Devastating Power of Hurricane Katrina

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Introduction: Hurricane

Hurricane is a sizeable revolving tropical whirlwind of unusual intensity. Hurricanes build up from slight tropical depressions over the warm waters of all tropical and subtropical oceans except the South Atlantic and eastern Pacific. They are called “Typhoons” in Western Pacific Oceans. These are less violent than the tornadoes which are local storms but are as big as the extra tropical cyclones of middle latitudes. The blend of substantial size and immense strength turns into the most hazardous and devastating of all storms. (Miller, P1).

Occurrence and Movement

Hurricanes in the North Atlantic Ocean build up frequently from June through October, when the sea surface is warmest and the air dampness highest. They come about less recurrently in May and November, and on exceptional instances they arise in other months. The average number of tropical cyclones in the North Atlantic area is about eight per year, of which about five typically are strong enough to be categorized as hurricanes. (Miller, P1).

Hurricane Study

Study of hurricane is a challenging subject for meteorologists and seems to be essential to determine the economic collisions caused by it.

Investigating airplanes have gathered numerous thousand hours of flight time in tropical cyclones, assembling data at levels ranging to more than 12,000 meters (40,000 ft). Investigations based on these data have effected in reasonably absolute accounts of movement in such storms and of their thermal structure and energy processes. The consequences of starting hurricanes with silver iodide are also being studied. (Miller, P1).

Naming of Storms

In history, centuries ago, hurricane distressed communities used to give names to typhoons and hurricanes. Such as, it was a practice in West Indies to label the hurricane with specific saint’s day of its happening. Weather predictors in World War II selected human female’s names for the recurrent storms, to facilitate the trackers to distinguish more than one storms in the similar period. Following post war period they began labeling chosen from military as Able, Baker, and Charlie which later proved to be confusing. At last in 1953, the U.S. Weather Bureau (the forerunner to the National Weather Service) commenced with alphabetical lists of women’s names. In 1979 the lists were distorted to add in men’s names, in addition to names that recognize manipulates of other cultures, such as Spain, France, or native Hawaiian, in the regions affected. A name is retired if it has been given to a storm that brought about major harm, and a dissimilar one with the same first letter is included. Names starting with the letters Q and U are not used at all, and X, Y, and Z are used in the Pacific but not in the Atlantic. If there are more storms than a single alphabetic run of names for a given year, as occurred in 2005, Greek letters are used, beginning Alpha, Beta, and Gamma. (Anthes, p1).

Hurricane Katrina

This hurricane can be regarded as the most devastating storm ever stroke US. It occurred by the end of August in the year 2005. The point of formation of this tropical storm was at the Caribbean Sea and smacked Florida from its southern end. Gradually its immensity developed in the Gulf of Mexico and produced landfall on August 29, 2005 closed to the Louisiana-Mississippi edge. Soaring storm, enormous waves and flood was followed by this hurricane. The constant battering force of high winds and water levels caused four major breaks in the local levees. Water from Lake Pontchartrain began pouring in, flooding at least 80 percent of the city. The damage Katrina caused New Orleans and its surrounding areas like Louisiana, Alabama and Mississippi made it the worst natural disaster in the history of the United States. (Hurricane Katrina, p 1).

The Devastations Caused by the Storm

The citizens who had remained in New Orleans were confined for days earlier than noteworthy assist turned up. They had small or no food or hygienic water. There was no electricity. And as the days went by, the floodwaters persisted to increase and became progressively more contaminated with manufacturing and human trash. Gas and oil seepage caused fires to break out. Those who had not obtained refuge were abandoned on rooftops and public road overpasses, while hundreds more obscured. In the intervening time, aggressive offense and prowling became pervasive, and fright developed. Local police, firefighters, and medical teams were absolutely besieged. Rotting stipulations caused diseases to multiply.

Exterior release assistance ultimately came to the release. National Guard helicopters began airlifting survivors off rooftops. Thousands of people in the Superdome were relinquished to Baton Rouge and to the Astrodome football stadium in Houston and other places in Texas. In all, nearly 240,000 evacuees went to Texas. Thousands more spread out to places as far away as Utah and California. Meanwhile, help poured in from around the nation as well as from dozens of foreign countries. (Cowan, p 1).

The general public and administrative representatives countered the consequences of the storm in a number of ways. Two bills were signed by President George W. Bush contributing $60 billion to catastrophe respite. Numerous groups of people began refuge to citizens dislodged in the storm. Persons and private groups from all sides of the world donated billions of dollars to charities supplementing the revival. Several volunteers, including medical personnel and animal rescuers, came to the Gulf Coast from across the United States to put forward their assist. (Hurricane Katrina, p 1).

Criticism

Nevertheless, numerous alleged the reaction proved that the United States was not well organized to handle with such a crucial catastrophe. Federal, state, and local agencies came under attack for taking action too leisurely to the disaster. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), a branch of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, was predominantly condemned. Annoyance and desolation led to charges that rescue might have come earlier had the widely held of the casualty not been meager and African American. U.S. president George W. Bush promised to lead an investigation to examine how the debacle was dealt with.

According to estimation a period many years is still required to recuperate New Orleans from the aftermath of the storm and it is not easy to guess that how much of the original city could be recovered. It was truly expected that US troops take a number of months to refurbish the levees and to pump the stagnant water from the city. Though the death toll can never be recovered but the adverse collisions on the environment and economy may also not be estimated accurately. (Cowan, p1).

The director of FEMA(Federal Emergency Management Agency), Brown, Michael, exposed on 1^st September same year that he was not informed about the countless people abandoned in the convention centre at New Orleans. This proclamation caught undeviating media consideration and questions began to arise about the efficacy of disaster relief at federal level, well in spite of President Bush’s admiring complements about Brown’s efforts during disaster relief. Shortly afterward Michael Brown resigned from his post as a result of condemnation against his actions and credentials. There was a disagreement between President Bush and Kathleen Blanco (The governor of Louisiana) over the control of National Guards troops which were sent to New Orleans.

Public criticized the government for failing to pay attention to alerts and probable threats of a hurricane to New Orleans, and for not taking appropriate and timely steps for repairing of the levee system which had grown quite old. (Hurricane Katrina, p 1).

The investigation

On Sept. 15, 2005, the U.S. House of Representatives made a board to look into the response of government to Hurricane Katrina. The House proclaimed the board’s conclusions in a February 2006 report entitled “A Failure of Initiative.” The report established blunder with government at all levels for failing to get ready for such a hurricane, saying one had been forecasted in theory for years, and that Katrina’s landfall was correctly forecast five days earlier. The report positioned much of the fault on a need of headship by federal officials, including Michael Chertoff, the head of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, which supervises FEMA. The report said that a lack of interaction and collaboration among federal agencies, the White House, the military and other rescue personnel, and state and local authorities led to noteworthy postponements in recognizing main predicaments and offering relief to those in need. Even though the report by and large admired state evacuation attempts, it condemned Governor Blanco and New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin for hanging around unnecessarily before organizing a compulsory evacuation of New Orleans.

The House report extolled the daring endeavors of a number of persons and praised the National Weather Service and National Hurricane Center, whose predicts averted more harm and death toll. The report stated require for robust headship and proper communication of information to prevent correspondingly unsuccessful rejoinders to forthcoming catastrophes. (Hurricane Katrina, p 1).

Moving forward

Numerous queries stayed behind as dwellers of the Gulf Coast started the extended course of rejuvenating communities disturbed by Hurricane Katrina. Authorities suspected the perception and expenditure s of construction in places frequently struck by violent storms. In New Orleans, where progress to the levee system will take years to complete, officials faced questions of whether to rejuvenate low-lying neighborhoods at risk to flooding. A lot of evacuees, lacking homes and jobs to return to, established everlastingly outside the region. Amid heated criticism, governments at all levels felt stress to exhibit they can act in response efficiently to future debacles. (Hurricane Katrina, p 1).

Disaster Vigilance and Response Systems

On July 27, 2006, Declaration of Senator David Vitter Committee on Senate Environment and Public Works expressed gratitude to Chairman Inhofe and Ranking Member Jeffords for having this very significant investigation on the Stafford Act and how this legislation could be enhanced to be better organized to react for forthcoming debacles. Approximately 11 months earlier, Louisiana and the other Gulf States faced the most disparaging natural tragedy in our nations history when Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast. In Louisiana, unfortunately, Hurricane Katrina left over 1100 people dead with more still missing. Hurricane Katrina symbolizes one of the first times in history where a main urban region was evacuated and its economic bustle almost stopped. Thousands of American families lost their dwellings, their careers, their communities, and miserably too many lost their lives or loved ones. We must make sure this desolation entirely never takes place again. The Stafford Act provides the foundation for revival and reaction. (Vitter, p 1).

Because Hurricanes Katrina, Louisianans has had the challenge of rebuilding their homes and getting their lives back together. One of the greatest challenges Louisianans faces in a post- Katrina world is the removal of wreckage which is an enormous task in itself. There is an unparalleled amount of debris after Hurricanes Katrina. Debris removal is critical to ensuring that Louisiana parishes and cities can continue vital rebuilding and recovery work. Recently, the President extended 100% Federal reimbursement of debris removal in 5 parishes through the end of the year, which is so important to Louisianas recovery efforts.

Coordination between agencies involved and with the state and local government is crucial to bringing results that will ensure the clean-up of debris is done effectively, safely and timely in order for Louisianans to progress with their recovery efforts. We have a lot to learn from Hurricane Katrina and need to do all we can to be better prepared for future storms. (Vitter, p 1).

Works Cited

Anthes, Richard A. “hurricane and typhoon.” Grolier Multimedia Encyclopedia. 2008. Grolier Online. Web.

Cowan, Walter G. “New Orleans.” The New Book of Knowledge®. 2008. Grolier Online. Web.

“Hurricane Katrina.” World Book Online Reference Center. 2008. Web.

Miller, Banner I. “Hurricane.” Encyclopedia Americana. 2008. Web.

Vitter, David. Congressional Testimony. Review of Emergency Preparedness and Response Mechanisms: . Federal Document Clearing House. 2006. eLibrary. Proquest CSA. Robinson Secondary Sch. 2008.

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