Category: War

Introduction

Lack of unity and harmony in any country plays a pivotal role in the fueling conflicts and wars. Historically, many nations have fallen victims of civil wars due to the failure of the governing bodies to resolve internal conflicts. Research has shown that political conflicts are among the leading causes of wars in the world. Other types of conflicts that have proven detrimental to the well-being of a nation are religious conflicts, which have been the major cause of war in most of the nations in the Middle East. The Lebanon and Cyprus civil wars were caused, among other issues, by political differences as well as some religious aspects of the different groups in the nations. This paper gives a comparison of the Lebanese and Cyprus civil wars.

Similarities

The political parties in both cases were willing to go to the furthest extend to achieve their political goals. The leaders of the nations seemed to be an obstacle to political changes in the nation. Owing to this, the opposition groups planned to overthrow the national leaders and assassinate those who were opposing the changes in governance. For instance in Cyprus, when the coup de etat did not succeed, the Cypriot president, Makarios, was put to death in attempts to change the governance system of the nation. However, it was not the ultimate solution of their problems as far as governance is concerned since in both nations, war intensified after the assassinations.

The composition of the cabinet ministers was a crucial factor as far as maintaining political balance is concerned as portrayed by the rival parties in both nations. Towards the end of 1963, Archbishop Makarios proposed embarked on preventing the action of the London-Zurich Accords. He released the “Thirteen Points” which would be his stool against the accord (Camp 134) and the British influence on his leadership. The ultimate result of his act was the ethnic. Consequently, the republic came to a political deadlock. The accords sought to increase the representation of the Turkish Cypriots in several public institutions. They included the army and police forces, cabinet and the House of Representatives among others. Additionally, the Accord stipulated that the vice presidency would be the top seat of the Turkish Cypriot or rather it would be occupied by one of the Turkish Cypriots. Makarios’ move to challenge the details of the Accord caused political conflicts between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. It is noteworthy that the Turkish Cypriots never supported Makarios’ “Thirteen Points”.

On the other hand, during the Lebanese war, the president dissolved the existing cabinet and announced that a military cabinet would lead the nation. This increased the level of instability in the nation an aspect that made the president to do away with the military cabinet. It did not take long before the president led the formation of a cabinet that favored most of the sects i.e. each of the religious sects had a representative in the newly formed cabinet. The latter was in line with the people’s preference, which led to a remarkable decrease in the intensity of the war.

The efforts of political leaders to remain in power in both nations fueled most of the crisis during the wars. The first president of Cyprus, Makarios, did everything in his power to maintain not only his political stature but also the leadership of the nation. For instance, he wrote a letter about the Junta movement to Britain exposing all the issues that he believed would make the British act in his favor. On the contrary, the letter fueled the start of the war since Britain interpreted it as an illustration of Makarios’ dictatorship. Consequently, Britain supported groups that sought to remove Makarios from power.

On the other hand, the greed and efforts of the Lebanese politicians to remain in power played a pivotal role in fueling the Lebanese crises. The political leaders supported the militia groups, which in turn fueled more crises in the nation. Instead of helping the communities solve their differences amicably, the politicians used the communities’ weaknesses to gain political power or rather to lure the people to vote for them. Feudal, sectarian and religious ill feeling was the ever-present negative tendency. Politicians had an easy task convincing their voters to keep supporting them. It is noteworthy that in Lebanon sectarian and feudal influence is so strong that people can tell who will be representing them in parliament for the next hundred years. At any given time, the Lebanese could tell which minister would be staying and which would be leaving.

The fear of being defeated by another group/sect became a key factor in policymaking. This made the two nations a fertile soil for overseas intervention. Foreign intervention seemed an accepted practice for the politicians in both nations. Lebanese politicians saw no shame in reaching out to the Egyptians, Turks, English, and French to support them against each other. Other countries such as America, Israel, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Libya also seemed to take sides as far as the rival groups were concerned. A politician or a sect/group would align themselves with one of these powers to sustain their position in the government. The PLO indirectly received support from other nations. For instance, the Libyan government under the leadership of Muammar Gaddafi promised to use all its available military and economic resources to support the Palestinians in winning the war against the Lebanese. Regional changes always had a ripple effect on Lebanon. Additionally, the Lebanese embraced the non-Lebanese phenomenon with open arms e.g. the emergence of Nasser in Egypt (Soubra 12). In April 1976, Syrian forces entered Lebanon in support of the government and its political allies and clashed with the opposing PLO/Lebanese coalition. The objective of the intervention was to contain the expanding military, and by extension political, dominance of the PLO and their Lebanese allies.

As far as the pre-war period is concerned, both nations failed to address issues of their political regimes. Despite the sectarian nature, the pre-civil-war Lebanese political system exhibited features that are normally identified with modern western political systems. Such features include the freedom of expression, a variety of political parties and groupings, openness to the outside world and support of the private sector, along with the historical political traditions associated with sectarianism and clientism. The latter features dominated the governmental power structure. While the Lebanese political system continued to function, it began to show signs of increasing strains in the early 1970s. Since the elements of political instability were not properly addressed, they gained momentum over time (Ghosn, and Khoury 390). They included political calls to readjust the formula of power sharing between the Christians and Muslims, uneven development among the various regions with great disparities in income distribution and rural migration to the urban centers. These were accompanied by unchecked and rapid growth of the poor suburbs that surrounded the major cities, Beirut in particular.

Difficulties had risen over the large number of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon as well as the presence of Palestinian guerillas, mirroring the internal Lebanese sectarian identity struggles. The already existing Muslim-Christian political, social and economic differences grew more intense in 1973. The Palestinian problem fitted leftist, pan-Arab, mostly Muslims against right wing, Western oriented, mostly Christians.

In the same way the Lebanese government was reluctant to address issues that had the potential of having a negative impact of the nation, the Cypriot government under the leadership of President Makarios did not solve the political disparities in the nation. For instance, the government had taken no measures in solving the nationality issues between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots (Loizides 393). This led to the buildup of pressure between the two groups an aspect that played a pivotal role in the fueling of the Cyprus civil war.

Both Cyprus and Lebanon faced political pressures not only internally but also from several external forces. Lebanon witnessed military power of resident Palestinian organizations particularly after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. While their activity was ostensibly directed at keeping the Palestinian cause alive and continuing the struggle to reclaim Palestine, their presence in Lebanon was inevitably linked to the Lebanese domestic affairs. In consequence, the domestic and regional political agendas could hardly be separated. The prevailing weaknesses of the political system were exploited to enhance the status of the Palestinian of the Palestinian organizations. Alliances were forged with disenchanted Lebanese sectarian and the non-sectarian political parties and groups. They were supposed to form the Lebanese authorities that would bring about political reforms in the country. In the case of Cyprus, the geopolitical cold war environment in general and the cold war politics in particular had a profound effect on the internal sociopolitical development of both Greece and Turkey as well as the on their foreign policies and strategies (Anastasiou 18). In this context, governments in both countries were deeply rooted in the tradition of right wing politics and corresponding types of nationalism.

The rights of the people of Cyprus certainly seem to have been subordinated to the strategic interests of strong powers and to the vagaries of international and regional politics. One important factor is that Cyprus was and still is a victim of the problems of the Graeco-Turkish relations, particularly as regards Turkey’s claims to some Greek Aegean islands. This has been the cause of the expulsion of almost the entire Greek-speaking population of Turkey in 1964 and 1965 (Mallison 5). The Lebanese case was also similar to this in that the government was under pressure to meet international demands from other nations such as Palestine and Israel. The Lebanese government wanted the relocation of the PLO from their major cities as well as from their camps in the outskirts of Beirut, which was contrary to the demands of the Palestine. The Palestinian government argued that the removal of the PLO from Lebanon would mean that Israel, among other countries, would take advantage of the resources in the region that they were so much interested in e.g. the oil. This made Lebanon a victim of the rivalry of other nations.

There was significant influence of the politics from the motherlands of the rivalry groups in both cases. No conflict analysis of the Cyprus problem can arrive at a complete picture of the conflict pattern of relationships without taking into account the political influence of Greece and Turkey as well as their active intervention in the internal affairs of Cyprus. Interestingly, the route by which the policies and actions of the motherlands influenced the Cyprus problem, particularly during the 1960-74 period of repeated violence, followed a striking similar path (Newman 257). The warring parties in Lebanon certainly attempted to secure assistance from their respective communities abroad. This support took the form of political lobbying and/or propaganda as well as financial assistance. No estimates of the inflow of the financial resources are available, but it is known, for example, that Palestinians working in Kuwait were subject to a tax on their earnings earmarked for the PLO (Makdisi 42).

The absence of fundamental reforms in public institutions would not necessarily imply a change in the nature of the Lebanese state or in national political behavior. However, this should not obscure the fact that some of the actors involved in the conflict, both individuals and political groups, were motivated by non-sectarian ideologies and genuinely embraced a secular viewpoint. If anything, the sectarian nature of the political behavior became more accentuated in the post-war era. The case of Cyprus had a similar phenomenon.

The polarization between the nationalist view of the sate on the part of the state-controlling ethnic group and a nationalist quest for the self-determination on the part of the sub-state ethnic group decisively conditioned public opinion in the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities respectively for more than half a century. It shaped the underlying assumptions in how each side conducted itself during the endless cycles of formal negotiations. The interethnic dynamics generated by the antimony and irreconcilability between the nationalist approach to the state sovereignty and nationalist approach to state self determination, usually hidden beneath the formal agendas put forward at the negotiation table constituted the key factors of the political impasse which produced and animated the entire Cyprus problem. The irreconcilability between the state sovereignty and the self-determination that competing nationalisms always create and sustain the underlying cause of intractability of the Cyprus problem.

Both nations exhibited lack of co-operation between the key members of the government. This was portrayed by the resignation of key people from their government posts. The Lebanese Prime minister as well as the Cypriot premier gave up their official duties in the government. Most of the people in both nations were not satisfied by the actions of the presidents in the respective nations. Such posts were so crucial in the operation of the nation even during the crisis. Owing to this, they were replaced in the course of the wars.

Foreign powers manipulated the actions of the different groups in the countries in question. Palestine and Israel supported different political parties/groups in the case of Lebanon. The ethnic disparities in Cyprus were fueled by the foreign powers, among which were the U.S and Britain. Greece and Turkey also played a major role in escalating the differences between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. As far as Greece is concerned, it manipulated the two groups between 1967 and 1974-the period when it was under the military Junta. The other nations were the United States of American and Turkey. Additionally, Britain was the most influential in manipulating the political regimes in Cyprus during that period. Russia held a strategic position in Cyprus especially by influencing the nation to choose Makarios as the first president of the nation.

In both cases, the primary cause of war was political grievances from different groups. In Cyprus, the opposition argued that the president was biased. They claimed that he did not fully represent the interests of the people as far as nationalism is concerned. The primary causes of the war in Lebanon were political grievance arising from unequal power sharing among three of the major religious communities in conjunction with the political/military stance of the PLO, which clashed interests with the state. Irrespective of the relative importance of each factor in causing the outbreak of war, the mutual interaction of the sectarian and Palestinian factors finally led to the explosion of 1975. The PLO supported the Lebanese parties (comprising of the Islamic and nationalist forces) that opposed Maronite political hegemony and demanded a change in the political set up in favor of more equitable power-sharing (Makdisi 39).

Differences

The Lebanese communal society consists of several society layers that, while existing side by side, often in harmony, remain void of a basic central value system and widespread acculturation. Lebanese communities not only live next to each other but also interact with one another economically. However, this level of interaction was not strong and intense enough to integrate the various communities into one social system. Gerges asserts that the “war was born of the communal contradictions inherent in this communal structure and exacerbated by the external contingent factors” (538). The political life in Lebanon as well s political institutions had been affected by sectarianism and factionalism because of the communal structure-segmented and splintered. The Cypriot community was comprised of immigrants who sought their nationalism. The main perpetrators of the civil war in Cyprus were the people who had Greek and Turkish roots.

The differences in religious views were one of the main factors that led to the war in Lebanon. Besides having to religions in Lebanon, the sects in the Muslim religion were concerned about their ‘visibility’ as far as making national decisions is concerned. This fueled the conflicts not only in the broad sense of the Lebanese religious spectrum but also within the Muslim community. It was evident in the instance where the Muslim sects opposed the cabinet that was formed after the majority had disregarded the military cabinet. They argued that each of the sects should be represented in the cabinet. This shows the direct impact of the different sects not only in the governance of the nation but also in politics.

As far as the Cyprus civil war is concerned, the clash between TC and GC nationalism did not center on the fact that one community was traditionally Muslim and the other Christian. Whereas Turkish nationalism had historically evolved as a statist and secular type of nationalism, Greek nationalism historically emerged as a populist, cultural type in the tradition of European Romanticism. In the mental edifice of the mainstream Turkish nationalism, religion was reduced to a nonpublic, apolitical element. In the case of Greek nationalism, religion was a vital element of public ethnical identity and culture. The difference between the Turkish statist secular nationalism and Greek cultural religious nationalism was more central to the Cyprus conflict than the clash between religions. The perspective of TC and Turkish nationalists was centered on the fact that the TCs preferred secular politics and a secular state, in contrast to the GCs who intended to mix politics and religion.

Conclusion

Political conflicts among the different groups of people were the major cause of the civil wars. Political leaders in both countries were willing to go to any extend to protect their political prowess as well as their positions in the government. They overlooked the interests of the people to retain their position in their country. Foreign intervention also played a pivotal role in fueling the wars. Additionally, the intervention of the mother countries of the rivalry groups increased the crises in the nation. The composition of the cabinet ministers or rather the holders of key government positions was a significant factor as far as the cause of the wars were concerned. The difference of the two civil wars lies within the religious composition of the nations. Although both nations have Islam and Christianity as the major religions, the sects in the Muslim community caused many conflicts in their attempts to seek attention from the government. On the other hand, the differences of the rivalry groups in Cyprus arose from their opinions as far as nationalism is concerned.

Works Cited

Anastasiou, Harry. Broken Olive Branch. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2011. Print.

Camp, Glend. “The Cyprus Problem: A Cold War Legacy.” Global Dialogue 3.4 (2001): 133-143. Print.

Gerges, Fawaz. “The Lebanese Conflict: Looking Inward.” Political Science Quarterly 114.3 (1999): 537-539. Print.

Ghosn, Faten, and Khoury, Amal. “Lebanon after the Civil War: Peace or the Illusion of Peace?” Middle East Journal 65.3 (2011): 381-397. Print.

Loizides, Neophytos. “Contested Migration and Settler Politics in Cyprus.” Political Geography 30.7 (2011): 391-401. Print.

Makdisi, Samir. Lessons of Lebanon: The Economics of War and Development. London, GBR: I.B. Tauris, 2004. Print.

Mallinson, William. Cyprus: A Modern History. London, GBR: I.B Tauris, 2005. Print.

Newman, Edward. “Conflict Research and the Decline of Civil War.” Civil Wars 11.3 (2009): 255-278. Print.

Soubra, Hani. Letters to Dalia: Reflections on Lebanon and the Middle East. Westport, CT: Easton Studio Press, 2010. Print.

Introduction

Indeed, the defeat of the French military in the First Indochina war was as a result of many factors including indecisions, lack of stability, domestic conflict and economic incapability back at home. Besides the self inflictions by France, there were other issues, which will be discussed in this paper that contributed to the defeat. After the first Indochina was in 1946-1954, the second Indochina war emerged. In this case, the USA was the main instigator following the conflict between the American-backed government and the Viet Cong communists, who had control of the army (Morgan 189). This paper seeks to discuss some of the reasons that led to the defeat of French during the First Indochina War. In addition, it will explore the factors that led to the loss of war against the USA-backed South Vietnam in the second Indochina war.

Reasons for French Defeat in 1^st Indochina War

Domestic Conflict and Indifference

One of the most important factors that led to the defeat of the French was found in the domestic ideological conflict between the French populace and the entire political community. Whereas the political arena considered the Indochina war as a critical priority, the citizenry was completely indifferent about the battle. In fact, in a national survey which was conducted in 1948, the citizens placed Indochina as the last of their priorities (Schwenkel 172).

Importantly, the populace incurred a high cost of living and many casualties so that the war was no longer important from their point of view. This indifference played a major role in the defeat of the French in the First Indochina War, bearing in mind that mobilized and united support is critically important during the war. Similarly, the political arena also evoked such ideological conflict when it came to the importance of the Indochina war. The legislative body opposed the involvement of France in the war while French right opposed it. This led to a weakened position and little moral support of the government to deploy resources and win the war.

Economic Deficiency

Although there were enormous conflicts in the domestic arena, the economic incapability contributed to the defeat. Evidently, the First Indochina war came immediately after the Second World War. During World War II, France had used most of its resources to finance the army and sustain its political strength. As a result, it suffered critical economic losses as well as casualties. This implies France was recovering from the losses of World War II. With such a recovery struggle, it was difficult to win amidst a high cost of living at home and deficient infrastructure. Indeed, the focus was shifted to rebuilding the economy back home, leaving a very narrow gateway for the Indochina.

Order of the Battle and Infrastructure

In essence, the successive government had different views over the First Indochina War. As such, different administrations gave differing levels of attention to the war in respect to their foreign policies. As a result, the alternating policies and change of tactics led to an unstable battling. In addition, the economy was too handicapped to provide the military with enough personnel and facilities. For example, Navarre requested for about twelve battalions, seven hundred and fifty officers as well as two thousand five hundred and fifty NCOs. However, the government could only afford eight battalions, three hundred and twenty officer and 200 NCOs. This is a clear portrayal of incapacitation of the French government as far as the availabilities of facilities and personnel were concerned. Indeed, this deficiency led to the defeat of the French Army in the war.

Geographical Large Area of Coverage

Whereas the French authorities were trying to deal with their domestic economy and infighting, the large territory in Indochina posed a greater challenge. Indochina had three territories including Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia. The total area of the territory was about 737,000 square kilometres. The deficient personnel sent by the government had to be distributed over the entire area. As a result, its concentration per square kilometre was very sparse such that conquering the enemy was basically impossible. Importantly, this sparseness led to lack of coordination of the military.

Reasons for USA Defeat in the Second Indochina War

Disunity among Americans

Similar to the French war during the First Indochina struggle, USA was also confronted by domestic disagreements. In this case, Congress was against focused attention and active involvement in the Indochina war. This was evidently portrayed when the USA first made a deal with North Vietnam in order to withdraw from the war. When the North agreed on the deal in order for the USA to withdraw during Nixon’s administration, it later violated the terms of that deal. However, Ford tried to support South Vietnam on the basis that the earlier deal was violated, but Congress stopped the involvement (Turse 127).

Poor Order of Battle

USA was using a poor strategy in the Second Indochina War whereby it has been argued that the USA was not fighting to win. Instead, the country was finding an exit strategy. In this case, this implies that if the USA was fighting to win, it could have conquered the Viet Cong. However, after Nixon’s attempt to negotiate with the North, the opportunity to win the battle was lost. Some elements in the army lost the hope of winning the war against the Vietnamese such that the coordination of the battle was no longer effective. In fact, the army extensively disintegrated because they did not find the rationale of fighting a war which had little significance to the USA and one that had little chances of winning. As a result, the USA had to withdraw, bearing in mind that the unity of the armed forces is critical in a war.

Onset Deployment of Few Military Personnel and Infrastructure

At the onset of the fight, the USA deployed very few soldiers and infrastructure in the war. In essence, this was a crucial mistake on the side of the USA because they allowed the Viet Cong to organize themselves for the battle. As such, the Soviet Union-backed North Vietnam became very strong with time. The lowly motivated USA and South Vietnam Army were unable to stand up against them and win the war.

Geographical Terrain

The Vietcong and NVA were well versed with the terrain of Vietnam that USA troops (Haugen 134). Vietnam had many swampy areas and jungles, which made the NVA and Vietcong defend easily and attack in hostility. On the other hand, USA troops used maps and photos to learn the geography and terrain of the entire area. In that regard, therefore, they were unable to defend and attack effectively. As such, they definitely lost the war against their NVA and Vietcong.

Conclusion

It is evident that the defeat of France and the USA in the Vietnam-based wars was caused by various factors which had critical similarities. In this regard, it was identified that both countries incurred domestic infighting and disunity in countries regarding the importance of the respective wars. In addition, it was discovered that the order and strategies of the battles were faulty. The USA sent fewer troops at the onset of the war such that the enemies had enough time to reorganize while France sent few soldiers over a vast territory. The geographical size became a great challenge for France while the lack of physical knowhow posed a problem to USA troops.

Works Cited

Haugen, David. The Vietnam War. Detroit: Greenhaven, 2011. Print.

Morgan, Ted. Valley of Death and the Tragedy at Dien Bien Phu That Led America into the Vietnam War. New York: Random House, 2010. Print.

Schwenkel, Christina. The American War in Contemporary Vietnam Transnational Remembrance and Representation. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2009. Print.

Turse, Nick. Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam. New York: Henry Holt, 2013. Print.

Introduction

The rationale for the balance of power is that stable balances will create self-enforcing peace. In this case, the cost of war is the same as the value of peace, and nations prefer to remain in peace as long as the equilibrium persists. If there in an imbalance in the cost of war and the cost of peace, then the weaker powers begin to consider their survival above anything else. As a result, they become more resolved to go to war to protect their remaining sovereignty. On the other hand, the major powers will use their abilities to demand more from the weaker powers and end up provoking them to war. This paper will look at the reasons that cause wars to occur. The paper will consider the case of the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia and its significance in the World War I in explaining the balance of power.

The balance of power has relied a lot when talking about the structural theory, which aims to explain how society functions. As such, powers are expected to have an attitude of accepting a particular situation the way it is presented. They then prepare to deal with the situation accordingly. Thus, when the reality is a balance of power, then the environment will favor structural conditions that are peaceful. The idea of the balance of power is ancient, despite the fact that it has been a major influence in the modern theories and studies of international relations.

The rise to prominence of the balance of power

The balance of power became a core component of modern realism because the notion of power rose to become dominant in the recent studies of international relations. However, the balance of power can carry many meanings and the existence of different interpretations complicates the application of the concept. For example, it can relate to a policy aimed at sustaining an individual state of affairs. On the other hand, the balance of power can be an actual state of affairs as described earlier, where the cost of peace is the same as the cost of war. Irrespective of when the phrase is used, the balance of power will always refer to the conditions of the balance of the policies of establishing balance.

The powerful side can reduce its weight to achieve balance or the opposite can happen, where the lighter side gets more weight. Balance as such reflects the activities and intentions of alignment against a prevailing power or a threat. An example is when the Great Britain was balancing power by exercising the power to intervene and restore or create a status that would create a balance of power with the conditions that were explained earlier. This happened in the period between 1815 and 1870.

When considering the balance of power as an explanation of peace and war, it is possible to explain the origin of the World War I and many other wars that serve as major studies in international relations. According to Fromkin, the World War I started because there was an ignition that destabilized the existing balance of power in the world. First, Germany had begun increasing its power by advocating preemptive war against France and Russia. This was about a decade before the start of the war. Thus, the lack of a balancing actor in the affairs of the nations that were initially involved in the war became a major factor leading to the eventuality of war.

The theories explaining the balance of power

Other than the structural theory explanation of the balance of power, the institutional theory can also serve as the underlying theory for understanding the concept of the balance of power. Doyle dedicates a section to discuss liberalism, where the author offers the idea that all states must have a similar means of measuring power (157). This way, they are able to reach a compromise of limiting their aggression towards each other and maintain the trustful relationship.

According to Doyle, there is no single solution to world peace (99). The main assumption is that rational cooperation will defeat the tendency to go to war. However, there must be institutions that facilitate cooperation among different powers for the cooperation to persist. The presence of the institutions is one requirement, while the other requirement is sufficient support and respect for the institutions.

States have a choice to balance their power with aggressors or allow the aggressors to dictate terms of peace. Usually, the terms of peace involve the weaker state yielding its autonomy and authority. The motivations for yielding to the stronger power depend on the existing status of the balance of power. Here, the theories of realism and liberalism play a major role in explaining a particular state’s action. They also help to explain the coalitions that formed and led to the World War I, as described by various scholars such as Doyle and Fromkin in various quotations presented in this paper.

According to Fromkin, the World War I started after a conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia (8). The conflict was significant in explaining the events that transpired later to form the World War I. It also helped to point criticism of the claim of the balance of power as the fundamental motivation for the existence of peace among states. Nevertheless, as narrated by Fromkin, the war between the two small states went on to create a global crisis because bigger powers were taking sides and joining the war to demand that their enemies meet their bargain demands (8). However, the enemies also went to war not because they had an overall advantage of winning, but because they had too much to lose by agreeing to the demands of the defiant parties.

Thus, an alternative concept of the balance of power ensued and led to the war. Scholars like Frankel have referred it to as chain ganging (41). It refers to a situation where one state sees threats against another state as threats to its security. Therefore, such a state will go to war because it is protecting itself from the symbolic defeat of the friendly state (Frankel 41). This would explain why the entire European continent ended up in the war after the Austria-Hungary and Serbia war took off.

The intention here was to maintain balance. Chaining themselves to their allies and forming large coalitions would make the two equal partners in the world and the equality of the cost of war and the cost of peace would make them choose peace (Ikenberry and Inoguchi 47). However, the events leading to the formation of the two equal powers did not have the luxury of time, as the war was ongoing in the two smaller states. The entry of bigger powers, such as Germany also caused more agitation and war, which caused the formation of the coalition partners. In any case, nations were responding to the challenge of the balance of power.

They might have had separate motivations for joining different sides of the war, but the underlying fact was that they did that because they wanted to restore the peace that existed before or as Doyle puts it, they were balanced against the capacity of threat. The bigger nations wanted to protect their sovereignty and that of their allies (168). Thus, Fromkin concludes well by stating that the World War I was not the same conflict as the Austria-Hungary and Serbia conflict (8). The main war happened because the great European powers had a struggle for supremacy. In this case, each saw that the benefits of war were more than the cost of war.

Irrespective of the motivations of war, it is important to understand that nations cannot find a reason for war without a pretext. Thus, the elimination of war pretexts also serves as a mechanism for maintaining a balance of power. It is at this point where the reasoning of liberalism comes in.

As the lectures explained, the core idea of liberalism is that states will consider rational cooperation rather than go to war. This was what transpired after the World War I. Nations maintained their balance of power through mutual respect of their individual institutions and their cooperative institutions. Despite the institutions created to define the relationship between nations and reduce the tendency of a hegemony developing and declaring war, there was still hopelessness among nations.

If conditions such as the ones that led to World War I reoccurred, then nations would be unable to rely on the concept of liberalism. Such situations present no possibility of a bargain. Without bargain, a nation sees the only option is to go to war for self-defense and, at least, gain some benefits. Moreover, when there is an option of chain ganging, weaker states find the motivation to go to war, even when the fundamentals do not favor them. They join wars because they know that it is possible to take a back seat and only contribute their little resources as the major powers in their coalition take all the effort to defeat the enemy. The weaker states could then take part in the final stages of the war or step up to direct peace efforts after the exhaustion of the major powers from the different sides of a war.

Liberalism relies on the fact that humans are good-natured and favor freedom for the individual. In this regard, the major reason for going with liberalism as a concept that would support the balance of power comes from the following idea: The concept states that individuals have a right to be treated as equals and be protected by the law, while having the duty to consider and treat others as ethical subjects at the same time (Toledo 53). The idea of individual rights and responsibilities expands to cover the relationship between independent states. Therefore, for liberalism to work in ensuring a balance of power, it has to allow domestic and international institutions thrive, limit the attractiveness of war, and increase the payoff of alternative bargains.

In all the above considerations, the first task is to define peace and then go on to declare conditions that will support that peace. After that, the burden for states will be to respect and sustain those conditions, such that the balance prevails. When considering this fact of first defining peace, it is clear that there will be no single way of declaring and sustaining peace. This is the same thing happening with theories of balance of power. They are varied, yet they all somehow aim to support the same conception where structures, ideologies, or possible outcomes limit the possibility of war.

Going back to the notion of realism, there will always be a state that is more powerful than other states. When such a state goes on to become very powerful, it will enjoy a better bargain than other states. Other states will gather against the major state and form a force big enough to counter the threat of the major state. On the other hand, if realism was to persist, there would always be a threat posed by a hegemony power. In this regard, smaller states are always considering and making efforts to avoid death. Their collective action results in the balance of power. They can actively make coalitions and work on their internal defenses at the same time. Viewing the balance of power in the way explained here makes it is possible to see this as a continuous process with differing theoretical explanations, based on the way a person looks at the concept.

Critiquing the balance of power

An arising question out of the discussion is: What would happen if there would be no sufficient ability to prevent war? Would war be a resolve used to maintain the balance of power? For example, can one country, even hegemony, declare war to sustain the status quo? In this case, its motivation would be to weaken other states and compel them to continue being under its territory. This question and the conclusion of this paper raise more questions that many scholars continue to explore as they discuss the motivations of war and peace among nations. One can look at war as a persistent threat or a means to an end. It is impossible to ignore the realism perspective.

The only conclusion that can provide enough room for further inquiry and sustain the observations and facts made so far is that the theory explaining the balance of power, such as the realism and liberalism concepts reviewed in this paper, does not offer all the answers. However, the paradigm points to the right direction that can provide additional answers. Liberalism has played a major role in explaining the nature of individuals and states, as well as the international system (Cox, Dunne, and Booth 149-150). Understanding this concept makes it possible to see the reason for war to occur and the options for stopping or preventing war.

Conclusion

In the end, the balance of power and any structure or policy that seeks to preserve the international balance of power are essential. They play an important part in stabilizing the societies that exist among nations that consider themselves sovereign. In addition, this essay has delved into concepts of realism and liberalism as motivations for the balance of power. It shows that in either case, the stakes of war serve as the main reasons for pursuing the peace option.

At the same time, there is the presence of factors that limit the enjoyment of peace present opportunities for triggering a war. Thus, nations are in a persistent state of reducing their vulnerabilities and exposure to war. Their collective actions present a balance of power, irrespective of the motivations underlying those actions. In fact, a particular nation may not be aware of the effect it has on the realization of the balance of power.

Works Cited

Cox, Michael, Tim Dunne and Ken Booth. Empires, Systems and States: Great Transformations in International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Print.

Doyle, Michael W. Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism and Socialism. New York: Norton, 1997. Print.

Frankel, Benjamin. Ed. Realism: Retestaments and Renewal. Portland: Frank Cass and Company, 1996. Print.

Fromkin, David. Europe’s Last Summer: Who Started the Great War in 1914? New York: Random House, 2009. Print.

Ikenberry, John G., and Takashi Inoguchi. Eds. Reinventing the alliance: U.S.- Japan Security Partnership in an Era of Change. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Print.

Toledo, Peter. “Classical Realism and the Balance of Power Theory.” Glendon Journal of International Studies 4 (2005): 52-63. Print.

During the Gulf War, the main purpose of countries that interfered was to prevent Iraq from being too powerful in the Middle Eastern region. However, some of President Bush’s decisions were guided by other interests. Additionally, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait not only because he was a dictator – the leader was partly forced to do that by the second and third level factors.

On August 2, 1990, Iraqi troops entered Kuwait, “a small, oil-rich emirate on the Persian Gulf”, and started the Gulf War, which later involved a lot of countries (“The Persian Gulf War” par. 1). As Saddam Hussein, the President of Iraq, officially stated, he did that because Kuwait was a historical part of Iraq, and he wanted to reunite the territories. Still, it was a simple annexation.

The first reason for Iraq to invade Kuwait was oil. Since the greatest part of the national revenue of Iraq depended on it, it was crucial for this country to maintain high prices (“How the Gulf Crisis Began and Ended” par. 1). This necessity was even more urgent considering the need of the country to recover from the Iran-Iraq war and pay its debts. However, the prices for oil dropped by 33%, and Iraq started to blame Kuwait for such an outcome since, as Saddam Hussein claimed, this country exceeded the established quota for oil production, which caused the drop in prices (“How the Gulf Crisis Began and Ended” par. 1).

Finally, Saddam stated that Kuwait illegally located oil facilities on the land of Iraq taking advantage of the fact that the country was involved in the Iran-Iraq war at that time. Referring to that, Iraq demanded Kuwait to cancel its debt (“How the Gulf Crisis Began and Ended” par. 1). Kuwait refused, and Saddam launched an aggressive policy against it, which finally resulted in the invasion. Therefore, not only the fact that Hussein’s regime was “a brutal military dictatorship” played its role but also the second and third level factors, such as the outcomes of the Iran-Iraq war and the prices for oil, affected the President’s decision (“The Persian Gulf War” par. 2).

After August 2, 1990, many countries intervened in the war, and America was the first to do that. Firstly, it was much of the balance of powers since “with Kuwait under its belt” Iraq could control nearly 19% of all oil reserves in the world (Yetiv, Explaining Foreign Policy 33). Moreover, the invasion of Kuwait was a threat to Saudi Arabia, and if Iraq had invaded this country, its share of oil would have raised to 45% (Yetiv, Explaining Foreign Policy 33).

In that case, Iraq could blackmail other Arab countries or manipulate the prices for oil. However, the US actions in 2003, when an attack on already weakened Iraq was launched, and the events of the Iraq War began to unfold, can hardly be considered as another attempt to balance the powers (“Persian Gulf War” par. 7). As a prime example, that and the subsequent US attacks on Iraq “seriously flouted balancing policy”, eliminating the distribution of power between Iraq and Iran (Yetiv, Time for some American realpolitik par. 6).

As the result, Iran became too powerful in the Middle Eastern region. Therefore, it can be concluded that after 2000, the US was mostly guided by its domestic policies and own interests. But what exactly were those policies and interests? Firstly, the US was concerned about the problem of security and terrorism, particularly the attack on September 11, 2001. Secondly, oil also became an issue. In the twentieth century, the flow of Middle Eastern oil was one of America’s greatest political-economic concerns (Jones 208). That is why the US protection of Kuwait was partly provided in the States’ own interests. Considering this fact, we can say that President’s Bush decision-making has something in common with Saddam’s – both of them wanted to strengthen their countries using the others. However, Bush’s policy was still less aggressive.

Works Cited

How the Gulf Crisis Began and Ended n.d. Web.

Jones, Toby Craig. “America, Oil, and War in the Middle East.” The Journal of American History 99.1 (2012): 208-218. Print.

Persian Gulf War 2015. Web.

The Persian Gulf War 2014. Web.

Yetiv, Steve. Explaining Foreign Policy: U.S. Decision-Making in the Gulf Wars. 2nd ed. 2011. Baltimore, Maryland: JHU Press. Print.

Yetiv, Steve. Time for some American realpolitik in the Persian Gulf 2015. Web.

While analyzing the scope of the terrible events of the German Holocaust, it is hard to believe that the social anti-Semitism could have progressed to such a stage within a couple of years. It is evident that it should have taken a longer period for the Germans to accept the relevant ideology and adopt the unjustified prejudices against the Jewish nation. Therefore, the question arises concerning the factors that determined such a rapid development of the anti-Semitic phenomenon in the course of the Second World War. Historians have contradictory views on the nature of the German anti-Semitism’s violence as well as on its roots.

One of the common opinions supports the idea that it was the First World War that created a favorable environment for the cultivation of the anti-Semitic values. The defeat in this war prompted the German society to search for external forces guilty of their misfortunes. Under the relevant circumstances, the Jewish nation was an easy target for the government to shift the social attention from the flaws in the national policy to the external enemy. Therefore, the paper at hand is aimed at examining the role of the First World War in the development of anti-Semitism in Germany. In the framework of the relevant analysis, one makes an attempt to study the interconnection between the events of this war and the outrages of violence of the Holocaust.

On the one hand, the tragic events of the First World War were particularly significant for the Jewish population as they signified the outbreak of a large-scale anti-Semitism campaign. In fact, this war served to be the catalyst for the Second World War, and, consequently, the Holocaust, the most tragic events of the twentieth century. Today, it is hard to indicate the determinants of the unprecedented cruelty that took hold of society after the First World War. In the meantime, one might assume that there is a series of factors that can explain the interconnection between this war and the future catastrophe.

First and foremost, the First World War is important for understanding the development of anti-Semitism in German from a political standpoint. Thus, it was during this war that the German anti-Semitism underwent a crucial transformation. If previously it could have been regarded as a local phenomenon, in the course of the war, it turned into a national ideology. Therefore, it is logical to assume that as well as any other ideological changes, this shift was initiated by the government. The fact that the German right-wing party advanced the anti-Semitic racial ideology in the final part of the war seems to be undoubted. The party offered sustainable support for all the radical and nationalist movements that appeared during the war.

Nevertheless, it must be confessed that despite the fact that German politicians overtly announced the anti-Semitic appeal, they still did not treat the Jews as their principal enemies. In other words, Jewish people were only one object of the government’s attack contrary to the events that began in the mid-1930s. At that point, anti-Semitism was more of a formal character than of true violence.

On the one hand, one might suppose that the ideology was imposed from above. On the other hand, it is evident that at the most critical times in a country’s history, its politicians tend to provide support for those social groups that are dominant. As a result, the fact, that the German parties decided to fit the interests of anti-Semitic movements, means that social moods at that period had strong radical connotations.

In addition, it is critical to note that the Jewish population was the one that suffered most in the course of the First World War. The relevant phenomenon might be explained by the fact that the Jewish people fought for the armies of all the sides. They did their best to show their patriotic feelings for the country they defended, and the German Jews were not an exception. Whatever paradoxical it might seem, their patriotism did not only fail to assist them in further surviving but became one of the key reasons for their elimination.

Thus, shortly after the war, a large part of the German Jews was subject to being accused of disloyalty. After the First World War, the German General Staff carried out a census of all the Jewish soldiers that fought in the army in order to indicate the number of Jews who served on the front line. The gathered data was corrupted largely, and the public report announced that the majority of Jews balked their military duty. Despite the fact that it was further discovered that the data was distorted, at that point, the report accomplished its principal aim successfully – it caused the social distrust and hostility towards the Jewish population.

Therefore, one of the reasons why the First World War had a significant impact on the development of the negative attitude towards the Jews was connected with those nations that lost this war. In fact, it might be stated that the First World War was the first European experience of such a large-scale defeat that caused mass man casualties. Society required a reasonable justification for this sacrifice. As a result, the internal betrayal was employed in order to explain the failure.

The Germans and Austrians found it convenient to warrant their defeat in the First World War by the participation of the internal traitors that acted in accordance with foreign interests, in other words, in the interests of the Jews or communists. The German leadership had no other choice but to cultivate and spread this legend among the population. Otherwise, they would have been obliged to take personal responsibility and admit the fact that the defeat was the consequence of their unreasonable policy.

However, the violence towards the Jews would not be so severe in case it was initiated by the population of one country only. In other words, Hitler needed some external support in order to advance his Anti-Semitist campaign. The dictator would eagerly benefit from any negative image of Jews cultivated in other countries. From this standpoint, Eastern Europe assisted Hitler in reaching his aim. Thus, all the infrastructure of the Jews in Eastern Europe, including its social, cultural, religious and economic aspects was almost fully destroyed by the First World War. In addition, the cruel events of the war also radicalized the views of a large part of the Jewish youth in Eastern Europe – many of them accepted secularist and Marxists ideologies.

Another critical event that occurred in the course of the First World War and had a significant impact on the development of anti-Semitism was the Bolshevik revolution. On the one side, the new government made a lot of effort to destroy religion, and the practice of Judaism was not an exception (Shandler 10).

In such a manner, the Soviet Union supported the development of anti-Semitism ideology, to a certain extent. On the other side, the establishment of the Soviet Union, and the intention to spread communist dictatorship in Europe served to be a critical concern for the middle-class population of both Europe and the United States. The fact that a large part of the prominent communists was of Jewish origin gave the anti-Semites the grounds to associate Jewish people with the inculcation of the unattractive communists’ ideology around the world.

The anti-Semitism among the Polish population and the Lithuanian nationalists also became more and more violent before the Second World War. There is a lot of literature evidence of the simultaneous development of the anti-Semitic radicalism around the world. According to the contemporaries of the relevant period, the prejudiced attitude towards the Jews could be sensed in big and small European towns, in public organizations, and on the streets (Shandler 338).

Furthermore, it might be assumed that the First World War’s outcomes created the generally hostile environment the inhabitants of which were looking for the object that could become the target of their aggression and disappointment. Such countries as Germany, Austria, and Hungary, experienced a powerful psychological pressure as they were blamed for triggering the war off. Moreover, the government of these countries had to pay considerable damages to the winners. All this increased the level of grumpiness and extremity within the political circles. As a result, the shift to the radical right views was regarded as the only way to give utterance to the common despair.

As a result, the First World War prompted the appearance of a series of negative stereotypes regarding the Jewish nation. The first myth that appeared right after the war and that partially served to explain its unsuccessful outcome resides in the idea that it was the Jews that began the war pursuing the aim to destroy Europe both politically and financially. The key idea of this myth implied the hidden intention of the Jewish nation to control the world. Moreover, a large percentage of the European population after the First World War would willingly believe in the myth that the Jewish benefited from the misery of the war, pursuing their own interests and enriching themselves (Kaplan 59). It was assumed that the Jewish used the money, gained from the war, to support the Bolshevik Revolution.

Another stereotype that could appear after the First World War was aimed to advance the image of a Jew as a betrayer. The Jewish people were assigned to have inborn coward nature and were said to be disloyal. This stereotype explained the military failure by the Jewish overall defect to the enemy. Furthermore, Jewish interests were believed to spread far beyond their own community.

Thus, it was assumed that it was foreign Jews that held the peace negotiations, and they initially perused the aim of dividing Germany and Hungary with the help of artificial borders. At the same time, the domestic Jews planned to enslave the Germans. The key idea of this stereotype resided in the fact the Jews established the constitutional democracy in order to enfeeble the political power of the Germans. It was believed that their final aim was to destroy the superiority of the Aryan blood (Kaplan 86).

In the meantime, it would be rash to assert that it was the First World War that marked the beginning of the activity aimed at the elimination of the Jewish population. The implications for the particular violence towards this nation might be found at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Thus, Eduard Silbermann recalls the Jewish community that existed in Bischberg. He notes that the Jewish were not severely oppressed in the territories that were controlled by the ecclesiastical jurisdictions contrary to the secular areas.

In the meantime, the life of Jewish was regulated by the Edict of the Jews established in 1813. Some of the Edict’s statements have strong connotations for the national segregation. For example, according to the Edict, the number of Jewish families living in the relevant territory had to be externally controlled: it could not increase, but it was recommended to decrease it in case the authorities would consider it to be excessive. Moreover, Jewish immigration and domicile were forbidden within the Kingdom (Richarz, Rosenfeld and Rosenfeld 82). As a result, one might conclude that although the First World War played a significant role in the development of anti-Semitism, the first signs of its appearance date back long before this war broke out.

The assumption that the Holocaust was an unexpected event that no one could ever predict is not exactly true. Whereas the major part of the world population would never foresee the scope of violence that would exist towards a particular nation, there still were numerous signs foreboding the future disaster. Thence, the memoirs of some Jews are full of relevant evidence.

Clara Geissmar, for instance, describes her life long before the terrible events as calm and peaceful. In the meantime, the woman notes that she had some inexplicable regrets about her son being a Jew. For a strange reason, Geissmar could feel he was about to suffer largely due to his nationality and religious belief (Richarz, Rosenfeld and Rosenfeld 161). Therefore, studying the recollection of the Jews that lived in the nineteenth century makes one think that anti-Semitic tendency was gradually developing through centuries and reached its peak in the course of the Second World War.

As a consequence, one might draw a conclusion that the events of the First World War played a critical role in the development of the anti-Semitic ideology in German society. Due to the defeat in the war, the Germans were obliged to search for an external enemy. As a result, the national government took advantage of the desperate social mood and created a series of myths assigning various negative characteristics to Jewish people.

The appalling image of the Jews gradually turned into a strong prejudice against the entire nation. In the meantime, it would be wrong to believe that it was the First World War that determined the development of this phenomenon. History shows that the anti-Semitism appeared long before the war, and it was not only Germany that supported its cultivation. Many European countries, whether intentionally or not, contributed to the spread of anti-Semitic ideas to a larger or smaller extent.

Works Cited

Kaplan, Marion. Between Dignity and Despair: Jewish Life in Nazi Germany, New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. Print.

Richarz, Monika, Stella Rosenfeld, and Sidney Rosenfeld. Jewish Life in Germany: Memoirs from Three Centuries, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1991. Print.

Shandler, Jeffrey. Awakening Lives: Autobiographies of Jewish Youth in Poland Before the Holocaust, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2002. Print.

The issue of war and peace is a central matter of concern in developing bonds in the global arena as well as between states. It has always been a stumbling point in the theory of international relations. Now some numerous approaches and theories describe the acceptability of waging wars. Nevertheless, most of them are based on myths, including but not limited to the myth of optional war and the myth of national self-defense (Oberman 2015; Rodin 2014). Some of them focus on the conditions under which waging war is required, while others concentrate on the permissibility of military conflicts. Still, the question is, why is it ever possible to state that there are optional wars? Therefore, the belief that there is no such concept as optional or permissible war is the foundation of the paper at hand, as states are either required to become involved in conflicts due to self-defense issues or prohibited to as it points to the fact that they enjoy moral corruption and seek ways to justify unnecessary bloodshed (Oberman 2015).

Waging a war is a complicated decision, especially given a normative democratic theory. From the perspective of this approach, democratic states are rarely concerned about other democracies as they are believed to be predictable. It means that in most cases, other democracies are perceived as a pacifist and demonstrating no interest in aggressive actions (RAND n.d.). Still, the growing interconnectedness between international relations actors, as well as the increasing role of economic issues in the regulation of interstate bonds, makes it complicated to identify the real aggressor. In this way, the issue of the permissibility of wars is becoming more and more challenging.

To speculate the justification of the self-defense wars, it is critical, to begin with obtaining an understanding of such a concept as the lesser aggressor. It can be explained by the volume of potential harm a state might inflict when initiating military actions aimed at violating another state’s rights, such as sovereignty, national wealth, or territorial integrity. In this way, lesser aggressors are those that can do less harm compared to other potential aggressors (McMahan 2014b). From this perspective, waging wars against lesser aggressors is often seen as permissible because it is believed that averting small harm is beneficial for the state’s future welfare as well as helpful for improving its global image. This assumption is based on the belief that defeating a lesser aggressor—killing a small group of people—would serve as a warning sign for other potential aggressors as states demonstrate their power in such a way (Crisp 2013).

Nevertheless, it is essential to remember that lesser aggressors might create unofficial political and military pacts, thus increasing the volume of potential harm when waging wars against them (McMahan 2014b). At the same time, it is critical to point to the fact that the concept of lesser aggression if often connected to actions and political decisions that do not entail the risks of killing both civilians and soldiers, thus not jeopardizing vital human rights (McMahan 2014a). It means that even though they do not imply bloodshed, both individual lesser aggressors and their alliances might significantly destabilize international relations and negatively affect interstate bonds. It is the problem that is directly connected to the question of the permissibility of self-defense wars against lesser aggressors.

Still, to find a relevant answer to the problem under consideration, it is critical to realize that war theory is closely connected to particular myths. For instance, the myth of the optional war and the myth of the self-defense war are the two that are most relevant when questioning the permissibility of wars. Understanding them is essential for becoming aware of the most common motives that get states involved in wars and make them tolerate risks of potential human losses. At the same time, it is essential to realize that both are closely related to another and should be viewed integrally.

To begin with, the myth of optional war justifies waging military conflict even in cases when a country is not required to do so. It means that states initiate conflict because they believe that they are permitted to do so. One instance of such optional wars is a humanitarian intervention aimed at addressing internal political issues even if the other states have not asked for any kind of help (Oberman 2015). The reason for pointing to the significance of humanitarian aid in the form of military help is the fact that it can be well connected to the matters of national self-defense even though it is another state. Still, it is essential to mention that in this way, states initiating humanitarian interventions also demonstrate their power, thus decreasing potential risks of lesser aggression within their territories.

The concept of humanitarian wars is closely connected to the myth of self-defense wars because it is the second type of optional war (Oberman 2015). Nevertheless, the idea of self-defense wars is more intricate because it incorporates different aspects of national security. As mentioned above, the first aspect to justify self-defense war is the criticality of protecting a state’s sovereignty. It can be related to both aggressions and humanitarian wars (Stilz 2014). Still, this idea is ambiguous because not only democracies but also totalitarian regimes strive for the protection of sovereignty, thus claiming that self-defense wars are permissible. This concept was referred to as the Hegelian Myth—the desire of tyrannies to maintain their positions in a particular state, thus ignoring fundamental human rights, such as the right to life, and waging self-defense wars (Tesón 2004).

Another common justification of self-defense wars is the desire to protect the norms of nonaggression. It is seen in the belief that any aggressive activities of other states should be treated in the same way, thus demonstrating that it is the wrong approach to developing bonds between countries (Oberman 2015). The support of nonaggression by promoting military activities is illogical because it involves the violation of the right to life. However, it is critical to draw the line between a real threat and nonaggressive activities that do not involve risks to human life and a state’s sovereignty (Walzer 2015).

Except for protecting sovereignty and promoting nonaggression as the fundamental approach to developing international relations, there are other popular justifications of the self-defense war as well. For instance, one of the most commonly recalled issues is the challenge of preserving national wealth, which is commonly measured in natural resources (Szabó 2012). In similar cases, it is critical to realize that sometimes the desire to possess national resources is no more than robbery. It means that the activities of other states are not connected to aggression and that these states are not motivated to kill civilians or even soldiers (Øverland 2010). Instead, their only drive is to illegally transport natural resources to their states, thus increasing their national wealth.

Finally, it is critical to remember that there are instances of crooked politics, for instance, sending troops abroad without any justifiable reason. In some cases, humanitarian wars can be perceived as a crooked political decision. The idea is that the troops are sent without the real need to stabilize internal or international relations (Mapel 2004). In such cases, waging a self-defense war might also turn into the representation of crooked politics because it violates nonaggression norms and puts the lives of innocent people—both civilians and the attacking soldiers—at risk (Rodin 2004b).

Now that the primary motives for becoming involved in self-defense wars are clear, it is easier to find the answer to the question under consideration. Still, it is critical to point to the fact that this challenge is highly subjective and that there are numerous opposing opinions regarding the matter of concern. In this way, there are both supporters and critics of the belief that self-defense wars are justifiable. For instance, Rodin (2014) believes that there are self-defense wars that are impossible to justify in most cases mentioned above. This means that the robbery of national resources, the annexation of particular territories, or even limitation of political freedoms are not reasons for waging self-defense wars, because they do not impose risks to human lives or dignity (Rodin 2014; Steinhoff 2013).

At the same time, Rodin (2004a) points to the criticality of an adequate reaction to humanitarian interventions. The researcher claims that similar actions can be treated both aggressively and non-aggressively based on the motives of the other parties involved in the conflict. In this way, the focus should always be made on relations between citizens and states instead of bonds between states. This means that human life, not a state’s interests or international image, should become the highest priority (Rodin 2004a; Rodin 2004b). The author supports self-defense wars in the case of unjust bloodshed or violation of human rights, including killing people or enslaving them (Rodin 2014).

Nevertheless, Rodin’s dual perception of the permissibility of self-defense wars is a common subject for both support and criticism. For instance, Hurka (2005) shares the belief in the proportionality of treating lesser aggressors. In this way, the author believes that regardless of the complexity and controversy of the national self-defense myth, it is a comprehensive approach to perceiving self-defense wars due to its focus on estimating conflicts individually (Hurka 2005). The same opinion is supported by Ilsaas (2008). However, the author goes further and believes in the criticality of viewing the potential influence of conflicts on the development of international relations. In this way, if lesser aggressors neither violate vital human rights nor destabilize international relations, self-defense war is not justifiable (Blair 2008; Ilsaas 2008).

At the same time, Rodin’s approach is severely criticized. For instance, Tesón (2004) does not support the belief in the state–person relations, claiming that self-defense wars are permissible when opposing tyrannies and minimizing their potential influence on peace in the global arena. More than that, McMahan (2004) states that there are no arguments for justifying self-defense wars because all parties involved act immorally and violate international law and human rights. In this way, neither the lesser aggressor nor the party reacting to its activities should be supported (McMahan 2004). The same assumption is expressed by Tadros (2014), who believes that similar actions can be perceived as punitive wars and are immoral and should not be permitted.

To sum up, it is vital to state that the issue of the permissibility of self-defense wars against lesser aggressors is a complex and ambiguous matter of concern. Regardless of a wide variety of perceptions of the problem, that of Rodin seems the most comprehensive and well-developed because of the focus on state–person relations and the criticality of protecting fundamental human rights. Nevertheless, I cannot but support the idea of estimating the influence of lesser aggressions on the development of international relations as well as stability in the global arena. Therefore, based on conducted research and studying different opinions regarding self-defense wars, my conclusion is that it is possible to justify it in the most critical cases. In this way, if the lesser aggressors do not violate human rights and destabilize international relations, reacting to similar instances with military actions is immoral. Instead, it is advisable to deploy diplomatic leverages for solving conflicts and avoiding bloodshed. That said, in my opinion, the annexation of territories or robbery of national resources cannot be perceived as the instances that permit waging self-defense wars. Using them as such might point only to enjoying moral corruption in all involved parties and creating the image of cruel states that do not respect international law and nonaggression norms.

Reference List

Blair, J 2008, ‘Tensions in a certain conception of just war as law enforcement’, Res Publica, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 303-311.

Crisp, R 2013, The difficulty with lesser aggressors, Web.

Hurka, T 2005, ‘Proportionality and the morality of war’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 33, no.1, pp. 34-66.

Ilsaas, P A 2008, ‘Blair on Rodin: rejoinder’, Res Publica, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 313-316.

Mapel, D R 2004, ‘Innocent attackers and rights of self-defense’, Ethics & International Affairs, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 81-86.

McMahan, J 2004, ‘War as self-Defense’, Ethics & International Affairs, vol. 18, no. 1, 75-80.

McMahan, J 2014, ‘Proportionality in defense against inflictors of [many] small harms: some initial, incomplete thoughts’, Web.

McMahan, J 2014, “What rights may be defended by means of war?”, in C Fabre & S Lazar (eds), The morality of defensive war, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 115-158.

Oberman, K 2015, ‘The myth of the optional war: why states are required to wage wars they are permitted to wage’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, vol. 43, no. 4, pp. 1-38.

Øverland, G 2010, ‘Conditional Threats’, Journal of Moral Philosophy, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 334-345.

RAND n.d., The democratic peace idea, Web.

Rodin, D 2004, ‘Beyond national defense’, Ethics & International Affairs, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 93-98.

Rodin, D 2004, ‘War and self-defense’, Ethics & International Affairs, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 63-68.

Rodin, D 2014, “The myth of national self-defense”, in C Fabre & S Lazar (eds), The morality of defensive war, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 64-84.

Steinhoff, U 2013, ‘Rodin on self-defense and the “myth” of national self-defense: a refutation’, Philosophia, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 1017-1036.

Stilz, A 2014, “Territorial rights and national defense”, in C Fabre & S Lazar (eds), The morality of defensive war, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 203-228.

Szabó, K T 2012, Anticipatory action in self-defense: essence and limits under international law, Springer, Amsterdam.

Tadros, V 2014 “Punitive War”, in H Frowe and G Lang (eds), How we fight: ethics in war, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 18-37.

Tesón, F R 2004, ‘Self-defense in international law and rights of persons’, Ethics & International Affairs, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 87-92.

Walzer, M 2015, Just and unjust wars: a moral argument with historical illustrations, Basic Books, New York.

Tactics Used by Early Colonist

The early colonists in the United States used to divide and rule as one of the basic military strategies to conquer the Native American opponents. Through Christianity brought by the early explorers and missionaries, the colonists were able to convert a number of Native Americans who they installed as village rulers. The colonists used these converts to understand the plans of the local rebels and to organize surprise attacks on them which had devastating consequences. They always knew the plans of their opponents hence they could easily strike them before they could organize an offensive (Lovern and Locust 79).

The biggest strength of this strategy was that the colonists were always ahead of their Native American rivals in war planning. They infiltrated the camps of the Native Americans and knew all their planned activities well in advance. On the other hand, the Native Americans knew nothing about the military plans of the colonists hence they were always unaware when the enemy would strike (Kalayjian and Eugene 113). This strategy also helped the colonists to determine the size and strength of their enemy. This way, they were able to make necessary preparations to attack the enemy or defend their camp.

The main weakness of this tactic was that in some regions it failed to work. Not all the locals were willing to help the settlers to fight Native Americans. Some considered this a betrayal of their own people, hence opted to die instead of helping the colonists. Tucker says that in some cases, the natives acted as a spy to the Native American army instead of being a reliable informer to the colonists (19).

Native American Military Practices

The Native Americans had their own military practices that helped them protect their territory from the intruders. Guerrilla warfare was one of the most popular strategies that they used, especially to fight the White settlers (Tucker, Arnold, and Wiener 56). This strategy was effective in their political and cultural environment given that the settlers had superior weapons. Engaging the settlers in direct combat was dangerous to the Native Americans hence they employed this strategy as a way of inhibiting the settlers’ ability to conquer their land. Although the Native Americans failed to stop the settlers from taking over their land and imposing their rule on the locals, the strategy complicated the administration of the colony by the settlers. This strategy was later used to successfully achieve independence from the British rulers.

The Native Americans also employed scalping as a strategy to drive away from the settlers from their land. According to Gregory, the colonists were always brutal in their attacks and they did not spare anyone when conquering a region (61). The Native Americans employed the dreaded scalping strategy to send a message to the foreigners that they too would show any mercy to the settlers. Scalping was considered more appropriate than beheading the victims. Given the political environment at that time, this strategy was considered very appropriate because the locals were able to pass a message to the colonists that they were willing and ready to do anything to protect their territory. The strategy forced most of the settlers to stay in specific locals where they could protect themselves and avoid this severe punishment (Lundquist 78). It was one of the practices that the colonists feared.

Works Cited

Gregory, Sheila. Voices of Native American Educators: Integrating History, Culture, and Language to Improve Learning Outcomes for Native American Students. Hoboken: Wiley, 2013. Print.

Kalayjian, Ani, and Dominique Eugene. Mass Trauma and Emotional Healing Around the World: Rituals and Practices for Resilience and Meaning-Making. Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010. Print.

Lovern, Lavonna, and Carol Locust. Native American Communities on Health and Disability: A Borderland Dialogue. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Print.

Lundquist, Suzanne. Native American Literatures: An Introduction. New York: Continuum, 2005. Print.

Tucker, Spencer, James Arnold, and Roberta Wiener. The Encyclopedia of North American Indian Wars, 1607-1890: A Political, Social, and Military History. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2011. Print.

Tucker, Spencer. Almanac of American Military History. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2013. Print.

The War of Independence in the United States which started in 1775 and lasted till 1783 resulted in great liberation of many states within the country from the colonial rule of the British Empire (Krieger 53). The war started as a resistance towards payment of taxes, it became a protest before escalating to boycotts. The British authorities responded by closing Boston port and putting restriction as a way of punishing the locals (Koonings 12). A group of freedom fighters calling themselves Patriots formed their own government in Boston to coordinate the activities of the locals.

Twelve colonies supported this new movement and together they formed Continental Congress. This was a group of civilians and militia willing and ready to liberate their country from the colonial powers through any way possible. As the War of Independence gained momentum, the liberators realized that although the military played the main role in fighting the colonial masters, it was important to maintain civilian control over them because of the desire to have a democratic government other than a dictatorial rule of the military. In this paper, the researcher will look at how civilian control of the military was established and maintained throughout the War of Independence and after (Forsythe 38).

Civilian control of the military was established at the initial stages of the war. The revolution was started by civil groups who were dissatisfied by the way British government was governing the country. At first, their actions did not involve the use of force hence there was no need for a military group. It then turned into protests and boycotts to destruction of properties. The revolutionists then realized that they needed military force to drive away the colonial masters (Masciulli 42). The first step that was made to ensure that the military remained under the rule of civilians was the appointment of General George Washington as to head the militia group. The military general knew that he was exercising authority given to him by the civilians.

During the war, General Washington had to consult Continental Congress- a body of civilian rulers- when making important decisions. This helped in installing a civilian leadership during the war. The militias knew that they derived their authority from the masses who wanted to gain independence from the colonial masters. They knew that they were working on behalf of the citizens of the United States (Marston 81). Their interest when engaging in the war was to achieve victory for the people and to establish a rule for the locals. The Continental Congress gave Washington powers to command the military and to ensure that the country was liberated from the colonial rule, but he did this based on the regulations given to him by the Congress.

After the War of Independence, important precedents were set to ensure that there was civilian control of the military. The country gained independence and elected a president in a democratic election. The constitution stipulated that the president of the United States of America had to be a civilian. This means that if a military officer wanted to vie for a political position, he had to resign and become a civilian (Chartrand 89). The constitution also made the civilian president the commander-in-chief, giving him full control over the military. The supremacy of the civilian president over military commanders was demonstrated when President Harry Truman terminated the command of celebrated General Douglas MacArthur’s command.

Works Cited

Chartrand, Rene. American War of Independence Commanders. New York: Osprey Publishing, 2013. Print.

Forsythe, David. Encyclopedia of Human Rights: Vol. 5. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Print.

Koonings, Kees. Political Armies: The Military and Nation Building in the Age of Democracy. New York: Zed Books, 2013. Print.

Krieger, Joel. The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Print.

Marston, Daniel. The American Revolution 1774-1783. Oxford: Osprey Publishing Limited, 2012. Print.

Masciulli, Joseph. The Ashgate Research Companion to Political Leadership. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2009. Print.

War has always been an integral part of human society. Very often, it has served as a main moving force that has contributed to the communitys further evolution and the appearance of new unique features. Moreover, it has also been considered one of the tools of natural selection that has promoted the survival of the strongest groups and the extinction of the weakest ones. Thus, the causes of war have been different. Trying to obtain a certain competitive advantage, states have fought for territory, resources, people, and more. Yet, in the course of the evolution of society and the development of diplomacy, the causes of war have become more complex. As a result, the majority of modern military conflicts have been instigated by a set of sophisticated reasons that have triggered the evolution of various processes and the escalation of violence. In this regard, the subject of war could be considered an important topic.

Thus, one realizes the fact that war also attracts the attention of people who are directly impacted or know about it. That is why there are also numerous sources that try to depict the most important peculiarities of this process and understand its ugly nature. War obviously cripples individuals, altering their mentalities, psyche, and lives. For instance, A Novel of the Balkans by S. Drakulic shows readers how war deprives people of their identity and creates the basis for numerous problems in the future. The region depicted in the story has experienced a severe military and civil conflict that resulted in the collapse of the state. There were different causes for this opposition. However, no one won, and people found themselves in a totally devastated land inhabited by desolate people who were not able to understand how they should survive under the new conditions. That is why, being a teacher, the main character of the novel turned into a depersonalized, raped refugee, who had no motherland and who had to look for her identity (Drakulic 67). The novel revolves around the subject of war by underlining its pernicious impact on peoples lives. Individuals involved in the war are deprived of a future.

Additionally, the war also destroys families and annihilates values appreciated by people. Being placed in stressful conditions, they adhere to unusual behavioral patterns. Additionally, the political background of the majority of wars conditions the appearance of disputes within the family. The Company You Keep provides a certain perspective on the way the tension between political ideals and family loyalties might contribute to the aggravation of the situation (Gordon 34). People who have experienced war are very often not able to restore their inner balance and reunite with family because of the differences in attitudes to war. This is another aspect of the subject of war. Very often, it results in the collapse of the traditional value system and reconsideration of one’s main principles.

Altogether, the nature of war and its never-ending character contribute to the increased importance of the subject of war. It is obvious that it has an overwhelming impact on peoples lives and cripples their souls. There have been different causes that have triggered the escalation of violence; however, the result has always been the same. Being deprived of their homes, individuals are doomed to wander, looking for new shelter and trying to find their identity and reconsider their lives. War has a horrible face and results in the appearance of thousands of unhappy people.

Works Cited

Drakulic, Slavenka. S. A Novel about the Balkans. Penguin, 1999.

Gordon, Neil. The Company You Keep. Penguin, 2004.

The First World War has become one of the most tragic and bloody events in the history of mankind. The consequences of this War had a powerful impact on the course of history. Its beginning had a series of determinants, each of which needs to be critically evaluated in order to acquire a clear vision of the entire phenomenon. The paper at hand is aimed at examining the key factors that are considered to be the principal causes of the war, breaking out: militarism, alliance, nationalism, imperialism, and assassination.

First and foremost, it should be noted that at the relevant historic point, two powerful European countries were aimed at enhancing their military forces. In other words, at the beginning of the twentieth century, Great Britain and Germany started an overall arms race in order to establish a leading position in the region. As a result, new military technologies developed rapidly, and the climate grew tenser. The most numerous armies of the time were German, French, and Russian, with 5, 4, and 1.2 millions of soldiers relatively.

Secondly, it is essential to point out that at the stated historic point, all the relationships were determined by the alliances terms. Thus, the entire European continent was divided into two major unions: triple entente and triple alliance. The former comprised such countries Great Britain, France, and Russia, whereas the latter included Germany Austria-Hungary and Italy. Each member of the alliance was obliged to provide the essential military support to its allies.

Moreover, one of the key characteristics of the beginning of the twentieth century is the appearance of the nationalistic implications in the social environment. Along with the national pride and the feeling of self-identity, the willingness to receive the overall recognition increased. Hence, for example, Slavic groups publicly announced their determination to acquire independence, and were actively supported by the Russians. It should be, likewise, noted that the nationalism of the relevant period possessed aggressive and radical connotations – in their intention to gain independence, nations were ready to employ any resources available to them.

Furthermore, at the end of the nineteenth centuries, European countries would engage in extending their influence through colonies. Germany’s imperial ambitions contradicted the reality, as the country had a few number of colonies in the New World. As a result, it was eager to reorganize the existed world order. The rivalry in the colonial race had a negative impact on the general tone of the diplomatic relationships.

As it has been mentioned above, Germany was the most interested party in breaking out the war. In the meantime, it could not carry out this plan without the relevant formal reason. As a result, the formal reason was found. It was the assignation of the Archduke of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire which was organized and executed by the representatives of the Serbian terrorist organisation “Black Hand”, namely Gavrilo Princip.

Thence, the European community reached the point of no return, and it was Austria who first declared the war on Serbia. Then, Germany would also join in, begging one of the most crucial wars that history would have ever known. Meanwhile, it is essential to note that the causes mentioned above are just the complex groups of prerequisites – in fact, there might be hundreds of accidental coincidences that led to the tragic events.