French Immigration: Rights of Foreign-Born Citizens

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Table of Contents

Introduction
The impact of immigrants
Protecting the rights of foreign-born citizens
Conclusion
References

Introduction

French immigration during the 1980s -1990s was a political issue because of the national policies and reforms provided by the government. These changes were caused by the socialist victory of Francois Mitterand. In contrast to previous decades, this government improved the status of immigrants and gave them social support. The 1980s amendments to Immigration sharply changed immigration policy. The end of the national origins quota system that had applied to the Eastern Hemisphere since the 1920s resulted in a relative decline (Jelen, 2005). The earliest restrictions were intended to bar the entry of persons who would lower the nation’s productivity–the sick, disabled, indigent, and criminal. Even the ethnocentric national origins quota system was influenced by concerns with productivity, although based on a prejudiced reading of the data. These amendments, together with subsequent legislation, also changed the mechanism for rationing immigration visas among applicants from a country.

The impact of immigrants

Mass immigration was a political issue because it was used by the parties to gain the electorate and votes. “What followed was a reintroduction of an earlier repatriation scheme that gave migrants financial compensation if they returned to their home country and a toughening of already existing legislation whereby immigrants had to prove their employment status ahead of being granted residency” (French Immigration Policy 2007). In addition, the issue of illegal aliens has heightened public interest in immigration policy. Interagency task forces and commissions have been formed, or are soon to be formed, to study immigration policy. Even if legislation is not changed because these studies conclude that current law is optimal, the periodic reevaluation of policy is fruitful.

An analysis of the impact of immigrants on the average level and distribution of income among the native population shows that immigrants with higher levels of skill are more likely to raise the average level of income and decrease the inequality of income among the native population (Cox and Posner 2007). A preliminary analysis of the earnings of foreign-born white men in France also showed that the skills of immigrants are not static. Foreign-born men were compared with native-born men with the same demographic characteristics. Although the immigrants had lower earnings when they first arrived, as time passed, they acquired skills relevant to the labor market, and the earnings gap between the foreign and native-born narrowed (Hagedorn, 2000) After about thirteen years in the country, the earnings of the foreign-born exceeded those of the native-born. The Pasqua laws of 1986 gave local authorities the right to send back immigrants. These laws raised political debates and a new wave of political struggle between political parties and their supporters (Jelen, 2005).

During the 1990s, immigrant workers tend to raise the overall income of the native population, the incomes of native workers that are close substitutes in production for immigrant labor decline, while the incomes of other factors of production increase. If the immigrants are not substantial recipients of income transfers either owing to their high level of skill or denial of access to these benefits, income redistribution programs can be designed to transfer resources from the native groups that gain to the native groups that lose, so that after the transfers no native group loses by the immigration (Jelen, 2005). This cannot occur if the immigrants themselves are to be substantial recipients of these transfers, whether they are welfare benefits, social services, or social overhead capital financed before the immigration. As an alternative to the current policy of rationing immigration visas based on nonpecuniary criteria, a large (rather than nominal) visa fee or, as a substitute at the immigrant’s option, an annual immigrant income tax surcharge is considered.

The overall productivity of immigrants would be likely to increase, as productivity criteria would increase in relative importance in allocating scarce visas (Hagedorn, 2000). This change in rationing criteria is likely to increase the net gain to the native population from immigration both directly from the visa fee and indirectly from the increased productivity of immigrants (Hall, 2000). The increased benefits to natives from immigration would provide an economic incentive for an increase in the number of visas issued annually. The change in rationing criteria would not end immigration motivated by a desire for family reunification but would place it in an economic context rather than its current political context, as the. kinsmen who would presumably gain by the migration could assist the immigrant in paying the fee (Silverstein, 2005). The annual surcharge on the immigrant’s income tax as a voluntary substitute for the visa fee has the advantage of avoiding problems of the capital market financing constraints. It also provides greater flexibility in terms of emigration, although the visa fee should be partially refundable if emigration occurs. During the 1990s, “the violent riots in Lyon and Paris were an early sign of the deep crisis in the country’s social cohesion that remains unresolved today, borne from the social and economic marginalization and exclusion of many of the country’s second and third-generation immigrants” (French Immigration Policy 2007).

Protecting the rights of foreign-born citizens

The nation seems to face too many political problems for many to advocate sizable increases in immigration. Immigrants’ organizations became a strong political force in France protecting the rights and freedoms of foreign-born citizens. The most likely pattern in the 1980s is a continuation of the selectivity with modifications to admit more refugees and tinkering with the laws to make the process efficient (Diamond, 1996). If the Senate appears reluctant to make major changes in legal immigration, it is also unwilling to do much about illegal immigration, unless its magnitude grows substantially. Sealing the entry for illegals is difficult because of the inability of Congress to resolve conflicting groups and interests (Jelen, 2005).

Conclusion

While a humane immigration policy must surely include a recognition of the importance of kinship ties and refugee relief, the implications of these policies as distinct from one giving greater weight to productivity need to be recognized. The self-selection would be more pronounced the larger the costs of migration, including the costs of the subsequent adjustment in the new environment. “The 1980s and ’90s serve as good examples of the patchwork of policies pursued by different governments over the years. With policies that shifted radically, sometimes within a few months, a large part of France’s immigrant population was left in a situation of insecurity” (French Immigration Policy 2007).

The smaller costs of migration for economic migrants imply that the favorable self-selection will be less intense, which at least partially offsets the greater transferability of their skills. In comparison with economic migrants, refugees are less likely to be self-selected based on high labor marketability and work motivation, because factors other than labor market success are important determinants of their migration. In a cohort of immigrants, among those with the same number of years of schooling, those who are older have had more work experience in their country of origin. Liberalization did not mean a return to the nineteenth-century pattern of free immigration; few advocated that. To deal with the small refugee preference, Congress and the president took special action when emergencies arose.

References

Cox, A.B., Posner, E.A. 2007, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law.; Stanford Law Review, vol. 59, no. 4, 809.

Diamond, S. 1996, Right-Wing Politics and the Anti-Immigration Cause. Social Justice, vol. 23, p. 154.

French Immigration Policy 2007. Web.

Hall, B. 2000, Immigration in the European Union: problem or solution? OECD Observer, vol. a, pp. 72-75.

Hagedorn, H. 2000, Republicanism and the Politics of Citizenship in Germany and France: Convergence or Divergence? German Policy Studies, vol. 1, no. 3, p. 243.

Jelen, B. 2005, “Leur Histoire Est Notre Histoire”: Immigrant Culture in France between Visibility and Invisibility. French Politics, Culture and Society, vol. 23, no.1, p. 101.

Silverstein, P.A. 2005, Algeria in France: transpolitics, race, and nation. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press.

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French Immigration: Rights of Foreign-Born Citizens

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