still controlled by the Omnibus Crime Control Act (Title III) of 1968. Such were the legislations that incapacitated the intelligence services as well as the control of information sharing on terrorist activities.

The Title III Act prohibited the interception of any electronic communications only such exchanges falling within the domain of the act. In fact, electronic surveillance under FISA is one of the jurisdictions or domains of the Title III act. The electronic communications that was used by the terrorists did not fall within the domain and therefore was ignored and even if it was detected to be security threat, the FISA Act further curtailed the sharing of such information with other law enforcement agencies (Shlapentokh and Woods 119).

Under the FISA, Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) was the only agency with both investigative and law enforcement powers. The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) was conceived to be the international intelligence agency as well as the law enforcement agency. FBI was also the only agency that had prosecutorial powers beyond the US.

The Title III Act also permitted that the foreign intelligence should not involve in probable or definite contravention of the American legal regulations. In other words, intelligence could be obtained within the US regarding a plot involving parties outside US that would not affect the operations proscribed by US laws. Moreover, such intelligence might be of great importance to the policy makers but the intelligence agencies are not entitled to acquire such information under Title III Act. Such provisions provided gaps and overlap on the intelligence information provision and the laws enforcement. In addition, the implementation of FISA greatly influenced the relationship that existed between the law enforcement and the intelligence agencies.

According to FISA, the purpose of electronic surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence information. Further, FISA allowed giving out information regarding criminal operations incidentally obtained during the physical search or the electronic surveillance to the law enforcement agencies (Blitzer 111). However, such dissemination of information was constantly challenged and majority of state courts held judgments that was against sharing of information.

Moreover, the judgments held that the functions of FISA are limited to the gathering of foreign intelligence information. In most cases, FISA information sharing was challenged as being against the Fourth Amendment on domestic criminal information. The federal courts of appeal held in most cases that FISA’s primary purpose was to collect foreign intelligence information through electronic surveillance or physical search, which was inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment requirements for criminal cases.

The regulations of FISA and court orders curtailed the information sharing among the intelligence agencies. The criminal and justice policy more progressively predicted that holding on primary purpose of FISA effectively envisaged the challenges of the Fourth Amendment. The criminal investigators had to get FISA court orders to obtain intelligence information regarding criminal activities (Shlapentokh and Woods 118).

The concerns by the criminal investigations department and criminal justice policy makers were that the courts would consistently suppress information obtained through FISA investigations. The argument was that the criminal investigators primarily used FISA to collect domestic criminal evidence instead of gathering foreign intelligence. Practically, aptitude data collected by the intelligence agencies including the FBI investigations on counterterrorism and counterintelligence was separated from information shared by other security agencies and prosecution. The fear was that FISA could be reversed.

The gaps and lapses due to legislations and regulatory framework led to the failure of information sharing exposing weaknesses in the US intelligence. Moreover, the regulatory framework led to lack of appropriate policies and management frameworks on probable acts of terror and counterterrorism measures (Blitzer 122). The impact of the conflicting legal regulations led to lack of information concerning imminent attack. Most of the prior intelligence information was either ignored or not taken seriously. In the circumstances that the intelligent agencies had information that some terrorists were within the country, the intelligence agencies had to prove it beyond reasonable doubt and not be seen as flouting the laws in case sharing such information was necessary.

Lack of counterterrorism policy

Lack of information particularly failure to share information among the intelligence and security agencies led to the need of counterterrorism strategic measures. The security policy measures were deficient of information on probable threats to come up with immediate measures to counter terrorism activities. In other words, terrorism was not the major security concern during the time.

The policy challenges were purely blamed on the conflicting legal and regulatory frameworks that existed. The intelligence officials and security policy makers disregarded the terror warnings or regarded full invasion of US by terrorists as practically impossible at that particular time. Moreover, the security policies that existed at the time did not adequately address the terror threats or were based on haphazard intelligence information collected by various agencies under tight regulatory frameworks (Blitzer 105).

Reduced capabilities

The legal and policy frameworks that existed before the 9/11attcaks were majorly crafted to deal with terrorist activities outside US (Shlapentokh and Woods 115). Moreover, such policies were based on the capabilities originating from the post cold war errors. Such capabilities proved inadequate amid advanced technological knowhow and the new capabilities used by terrorists. Further, the intelligence capabilities were reduced by failure of coordination on information sharing due to legal regulations and lack of clear policy frameworks. The existing capabilities proved insufficient and little actions were undertaken to reform such policies.

Among the security agencies, the CIA had limited capacity to enforce laws on top of conducting paramilitary operations. The CIA did very little to improve on such capabilities as well as its personnel to conduct preliminary investigations. In addition, the CIA did not improve on its capabilities in collecting intelligence data from human agents due to lack of legal frameworks. Further, the department of defense did not fully engage in countering terrorism. Even though terrorism was the most probable external threat facing US, the defense capabilities were not directed towards fighting terrorists.

Even though homeland security detected the alerts on the application of guided hijacked planes towards American targets, the homeland capabilities were directed towards the aircrafts coming from the outside of the US (Shlapentokh and Woods 119). Serious weaknesses in the intelligence competencies were on the domestic arena. FBI lacked the potential of linking the collective knowledge of the field agents to national priorities. Moreover, other domestic intelligence agencies deferred their intelligence information to FBI.

Generally, the security agencies were extremely weakened by the inadequate policy frameworks and tight legal regulations that controlled the sharing and use of information. There was lack of serious examination of possibilities of the suicide hijackings, which could have been critical in sealing the loopholes within the security system. Strategies to fix vulnerabilities including expanding no fly zones, advanced screening of passengers, deployment of federal air marshals, hardening aircrafts cockpit doors and alerting the crew on possible terror hijackings could have been undertaken with strong policies and legal frameworks on the part of security agencies (Blitzer 109).

The roles of Khalid Sheik Mohammed in 9/11 terror attack

Khalid Sheik Mohammed is one of the main suspected masterminds of the terrorist attacks around the globe. In the 9/11 terror attack, Khalid Sheik Mohammed was said to have been the architect of the deadly event. In fact, Khalid Sheik Mohammed played the roles of training, plotting and commissioning the attack. Moreover, the roles Khalid Sheik Mohammed played in the 9/11 terror attacks originated from his beliefs on Islamic ideals and the notions of the western countries particularly the United States. Khalid Sheik Mohammed was purely against the US foreign policy on Muslim countries particularly that favored Israel (Bolton 98).

However, Khalid Sheik Mohammed spent some of his early life in the United States as a student. During the American stay, Khalid Sheik Mohammed developed hatred for the American foreign policy, which later contributed to his terrorist activities.

Khalid Sheik Mohammed’s actual planning of terrorist activities against US began back in 1994. In the same year, Khalid Sheik Mohammed took part in a plot to destroy twelve US planes operating in East and Southeast Asia. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, the United States intelligence agencies believed that the planning for the 9/11 attacks started during the time. The use of passenger planes was found to be among Khalid Sheik Mohammed’s plans besides crashing explosives into the CIA headquarters (Mcdermott 231). However, the planning to bomb twelve planes with nearly five thousand Americans in Southeast Asia aborted when it was detected by the intelligence services before the actual action.

After the failure of initial plans, Khalid Sheik Mohammed went back to the drawing board. With the help of experienced terrorists during the time, the planning began again in Philippines including the broader terrorist attack plans on the US planes commonly known as the Bojinka plans (Mcdermott 189). The Bojinka plans included buying one of the planes fully fitted with explosives and crash-landing the plane into the CIA headquarters.

The plan had a back up of hijacking another plane that was to be crashed over pentagon or any other important US interest buildings. The plans followed a series of tests that were conducted before on the US airlines that resulted in the death of several citizens of Southeast Asia countries. Following the terrorist activities in Philippines, Khalid Sheik Mohammed was indicted on terrorist charges in US and in 2001 just before the 9/11 Khalid Sheik Mohammed was listed as the most wanted terrorist by the FBI.

The close relationship between Khalid Sheik Mohammed and diehard terrorists such as Osama bin Laden and the Sudanese political activist Hassan Al-Turabi contributed to his continued hatred for the Americans and actions that led to the 9/11 terror attacks. Khalid Sheik Mohammed was said to have been closely associated with Osama bin Laden by the time he was being wanted and fled to Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, the full plan for the attack took place. With the help and assurance from Osama bin laden, Khalid Sheik Mohammed recruited, trained terror cells and executed the plans in 2001. The plan for 9/11 terror activities resembled that of Bojinka in Philippines where several planes were to be hijacked and crashed into the major targets of great interest to the US (Mcdermott 231).

Evidence indicated that Khalid Sheik Mohammed presented his 9/11 terror plans to Osama bin Laden back in 1996 at Tora Bora in a meeting arranged by Al Qaeda chief of operations Mohammed Atef. The plan that Khalid Sheik Mohammed presented to bin Laden included the quadruple hijackings of the US planes in 2001. In the meetings between Khalid Sheik Mohammed and bin Laden, Khalid Sheik Mohammed was particularly persuaded to become a fully-fledged member of Al Qaeda.

However, Khalid Sheik Mohammed refused constantly until late 1999 after the bombings of US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam that Khalid Sheik Mohammed accepted full commitment to terror activities of Al Qaeda (Mcdermott 211). The acceptance initiated the move to Kandahar upon invitation by bin Laden where Khalid Sheik Mohammed became the leader of the media committee of the Al Qaeda. In Kandahar, Khalid Sheik Mohammed cemented his plans for terrorist attack in US.

One of the plans that Khalid Sheik Mohammed presented to bin Laden included hijack of several planes and crash into several US targets. The plans were to be undertaken inside US by several well-trained terror cells. The plans evolved from the previously held strategies that were undertaken in Southeast Asia. However, the Al Qaeda leadership rejected some of the plans including crashing a plane in US bank tower.

The final plot was allowed by bin Laden and was drafted between 1998 and 1999 in a meeting held by Khalid Sheik Mohammed, Mohammed Atef and bin Laden. In that meeting, bin Laden agreed to finance the final plan and provide ground for execution. From that time, bin Laden led the final plans while Khalid Sheik Mohammed was involved in the recruitment and training of the terror cells that were to execute the plot. The trio contributed in the selection of the participants who had to be thoroughly screened and trained for the execution of the plan (Bolton 112). Mohammed Atta was chosen and trained to be the lead hijacker.

Khalid Sheik Mohammed also provided support for the entire operation including choosing the best targets, arranging for the travels of the hijackers as well as other logistical requirements such as their accommodation and movements. Atef controlled the movements of the terror cells that were to undertake the hijackings. The trio of bin Laden, Atef and Khalid Sheik Mohammed coordinated the 9/11 attack each effectively playing different roles.

Khalid Sheik Mohammed and bin Laden discussed the elaborate plans and chose World Trade Center as the most possible target representing the US economic interest (Chernick 198). Mohammed Atta led the team that hijacked the planes that were crashed in the World Trade Center. Osama Bin Laden and Khalid Sheik Mohammed were also convinced that the Pentagon represented US military while Capital was perceived as the source of policy that supported Israel. The Pentagon and the Capital also remained high targets within the plan. In the plan, the White House was also listed and the trio believed that it represented the US political prowess. According to the plan, the hijackers were to be trained in US as pilots of the purported planes and outside US as militants (Mcdermott 58).

According to the intelligent sources, the hijackers were trained in Afghanistan as militants and were made to believe that Americans as well as the West were against the Muslim faith, doctrines and practices. Moreover, intelligence sources indicated the hijackers were to be trained in US as pilots of various specified planes and acquainted with the necessary routes and flight schedules. According to the plan, the team of hijackers consisting of nineteen militants was to be rigorously trained as pilots as well as live in US without prior detection (Mcdermott 63).

The hijackers were to be briefed on the development of the plan after every four months by somebody only known to bin Laden and Khalid Sheik Mohammed. The funding was to be provided by bin Laden. Khalid Sheik Mohammed was responsible for logistics and operations including preparing the hijackers for the final date.

According to intelligence sources, Khalid Sheik Mohammed and Osama bin Laden were motivated and remained committed to punish US in a grand scale for its involvement in the support of Israeli affairs towards Middle East and anti Muslim sentiments. On the eve of the event, bin Laden wanted the date to be postponed. However, Khalid Sheik Mohammed insisted that everything was within the plan and the hijackers were ready. Moreover, bin Laden wanted the hijackers to down the planes with all the passengers on board rather than hitting the targets.

On the contrary, Khalid Sheik Mohammed insisted on his plans and argued that the operations would not be successful by only downing the planes. The hijackers had to hit the targets. Moreover, Khalid Sheik Mohammed persisted that the hijackers had to be fully trained as pilots and combatants. Additionally, the hijackers had to be large to hit the targets at the same time. Several intelligence sources indicated that Khalid Sheik Mohammed was directly involved in the 9/11 terror operations with the help of other Al Qaeda top leaders such as Ramzi bin Al-Shibh.

Even though Khalid Sheik Mohammed was accused of being the head of Al Qaeda military committee, it was never proved and in most instances, Khalid Sheik Mohammed denied being a member of the Al Qaeda military committee. However, in several occasions, Khalid Sheik Mohammed admitted involvement in the planning and operations of the 9/11 terrorists attack in the US soil.

Even though Khalid Sheik Mohammed was the chief architect of the 9/11 terror attack, five other top members of Al Qaeda members were fully aware of the details of operations of the attack. The top Al Qaeda members included Osama bin Laden, Ramzi bin Al-Shibh, Abu Turab Al-Urduni and Mohammed Atef. Other members included the Humbug cell that later became the pilots and hijackers. The motive behind the actions of Khalid Sheik Mohammed and other Al Qaeda members included the declaration of the holy war by Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden against the American citizens for alleged support of Israel.

The declaration of holy war against American citizens led Khalid Sheik Mohammed to organize for mass killing of the American civilians as well as the destruction of major American economic and political interests around the world (Chernick 201). However, the motives behind the terrorist attack included the American support for the attack of fellow Muslims in Somalia, support for atrocities against Muslims in Chechnya, support for Muslim oppression in Kashmir, presence of US bases in Middle East, support for Israeli atrocities against Muslims as well as sanctions against Iraq.

Using the above motives, Khalid Sheik Mohammed found it reasonable to organize and carry out operations that ensured the demise of American citizens. In the 9/11 terror attacks, Khalid Sheik Mohammed played a critical role as the chief architect and led the operations including training of the hijackers as well as logistical support to the hijackers. With the help of other Al-Qaida members, Khalid Sheik Mohammed ensured that his plans were undertaken to success.

Ways used by Khalid Sheik Mohammed and Mohammed Atta as a deception to avert intelligence discovery and prevention of the attack

The application of deception and denial

While the tactics used by terrorists to avoid detection from security agencies may vary, common tactics have often been employed (Sageman 159). In fact, terrorists use different tactics at every given opportunity because of vulnerability to security agencies. Advanced modern communication technology plays a critical role in the deception tactics used by terrorists (Jessee 368). Essentially, denial and deception has been major tactics that have been employed by terrorist groups particularly the Al Qaeda. Khalid Sheik Mohammed and Mohammed Atta used the tactics throughout the operations leading to September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to avoid detection by the Americans as well as other international security agencies (Sageman 159).

The reasons why Khalid Sheik Mohammed and Mohammed Atta majorly applied the tactics were that denial and deception had been institutionalized in all aspects of Al Qaeda structure and organization (Jessee 369). Being members of the terror network, Khalid Sheik Mohammed and Mohammed Atta had been trained and mastered the techniques of deception and denial. Moreover, most of the international as well as domestic securities agencies hold the perception that terrorists are incapable of employing the tactics as part of their grand strategy (Eldridge 132). Having the knowledge, Khalid Sheik Mohammed and Mohammed Atta applied the procedures to evade detection and arrest in planning the operations leading to the September 11, 2001 terror attacks.

Throughout the planning and operations of the Al Qaeda, Khalid Sheik Mohammed employed disinformation through the publication of manipulated footage in order to falsify the American security agencies as well as the allied agencies of the identities of other people not directly connected to the terror activities (Jessee 370). In most cases, the terrorists used information of the countries’ citizens as having direct link to the terrorist groups.

Often, the terrorists implicated names of security personnel or journalists to be leaking intelligence information to the terror groups. The tactics were applied by Khalid Sheik Mohammed to divert attention of the security agencies from the plans, activities and operations (Sageman 160). The application of false publications and information ensured the survival of Mohammed Atta and other terror cells in Hamburg and US. Essentially, Khalid Sheik Mohammed applied false information at strategic and operational levels in order to avoid detection as well as attain the strategic results.

In support of the grand strategy, denial and deception covered a wide range of activities including institutionalized training, travel, financing and communications. Khalid Sheik Mohammed applied all the tactical actions to achieve the desired goal (Eldridge 125). In fact, Khalid Sheik Mohammed ensured that all the information channels by which the intelligent agencies could learn the plans, strategies and operations were blocked.

The deceptive travel tactics included incapacitating intelligent airport agencies, passport fraud, visa fraud and choosing several means of travel (Eldridge 130). In terms of financing, the terrorists used nondescript transactions, non-banking transactions and non-disclosure of the sources of finance.

Communication was one of the most sensitive areas where the terrorists’ activities could be detected. Khalid Sheik Mohammed and Mohammed Atta used many encrypted codes that could not be identified easily by the intelligence agencies and if detected took time before such codes were understood (Eldridge 128). Moreover, Khalid Sheik Mohammed and Mohammed Atta used extremely limited communications throughout their operations. The command of the activities were communicated in prior particularly during the training sessions (Sageman 159).

Institutionalized training

Terrorists are thoroughly instructed on the disguise tactics during training sessions. Khalid Sheik Mohammed admitted in several occasions on how he was trained on the art of disguise and the way the tactic aided in the avoidance of arrest and detention of security agencies particularly in Pakistan and Southeast Asia (Sageman 159). Moreover, Khalid Sheik Mohammed admitted how he thoroughly trained the hijackers including Mohammed Atta on the disguise tactics, rendezvous practices, concealed writing skills, cryptology and codes.

Moreover, Khalid Sheik Mohammed and Mohammed Atta trained the hijackers on how to live the American lifestyle including how to order food in restaurants, type of clothing and other social actions that would allow them mingle with the population without suspicion (Jessee 381). The Al Qaeda training manual contained elaborate procedures and instructions on how the operatives could avoid detection while infiltrating an enemy area. The lessons included currency counterfeiting, forging documents, cell compartmentalization, living under cover and clandestine meeting and communications. Mohammed Atta and other hijackers were thoroughly trained on these deceptive tactics in Afghanistan before travelling to US (Sageman 158).

Deception and denials in travel

The Reports of 9/11 Commission indicated that Khalid Sheik Mohammed applied deceptions on the hijackers’ travels in order to be in the locations where they could easily accomplish the desired objectives (Sageman 158). Further, the 9/11 Commission Report indicated that travel issues played a critical role in the planning and operations of the attackers. Mohammed Atta and other operatives used fake visas and passports, used the US borders to their advantage and chose several air travels that provided the opportunity to hijack various planes at the same time (Jessee 381). In fact, the reports indicate that the travel techniques were inculcated during the instructions provided by Khalid Sheik Mohammed.

Instructions

Before the 9/11, Mohammed Atta and other operatives were thoroughly instructed on how to falsify the travel documents to avoid any suspicion. The falsification process was such a way that the documents could not be detected as being forged (Jessee 388). The instructions included passport modification techniques such as replacement of photos, deleting or adding travel statuses and manual representing skills as well as cleaning of visas.

The purposes for the instructions were to increase the hijackers’ capacity on documents forgery and to enable the operatives make adjustments while on the field (Eldridge 136). Khalid Sheik Mohammed trained Mohammed Atta and other operatives on how to use forged documents as well as the expected reactions and actions of the customs officials while entering foreign countries.

The institutional incapacitation

Prior to 9/11 the Al Qaeda operations arm ensured that airport as well as border customs were incapacitated in terms of detection of any fraudulent documents (Sageman 160). In fact, the falsification procedures were undertaken through a command system that was located in the host countries and specialized in the techniques of altering documents. In the case of Khalid Sheik Mohammed and Mohammed Atta, travel-coordinating cells located in various airports within the US synchronized the travels of the hijackers (Jessee 382).

The facilitators ensured that Mohammed Atta and other operatives obtained fraudulent documents, arranged for real or fake visas, made reservations for the airlines, bought the airline tickets, arranged accommodations and the ground transportation and were responsible for all aspects of travel where expertise or contacts were required (Sageman 160). As such, the domestic intelligence encountered difficulties in detecting the operations of the terrorists. The activities of the facilitators also incapacitated the detection procedures of the airport customs officials.

The passport and visa fraud

Passports and visas were critical in the facilitation of the terrorists’ travels. In relation to the visas and passports fraud, the terrorists had skills in changing photos, deleting or adding fake status on visas and passports, bleaching stamps and substituting pages (Sageman 159). The techniques were highly utilized in the provision of cover during the travel of the hijackers. In fact, two passports that were found after 9/11 attacks were fraudulent.

Visa frauds are critical in disguising the travel destinations. The cachets on the travel destination on visas were changed to disguise the information on the travel destinations to avoid detection and follow-ups. In the 9/11 operations, Khalid Sheik Mohammed enabled two hijackers Khalid al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hamzi to utilize Yemeni passports for travel from Pakistan to Malaysia. Thereafter, the two hijackers used Saudi passports to travel to US. The undertaking was to prevent US customs officials from noticing Pakistani markings on the Yemeni documents that could raise any suspicion (Jessee 376). The indications are that almost all the hijackers used falsified visas and passports to enter into United States.

Cover tactics

Khalid Sheik Mohammed and Mohammed Atta perceived the attacks in the World Trade Center and other targets within US as open warfare or insurgency against the American citizens (Sageman 158). As such, they took cover among the American population. Cover was one of the strategies that Khalid Sheik Mohammed used to shelter the insurgents who later became the nineteen suicide plane hijackers. The insurgents camouflaged among the American population without detection until they accomplished their mission (Sageman 161). Mohammed Atta used the cover tactics throughout his involvement in terror activities.

In Hamburg, Germany, Mohammed Atta took cover as a student and used false reasons behind failure to perform his roles as a student (Eldridge 123). Further, Mohammed Atta used false identities including different names to prevent detection by the security agents. In US, Mohammed Atta perfected the tactic, used false identities including names, passports as well as activities, and successfully evaded the detection of security agencies (Jessee 383).

The communities perceived Mohammed Atta as respectful person and in most cases was sympathetic towards his course. In fact, majority of people Mohammed Atta interacted with were indifferent towards his activities or acted under duress (Eldridge 125). The communities as well as the security agencies knew little about the terror activities of Mohammed Atta. Nevertheless, Mohammed Atta successfully used the tactic of cover to undertake the terrorism operations.

Works Cited

Blitzer, Robert M. Domestic Intelligence Challenges in the 21^st Century. Arlington, VA, Lexington Institute, 2002. Print.

Bolton, M. Kent. U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy making After 9/11: Present at the Re-creation. Lanham, Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield, 2006. Print.

Chernick, Howard. Resilient city: the economic impact of 9/11. New York, NY, Russell Sage Foundation, 2005. Print.

Eldridge, Thomas R. 9/11 and Terrorist Travel: Staff Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. New York, Norton, 2004. Print.

George, Roger Z. and James B. Bruce. Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations. Washington, DC, Georgetown University Press, 2008. Print.

Jessee, Devin D. “Tactical Means, Strategic Ends: Al Qaeda’s Use of Denial and Deception.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 18.1 (2006):367–388. Print.

Mcdermott, Terry. Perfect Soldiers: The 9/11 Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It. New York, NY, Harper Paperbacks, 2006. Print.

Sageman, Marc. Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. Print.

Shlapentokh, Vladimir and Joshua Woods. Feudal America: Elements of the Middle Ages in Contemporary Society. Pennsylvania, Penn State Press, 2012. Print.

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