Conceptions of Freedom: A Focus on Yuval Levin

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Abstract

This paper conceptualised Levin’s understanding of liberty by contrasting it with three sets of positive/negative representations of liberty. The recommendations of work, family, education, and religion have both strengths and weaknesses in moral foundations. The main flaw of Levin’s argument is that it is grounded in the privilege of first world society that overlooks the circumstances of less privileged societies, which limits the reach of his recommendations. Levin essentially described “freedom of autonomy’ by advocating for strengthening society’s moral foundations for a “truly liberal society”. It recommends that Levin broaden conceptualization of freedom to incorporate desire as a positive force in liberty.

Introduction

Liberty is conceptualised as the state of being emancipated from external and internal restrictions. There are numerous perspectives on which type of liberty compliments contemporary society the best. This essay aims to discuss the interpretation of Levin’s idea of liberty with reference to the three distinctions between liberties, and the strengths and weaknesses presented throughout his article. This essay will debate which “type” of liberty Levin presents by contrasting his argument with the six conceptions of freedom presented by Swift.

Levin’s argument

Levin starts off by highlighting that as much as conservatives and liberals are different, they are similar in their pursuit of greater individual freedom. Levin argues that there is more to liberty than just allowing the individual to be and do as he pleases and that there is a need for the individual to have a strong moral foundation. He recommends that being socialised in the institutions of work, family, education, and religion are critical in forming a strong moral foundation of the individual. Levin argues that obligation in the form of work can be liberating, that obligations are what shapes individuals and that there is no freedom without responsibility. He explains that the obligations of family roles contribute to moral formation. Levin notes that the function of education is not only to teach technical skills but also to introduce the individual to the “power of the sublime”. He notes that religion should be seen as the building block of liberal order as it teaches us to align our desires with our responsibilities. Levin rounds off on these four institutions by saying that the individual can truly be free when responsibility and discipline are the basis of their moral foundation. (Levin 2014: 9-10).

Strengths and Weaknesses identified in Levin’s argument

Work

Work allows an individual to meet their economic needs; it reinforces responsibility, capability, and a formation of dutiful habits which transfer to the rest of life (Levin 2014:9). However, he assumes that having a job automatically makes an individual connected to his work and society.

The weakness is that some individuals do not have the choice of better work e.g. workers in Bangladesh accept blue collar employment, despite the conditions to earn minimum wage to survive (War on Want 2019).

Family

There are many weaknesses in using the family unit as a site for moral formation. Levin (2014: 8) agrees that playing a role in a family makes it possible for members to be free from the burden of having to choose to be responsible or not. This is a weak argument considering that he assumes it would be a burden for some to choose to be responsible or not. However, this can be seen as a strength in the sense that one’s obligation to the family allows for one’s higher self to be in control of the lower self and thus liberating (Silver 2017). Levin (2014: 9) strengthens his argument in favour by noting that the family protects an individual from poverty.

Education

Education gives an individual access to more opportunities and allows an individual to choose the best choice, thereby enables the individual to become more autonomous (Swift 2014: 66). Education influences the type of career someone can have, it also teaches one to think for himself and avoid falling into the trap of populism or religious manipulation. Education is an important factor in moulding individual morality because it helps rid society of ignorance and intolerance. Governments and societal norms advocate for training in STEM degrees, which Levin (2014: 10) criticizes, but in most countries, the function of education is to ensure that people can secure adequate jobs.

Religion

Religion challenges and corrects the flaws within the liberal order – it imparts values that mould individuals into empathetic, righteous, law abiding, and responsible citizens (Levin 2014: 11). Durkheim argues that religion forms a fundamental basis of human life because it upholds a “moral community” which supports Levin’s argument for moral formation (Cosman 2001: 46). However, religious institutions prevent social transformation as seen with gay rights versus religious doctrine debates (Levin 2014:11-12). Levin writes in a period of religious pluralism and multiculturalism in America yet he focuses primarily on Christianity (Levin 2014: 12). In order for individuals to be free, liberty needs to recognise all religions, as they have different internal and external impacts on an individual (Surprenant 2010: 87). This lack of acknowledgement sparks totalitarian thinking as external voices can force an individual to divert from their religious paths to one that is more accepted – making them less free (Swift 2014: 83). External voices can claim to know better and promote a certain religious ideology causing a conflict of interest: e.g. the spread of Islamophobia, as Muslims are collectively perceived as terrorists making them feel unfree to practice their religion (Uddin 2018).

Contrast of Levin’s conception of freedom with Swift’s freedoms

Swift (2014: 59) draws on Berlin who identifies a distinction between positive and negative freedom with the former advocating for freedom from and the latter for freedom to. Those in favour of negative liberty argue that liberty is being free from various external constraints while those in favour of the positive advocate for the freedom to act in particular ways.

Freedom as political participation versus freedom beginning where politics ends

This focuses on whether freedom is enhanced if it is embedded in the participation of political activity or if it remains in the private sphere of the individual. Levin argues that without local governance there is no “spirit of liberty” (2014:10) as it provides an environment for people to enjoy their liberty. He thus advocates for local governance to avoid centralisation of administration or authority, requiring political participation. Since Levin (2014: 10) recognises the importance of local governance in maintaining liberty – he does not believe that freedom begins where politics ends, especially because religion cannot be separated from politics (Strenski 2010: 4). His recommendations for strengthening morality are rooted in the social institutions of work, family, education, and religion which are in the public sphere – thus freedom cannot be fully experienced in the private sphere.

Effective freedom versus formal freedom

Levin acknowledges that there are limits to effective freedom as some individuals have more resources to “effect” their freedom whilst others do not. His push for strong moral building influences socialisation which in turn, influences one’s decisions and choices, thereby “effecting” an individual’s freedom (Levin 2014: 2). Levin recommends work, family, education, and religion for their intangible benefits of the soul, but there are also material benefits that will facilitate effective freedom. By advocating for work, one acquires financial resources to allow for more opportunities such as moving up the social ladder or access to higher education. Education is thus a gateway to greater job opportunities and greater financial resources. The family structure and the institution of religion socialize the individual with a certain set of values that will affect the choices he makes in life.

Levin notes that people are delinking from their religious institutions, which he believes builds morality, but does not advocate for the law to enforce religious practice and policy. He does not promote for the legal legitimisation of religion in societies (Levin 2014: 11).

Freedom as autonomy versus freedom as doing what one wants

Levin says that true liberty is the “emancipation of the individual not just from coercion by others but also from the tyranny of his unrestrained desire” and to follow our desires is to liberate our “appetites and passions” (2014: 5-6). True liberty does not merely stem from the individual being free from constraint but from exercising freedom in their own right without incessant gratification of desires. Swift (2014: 67) draws on the work of Kant who states that individuals have two-selves – a higher and lower self whereby autonomy is only achieved when the higher rational self is in control of the lower emotional self. If individuals act against their higher self, they become less free and slaves to their desires. In agreement with Levin, Waldron notes that liberty is more than egoism; that true self-rule is when his actions demonstrate “universalised concern” (2005: 307) where he is, as Levin puts it, free in a “sustainable” way. Thus, individuals need to be responsible and disciplined in their use of freedom (Surprenant 2010: 87). Levin (2014: 5) and Swift (2014: 66) highlight the importance of morality as a prerequisite for autonomy and thus a prerequisite for freedom. They argue that to enjoy liberty individuals need to have the option to choose but they must make good choices. One of Levin’s recommendations promotes education which Swift (2014: 66) notes is a tool to guide an individual to choose well.

Freedom as doing what one wants emits the false notion that uncontrolled agency is automatically void of moral responsibility. Levin constructs desire as “unrestrained” whereas Neely (1974: 32) conceptualises desire in a positive light where it can be framed as an aspiration to do one’s duty or act for the common good. By expanding on the meaning of “desire”, one can understand freedom as doing what one wants without the deception of an unstructured pursuit of life. Therefore, a desire could be synonymous with a career or spiritual goal instead of relating desire with gluttony or greed. Schopenhauer uses the example of a billiard ball to illustrate that the force that moves the ball towards its destination is the same as man driven by internal desire (Neely 1974: 36). Desires can hence be conceptualised as the same motivational force that Levin advocates for through work, family, education, and religion. For Neely (1974: 34), the dialectic of realising one’s freedom in a morally responsible fashion and realising one’s freedom in accordance with free will are the same if one assesses the relationship between circumstances, skills, beliefs, and desires. Levin’s push for building morality can be placed within these four-character building elements, as one’s moral compass informs his beliefs and desires.

Conclusion

Levin’s conception is more substantiated in freedom as autonomy than the other five freedoms presented as his recommendations is to strengthen moral formation is through social institutions, such as religion, rather than through individual means (freedom as doing what one wants), material means (effective freedom), or legal means (formal freedom). Despite Levin’s recommendations being rooted in social institutions he does not directly advocate for stronger political participation or to dissociate from political participation. The values imparted from work, family, education, and religion may however influence an individual to become more politically active. Levin predominantly draws on Kant’s focus on the higher rational self-control over the lower emotional self, which is a distinct feature of freedom as autonomy. Levin’s urgency for moral responsibility aligns with understanding that true liberty is not only emancipation from external limits but equally from internal ones too. Although, it should not always be assumed that individuals are chaotic in their desires – they may have positive influences on decisions. Levin’s argument does not align with freedom to do as one wishes because he advocates to curb such “wishes” through moral fine-tuning by means of family, work, education, and religion. If Levin reworks his argument to recognize desire as a positive force perhaps his recommendations would be more practical.

Bibliography

Cosman, C. 2001. Emile Durkheim: The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. New York: Oxford University Press.
Levin, Y. 2014. Taking the Long Way: Disciplines of the soul are the basis of a liberal society. Internet: https://www.firstthings.com/article/2014/10/taking-the-long-way.
Neely, W. 1974. Freedom and Desire. Philosophical Review, 83(1): 32-54.
Silver, J. 2017. Yuval Levin on the Long Way to Liberty. New York: The Tikvah Fund. Internet: https://tikvahfund.org/library/podcast-yuval-levin-on-the-long-way-to-liberty/
Strenski, I. 2010. Why Politics Can’t Be Freed from Religion. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
Surprenant, C. 2010. Liberty, Autonomy, and Kant’s Civil Society. History of Philosophy Quarterly, 27(1): 79-94.
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Uddin, T. 2018. The Latest Attack on Islam: It is not a religion. The New York Times, 26 September.
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Internet: https://waronwant.org/sweatshops-bangladesh. Access: 11 April 2019.

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