Exceptions in “Quietly Quitting” At-Will Employees

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Table of Contents

Introduction
The Public Policy Exception
Implied-Contract Exception
Implied Good-Faith and Fair-Dealing Covenant
Conclusion
Works Cited

Introduction

The assumption that workers will not be fired if they perform their jobs properly has been eroded by major layoffs, staff cutbacks, and job churn in recent decades. Employers appear to have favored using the “employment at will” doctrine (Mujtaba and Senathip 213). The doctrine specifies that employers may fire employees for any reason when there is no employment contract, or the duration of employment is undetermined (Mujtaba and Senathip 213). This doctrine has spurred the growth of a trend called “quiet quitting,” whereby employees only concentrate on tasks specified in their job description before departing for the day (Zaller).

The areas where at-will employment may not apply are three. These include situations where an employee refused to violate a public policy, an implied contract exists, and where there was an agreement to work out of out of good faith (Varner and Schmidt 30). All these exceptions provide reasonable grounds not to fire a quietly quitting employee who refuses to work when doing so violates a law, and when an employee declines in good faith to take up assignments beyond what is defined in the job description. In other words, for this phenomenon there is an unambiguous legislative framework that interprets all sorts of options for satisfying a quiet dismissal.

The Public Policy Exception

The public policy exception prohibits terminating workers for refusing to break a law or public policy. Employees who file workers’ compensation claims due to work-related accidents are generally excluded from dismissal. In quiet quitting, employers may want to know whether it is permissible for workers to decline assignments that are outside of their job description (Martella 119). This is particularly true for employees who may not want to accomplish a task because it is not part of their job description. A job description, however, should only serve as a basic sketch of the duties required of the employee and should not be construed as a binding legal agreement. Instead, job descriptions are meant for job analysis, or measuring employees’ work performance (Zaller).

The Griggs v. Duke Power (427) decision set a precedent for job analysis. The court ruled that a screening tool should assess the job applicant, not the person. Testing and measuring are permitted under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act because they are helpful for evaluating employee performance but do not form an employment contract. Against this backdrop, an employer may not dismiss a quietly quitting employee for refusing to work beyond what is defined in the job description, as it does not form part of the employment contract (Martella 119). Nevertheless, in the context of a public policy exception, it would be important to establish the reason behind an employee’s engagement in quiet quitting.

The public-policy exception forbids employers from terminating workers at will when doing so would violate social laws. Hence, an employee caught up in quiet quitting after sustaining an injury in the line of duty cannot be dismissed (Zaller). Similarly, employees who refuse to break the law when told to do so are not subject to disciplinary action. In Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the union’s secretary-treasurer offered Peter Petermann a job as a commercial agent if he performed well (California Court of Appeals 27).

Petermann was summoned to appear at his workplace before a committee that was investigating Teamsters Union wrongdoing. Petermann answered all committee questions honestly despite union orders to mislead. After testifying, he was dismissed. However, the court overturned the decision to dismiss the employee. Hence, this exemption would protect an employee from being dismissed for quietly quitting when doing so is legitimate.

Implied-Contract Exception

The second primary exception to employment-at-will is the development of an implicit contract between an employer and employee without an explicit, written agreement. Typically, a worker is an “employee at will” under common law and may be fired at any time, for any reason, or for no reason in the absence of an employment contract (Varner and Schmidt, 30). This may happen if an employer adjusts an employee’s duties or job description (Varner and Schmidt 32).

Here, an “implied contract exemption” prevents employers from firing employees at will when the terms of employment in the job description are implied (Zaller). An employee who quits quietly on the grounds of an implied contract may not be dismissed. Despite the absence of a formal contract between an employer and employee, the latter may offer the former verbal or written guarantees on the security of their job or the procedures to be followed in the case of negative employment choices. If these claims are true, an employee may not be fired despite quietly quitting.

An employer’s verbal assurances to employees, such as continuing employment if the employee performs well, may establish an implicit contract forbidding termination without cause. The Michigan Supreme Court ruled in Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan (883) that even though an employee’s employment was not for a specific period of time, a condition declaring they could only be dismissed for cause may constitute an implicit contract if it led to reasonable expectations of job stability (Varner and Schmidt 33). Hence, when an employee “quietly quits” on the grounds that he is performing work based on implied terms, he may not be dismissed.

Implied Good-Faith and Fair-Dealing Covenant

The most significant variation from the standard employment at will premise is the acceptance of a covenant of good faith and fair treatment. This exception incorporates a pledge of good faith and fair dealing into every work arrangement. Employers are required to provide a good reason for any personnel decisions they make, and the legislation has been interpreted to ban spiteful or ill-intentioned terminations (Zaller).

A quitter may not be dismissed for refusing to accomplish tasks outside of a job description. Typically, at-will employment allows either the employer or the employee to discontinue the relationship at any time, with or without cause. The main difference from employment at will is a covenant of good faith and fair treatment. This exception requires good faith and fair conduct in all labor arrangements. Employers must present a good cause for all personnel decisions, and the law bans spiteful terminations (Zaller).

For this reason, a quitter may not be fired for declining to do extra work if doing so would portray the employer as spiteful and when the employer does so in good faith. In Lawrence M. Cleary v. American Airlines, the court ruled that due to the employee’s long tenure and the airline’s public representation that it manages personnel issues, a California appeals court found that the corporation could not fire him without cause (California Court of Appeals 724). The court decided that American Airlines was required by the implied-in-law duty of good faith and fair dealing to not deprive an employee of 18 years of earned benefits.

Conclusion

An employee’s dismissal may be overturned even when an at-will clause in the employment contract enables it. After suffering an injury while performing their job duties, an individual who engages in quiet quitting may not be fired. Employees who refuse to breach the law when instructed to do so will also not face termination. Additionally, where the conditions of employment or job description are inferred, the implied contract exception forbids employers from discharging workers at will. This would prevent the employer from terminating the worker without cause or taking other unlawful employment measures. Furthermore, an employer may not terminate a quitter for refusing to take on additional duties if doing so would make the employer seem vindictive and if the employer declines in good faith.

Works Cited

California Court of Appeals. Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 1980, pp. 722-727. Case Law V-Lex. Web.

California Court of Appeals. Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal.App.2d 184, 1979, pp. 26-38. Case Law V-Lex. Web.

Martella, Michael. Law 101: Fundamentals of the Law. Open Educational Resources, 2018.

Michigan Supreme Court. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.2d 880, 1980, pp. 883-95. Case Law V-Lex. Web.

Mujtaba, Bahaudin, and Senathip, Tipakorn. “Layoffs and Downsizing Implications for the Leadership Role of Human Resources.” Journal of Service Science and Management, vol. 13, no. 1, 2020, pp. 209-228.

United States, Supreme Court. Griggs v. Duke Power. United States Reports, vol. 124, 8 March 1971, pp. 425-35. Case Law V-Lex. Web.

Varner, Katrin and Schmidt, Klaus. “Employment-at-Will in the United States and the Challenges of Remote Work in the Time of COVID-19.” Laws, vol. 11, no. 2, 2022, pp. 29-42.

Zaller, Anthony. “Potential Legal Responses Towards “Quiet Quitters.” Zaller Law Group. 2022. Web.

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