Category: War

Plan of Investigation

What caused the outbreak of the First World War (WWI) has been a topic of debate among historians for almost a century. Some belief, the problem began in the mid-19^th century during German unification by Chancellor Otto von Bismarck (1864) and continued with the dreams of economic predominance by Kaiser Wilhelm II (1871). Some believe that it was the aggressive foreign policy adopted by Germany in the years preceding 1914 that led to the outbreak of the world war (Geiss 1966; Gillette 2006).

Others think that domestic policies had more influence on the outbreak than the foreign policy of the warring nations (Gordon 1974). Some scholars emphasized on the German innocence (Moses 2015). However, scholars like Fritz Fischer annulled such claims in the 1960s that held the Germans responsible for the July crisis that inevitably led to WWI (Kaiser 1983). Therefore, there have been two poles debating over the reasons for the outbreak of WWI. The research question is, in what ways, and to what extent, were German and Austrian policies responsible for the outbreak of the First World War?

For this investigation, we have relied on archival records of the original treaties, declarations, and official letters. These are highly reliable primary sources of policies adopted by Germany and Austria before WWI.

Summary of Evidence

This paper will study two primary documents – (1) The expanded Triple Alliance between Austria and Germany in 1882 (The Triple Alliance 1912), and (2) Declaration of Annexation of Bosnia (Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1908). These two primary sources show the policies adopted by Germany and Austria-Hungary since the 1870s that had led to the polarization of the world powers.

The Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, first signed in 1882, was renewed in 1912, created a formal coalition between the three nations against France (The Triple Alliance 1912). The alliance ensured military support to one another in the case of a war. The document stressed that it was a strategy to strengthen their defenses if threatened by other nations (1912).

The aim of the alliance was to create power blocks in Europe to have to promise bound alliances in the case of a war. Germany had created an alliance with Austria and Russia by creating the Three Emperor’s League in 1890 but it did not help as Russia and Austria conflicting interests in the Balkan region (Herwig 2014). Germany and Austria already had formed a formal alliance. Germany’s interest was to safeguard its territories against France (especially after the latter’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian War) (Part 2014).

The Triple Appliance has three bilateral accords. Germany and Austria have been strong allies since 1879. Italy allied with them after its defeat by France in North Africa (Kennedy 2014). The treaty of 1882 of the treaty had eight articles. The formal alliance ensured that the concerned parties would not enter into any alliance with other nations that may hamper the peace and security of the signatories of the treaty.

The treaty promised military help to Italy if France attacked its boundaries. Italy too was bound to help Germany and Austria in the case of a Franco-attack. Further, Bismarck forced Austria into an alliance with Italy to reach a mutual agreement on the power struggle over the Balkan region.

The declaration of the Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908 started the Balkan Crisis that resulted in the creation of conflicting power blocks in Europe. Austria was the authoritarian body in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1878, a power given to her by the Treaty of Berlin that gave her the right to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina (MacMillan 2013). The declaration has the letters exchanged by Franz Joseph I, the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary and Wilhelm II, the German Emperor and King of Prussia.

The reason stated by Austria-Hungary was the rising influence of the Turkish Ottoman Empire in the region, created difficulty in its administration of Bosnia. The rising demand for a constitution in the region had brought forth the necessity of a monarch in the region. Therefore, he had to annex the territory to maintain peace and stability in the region. (Annexation 1908)

Both primary sources have certain common elements. The first element is both shows the German and Austrian policies before the outbreak of WWI. The second similarity is in the intent with which the policies were drawn. Both policies aimed to create peace and stability in Europe. Third, both documents show a strong urge to build military alliances. Primary sources depict policies that had given rise to further animosity in Europe that eventually led to the WWI.

Evaluation of Sources

The contribution of German and Austrian policies in the outbreak of WWI can be glimpsed through the primary sources chosen for the research. The origin of both policies was with the intent to create peace and security in the European region. However, the covert intent was to gain regional power over certain regions and create strong military allies. For instance, Austria wanted to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina to fulfill their Eastern European expansion plans, while Germany wanted allies if France chose to attack it after its defeat in the Franco-Prussian war.

The sources are valuable for the purpose of this historical investigation as they show the rising hostility among nations in Europe since the mid-nineteenth century. The alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary was formed based on the similarities in ethnicity. In addition, the sources show how they might have affected the power balance in the European region. Austria and Germany’s plans to become regional powers incited their decisions to create military alliances and annexations that toppled the power balance on the continent.

Both sources are primary sources and they directly address the research questions undertaken for the investigation. However, these two are just two documents that show the policies undertaken by Germany and Austria. However, this does not show the policies undertaken by France, Russia, and Britain during which would have given a more holistic understanding of the reasons behind the outbreak of WWI.

Analysis

Since the mid-nineteenth century, forming military alliances became the source of regional power for strong nations like Germany and France. Ambitious countries like Germany, under the leadership of Otto Von Bismarck, tried to create political predominance forming leagues with other nations (Kaiser 1983). Therefore, Bismarck’s policy of German unification aimed specifically at maintaining the power balance in favor of Germany.

For this, he created an alliance block with Austria-Hungary, then with Austria-Hungary and Russia, and later with Austria-Hungary and Italy (Charmley 2013). Bismarck believed that one dominant ally would be able to control the other smaller nations within the block to control its allies to deter the balance of power in the region. The Triple Alliance of 1882 aimed to establish a power block with Austria-Hungary and Italy.

Germany’s aim was to control Austria’s policy to fight against Russia, defending the latter’s interests in southeastern Europe. The allies will join forces if France attacks any one of them. Further, if anyone of the allies is engaged in a dispute with some other nations, the other two would stay neutral. Thus, the aim was to impose German control over Austrian expansion ambitions. Austria too believed that an alliance with Germany would increase regional stability. The 1892 Franco-Russian military treaty created an atmosphere of suspicion and hostility (Mombauer 2013). The question that many historians ask is if chain-ganging has really caused wars? The answer is no (Tierney 2011).

According to the chain-ganging theory, the aim of the main ally is to ensure the survival and safeguard the interests of the minor ally. Thus, in this case, if Austria went to war with France, then Germany would follow Austria, and if Russia went to war against any of these European nations, France had to follow, or be left alone. However, the aggressor in the coalition, with strong military interests, will try to impose expansionist ideals on the coalition, and drive the alliance to war (Tierney 2011).

Thus, initially, Bismarck’s aim was to keep the peace between Austria and Italy, but as the world political scenario changed. The whole plan backfired, opening a Pandora’s box. However, the aim of the Triple Alliance became futile as Italy entered into a secret alliance with France. Later, Russia and France create an alliance. However, the political situation in the continent changed drastically as Britain, which had remained neutral until the twentieth century realized that Germany was harboring expansionist plans. Thus in 1902, Britain entered into a treaty with Japan and then in 1904 with France (Levinson 2005).

However, the alliances formed to safeguard the balance of power in the continent actually led to political destabilization. Further, the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 gave Austria the freedom to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, which escalated the Serbian crisis that ultimately paved the way for WWI. In 1908, after the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the alliance between Germany and Austria became clearer. The annexation of instigated by the fear of the rising prominence of the Young Turks.

At first, Russia was infuriated at the annexation, but Wilhelm II stood by the Austrian leadership and declared that if Russia went to war with Austria, the latter would have Germany’s support. Some historians believe that the aggressive diplomacy adopted by Germany to support its ally, Austria, pushed Russia more towards creating a rival group and fight for the Balkans. Evidently, the alliances drawn by Bismarck in the nineteenth century became the cornerstone of the German-Austrian alliance before WWI. The change in the political scenario and the rise of a power struggle in the continent was eventually responsible for the creation of a second power block that was formed to oppose the German-Austrian alliance.

Conclusion

The primary sources chosen for the investigation show that the political condition of Europe, prompted by Germany’s desire to create a balance of power in the continent. Germany wanted to dominate the power blocks and create military alliances to increase its influence in the continent. The Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 1908 causes the Balkan crisis, which eventually led to the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, initiating international tumult. Eventually, it was the struggle for power in Europe for more than three decades that led to the outbreak of WWI.

References

Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1908. Web.

Charmley, J 2013, Splendid isolation?: Britain, the balance of power and the origins of the First World War, Faber & Faber.

Geiss, I 1966, ‘The outbreak of the First World War and German war aims’, Journal of Contemporary History, vol 1, no. 3, pp. 75-91.

Gillette, A 2006, ‘Why did they fight the Great War? A multi-level class analysis of the causes of the First World War’, The History Teacher , vol 40, no. 1, pp. 45-58.

Gordon, MR 1974, ‘Domestic conflict and the origins of the First World War: The British and the German cases’, The Journal of Modern History, vol 46, no. 2, pp. 191-226.

Hart, BL 2014, A history of the First World War, Pan Macmillan, London.

Herwig, HH 2014, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918, Bloomsbury Publishing, New York.

Kaiser, DE 1983, ‘Germany and the origins of the First World War’, The Journal of Modern History, vol 55, no. 3, pp. 442-474.

Kennedy, P 2014, The war plans of the great powers (RLE the First World War): 1880-1914, Routledge, London.

Levinson, MH 2005, ‘Mapping the causes of World War I to avoid armageddon today’, ETC: A Review of General Semantics, vol 62, no. 2, pp. 157-164.

MacMillan, M 2013, The war that ended peace: how Europe abandoned peace for the First World War, Profile Books, London.

Mombauer, A 2013, ‘The Fischer Controversy, documents and the ‘truth’ about the origins of the First World War’, Journal of Contemporary History, vol 48, no. 2, pp. 290-314.

Moses, JA 2015, ‘The war guilt question: a note on politics and historiography in the Weimar Republic’, Australian Journal of Politics & History., vol 61, no. 1, pp. 128-134.

Tierney, D 2011, ‘Does chain-ganging cause the outbreak of war?’, International Studies Quarterly, vol 55, no. 2, pp. 285-304.

The Triple Alliance 1912. Web.

Introduction

The history of militia use in the USA stretches back to the very establishment of the 13 colonies in North America. The English colonists used militia units in their wars against the natives and later against the French. Militias saw plenty of action during the Anglo-French war, the Revolutionary war, the war of 1812, and the Mexican-American war. During the first three wars, despite several victories, the militia never proved itself as an effective or reliable military force.

The British army regarded the colonist militia as undisciplined rabble. Many battles during the War of 1812 were lost due to how incompetent and unreliable militia units were. However, during the Mexican-American war, the militias performed admirably, contributing greatly to many victories for the American army. One of the most successful examples was the battle at Buena Vista. The American militias were much more effective during the Mexican-American war due to improved training and discipline, the quality of high and junior commanding structure, and competent military bureaucracy. The paper will support this thesis by analyzing and comparing the battle of Buena Vista to the battle of Bladensburg.

The Pros and Cons of American Militia

American militias sometimes referred to as citizen soldiers, were men aged between 15 to 50, who volunteered to serve in the standing army in order to defend their homes, answering the president’s call, or for any other reasons. Frequently, they brought their own arms. Like all militia forces around the world, these troops had their own sets of strengths and weaknesses. The American militias were often numerous, outnumbering regular forces 5 to 1.

Their effectiveness varied from one company to another, but as a rule, they fought better if their direct interests were at stake. However, the cons usually outweighed the pros. Militias were notoriously unreliable. They were known for leaving the front after serving for 90 days, they often refused to fight outside of their own state, were fiercely independent, were notorious for lack of discipline and a coherent command structure, and were unwilling to take casualties in order to attack or defend key strategic objectives, if the odds were not heavily in their favor.

The regular military held the militias in contempt, as the units lacked the discipline, experience, and professionalism required to fight wars. Samuel Clemens, a commander of a militia company and a military officer, referred to his men as “cattle herd.” The only reason why militias saw such a wide use during all these wars was that the USA did not have a large standing army for a long time, and thus had to rely on volunteers.

The Battle of Bladensburg

The Battle of Bladensburg is considered “the greatest disgrace to American Arms.” It also highlights the classic weaknesses of a militia force. During that battle, the defenders sported around 6,000 militias from Virginia, Columbia, and Maryland, under the command of William H. Winder. They were poorly trained and equipped. In addition, they had little to no experienced veterans or officers among their ranks. This was the reason for their meager effectiveness during the battle.

Some of the militias abandoned the battle, thrown into a rout by the use of Congreve rockets by the British army. The rest received conflicting orders from the high command and fled. As a result, an almost entire host of 6,000 troops routed or retreated from the battlefield, leaving the small contingents of regular infantry and artillerymen to fend off for themselves. The British lost only around 65 soldiers killed or injured. The defenders’ losses were comparable. As a result, the British took Bladensburg without a proper fight. There are three reasons for such a poor performance by the militia:

• Poor training and discipline, which resulted in a rout when facing a rocket barrage.
• No competent officers, which resulted in a retreat when receiving conflicting orders.
• Incompetent military bureaucracy, which resulted in delivering conflicting orders.

Had the militia forces held their ground and assisted the regular detachments as they were supposed to, this victory would have been a lot more costly for the British army.

The Battle of Buena Vista

During this battle, the army of General Taylor that consisted of 4500 men, 90% of which were volunteers, faced Santa Anna’s military host of 15,000. The outcome of the battle of Buena Vista was notoriously different from the battle of Bladensburg, for several reasons. The militias in Taylor’s army were recruited for 12 months rather than three, which reflected greatly on the overall level of training received by the soldiers.

They were not a hastily assembled bunch of volunteers, but a moderately trained and organized force. This proved to be an important factor, as they faced a much larger force of Santa Anna, with over 15,000 regular troops at his disposal. The position of Taylor’s army, just like in the case with Bladensburg, favored the defenders. The soldiers were required to hold the line to make use of these advantages, which they did.

The militias fighting at Buena Vista were commanded by professional military officers. Many militia leaders have decommissioned officers trained at the military academy at West Point. They had both the respect of their fellow compatriots and the military training and skill to organize their units into coherent battle groups. This reinforced the fact that good leaders could turn regular citizens into excellent soldiers in a relatively short amount of time. The last difference between Taylor’s army and Winder’s army was in its competent military bureaucracy. Orders were accurate, supplies and ammunition were delivered on time, and the army had a coherent chain of command. To summarize, the keys to victory at Buena Vista were:

• Better training and discipline, as the troops did not rout even when facing a much larger force.
• Competent junior officers, who kept the order among the inexperienced militias during the battle.
• Competent military bureaucracy, which established a coherent chain of supplies, timely delivery of orders, and a coherent chain of command.

Conclusions

The success of the US militias during the Mexican-American war is explained by the fact that it was not, in fact, a militia in the common sense of the word. They resembled a professional army, rather than a militia force. The success at Buena Vista was not a singular example of their effectiveness in that war. The armies of General Tailor and General Scott, which were largely comprised of militias, won numerous victories before and after that battle.

The war ended with a victory for the USA, which claimed Texas and other territories as its own. The militias proved themselves so effective due to better training, better command structure, and competent military bureaucracy – something they were sorely lacking during the War of 1812.

The term “hybrid warfare” has been in use by political analysts since 2010 (with respect to the challenges faced by the US Army in Iraq). It was named in the year 2014 that the general public became aware of it as well – all due to the famed “annexation” of Crimea by Russia that took place that year. Ever since then, the Western Media have never ceased referring to the concerned development as the clearest example of what “hybrid warfare” is all about. In its turn, this causes many people to assume that the “hybrid” approach to conducting warfare is innately incompatible with the Western conceptualization of international relations, in general, and war, in particular.

What adds to the situation even further is that many political analysts in the West make a point in promoting the idea that only the “evil Russians” are capable of waging “hybrid wars” and that the collective West has never considered doing the same. For example, according to Kilinskas (2016), “Hybrid warfare is the term used by representatives of mass media, politicians, professional military personnel… to define actions of the Russian army in occupying Crimea and invading the territories of East Ukraine” (p. 139).

Nevertheless, such a practice is far from being considered thoroughly appropriate. The reason for this is apparent – as indicated by the recent outbreaks of “democratic” revolutions in Georgia, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Ukraine, the collective West is, in fact, an active practitioner of “hybrid warfare” – at least for as long as the most updated definitions of the concerned term are in question. In my paper, I will explore the validity of this suggestion at length.

One of the main problems with describing a particular geopolitical development in terms of “hybrid warfare” is that there is no universally accepted definition as to what this type of warfare is all about. To complicate the situation even further, the concerned term continues to undergo a qualitative transformation – something that causes many political analysts to doubt whether it could be considered axiomatically legitimate, in the first place.

For example, as it was initially coined up by Frank Hoffman in the mid-2000s, the definition of “hybrid warfare” implies that resorting to the “hybrid” instruments of waging war is a prerogative of the specifically non-state players in the arena of international politics. According to him, this type of warfare refers to the “threats that incorporate a full range of differ­ent modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics, and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion… conducted by a variety of non-state actors” (Wither 2016, p. 75).

The more recent definitions of the term, however, imply that the very essence of political dynamics in today’s world presupposes the eventual integration of “hybrid war” as an integral part of conducting international affairs by nation-states that compete for the same resource within a particular geostrategic niche. Stefanescu’s (2016) conceptualization of the term stands out quite illustrative in this regard, “Hybrid warfare is a war mixed with peace, where the conflict methods changed… while political, economic, informational, humanitarian and other non-military measures being involved to a greater extent. All of these can be supplemented by inciting the local population and by using armed forces in disguise” (p. 156).

The logic behind the mentioned transformation has to do with the ongoing geopolitical confrontation between the US and Russia (with its de facto ally China), which ever since 2014 continued to attain exponential momentum. Being in the possession of the “nuclear triads” (land-based nuclear missiles, nuclear submarines, and strategic bombers) of their own, both conflicting parties are in no position to declare formal war on each other because this would result in the destruction of human civilization, as we know it.

Predictably enough, this prompts them to consider challenging each other indirectly (via “proxies”), just as it used to be the case during the Cold War. What this means is that there is indeed much rationale behind the idea that the collective West is no stranger to taking practical advantage of the various “hybrid” war-waging techniques, within the context of how it strives to weaken its main geopolitical rivalries – Russia and China.

The validity of this suggestion will become especially apparent, once we highlight yet another notable aspect of the most up-to-date definitions of “hybrid warfare” – they presuppose that the organized criminal activities and media-endorsed political brainwashing are the indispensable elements of how different countries compete for the “place under the Sun” in the 21st century (Fuchs 2016). After all, the most recent escalation of political tensions in the world would not have taken place had it been not up to the Western politicians’ willingness to assume that when it comes to confronting Russia, there can be no “right” and “wrong” approaches to doing it, but only the effective and ineffective ones – hence, the above-mentioned specifics of how the West addresses the task.

As of today, it is possible to identify what have been the distinctive characteristics of the specifically Western approach to indulging in “hybrid warfare” through the last ten years. They can be outlined as the circumstantially adjusted combinations of the following:

• Direct military action (the 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO planes).
• Covert military action (using mercenaries hired by the private military contractors to topple political regimes in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine).
• Enactment of economic sanctions (enacting this type of sanctions against Russia in 2014, contrary to the provisions of international law).
• Information warfare propaganda (ensuring the ideologically biased media – coverage of the political dynamics in a particular part of the world and making up “fake news”, such as it was seen during the West’s latest attempt to spread “democracy” to Syria and Ukraine).
• Subversion (establishing the network of the Western-controlled Non-Governmental Organisations/NGOs across the world, capable of organizing the deposal of even the highest governmental officials on the locale, in case the latter refuse taking orders from their Western curators, such as it was done in 2014 in Ukraine).
• Criminal action (using the secret services to provide support to the terrorist organizations, such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, whose main task is to wreak “controlled chaos” in the resource-rich countries friendly with Russia).
• Support of local unrest (using high-ranking diplomats to intensify political tensions within a particular country, just as it was the case in Ukraine prior to the Western-endorsed seizure of political power by the armed gangs of Ukrainian nationalists in 2014).

As one can infer from what has been said earlier, there is a well-defined global dimension to how the West has been taking practical advantage of the “hybrid war” concept throughout the last decade. Nevertheless, it is specifically the 2014 “democratic” revolution in Ukraine (which in essence was just another CIA-led military coup) which appears to be the most illustrative of just about every out of the above-outlined specifics of the Western way of conducting “hybrid warfare”, with the exemption of the “direct military action”.

There is even more to it – the concerning development is consistent with what has always accounted for another unmistakably Western (more specifically Anglo-Saxon) approach to fighting its wars in different parts of the world – exploiting the local populations (primarily made up of uneducated peasants) as a “cannon fodder” during the process (Pradhan 2015).

What this means is that the ongoing civil war in Ukraine, which the Western media describe as such that has been triggered by the imaginary “Russian aggression”, is nothing by a part of the Western-led “hybrid war” against Russia that has started as early as through the 20th century’s late nineties. The same can be said about the significance of the ongoing civil war in Syria, which is essentially a “proxy war” that is taking place between Russia and the US as we speak, with the international terrorists from ISIS acting as America’s de facto allies.

After having been appointed Yeltsin’s “successor” in 1999, Vladimir Putin began to consolidate more and more political power in his hands for the purpose of restoring Russia’s former military and economic might. Simultaneously, he proceeded to apply much effort in the reestablishment of cultural, economic, and infrastructural links between the post-Soviet countries.

This move, on his part, was perceived to pose a clear and present danger to the West’s agenda of helping Russia to fall apart as a unified state, so that the broken-off segments of this country’s “body” could be “devoured” by the Western-based transnational corporations – hence, enabling citizens in Western countries to continue enjoying the world highest standards of living, without having to give much thought to what enables their continual prosperity, in the first place.

The West reacted to the threat by means of setting up an extensive network of NGOs in just about every post-Soviet country. While being formally concerned with the “promotion of democracy” and “protection of human rights”, the true purpose of these organizations’ functioning was to serve as the hubs of Western influence/espionage centers in host-countries. As Charap (2015) noted, “The main instrument of hybrid war is the notorious ‘fifth column’ of agents of influence controlled by the adversary… [Hybrid operations] involve the legitimization of anti-government political forces and a recognition of their right to represent the people who allegedly spoke out against the tyranny” (p. 51).

In this respect, the West’s ultimate objective was concerned with:

1. Ensuring that only the most corrupted and inept politicians come to power in the post-Soviet countries,
2. Inducing political and economic instability in these countries, which in turn was supposed to undermine Russia’s integrative efforts in Eurasia,
3. Promoting the idea of joining the NATO among the locals,
4. Encouraging the corrupted government officials in the newly emerged post-Soviet countries to provoke Russia economically and militarily on a constant basis.

Ukraine again stands out quite exemplary in this regard – the US top-officials have never even made a secret of their intention of keeping this country as America’s yet another “puppet state”. According to Mearsheimer (2014), “Victoria Nuland, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, estimated in December 2013 that the United States had invested more than $5 billion since 1991 to help Ukraine achieve “the future it deserves” (p. 83).

Nuland’s statement refers to the amount of money the American taxpayers had to pay, in order to have Ukraine saturated with the US-based NGOs – the actual organizers of Ukraine’s “democratic” revolution of 2014, which resulted in plunging the country into the chaos of the never-civil war ever since then.

Evidently enough, by endorsing the establishment of NGOs in the post-Soviet space, the West seeks to be able to meddle in the internal affairs of its “client states” in this specific region (to ensure the continued expansion of NATO towards Russia’s borders), without providing Russia with the formal casus belli to consider this an act of aggression and react accordingly. The “hybrid” quality of this specific approach to containing Russia, undertaken by the West, is quite apparent.

As it was implied earlier, one of the most peculiar aspects of how “hybrid wars” are being waged now these days, has to do with the conflicting parties’ willingness to resort to committing a variety of even the most despicable criminal acts while striving to undermine each other and use Media as a powerful propaganda weapon (Giegerich 2016).

The ongoing military confrontation in the Eastern part of Ukraine between the Russia-backed rebels (who refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Western-endorsed military coup of 2014) and the armed formations of Ukrainian nationalists (who aim to “cleanse” Ukraine of its Russian-speaking citizens), will again come in perfectly illustrative – specifically, with respect to the downing of the Malaysian flight MH17 over Eastern Ukraine in the summer of 2014, which resulted in the deaths of 283 innocent people.

As we well remember, within a matter of less than even a half of an hour since this plane had hit the ground, both Obama and Poroshenko (Ukraine’s President) came up with the official statements blaming Putin personally for what had happened and accusing him of having committed a “crime against humanity”. For no less than a few days after the incident, most TV-channels in the West continued to feature live coverages of the developments that followed the shooting down of the flight MH17 by “evil Russians”, with news anchors striving to convince ordinary citizens that Russia was indeed a culprit – despite the fact that even up until today there has not been procured even a single piece of evidence in support of this point of view. Then, the Media have ceased focusing on this tragic event all of a sudden, as if it turned out not to be of any importance, whatsoever.

Despite the fact that it has been more than three years now since the incident, the official investigators from the affected countries and ICAO continue to claim that they are still in the process of “collecting evidence”. Moreover, in the Netherlands (the most affected country) the preliminary investigative reports of relevance have been classified to constitute a “state secret”, with the general public being denied the right to access them (Toal & O’Loughlin 2017).

There is, however, nothing truly secretive or mysterious about the downing of MH17 – the event that proves the insightfulness of the old saying that the actual thieves are necessarily those who yell “catch the thief” the loudest. The application of the cui bono? (to whose benefit?) principle for defining the event’s cause-effect subtleties will inevitably bring one to conclude that it was named the US/West (and not Russia) that benefited the most from the destruction of the fated Malaysian plane. After all, it legitimized the American government’s intention to impose economic sanctions on Russia and served as the best argument to convince the EU countries doing the same.

Back then the Russian Media used to report sarcastically that the pilot’s last message to the ground was – “We’ve been hit by evil Putin! Enact economic sanctions against Russia at once!” Given what we know about the role that the CIA played in the downing of the Cubana de Aviación Flight 455 in 1976 (Bolender 2010), it is indeed thoroughly appropriate to suggest that the concerned tragic episode should be seen indicative of the West’s ability to resort to even the most morally despicable means of waging “hybrid war” on Russia, in full accordance with Realist take on the essence of international politics.

I believe that the deployed line of argumentation in defense of the idea that the new “Cold War” that is being currently waged by the collective West on Russia is an essential “hybrid”, correlates well with the paper’s initial thesis. It appears that the Russians have come to recognize the “hybrid” nature of their confrontation with the West as well – hence, the sheer effectiveness of Russia’s asymmetric responses to be provoked by the former. There are many reasons to believe that as time goes on, the West will continue to sustain more and more setbacks within the context of how it conducts “hybrid warfare” against its main geopolitical adversary. This, however, would be the subject of a separate discussion.

References

Bolender, K 2010, Voices from the other side: an oral history of terrorism against Cuba, Pluto Press.

Charap, S 2015, ‘The ghost of hybrid war’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 6, pp. 51-58.

Fuchs, G 2016, ‘Hybrid warfare – identifying the cause of potential conflict is important – not the ways and means?’, Online Journal Modelling the New Europe, vol. 2, no. 21, pp. 77-96.

Giegerich, B 2016, ‘Hybrid warfare and the changing character of conflict’, Connections: The Quarterly Journal, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 65-72.

Kilinskas, K 2016, ‘Hybrid warfare: An orientating or misleading concept in analysing Russia’s military actions in Ukraine?’, Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 139-158.

Mearsheimer, J 2014, ‘Why the Ukraine crisis is the West’s fault: the Liberal delusions that provoked Putin’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 93, no. 5, pp. 77-89.

Pradhan, R 2015, ‘Russo-American engagement in Ukraine: Geopolitics at work’, IUP Journal of International Relations, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 7-20.

Toal, G & O’Loughlin, J 2017, ‘Why did MH17 crash? Blame attribution, television news and public opinion in Southeastern Ukraine, Crimea and the de facto states of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria’, Geopolitics, vol. 5, no. 4, pp. 1-35.

Wither, J 2016, ‘Making sense of hybrid warfare’, Connections: The Quarterly Journal, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 73-87.

The causes of a civil war can vary. As Collier and Hoeffler (2007, p. 8) point out, the major reasons include the level, growth, and structure of income. Growth collapses often cause civil wars, while the growth of the income reduces the possibility of war. Ndulu et al. (2015) notice, growth collapse in Africa in 1990s produced conditions for rebellion, namely extreme poverty and government dysfunction.

Specific resources and channels can also influence the probability of rebellion. Rebel groups in Sierra Leone were diamond-financed, and other groups used oil as a source as well. The next channel is the rebellions’ desire to capture the rents (Collier & Hoeffler 2007, p. 10). The third channel is the government’s remoteness from the population. In countries with rich resources, governments do not have to be close to their populations because they do not need to tax them (Collier & Hoeffler 2007, p. 10). The recourses’ influence on the civil wars and governments is supported by Ross (2004, p. 347). He claims that “natural resource revenues can, ironically, weaken governments – making them less likely to resolve social conflicts” (Ross 2004, p. 347).

Furthermore, if a government has its revenues from natural resources, it is more likely to be more corrupt. Poverty rates also raise because the government provides little help in healthcare and education of citizens (Ross 2004, p. 341). The abundance of resources can also lead to secessionist movements, just as it was in Aceh in 1976. The establishment of a natural gas plant resulted in social issues such as disproportion in jobs, problems with health among locals, and immigration (Ross 2004, p. 347).

Other main causes of civil wars are ethnic differences and religious beliefs. Religious polarization and animist diversity are the key concepts to explain probable incidents of civil wars (Reynal-Querol 2002, p. 52). Moreover, it should be noted that religious differences are often more influential than linguistic ones. Religious polarization has more potential to cause a civil war (Reynal-Querol 2002, p. 52). At last, a democratic government can reduce the chance of a civil war.

Ethnic identities of individuals can also influence the spread of violence and the possibility of a civil war. Since multiple actors construct ethnic identities, the changing values and beliefs influence ethnic conflicts. Nevertheless, they are not always driven by religious differences (Fearon & Latin, 2000, p. 860). Ethnicity and political grievances are complex combinations. They often drive a country towards civil war (Wucherpfennig et al. 2012, p. 81).

It should also be noted that the influence of civil war on the self-perception of ethnic groups is rather evident. For example, “ethno-nationalism increases with the experience of armed ethnic conflict” (Dyrstad 2012, p. 818).

Therefore, even if ethnic identities are shaped before the conflict, they tend to change during and after it. Civil wars are usually fought between governments or organized groups rather than between individuals (Buhaug, Cederman & Gleditsch 2014, p. 422; ). As can be seen, civil wars are shaped by multiple factors and have a significant influence on ethnic identity.

Reference List

Buhaug, H, Cederman, L, & Gleditsch K 2014, ‘Square pegs in round holes: inequalities, grievances, and civil war’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 58, no. 2, pp. 418-431.

Collier, P, Hoeffler, A & Rohner, D 2009, ‘Beyond greed and grievance: feasibility and civil war’, Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 61, no.1, pp.1-27.

Dyrstad, K 2012, ‘After ethnic civil war: ethno-nationalism in the Western Balkans’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 49, no. 6, pp. 817-831.

Fearon, J & Laitin, D 2000, ‘Violence and the social construction of ethnic identity’, International Organization, vol. 54, no.4, pp. 845-877.

Ndulu, B, O’Connell, S, Azamm J, Bates, R, Fosu, A & Nijinkeu, D 2015, The political economy of economic growth in Africa, 1960-2000, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Reynal-Querol, M 2002, ‘Ethnicity, political systems, and civil wars’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 46, no.1, pp. 29-54.

Ross, M 2004, ‘What do we know about natural resources and civil war?’, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 41, no.3, pp. 337-356.

Wucherpfennig, J, Metternich, N, Cederman, L & Gleditsch, K 2012, ‘Ethnicity, the state, and the duration of civil war’, World Politics, vol. 64, no.1, pp. 79-115.

Introduction

Throughout this week’s reading, the discussion focused on the topic of war and how it was perceived through political and theoretical perspectives. In this paper, three articles will be reviewed and analyzed to determine the authors’ views on the nature of war and theories that could explain the reasons behind it. Articles included in the analysis are “Offense, Defense, and Causes of War” by Van Evera, “Domestic Politics and War” by Levy, and “The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace” by Levy; all present unique perspectives on the topic of war and contain insightful research that will be analyzed further.

“Offense, Defense, and Causes of War”

Van Evera came up with a list of ten war-causing effects, which, when combined, present an offense-defense theory that could give a profound explanation to the nature of war and its outcomes across such domains as military and foreign policy, as well as crisis diplomacy. The author suggested that due to the wide explanatory range of the offense-defense theory, it was possible to determine how intervening phenomena such as expansionism, arms races, first-strike, move advantage, and others were “war causes in their own right” (Van Evera 41). Some of the most noteworthy explanations for the nature of war include; “empires are easier to conquer,” “states negotiate less readily and cooperatively,” “offense dominance is self-feeding,” “arms racing is faster and harder to control” (Van Evera 6). The greatest strength of the proposed theory to explain the causes of war is its simplicity and the applicability to real-world events such as World War I. Also, it is essential to mention that the offense-defense theory is utilitarian and takes into consideration the direct effects of war on military and national policies of entities involved in warfare (Van Evera 11). On the other hand, there is a weakness that prompts the further exploration of the theory. For instance, despite providing a satisfying explanation for the causes of war, the theory fails to explain why the majority of entities that participated in wars only placed importance on offense rather than defense, contributing to the exaggeration of aggressive military actions.

“Domestic Politics and War”

Levy aimed to explore the role of domestic political variables in facilitating war due to the gap in the available studies that predominantly focused on isolated hypotheses of a non-cumulative and atheoretical nature. The author argued that there was a need in recognizing the role that domestic factors played in contributing to the war to strengthen the validity of the proposed theories (Levy, “Domestic Politics and War” 653). Therefore, Levy explored connections between war behaviors of countries and their national attributes such as democratic/non-democratic regimes, liberal/Marxist theories, the prevalence of nationalism, and so on (“Domestic Politics and War” 654). In the article, the critique of historians’ neglect of societal variables was presented to emphasize the fact that the frequencies of entities involved in the war, by and large, depended on a broad spectrum of attributes about culture, ideology, and even religion. This suggestion can lead to the conclusion that some countries had been more involved in military action than others due to their desire to exhibit nationalistic ideas (e.g., Germany in World War II) or any other social characteristics.

The key strength of Levy’s argument laid out in the article “Domestic Politics and War” is associated with the author managing to point out the disadvantages in the existing political science literature on the topic of war. It was concluded that the lack of support for the relationship between war and domestic policies did not align with the specific case studies of different foreign conflicts that historians had previously explored (Levy, “Domestic Politics and War” 672). Also, the author mentioned that the lack of evidence could be attributed to the absence of a coherent and well-developed theoretical explanation that should guide empirical research on the topic. However, there was a prominent weakness in the article; Levy did not propose a solution that could be implemented for reducing the gap in research and developing a theoretic framework that could have strengthened the role of domestic policies in contributing to foreign conflicts.

In comparing Levy’s approach in this article to Van Evera’s findings, it is evident that the latter proposed a definite theory that could be used for explaining heated foreign conflicts. Levy, on the other hand, critiqued such theories for the lack of attention to specific cases that could explain better whether domestic policies played any role in facilitating war or contributing to it. Also, the differentiation between the two approaches is quite clear: while Levy tried to underline the role of domestic policies and social determinants, Van Evera placed higher importance on foreign policies that could have led nations to be more susceptible to participate in the war.

“The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace”

In another article, Levy reviewed and assessed the available literature on the cause of war with the focus on “power theories, power transition theories, the relationship between economic interdependence and war” (“The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace” 139). The author’s task was complicated due to the wide diversity of existing perspectives on the origins of war and peace; therefore, it was chosen to only select the leading theories and trends in the field, avoiding focusing on postmodern or feminist approaches. During the review and analysis of literature, the author concluded that there were some significant shifts in trends and paradigms that explained the nature of war. For instance, it was concluded that there had been a move from a focus on great power toward an interest in smaller (civil or ethnonational) conflicts.

Also, the author underlined the fact that the available research recognized a need for studying societal-level explanatory variables and their role in contributing to war (Levy, “The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace” 160). Thus, there was a noticeable decline in interest in the bipolar structure of the Cold War and an increase in attention to smaller and less politically stable nations that participate in ethnonational conflicts. It is also important to mention that the author found an increase in the complexity of the causes of war and the willingness of historians to pay more attention to developing models that could explain such a complexity. A significant strength of the article was that Levy concluded that theorists paid more attention to exploring interaction effects between different variables in the processes that occurred in periods leading to war (“The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace” 160). On the other hand, it could have been more effective if the author focused on a smaller number of theories and approaches and explored them in-depth rather than including a broad range of trends.

Comparing this article to the ones analyzed previously, it is important to mention that Levy’s approach in “The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace” was much broader than that in “Domestic Politics and War.” For instance, in the 1988 article, the author pointed out the gap in the research literature with regards to the connections between foreign conflicts and domestic policies while the 1998 article included clear praise in the improvement of historians’ coverage of war-related theories and underlined their desire to examine less generalized approaches. About the comparison of Van Evera’s article and Levy’s approach toward explaining the reasons behind warfare, it is evident that “Offense, Defense, and Causes of War” was more generalized and proposed an offense-defense theory that was predominantly focused on external affairs of powerful nations.

Conclusion

The analysis of these three articles showed that the theorists took different approaches toward explaining the reasons behind wars. This paper provided a discussion of Levy’s and Van Evera’s key arguments and pointed out the strengths and weaknesses of their positions regarding the exploration of the nature of war. In the first article, Van Evera made a point to present a specific theory that could explain why wars occurred. In the second article, Levy criticized the use of generalized and broad theories for exploring the causes of armed conflicts. In the third article, Levy concluded that there was an improvement in available research on the topic and a significant shift in focus from large armed conflicts between power nations toward exploring smaller ethnonational conflicts.

Works Cited

Levy, Jack. “Domestic Politics and War.” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, vol. 18, no. 4, 1988, pp. 653-673.

Levy, Jack. “The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace.” Annual Review of Political Science, vol 1, 1998, pp. 139-165.

Van Evera, Stephen. “Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War.” International Security, vol. 22, no. 4, 1998, pp. 5-43.

Strategic Context and Goals

The United States’ involvement in the military conflict in Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s occurred because of the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, two massively powerful states that were fighting to exert their sphere of influence on a global scale at the time. As the communist regime began to strengthen in Vietnam, along with the threat that the entire country might become united under a communist leader, the United States felt compelled to intervene. The entire situation was complex from a strategic point of view because the ultimate goal of the leadership in countries worldwide was to avoid the eruption of another world war. Thus, any state gaining new allies and seeking to spread its political ideology was immediately perceived as a global threat as well as an aggressor attempting to establish world domination.

To weaken the developing communist regime in Vietnam, US leadership created a complex military operation known as Rolling Thunder.¹ The plan for this operation involved conducting a series of bombings against vital strategic and infrastructure targets in North Vietnam, where the communist regime was in place.² The aerial attacks were anticipated to slow down and weaken the communist leaders of North Vietnam by showing them that they would pay a devastating price for continuing their effort to unite the country under a communist ruler.

The Operation Design

Rolling Thunder was known as one of the most significant failures in terms of warfare for the civilian and military leadership during the Vietnam War. The operation was designed by such conflict-based theories as “graduated escalation” and “flexible response.”³ However, despite the thorough planning and resources involved, the operation never managed to achieve the planners’ anticipated results. This failure was mainly caused by the fact that neither of the aforementioned principles (flexibility and gradual escalation) was followed properly. As a result, the use of aerial power did not produce the desired response from the leadership of North Vietnam.

Another significant part of the operational design was a strategic analysis of the enemy’s capacity and will to withstand attacks.⁴ In turn, errors in analysis led to inadequate expectations and flawed planning. Moreover, from the beginning, several different groups of military and civilian leaders were engaged in the operation as commanders. Based on their differences in views, vision, and training, the leaders began to disagree. Consequently, the development of the operation was heavily influenced by the differing aims resulting from the leaders’ perspectives. Also, it is important to notice that, according to the design for accountability in Rolling Thunder, the military leaders who operated directly in Vietnam or who had a clear idea of the events that were unraveling in the war zone had to answer to and were strictly controlled by civilian leaders who remained in the United States, in the White House and congressional halls.

The Course of Action and Choices

As mentioned previously, the selected course of action for Rolling Thunder was a lengthy and sustained series of airstrikes aimed at vital strategic targets in North Vietnam and Laos. The bombings were mainly focused on what came to be known as the Ho Chi Minh trail, an essential logistical system that provided supplies for the army of North Vietnam.⁵ President Lyndon Johnson, the leader of the United States at the time, saw the entire campaign as a way to negotiate peace with North Vietnam. In practical terms, his vision was based on the idea that the airstrikes that were part of Rolling Thunder and other air warfare operations would pressure North Vietnam to give up its positions and motivate South Vietnam to fight communism and corruption.⁶ President Johnson was convinced that airstrikes were the best choice of means and strategy for an operation dedicated to establishing American will in the region.

The other option for the United States in terms of conducting military operations in North Vietnam was an engagement in intense on-land warfare and an assault on the enemy’s territories.⁷ However, the major problem with this solution was an increased possibility of a response from three allies—two of them powerful—of North Vietnam: the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. Should these allies be provoked, a confrontation could easily grow into a massive military conflict of a global character—an unwanted scenario for the United States. As a result, US leaders focused on what they perceived as a faster way to compel the government of North Vietnam to surrender or abandon their plans without disrupting any domestic campaigns.

Assumptions of the Leaders

One of the main assumptions made by the United States government, as well as many of the military leaders who were operating in Vietnam, concerned the military might, capacity, and will of their enemy. In particular, US leaders were convinced that in conducting warfare in Vietnam, their forces faced a much weaker and less-capable adversary. As a result, the leaders did not give much consideration to the operation in terms of a potential strategic response on the part of North Vietnam or its endurance. Initially, Rolling Thunder was planned to span less than 30 days; however, the decision was made to extend the operation, and in the end, it lasted three months.⁸ In reality, the US leaders’ estimations and expectations turned out to be wrong as the overall military campaign continued for years without bringing any successful results.

Based on the failure of Rolling Thunder to achieve any of the essential elements of a successful airstrike operation, it is possible to conclude that an inappropriate perception of the enemy’s military capacity led to mistakes. In other words, such critical-for-success components as flexibility, the element of surprise, and the gradual concentration of forces heavily depended on assumptions made about the enemy’s power and ability to withstand attacks. Initially underestimating the military forces of North Vietnam later jeopardized the sophistication of plans.

Factors Considered during Operation Planning

In the planning of Rolling Thunder, the condition of North Vietnam’s allies (as mentioned, the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea) was taken into account as an important factor impacting the scale of attacks, meaning the operation had to be carried out in a way that would not provoke the allies to become involved. Also, US leadership was convinced that the logistics of the planned airstrikes had been properly taken into consideration and corresponded with the potential movements and strategies of enemy forces. In effect, the entire campaign pursued political rather than military goals.⁹

Consequently, political and social realities in all the involved states were taken into account as well. Specifically, attempting to avoid provocation that could lead to the engagement of more countries in the conflict, the military and civilian leaders in charge of the operation had to make decisions, some of which included the use of foreign military bases (in Thailand, for example) and the schedule of attacks while the leaders of allied states visited the capital of North Vietnam.

The weather was another important factor to consider because Rolling Thunder began during the onset of the region’s monsoon season, making it impossible for airplanes to navigate the sky over Vietnam. Furthermore, following a strategy based on a gradual escalation of attacks, President Johnson reviewed several first strikes known as operations Flaming Dart I and II. Seeing the resulting lack of success and the overall minor damage done to the enemy, the US president decided to move on to a more vigorous phase that would involve launching larger strikes.

Execution of the Operation and Key Decisions

As the number and magnitude of airstrikes on various targets in North Vietnam rose, US leadership decided to reduce the publicity of their actions to avoid the negative response they feared from the Soviet Union, North Korea, and China and to present US military operations as necessary but not extraordinary measures.¹⁰ Another key decision that took place during the increased concentration of airstrikes was aimed at significant changes in the purpose of the overall campaign. To be more precise, the initial goal of Rolling Thunder was to demonstrate US intentions to support South Vietnam and curb the military effort of North Vietnam. Over time, US authorities decided that their key goal should be to cut supplies and reinforcements for North Vietnam to pressure its leaders into peace negotiations.¹¹

Restricting the scale of air warfare became the first reason that US leadership began to experience disagreement. Specifically, since the operation initially revolved around achieving political goals through military action, two groups of authorities were involved. Military leaders operating in Vietnam saw that the enemy was managing to absorb the airstrikes and quickly recuperate. As a result, they expressed criticism of the intentionally limited scale of attacks. The civilian leaders, however, were more afraid of provoking additional international conflicts than they were motivated to stop the expansion of North Vietnam southward.¹² Therefore, the decision to increase airstrikes to achieve the desired level of impact was never made, and the entire operation failed to proceed as planned.

Key Factors that Contributed to Operation Failure

Operation Rolling Thunder is known as one of the most massive aerial bombing campaigns in the history of warfare. However, regardless of its length, might, and the number of people and amount of combat equipment involved, the operation was a huge failure. Initially, the planners of Rolling Thunder were optimistic about its course, but in the end, most of their prospects and calculations contained critical errors that influenced the success of the operation.

The major factor affecting the planning of the operation was the US authorities’ flawed understanding of their enemy. In terms of military capacity and the will to fight, North Vietnam was perceived as a weak rival having limited resources, a foe that would be defeated quickly and easily. The American leaders focused on the belief that the mere initiation of military action in the territory of Vietnam would allow the US government to compel the communist leaders to give up and end their expansion to the south. As a result, the first airstrikes were relatively minor and had almost no impact. The following increase in the magnitude and frequency of strikes had to be hidden from the public eye due to the US leaders’ desire to avoid the escalation of armed conflict. However, the increased might of attacks also failed to bring results.

The dissent that followed multiple restrictions of military actions divided the US authorities in charge of Rolling Thunder into two groups: those who advocated for a more aggressive military effort and those who opposed such an effort due to political pressures. The leaders had the final say in the operation exerted their control from afar and lacked the appropriate practical knowledge and military training. Due to these key factors, Rolling Thunder continued for two-and-a-half years instead of the earlier-anticipated three months.

The Failure to Meet the Strategic Objectives

Operation Rolling Thunder’s strategic objectives were never met. The operation consumed numerous resources. It lasted much longer than expected and resulted not only in the loss of military significance for the United States but also damaged the reputation of its leaders as the protectors of democratic values and freedoms in general. From the beginning, the engagement of the American forces in the war and the initiation of the airstrikes that made up Rolling Thunder led to multiple public and policy-related protests all around the world.

Convinced that their plan was going to succeed in curbing the aggression of North Vietnam and its communist expansion to the south, US authorities continued the operation past its original termination date. Seeing that its impact was less than anticipated, the authorities were forced to introduce changes throughout Rolling Thunder. However, due to the political nature and purposes of the operation, its targets, structure, and magnitude were severely restricted. Furthermore, the enemy’s forces and military capacity were significantly underestimated. As a result, North Vietnam was able to absorb the airstrikes with minor losses while continuing its expansion.

The Balance of Ends, Ways, and Means

The desired outcomes of the operation—its ends—aimed at achieving the capitulation of North Vietnamese forces and stimulating the South Vietnamese authorities to fight the communist regime to their north. The ways involved in Rolling Thunder included the actions carried out to achieve the aforementioned goals. Finally, it means included the resources available during the operation. Analyzing the balance of the three elements, it is possible to conclude that the operation’s ends and means were mostly balanced as the US had much military power and could break the course of events in Vietnam. However, the ways of this operation were its major limitation as to how Rolling Thunder was conducted led to its lack of political and military impact.

Most importantly, US military and civilian leaders were aware of the restrictions of the means from the time of the planning stages of the operation. However, this knowledge did not stop them from executing the plan due to the major underestimation of North Vietnam’s readiness to withstand a military confrontation against an opponent as mighty as the United States. In their planning for the potential outcomes of Rolling Thunder, the American leaders failed to take into account the fact that their enemy might successfully predict the political pressure the US would face and the degree to which a negative response could restrict their military actions.

Bibliography

Frankum, Ronald Bruce. Like Rolling Thunder: The Air War in Vietnam, 1964-1975. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005.

Polmar, Norman, and Edward J. Marolda. Naval Air War: The Rolling Thunder Campaign. Washington: Department of the Navy, 2015.

Van Staaveren, Jacob. Gradual Failure: The Air War over North Vietnam 1965–1966. Washington: United States Air Force, 2002.

White, Duglas M. “Rolling Thunder to Linebacker: U.S. Fixed Wing Survivability over North Vietnam.” MA thesis, United States Naval Academy, 2014.

Wilson, Stephen W. “Taking Clodfelter One Step Further: Mass, Surprise, Concentration, and the Failure of Operation Rolling Thunder.” Air Power History 48 (2001): 40-47.

Footnotes

1. Duglas M. White, “Rolling Thunder to Linebacker: U.S. Fixed Wing Survivability over North Vietnam” (MA thesis, United States Naval Academy, 2014), 9.
2. Norman Polmar and Edward J. Marolda, Naval Air War: The Rolling Thunder Campaign (Washington: Department of the Navy, 2015), 1.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Stephen W. Wilson, “Taking Clodfelter One Step Further: Mass, Surprise, Concentration, and the Failure of Operation Rolling Thunder,” Air Power History 48 (2001): 42.
7. Polmar and Marolda, Naval Air War, 1.
8. Wilson, Taking Clodfelter One Step Further, 43.
9. Jacob Van Staaveren, Gradual Failure: The Air War over North Vietnam 1965–1966 (Washington: United States Air Force, 2002), 24.
10. Ronald Bruce Frankum, Like Rolling Thunder: The Air War in Vietnam, 1964-1975 (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 24.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., 25.

The work provides a consistent assessment of the Second World War’s vanity through the analysis of reports, which were recounted by the activist of the time. First, the story by the American-Japanese, Yuri Kochiyama, Then Came the War, recount’s the author’s personal experience of an immigrant, who was discriminated during the war, according to his ethnicity. Mainly, the writing describes the outbreak of military actions in the world and their influence on the citizens of the USA. Kochiyama represents the cruel arrest of his father, who was sick, which inflicted his death. Moreover, he dwells on the hardness of living in detention camps, which were allocated to the government for the purpose of keeping all Japanese in one place.

The recurrent stylistic coloring, which is given to the words “I was red, white, and blue,” reflects the central theme of the work (Zinn and Arnove 360). The author hints at racial diversity and discloses one of the most critical problems of the American culture – discrimination and inequality.

The terrifying detailed of the last years of the Second World War are described by the Japanese activist, Yamaoka Michiko, in the story Eight Hundred Meters from the Hypocenter. In this work, the author recollects the tragic incident of the USA military forces throwing a bomb on the Japanese district. The consequences, which were inflicted by the event, included hundreds of deaths as well as the complete destruction of multiple buildings. Michiko, who was a young girl, received some face injuries, which distorted her appearance. The author also claims that there was no help from the government of the country to the injured citizens. Therefore, the primary motif of the story concerns the idea that the Second World War introduced much hardness for the global citizens, for the individual authorities could not cope with the management of the situation.

The third story, which was provided by Gene, The Good War, reflects the opposition between the American government and Japan from the perspective of the U.S. Navy admiral. The author states that one of the major attacks of the Japanese occurred in Pearl Harbor, where the American was situated. The admiral recollects that the representatives of the U.S. military forces were extremely skeptic about the Japanese as the nation and a political leader. Therefore, the powerful bombing, which came from the side of Japan, was expected to be quickly neutralized. However, the assumption was faulty, for the attacking forces brought much damage to the U.S. Navy. In this context, Gene regards the issue of national identification and prejudice. He states that the Native Americans have always treated the other communities with inferiority. It was believed that the representatives of the white race could not be treated in the same way as the so-called “browned” Japanese. Therefore, the report certifies the idea of discrimination being one of the foundations of the military activities of America.

The issue, which unites all of the reviewed stories, is the problem of inequality. The writings provide a perfect description of the way, in which discrimination may influence military actions as well as initiate oppositions between the nations. The concern might be linked to some contemporary situations. For instance, racism proceeds to flourish in the settings of multiple American states. The experts argue that the huge gap between the U.N. Convention and the reality, which is faced by the residents of black districts, differs. Therefore, one may deduce that inequality is an eternal problem of the cross-cultural societies (Bhatnagar par. 3).

Works Cited

Bhatnagar, Chandra. The U.S. Record on Racial Discrimination is on the Whole World’s Agenda. 2014. Web.

Zinn, Howard and Anthony Arnove. Voices of a People’s History of the United States. 2^nd ed. 2009. New York: Seven Stories Press. Print.

Leaders should not be followed blindly since they are not always right. For example, Adolf Hitler believed that German Jews had to be persecuted for a decade, and he sponsored the persecution. He had his reasons for doing that but his followers just carried out the orders without any much of a thought. People need to consider their actions even if the orders are usually communicated by the superiors. The non-Jews could prevent Hitler’s actions if only they had not followed orders blindly.

Inhumane acts should not be carried out when trying to punish those who people believe that they are in the wrong. The way the Jews were killed increased their pain and suffering since Hitler wanted to use slow death as a means of persecuting the German Jews (Kershaw 48). The horrible things done to innocent people explain the level of inhumanity that people carry out during wars. For example, nuns would be raped; mass massacres perpetrated in horrible ways such as making the Jews dig their graves and killing them right next to the graves (Kershaw 65).

Lack of understanding among humankind brings war to the people. The Japanese bombed Hawaii killing so many people and destroying the United States military and naval forces. This happened at a time when peace negotiations seemed to be taking place extremely well. The Japanese seemed to be hypocritical since they carried out the attacks that showed a well-planned exercise (Johnson 44). If the Japanese had relied on the negotiations, the situation would not have worsened. The same thing could have solved the German Jews’ question. If Hitler and his men would have understood that Jews were also human beings, they could not have persecuted them (Hitler 43).

Revenge seems to be a source of satisfaction for humankind. For example, in the United States’ problem with the Japanese people, most Americans felt the need to revenge the attacks. Japanese had provoked the Americans by bombing most of the Pacific areas and the American people believed that they would reiterate and ensure that such a thing never happened again. Also, in the case of Hitler, those offended felt the need to revenge against the perpetrators of the crime. People usually feel some form of satisfaction after revenge.

The effects of war do not only affect the war-torn regions, rather, but it also affects the world as a whole. Most people think that the effects can only be seen in the regions that carry out the fights. The author of the issue of German Jews, the results got disastrous for the whole world due to deportations, the mass execution of populations, and the general effects of war on the economy as a whole. Whenever some countries fight against each other, the rest of the world gets a negative impact from such a war (Haugen 87).

Lastly, there is a need to find alternative ways of solving conflicts apart from fighting against each other. The writer of the article about the persecution of the Jews expressed the need to find a mode of talking it out instead of fighting. He suggested that talking could deter Hitler and his people from the homicide mania. Also, he suggested that diplomatic ways could be used to solve conflict issues. Tribunals could be set up to find alternative ways of solving the issues affecting the Jews and Christians. This way, people’s rights should be respected, and liberty will prevail among the nations (Schramm 23).

Works Cited

Haugen, Brenda. Adolf Hitler: Dictator of Nazi Germany. New York: Compass Point Books, 2006. Print.

Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf: My Struggle. New York: Fredonia Classics, 2003. Print.

Johnson, Michael P. Reading the American Past, Volume II: From 1865: Selected Historical Document. New York: Cengage Learning. Print.

Kershaw, Ian. Hitler: A Biography. London: W.W. Norton & Co., 2010. Print.

Hitler: 1936-45 : nemesis.

Kershaw, Ian. Allen Lane History Series. London: Penguin, 2001. Print.

Schramm, Percy Ernst. Hitler: the man and the military leader. New York: Routldge, 1986. Print.

In early Chinese thought, much attention was dedicated to the issue of was and righteous approaches to it. The philosophers of the late Spring and Autumn, as well as those of Warring States eras, realized the need to put an end to the constantly growing anarchic atmosphere through some wise methods. The 100 Schools thinkers considered it significant to discuss the impact of violence on people’s relationships. As a result, the major political and social philosophies that appeared during this period pay much attention to war. History experts identify two principal views of that time. The first one supported a realist stance and considered war as a practical policy instrument. The second approach viewed war as an immoral and unwise way of settling conflicts and found it acceptable only under some particular conditions.

The first view, which saw war as an instrument of policy, was favored by the Shang kings who were eventually defeated by Zhou people. The last Shang king was known for his cruelty and greed. Therefore, he employed war methods not with righteous objectives but with the aim of gaining more land and power.¹ A “monstrous caricature” of vice and lust, the last Shang king was the creator of nefarious tortures who enjoyed orgies and would not refuse from using monstrous methods in regulating conflicts.² Once, the king cut open his adviser’s body in order to see whether his heart had seven apertures.³ Thus, the story of the Shang kings is one of the many examples of considering war as an effective instrument of policy. It is obvious that it was not effective since people were not satisfied with such leaders, and no benefits for the state could be gained in such a way.

The opposite view was associated with tolerating war only under certain circumstances. An example of such an attitude is the fight between the Shang people and Zhou people. The latter became involved in war because they were trying to defend their own land.⁴ The justification of such wars was in the “moral differential” between the rivals.⁵ Most of all, there was a great difference between the leaders’ moral nature. The supporters of the second approach were not apt to act cruelly. They only wanted to defend the weaker or not let the enemies take what did not belong to them. Basically, the two approaches to war were the opposition between virtue and vice. Those who initiated wars expressed cruelty and lust. Those who considered war as something immoral engaged in it only when it came to defending justice.

In ancient China, there was a distinction between the understanding of just or righteous war (jus ad bellum) and just or righteous conduct in war (jus in bello).⁶ Jus ad bellum presupposed the use of force is necessary in cases when it is not possible to resolve a conflict in a virtuous way. In ancient China, righteousness was employed to control the justice. However, when it was impossible to reach the expected political and moral goals through virtue, authority came into action. Since authority could not appear from harmony, it necessitated the initiation of war. Thus, in ancient China, it killing people was considered acceptable if it was an unavoidable constituent of reaching peace. It was allowed to attack other states if one’s own state or people were under threat. Finally, if war was the only available option of ending another war, it was also permissible. However, even if war was approved, there were certain rules – jus in bello – that outlined the righteous conduct during the armed conflict.

There were certain things that soldiers could not do if they wanted their war to be regarded as an endeavor for reaching peace and justice. Upon entering the territory of their enemy, they could not violate its gods or destroy buildings. It was also forbidden to take domestic animals or hunt wild ones and cut down trees. Warriors also could not demolish barricades or set fire to any buildings in the offender’s state. When a soldier met children or old people, he should not cause them any harm. When warriors encountered adults who were not soldiers, they should not consider them as enemies. If one noticed an injured representative of the enemy’s army, he was supposed to give him medical aid and let him go or take him to his army.⁷ According to Sima Fa, it was crucial for the leaders to analyze the situation thoroughly before initiating or getting engaged in war. Whenever possible, it had to be avoided because it was bound to bring devastation and depression. At the same time, however, Sima Fa declared that no one should forget about was altogether, and it was necessary to remain cautious at all times.

Therefore, the concept of righteous war in ancient China presupposed adherence to certain principles and regulations. War was justified only in certain cases and under specific circumstances. At the same time, it was considered as necessary not to lose one’s alertness and remain cautious of one’s possible enemies all the time.

Bibliography

Graff, David. “The Chinese Concept of Righteous War.” In The Prism of Just War: Asian and Western Perspectives on the Legitimate Use of Military Force, edited by Howard M. Hensel, 195-216. New York: Routledge, 2016.

Footnotes

1. David Graff, “The Chinese Concept of Righteous War,” in The Prism of Just War: Asian and Western Perspectives on the Legitimate Use of Military Force, edited by Howard M. Hensel (New York: Routledge, 2016), 195.
2. Graff, “The Chinese Concept,” 195.
3. Ibid., 195.
4. Ibid., 195.
5. Ibid., 196.
6. Ibid., 206.
7. Ibid., 207.

Introduction

The Second World War began on September 1^st, 1939, after Germany invaded Poland (Bercuson 152). As a result, Britain and France declared war on Germany two days later. Canada, which had been an ally of Britain, was also not left behind. Seven days after the German invasion, her parliament also declared war on Germany, the first war the country had ever participated in after becoming an independent state (Byers 12). This marked the beginning of Canada’s involvement in the most brutal war ever recorded in history. This paper will critically analyze Canada’s essential participation in the Second World War as an ally of Britain.

The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan

The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan was an agreement signed between Australia, UK, Canada, and New Zealand on December 17th, 1939 (Hatch & Hillmer, 2007). The program was one of Canada’s critical contributions to the victory of the allies in the Second World War. As stated by Hatch and Hillmer (2007), this operation, which was conducted until March 31st, 1945, was referred to as the Aerodrome of Democracy by President Roosevelt. Canada provided a good atmosphere for the program since it had a large air space for training located far from the enemy (the Germans), excellent weather conditions, quick access to the US industry, and its closeness to Europe through the North Atlantic shipping lanes (Hatch & Hillmer, 2007).

Having been an effective training and recruitment ground for the British in the First World War, the British government hoped that the same relationship would continue during World War II. However, negotiating this deal was complicated. In the end, Canada agreed to meet all the financial costs for the plan. Still, it insisted that Britain agree that the air training program would prioritize all other aspects of the Canadian efforts during the war. The training program began in April 1949, and it was a success having a total of 131,553 graduates constituting of pilots, navigators, bombers, and flight engineers who participated actively during the war that saw the fall of Germany (Hatch & Hillmer, 2007).

The Merchant Navy

Another Canadian contribution towards the victory of the allies during the Second World War was its merchant navy. From a humble beginning in 1939, the merchant navy of Canada grew rapidly in size and number. The navy faced fierce confrontations from the Germans and their U-boats who had taken control of the Atlantic Ocean between North America and the United Kingdom, making the transportation of food, machinery, and other necessary equipment for the allies from North America to Europe to become a dangerous exercise. The Canadian navy suffered heavy losses by losing 1,500 sailors’ lives, while 198 were captured and became prisoners (Ridler 11). This was because the nation was not prepared for modern warfare, sea included. They were using outdated ships, and the crew was poorly trained.

In response, Canada increased the number of recruits in the army. These recruits were composed of able-bodied who were intelligent and had the naval experience. This saw a rise in the number and size of the merchant navy. Canada also started a shipbuilding program. At the beginning of the war, Canada only had four shipyards and nine berths able to service 10,000-tonne ships. By the end of the war, she had 38 berths operating in ten yards and over 25,000 merchant ships, making it the third-biggest navy in the world (Ridler 13).

Security of the merchant ships was provided by warships from a convoy of either the Canadian or British army. This is because the merchant ships were lightly armed. The efficiency of transportation of food, materials, and other equipment increased after 1943 due to the reduction of attacks from the German U-boats. When the German navy changed its attack tactics, the Canadian navy coupled these attacks by improving their defense using better technology and improving its crew training.

They built ships with improved sonar and depth charges, aircrafts surveyed the routs which the convoys were passing through, and the newly built ships had a flight deck extension for aircraft landing to provide local air support in times of distress. This made the Atlantic waters between North America and the United Kingdom safer, although there were still some attacks on the convoys from the German U-boats.

The Dieppe-Raid

In 1942, Canadian troops camped on the hills and towns of the South Downs near Brighton about to raid Dieppe, a German-held French port. More than six thousand soldiers were taken to Dieppe, coming from Portsmouth, Southampton, and Cowes (Greenwood 2002). They were planning an attack on the harbor. In the troop, there were around 5,000 Canadian soldiers. This attack was called Operation Jubilee, and its primary intent was to raise the morale of the allies in a time when the war seemed to go against them and to relieve pressure from the Soviet Union (Greenwood 2002).

Though carefully planned as a surprise attack, the result of the raid was a disaster. A German patrol boat spotted the troops before they approached the shore and opened fire, which alerted the German shore batteries. A few troops that managed to reach the beach moved deeper into the land, where they faced a much stronger German resistance than anticipated. The Canadian forces faced heavy casualties at Dieppe.

As stated by Greenwood (2002), 907 soldiers lost their lives, 1,874 were taken prisoner, and 2,460 were wounded on that very day. Of the 236 who returned to Britain, 200 had not landed. The soldiers who made it into the town fought bravely, winning three Victoria crosses on that day. In contrast, only around 500 German soldiers were killed, and a small number of them were taken back to Britain as prisoners (Greenwood 2002).

The Battle of Normandy

On June 6^th, 1944, a Canadian troop and other allies’ forces landed on Juno Beach during the Battle of Normandy. On the first hour of landing, the Canadian forces suffered over 50% casualty (Allen 6). Despite this, it was evident that they were the most powerful troop since they had moved deeper inland than any other allied troop by nightfall. In the first month of this operation, the Canadian troops, together with those of the allies, faced the strongest resistance from the German army. The main aim of this operation was to liberate Paris from German rule. Canadian troops played a critical role in the destruction of the German army in Normandy, and by the time they met with the American troops, the German army was very weak.

Protection of Hong Kong

The British crown of Hong Kong constituted the island itself and the adjacent mainland of Kowloon and the mountainous surroundings. Britain realized that it would be difficult for them to protect the colony in the event of war with Japan since it did not have enough military power and equipment for war. The thought of sending in new troops would be noticeable and risky. However, with time Britain saw the necessity to have reinforcements on the island, thus asked Canada for two battalions who sailed from Vancouver on October 17th, 1941 to Hong Kong (Canadian Military 2010).

The island did not have sufficient naval, air, or ground troops, but the Canadians’ arrival boosted their strength. War finally broke out on December 7^th when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor and Hong Kong a day later. Despite their desperate efforts, the troops in Hong Kong were no match to the Japanese army, and after 17 days of fierce fighting, they surrendered. The survivors became prisoners of were and were only released at the end of the war. Of the 1,975 Canadian soldiers who sailed from Vancouver, over 550 never returned home (Weinberg 51).

Conclusion

As argued in this paper, it is evident that Canada was actively involved in the Second World War, essentially as an ally of Britain. Canada offered land as a training ground for the British Commonwealth air training plan, developed a strong navy which facilitated the transportation of food and necessary equipment from North America to the United Kingdom and gave its military to fight for Britain on several occasions that fought bravely, some got seriously wounded while others lost their lives. Canada, therefore, should be credited for the allied victory of the Second World War.

Works Cited

Allen, Tony. The Battle at Normandy. London: Stoughton, 1998.

Bercuson, David. Maple Leaf against the Axis. Canada’s Second World War. Toronto: Stoddart, 1995.

Byers, Adams. The Canadians at War 1939–45. Westmount: QC, 1986

Canadian Military. World War II.The Defense of Hong Kong. 2010. Web.

Greenwood, Gavin. The Dieppe Raid: A Tragedy In 1942. Culture24. 2002. Web.

Hatch, Francis J., and Hillmer, Norman. British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. The Canadian Encyclopedia. The Canadian Encyclopedia Ltd, 2005. Web.

Ridler, Jason. Nothing but Hope and Courage. Canada’s Merchant Navy In The Second World War. Vancouver: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 2010.

Weinberg, Albert. Manifest Destiny: A Study of Nationalist Expansionism in American History. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1935.