Effects of the September 11, 2001 Terror Attacks on Sino-American Relations

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Table of Contents

Immediate Response
Sino-American Relationship Before September 11, 2001
Sino-American Relationship after September 11, 2001
Conclusion
Bibliography

After the events of September 11, 2001, the entire world was horrified at the new precedent set for terror against states making every country vulnerable. The United States was gripped with fear of further attacks, while Russia was concerned about remaining marginalized on the global stage (Buckley & Fawn 2003, p. 3). Africa worried about how terrorism might reduce funds allotted for alleviating poverty and AIDS. Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi’s right-wing coalition government was confused regarding whether or not to commit troops to America’s war on terror.

Germany, while pledging to fight terrorism as part of its security policy, called for European multilateralism in the face of US unilateralism. In the Middle East, countries such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Israel expressed condemnation of terrorism to differing degrees and for varying reasons. The reactions of different countries to the terror attacks have also been impacted by the presence of Muslim populations within states, history of a given state, size of its Muslim population, constellation, and nature of religious beliefs, type of government, presence of terrorist groups and region.

Thesis: In the aftermath of the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, China and the USA have come together on a common platform to combat terrorism reshaping Sino-American relations and redefining Asia–Pacific security concerns.

Immediate Response

China’s immediate response to the terror attacks was both swift and cautious. President Jiang Zemin was among the first world leaders to send condolences to President George W. Bush (Lam 2001, p.1). Chinese leaders decided to condemn the terrorist attacks and express sympathy for the victims but they would not express their solidarity with America in its conflict with terrorists. China had its terrorism concerns especially in the western province of Xinjiang where Muslim separatists supported by Afghan-based groups existed. Chinese officials felt that the USA must not take independent action against the terrorists but must proceed through the United Nations Security Council.

Moreover, they demanded that the US should produce ‘concrete evidence’ before launching any action against suspected terrorist groups. Though China did not approve of US operations in Afghanistan, it responded positively to Washington’s call for international cooperation in fighting terrorism. Jiang was keen to maintain an image of China as a peaceful and constructive member of the international community.

According to Western media, Chinese citizens were shocked by the scale of the terror attacks and tended to blame the tragedy on the USA’s ‘hegemonic policy’ (Yunzhong 2002, p.5). The anti-American sentiment was widely expressed on Chinese websites and chat rooms across the internet exposing the fact that while China admired the wealth and power of the US, it resented its status as a great power (Florcruz 2001, p.1. On the political side, Chinese analysts did not doubt that the 9/11 attacks were terrorist acts, and their security specialists disapproved of such acts. China’s view was that international terrorism is the product of an unjust international political and economic order dominated by a hegemonic power, namely, the USA.

Sino-American Relationship Before September 11, 2001

During the Clinton era, China was seen more as a strategic partner of the United States whereas, during the Bush campaign, China is seen more as a strategic competitor (Rice 2000, p. 55). Immediately after taking office, Bush took steps to strengthen America’s security relations with friends across the Asia-Pacific. This step was perceived as a threat to Chinese security by China. The mid-air collision of an EP-3E spy plane and a Chinese fighter jet over the South China Sea and the unauthorized emergency landing of the American plane on China’s Hainan Island in April 2001, led to a major diplomatic crisis between the two states (Buckley & Fawn 2003, p. 213). Thus the relation between China and the United States was on precarious territory before the terror attacks on the WTC.

Sino-American Relationship after September 11, 2001

Sino-American relations were expected to improve after 9/11 as it was imperative to have China’s support for America’s battle on terrorism to be effective. China’s willingness to cooperate with the USA in fighting international terrorism has been welcomed by Bush. In Shanghai, in October 2001 Bush referred to the USA and China as ‘two great nations.’ In December, the US government granted China permanent status as a normal trading partner which, according to the White House, marked ‘the final stage in normalizing the US-China trade relations’ (BBC News 2001, p. 1).

Though the two countries have been brought together on the common platform of fighting the ‘war against terrorism’ there are also many obstacles to developing a closer relationship. Both countries have different perceptions on issues such as the origins of terrorism, the best way to fight it, and the expected outcomes of anti-terrorist cooperation. China views with suspicion and alarms the expansion of America’s anti-terrorist networks. There are also differences between the two countries on many strategic, political, and economic issues such as Taiwan, WMD proliferation, missile defense, human rights, and religious freedom.

The US views China as a non-status quo power that, despite its tremendous economic achievements over the past two decades, is still under self-appointed communist rule. Many US politicians and analysts fear that as long as China continues to be under communist rule, its increasing power and growing military strength cannot be used to deal peacefully with conflicts among its neighboring countries. This is a challenge confronting the USA and allies in the Asia-Pacific.

The United States is concerned over the increasing military strength of China. A CIA report of 2002 estimated that China’s ballistic missiles will increase several-fold by 2015 and that they would be deployed primarily against the USA (NIC 2002). A Pentagon report published in July 2002 also echoed concerns about China’s growing military power and the probable threat it poses towards Asia-Pacific security and US interests.

Taiwan is a very contentious issue between the two countries – the US and China. Bush has expressed his open support for Taiwan and has approved the sale of a massive arms package to Taipei to defend itself (Sanger 2001, p. A1). Washington is holding on to its commitment to Taiwan by having close military ties with the Taiwanese and allowing senior Taiwanese leaders and officials to visit the USA (Li 2002, p. 157).

According to a leaked Pentagon report, it is reported that the United States may unleash its nuclear weapons on China, should it choose to enter into conflict with Taiwan. China of course resents these activities of the United States who feel that the Bush administration is trying to exploit the Taiwan issue to stall the development of a strong and united China (Buckley & Fawn 2003, p. 214). Chinese leaders desire to see China as the rising world’s superpower, challenging US domination.

After September 11, 2001, China’s foreign policy is undergoing important changes, allowing China to actively participate in the international security system along with other permanent members of the Security Council (Weiner 2006, p. 415). In contrast to its foreign policy ten years ago, China has accepted international rules and regulations and supports the role of the Security Council in tackling global security concerns (Medeiros & Fravel 2003, p. 22).

China perceives itself as a possible victim to terror attacks in the future and hence recognizes its responsibilities in seeking to combat it. A Chinese government “White Paper” entitled “China’s National Defense in 2002″ reveals that China fears the growth of a domestic Islamic terrorist movement in the western Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region and the forces of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (Davis & Azizian 2007, p. 47). After September 11, 2001, clashes between Muslim and non-Muslim civilizations have spilled over into China from Afghanistan partly because of the U.S presence in the region (Davis & Azizian 2007, p. 47).

The agitation has overflowed into Xinjiang with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) cracking down what they call Uyghur terrorists. But Beijing is accused by Western human rights groups of trapping innocent Uyghurs in addition to the Uyghur militants. China expected the international community to accept its post-September 11 crackdowns in Xinjiang as part of the global war on terrorism (Davis & Azizian 2007, p. 47).

Though China had opposed vehemently the U.S.-led intervention in Kosovo in 1999, it chose to endorse the Afghanistan campaign – “the first such action that China had endorsed since the ending of the Cold War” (Malik 2002, p. 152). Counterterrorism cooperation between the United States and China has opened a “new era of bilateral relations” between the two countries (Wu 2005, p.35). China offered the United States important forms of political support for its war on terror by supporting resolutions passed by the Security Council and General Assembly (Taylor 2005, p. 181) as well as the U.S. assertion that states may use force in self-defense against terrorist actors abroad (Oudraat 2003, p. 168).

More significantly China played an instrumental role in encouraging its close ally Pakistan to support American efforts in Afghanistan (Taylor 2005, p. 181). China also pledged $150 million towards reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and participation in the Container Security Initiative to prescreen cargo shipped from China to the United States (Kelly JA 2003, p. 2-3). China has also reportedly engaged in intelligence sharing with the United States on the Al Qaeda network and has expanded cooperation with American law enforcement officials on anti-terrorist financing efforts.

Beijing sent a team of counter-terrorism experts to Washington to explore ways to counter the al-Qaeda network by sharing information. China even allowed United States to station Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) officials in Beijing that allowed sharing of intelligence, financial transactions, and law enforcement between China and the US. More surprisingly, international cooperation on combating terrorism is one of only four topics discussed in China’s 2002 National Defense document (Weiner 2003, p. 415).

Sino-American relations have come a long way since the days of the Korean War, during which China’s strategic commitment to North Korea brought the United States and Chinese forces into a dangerous direct military confrontation. After September 11, 2001, the two countries today “share a common goal in preventing North Korea’s further development of weapons of mass destruction” (Wu 2005, p. 39).

Conclusion

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have redefined global security concerns and created new alliances between global powers. The present superpowers of the world – the U.S. and China – find themselves as partners in the global war on terrorism. China has lined up along with the rest of the international community to condemn terrorism in the strongest possible terms and to declare solidarity with the United States in its hour of need.

Bibliography

BBC News 2001, US Normalizes Trade with China. Web.

Buckley, M & Fawn, R 2003, Global Responses to Terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan and beyond, Routledge Publishers, New York.

Davis, EVW & Azizian, R 2007, Islam, Oil, and Geopolitics: Central Asia after September 11, Rowman & Littlefield.

FlorCruz, J 2001, China’s Dilemma in the Fight Against Terrorism. Web.

Jiang, L 2002, Sino-US Relations and World Politics Since 9.11, Beijing Review, Vol. 45, No. 1. p.7.

Kelly, JA 2003, U.S.-China Relations: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong, p. 2-3.

Lam, WW 2001, China Sends Condolences to U.S. Web.

Malik, MJ 2002, Dragon on Terrorism: Assessing China’s Tactical Gains and Strategic Losses after 11 September, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Volume: 24, Issue: 2, p. 252+.

Medeiros, ES & Fravel, MT 2003, China’s New Diplomacy, FOREIGN AFF., p. 22.

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Audra, CJ 2003, Combating Terrorism, WASH. Q. p. 168.

Rice, C 2000, Promoting the National Interest, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 1, pp. 55–7.

Taylor, B 2005, US-China Relations after 11 September: A Long Engagement or Marriage of Convenience, 59 AUSTL. J. INT’L AFF. Volume 179, Issue 191, p. 181.

Weiner, AS 2006, The Use of Force and Contemporary Security Threats: Old Medicine for New Ills, Stanford Law Review, Volume: 59, Issue: 2, p. 415+.

Wu, 2005, What China Whispers to North Korea, WASH. Q., p. 39.

Yunzhong, Y 2002, The Profound Impact of the Events of September 11 on the International Strategic Situation, Dangdai yatai (Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies), Beijing, No. 3, p. 5.

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