Category: Warfare

Introduction

One defining characteristic of the post 9/11 era has been the use of targeted killings as a part of the US government’s counterterrorism strategy. While these killings have mostly been restricted to non-American targets suspected of terrorism, there have been a number of prominent killings of American citizens. One prominent incident of targeted killing of an American citizen involved Anwar al-Awlaki. Al-Awlaki was a US citizen who lived in Yemen where he engaged in activities on behalf of the al Qaeda terrorist organization, of which he was a part of.

As a high-value terrorist target, the Obama administration has declared that its decision to kill al-Awlaki was justified. The al-Awlaki case raised significant concern since the Obama administration approved the targeted killing of an American without any charges or a trial. This paper will discuss the justifications offered in defense of al-Awlaki’s targeted killing by the US. The paper will highlight how the events of 9/11 led to marked shifts in counterterrorism measures by the US.

9/11 and Targeted Killings

The targeted killing of individuals has been carried out by States far back into historical times. By definition, targeted killing is “the use of lethal force by the state or its agents with the intent, premeditation, and deliberation to kill”(Maxwell 123). While the use of targeted killings in the pre-9/11 era was greatly limited, post 9/11 US administrations have adopted a national security policy that allows for frequent use of targeted killings to eliminate terrorists. The most prevalent tool in the post 9/11 targeted killings has been unmanned aerial vehicles (commonly known as drones).

The drones had been used sparingly during the Bush administration to complement other counterinsurgency activities. These tools have assumed an indispensable place on the list of counterterrorism offense tools during the Obama administration. The preference for drone attacks has been because of their great effectiveness in carrying out surgical attacks. Drone attacks are preferred since they do not put American troops at risk. Kebriaei states that without the domestic blowback from troop casualties, the administration has been able to carry out sustained targeted killings with little domestic opposition (161).

Criticism of al-Awlaki’s killing

An issue that has emerged in the al-Awlaki killing is that it took place in what is considered peacetime environment. The killing of al-Awlaki took place in Yemen which is not a conflict zone. This raises significant concerns since while targeted killings against enemy combatants in conflict zones such as Afghanistan are accepted, killings outside a zone of conflict are controversial. Legal scholars and some foreign governments assert that it was wrong to kill a person, even if he was considered an enemy of the state, if armed conflict between the states is not present at a location (McKelvey 1355).

The US constitution guarantees every citizen’s right to a fair trial and due process of the law. Buckley documents that al-Awlaki’s killing was in violation of the protection offered to US citizens under the Fifth Amendment of the constitution which prohibits the deprivation of life without due process of the law (453). State officials justified the use of lethal force by contending that al-Awlaki was a lawful target in the armed conflict since he was engaged in war against the US through his affiliation with the al Qaeda network.

The legality of al-Awlaki’s attack was further questioned by the lack of clear evidence that this American citizen was planning an imminent violent attack against the US. McKelvey reveals that the government refused to produce specific evidence to justify the killing of al-Awlaki (1355). The only justification offered for the strike against al-Awlaki was DOJ claims that he was a senior al-Qaeda leader who was planning attacks against the US. McKelvey notes that in spite of these accusations, al-Awlaki had never been convicted for any terrorist activity against the US and all the charges against him remain allegations (1355).

US Government Justification

Al-Awlaki was accused of playing a significant role in al Qaeda operations. According to government officials, al-Awlaki was engaged in recruiting individuals to carry out terrorist attacks against US targets both in the homeland and abroad. The US intelligence services claimed that in addition to encouraging terrorist activities in the US, he engaged in active financing of the terrorist organization and gave material and technological support to terrorists (Maxwell 124). As a result of his active involvement with al-Qaeda, the US decided to label al-Awlaki a belligerent. This made it possible for the state to target this individual for killing. Maxwell reveals that a person designated as a terrorist can be targeted and killed because of their status as enemy belligerents (126). Killing an enemy belligerent is legal regardless of whether he poses an immediate threat at the moment.

The president is constitutionally empowered to take steps to protect the US from belligerent entities. The 9/11 attacks led to the president acquiring Congressional authorization to go to war with al Qaeda, which was the organization responsible for this attack. Under the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), the president obtained sweeping powers to deal with terrorist organizations and the individuals in these organizations (Buckley 440). Government officials therefore argue that Obama acted within the constitution by ordering the hit on al-Awlaki, who was considered a national security threat.

In response to the accusations that the killings were illegal since they took place outside a current conflict zone, the Obama administration claims that it carried out this action as anticipatory self-defense. The right of the State to act in anticipatory self-defense is recognized by international law and codified in the UN charter (Kebriaei 160). Each nation has the unilateral right to carry out attacks against an enemy in self-defense even if the enemy is not engaged in an active attack at the moment. The Obama Administration contends that attacking al-Awlaki was a necessary act of self defense.

The US administration has assured its critics that the killing of al-Awlaki was only done after a long, independent intelligence process that ascertained that he was a threat to US national security. The Obama Administration argued that al-Awlaki’s assassination decreased the capability of al-Qaeda to carry out attacks against the US. Buckley reveals that targeted killings are aimed at eliminating al-Qaeda’s top echelon, thus severely limiting the ability of the organization to plan and execute terrorist attacks against US targets (440).

In response to the accusation that sufficient evidence was not provided to support al-Awlaki’s targeted killing, the Obama Administration declares that clear evidence is not a pre-requisite to the authorization of targeted killings. This idea was expressed in a White Paper released by the Department of Justice in 2012. In this document, the DOJ asserted that the US government could use lethal force against an American citizen even if the government did not have “clear evidence that a specific attack on US persons and interests will take place in the immediate future” because of the actions of the targeted individual (Guiora 238).

Discussion

Targeted killings have been a part of U.S. national security policy and many presidents have reserved the right to use targeted killings in unique circumstances. However, in the past this power was exercised in a very controlled manner and only under extreme circumstances. This has changed in the post 9/11 era where the US has intensified its attacks against suspected terrorists.

In spite of the debate on the legality of the al-Awlaki drone attack, targeted killings have continued to be used by the Obama Administration. This administration has argued that targeted killings are not necessarily illegal and serve the greater cause of Homeland defense. These killings have been cited as being integral to defending the homeland from imminent attacks. The Obama administration’s interpretation of what qualifies as “self-defense” has significantly increased instances where the State can use aggressive force in the territory of a nonbelligerent state.

Conclusion

This paper set out to discuss the US drone strike against al-Awlaki in Yemen and present the justifications offered by the government for this killing of a US citizen. The paper began by highlighting the prevalence of targeted killings in the post 9/11 era. It then discussed the criticisms offered against the targeted killing of al-Awlaki. This action was a violation of the constitutional right of the target to receive a fair trial. The paper has recognized that targeted killing gives the opportunity to defend itself against the threat of terrorists. The actions are also within the rights of the president who has been given unfettered authority in the area of national security in post 9/11 America. Due to their effectiveness, targeted killings can be expected to be a core part of US counterterrorism strategy for many years to come.

Works Cited

Buckley, Ahmed. “Smiting Spell: The Legality of Targeted Killings in the War against Terrorism.” Journal of East Asia & International Law 5.2 (2012): 439-454. Web.

Guiora, Amos. “Targeted Killing: when Proportionality gets all out of Proportion.” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 45.1 (2012): 235-257. Web.

Kebriaei, Pardiss. “The Distance Between Principle and Practice in the Obama Administration’s Targeted Killing Program: A Response to Jeh Johnson.” Yale Law & Policy Review 31.1 (2012): 151-172. Print.

Maxwell, David. “Targeted Killing, the Law, and Terrorists.” JFQ 64.1 (2012): 123-130. Web.

McKelvey, Benjamin. “Due Process Rights and the Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: The Unconstitutional Scope of Executive Killing Power.” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 44.1 (2011): 1353-1384. Print.

Introduction

Counterinsurgency entails a set of approaches and practices proposed to minimize insurgency. It is noteworthy that insurgency entails a robust set of approaches and applications planned to demolish or change an existing authority organization. Contextually, counterinsurgency’s main concern is how to develop a prearranged authority structure. Deviation in existing organizational structures over time creates differences in both the selection and usefulness of counterinsurgency approaches. The creation of a useful counterinsurgent strategy is crucial for the practitioners involved in the counterinsurgency actions. This paper discusses the steps, which are necessary for the creation of an effective counterinsurgent strategy.

Rational of a Useful Counterinsurgent Strategy

Presently, insurgent groups have diffused and developed into competing organizations. This has changed their approach to undertaking their insurgency activities. Therefore, the planning for counterinsurgency strategies should recognize the changing insurgent environment and behavior. The counterinsurgency strategy should adapt to the alterations in the insurgent community it seeks to counteract. The strategy must also recognize the ideal that counterinsurgent practices are fundamentally political and not essentially military in nature (US Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, 2009). The created strategies aim to protect the country’s residents against insurgent aggression, reinforce relevant government departments, and marginalize the rebels politically, collectively, and economically.

Steps for Creating a Useful Counterinsurgent Strategy

Firstly, the team implementing a counterinsurgency strategy should put in place adequate equipped military officers to devastate and eject the organization of prepared insurgents. This is a crucial step in creating a useful counterinsurgency strategy and it builds from understanding the insurgent group’s environment and behavior (Galula & Nagl, 2006). Ensuring the successful implementation of this important step determines the subsequent counterinsurgency practices.

Secondly, a useful counterinsurgency approach entails adding adequate military officers to the area where an insurgent group has successfully retreated to counter the insurgents from making a comeback. This is a critical counterinsurgency strategy because the additional force can further destroy the insurgent group whenever they attempt to make a comeback with reinforcement (Galula & Nagl, 2006). The strategy also works through placing the armed military men into the regions occupied by local residents such as in the villages and towns. Furthermore, the installed troops can conduct pacification within these villages or towns to expel insurgent elements from their hiding (Marston & Malkasian, 2010).

Thirdly, the counterinsurgent team should create contact with the residents of the area and manage their movement in order to eliminate their chances of associating with insurgents. The fourth counterinsurgency approach would include the demolition of the insurgent group’s political union (Galula & Nagl, 2006). Fifthly, the counterinsurgent team should establish fresh temporary leadership in the region through democratic processes. The sixth strategy should include the assessment of people providing temporary leadership. The team should substitute incompetent leaders and provide adequate support to those performing well (Galula & Nagl, 2006). The seventh counterinsurgency approach should include gathering and providing education to the temporary leaders. Finally, the counterinsurgent group should win over the remaining remnants of the insurgent elements. However, it is notable that they can be suppressed further.

Conclusion

In summary, this paper has presented the discussions on the steps for creating a useful counterinsurgent strategy. The team implementing the counterinsurgency approach may leave out some of the depending on the area controlled by an insurgent group. For example, areas that are already under the control of the administration may not require the application of all the approaches.

References

Galula, D., & Nagl, J. A. (2006). Counterinsurgency warfare: Theory and practice. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.

Marston, D., & Malkasian, C. (2010). Counterinsurgency in modern warfare. Oxford: Osprey.

US Government Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative. (2009). United States Counterinsurgency Guide. Web.

Nigeria has one of the well established insurgent groups that was established way back in 2004. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta asserts that its main role is to oversee fair treatment of the people of Nigeria (Goodman and González par. 2). In order to attain its broad goal, this insurgent group makes that all acts that are inhuman are made known to the rest of the world.

Since there has been exploitation of natural resources (mainly oil) by the government and private companies, the movement seeks to make sure that this worthy resource is used well and its benefits trickle down to residents of Niger Delta. Although it initially began as a peaceful pressure group agitating for the well being of the people living in Niger Delta, it has turned out to be an aggressive group that is very keen on sharing oil resources mined within the Niger Delta region. There has been growing tension between the Federal government of Nigeria and this group.

Following the popularity of the group, it has so far developed into an umbrella body that runs several insurgent groups fighting the government. Worse still, these groups have turned out to be violent since they are well armed and ready to unleash terror whenever the federal government does not give them the required attention. It is against this backdrop that the Niger Delta region has been experiencing a lot of conflict in the recent past.

The group is no longer a peaceful pressure group as it was initially intended to be. There are myriads of attacks that have been so far launched on petroleum operations in the Niger Delta region thereby hindering smooth operations (Hanson par.1). this expounds why this movement is considered to be an insurgent group fighting for the availability of a natural resource.

Some of the terror-like operations that this group has been engaging in include kidnapping of innocent civilians, intense warfare in form of guerilla tactics, massive spoiling of property, robbery with violence as well as sabotage of petroleum operations and other vital services. Although the insurgent was originally meant to confine its operations of within the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, it has now expanded its mandate since it is keen on controlling Nigeria’s oil by localizing it. In addition, the group is also demanding reduced pollution of the environment that is resulting from mining of oil resources.

The federal government of Nigeria has intensified its fight against this group since it has grown to become one of the most versatile and hostile movements in the country. Perhaps, the tactics being used by this group are sophisticated and advanced making it difficult for the government forces to crash the group completely. For example, the trained guerillas have been provided with speed boats that they use to launch attacks through swarm-based maneuvers. There are several of such highly flexible guerilla groups who are prepared to attack any time (Howden par. 2).

As a result, the defensive systems of the Shell and the federal government have been significantly destabilized in this region making it difficult for the group to be defeated. Secondly, combat training and firepower have been significantly improved among the group. This explains why the private military guards and the government military wings have been outwitted severally in the Niger Delta region. In addition, the insurgent group has employed system disruption in the most effective manner. Worse still, hostages captured from the Shell group are being used to terrorize the countering forces. The multinational corporations as well as the government have been compelled to comply with various demands due to hostages held by the group.

Works Cited

Goodman, Amy and Juan, González. As Hundreds Die in an Oil Pipeline Explosion in Lagos, A Look At the Fight Over Nigeria’s Natural Resources. 2006. Web.

Hanson, Stephanie. MEND: The Niger Delta’s Umbrella Militant Group. 2007. Web.

Howden, Daniel. Nigeria: Shell may pull out of Niger Delta after 17 die in boat raid. 2005. Web.

The United States of America has over the in the recent years strongly involved itself in fighting and stopping attacks by insurgent groups. These groups are largely associated with terror and extremist movements. Therefore, they consider them as enemies who are merely waiting for the best opportunity to strike. In Africa, the insurgent movement in Sub-Saharan Africa is a group that has existed for a long time. It is a major cause of terrorist activities globally (Poynting and Whyte 97).

Information obtained from the United States Commission Report on Terrorism against the United States repeatedly mentioned that Sub-Saharan Africa was hosting Libya mercenaries and the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) among other insurgents. This region is a hub for terrorists (Gus 200). Notably, the USA has never argued that Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole is a threat to people. Its involvement is a move aimed at curbing terrorist activities and destroying terror networks while protecting the lives, property and economies of nations.

The involvement of the USA

United States has bombings moved to great lengths in fighting against terrorism in Africa since the September 11. There is great level of threat both at home and overseas where its embassies and citizens are located. The Sub-Saharan Africa is faced with diverse religious dynamics, underdevelopment, low literacy levels in some regions and high rate of unemployment. These factors have made it possible for terrorist insurgent groups to easily form and grow. The group has grown because it has been able to tap the jobless youths in the region, women and ex-military officers (Gus 210).

Besides, the group has been a major cause of terror attacks in the horn of Africa, Europe and the USA. Its network is believed to receive major support materially and financially by certain politicians and interested groups globally (Poynting and Whyte 115). The easy recruitment of members especially for this group, financial capabilities, state of the art weaponry and the fact that states harbor and hide terrorists creates the sense the United States that indeed there is a greater support of terrorism. Consequently, it will indeed be very difficult to fight racialism because an influential faction rides on it and further use it to achieve key objectives such as inflicting terror.

The insurgent movement generally holds the largest number of terrorist groups in Africa (Gus 100). Groups designated as terror organizations (such as Al-Qaeda and Muslim Brotherhood) are closely associated with this insurgent movement. As a result, there is a sense that fighting terrorism in the Middle East without extending it to Africa will not bear much result. While this is not enough to justify their involvement since African nations are capable of handling their security issues, it is true that dealing with a terrorist network requires a holistic approach.

Nonetheless, the major force that drives the USA to implement the necessary certainty for action is the most important step that ought to be taken. Analysts consider the insurgent movement in Sub-Saharan Africa to have a vast network while local communities are ill-equipped professionally, diplomatically, and even technologically in addressing the worst state of terrorism problem. This requires full involvement of the Western world and other like-minded nations (White 100). Although successful coordination by the insurgent groups invokes the necessary intervention by the USA, it is imperative to employ appropriate intelligence in order to understand and stop acts of terror before taking place.

Works Cited

Gus, Martin. The Sage encyclopaedia of terrorism. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publication, 2011. Print.

Poynting, Scott and Daniel, Whyte. Counter-Terrorism and State Political Violence: The ‘war on terror’ as terror. Abingdon, OX: Routledge, 2012. Print.

White, Jonathan. Terrorism and homeland security. Belmont, CA: Cengage Learning, 2012. Print.

Introduction

Security threat is a major concern for many economies. This is because terror groups have changed their ideologies and focus heavily on causing physical damages. Canada and the US are among the countries that are still facing security threats. Insecurity can affect a country’s economy, health, among other factors. Therefore, in order for an economy to develop it needs to shield itself from both internal and external attacks. Some of the threats facing Canada range from terrorist attacks, illegal immigration, drug trafficking, cybercrimes, radicalization and nuclear threats among others. These threats are similar to those being faced by other countries such as the US. These threats mainly come from global terror networks and organized crime groups. Internet technology and globalisation are the main tools used by these groups in accomplishing their missions. Security threats consume a lot of costs from a given state. Therefore, it becomes important to establish control measures rather than to repair for damages. The aim of this paper is to analyse the various security threats that are facing Canada within the next five and ten years and ways of solving them.

Security threats facing Canada

Some of the security threats facing Canada are: Non- Traditional Security Threats: These are Trans-national organized crime (TNOC), terrorism, Cyber-terrorism, radicalisation and nuclear threats. They are referred to as Non-Traditional because they attack the state indirectly. However, these threats are asymmetric. This means that they use other means such as corruption, violence and exploitation to attack a state’s main infrastructures (Charters p. 2). Therefore, they destroy buildings and hurt people leaving the victims with crippled economies.

Types of security threats the state faces in the immediate (next 5 years)

Terrorism

Terrorist attacks in Canada date back to the 1960s when the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) attacked Quebec. Additionally, in 1985 there was a terrorist bombing of an Air India flight. As a result of this attack 329 people that were on board the plane lost their lives. Al- Qaida is a revolutionized terrorist group that has mixed features of a cult and an international corporation. It uses globalization tools such as the Internet, mobile phones and air transport to attack western states such as Canada. This is because these states’ economies rely heavily on these modernized facilities in running many personal and business activities. The group uses a website known as ‘Terrorism.com’ to communicate with its members internationally. This way crimes are organized and executed under specific instructions which are passed over the internet. The 9/11 attack on the United States consumed lives of a dozen Canadians in addition to 3,000 people in the US.

The attack also distabilised the economy and caused human, political and psychological damage (Charters p. 3). The successful attack could also have motivated other terrorist groups to follow the same example. Al- Qaida combines Jihadism and IT; Jihadism challenges modern ways and insists on traditional ways of carrying out revenge attacks on enemies while IT supplements the group’s activities. The two ideologies find their way in to the entire world through globalization. For example, it is said that the two converged during the 9/11 attacks. The Al- Qaida group motivates its members to act locally but to think globally. With this in mind the perpetrators of crime still use the technology in carrying out attacks as a way of fulfilling the wishes of their leaders.

Trans-National Organized Crime (TNOC)

This is a major problem facing Canada’s law enforcement community. It is referred to as Trans- National because it affects various countries. This crime involves drug trafficking, prostitution and money laundering (Charters p. 7). Globalization has also led to TNOC just as it has influenced Al-Qaeda. The war on drugs started in the 1980s. The key TNOC players in Canada are the Asian gangs and East European Organized Crime Groups. They engage in traditional organized crime undertakings and they use international networks for these activities. TNOC groups only pose indirect security threats to Canada. These are threats to social stability and integrity. For example, drug trade leads to violence, high health care costs and smuggling of firearms. For example, in the 1990s a Canadian group ‘Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)’ took part in violently harassing and extorting the Tamil community, drug trafficking among other illegal activities.

Human smuggling is also an OC- driven activity that poses insecurity to Canada. It also costs the state a lot because the welfare of the illegal immigrants is catered by the government. Expenses incurred range from $120 to 400 million annually for purposes of supporting the illegal immigrants and for law enforcement. Additionally, given that the state is unable to keep track of some of the immigrants it poses a question of integrity of Canada’s borders; the borders may not be very secure or the officials may be corrupt. Therefore, the country is prone to terrorists entering through these borders (Charters p. 8). Even though organized crime groups are engaged in various illegal and criminal activities, there has been no evidence of links between them and the terrorist groups. This is because terrorist groups would not risk exposing themselves by engaging in petty crimes involving drugs; they would rather concentrate on terror activities. Even though terrorist groups are also engaged in identity fraud and smuggling of people, money is not their goal but it is their tool (Charters p. 8).

It is also important to note that a “narco-war” is likely to result in the near future as a result of failure of civil war in the affected states. Some of the states that are likely to face this type of war are those which are exposed to drug cartels. Such cartels may in turn overpower the government because they possess a lot of power and money. Examples of such states are Mexico and Colombia. Canada will be affected because it will need to intervene in some way because of it obtains economic and commercial benefits from the region (Alpheus 1).

Radicalization has also become a major threat to Canadian security. The terrorist groups spread their word through the internet and other symbolic ways. This way they influence their followers to commit crimes claiming that it is the will of God. I this regard, the spokeswoman for the Muslim Canadian Congress ‘Salma Siddiqui’ once asked the community to assist in reducing extremist activities. According to her, Canadian Imams can criticize armed jihad. Given that such an ideology would be enforced by the imams and other religious leaders, the youth are able to follow suit. Young are easily persuaded and misled by petty gifts or eternal promises. Therefore, they are usually used for bombings and if their religious leaders convince them otherwise, they may change their stand. As a result, suicidal bombings can be reduced (Payton 1).

Types of security threats the state faces in the long term future (10-20) years

Terrorism: During 9/11 attacks, Al-Qaida claimed lives of many people in just a single attack. According to a nuclear terrorism expert, Gavin Cameron, future terrorist attacks are not a matter of “if” but “when”. This means that although it may not be clear when such an attack is likely to occur in either the next five years or ten years it is very possible to occur nevertheless (Charters p. 4). Such attacks could affect Canada either directly or indirectly. Canada will be a potential target because of its geographic, military, political, cultural and economic relationship with the US. Additionally, the Al-Qaeda group is aware that Canada is one of the states that joined the War on Terrorism. This makes the state to be prone to future terrorist attacks. Terrorism still remains a crisis that requires conflict management. Future attacks are possible and as terrorists are thinking outside the box in order to come up with bomb techonologies which are hard to detect even under security screening. However, it is hard to tell for certain the exact period that these attacks are likely to take place.

Cyber-Terrorism

The existence of computers and fast internet speeds create a target environment for cyber-terrorists. This is because vulnerability of one user can affect several other users. Given that cyber-attacks are spreading at a high rate the level of vulnerability is rising immensely (Charters p. 5). Cyber- Terrorism is likely to affect Canada indirectly in the future. The attacks will be indirect because they might be part of the large project. This means that although terrorists aim at causing physical destruction, they may use cyberspace to recruit, generate funds and to strategise terrorist activities (Charters p. 6). This means that they may use IT facilities as a channel for accomplishing their main goal of physical attack. Additionally, as a result of cyber- crime hackers are able to access many government , military and other sites in order to steal confidential information.

There are also viruses and worms such as ‘I Love You’ that disrupt major communications systems. As a result they inflict high maintenance and prevention costs to the government. For example, total cost incurred from these viruses is more than $13 billion. However, this security threat is yet to advance to critical stages. It is also important to note that terrorists do not recognize national boundaries. Therefore, they mostly use the internet to radicalize their terror ideologies (Payton 1). So far this is the main reason why terror groups are still using cyber space.

Nuclear threats

Some countries have been amassing nuclear technology and weapons in readiness for an upcoming demand for such weapons. This demand could result from terrorist attacks. For example, Iran is well known to have gone against UN Security Council restrictions towards its nuclear program. Its nuclear prospects may prompt other countries in the Middle East to follow suit. These nuclear weapons may be used to build nuclear weapons. As a result countries like Canada which have not yet developed such technologies may be at threat. Iran already has installed 8,000 centrifuges of uranium at its plant at Natanz. The country has also built an underground uranium plant near Qom city. This facility is fit enough for storing weapons rather than for fuel production. Therefore, it could be that the storage is for future nuclear weapons. Therefore, Canada and other countries that are still against the idea of nuclear weapons may find themselves under defenseless attack (Charters p. 22).

Arab Spring’s movement into the Arabian peninsula

Many Arab countries are reuniting to form a single union. If this happens the oil prices are likely to rise. This is because the oil resource is likely to be controlled by a particular union. As a result the states in the union are likely to dictate the prices. This would in turn affect the Western countries because they would be external parties to such an agrremet. Therefore, the Arab countries are likely to enjoy subsidized prices as other countries face high end prices (Rudner p. 1). This would lead to high living costs, and economic pressure.

Threat from control over Canada from foreign activities and social order

In future Canada is very likely to be negatively affected by foreign influence over its affairs. This influence might be from its allies such as the US. Such a thing would destabilize the validity of democratic Canadian institutions. Therefore, the Canadians would feel that their freedom is threatened. Additionally, the state is likely to face increased competition in the economy. It is predicted that China will be among the most prosperous states with most of its influences being on Africa. As result, Western economies such as Canada will be facing real problems trying to market themselves in Africa. As a result of these economic pressures the welfare of the Canadians is likely to be at risk. There is also a looming threat to peace and order in Canada. This will come from violence and civil disorder. Additionally, terrorist attacks, cyber-crimes and Tran-National Organized Crimes will contribute towards this disorder. However, the country will be able to control such a problem (Capstone seminar project team 29).

Some possible solutions to Canada’s security threats

Canada should prioritise on its intelligence. This should involve developing effective and more advanced means of communication among the intelligence groups. This way the state can achieve successful campaigns and operations against terrorism. If such a strategy is applied, it can anticipate upcoming threats, warn the public against any attacks, organize investigations, capture and prosecute the terrorist groups. When the country anticipates threat it gives the security forces a chance to prevent a crime from occurring; early warning enables the government to avoid being surprised and thus reduce the effects of the attacks. With good intelligence, the government can be able to manage and allocate scarce resources appropriately. Additionally, the leaders are able to tackle the given problem in a well- informed manner.

This way the economy can grow with less resources being assigned to solving already incurred losses. However, it is important to note that not all terrorist attacks can be prevented; only surprises can be minimized (Charters p. 14). In order to enforce intelligence, Canada should expand the capacity of CSIS. It can do this by adding a foreign branch. Therefore, a separate foreign intelligence service should be created. This should involve realistic debates and discussions from the public. A new service would also require training and financial resources. According to terrorism expert, Prof. Gavin Cameron, law enforcement is the key to ensuring that radical groups are minimized. Therefore, it is important that the government allocates more resources to its security departments and forces in order to ensure that law and order is reinforced within Canadian borders (Payton 1).

The government needs to make a decision on how it will use the limited military power it has. It should be clear on what it requires the armed forces to do. It should decide if it wants them for internal security, missions or defense. The decision will be affected by the type and source of non-traditional threats, internal or international environment and on budgetary constraints. It is important to note that Canada is being faced with budgetary constraints which mean that its forces have limited ability to cater for internal, external and expeditionary missions. Presently, the Canadian forces (CF) are only able to undertake small-scale operations which are of low intensity and for a short period of time. Additionally, their efforts in countering terrorist attacks either internally or internationally are limited. This is because the force expects few attacks from terrorist groups. However, there is need for CF to conduct air control which involves surveillance, missiles and naval systems in order to protect its boundaries, nuclear plants and airliner hijackings (Charters p. 19).

Canada will also be expected to reinforce its allied relationships by conducting military expeditions. This involves peacekeeping and counter terrorism activities. This will also enable Canada to add value to the state of its allies and the UN. Additionally, Canada is likely to benefit from support from both its allies and the UN in case it is faced with terrorist attacks. Such expeditionary missions would involve a battalion, separate overseas brigades and combat elements. With its security alliances such as NATO and NORAD, Canada is able to share its culture, norms and foreign policies with its military allies. As a result the state is likely to focus or concentrate its security operations. Alliances are also flexible and involve commitments and clear objectives (“Conflict is Changing: Future Directions”).

The other solution that Canada can undertake towards facing out its security threats is review of the role of Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2). Such a group can carry out counter terrorist and civil affairs activities among others. Additionally, it can be reviewed and its size increased in order to carry out SOF and special overseas missions. However, the government needs to consider that at the moment CF cannot be in a capacity to facilitate a larger JTF2. Additionally, expansion of this force would limit the ability to carry out low intensity missions. Therefore, since expansion of JTF2 is vital, it should be incorporated in to the expansion of the entire armed force (Spruyt 1).

Canada should also resolve to secure its borders. For example, if the Northwest Passage is opened up clear regulations as well as military presence should be established. This would be in order to ensure safe passage of goods in and out of the country. Additionally, the state should enforce the F-35 program that will ensure that the state is able to operate together with the allied forces. Additionally, such a program will enable Canadian Forces to maintain aerial dominance and evade attacks from the enemies (Alpheus 1). With an alliance, several countries are able to cooperate and coordinate surveillance and as a result lead to improved security.

Conclusion

Security threat has been a major threat to Western economies. Canada is one of the states affected. The threats the state has been facing range from terrorism, social insecurity, cyber terrorism, radicalization, Trans- National Organized Crimes (TNOC) among others. Some of the threats have been there for long while others are expected to advance as time passes. Therefore, terrorism and TNOC have been affecting the country and are very likely to continue affecting the Canadian economy for the next five years. However, there are other threats that are likely to go on for up to ten years to come. These are terrorism, nuclear threats and cyber terrorism among others. Canada will be required to be well prepared for upcoming states such as China which threaten the future of the current superpowers.

Additionally, the state is expected to find ways of solving some of the threats that it is facing. For example, it can develop alliances with different countries or international organizations such as the UN. This way it will have to support its allies militarily in expectation of similar returns if it falls under any form of attacks. Additionally, Canada can reinforce its military intelligence in order to improve threat awareness and control. The government is also expected to wisely use its limited military resources as the limited budgetary allocations to its forces. This might mean compromising enlargement of the Joint Task Force Two security group. Therefore, it is important that Canada undertakes the recommended resolutions in order to control current threats and to cushion against future threats.

Works Cited

Alpheus “Defining ‘readiness’ critical question for forces: expert says.” iPolitics. 2012: 1. Print.

Capstone seminar project team. Canada in 2020: Identity Politics and Security Future Scenarios. University of Ottawa, 2009. Print.

Charters. n.d. Canadian Foreign Policy, Terrorism, and Non- Traditional Security Threats: Temporary Aberration or Permanent Condition?. Web.

“Conflict is Changing: Future Directions” n.d. Web.

Payton, Laura “Canada faces global terror threats.” Parliamentary Bureau. 2010: 1. Print.

Rudner. n.d. Contemporary Threats, Future Tasks: Canadian Intelligence and the Challenges of Global Security. Web.

Spruyt, Hendrik 2012, And Still it Moves: Configuring NATO for the 21^st Century. Web.

Introduction

The Middle East has experienced several civil conflicts as well as the rising of extremist groups. The past decade has seen a rise in the number of uprisings, most of them propagated by the people’s discomfort with the ideologies of those in power. This paper seeks to bring more light into the situation that has been in Syria and its neighboring country, Iraq.

The origin of the civil war in Syria

The year 2011 (March), some citizens started demonstrating against the Syrian government headed by President Bashar-al-Assad. The protests originated due to the Arab Spring whereby several protests were going on in various Arab countries from the time the Tunisian government was brought down early 2011. The protests were at first peaceful, but when the government forces reacted to it with much force, the rebels took up arms and started the war with the government. The prevailing events dragged the whole nation into a civil war.

In the month of July, several individuals who had defected from the Free Syrian Army also joined the rebels against the government. In fact, the differences between various ethnicities, Islamists, and secular fighters brought political complications to the crisis (Manfreda 2015).

The widespread civil war brought about deaths above 200,000, which comprised mostly of civilians in a period of four years. Continued bombings have destroyed cities and widespread violations of human rights. The populations of the affected areas are also unable to access basic amenities like healthcare and food. The war has displaced more than 7 million people according to UN reports. In fact, the war registered more than 3 million refugees with Syrian origin. In addition to the existing refugees, almost a third of the country’s population is in need of humanitarian help.

Interests and grievances leading to the crisis in Syria

Several issues have fuelled the crisis in Syria. One of the main reasons for the conflict is political repression. President Bashar as-Assad took over after his father who had ruled the country died. His actions ensured that the concentration of power was in the first family, and he continued with the system of a solitary party. The actions cleared all the hopes of any reforms and brought dissent with the political set up. The country has never had any democratic transfer of power from mid 20^th century, and a military coup was seen as the only hope (Mansoor 2014).

The uneasiness with the ideologies of the Syrian Baath party was another contributor to the start of the conflict. The party was considered as the originator of Arab socialism, which was an ideology that brought together Pan-Arab nationalism and the economy. The situation changed that by the year 2000 when the party’s ideology was crippled after losing wars to Israel and a slump in the economy. When Assad took power, he tried implementing a Chinese approach to reform the economy but he was never successful.

The few remaining traces of socialism promoted the start of private investments raising the consumption power of the upper-middle class people in the urban set ups. The process, however, favored mostly families that have personal links with the first family. The action left the rest of the country burning with anger due to the rising costs of living and high cases of unemployment.

The country has also been adversely affected by cases of droughts since the year 2008. More than a million people depending on farming have been unable to get a source of income and therefore migrated to the growing slums in the urban areas. As a result, people got angry about the way a small population of the country was growing to be rich and the government lacked intervention to bring uniformity (Landis 2014).

The other contributor to the uprising was the growth of a young population that is unemployed. Every year, the country had about 250,000 new entrants to the job market yearly that lacked sufficient job opportunities. These individuals quickly joined sides with those against the government.

Widespread corruption in the country was another contributor to the uprising. The poor therefore had no means of fighting for their rights and had to resort to protests as a way of fighting for their rights. The corrupt system allowed even the opposing forces to buy weapons from the forces of the state. The families of detained relatives were also able to bribe the authorities so that their relatives could be released (Manfreda 2014).

The government of Syria runs a system of fear having several intelligence services. It was the same brutal security forces that reacted with much force to the peaceful demonstrations provoking the protestors to resort to violent means. Besides, the Alawis, which is a minority religious group from the Shiite community where the Assad family belongs, controls the top positions of Syrian security. The majority of the country’s population is Sunnis, and they are not comfortable with the minority being in control. The situation contributed to the religious animosity among the Sunni and Shiite communities who live together contributing to the uprising.

The uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt that ensured the success in ousting the governments were a motivation to the Syrians. The widespread uprisings in the Middle East made the Syrians realize that they had a chance for change (Manfreda 2014).

The rise of ISIS

Originally, ISIS was an Iraqi al-Qaida group going by the name Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). With the intensification of the war in Syria, it first started getting involved in the war. In June 2011, one member of ISI (Abu Muhammad al-Joulani) formed a Jihadi group called Jabhat al-Jabhat al-Nusra that got involved in the Syrian war (Cockburn 2015).

Later on, Baghdad wanted more influence of the group, which was rapidly growing. Baghdad sought this by getting involved in the influence of ISI in Syria. The step brought about the formation of ISIS in 2013. Internal differences later emerged on the methods and strategies that ISIS was employing with the group getting too harsh to both Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Qaida. The differences made ISIS to lose grounds in Syria. However, it later on came to capture a large territory including the second biggest city in Iraq, Mosul, Falluja, Syria and Aleppo (Tran 2014).

ISIS has had many brutal and ruthless actions in the areas it controls in Syria killing several top officials of other opposing groups. Even though it has been seen as having high levels of brutality, it has still managed to attract some Sunnis to help it fight against the Nouri al-Malik who leads the government of Shias.

The ISIS troops have an advantage over opposing forces by having high motivational levels, highly equipped and hardened for battle. The group runs schools, courts, and several other services. They also fly their flag, which is black and white in all the facilities that are under their control.

The group boasts to have more than ten thousand individuals in its ranks. The group has volunteers recruited from Syria and others from Europe and the United States of America. The group dominates networks for extortion in Mosul to get resources to run its operations. It also managed to capture a rich gas field called Conoco that was previously under the control of Jabhat al-Nusra. Having captured Mosul, a large Iraqi city, its claims of being the strongest Jihadi group can be justifiable (Ghosh 2014).

The interests, interactions and institutions that contributed to the rise of the ISIS

Several individuals have been seeking ideologies or individuals to blame for the fast growth of the Islamic State. In fact, several pundits are looking for certain politicians that they can put the blame on to justify their political motives. In addition, various analysts are trying to come up with explanations for the rapid growth of a small terrorist group that seizes and controls regions by selecting political players to put the current Middle East on crisis.

Most of these theories could be true, but the major contributors to the emergence and rapid growth of ISIS have not been fully addressed. The studies majorly focus on minimal issues, but the focus that should be on social and historical factors is not yet comprehensively covered. The public in the region demand the formation of a state on an Islamic caliphate, but this has been ignored given that ISIS is viewed as the major problem. Even if the foreign troops kill the top leaders of ISIS, the Jihadist followers may come up with substitute leaders to ensure that they achieve their dream of a global caliphate (Shahhosseini 2014).

One of the factors that contributed to the rise of ISIS was the performance of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki that several supporters of former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein were not comfortable with in the end. He tried to displace the Baathist followers in the country who had been in control over a long period. Former Sunni soldiers were promised to be paid to join forces in fighting against the Al-Qaida extremist forces to strengthen the new Iraqi state. However, once al-Maliki consolidated power, he let go of the soldiers without even taking caution of disarming them. When civilians started protesting against him and got a violent reaction from the government, the previously dismissed soldiers joined them to fight against the government and later welcomed ISIS into Iraq.

The Arab spring also did not bring fruits to the expected standards. As people were celebrating the ousting of the Egyptian president, they never knew that it would lead to a buildup of another coup de tat. The war emerged in the country after failures in negotiation and peaceful democratic transition of power. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood supported the demands that are radical and firmness from the demonstrators. In turn, people lost hope in peaceful transitions and the missions of the radical groups advanced in the Middle East (Jafari 2004).

The developments in the political situation of Syria under President Bashar Assad also contributed to the rise of ISIS. The opposition and several other interested parties expected Assad to end his rule, but it seemed that it would not come. The opposing groups came up with military groups that got well equipped and dangerous. When their chances in Syria became limited, they resorted to Iraq that was already having several loopholes to be invaded by extremist groups.

The popularity of the extremism theory in the Middle East was a contributor to the rise of ISIS. People were felt the humiliation due to the fall of the Islamic civilization and lack of efficiency among the political setups in the region. Moreover, people felt that they were denied the right of determining the way to be governed. The citizens tried to fight for what they wanted in a peaceful manner, but the opportunity was denying. The events led to the emergence of radical means (Tran 2014).

One of the institutions that may have been involved in the rise of ISIS is the Saudi Arabian government. On several occasions, issues have arisen that the Saudi government funds terrorists but the connection with ISIS is seen as being deeper. Saudi for a long time had close links in ideologies with Sunni Islam and loathing of Shia Islam. It has therefore been involved in financing Sunni extremists to ensure destabilization of the Shia states (Moris 2014). Large amounts of money are said to have been sent to the extremists in Syria and Iraq and the disciples from the groups would later form ISIS.

The western world can also be said to have contributed to the situation. After the installation of Maliki as the president, the West supplied him with sophistical weapons for fighting al-Qaida. As the ISIS troops invaded Iraq, the Iraqi forces escaped and left all the weapons at the disposal of the ISIS. The occurrence made them get all that they wanted to fight a successful war (Morris 2014).

Conclusion

The emergence of the ISIS is based on various factors. In fact, the origins of the conflicts and growth of extremism in Syria and Iraq are deep rooted. Thus, the real issues being demanded by the citizens have to be met or else bringing a solution to the situations will be almost impossible.

Reference List

Cockburn, P 2015, “Who are ISIS? the rise of the Islamic state in Iraq and the Levant”, The Independent. Web.

Ghosh, G 2015, A short political history of the terrorists who now call themselves the ‘Islamic state’. Web.

Ghosh, J 2014, “ISIS: a short history; the terrorist group’s evolution from fervid fantasy to death cult”. Web.

Jafari, S 2014, “Five major reasons leading to ISIS emergence”, Iran Review. Web.

Landis, J 2014, “The battle between ISIS and Syria’s rebel militias”, The Clarion Project. Web.

Manfreda, P 2015, “Syrian civil war explained: the fight for the Middle East”, About News. Web.

Mansoor, P 2014, “The rise and inevitable fall of the ISIS caliphate”, Hoover Institution. Web.

Moris, M 2014, “10 mistakes that fed the rise of ISIS”, Listverse. Web.

Shahhosseini, K 2014, “The rise of ISIS: who’s to blame?” International Policy Digest. Web.

Tran, M 2014, “Who are ISIS? a terror group too extreme even for al-Qaida”, The Guardian. Web.

Introduction

In the year 1968, a company of American soldiers involved themselves in an unfortunate event in the Vietnamese village of My Lai. The incident occurred during the American-Vietnam war when soldiers raided a Vietnamese village and killed all persons that were insight. The soldiers raped, physically abused, and killed all persons, including the elderly, as well as women and children. Aside from killing the residents, the soldiers also destroyed the villager’s homes and other properties.

The Genesis of My Lai

The soldiers had gotten information that the villagers were what was referred to as Vietcong. During the war, the term Vietcong was used to refer to persons who sympathized with the Vietnam side of the war encounter. The soldiers and their commandants used this information to justify their actions in the village of My Lai. At the beginning of the war, the argument was justifiable, given the situations that exist when a war is starting. It was impossible for the soldiers to identify their enemies as the Vietcong applied guerilla techniques to fight the American soldiers. As such, it was difficult to tell the civilians apart in a group of enemies.

As the war continued, the justification issued by the American soldiers made less sense. When the war progressed, it was clearer to the soldiers who the civilians were and how to identify them in a group of Vietnamese people as the civilians were not armed. The book My Lai: A Brief History with Documents paints a clear picture of the main explanations that were given by the American troops for their actions during and after My Lai. The soldiers claimed that the Vietcong attacked. There was a characteristic pretense of memory loss among the troops in order to avoid questioning. The troops also argued that they received orders from their superiors.

Soldiers’ Accounts

The American troops had been informed that by attacking My Lai, they would be able to neutralize the Vietcong troops as well as their sympathizers who resided in the village. The reality of the matter was that there were very few Vietcong who inhabited My Lai. According to Colonel Oran K. Henderson, “all persons living in this area [were] considered to be Vietcong or Vietcong sympathizers by the District Chief¹.”

Colonel Henderson, as well as other officers, who were of his rank or other ranks above, dispatched men to My Lai on the basis of this belief. Even when the actions at My Lai were brought to the fore, the officers denied the reports and used this argument to justify their reasons for sending the troops to the village. Notably, Colonel Henderson made a report in which he stated that 128 Vietcong were killed during the attack and that only a total of 20 civilians had been accidentally caught in the line of fire. The report was inaccurate and went against the existing evidence that indicated that more than 150 civilians had been caught in the crossfire and that the village had very few Vietcong. The figure could be proven through a body count after the incidence took place. It is regrettable that an officer of the rank of colonel could give a falsified report and lie in an attempt to defend his actions and those of his troops. There is a higher likelihood that Henderson fabricated the figure regarding the number of Vietcong and civilians killed in the attack with the sole aim of ensuring that his reputation was not tainted as a result of the incidence.

In reality, it is factual that My Lai did have some Vietcong. As reported by Thomas Partsch, he watched when two American Soldiers walked into mines that were set up by the Vietcong². The event occurred two days after the raid on My Lai. It is debatable whether the mines were placed before or after the attack, but what is clear is the fact there was a trace of Vietcong activities in the area. The Vietcong had placed the mines strategically in a place where American troops would run into them when they entered the area. Partsch did not expect anyone would read his journal, and he was more bound to note down what he had witnessed without trying to make an impression.

Many soldiers, as well as other officers, have indicated that they had little knowledge of what happened at My Lai in order to cover up for the event that took place. There is a characteristic of memories of soldiers who were involved in having forgotten the events so fast that they did not have any credible information to provide when questioned later. For example, Dennis Conti and his crew, who were present during the attack, were examined two days following the My Lai attack. When Conti was asked about the questioning, he feigned forgetfulness and even reported that he “was probably in a bunker somewhere trying to get some rest³.” That was not true given that there was documentation that Conti was among the group that was questioned two days after the attack. Conti claimed that all he knew was that there was some investigation that had been carried, and he had gotten this information through other soldiers. Conti had intentions of avoiding to incriminate himself or the soldiers, and as such, he resulted in such distortion of facts.

It can be asserted with certainty that Conti knew everything about the My Lai situation and the investigations that followed, but he did not want to put himself and the other men at risk. By telling the truth, Conti could have broken their camaraderie. Another reason he chose not, to tell the truth, is the fact that he participated in the My Lai attack, and as such, he was as guilty as everyone else. Interestingly other men had similar memory issues as those demonstrated by Conti. Oran K. Henderson, who had questioned a number of men two days after the event, had no recollection of the troops he had questioned when he was filing his report. Just like Conti, Henderson was not honest when he stated that he could not remember the names of the men he had spoken to during the investigations.

There was a group of soldiers who never feigned memory loss, but they chose to state that they could not discuss anything as they had orders from their superiors not to tell anything concerning the My Lai attack. Michael Bernhardt, who was under the command of Captain Medina, indicated that he and other men were under instruction not to talk about the investigation. According to Bernhardt, Captain Medina had given them the reason that is talking about the attack “was not going to do any good, and it was going to get a lot of people in trouble⁴.”

Such an utterance would be incriminating for Medina, but it was an excuse used by Bernhardt to evade having to report on what happened at My Lai. When Herbert Carter, who was one of the men who participated in the attack, was asked about it, he stated that he was hospitalized during the events. He said that he had learned from his colleagues who had visited him that the information that they were to give to anyone asking about My Lai was that they “were fired upon and [to] say a sniper round had come in or something⁵.” It is interesting that Carter, despite being hospitalized, was aware, “somebody was trying to cover something up⁶.”

It is evident that he gave such an explanation just to ensure that if in case he was discovered to be lying, the focus would be shifted to someone else. As such, Carter would be cleared of any responsibility.

Conclusion

It is against the fair principles of war to justify the actions of the American troops who perpetrated the events at My Lai. The soldiers gave excuses for their actions during the attack as well as covering up for their actions or lack of, after the My Lai attack. Some of the soldiers falsely stated that they were aware of Vietcong existing in the area and that some of the troops had been attacked by the Vietcong, and as such, they only took action to neutralize the threat. The soldiers feigned forgetfulness or blamed their superiors for the events when the investigations began. Such was the tragic events at My Lai that led to the loss of life of innocent civilians. The actions of the troops revolving around My Lai should never be covered up to protect the perpetrators of the heinous acts.

Bibliography

Bernhardt, Michael, “Testimony to Peers Commission, 1970,” in My Lai: A Brief History with Documents, 123. Edited by James Olson & Randy Roberts. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s,1998. Web.

Carter, Herbert, “Testimony to Peers Commission, 1970,” in My Lai: A Brief History with Documents, 125. Edited by James Olson & Randy Roberts. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1998. Web.

Conti, Dennis, “Testimony to Peers Commission, 1970,” in My Lai: A Brief History with Documents, 124. Edited by James Olson & Randy Roberts. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1998. Web.

Henderson, Oran, “Report of Investigation, 1968,” in My Lai: A Brief History with Documents, 127. Edited by James Olson & Randy Roberts. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1998. Web.

Partsch, Thomas, “Journal Entries, 1968,” in My Lai: A Brief History with Documents, 141-142. Edited by James Olson & Randy Roberts. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1998. Web.

Footnotes

1 Oran, Henderson, “Report of Investigation, 1968,” in My Lai: A Brief History with Documents, ed. James Olson and Randy Roberts (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1998), 127.

2 Thomas, Partsch, “Journal Entries, 1968,” in My Lai: A Brief History with Documents, ed. James Olson and Randy Roberts (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1998), 142.

3 Dennis, Conti, “Testimony to Peers Commission, 1970,” in My Lai: A Brief History with Documents, ed. James Olson and Randy Roberts (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1998), 124.

4 Michael, Bernhardt, “Testimony to Peers Commission, 1970,” in My Lai: A Brief History with Documents, ed. James Olson and Randy Roberts (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1998), 123.

5 Herbert, Carter, “Testimony to Peers Commission, 1970,” in My Lai: A Brief History with Documents, ed. James Olson and Randy Roberts (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1998), 125.

6 Ibid., 126.

Introduction

The outbreak of war in Iraq is something that started out as an impulse. Many people felt that it was short-lived until days and months past. The Iraq war can be examined from many perspectives. To begin with, the invasion kicked off in 2003. It believed that the attack on Iraq was a combined effort from the United States of America’s troops, the UK, along with other several allies (Axelrod 21). It all started when the US and UK declared that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, and thus there was a need to prevent it from causing massive destruction. Though the attack on Iraq was a direct infringement of the United Nations’ Charter, the invasion was carried out under the umbrella that there was a need to enhance democracy and freedom in Iraq.

It was a form of attack that was not declared, and hence the government of Iraq was caught unawares. By the end of the year 2012, it was believed that US troops would leave Iraq following an order from President Barrack Obama (Bigger 37). During the invasion, many negative things were witnessed. For example, the state of peace in Iraq deteriorated, and Saddam Hussein’s government toppled. In addition, the war led to the mass destruction of both human life and property.

After the plan to withdraw its troops from Iraq, there were numerous opinions on the subject. According to Katulis (10), the continuous stay of America’s troops in Iraq hampered the country’s efforts to deal with other threats such as in Afghanistan or Iran.

First, all the attention in terms of funds were directed to Iraq. Secondly, America had focused all its security concerns on Iraq. As such, it was maintaining its army in Iraq would economically affect the US following the increasing cost for living as well as the need for the troops to attend to other security concerns. The withdrawal of the US armies from Iraq marked a decade of war and torture in Iraq, with the reasons behind the invasion being highly contested, as well as debated (Katulis 6). Even though there has been a lot of debate about the reasons for Iraq’s invasion by the US troops, no concrete reasons have been set forth up to date.

However, as the country thinks about the reasons for the US invasion of Iraq and the thought of reforming the community’s intelligence, there is a need to remember that bad intelligence was not the cause for Iraq’s war, per se (Daly 64). According to a statement by a former director in Bush’s administration, Iraq’s war was one of choice. According to Bush’s administration, the decision to go on war with Iraq did not come from the intelligence service (Greeley 22).

Instead, it found itself in the mix for a war that had been planned without its consent. There were a number of reasons, that according to George Bush that the US went into war with Iraq. To begin with, the US pointed out that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Secondly, the US felt that Iraq collaborated with Al Qaeda in acts of terrorism. Third, the Bush administration believed that Iraq, through its perceived collaboration with the terrorist group, Al Qaeda, was advancing weapons of mass destruction to them for their terror acts (Simon 64).

Even though the Bush administration insisted on the above reasons, several commissions that were formed to enquire about the reasons for the invasion, it was found out that the first three reasons were made up. The fact that the US and its allies did not plan well for post-war added to the elevation of Iyad Allawi, as well as the insidious corruption that was evident among the contractors employed by the United States and the ones responsible for funding the invasion is responsible for the making up of the cited reasons.

Why then was there a war between the US and Iraq? The evidence that is given does not point to any particular reason. However, considering the broad perspective, one finds that there are several reasons that tend to both converge and interwove (William 24). These included military transformation, Israel, and oil. As evident from the Cheney energy strategy, it is enough proof that the search for oils was one of the reasons that the United States of America and its allies invaded Iraq. In addition, there was a concern by AIPAC, as well as the Christians of weakening the Arabic world as a way through which they could strengthen Israel. On the other hand, other parties had different agendas. For example, Don Rumsfeld aimed at expediting the United States of America’s military transformation.

Cheney Energy Policy

Using two recommendations, one can adequately understand the US’s first rationale following the Iraq invasion. The then vice president suggested these recommendations with the primary focus being on the energy policy. First, there was the call for the president to prioritize energy security as the United States of America’s policy on foreign affairs and trade. Secondly, the NEPD called for oil-producing and exporting countries (UAE, Qatar, Algeria, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia), as well as other suppliers, to set rules that allowed foreign investment into their energy areas. However, it should be remembered that the source of the oil used in America does not come from individual countries, but it gets it from the international market.

During the 1990s rise in demand for oil, there was a decline in oil production among oil-producing and exporting countries. As such, the demand and supply for oil grew extremely tight, which implied the oil producers lack finances as well as the technology to meet the growing demand. This had the implication that unless they allowed foreigners to help them in extracting the oil, prices would continue rising.

During the period of the Cold War, Asia was responsible for the increase in the prices of oil. At the same time, the cost of living was considerably rising following Chinese exports. Such scenarios implied that the cost of energy was likely to rise due to significantly high demand for energy all over the world. The effect was that there was a high possibility of reducing the economic growth of America following its role in offering incentives for alternative sources of energy as well as influencing the Asians politically. Adding OPEC’s quotas worsened the situation. It was nothing new that the United States of America was highly concerned with the supply of the world’s oil. For more than 30 years, the US has been operating on its “Carter Doctrine” that discouraged any other party from controlling the region around the Persian Gulf. According to this doctrine, any party that infringed its terms were regarded as assaulting the United States of America’s interests. The oil fields in Iraq were, thus, an opportunity for the US.

The fact that Iraq had the second-largest oil field added to its inability to exploit them was seen as an advantage for the US to exercise their power. However, the United States of America was sure that they could not succeed with their mission due to the presence of Saddam Hussein. As such, America could only have succeeded if they managed to control the oil fields of Iraq. Although such an objective was not in the list of the goals that the task force wanted to achieve, it was later exposed in a memoir. As such, by the end of 2001, there was a drafted document that outlined the procedure that the US would use to divide the oilfields of Iraq successfully. It is thus evident that even the declaration by the US that China was a potential threat was based on reasons around securing as well as dominating oil fields. However, it was later to be understood that such competition between the US and China was about the control of oilfields of the Persian Gulf.

Strengthening Israel at the expense of the Arabs

There existed a complicated relationship between Israel and the US administration during the leadership of George Bush. This following the fact that the president’s success in the election was large as a result of the Christian conservatives. Controlling the biblical lands was anticipated to be given to the Christian Zionists. In addition, the then president of America had a lot to honor the AIPAC, which was a strong lobby group under the Jewish umbrella. The AIPAC was supporting Ariel Sharon in the rejection of a policy that had existed for a long time regarding the “land-for-peace” policy.

On the other hand, Bush was in a dilemma following the neoconservatives’ view of a Chamberlain-Hitler negotiation in the context of PLO and Arafat’s negotiation. Following such a mix of power interests led the Israelites to draw an alternative policy for the US.

The policy revolved around Israel providing a suitable situation for the US to handle Saddam Hussein if they progressed with their Palestinian issue. In addition, there was the other option provided whereby Israel would deal with Hussein in the hope of a convenient situation of gaining strength against the weakened Arabs. The two options involved the elimination of Saddam and the support that he was giving the Palestinians, chances of reducing the prices of oils as a result of weakness among the OPEC and Saudi Arabia, as well as setting a permanent United States of America’s army base in Iraq (Phillips 23). All these attempts were aimed at giving the US room to control the oil fields of Iraq. With the Arabs weakened, it would be easy for Israel to negotiate easily whenever they wished for any deal.

Speed up Military Revolution

The conservatives were so close to Bush. However, they gained power in the year 2001. This group of people aimed at the general restructuring of the United States of America, with a lot of focus on the establishment of dominating conditions. However, such goals in practice would just mean that they were only extending the demands of the Charter Doctrine, considering that the US economy depends highly on foreign oil sources. As a victim of these three

components, Iraq became a target for the conservatives to achieve their expedition mission (Koga 35). As such, there was the hope that staging war against Iraq was a suitable opportunity for the US to implement the new doctrine of dominance. In the end, such war would destabilize the military structure, thereby creating room for the implementation of the perceived changes. It was thus seen as a project that would result in the fulfillment of the interests of Rumsfeld, New American Century, Wolfowitz, and Cheney. As such, it was highly anticipated that an emergency would be called that would present an opportunity for the implementation of the desired changes.

From the foregoing, one would be tempted to question why it was necessary for the Bush administration to deceive the public. America had been addicted to oils and its control, and thus, there was a need for the US to control necessity was evident. Just the administration offered justification for the Gulf War, so did they look for reasons to justify their presence and actions in Iraq. A unique opportunity was available for the US invasion in September 2001. This followed the surge of patriotism as well as the trust that was gained following the Washington and New York attacks. Such a scenario seemed to make a comparison between the Soviet Union and the Al Qaeda. As such, Bush saw it as a suitable opportunity to offer cover for his intention and goals in Iraq. For this reason, the Bush administration could go on with its activities without undergoing any political resistance.

The invasion of Iraq led to serious effects, such as the elimination of Saddam Hussein. This was one of America’s strategic goals as they invade Iraq. In spite of what happened during and after the invasion of Iraq, it left many different opinions and evidence that the invasion was on a self-interest basis as opposed to a democracy mission.

First, the current situation in Iraq, both politically and economically, is worse than it was during the time of Saddam. It is factual that Iraq has suffered a hard period during the invasion. In spite of this, and the US’s insistence that they were working towards a secure nation, the future of this country is far from being secure. As such, from the current situation of continual tension and attacks, it is evident that the invasion of Iraq was not aimed at ensuring better living standards for the Iraqis, but is focused on making sure that the America and its allies were safe.

Secondly, it is likely that wars to impose democracy would invariably lead to failure. Whether such a scenario was true, it seemed irrelevant for Iraq. The justification that Bush and its allies had for the invasion was that they were trying to create democracy. However, such arguments did not seem to play any measurable role in their activities that were aimed at ending the regime of Saddam Hussein. In addition, it was expected that the representative government would replace the Ba’ath party. However, this did not happen, which explained that the invasion was not aimed at bringing democracy to the country.

Thirdly, the concept of the presence of WMD in Iraq was a lie. However, there had been a shared belief that Iraq possessed numerous chemical weapons. Saddam Hussein had declared that the country had destroyed its weapons of mass destruction following the United Nation’s sanctions.

Considering the event that unfolded during and after the invasion of Iraq, it is evident that the role of the US in this invasion was way past the destruction of the WMD. The invasion was thus, centered on other interests of both the US and its allies. As such, it suffices to conclude that the intervention of the United States of America was highly aggressive. In addition, it is evident that Iran has grown highly powerful presently than during the time of Saddam.

Works Cited

Axelrod, Alan. Political History of America’s Wars. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2007. Print.

Bigger, Nigel. ‘The Invasion Of Iraq: What Are The Morals Of The Story?’. International Affairs 87.1 (2011): 29-37. Web.

Daly, Erin. ‘Transitional Justice in Iraq: Learning the Hard Way’. Isr. law rev. 47.01 (2014): 63-83. Web.

Greeley, Andrew. A Stupid, Unjust, and Criminal War. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 2007. Print.

Katulis, Brian. “The United States Must Leave Iraq.” Opposing Viewpoints: National Security. 34.4 (2007): 6-10. Print

Koga, Yosseh.Why America Went To War In The Gulf’. Choice Reviews Online 39.06 (2002): 35-39. Web.

Phillips, James. “Winning the Iraq War Will Decrease Terrorism.” Opposing Viewpoints: Terrorism. 45.3 (2009): 23-24. Print

Simon, Steven. ‘America And Iraq: The Case For Disengagement’. Survival 49.1 (2007): 61-84. Web.

William E. Odom. “Withdrawing the Military from Iraq Would Improve U.S. Credibility.” Opposing Viewpoints: America’s Global Influence. 40.3 (2007). 22-24. Print

In the recent years some of the West African states faced a number of armed conflicts and rebellions caused by various ideological differences and growing dissatisfaction of the citizens with the work of their governments. These conflicts occurred due to a number of various factors and included the involvement foreign influences. Ibrahim (2014) notes that Mali and Mauritania are the Sahelian countries that are located on the frontlines of what might be called a Sahel-Saharan Islamic insurgency.

The armed insurgents in Mali started as a separatist movement of one of the country’s districts called Azawad. Ethnically this district of Mali is populated with people called the Tuareg. Historically the Tuareg used to be nomadic and independence loving people; they have been occupying their territories ever since the fifth century. In the fourteenth century the Tuareg officially converted to Islam and continued to travel and trade in Sahara. The Tuareg’s independence was limited when Mali was colonized by France that established districts and borders within the country (Devon 2013). Ever since that time, even though Mali became independent in 1960, the Tuareg kept initiating rebellions trying to gain self-independence for Azawad in 1916, 1960, 1990, 2007 and 2012. The latest rebellion involved Islamist groups that initially supported the Tuareg nationalists, but in the end clashed with them and took over their occupied territories. The clash happened due to the differences of future plans and visions of the leaders of both organizations for the further development of the territories they struggled for.

The growing popularity of Jihadist movements on the territories of West African states caused some serious territorial and social ruptures. For example, the Civil War in Libya because one of the main reasons of the influx of illegal weapons to the regions of Mali that armed the rebellions from Azawad and allowed them to start the insurgent. Although, according to the amount of weapons employed during this conflict it is seen that these resources have been stored in Mali for years, and the rebellion was planned and prepared for a long time.

Political and social instability in the nearby states directly affected Mauritania, which seemed to be the first Sahelo-Saharan frontline country to achieve the post – Islamic insurgency. Mauritanian leaders spent years fighting Jihadist movements and ideologies on the territory of the country. The crisis period for Maurithania happened between 2005 and 2011, when the country experienced extreme vulnerability due to high levels of jihadist activism (Ibrahim 2014). The conflicts in Mali also threatened the weak stability in Mauritania, yet to stay away from the war Mauritanian troops were given an order not to intrude into the threat coming from AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) unless they would set their camps closer than two hundred kilometers from the Mauritanian boarder (Oumar & Gueye 2012).

Since the insurgent in the North East of Mali ended with the defeat of NMLA (National Movement of Liberation of Azawad) and the renouncement of the independence claim, there is a good chance that the rebellion might repeat again within several years, because the Tuareg have been trying to obtain independence for decades now. The influx of weapons on the territory of Northern Mali makes the possibility of another conflict greater. These factors put jihadist-free Mauritania under a constant threat as its territory and its frontline position would always be an attractive strategic zone for terrorist attacks.

Reference List

Devon, D. B (2013). The Crisis in Mali: A Historical Perspective on the Tuareg People. Web.

Ibrahim, I. Y. (2014). Managing the Sahelo-Saharan Islamic Insurgency in Mauritania. Web.

Oumar J.& Gueye B. (2012). Mauritania Braces for War Against Al-Qaeda in Northern Mali. Web.

Ever since the state of Egypt proclaimed its independence from the United Kingdom in 1922, it has been engaged in several international, domestic, and one-sided incidents of violence. Generally, these conflicts were linked to one of the following three reasons: disputes over the Suez Canal, disagreements regarding the Sinai Peninsula (particularly, with Israel), and insurgency of Islamist rebel groups. Apart from that, the Egyptian government has a rather poor human rights record, and it has engaged in one-sided violence on several occasions.

The present paper provides an analysis of the insurgency of the Islamist group al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya that operated in Egypt from 1993 to 1998, aiming to overthrow the secular Egyptian government to erect an Islamic state. The first part of the paper examines different historical stages and periods of the conflict, as well as the changes in battle deaths and civilian casualties over the course of the conflict. The second part provides an overview of the main actors involved in the conflict and analyses the relationships between them. The final part of the paper considers the primary causes and consequences of the conflict; throughout the paper, visuals are used to demonstrate the key concepts and elements in the analysis.

Conflict Cycle: Conflict’s Stages and Periods

Even though the al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya’s main activities did not start until 1993, the group was starting to be formed in as early as 1974. The events of the early 1970s led many people – especially youth – to grow discontent with the politics of the Sadat government, such as its friendly stance toward Israel, amicable relations with Iran, and lack of support for the Islamist trends. Until 1984, al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya was also closely linked to other jihadist groups who have collaborated to murder President Sadat in 1981. Despite the subsequent unrest and violence between the militants and government forces, the al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya’s actions did not yet constitute rebellion. The country enjoyed relative stability throughout the 1980s, as many Islamist militants turned their attention against the Soviet Union, following its invasion of Afghanistan.

However, the situation changed dramatically when the veterans returned to Egypt in the early 1990s. Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya initiated the rebellion and engaged in a direct confrontation in 1992 by launching small attacks in Southern Egypt. 1993 is considered the first active year of the conflict, as militants and police forces began to engage in frequent violent encounters. The next year, the group appeared to dominate the government forces, but many militants were either killed or imprisoned in 1995.

Meanwhile, al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya also engaged in one-sided violence against civilians, which culminated in the 1997 Luxor Massacre that had important consequences in undermining the group’s internal structure. Despite the increasing violence, the government of Egypt refused to engage in peace talks with the militants, even when a truce was suggested by the imprisoned leaders of the group in 1996 and 1997. In fact, peace agreements proved to be unnecessary as the events of previous years have led to a gradual disintegration of the group, with the violence coming to an end in 1998 (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, n.d.).

Thus, the following stages have been identified in the conflict. It was marked by a prolonged pre-conflict stage that lasted for approximately twenty years prior to the conflict’s first active year. Despite the short period of violence and unrest following the assassination of President Sadat in 1981, the conflict was contained because the group lacked the necessary resources to engage in a direct confrontation. However, as al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya regained its human capital following the events in Afghanistan in the early 1990s, the conflict escalated rather quickly. While the group had the potential to prolong the fight well into the 1990s and even 2000s, the harsh government response combined with the group’s miscalculations led to a rather abrupt end of the conflict.

Trends in Battle Deaths and Casualties of One-Sided Violence

The UCPD data on fatality estimates over the course of the al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya’s rebellion seems to be based on accurate records, as there is little deviation between the low and high fatality estimates. Figure 2 uses the best total fatality estimates to plot the available data. Importantly, the UCPD only records the deaths that occurred between 1993 and 1998, even though the first instances of violence took place in the early 1980s, and the group was responsible for one-sided violence since 1992. However, the count of civilian deaths takes into account only three years of the conflict.

Nevertheless, one can rely on this data to examine and analyze the changes in battle deaths and civilian casualties over the course of the conflict. Up until 1995, the number of total fatality estimates had been experiencing a steady rise, until it witnessed a sharp decline in 1996. After that, the fatality figures have seen a steady decline all the way until the closing year of the conflict. The limited availability of the civilian deaths data makes the analysis more difficult, as one can only observe the steady decline of the violence from 1995 to 1997 as the group was attempting to terrorize the population of Egypt.

Regardless of the missing data for the years leading up to the conflict, the trends in fatality estimates generally follow the conflict cycle of the al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya’s insurgency. 1993 marked the start of the group’s official violence campaign, so the total number of casualties is rather high immediately. When the government responded to the al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya’s actions in 1994, the death toll went up considerably. As the group had been gaining significant power, the confrontation between the militants and police resulted in a consistently higher death toll. The same trend was carried into 1995 as the government forces aimed to eliminate the militants.

1995 is the turning point in the conflict, the battle deaths, and civilian casualties both go down after that year. The only outlier is the Luxor Massacre that carried significant political weight because of its high concentration of casualties, even though its total toll is comparatively low with respect to the estimates from other years. The final year of the conflict was marked by comparatively few deaths as the group virtually ceased to exist at that point (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, n.d.).

Key Actors and Main Issues

The use of the bubbles map helps examine the main parties involved in the conflict, as well as analyze the links and relationships between them. Two primary parties engaged in the selected conflict are al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya and the Egyptian government. Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya is an Islamist group that originated in the 1970s as a student association. The group’s formation was a response to the politics of the Egyptian government at the time, such as the country’s defeat in the 1973 October War and its friendly relations with Iran. A major factor was the release of the Muslim Brotherhood’s leaders from the prison – an act supported by President Sadat himself.

The group followed the teachings of two individuals, Sayid Qutb, and Omar Abd al-Rahman, who claimed that Islam is the only acceptable source of authority and governance and propagated jihad as a means of achieving this goal. The Egyptian government and its police and military forces resisted the violence carried out by al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya. Thus, the main source of dispute between the two parties was the control over the state and government.

Even though initially, in its early years of conception, al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya allied with other jihadist groups operating in the country, namely, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad group, the two split in 1984, so the latter is not represented in Figure 3. Nevertheless, the al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya’s group enjoyed considerate support from other third parties during its active year. Its allies include the governments of Iran and Sudan and Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda group.

The partnership manifested itself in several ways: the allies supplied weapons and training to the al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya’s militants. Moreover, they also provided safe havens for those Islamist activists that needed to escape the country. Even though the al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya’s actions were condemned by several world governments, only the United States government provided direct support to the Egyptian government by conducting joint military exercises with the Egyptian forces for the purpose of training (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, n.d.). Overall, the conflict was contained within the country’s borders and little direct involvement from third parties was present.

The Key Causes of the Conflict

A treemap is a useful visual tool that helps understands how the main causes of the conflict shaped its core problem and what consequences followed after the conflict’s resolution (Fisher et al. 2000). Essentially, the key causes of the conflict can be divided into two main categories: dissatisfaction with the government’s foreign policy and Islamist ideology’s incompatibility with the secular nature of the state of Egypt. Different events regarding these two elements of Egyptian politics contributed to the formation of al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya as a domestic actor, and the government had to respond to the group’s demand.

Consequently, the core problem of the conflict was control of the state and government in Egypt. The government wanted to maintain its control over the country while al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya attempted to overthrow the government with the aim of establishing Sharia law in Egypt.

The conflict had several important implications for Egypt. First of all, the fact that violence was frequently directed at tourists significantly harmed the country’s travel industry, which is one of the main contributors to the Egyptian economy. The Luxor Massacre, in particular, had a detrimental effect on the country’s tourist attractiveness, and it caused the considerable international condemnation of the violence. Given the outcome of the conflict – that is, the disintegration of the group – another consequence was the maintenance of the political status quo, as al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya failed to convert Egypt into an Islamic state. Islamism has lost its popular appeal: even the former leaders of al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya renounced violence, apologized for their past actions, and began advocating against religious extremism (Gunaratna & Ali 2009).

Another useful tool to understand the conflict is the onion map that examines the positions, interests, and needs of the conflicting parties. These three layers represent the claims, intentions, and goals of al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya and the government of Egypt. While the positions represent what the actors claimed they wanted, the interests represented what they actually wanted. The needs are what was necessary for the parties to achieve their goal (Fisher et al. 2000).

The al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya’s group claimed they wanted to establish an Islamic state in Egypt which translates into their actual desire for state and government control. Ultimately, for them to achieve this goal, they needed to spread the Islamist ideology and make it popular among the people of Egypt. However, the group chose the wrong methods to attain this goal as their violence only drove potential supporters away.

On the other hand, the official government’s position in the conflict was ending the al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya’s violence. However, given its firm refusal to negotiate with the group’s leaders, the government, in fact, was primarily concerned about suppressing the dissent and retaining their political control. For them to do this, they needed to ensure peace and maintain political, ideological, and military supremacy over the militants.

Even though the active years of the conflict are only from 1993 to 1998, it can nevertheless be considered a protracted conflict, defined as hostility between groups based on religious and other reasons and manifesting itself in occasional violence outbreaks over a long period of time (Fisher 2001). Given the group’s activities in the 1980s, the insurgency can be considered a protracted conflict. The main difficulties associated with resolving the conflict are as follows. First of all, the two sides had absolutely incompatible political agendas that left no room for consensus or compromise. Secondly, the militants had access to many resources, both human and material, which allowed them to resist the government for quite a long time.

The conflict between the government of Egypt and al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya was a rather short one, only lasting for about six years. The duration and intensity of the conflict can be best understood by analyzing the positions and resources of the conflicting parties, as well as the consequences of their actions. The group’s internal deficiencies combined with the government’s harsh response quickly led to the demise of al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya in Egypt.

Reference List

Gunaratna, R & Ali, MB 2009, ‘De-radicalization initiatives in Egypt: A preliminary insight’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 277-291. Web.

Fisher, RJ 2001, ‘Cyprus: The failure of mediation and the escalation of an identity-based conflict to an adversarial impasse’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 307-326. Web.

Fisher, S, Abdi, DI, Ludin, J, Smith, R, Williams, S, Wiliams, S 2000, Working with conflict: Skills and strategies for action, Zed Books, London, UK. Web.

Uppsala Conflict Data Program n.d., Egypt, Uppsala University. Web.