Chemical Sector-Specific Plan: Risks, Threats, and Hazards

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Table of Contents

Introduction
Primary Areas of Risks
Addressing the Threats
Continuity Planning
Conclusion
References

Introduction

It is important to note that the chemical sector is vulnerable to a wide range of major risk elements, which require proper risk management measures in order to both mitigate them as well as ensure minimization of their impact on the operations. More specifically, there are five significant and primary chemical sector risks identified in the assessment, which include pandemics and biohazards, terrorism and deliberate attacks, extreme weather and natural disasters, cyber threats, and insider threats. In order to ensure the continuity of the essential services, a collaboration of local governments, critical infrastructure sectors, private sector entities, non-governmental organizations, communities, individuals, households, families, the federal government, tribes, as well as territorial and state governments is necessary.

Primary Areas of Risks

Pandemics and Biohazards

It should be pointed out that the chemical sector is vulnerable to five groups of major risks. Firstly, pandemics and biohazards are the most prominent form of risk at the moment due to the global impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. It is stated that “the likelihood of foreign-born viruses being introduced into the United States’ population is increasing, which may bring pandemics that adversely affect the sector’s workforce and operations,” which is further evidenced by the pandemic (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2015, p. 5). A recent chemical industry trend analysis reveals that “consumer preferences have shifted rapidly towards more environmentally friendly, sustainable and ethical purchases, and dramatically accelerated FMCG (fast-moving consumer goods) manufacturer responses” (Gomez & Elser, 2021, para. 10). Therefore, the given risk group can make operations challenging due to imposed regulatory restrictions, such as supply chain disruptions, as well as alter consumer preferences rendering long-term projections and related strategic plans useless (Agrawal et al., 2020). In other words, one should be aware that this category of risks can have a multifaceted form of influence on the sector.

Terrorism and Deliberate Attacks

Secondly, terrorism and deliberate attacks still pose a serious threat to the chemical sector. It is stated that “chemical sector facilities may be a target for attack or terrorism because they hold specific chemicals that could cause significant immediate and long-term damage to people and/or surrounding environments” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2015, p. 5). The given category of risks is substantiated by the recent international events, such as the Taliban’s overtake of Afghanistan. Experts suggest that this occurrence will most likely increase the instances of terrorist attacks across the globe, including in the United States, due to the links of the Taliban to other dangerous terrorist organizations (Turak, 2021). In other words, it is evident that the chemical sector needs to be more prepared for possible disruptions from terrorism.

Extreme Weather and Natural Disasters

Thirdly, extreme weather and natural disasters are also becoming an increasing source of threat to the functionality of the chemical sector. It is stated that “The frequency of these events has increased along with the economic impact. These events cause property damage and may affect access to critical resources such as water and electricity, which would adversely affect facility operations and may cause supply chain disruptions” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2015, p. 5). In other words, natural disasters can “have major impacts and a high level of complexity in terms of risk management, because they are the result of cascading events” (Nascimento & Alencar, 2016, p. 347). In other words, there are several layers of the impact caused by natural disasters ranging from economic and financial damages to public distress and societal collapse in a region.

Cyber Threats

Fourthly, the chemical sector is becoming more vulnerable to cyber threats and attacks from a wide range of agents. It is stated that “disruptions to these systems could result in theft of intellectual property; loss of operations capacity; or a chemical theft, diversion, or release” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2015, p. 4). This is evidenced by the recent Colonial Pipeline ransomware attacks as well as more recent “cyberattacks on Siegfried, Brenntag, and Symrise,” which “forced temporarily halts in manufacturing and other operations while the firms investigated the breaches” (Dickinson, 2021, para. 1). It should be noted that criminals view the chemical sector as a high-value target (Bomgardner, 2021). In other words, a number of cyber threats are the result of technological advancements, and the vulnerability of organizational defense mechanisms against such threats make chemical sector unit highly appealing targets since their operations are essential for the economy.

Insider Threats

Fifthly, the final category of major risks includes insider threats. It is stated that “the chemical sector largely prevents damage from outsider threats, but the potential for insiders with access to intentionally or unintentionally cause harm is a significant concern in the chemical sector” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2015, p. 4). In other words, insider attacks can be more disruptive and damaging to the operational functionality of the chemical sector organizations due to them being less protected from internal interventions. The latest reports suggest that “the prevalence of these attacks has increased to 56%, whilst 30% of organizations believe that they have experienced one too many attacks” (Saxena et al., 2020, p. 1). Therefore, there is a strong trend of growth in regard to insider threats in the chemical sector.

Addressing the Threats

The chemical sector addresses and counters the listed categories of risks with comprehensive strategies, which involve mitigation, prevention, preparedness, and minimization of damages. For insider threats, “the sector periodically hires third-party, temporary contractors for their specialized experience and expertise” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2015, p. 4). Cyber threats are dealt with by strengthening the internal cybersecurity infrastructure and reallocation of resources for possible ransom demands in order to ensure the avoidance of disruptions (Sadiku et al., 2018). In the case of natural disasters, the key risk management approaches are planning and minimization of the damages through infrastructural enhancements of facilities (Madu & Kuei, 2018). There is a wide range of measures, which can be undertaken to prevent terrorist attacks, such as alarm systems, entry control, and advanced detection methods (Argenti et al., 2017). Lastly, biohazards and pandemics are managed by adhering to the regulatory mandates and planning reactionary mechanisms for individual outbreaks.

Continuity Planning

It is important to note that the chemical sector needs to improve its capability of essential service provision through continuity planning. It is stated that “continuity of operations (COOP) ensures an individual organization can continue to perform its essential functions, provide essential services, and deliver core capabilities during a disruption to normal operations” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2018, p. 3). The overall continuity is ensured through a cooperative network between various private and governmental enterprises, where the core guiding principles include flexibility, adaptability, scalability, community engagement, resilience, and preparedness (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2018). For example, communities and households play a critical role in the provision and execution of essential services, whereas local governments and businesses develop and integrate recovery plans due to their in-depth knowledge of local specificities with the federal government ensuring coordination and involvement of all of its branches.

One should be aware of the fact that the most critical units of the chemical sector are comprised of private enterprises. It is stated that such “businesses play an essential role in protecting critical infrastructure systems and implementing plans for the rapid reestablishment of normal commercial activities and critical infrastructure operations following a disruption” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2018, p. 5). Therefore, the continuity within the chemical sector is dictated by the community and local continuity elements, where the collaborative effort of eight major groups is required, which include local governments, critical infrastructure sectors, private sector entities, non-governmental organizations, communities, individuals, households, families, the federal government, tribes, as well as territorial and state governments (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2018). In other words, the chemical sector needs to identify its essential functions and develop mitigation options through the identification of key elements with their subsequent plan-based implementation.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the chemical sector is vulnerable and under constant threats from five major categories of risks. These include pandemics and biohazards, terrorism and deliberate attacks, extreme weather and natural disasters, cyber threats, and insider threats. The recent events are indicative of the fact that the occurrence rate and the overall severity of these risks are increasing. A wide range of strategies is put in place in order to counter these threats, which revolve around minimization, mitigation, prevention, preparedness, and detection. In order to ensure the continuity of the essential service provision, a network comprised of eight critical groups is required. These include local governments, critical infrastructure sectors, private sector entities, non-governmental organizations, communities, individuals, households, families, the federal government, tribes, as well as territorial and state governments.

References

Agrawal, S., Jamwal, A., & Gupta, S. (2020). Effect of COVID-19 on the Indian economy and supply chain. Preprints, 1, 1-12.

Argenti, F., Landucci, G., Cozzani, V., & Reniers, G. (2017). A study on the performance assessment of anti-terrorism physical protection systems in chemical plants.Safety Science, 94, 181–196.

Bomgardner, M. M. (2021). Siegfried, Brenntag, and Symrise hit by cyberattacks. C&EN.

Dickinson, B. (2021). Cyber threats facing the chemicals industry. Chemical Engineering.

Gomez, F. J., & Elser, B. (2021). COVID-19 is challenging the way we think of chemical industry trends. This is how.World Economic Forum.

Madu, C. N., & Kuei, C. H. (2018). Handbook of disaster risk reduction & management. World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Nascimento, K. R. D. S., & Alencar, M. H. (2016). Management of risks in natural disasters: A systematic review of the literature on NATECH events.Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 44, 347–359.

Sadiku, M. N. O., Musa, S. M., & Musa, O. M. (2018). Cybersecurity for chemical industry.Invention Journal of Research Technology in Engineering & Management, 2(1), 17-20.

Saxena, N., Hayes, E., Bertino, E., Ojo, P., Choo, K.-K. R., & Burnap, P. (2020). Impact and key challenges of insider threats on organizations and critical businesses.Electronics, 9(9), 1-29.

Turak, N. (2021). Terrorism will increase under Afghanistan’s newly appointed Taliban government, experts warn.CNBC.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2015).Chemical sector-specific plan: An annex to the NIPP 2013.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2018). Continuity guidance circular: FEMA national continuity programs.

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