Common Property Resources Management

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Table of Contents

Introduction
Customary Marine Tenure
Socioeconomic Changes
Tragedy of the Commons
Conclusion
Works Cited

Introduction

Managing a common pool resource is often a complicated task. Its complexity has interested conservationists, environmentalists and scholars alike. Particularly, the need for societies to adopt sustainable natural resource exploitation practices has emphasized this issue in social and economic studies. Before delving further into the details of this issue, it is crucial to understand that common properties encompass natural resources that are only useful when communities, or groups of people, protect and derive benefits from it. These resources are unique because, unlike public goods, they are often susceptible to misuse and overexploitation.

Moreover, since they have a limited supply, they are extremely vulnerable to human activities. Therefore, it is important to adopt a common property use regime that addresses the unique challenges of managing common property resources.

This paper explores the above issue by discussing the use of common property philosophies in natural resource management. This discussion mainly focuses on marine resource management, as a common resource. Using the arguments from renowned theorists in this field, including Wade (95) and Hardin (1243), this paper shows that common resource management has a limited viability in modern societies. Similarly, using the findings of Cinner (36), through his investigations into the socioeconomic factors that influence customary marine tenure in the Indo-Pacific region, this paper shows that only a few socioeconomic changes (that happen today) support the common resource management regime. As a practical example of this fact, this paper explores how different societies have used the customary marine tenure, as a common resource management framework.

Customary Marine Tenure

Cinner (36) says that, for many generations, governments and community organizations in the western pacific region have used many resource management techniques that involve private restrictions on resource use to manage common pool resources. Most governments have adopted these measures through the customary marine tenure (CMT) localized control over natural resources. This system outlines the legal and cultural foundations for exploiting marine resources. Many communities, governments, and non-governmental organizations prefer to use this system, as opposed to other methods, because it addresses their conservation and community goals (Cinner 36).

Although this system has protected natural resources, in some communities, some critics have questioned its long-term viability, based on social and economic changes. For example, as shown below, Cinner (36) has investigated how changing socioeconomic factors affect CMTs reliability to protect marine resources.

Socioeconomic Changes

Wade (96) says the CMT system thrives when groups of people live in a situation where they could mutually benefit if they restrained their use of common-pool resources (Wade 96). Comparatively, the CMT system mainly thrives on a specific notion that exists within a society, at a specific time. If the socioeconomic framework changes, the CMT system becomes irrelevant (Cinner 36). This is the main problem associated with the CMT system. Some researchers have affirmed this criticism by doubting CMTs viability in places where external influences dominate common pool resource management (Cinner 36).

For example, Cinner (46) says the Asia Pacific region is undergoing several socioeconomic changes that affect marine tenure regimes. He argues that the tenure system is unable to cope with some of these changes (Cinner 46). For example, increased immigration and the adoption of free-market policies undermine common property management foundations. Similarly, a decreased dependence on marine resources has the same effect on the tenure system.

Comparatively, Cinnar (46) argues that the tenure system is immune from some socioeconomic changes, such as a high population growth. For example, he says the tenure system can work in communities that have up to 1,700 people (Cinner 46). However, strong marine tenure systems exist in communities that have a small immigrant population. Overall, the changing socioeconomic factors of different communities limit common property management regimes, such as the CMT. To support this view, many collective action theorists have often argued that, without an external force, many communities would not protect common property resources, even if they could benefit from doing so (Wade 95). Similarly, many property right theorists have argued that many communities are bound to misuse common property resources by increasing their demand for such resources (Wade 95).

Wade (96) also believes that the social cost of lacking exclusivity in natural resource exploitation often undermines the benefits that come from protecting a common resource. Therefore, if people feel they lack the exclusive ownership rights of a marine resource, they are bound to increase its use, thereby leading to its overexploitation. Based on this analogy, Wade (96) supports the limited application of the CMT system.

Tragedy of the Commons

The tragedy of the commons is a philosophy introduced by Hardin (1243), which explains the problems associated with common property management. It explains the difficulty of preventing natural resource mismanagement because of peoples selfish interests. Stated differently, Hardin (1243) believes that the interests of a minority group of people, acting independently, would lead to the misuse and overexploitation of natural resources. Using the same argument, Hardin (1243) argues that welfare states often support natural resource mismanagement because they give room for free-riders to benefit from other peoples hard work. Therefore, Hardin (1243) argues that relying on human conscience to guide common resource pool management is impractical because not all people are altruistic.

Although the arguments of Hardin (1243) have prevailed for many decades, independent analyses show that the tragedy of commons philosophy has some shortcomings. For example, this philosophy is not prevalent in all human societies, as claimed by Hardin (1243). Moreover, selfish persons do not only serve their interests because they often collaborate with other people when undertaking their economic activities. Therefore, communities can realize collective interests in common pool resource management (selfish and collective interests can co-exist in common pool resource management). Nonetheless, Wade (233) says the validity of these criticisms mainly depends on several factors, including the characteristics of the protected natural resources, the characteristics of the communities that protect the resources, and the nature of the state-community relations that prevail in the country.

Conclusion

The common property management system depends on a few socioeconomic factors to make sense. However, some changes in these factors undermine the foundations of the tenure system. For example, this paper shows that high immigration rates and free-market policies undermine common property management. However, high population numbers have little effect on such systems. The tragedy of commons philosophy supports the limited viability of common property management because it shows how selfish interests could easily lead to natural resource mismanagement. The lack of exclusivity in the common property management system also undermines its viability because it causes increased natural resource use. Comprehensively, it is difficult to support the long-term viability of common property management because many socioeconomic changes undermine it. Comparatively, few of these changes support its practicability in many modern societies.

Works Cited

Cinner, Joshua. Socioeconomic Factors Influencing Customary Marine Tenure In The Indo-Pacific. Ecology and Society 10.1 (2005): 36 -50. Print.

Hardin, Garrett. The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162.3859 (1968): 1243 1248. Print.

Wade, Robert. The Management of Common Property Resources: Collective Action as an Alternative to Privatisation or State Regulation. Cambridge Journal of Economics 11.1 (1987): 95-106. Print.

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