Closing the Gaps in Air Cargo Security

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Air Cargo Security Under Threat

Air cargo industry is a world-spanning web of supply routes, which allow for fast deliveries of key products in almost any city and country. It is implemented for delivering mail, personal articles, and possessions, as well as various products and merchandise that could be sold on the market. Air cargo industry has the reputation of the fastest and safest delivery system. However, as of 2010, this reputation has been put into question by a failed bombing attack in Saudi Arabia, where two bombs were smuggled on board disguised as printer cartridges. Numerous governments responded to this new threat by raising security demands for air cargo. In “Closing the Gaps in Air Cargo Security,” Sarah Moore (2015) argues that the solution to the problem is the adoption of unified security standards for Air Cargo Security.

The 2010 Printer Bomb Plot

The article explains that the issue in regards to restrictive air cargo security demands has appeared after a failed cargo bombing plot of 2010. Two bombs, brought aboard as printer cartridges, were filled with PETN explosives, which are hard to detect by x-ray, as the compound resembles the ink found in regular cartridges. Sniffer dogs also missed the bombs, as PETN has low vapor pressure (Gopalakrishnan & Dichtel, 2013). One of the bombs were brought into the cargo holds of a passenger plane, and would have detonated mid-air, causing more than 200 deaths, had the plot not been foiled by the intelligence provided by a Saudi double-agent. The second bomb was found in one of UPS’s cargo jets.

Economic “Jihad”

Moore (2015) bases her argument around the doctrine proposed and described in the jihadist journal “Inspire,” which describes the strategy of Economic Jihad, using cargo bombings as means of doing so. She states that by doing nothing, airline operators increase the possibilities of bombings, whereas by adopting restrictive security policies, they would also be playing into the terrorists’ hand. The alternative solution, according to Moore (2015), lies in the united standards of security for all air cargo around the world.

What does Increasing Security Measures Bring?

Some countries have adopted restrictive and thorough security protocols for all cargo flights. According to Moore (2015), the US airlines were forced to comply with the “100% screening policy” for passenger and cargo flights. This has come with significant costs, but the US market was capable of bearing that costs. Such measures would not be effective in all countries, as in some less economically stable regions the introduction of 100% screenings for cargo flights would significantly increase prices, which would cause a loss of customers and profit (Georgescu, 2012).

Why Increasing Security Measures Cannot Guarantee Safety?

Moore (2015) uses the example of the 2010 Cargo Bombing plot to highlight the inefficiencies of the current scanning and bomb-detection methods. Her argument is based on the fact that terrorists are becoming increasingly efficient in making bombs that camouflage themselves as regular electronic devices, such as computers and printers, and are packaging them in a way to make vapors less detectable. In doing so, they minimize the possibility of detection.

Possible Solution: Introduction of the Global Protocol for Air Cargo

Moore (2015) investigates the potential for the introduction of the GPAC (Global Protocol for Air Cargo) for the EU, USA, Australia, and New Zealand, due to relative similarities of cargo screening standards in the countries. The idea of recognizing security measures performed in other countries would allow forgoing repetitive cargo screenings in-transition, which would increase the cost-efficiency of the cargo flights and decrease waiting times (Gillen & Morisson, 2015). At the same time, Moore (2015) states that the extra time could be spent on conducting a more thorough initial cargo screen.

Weaknesses of GPAC

Moore (2015) recognizes some of the weaknesses of the proposed GPAC model. One of the biggest weaknesses would be the possibility of terrorists placing bombs in transition flights, where additional security screenings would not be conducted. In addition, the author highlights the fact that modern X-ray screening tools are expensive, with some models costing over 1 million dollars (Moore, 2015). Lastly, he states that some countries use bomb detection technology, others rely on sniffing dogs to scan the cargo for bomb threats, and forcing everyone to comply with the same standards would be very hard if not impossible, as both measures are acknowledged to be effective (King, 2013).

Article Conclusions

The author concludes her article on a supporting note towards GPAC, once more listing the inefficiencies of the 100% screening system, and stating that “History demonstrates that systemic change in the face of a major shock also results in overreaction, like Representative Markey’s attempt to introduce an all-air cargo screening bill in the wake of the AQAP printer cartridge plot” (Moore, 2015, p. 134). The author claims that developing a new screening and response system in the absence of a crisis will lead to a sturdier and more economically-efficient security model.

Discussion: Arguments against GPAC

While Moore provided credible and solid arguments in favor of introducing GPAC, she did not take certain points and factors into account. Her paper was written in 2015, whereas the infamous Cargo Bombing Plot occurred in 2010. Despite the sporadic and reactionary measures taken by the government, not a single air cargo bombing occurred between 2010 and 2017. Had it been as effective as stated by the article, the terrorists would have, no doubt, attempted it more than once. As it stands, current Cargo Air security protocols guarantee a very high rate of failure for any attempted cargo bombings, due to more thorough screening procedures and the use of advanced screening technology to locate the bombs (Tarim, Ozmutlu, Gurler, & Yalcin, 2015).

Personal Conclusions

The two bombs smuggled inside the cargo hold of a passenger flight and a UPS cargo flight were intercepted during in-transition screenings in Dubai and London, UK. The removal of extra screenings and the introduction of selective screenings instead of full cargo screenings would benefit companies and air transportation providers a great deal, as it would allow them to cut costs on transportation significantly while making the governments around the world pay extra for additional security measures to adhere to GPAC. With cargo bombings being as infrequent as they are, it can be concluded that the measures currently in place are reasonable enough to intercept future cargo bombings, despite the additional costs and time delays they impose on businesses. Trying to cut costs on the security of the passengers is something that could not be allowed.

References

Georgescu, C. (2012). Air cargo security. International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, 2(1), 340-346.

Gillen, D., & Morrison, W. G. (2015). Aviation security: Costing, pricing, finance and performance. Journal of Air Transport Management, 48, 1-12.

Gopalakrishnan, D., & Dichtel, W. R. (2013). Direct Detection of RDX Vapor Using a Conjugated Polymer Network. Journal of the American Chemical Society, 135-22, 8357-8362.

King, A. (2013). The new canine detectives. New Scientist, 219(2931), 40-43.

Moore, S. (2015). Closing the gaps in air cargo security. Journal of Transportation Security, 8(3), 115-137.

Sodhi, M. S., & Tang, C. S. (2012). Strategic approaches for mitigating supply chain risks. Operations Research & Management Science, 172, 95-106.

Tarim, U. A., Ozmutlu, E. N., Gurler, O., & Yalcin, S. (2015). A possibility for standoff bomb detection. Radiation Physics and Chemistry, (106), 170-174.

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