Category: War

Most countries that participated in the Second World War served either the interest of the allied forces or that of the Germans. The Second World War took place primarily to prevent the German invasion of Europe and the rest of the world. Britain, being one of the major frontier forces against the Germans drew most of its colonies in the war.

Like most of the British colonies around the globe that participated in the Second World War, Australia did not take part in repelling the Germans from invading the Middle East and Europe to serve her interest but that of Britain and the allied forces.

The United Kingdom and the Australian governments used the war propaganda to make Australians believe that they are facing the real threat either from the Far East or from the German naval forces¹. As a result, Australian ground soldiers and aircrew were recruited through various programs to participate in the war particularly in Europe and around the Mediterranean.

Various reasons indicate the reason why the Australian interests were not served during the war. First, the war was not between Australia and the Germans. In fact, the allied forces were protecting Europe and not Australia from the German invasion and occupation.

While it could be argued that the allied forces were protecting even their colonies, Australia in particular was not facing the real threat from the Germans and its allies. In fact, the absence of the German naval forces in the Indian and the Pacific Oceans was a clear indication that the threat was not immediate².

Second, the British Royal Air Force (RAF) controlled the activities of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the ground solders that participated in the war. In fact, the United Kingdom ensured that its colonies or the commonwealth countries participated in the war through various programs.

Essentially, Britain and its dominions adopted the programs such as the Empire Air Training Schemes (EATS) to ensure constant supply of trained aircrew to fight alongside the RAF³. Through the program, the RAAF recruits received basic training around the Australian airbases.

From the airbases, the recruits were sent overseas for further training and redeployment to participate in the air squadrons in Europe. In fact, thousands of the Australian aircrew and ground solders headed to Europe in aid of the British during the Second World War.

Third, the British did not prioritize the Australian interests in the Far East. When Singapore and Malaya were under the threat of the Japanese invasion, the allied forces failed to protect these Australian interests rather, diverted the Australian air force to fight in the Balkans.

With thousands RAAF aircrew deployed in various parts of Europe, the available Australian naval force could hardly resist the Japanese invasion and intent without the backing of the allied forces. Therefore, it could well be argued that the participation of Australia in the Second World War was not to serve the Australian interest but that of the United Kingdom.

Essentially, the deployment of the RAAF and ground soldiers in the Middle East and Europe only served the interest of the British and the allied forces. During the Second World War, the Australians served in various capacities ranging from aircrew to maintenance and administrative responsibilities.

References

Horner, DM, “The Greek campaign February–April 1941: the political decision”, High command: Australia and allied strategy, 1939–1945, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1982, pp. 76-85.

McCarthy, JM, “The defence of Australia-and the empire air training scheme: 1939-1942”, The Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 20 no. 3, 1978, pp. 326-334.

Robertson, J, “The Mediterranean campaign, 1940–1945”, in J Robertson (ed.), Australia at war: 1939–1945, William Heinemann Publishers, Melbourne, 1981, pp. 37-51.

Footnotes

¹ JM McCarthy, “The defence of Australia-and the empire air training scheme: 1939-1942”, The Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 20 no. 3, 1978, pp.326.

² DM Horner, High command: Australia and allied strategy, 1939–1945, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1982, pp. 77

³ J Robertson, Australia at war: 1939–1945, William Heinemann Publishers, Melbourne, 1981, pp. 37.

Introduction

On December 27, 1979, the world woke up to the news of the invasion of puny Afghanistan in Asia by the then super power of the Soviet Union.

The news brought with it the surmise that this was a war that Afghanistan, a disunited country with limited military resources, would not stand up to the military might of the Soviet Union, leading to the foregone conclusion that in a short while of time, Afghanistan would become another satellite country of the Soviet Union, joining the many satellite countries like Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary that the Soviet Union had taken over, since the end of the Second World War.

Protests were naturally expected from the United States of America (U.S.A.), the NATO countries, and other nations friendly with the U.S.A. and the NATO powers. They would remain protests only, just as would be the noises that would emanate from the United Nations (U.N).

Gradually they were expected to die out. Afghanistan would have to virtually fight its own physical battles against the Soviet Union, and fait accompli the small nation of Afghanistan would be gobbled up by the mighty super power of the Soviet Union.

Initially, the course of events could find no fault with the surmise that Afghanistan was a lost country, as more and more parts of the country swiftly came under the control of the Soviet Union. However, gradually the speed of the advance of the Soviet Union slowed, and even though most of the country was in their hands, they were soon facing strong resistance from the resilient Afghans in their pockets of strength.

It was becoming clear that this was turning out to be a war of as attrition, and the more determined of the opponents would carry the day. The light at the end of the tunnel for the Afghans was glowing bright. The Soviets had not come prepared for a war of attrition, and the Afghans with ever growing support from the Americans in terms of military supplies were proving a hard nut to crack, in terms of total dominance.

The war between the Soviet Union dragged on for nearly a decade, and in the early months of 1989, a tired, disappointed, and disgraced Soviet Union started pulling out its battle weary troops, not wanting to lose any soldiers to what had become a lost cause.

Afghanistan had surprised the world by first withstanding total domination by the Soviet Union, and then driving the troops of the Soviet Union out of the country. Another super power had bitten the dust to a determined opponent, brining back memories of war between the U.S.A. and Vietnam.

Background

Moves by the Soviet Union to control the country of Afghanistan started earlier than the attempted physical invasion of Afghanistan. This was the consequence to its desire to expand its influence in Asia, and get closer to the prized warm water ports of the Arabian Sea.

Through a bloody coup in April 27, 1978, a puppet communist government was established under President Nur M. Taraki. The government of Nur M. Taraki was not a popular government, and not surprisingly resistance to the government sprung up in different parts of the country that essentially consisted of several warrior tribes.

The first major outburst of this resistance took hardly a year to happen, when in March 1979 a bloody uprising took place in the city of Herat. The uprising was put down, but the casualties included 100 Soviet Union citizens, which was a foreboding of things to come, and the possible time when the Soviet Union realized that it may be forced to actually occupy the country, if it wanted to control it (Navroz & Grau, 1996).

In essence, the problems within the ruling Communist Party in Afghanistan stemmed from factionalism that existed in it, making it a divided house. There were two prominent factions, namely the Khalq, led by the Pathans and the Parchem consisting of the Uzbek, Tajik, and Hazara tribes.

Fighting between these factions often led to physical battles between them. There was no unity between President Nur, M. Taraki and his deputies, Hafizullah Amin, Babrak Kamal, and Najibullah. To try and establish peace Babrak Kamal and Najibullah were called to the Soviet Union, and retained there (Margolis, 2001, p.15)

However, in September 1979, Hafizullah Amin set up the murder of President Nur, M. Taraki and took over power. Under Hafizullah Amin conditions went from bad to worse, as he set about a radical modernization and bloody Sovietization of Afghanistan that was reminiscent of totalitarianism under Stalin.

He did not even spare his opponents in the moderate Communist Khalq faction, leading to growing resistance from Afghans from all the tribes.

The growing turmoil arising from the cruel disposition of Hafizullah Amin, necessitated action from Soviet Union to retain its hold on Afghanistan, which came in the form of a unit of the Soviet Special Forces eliminating Hafizullah Amin, and the movement of Soviet troops into Afghanistan on December 27, 1979 to bolster Soviet control over Afghanistan.

Another puppet Afghan government was put in place by bringing back from the Soviet Union Babrak Kamal to head the regime and Najibullah as his deputy. The puppet regime would be supported by the Soviet forces in the country that were already taking control of most of Afghanistan. The presence of a foreign invading force, in the form of the troops of the Soviet Union, in Afghanistan had its consequences.

The various Afghan tribes that were feuding with one another united together to fend off the invader, and focused all its attention on this objective. This action of the Afghan Muslim tribes was reinforced by the Jihad call given by the Muslim religious leaders in Afghanistan. The Jihad call was against the invading non-believers from the Soviet Union and their Communist Afghan allies.

History of the subsequent decade shows how the several tribes of Afghanistan united under the Mujahedeen gradually forced the Soviet Union to withdraw its invading forces from the soils of Afghanistan (Margolis, 2001, p.15-17).

Factors in the Defeat of the Soviet Union in the War in Afghanistan

Soviet Union Tactics in Afghanistan

The Soviet tactics to gain control of Afghanistan were essentially based on the experiences in their earlier subjugation of the Hungarian revolution of 1956, and the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet Union began its assault on December 27, 1979 by the taking of the Bagram air base in Afghanistan by two airborne assault brigades, which was followed by the entry of the Soviet Army through the land passes of the Salang Pass and the Salang tunnel, after they were secured by Soviet Special Forces.

The Soviet objective to control the main cities of Heart, Shindand, Kabul, and Kandahar was quickly achieved. Within a span of one week, the Soviet Union moved 50,000 ground troops, 350 tanks, and 450 armored vehicles into Afghanistan, with which it aimed at controlling the key cities and the main communication lines (Clements, 2003, p.19).

Basically the Soviet tactics for the invasion of Afghanistan and its subsequent control of Afghanistan consisted of seven elements.

These seven elements consisted of the presence of its troops along the main routes, key cities, airbases, and logistically important sites brining about stability in the country; using the Afghan government troops to meet any counter insurgency threats, with particular emphasis on the country side; meeting the logistic, air, artillery, and intelligence support needs of the Afghan government troops in their counter insurgency operations; minimizing the need for interaction between the Soviet personnel and the local populace; reducing the casualty count of the Soviet troops to the minimal; and making the Afghan government troops strong enough to defeat the resistance and take over the country, to enable withdrawal of the Soviet.

Every element of this strategy of the Soviet Union was doomed for failure, as it was based on its successful experiences in the European theatre. Afghanistan was to present an experience that the Soviet Union had never experienced, and were hardly prepared for, when they entered Afghanistan, which was to be a critical factor in its losing the War in Afghanistan (Navroz & Grau, 1996).

The Soviet forces came to fight a conventional war, for which they were trained, experienced, and armed, including SA-4 anti-aircraft missiles and chemical weapons. The war they would have to fight however was not made up of conventional warfare, but rather the guerilla tactics of the Afghan resistance, which the Afghan government army was not capable of putting down.

The failure of this key ingredient in the recipe made out for winning the war in Afghanistan by the strategists of the Soviet Union, combined with the lack of training and experience of the Soviet forces in guerrilla warfare would unravel all the other elements in the tactics used by the Soviet forces (Clements, 2003, p.19).

The incapacity of the Afghan government forces to counter the resistance in the country side sucked in the Soviet forces into the country side in support of their Afghan allies, resulting in the need to increase the presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union within a short time of its invasion of Afghanistan was forced to increase its armed strength in Afghanistan to 85,000 ground troops, 25,000 support troops, 10,000 airborne troops, with the active additional support of 30,000 troops and air force pilots though located in the Soviet Union, seeing action in Afghanistan.

The increased number of troops and their active participation in anti-insurgency operations only increased their exposure to enemy activity, enhancing the casualties, and nullifying the strategy to minimize the casualties taken by the Soviet forces in Afghanistan (Clements, 2003, p.19).

In spite of this increase in strength of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, at no time during the nearly decade long war was Soviet Union willing to commit the large strength of Soviet forces required to quell the insurgency. This aspect combined with the unwillingness to face large casualties dictated the tactics employed by the Soviet forces to combat the Afghan insurgency.

Their immense fire power and tactical mobility made up the key elements in their approach to fight insurgency (Borer, 1999, P.175-176). Typical engagements with the insurgents show that upon the reconnaissance patrol being fired upon, the battalion came to a halt, and artillery fire and helicopter support was called in.

Subsequently, feeble attempts were made to encircle the enemy, which stopped the moment enemy fire occurred. Since the Mujahedeen employed tactics that called for a withdrawal after extracting a heavy toll on the opposing force, enemy fire soon reduced, but even then the Soviet ground forces failed to go after the Mujahedeen and continue the action to destroy them.

This lack of commitment only encouraged more hit and run activity from the Mujahedeen, who struck at will, and withdrew when the heavy fire power of the Soviet forces was brought to bear on them (Grau, 1996, p.2-3).

In effect the Soviet armed forces maintained control over the major cities and their strategically located and protected garrisons, while control of the country side was essentially with the Mujahedeen resistance fighters. To reduce the control that was exerted by the Mujahedeen on the country side, the Soviet forces countered with the combined scorched earth policy and migratory-genocide policy.

In the scorched earth policy, the Soviet used its air force to conduct bombing raids on the country side to destroy the Mujahedeen, with no consideration for the innocent civilians in the area, which was similar to what was done by the U.S.A in Vietnam. The migratory-genocide policy was aimed at reducing the ranks of the Mujahedeen getting swelled from population bases that supported it.

Actions of this policy involved the destruction of agricultural crops to force the local population to flee to countries like Iran and Pakistan.

Both these policies became self-defeating, as the civilian deaths from the scorched earth policy and the humiliation that the local populace was forced to undergo in the migratory-genocide policy only increased the wrath of the local populace against the Soviet invaders that swelled the ranks of the Mujahedeen, and the commitment of the Mujahedeen to drive the invaders from their lands (Borer, 1999, p.176)

In the face of the determined Mujahedeen the plan of the Soviet Union to minimize its losses did not work. By the end of the war, the Soviet Union had suffered troop casualties of 30,000 either dead or wounded, the loss of 3,500 vehicles, and 600 aircraft, which were brought down by the clever use of the Stinger missiles by the Mujahedeen (Borer, 1999, p.176).

Summing up the failure of the Soviet tactics in Afghanistan starts from the wrong assumption that Afghanistan would be an easy pushover with the conventional warfare strength of the Soviet Union, and the failure to take into consideration, or have a plan for the guerilla warfare that they would really face in Afghanistan.

Consequently, the Soviet Union deployed heavily mechanized forces that were unsuited for the hit and run tactics of the Mujahedeen on rugged terrains.

The belief that the war in Afghanistan would be won using conventional war tactics against a force that was using guerrilla tactics meant that the Soviet Union never deployed the numerical strength in troops that were required to overcome the Mujahedeen in their country side strongholds. The Soviet Union went to war in Afghanistan using technology against peasantry.

The guerrilla war that developed in Afghanistan could not be won by the use of technology, but rather by endurance and a national will for victory, along with commitment and morale of the fighting force. None of these elements were present in the tactics used by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, which contributed to its losing the war in Afghanistan ((Navroz & Grau, 1996).

The Mujahedeen of Afghanistan

The warlike tribes of Afghanistan have been feared fighters starting from the time the Greeks came in contact with them right down to the height of the British colonial period.

Even the British made every attempt to avoid direct confrontation with the Afghan tribes and any attempt to make Afghanistan a British colony, because of the fighting spirit of the Afghan tribes and their adaptation to the rugged terrain they live on to take a maximum toll of any enemy.

The Afghan tribes live by their own laws, and fiercely love and defend their independence. They are also devout Muslims. This makes for a deadly concoction that any invader of Afghanistan should be wary of, for even though they easily fight amongst themselves, the threat of a non-Muslim denigrating their soil and threatening their independence unites all the tribes to take on the invader as an enemy (Margolis, 2001, p.15).

Fighting for a Muslim comes easily and it can be traced back to the time of the war on Mecca and the humiliation of the defeat and forced abandonment of Mecca, which gave rise to the cry “Fight in the cause of Allah who fight you”, Surah 2, verse 190. This is further reinforced by Surah 4 verse 75 “And why should one not fight in the cause of God and of those who, being weak, are ill-treated (and oppressed)?

Men, women, and children, whose cry is; Our Lord! Rescue us from this town, whose people are oppressors; and raise for us from thee one who will protect; and raise for us from thee one who will help! (Maitra, 2009, p.65).

The Soviet Union through its invasion of Afghanistan took upon a warrior nation that looked upon this trespass of their lands by a non-believer as a humiliation of their religion. This act was made worse by the scorched-earth policy and the migratory-genocide policy, through which the Soviet Union demonstrated lack of understanding of the blood of innocent civilians shed and the travails that women and children were put too.

The consequence was the determination of the Mujahedeen through Jihad to rid the land of the oppressor, no matter what sacrifices had to be made in this religious war. Thus, in the Mujahedeen the Soviet forces faced a fierce, committed and determined enemy, with no fear for their lives (Margolis, 2001, p.15-17).

The Mujahedeen were consisted of teenagers from the age of eighteen to battle hardened veterans over the age of sixty, and each fought with the same fervor as a Muslim did during the infancy if Islam. They demonstrated the enthusiasm, commitment, and the lack of fear of death that was a consequence of the blood of their ancestors that coursed in their veins.

They would ambush Soviet troop movements outside of their garrisons effectively using their knowledge of the terrain to their advantage, and then quietly withdraw from the scene of ambush, when the Soviet reinforcements and air power threatened to over run their positions. However, by then they would have extracted the toll they wanted on the ambushed Soviet armed forces (Margolis, 2001, p.3).

When the Soviet troops showed reluctance to come out of their garrisons, the Mujahedeen attempted to draw them out by firing rockets on to their positions and presenting themselves as targets for their response.

The response of the Soviet armed forces was a barrage of artillery and tank fire that the Mujahedeen hid from using the rocky land formation for cover. However, they withdrew, when they found that the intensity of the enemy response was becoming too heavy for them (Margolis, 2001, p.3).

These sorties against the enemy forces were carried out by the poor Mujahedeen fighters. They were so poor that they could not afford coats and shoes. In the icy cold mountains of Afghanistan, the Mujahedeen went to battle covered in thin shawls to protect them from the cold.

In bare feet and flimsy protection from the cold, the Mujahedeen would plod through snow for more than a day and night with a heavy load of mortars or rockets on their backs, in addition to their rifles to attack their enemies ensconced in garrisons or travelling in motorized vehicles, and then return in the same manner, with the added task of evading the helicopter gunships that would come hunting for them.

Such was the determination and commitment of the Mujahedeen in their fight against the Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan (Margolis, 2001, p.5).

In the early years of the war in Afghanistan, the Mujahedeen virtually took on the might of the Soviet army with outdated.303 rifles, rockets, mortars, and grenade launchers. In essence, these were light weapons that were no match for the fire power available with the Soviet armed forces, and no use at all against the helicopters and airplanes that were used to bomb them.

However, as realization that the Afghans were putting stiff resistance to the Soviet occupation, became clear to the world, assistance to take on the air attacks was made available to the Mujahedeen, which was to add a new dimension to the resistance being put up by the Mujahedeen to the discomfort of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan (Angstrom & Duvyestan, 2007, p.158).

For the early part of the Soviet war in Afghanistan the Mujahedeen ability to prevent air attacks was limited to the SA-7 shoulder-to-air missile (SAM), with which they attempted to inflict whatever damage they could to Soviet aircraft and helicopters. In 1985, however they received British-made Blowpipe SAMs, which enhanced their ability to shoot down Soviet aircraft and helicopters.

The clinching blow came in 1986, when the American made efficient SAM missiles became available to them. The SAM missile made it possible for the Mujahedeen to cause heavy damage during Soviet air attacks, with particular emphasis on Soviet helicopters. The Soviet strategy to reduce ground forces casualties was to use artillery fire, aircraft and helicopters to attack Mujahedeen positions.

The attrition rate on helicopters that the Mujahedeen were extracting during such attacks was making the use of helicopters against the Mujahedeen too costly.

The attack from a distance strategy of the Soviet Union was unraveling, and with unwillingness to enhance the force strength in Afghanistan to the required levels, and commit ground troops to destroy the Mujahedeen, meant that the only course left for the Soviet Union was to pull out of Afghanistan (Angstrom & Duvyestan, 2007, p.158).

The fighting abilities of the warrior Afghan nation, and the grit, determination, and religious fervor with which they took on the much mightier super power, and growing from strength to strength with support received from external sources, as the world realized the resistance that was being put up by them, was an important reason why the Soviet Union lost the war in Afghanistan.

Role of Foreign Support

During the Cold War, the U.S.A. essentially relied on Pakistan for its strategic purposes in South Asia. Afghanistan was simply kept out of the American ambit, as the U.S.A could not provide any guarantees on its protection from invasion by the Soviet Union. Consequently the Baghdad Pact an assembly of American allies in Asia found Pakistan as a member, but not Afghanistan.

Afghanistan thus maintained a neutral posture in the Cold War. American support to Afghanistan was limited to small monetary support. However, the neutral position of Afghanistan over time was eroded, and Afghanistan started leaning towards the Soviet Union due to economic largesse that the Soviet Union showed, and led to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to maintain its firm grip on it (Clements, 2003, p.257).

During the initial years of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, U.S.A was under the stewardship of President Carter, who maintained a strong policy of non-intervention in regional wars. This limited the reaction of the U.S.A. to verbal and diplomatic responses to the Soviet invasion.

When President Reagan replaced President Carter in 1980, the dove-like attitude of America to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan changed to a more hawk-like posture. The failure of the Soviet Union to gain absolute control of Afghanistan and the resistance put up by the Mujahedeen only enhanced this hawkish posture of the U.S.A (Hilali, 2005, p.147-159).

There is no doubt that the support and aid received as a result of Reagan Doctrine was instrumental in the Mujahedeen gaining in strength to increase the pressure on the Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan and the realization by the Soviet Union that they were involved in a war that they could not win.

Based on the Reagan Doctrine, American military support to the Mujahedeen rose to $120 million in 1984 and continued to rise to $ 630 million in 1987, totaling more than $2 billion in military supplies during these years. More American support was made available through the good offices of American allies like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

Pakistan played a major role in acting as the funnel through which this massive American support reached the Mujahedeen, and also provided them training in using the military supplies and strategic advice on tactics to be used to defeat the Soviet armed forces. In addition, Pakistan became the home of more than 3.5 million Afghan refugees, who had fled the fighting in Afghanistan (Hastedt, 2004, p.5).

While the American response to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan was initially weak, the response of Pakistan was swifter and of great assistance to the Mujahedeen in their early days of resistance against the Soviet Union invaders. The quick response of Pakistan was the result of the security threat that would be posed by an entrenched Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

Even prior to the arrival of the Soviet troops, Pakistan had set up guerrilla training camps in Afghanistan against the Afghan Communist government. The Pakistani President Zia ul Huq believed the war in Afghanistan was a military and economic profit opportunity for Pakistan.

President Zia activated the Guerrilla training camps for the Mujahedeen and based on strategic calculations decided that a course of action that provided overt political, diplomatic, and humanitarian support to the Afghan refugees on one side, while on the other hand providing covert assistance to the Mujahedeen, by becoming the funneling channel for American military and American aid to the Afghan resistance fighters.

Pakistan did extract its pound of flesh from the U.S.A. for its actions in support of the Afghan Mujahedeen, but it is agreed that Pakistan provided yeoman service by training them on how to use the military aid and knitting them into an effective fighting force (Hilali, 2005, p.147-159).

Conclusion

There were three major reasons that in combination worked towards the defeat of the Soviet Union in its war in Afghanistan.

The first major reason was the poor tactical strategy that was employed by the Soviet Union in believing that it was going to fight a conventional war and that it would it would be able to easily overcome any resistance on the basis of its conventional warfare might, without the required strength of the invasion force to quell resistance in the country side.

The second reason was the strong resistance put up by the Mujahedeen in the face of all the adversity faced, with the objective of repelling the invaders from Afghan soil.

The final nail in the coffin was the large and generous military and economic aid that was provided by the U.S.A. and its allies, and the role played by Pakistan in reaching this aid to the Mujahedeen and training it to use the military aid in its guerrilla tactics against the Soviet Union forces in Afghanistan.

End Notes

1. Mohammad Yahya Navroz & Lester W. Grau. 1996. The Soviet War in Afghanistan: History and Harbinger of Future War. Web.

2. Eric, S. Margolis. 2001. War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Tibet. New York: Routledge, p.15.

3. Ibid., 15-17

4. Frank Clements. 2003. Conflict in Afghanistan: A Historical Encyclopedia. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, Inc., p.19.

5. Mohammad Yahya Navroz & Lester W. Grau. 1996. The Soviet War in Afghanistan: History and Harbinger of Future War. Web.

6. Frank Clements. 2003. Conflict in Afghanistan: A Historical Encyclopedia. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, Inc., p.19.

7. Ibid., p.19

8. Douglas, A. Borer. 1999. Super Powers Defeated: Vietnam and Afghanistan Compared. Abingdon, Oxon: Frank Cass Publishers, p.175-176.

9. Lester, W. Grau. 1996. The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan. Washington D. C: National Defense University Press, p.2-3.

10. Douglas, A. Borer. 1999. Super Powers Defeated: Vietnam and Afghanistan Compared. Abingdon, Oxon: Frank Cass Publishers, p. 176.

11. Ibid., p.176.

12. Mohammad Yahya Navroz & Lester W. Grau. 1996. The Soviet War in Afghanistan: History and Harbinger of Future War. Web.

13. Eric, S. Margolis. 2001. War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Tibet. New York: Routledge, p.15.

14. Gautam Maitra. 2009. For Whom the Bells Toll: America or the Jihadists? Victoria: Canada: Trafford Publishing, p.65.

15. Eric, S. Margolis. 2001. War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Tibet. New York: Routledge, p.15-17.

16. Ibid., p.3

17. Ibid., p.3

18. Ibid., p.5

19. Jan Angstrom & Isabelle Duyvestan. 2007. Understanding Victory and Defeat in Contemporary War. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, p. 158.

20. Ibid., p.158

21. Frank Clements. 2003. Conflict in Afghanistan: A Historical Encyclopedia. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, Inc., p.257

22. A. Z. Hilali. 2005. U.S. Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Hants, U.K.: Ashgate Publishing Limited, p.147-159

23. Glenn, P. Hastedt. 2004. Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy. New York: Facts on File, Inc., p.5.

24. A. Z. Hilali. 2005. U.S. Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Hants, U.K.: Ashgate Publishing Limited, p.111-115.

References

Angstrom, J. & Duyvestan, I. 2007. Understanding Victory and Defeat in Contemporary War. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

Borer, A. D. 1999. Super Powers Defeated: Vietnam and Afghanistan Compared. Abingdon, Oxon: Frank Cass Publishers.

Clements, F. 2003. Conflict in Afghanistan: A Historical Encyclopedia. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, Inc.

Grau, W. L. 1996. The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan. Washington D. C: National Defense University Press.

Hilali, A. Z. 2005. U.S. Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. Hants, U.K.: Ashgate Publishing Limited

Maitra, G. 2009. For Whom the Bells Toll: America or the Jihadists? Victoria: Canada: Trafford Publishing.

Margolis, E. S. 2001. War at the Top of the World: The Struggle for Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Tibet. New York: Routledge.

Navroz, M. Y. & Grau, L. 1996. The Soviet War in Afghanistan: History and Harbinger of Future War. Web.

History has seen wars come and go. For centuries, civilizations have had the constant need to dominate those beneath them. Man’s happiness is measured by what he has, but he is never satisfied by what has. The greatest imperfection of the humans is the thirst for power (Junger, 2011). This statement perhaps defines why countries are in constant wars with each other.

The twentieth century saw its fair share of wars. Hitler’s ambition in world war two was to conquer the whole of Europe. The best political minds always have war as their end game. The key to understanding why nation-states go to war may lie in the politics of anarchy. Democratic states display reluctance to destabilize that condition by going to war (Nozick 1971).

The theory of security dilemma perhaps best brings out the situation of war vis-à-vis anarchy. The theory underlines the fact that, a country’s strength or weakness may lead to agitations in others and or aggression from other countries. Territories seem smaller as aggressors find new ways of warfare, which include economic wars. Super powers will fuel wars as longs as they get ahead economically.

Guns are no longer the only weapons for battles; economic mind games also integrated into the system of anarchy. The losers are always the weak states who are at the mercy of super power; depending on them for economic support.

Countries with the same interests and goals are bound to keep checks on each other. If the United States of America feels the need of protecting its territory by accumulating nuclear weapons; its competitors like Russia and China will be obligated to do the same to match any aggression that may come from the US. This phenomenon, ultimately defines the spiral model. Therefore, a country’s desire to be powerful even when it has no intension of aggression; causes security threats to others.

States constantly exist in a context of souring political relations as a result of international anarchy. As the strong nations secure their territories, the weak countries prepare for the eventuality of war.

The security dilemma is predisposed by two variables; the offense and defense realisms. The defense realism views states as security maximizers that avoid participation in wars, so that their securities are not threatened. This was the case for the US in the First World War.

Offensive realism on the other hand, preys on the fact that; weaker states are in constant fear of the strong nations. The strong nations have a predatory nature as they are constantly hungry for power. These variables work best to support the spiral model.

Taking a historical example, Israel has been for a long time in conflict with Palestine. The conflict dates back to the 1800s when a group of Jewish extremists called the Zionists, wanted to colonize and convert the Palestine to a Jewish land. Palestine was a multicultural land with a majority of the population being Muslim. Small fractions represented the Christians and the Jews.

Hitler’s persecution of the Jews saw an increased immigration into Palestine. The situation worsened when in 1947, the UN awarded more than half of the land to Israel. While the Palestinians want to have their own separate Muslim state, the Israelis want it as a part of their country.

There exist border issues, curtailed Palestinian movement within their own land, security of Palestine occupants and the issue of who gets to control Jerusalem. This is a battle of supremacy that has a substantial stake for each of the two parties.

This conflict still persists even as the international community keeps a watchful eye. At the moment Israel seems to be in control over the Palestinians; as many of them are captured and detained in the Jewish prisons. Israel has military capabilities of any superior states like the US.

Palestine on the other hand, struggles to raise an army that is ill-equipped. It lacks the necessities to actively defend itself from Israel. Moreover, civil wars and poor leadership inhibit any efforts to fight the Israeli.

Talks to secure a peace deal are constantly declined by both parties, even though more innocent civilians are losing their lives each day. Wars take precedent in this anarchical system as diplomatic negotiations become mirages that never seem to come true. While the UN and other countries try to forge a peace deal, key issues are not addressed.

For instance, no one is asking the Israelis to stop constructions of settlements in Palestine (Gelvin, 2007). The reason being, Israel is a major ally to the US and therefore the US feels obligated not to interfere; but only offer shadow diplomacy. This is a key element as super powers always gang up to oppress the weaker states; offering sanctions as threats if they do not get their wishes.

This historical example is in line with the hypothesis; that war is necessitated by anarchy. Even with the presence of international bodies like UN and other regional bodies like the EU; the super powers continue dictating the rule to the weaker states. There is no fairness in the distribution of power.

The UN might be an international body that is supposed to be impartial; but it is a tool used by the super powers to intimidate the weak states. The composition of the Security Council is made in a way that only the super powers have permanent seats. This means that they dictate the terms. Wars will never end; they are simply means to an end.

Super powers seem to be investing in war, as they strive to come up with new technologies to improve warfare. It would seem hypocritical, when super powers accumulate weapons of mass destruction; while on the other hand barring other countries from doing the same (Harms, 2005). The arms race might be over on the surface, but deep down into the mountains; there are top secret military experiments going on.

The Israel-Palestine conflict can only be resolved if military action is taken off the take and both parties are willing to have diplomatic compromises. Policies should lean towards diplomatic options. The international community should not be watching as thousands of people are denied freedom and hundreds of others lose their lives over wars they know nothing about.

Future leaders should not use war as a platform for coming into power. It is not who fights the best war but who keeps the best peace that matters. The stability of the weaker states largely depends on the ability of the supers to maintain the status quo of peace. Freedoms of all men, women and children should be equal for all regardless of where one may come from.

Works cited

Gelvin, James. The Israel-Palestine conflict: One Hundred Years of War. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Print

Harms, Gregory. The Palestine-Israel conflict: A basic introduction. London: Pluto Press, 2005. Print.

Junger, Sebastian. War. New York: Twelve Hachette Book Group, 2011. Print.

Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State and Utopia. New Jersey: Harvard University Press, 1971. Print.

Introduction

Afghanistan has experienced many armed conflicts in its historical developments. The terms ‘war in Afghanistan’ may refer to Afghanistan’s Islamic conquest between 637 and 709, the subjugation of Afghanistan during 330 BCE and 327 BCE by Alexander the great, Mongol empire downfall of Afghanistan in the13th century, or a myriad of Mughal Empire campaigns against Persians in the effort to gain control of Afghanistan.

Studying war in Afghanistan may also focus on the Anglo-afghan war, which occurred between 1839 and 1881 (first and second Anglo-Afghan wars), third Anglo-afghan war (1919), Soviet Afghanistan war of 1979 and 1989, and even various Afghan civil wars lasting until 2001.

Although different scenarios in which the war was experienced in Afghanistan may be deployed in the discussions of this paper, the main focus is on Afghanistan war that resulted in the collapsing of Taliban, which is still ongoing since 2001.

Summary

The war that began in Afghanistan from 2001 up to the present time rose following the attacks of September 2001 in the World Trade Center twin towers in the United States of America. The war involves the US, NATO forces, and the allied forces that aimed to politically liberate Afghanistan by toppling the Taliban government. Taliban government was allied to the al-Qaida, which is the group that is held responsible for the September 2001 attacks.

Gorge W. Bush of the US had made an order to that terrorist group to bring Osama Bin Laden in the hands of the United States while also banishing any links of the Al-Qaida, which boosted the group’s control in the fight involving Afghanistan’s Northern treaty. However, instead of extraditing bin Laden, Taliban recommended that he should depart from Afghanistan due to lack of evidence that he was the main architect behind the September 11 attacks.

The move by the Taliban prompted America to initiate operations in Afghanistan without necessarily having to engage in negotiations. The United Kingdom, together with Germany, joined in the war later to topple the Taliban government, thus raising heavy attacks on the Northern Alliance (Keppel, Jean-Pierre, and Ghazaleh 32).

The US and the associated troops forced the Taliban government out of supremacy and put in place martial camps within the main town of Afghanistan. However, this did not end the operations of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The groups retreated to rural mountainous regions and in Pakistan. While operating from these bases, Mullar Omar reorganized the Taliban in 2003.

The group initiated insurgency attacks against ISAF and the Afghanistan government. In this context, Keppel, Jean-Pierre, and Ghazaleh note, “though vastly outgunned and outnumbered by NATO forces and the Afghan National Army, the Taliban insurgents have waged asymmetric warfare with guerilla raids and ambushes in the countryside, suicide attacks against urban targets, and turncoat killings against coalition forces” (45).

The government felt the impacts of the Taliban on the war. The gang subjugated the flaws of the government, such as fraud to gain control in the southern regions of Afghanistan. In 2006, NATO responded to the progress made by the Taliban through the initiation of projects for nation-building in the effort to win the confidence of the Afghans together with increasing the number of troops operating in Afghanistan.

The efforts of NATO to engage Taliban and al-Qaida insurgents in the war resulted in the spreading of the war into the North West parts of Pakistan. In 2004, NATO forces launched attacks to flush out and kill Taliban militia and al-Qaida insurgents seeking refuge in Pakistan. This led to the emergence of Waziristan insurgency in the year 2007. In May 2011, the US Navy SEALs managed to kill the kingpin of al-Qaida, Osama bin Laden.

In the three weeks following his killing, NATO began working on a strategy to exit from Afghanistan. During this time, the UN sought to engage the Afghanistan government and the Taliban insurgents in peace talks (Keppel, Jean-Pierre, and Ghazaleh 2008 62).

Since the war emerged between the US and the allied troops in Afghanistan and later to include the Afghanistan government that took place after the Taliban government was toppled, with tens of thousands of ordinary civilians having lost their lives, also, “over 4,000 ISAF soldiers and civilian contractors, as well as over 10,000 Afghan National Security Forces, also died” (Keppel, Jean-Pierre, and Ghazaleh 63).

Although many of the people who have perished in the war are Taliban insurgents and ordinary civilians, statistical findings on the number of deaths of security forces from both the Afghanistan government and ISAF indicate that the Afghanistan war had negative ramification on both civilians and the security forces.

The main question that emerges here is whether it is necessary to take the lives of thousands of innocent people in the name of pursuing a small group of terrorists.

Although deaths and casualties encountered in the Afghanistan war from 2001 to date are due to the operations of both Taliban and the US and NATO forces, international reactions point the largest finger of blame to Taliban and al-Qaida insurgents. For instance, the United Nations attributes 76% of all civilian casualties in the Afghanistan war from 2001 to 2009 to Taliban (Keppel, Jean-Pierre, and Ghazaleh 124).

The AIGRC (Afghanistan sovereign human rights body) viewed the intimidation deeds of the Taliban’s in opposition to their fellow people as combat. Official pardoning was built on this line of argument claiming that Taliban combat offenses involved turning against civilians, butchering of tutors, employee kidnappings, and burning of learning institutions.

A major concern of the international community on the war in Afghanistan is the use of phosphorus. Human rights bodies across the globe denounce the application of phosphorus in combat since it causes ruthless injuries. Several remains of people who perished during the actions of the Taliban and the US army have been discovered having white phosphorus injuries.

In May 2009, the US and NATO spokesperson confirmed that the forces used white phosphorus as a mechanism of illuminating its targets. Alternatively, they deployed it as an incendiary in the effort to destroy the enemy’s equipment together with bunkers.

International Agreements and Contributions of the UN and Non-Governmental Organizations in the Afghanistan War

In the Afghanistan war against terrorism between 2001 and beyond, various non-governmental organizations, including the UN, played significant roles in the provision of humanitarian aid to the war victims. The involvement of the UN in the war was initiated by the pleading of humanitarian aid amounting to $584 million by the then secretary general of the UN Kofi Annan on October 1, 2001.

The aid was planned to enhance the supply of foods stuff to an excess of 7.5 million citizens of Afghans over six months (Porter 19). However, the roles of the UN and non-governmental organizations in ensuring that the conflicts between the US’ forces and the Taliban did not result in humanitarian crises were incredibly impaired following the escalation of confrontations.

Indeed, according to the UN News Center, the increased confrontations between the US and the Taliban “compelled the UN agencies to withdraw international staff from the country, as the flow of food and other essentials into the country was slowed or halted” (4).

Nevertheless, this did not stop the efforts of the UN to promote talks between various Afghanistan’s parties in the effort to establish an all-inclusive government. This effort led to the reappointment of Lakhdar Brahimi as the UN special envoy to Afghanistan.

According to the (UN News Center, “UNDP, World Bank, and the Asian development bank opened a conference with the theme of reconstruction of Afghanistan in Islamabad on 27 November” (5). Following the institution of the Afghan interim power and the ISAF, safety measures improved in Kabul. Due to the eased hostilities, the World Food Program managed to deliver 114, 000 metric tons of food.

This food was adequate to meet the needs of about 6 million people for two months (UN News Center 5). As the conflicts in Afghanistan have not yet ended, through the UN population funds (UNFPA), WFP, and UNHCR, the UN continues to play significant roles in enhancing rehabilitation together with a reconstruction of post-war Afghanistan.

Since the initiation of war on the Taliban, several agreements have been made between the US and the government of Afghanistan. One of the earliest agreements was the Bonn Agreement. It formed the basis of announcement of the “composition of the Special Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga (Pashto for the grand council -a traditional forum in which tribal elders can come together and settle affairs)” (UN News Center 8).

The pacts provided that Loya Jirga would be composed of 21 members. Its tasks included the election of the head of the transitional administration together with making decisions on the structuring of the key personnel comprising the transitional administration. The Bonn accord also provided for just, open, and autonomous voting after twenty-four months following the enactment of Loya Jirga.

Other pacts include the status of forces’ agreement and the agreement for the SOF (special operations forces) to continue executing night raids. The status of forces’ agreement gave the US’ army operating in Afghanistan immunity against prosecutions.

It also “imposed no limitations on the US’ forces about military operations” (Porter 17). The agreement on the Special Forces to continue executing night raids attracted immense disagreements between the US government and the Afghanistan government, with president Karzai claiming the power to execute the raids.

Nations involved in Afghanistan’s Conflict and their Interest

Although other nations were involved in the Afghanistan war, the US carries the major stake. The war began as a response to the September 11 attacks. According to Keppel, Jean-Pierre, and Ghazaleh, the main aim of the war was to “ find Osama bin Laden and other high-ranking al-Qaeda members to be put on trial, to destroy the organization of al-Qaida, and to remove the Taliban regime, which supported and gave safe harbor to it” (13).

Other nations involved in the war through the provision of NATO forces, such as Demark, Spain, France, Germany, Canada, Netherland, Italy, Poland, Australia, and the United Kingdom argue that their main interest is to ensure that terrorism is defeated.

The main concern of all nations involved in the Afghanistan war is to enhance security within their borders by ensuring that terrorists’ groups such as al-Qaida and others do not gain safe operational zones. However, political critics argue that the interest of the US in the Afghanistan war is beyond their stated interest in the war.

The US navy managed to kill Osama bin Laden, who was the main person the US labeled as a terrorist who was responsible for the September 11 attacks. Why then is the continued stay of the US and NATO troops in Afghanistan soil?

The interest of the US and NATO forces in the Afghanistan war is also questionable considering that the US has insisted on carrying the roles of night raids on the Afghanistan citizens in the name of flushing out the Taliban insurgents from their sympathizers.

The US has a history of supporting resistant groups later to turn against them once they develop into terrorist groups. In 1997, the US recognized the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Indeed, Robin Raphael instructed Ahmad Shah Massoud to consider surrendering to the Taliban government.

Sometimes later, “top foreign policy officials in the Clinton administration flew to northern Afghanistan to try to persuade the United Front not to take advantage of a chance to make crucial gains against the Taliban” (Keppel, Jean-Pierre, and Ghazaleh 89).

The officials insisted that time for cease-fire had arrived. On the other hand, Pakistan initiated its efforts to re-equip the Taliban. Following the killings of the US task forces in 1998, the US distorted its course of actions for the Taliban.

The UN and the US developed sanctions against the Taliban through resolutions of the United Nations Security Council no. 1267. The resolution required the Taliban to surrender Osama bin Laden to the US while also ensuring that all terrorist training camps operating within Afghanistan were closed.

In fact, instead of condemning Massoud, the camps collaborated with him in the attempt to trace Osama bin Laden. However, during this time, the EU and the US offered no monetary or any other form of support to Massoud forces.

In case the groups failed to topple the Taliban in their failure to honor an ultimatum to surrender bin Laden, the US was to engage Afghanistan in direct military combat. These changes of policies raise the question of whether the US attacked Afghanistan in the quest to eliminate terrorism or to enhance its policy of remaining the world’s superpower.

The nations that support the US war against terror, which have also provided troops to NATO, are also among the most powerful nations in the world.

Upon considering that the US and NATO forces, even after the defeat of the Taliban, have continued their stay in Afghanistan with no clear policy on when the troops will be withdrawn fully, a critical question is whether the main interest of the nations involved in the war is to fight terrorism or to fight persons opposed to their quest to control the world.

Realist and Liberal Perspectives of the Afghanistan War

The concepts of interest in international peace and security as manifested in the perspectives of power constitute a central driver of the war against terrorism. The US considers itself a world superpower. Hence, it endeavors to portray its ability to compel nations to subscribe to the principal place of international relations.

This extent of expression of power together with the portrayal of power relationships defines the realist school of thought in the international relations approaches, and hence counterterrorism. Meyer reveals, “Power in realism occupies the central place for projecting the country’s influence abroad by statesmen” (653).

From the realist school of thought, the influence of nations in fostering international relations is showcased through diplomatic efforts, military interventions, and information intelligence. From the previous discussions, the US effort to engage Taliban diplomatically through requests and subsequently an ultimatum to surrender bin Laden failed, thus prompting military interventions.

These alternatives are valid and anchored within the school of realism in matters of international relations. President Bush viewed terrorism as an issue presenting major threats to international peace. In the words of Meyer, he adopted a realistic approach to intervening it “because the international system did more to hamper the US efforts at combating a sophisticated actor from outside the state system than it did to prevent the attacks of multiple US targets in the first place” (648).

Thus, America had no options other than utilizing its power to influence the international system to promote democracy and freedom from external threats.

Liberalism focuses more on the factors residing outside a given nation in shaping international relations. Power is an important aspect of the liberalist school of thought. However, opposed to realism, liberalist perspectives of power concentrate on the political hu, man rights protection, energy security, economic sanctions, and even environmental protection.

This implies that international groups pushing for this freedom have the biggest impacts on international relations. In case e of the Afghanistan war, NATO plays significant roles in fostering peace and fights against terrorism.

President Obama administration’s engagement in the Afghanistan war assumed the liberalist perspectives in the approaches of international relations. The administration has been seeking aid from multilateral institutions, allies, and even partners to harness the American political power to shape democracy in Afghanistan.

The Future of Afghanistan

The future of the war in Afghanistan remains unknown. The US has been postponing its decision to withdraw all its troops from Afghanistan. In January 2102, the US stated that withdrawing all the troops from the Afghanistan soil by 2014 was a major consideration. At the dawn of 2012, President Karzai and his US counterpart accepted to increase the pace of handing over NATO’s operation to the forces of Afghanistan.

This meant that the Afghan forces would assume the forefront in war engagements, with NATO and the US troops providing the required training and advice. Until now, it is not known when NATO and the US will consider giving President Karzai’s government full control of the Afghanistan affairs.

Hence, it is impossible to forecast or speculate the presence of post-NATO and the US troops in Afghanistan in terms of the stability of the democratic government of Afghanistan. The US only hopes that the Afghanistan security forces will be able to maintain security in the nation at some point in the future. Perhaps when such a time comes, NATO and the US will withdraw all their troops from Afghanistan.

Works Cited

Keppel, Gilles, Jean-Pierre Milelli and Pascale Ghazaleh. Al Qaeda in its own Words. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2008. Print.

Meyer, Christoph. “International terrorism as a force of homogenization? A constructivist Approach to understanding cross-national threat perceptions and responses.”

Cambridge Review of International Affairs 22.4(2010): 647-666. Print.

Porter, Gareth. “US-Afghan Pact Won’t End War-Or Special Operations Forces Night Raids.” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 31.4(2012): 17-19. Print.

UN News Center. Afghanistan and United Nations. Geneva: UN News Service, 2013. Print.

Introduction

After the end of the Second World War, many authors wrote on the events that took place during the war period with some writing from personal experiences and others from studies on the subject.

The Holocaust, which took place during the war, has attracted much attention from scholars, especially historians, most of whom work to justify why the event happened, its actualization, and the aftermath.

The Destruction of the European Jews by Raul Hilberg and The war Against the Jews by Lucy Dawidowicz are two such texts that focus on the Holocaust. This paper is an analysis of the two texts and it presents similarities and differences in the prevalent themes.

Similarities

The most outstanding similarity between The Destruction of the European Jews by Hilberg and The War against the Jews by Dawidowicz is their subject of discussion.

Both books give accounts of what happened during the Holocaust in Europe during the Second World War, albeit from different perspectives.

Hilberg’s account comprises some of the major institutions that orchestrated the event and how the institutions planned and executed the murder, which resulted in the death of millions of Jews throughout Europe.

Similarly, Dawidowicz’s account of events during the period explains aspects in the German leadership at the time that led to the annihilation of millions of Jews all over Europe.

Secondly, although the accounts in the books differ significantly, both focus on the same event, viz. the Holocaust.

Hilberg discusses the Holocaust from a perspective that focuses on the possible causes of the event and progression of occurrences that culminated in the annihilation of millions of Jews in Europe, with Germany as the epicenter.

He explains that the Holocaust was a partial result of the passive nature with which the Jews in Germany treated German acts of oppression in the years preceding the execution of the ‘final solution’ (Hilberg 1985, 65).

Dawidowicz explores the Holocaust as an atrocious event that greatly affected the Jewish community in Europe.

She also vulcanizes Hitler for the atrocities, stating that the event was a grand scheme Hitler had planned several years before the German administration executed it (Dawidowicz 1986, 42). In her view, the turn of events caught the Jews unaware, justifying the high death count.

Thirdly, both accounts bear evidence of extensive research on the topic by both authors through evidence they present in support of their perspectives.

Both authors passively observed as the holocaust unfolded during their lifetime and thus lacked substantive information to narrate in their accounts. As a result, they compensate using extensive research on the topic from years of study.

For instance, Dawidowicz includes data from an analysis of ‘one-way’ passes from train stations during the Holocaust in support of her theory that Hitler’s hatred of Jews went to irrational extents (Dawidowicz 1986, 107).

On his side, Hilberg uses data from his studies on German documents in presenting his conclusions about the involvement of the German bureaucracy in the destruction process.

He expressly states the same at the beginning of his book, further indicating that his account is not about the Jews (Hilberg 1985, 6).

The last and perhaps most interesting similarity is that both authors had a background in Judaism, which affects their opinions with regard to the subject at hand and the resultant contents of the books.

Evidence of influence from their Jewish backgrounds is present in the difference with which both Hilberg and Dawidowicz narrate the involvement of the Jews in the holocaust.

Hilberg regards the community’s passive nature in dealing with conflict as part of the reason why the Jews were vulnerable to attacks during the destruction process (Hilberg 1985, 66) while Dawidowicz places all the blame on Hitler and his administration (Dawidowicz 1986, 42).

Dawidowicz grew up in Jewish households for the most part of her life. She married a Jew after leaving her parents’ Jewish home and working with a Jewish organization in Poland before and after the Holocaust period (Davis 1994, 29).

This aspect explains her activist stand against the atrocities that befell the Jews in Europe during the Second World War.

Although Hilberg’s parents practiced some Jewish traditions such as occasional visits to the synagogue, Hilberg never had a personal interest in religion as he found it irrational.

Hilberg’s family fled Europe in 1939, just a few years before the occurrence of the holocaust (Popper 2010, 47), which explains why he thinks the Jews should have been more aggressive in their protests against persecution before the holocaust.

However, the accounts present more differences than similarities regarding an analysis of facts about the event by the two authors.

Differences

The first major difference that the two accounts present concerns the perspectives of the authors on the holocaust. Hilberg writes his book from a German perspective, which has resulted in controversial debates over the years.

At the beginning of the book, Hilberg expressly states that his account of events does not include the Jews as most of his research on the topic hinges on documentation from German authorities discovered after the conclusion of the Second World War (Hilberg 1986, 3).

Throughout the book, the author describes events according to his opinion of how German authorities and the German community in general rationalized their actions and reactions towards the Jews after the First World War, which led to the holocaust.

For instance, he explains that the German bureaucracy found it increasingly easy to suppress the Jews and take advantage of the Jewish population as a source of cheap labor after implementation of policies that deprived Jews of property ownership rights (58).

He explains further that part of the reason for the progression of the oppression that led to the annihilation of a large percentage of the Jewish population in Europe was the passive response of the Jewish community and its leadership towards unfair policies that aggressively targeted them in a negative way (65).

Hilberg presents the opinion that had the Jewish Councils opposed oppressive laws, which stripped them of property and job ownership, the Jewish community would not have experienced “vulnerability in the hands of German bureaucracy” (72).

Some scholars argue that the choice for Jewish leadership to remain passive was in itself a form of protest against the German bureaucratic leadership.

They explain that by refusing to act in the same way that the German community acted towards the Jewish community, the Jews protested against the draconian leadership while setting the appropriate example.

The logic behind this explanation is that one cannot fight against war by engaging in actions that propagate the same vice.

However, Hilberg (1985) rejects such theory and explains that although passive rejection of bureaucratic ideologies prevented war, it also escalated and fast-tracked plans against the Jewish population (78).

In this sense, Hilberg (1985) suggests the appropriation of a certain portion of blame on the inefficiency of Jewish leadership in defending its people, which “both saved and destroyed its people” (216).

In essence, Hilberg apportions blame for the occurrence of the Holocaust to German bureaucracy as well as Jewish leaders.

On the other hand, Dawidowicz (1986) looks at the event from a Jewish perspective. Her account presents the opinion that the persecution of the Jews was a formulation of German leadership that had been in gear since the conclusion of the First World War in 1919 (42).

According to her account, the Jews had no way of knowing the occurrences that were about to befall them as the events of the Holocaust lacked any legal justification. Therefore, blaming the Jews for atrocities that they had no hand in planning is unreasonable in a sense (70).

Her account presents the lack of representation of the Jewish community’s concerns in the German legislature as the apex of the problem by citing lack of ministries to cater for affairs of Jews as an example.

She explains that barring Jews from involvement in all public affairs, including economic activities, created an aspect of secrecy that resulted in an unfair advantage for the Germans with regard to defensive response during the Holocaust (Dawidowicz 1986, 65).

Dawidowicz also presents an interesting perspective regarding the orchestrators of the event. Her account presents the opinion that Hitler was the root cause of the series of acts of persecutions leading to the holocaust.

Her account of events presents the view that the Holocaust was the culmination of a plot intended for the extinction of the entire Jewish race from Europe by Hitler, with the aid of the German government (105).

Although the book presents little evidence of her claim, she blames the misplacement and destruction of documents during the progression of the Second World War for lack of proper factual evidence to support her premise.

The second significant difference between the texts is that both accounts show a difference in the point of focus concerning the cause of the Holocaust.

While Dawidowicz’s book presents Adolf Hitler as the sole author of the entire plan, Hilberg directs his focus on government institutions that formed the German Bureaucracy at the time.

Hilberg (1985) explains that the ‘final solution’ was a “step-by-step” process that led to the “annihilation of 5 million victims” (46).

The first stage involved passing policies that made it illegal for Jews to own property or work in the public sector. For the success of such a step, civil service agencies, together with law enforcement and other relevant agencies had to work in tandem.

The book bears the explanation that the German bureaucracy took the communist ideology of the Jews and used it against them as justification for denial of rights to own property (Feldman and Seibel 2006, 68).

The German administration considered communism as a defeatist ideology with regard to economic development, particularly concerning property ownership (Hilberg 1986, 80).

The German government favored capitalism instead by propagating it as an ideology that would cater for the proprietary benefits of every individual within the nation’s territorial borders.

The negative perception that the German government had regarding communism was one of the main reasons it fought against the Soviet Union, as it thought of the idea as pro-colonization move.

The resultant effect of the restrictive proprietary policies against the Jews was an increased vulnerability of the Jewish community (Feldman and Seibel 2006, 75).

The policies made it impossible for Jews to earn a substantial income through trade and acquisition of capital goods, and thus a vast majority of the Jewish population was available to the German government as cheap labor.

Other countries across Europe implemented similar policies in order to obtain the same benefits. Such actions led to the treatment of Jews as sub-human entities across the European states (Hilberg 1985, 189; Feldman and Seibel 2006, 82).

The passive reaction of the Jews towards this form of persecution encouraged the establishment of the second stage, which involved segregation of Jews in Ghettoes.

Although the bureaucracy justified it as a form of protective measure for the Jews from acts of persecution by the German population, it made Jews easy targets and made it easy for the achievement of the last stage, viz. the annihilation.

Hilberg (1985) points out that those at the insiders of the bureaucracy were aware of the plan, but he makes note that knowing about the plan and hatching it are two separate concepts (192).

This opinion diverts attention to German governance, instead of the traditional attention on Adolf Hitler for his bold support for the idea of destruction of the Jewish race as a ‘final solution’.

The idea obtains more plausibility, especially in view of Hilberg’s application of documentation in existence at the time.

Dawidowicz’s idea on the topic presents Hitler as the sole mastermind of the destruction process. She explains that Hitler used his influence in the government to launch an anti-Semite campaign in the guise of anti-socialism.

Her account of events includes a link between Martin Luther and Hitler originating from the early Christian church. She insists, “Martin Luther’s anti-Semitic writings and Hitler’s ideologies bear too much significance to be mere coincidence” (Dawidowicz 1986, 96).

She adds that Hitler’s crusade against Jews had been brewing since the end of the First World War and that the Second World War provided the perfect opportunity to execute his ‘final solution’ (98).

Although some truth exists in her explanations, Dawidowicz’s focus leans more on the religious aspect of Judaism than the political aspect, which applies more appropriately to the subject matter.

Although communism forms one of the core principles of Judaism, focusing on the concept as a religious concern derails her argument of the topic on political grounds.

The third major difference between the two texts involves the nature of the content. Dawidowicz’s book is mainly analytical of occurrences at the time of the Holocaust, while Hilberg’s account is mainly descriptive, albeit extensive.

Although Dawidowicz used previous research by other writers to gather information on the subject, most of the content in her book indicates an analysis of the information.

One of the possible reasons for this outcome is because, unlike Hilberg, Dawidowicz applies personal experiences from her childhood, coupled with experiences during the Holocaust and after the event.

Dawidowicz was born of Jewish parents in the United States and raised in Jewish traditions, even though her parents were secular Jews, and thus they cared little about its religious implications.

The occurrence of persecution of Jews occurred while she was pursuing her education, hence sparking her interest on the matter.

Although she was aware of the persecution of Jews, it was not until her trip back to Poland after the Holocaust as an aid worker in 1946 that she experienced the full extent of the atrocities that had occurred.

Some of the friends she had made during her previous stay in Poland had also lost their lives during the holocaust. She undertook extensive research regarding the reasons and effects of events during the period, which resulted in the book (Davis 1994, 30).

These facts play an integral part in shaping her opinion, as evident in the book. Her account bears a sense of activism that is absent in Hilberg’s version of events.

For instance, Dawidowicz (1986) contends that had the Palestine policy to make Israel a free state passed as a law; the Holocaust would not have occurred (79). Her insistence on blaming Hitler for the entire event also presents a personal view on the issue, which is devoid of statistics.

Her approach essentially involves the use of data as support for her criticism of Hitler and the entire German government’s activities as well as those of the European governments in general.

For instance, she considers Hitler’s hatred for Jews “irrational” by citing his prioritization of transportation of Jews to ‘death camps’ over supply of food to solders at the front line during the war as one example (Dawidowicz 1986, 85).

She notes that the death toll for the Jews after the Holocaust stood at 5,993,900.

Hilberg’s book presents a different front to that of Dawidowicz. Hilberg’s work represents a recollection of events occurring before, during, and shortly after the Holocaust as documented by German officials at the time.

As a result, Hilberg’s account appears more descriptive than analytical, in comparison to Dawidowicz’s version.

Apart from his controversial analysis of actions by the Jewish Councils through which he concludes they bore a portion of the blame for the event, his account is mainly a comprehensive compilation of occurrences from the documentation that existed at the time he wrote the book.

Part of the reason for Hilberg’s insistence of partial blame on the Jewish community is his life experience. Although his parents attended the Synagogue several times, Hilberg found religion irrational and allocated no interest to it.

Additionally, his family fled from Europe to Cuba and later to the US during the holocaust, which might explain his view of Jews as passive in dealing with the issues arising at the time of the holocaust.

The view is one that has born his book controversy from various scholars (Nathaniel 2010). Hilberg began his research on the subject in 1948, a few years after the execution of the holocaust, which suggests that most of his research is mainly from documented evidence rather than experience.

Hilberg’s estimation of the number of Jews that died during the Holocaust is 5.1million. Some researchers argue that such estimation lacks accuracy and thus creation of a margin of error alters the figure.

However, it is noteworthy that during the period within which Hilberg wrote his first edition, few records existed as evidence of the figures.

Dawidowicz had the advantage of writing her book later on at a period during which more information and documentation on the event were available for use. Thus, Hilberg’s figures bear an element of accuracy according to the period of publication.

Conclusion

Although both texts account for the same event, viz. the Holocaust, significant differences arise in terms of the authors’ perspectives on the occurrences during the period.

The differences hinge on the elements on which they choose to focus coupled with their period of publication and application of personal experiences. Overall, both texts bear extensive details and are thoroughly informative and objective.

Reference List

Davis, Barry. 1994. “Lucy S. Dawidowicz (1915-1990).” Jewish Quarterly 41, no. 1 (May): 27-31.

Dawidowicz, Lucy. 1985. The War against the Jews: 1933-1945. New Jersey: Holmes & Meier Publishers.

Feldman, Gerald, and Wolfgang Seibel. 2006. Networks of Nazi Persecution: Bureaucracy, business and the organization of the Holocaust. New York: Berghahn Books.

Hilberg, Raul. 1986. The Destruction of the European Jews. New York: Bantam Books.

Popper, Nathaniel. 2010. “A Conscious Pariah: On Raul Hilberg.” The Nation Magazine, April 19.

How the World Went to War in 1914

As a matter of fact, the events of the late spring and summer of 1914 went down in the history books as some of the major issues that would contribute to the First World War. The events occurred when pro-Serbian terrorists murdered the heir of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Archduke Franz Ferdinand. However, what irritated Austria-Hungary most as far as this particular event is concerned was that it took place in a Province within Serbia.

The event would lead to the revelation of a number of secret alliances that had been taking place between some European nations, and this was evident from the manner in which countries within the region had responded to the matter. The events of the late spring and summer of 1914, which included the killing of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, would probe Austro-Hungary to dispatch military troops into Serbia.

On July 28, 2014, almost a month after the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne had been assassinated, Austria-Hungarian government officially declared war on Serbia. This move by Austria-Hungary saw some powers in the continent rise against Serbia by sending their troops in the region. Other several countries who were allies to the powers would also fall in the fray, either in support of or against Serbia.

The invasion, which involved countries such as Germany, Russia, France, Belgium, and Great Britain, happened so fast that it ultimately moved beyond the ability of government leaders to control it (Gillette 49). As a result, these events played a significant role in setting the platform for World War I that would begin shortly afterwards. In this regard, the system of interlocking treaties or alliances between Europe nations was highly criticized for the spread of a global conflict from a localized problem.

As a matter of fact, government leaders of the involved countries could have intervened to stop the impending conflict, but their capabilities as far as the issue was concerned were highly limited for they were influenced by the terms of the alliances bonding them.

Was World War I Inevitable?

The First World War was inevitable, considering the nature of the various events that had contributed to its eruption. As it would be observed, territorial, imperial, and economic rivalries leading to the war between the Allies and the Central Powers were all inevitable causes.

For example, there were various unavoidable and uncontrollable events that would take place between June 28, 1914 when Archduke Francis Ferdinand was killed, and August 2, 1914. Some of these events include the issuing of a blank check by Germany in July 23, declaration of war against Serbia by Austria-Hungary in July 28, declaration of war on Russia by Germany on August 1, and the order by Germany to Belgium informing it to declare access to their troops.

Apart from the above causes, the inevitability of the First World War was also observed in the system of alliances which existed among several nations across Europe. One outstanding fact about these alliances is that they were made in secret between the parties involved, and for that reason, they resulted into distrust among the European nations.

This general suspicion and distrust would make it impossible for diplomats in the entire region of Europe to come up with a permanent solution to the many issues that preceded the Great War. As a matter of fact, the treaties were always established in times when wars were imminent. In this regard, the alliances played a significant task in increasing the conflict tension, thus contributing to an arms race among the participants.

Based on the above observations about the events preceding the First World War, there was no turning back starting from June 28, 1914, when the assassination of the heir of the Austro-Hungarian Empire took place in Serbia. The assassination had attracted the attention of at least six European countries that came up to express their support, either in favor of Serbia or Austria-Hungary. Each of the six powers had allies who would come to their assistance if they went into a warring event. However, all these participants harbored economic, imperialistic, and territorial tensions that were building up among themselves, thus necessitating the Great War.

Developments During the War

Some of the biggest developments that were observed as the First World War unfurled include the trench warfare and the role of women in the war effort.

Trench Warfare

This refers to the kind of fighting techniques that were used in the course of the War. As the war advanced, soldiers aligned to the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance adopted the practice of digging trenches that would protect them from their enemies. Trenches for opposing sides were secured using barbed wire and landmines that were buried beneath the soil.

The trenches usually had a depth of 2 meters and their wall surroundings were reinforced using dirt. The trenches were usually laid out in a zig zag pattern to ensure that soldiers were protected from missiles targeting the holes. The area separating the trenches of two opposing sides in a battlefield was referred to as a no man’s region. This area was usually a dangerous ground to trend on, since it separated two conflicting sides.

Life in the trenches was a bit harsh for the soldiers, considering the many unfavorable conditions that were associated with the holes, especially during rainy seasons. Moreover, there were no latrine or waste disposal zones and this made life more miserable for the warriors.

All this conditions made fighting in the underground holes hardly pleasant work for the soldiers. Apart from making life unpleasant, the trenches facilitated the spread of deadly diseases such as dysentery, trench foot, measles, trench influenza, and typhus among the fighters and their families.

The Role of Women in the War

The Great War brought great changes to every aspect of human life, including to the roles that were played by women in the society. While some women would adopt a strong anti-war position, others, especially those who came from the warring zones, threw their patriotic weight behind their male counterparts.

As it would be observed, females made major contributions to the war effort in a number of ways (Braybon 75). For instance, they took over men’s roles in arsenals, firearm factories, and government dockyards where they assisted in ensuring that ammunition and other war materials were safely delivered to soldiers in various parts of the world. Based on these facts, the contribution of women to the war effort cannot be overestimated.

What Finally Brought This War to an End?

The First World War would go on for four consecutive years, before coming to an end in November 1918. Apart from causing unprecedented damage across the world, this global conflict also claimed more than 10 millions lives worldwide. The Great War was finally terminated when Germany and the Allied powers completed negotiations on the terms of peace by putting their signatures on the Treaty of Versailles.

The Germans had become weak in the war following the diminishing support of their ailing supporters and exhaustion of war resources, among other reasons. The Germans could not bear the circumstances any longer, and were therefore forced to seek armistice with the Allies in November, 1918.

Works Cited

Braybon, Gail. Women Workers in the First World War, United Kingdom: Routledge, 2012. Print.

Gillette, Aaron. “Why Did They Fight the Great War? A Multi-Level Class Analysis of the Causes of the First World War.” The History Teacher 40. 1 (2006): 45-58. Print.

Introduction

One of the most important events of the 19^th century was undeniably the so-called Crimean War (1853-1856), which took place between Russia, on the one hand, and Britain and France, on the other.

The rationale behind this suggestion is that this particular war established the tradition of demonizing Russia in the West, as the ‘land of barbarians’, which continues to affect the geopolitical realities in the world, up until today – something that can be illustrated, in regards to what was the reaction of Western countries towards Russia’s appropriation of Crimea in 2014. In this paper, I will compare what used to be the 19^th century’s accounts of this war (contained in the newspaper New York Daily Times 1851-1857) with the contemporary ones.

Crimean War

The editorial The Lessons of War (1855) in the mentioned newspaper, expounds upon what can be deemed the geopolitical significance of the Crimean War to Europe and America. According to the anonymous author, the main of these lessons is that, while waging war on Russia, Britain proved itself utterly arrogant of the most basic provisions of international law.

The reason for this is that, as it appears from the editorial, this country did not have any reservations against setting up the unofficial recruitment offices on the territory of the U.S., so that American citizens would be provided with the possibility to join the British army.

As it was noted: “We find the British Government, which has so often complained of us as a nation of grasping filibusters … is detected coming upon our own shores, and here attempting to organize, upon foreign soil, a military force to be employed against a power with which we are at peace” (“The Lessons of War” 4).

The author of the editorial in question points out to the fact that the U.S. government should warn Brits that the mentioned practice, on their part, is inexcusable and that there will be consequences, should Britain proceed with trying to undermine America’s national sovereignty.

According to the editorial, the main lesson of the Crimean War is that it exposed Britain, as such, that experiences the acute shortage of soldiers, which in turn suggests that the U.K. can no longer be regarded quite as powerful, as it would like people to believe: “So England, after all, is not invincible – her resources are not inexhaustible. There has been no limit to her boasting and arrogance, but an unexpectedly short one is found to her physical power” (4).

In its turn, this created the objective preconditions for the U.S. to realize itself being in the position to be able to replace Britain as the actual ‘master of the world’ in the future. After all, this particular scenario appeared to have been fully consistent with the laws of history: “We have no great standing armies and navies.

But we have all the material and the men to make and man them. We have an abundance of men… glowing with an enthusiastic love of the country” (4). The editorial’s prediction, in this respect, proved thoroughly valid. During the 20^th century, America did succeed in becoming the leader of the Western world.

The newspaper’s other editorial, concerned with the Crimean War, is The Western Powers Outbid (1855). The main idea that it is being promoted throughout its entirety is that the war’s outcome largely depends on what would be the position of Austria, in regards to the concerned hostilities between Russia and Britain/France.

The editorial’s author pointed out to the fact that, even though Austria did fight alongside Russia during the course of the Napoleonic wars, it has grown increasingly uneasy with the growing geopolitical influence of Russia. At the same time, however, the idea of joining Britain and France in their war against Russia was not representing much of an appeal to Austria, as well.

The reason for this is that it could potentially set France on the path of trying to impose its dominance over the continent, just as it used to the case when it was ruled by Napoleon: “She (Austria) remembered the disasters of Austerlitz and Wagram, and she no more desired to see a French, than a Russian, supremacy established over Europe” (“The Western Powers Outbid” 4).

At the present time, notes the editorial’s anonymous author, Russian Czar Alexander applies a great effort into trying to persuade Austria to remain on friendly terms with Russia, and to refrain from siding with Britain and France. To support the validity of this claim, the author quotes from the letter of the Russian ambassador in Austria (Nesselrode) to the Austrian Emperor Francis Joseph I: “Russia views with satisfaction the occupation of the Danubian Principalities by Austria…

The armies of Russia are now as formerly at the service of Austria” (4). Nevertheless, the editorial suggests that Austria’s final decision, as to what should be its stance, in regards to the Crimean War, would depend on whether the Russians will be able to defend the city of Sebastopol against the Allied forces.

According to it, if Austria ends up becoming allied with Russia, Britain, and France will have no chance of winning the war: “If Austria goes (with Russia)… and when Central Europe takes part with Russia, and two powerful armies are advancing by forced d marches to the relief of Sebastopol, what chance of victory can the Allies have in the Crimea?” (4).

Thus, the editorial in question does deserve to be given credit for being rather insightful, with respect to how it expounds on the would-be effect of Austria’s involvement in the Crimean War. After all, it is named after this country decided to take sides with the Western allies in the conflict, that Russia admitted that it was losing the war and agreed to the peace-terms offered by Britain and France.

The most notable aspect of the earlier provided 19^th century’s journalistic accounts of the Crimean War is that they invoke the notion of immediacy. That is, these accounts treat the concerned historical event as a process in the making. This, however, cannot be said about the event’s contemporary interpretations. The reason for this is that their authors tend to discuss the Crimean War retrospectively while specifying what accounts for this war’s relevance to what happened to be the contemporary dynamics in the arena of international politics.

To exemplify the validity of this suggestion, we can refer to the 1985 book Why the Crimean War? A Cautionary Tale by Norman Wich. The main idea, explored throughout this book, is that the Crimean War provides us with insight into what the concept of geopolitics is all about. The reason for this is that, as this war showed, it is named, the Realist paradigm of international relations, which should be considered the only valid one.

According to the author, regardless of what happened to be the officially adopted political/social ideology in a particular country, this country may never cease being preoccupied with ensuring its ‘place under the Sun’, as its main priority. What it means is that the actual international agenda of just about any country on this planet is solely concerned with:

• political/economic expansion,
• maintenance of political stability within,
• destabilization of competing states.

Even though that, while explaining Britain’s decision to declare war on Russia, the British government’s top-officials of the time used to come up with the claims that the Russians posed a great danger to the ‘civilized world’, the outbreak of the Crimean War is best explained as the consequence of these people’s understanding that Britain could not possibly win in fair competition with Russia.

Therefore, Russia had to be destroyed before it grew too powerful. Wich concludes his book by suggesting the main lesson of the Crimean War is that, in order to avoid realizing themselves being in the state of war, the world’s most powerful countries must stay in ‘close diplomatic touch’ with each other.

As the author noted: “(The key to peace) is the maintenance of the closest possible diplomatic relations among the great powers so that none should feel threatened or isolated, and so that the means were always available to deal with the crises that are endemic to any international system through negotiation” (Wich 203).

Unfortunately, it appears that, as of today, Western countries have grown forgetful of the lesson of the Crimean War, in this respect – hence, their persistence with imposing sanctions against Russia, which reclaimed Crimea from the failed state of Ukraine in 2014.

Another contemporary account of the historical event in question is the 2008 article Rushing into Print: “Participatory Journalism” During the Crimean War by Stefanie Markovits. In it, the author expounds upon what were the specifics of this war’s propagandistic legitimization in Britain, while pointing out to the fact that the war in question can be referred to as the first instance in the history of Western civilization, when mass Media played an important role in sustaining a military fervor among citizens.

As Markovits noted: “For to an unprecedented degree, the experience of the Crimean War was filtered through print—not just after the fact as with past wars, when poets, novelists, and historians took up their pens to memorialize the experience, but in real-time and by an extraordinary range of writers” (560).

According to the author, during the Crimean War, many of Britain’s newspapers (such as Time), made a deliberate point in trying to dehumanize the Russians as ‘barbaric brutes,’ which in turn was meant to justify the idea that there is nothing wrong about killing them en masse. Therefore, in the aftermath of having been exposed to this Markovits’s article, readers will naturally be prompted to think that there was indeed very little ‘glory’ in Britain’s decision to send its troops to the Crimea in 1853.

Finally, we can mention the 1993 book The Origins of the Crimean War by David Goldfrank, as such, that contains clues as to what triggered the outbreak of the Crimean War in the first place. According to the author, this war came about as a result of the fact that, ever since the beginning of the 18^th century, the main principle of Britain’s foreign policy was concerned with preventing the country’s potential competitors from being able to realize themselves being in the position to threaten British geopolitical interests in the world.

As an integral part of this strategy, Britain never ceased applying a great effort into increasing the acuteness of social tensions in competing countries. At times when there were good reasons to believe that the deployment of this particular strategy will not prove very effective, Britain used to embark on launching the full-scale military invasions – according to Goldfrank.

The Crimean War exemplifies the validity of this idea perfectly well. Thus, just as it is the case with the mentioned book by Wich, The Origins of the Crimean War promotes the idea that the actual significance of just about any war should be assessed within the conceptual framework of the Realist theory of international politics, which emphasizes that war is nothing but the ‘radical’ extension of politics.

Conclusion

As was illustrated earlier, there is indeed much difference between the 19^th century’s accounts of the Crimean War, on one hand, and those of comparatively recent times, of the other. Whereas the former is being concerned with treating the subject matter in terms of the present development, the latter refers to it, as such, that sublimated the very spirit of the Victorian era.

There is, however, a strongly defined commonality between them, as well – both: the 19^th century’s and the contemporary analyses of this war’s significance imply that there was nothing incidental about the factors that sparked the armed hostilities between Russia and Britain/France, in the first place.

Works Cited

Goldfrank, David. The Origins of the Crimean War. London: Longman, 1993. Print.

Markovits, Stefanie. “Rushing Into Print: “Participatory Journalism” During the Crimean War.” Victorian Studies 50.4 (2008): 559-586. Print.

“The Lessons of War.” New York Daily Times (1851-1857): 4. 1855. Print.

“The Western Powers Outbid.” New York Daily Times (1851-1857): 4. 1855. Print.

Wich, Norman. Why the Crimean War? A Cautionary Tale. Hanover: University Press of New England, 1985. Print.

Bringing war to a dead end after its initiation challenges even nations with the largest sphere of influence and Kissinger is not an exception. He faced a good deal of challenges while sorting out strategies to send Vietnam War into dreamland. However, to amicably solve the challenges, with rejectionist critics on the strategies adopted expected, direct application of military power seemed far from the strategies deemed appropriate. Kissinger ran through all possible mechanisms at his disposal and found ‘shuttle diplomacy’ and witty negotiations as the key tools towards the realization of incredible solutions.

Considering negotiation as the way forward to end the Vietnam War in 1973, intervening from an implied diplomatic position without an indication of the intent of application of force by the mighty nation had a more probability of success. His approach was therefore to “negotiate from a position of strength” (Scott & Furmanski, 2003, p.39). The approach, though maintained in secret, unfolded through the bombing of Cambodia in an attempt to force the US opponents to bring down their weapons and consider receding from war. On the other hand, in Paris, he organized negotiations with “Le Duc Tho-over the strong protests of south Vietnam government” (Roskin, 2009, p.102), something that made his diplomatic policy bear fruits upon the realization of the US desire to seek peace at all costs in Vietnam in 1973.

Consequently, he managed to secure Nobel peace prize in the same year. In as much as Kissinger’s strategies of solving war problem in Vietnam bore fruits, they did not escape the eyes of critics who saw his policies characterized by “excessive strategies to make things right” (Roskin, 2009, p.60) through power deployment. His shuttle diplomacy in China that further postulated his method of seeking peace where he served as the intermediary in negotiations, aimed at bringing and promoting peace. After the 1973 war, he organized diplomat cease-fires campaign between Israel and Arab states (Scott & Furmanski, 2003, p.90) for instance Egypt and Syria. However, he was the man behind the deployment of the US troops in the aid of Israel on Arabic states soils.

Lessons for the Current Peace Attempts

Borrowing from Kissinger’s strategies to end wars in 1973, the nations involved in peacekeeping missions should make a clear demarcation between strategies designed for ‘Peace keeping’ and those for ‘peace-making’. Stopford (1995, p.105) argues that, “the logic for peace keeping flows from political and military premises that are quite distinct from those of enforcement; and dynamics of the latter are incompatible with the political process that then peace process is intended to facilitate”. Confusion of the two terms endangers peacekeeping operation. Force infliction during attempts to chill wars, should find application in situations demanding self-defense rather than making an assumption of possibility of transition from one technique to another. “Problems begin when one moves from peace keeping to peace–making, from preserving an already accomplished agreement to the imposition of an agreement onto reluctant parties” (Roskin, 2009, p. 25).

Casualties encountered during the peace keeping attempts never fail to register complains. Such complaints regard unprecedented damages experienced during the exercise despite the focus on war intervention having changed from peace keeping to peace making. Diplomatic procedure entangling the bringing of warring parties face-to-face under one forum, as witnessed in the case of Kissinger’s initiation of peace negotiations between Israel and Arabic states in 1973, provides strong supporting grounds of giving diplomacy the first take in ending wars. However, challenges exists especially where the adversary nations show up in the forums only to give conditions and impediments that hinder cease fire declarations.

Roles of US in peace Process

US can involve itself in peace process through aiding in provision of conflicts resolutions mechanisms. Resolving conflicts entails curtailing or total elimination of hostilities between nations, which presumably, encourage the emergence of wars. If the US devotes itself in conflict resolution, equality backed by harmony between warring parties becomes realizable. Conflicts, in majority of the situations, are instigated by unfairness and administration of injustices associated with nationalism issues of the aggrieved party that initiates the war. Through the “enhancement of community mediations, peaceful negotiations, arbitration, community conferencing, negotiated rule making” (Stopford, 1995, p.79), the US can greatly foster both internal and international relation between nations through civilization and a fight against inflexible islaminism ideologies.

A more proactive role involves the organization and facilitation of military interventions where diplomatic approaches to settle conflicts fail. Upon the realization of peace, strategies that ensure the warring parties never fall back at war require acute address. Steps and declarations to avoid repetition of hostile actions between nations, according to philosophical propositions, are inculcated in the societies through, “youth development strategies” (Stopford, 1995, p.85). The adults therefore, make no more attempts to repeat war mistakes in the future. In addition, having found lasting peace within its borders, the US plays a plausible role in the provision of food, knowledge sharing among other resources necessary for rebuilding nations recovering from war aftermaths.

The US plays noble roles in process of peace realization as noted by Roskin (2009, p.12) that “Our conscience tells us that we should treat others the way we want to be treated, with dignity, and respect”. The employment of weapons of mass destruction can take place where wars occur between nations with high technological knowhow. Probing and regulation of manufacturing of things such weapons serve to promote international peace. Finally, the US can facilitate attempts to nationalize an internationally law making organ incorporating all nations of the world mandated to formulate and implement laws geared towards fostering global peace. Unfortunately, the Muslim and Palestine community regard most of the attempts by the US to step in war peace promotion as discriminatory and one aimed at favoring one side of warring parties on the expense of the other.

Reference List

Roskin, G. (2009). IR: The New World of International Relations. London: Longman, Person Education, Inc.

Scott, M., & Furmanski, L. (2003). 21^st Debated Issues in World Politics. New Jersey, NJ: Prentice Hall, Pearson Education, Inc.

Stopford, R. (1995). Peace Keeping or Peace Enforcement. Stark Choices for Grey Areas, 49(4), pp. 79-112.

Throughout history, nations have fought against nations due to cross border conflicts. Along the way, wars have resulted and various atrocities perpetrated to not only civilians, but also the environment and the economy. Wars provide the right environment for perpetration of atrocities and prevalence of lawlessness. Other than just the winners and losers, two groups of people emerge from wars viz. the victims and the perpetrators of the atrocities. In every atrocity perpetuated, the culprit commits injustices to the victims of the war. Some of the atrocities recorded in history are beyond human understanding but one thing is common, the guilt of perpetrating these atrocities passes from generation to generation.

Traumatic experiences of seeing people killed or/and being raped coupled with the lucky survival to tell the story or losing loved ones in a war leaves lasting impressions in the mind of the victims. On the other hand, killing people, issuing commands to drop the last bomb, or raping women also leave lasting mental torture to the perpetrators of violence during wars. Some of the effects of war outlive the war in terms of trauma and psychological effects to survivors of both victims and perpetrators. Use of prohibited weapons like nuclear weapons has left devastating radioactive effects experienced even in contemporary times.

The effects of the war do not end with the immediate survivors and perpetrators; no, these effects pass on to the children and grandchildren of the involved parties. The question in consideration is whether the children of the survivors inherit the trauma and the children of the perpetrators live with the burden of guilt over injustices committed by their parents. The generations that follow are blamed by subsequent generations of their victims for atrocities they did not commit. For instance, even to date, the Hutus of Rwanda are blamed for killing thousands of Tutsis in the infamous Rwanda genocide of 1994. Even though many might not concur, the Hutus, who were born years after the atrocity, will continually carry the guilt of their fathers and tribesmen.

In fact, most of the perpetrator’s progenies have to bear the responsibility of compensating the victim’s offsprings. Sometimes, the compensation is paid not to survivors, but to the children of those who died or lost their lives during the war because the war fought between nations and the national identity continues to exist regardless of the passage of time.

The existence of nations even after the war means the subsequent government has to bear the responsibility of previous governments. For example, a government that signs a treaty to end a war means subsequent governments abide by the requirements of the treaty. Therefore, such occurrences cause inheritance of the guilt of perpetration by generations that carry the burden of wars they did not commit.

The effects of atrocities perpetrated by previous generations pass guilt to the offsprings of such generations. Monuments and cemeteries are set up as memorial sites to remember atrocities; however, the monuments have served as constant reminders of those atrocities thus a reminder of the guilt laid on the perpetrator’s children. Such has been the effect of the monuments that Iris Chang was motivated to research on the Nanking Massacre committed in China by the Japanese Army. The arguments above indicate a strong case that guilt of perpetration passes from generation to generation.

In February2003, United States President George Bush declared war in Iraq, but cautioned that United States did not intend to determine the precise form of Iraq’s new government. Its intention is to ensure that another brutal dictator does not govern Iraqi people. He prompted that rebuilding Iraq will require sustainable commitment from other nations, including US (Bush 9). As victory defines the central front in any global war on terror, success is an essential component in war against ideology that breeds international terrorism. The policy highlights that victory in Iraq will not come in the form of an enemy’s surrender, or Battleship in Missouri and Appomattox, but it will be realized in stages. These stages included short-term and long-term strategies.

Key Elements for Escalation in Iraq

President’s Bush escalation plan is quite similar to the previous ones undertaken. These plans had been tried in the earlier periods, and it tremendously failed.

1. Increasing the number of American troops in Iraq. Over the past years, the US government had been increasing the number of troops to Iraq. For instance, in June-October 2006, there was the Operation Together Forward where the troops were given reinforcement in securing Baghdad. The aim of President George W. Bush was the removal of Iraq President Saddam Hussein from the presidential throne. This was to be achieved through the military action, and was justified by enhancing intelligence during the war.
2. Handling off the various security responsibilities in Iraq before the end of November. This was to be achieved by training the Iraqi’s, with the help of the Iraqi authorities, in order to boost their own security. The security program was initiated in May 2004. The number of the Iraqi soldiers that were to be trained were about 260,000, and the American unit was the team selected to oversee its progress.
3. Bush wanted Saddam Hussein to release weapons of Mass destruction. He knew that this will not be achieved with ease and retaliated to use of military force in order to induce the Iraq president to comply with the regulations. Bush was still contemplating the September 11, 2001 bombing when the Iraq-Al-Qaeda connection destroyed the United States Twin Towers.
4. Empowering Iraqi Government and Maliki to find a solution to their Internal Political turmoil. President Bush stated that Iraqi Prime Minister, Maliki, should devise strategies in an attempt to control the worsening of the situation. As such, there is need for a long-term political solution to the current crisis by defeating the insurgency and quelling the ‘sect’ violence. In May 2005, President Bush, Blair, and Maliki issued a joint statement on the Iraqi authority’s responsibilities. They stated that the government needs to undertake presumptuous measures in order to control the crisis. However, the situation in Iraq continued to deteriorate.
5. It was critical that the Bush policy was a based on a revenge basis. The view of the US presidential policy acknowledges that President Bush’s efforts of regime change commenced around two views. The first is that Saddam’s conspiracy to kill the elder Bush in April of 1993 lingered on the mind of the president for years (Woodward 202). The president even hinted publicly why he wanted to end the regime of Saddam Hussein Presidency in Iraq.

Bush highlighted that the war on terrorism was the defining challenge in which the current generation faced. He likened it with the struggle against fascism and communism in United States (Feaver 89). The US government committed itself wholly to the activities in enhancing this achievement. The US army will prevail in Iraq, as it will be able to achieve success on the war against terrorism.

Options given to Bush Administration

1. Heighten regional and international diplomacy, including with Iran and Syria, and including the holding of a significant international conference in Baghdad.
2. As part of an international approach, he should renew commitment to Arab-Israel peace. This was not a key feature of the President Bush’s plan, although he implemented the stepped up U.S. diplomacy led by Secretary of State Rice on the issue.
3. Setting benchmarks for the Iraqi government to achieve political reconciliation, security, and governance. This includes possibly withholding some U.S. support if Iraq government refuses or fails to do so. The Bush administration at first opposed reducing support for the Iraqi government if it failed to uphold commitments, but President Bush later signed P.L. 110-28, which linked the U.S. economic aid to progress on the benchmark.
4. Securing and expanding Iraq’s oil sector. The United States has consistently prodded Iraq to pass the pending oil laws, which would encourage foreign investment in Iraq’s energy sector. Ideally, increasing economic aid to Iraq and enlisting more international donations of assistance will enhance Iraqi’s citizens co-operation.

Question not asked by the policy

1. What effects does the Iraq war have on the economic conditions of the US?
2. What are the long-term effects of the War?

The issue of long-term effects for the US citizens was not, in any way, analyzed by the policy. Indeed, such consideration is necessary, as the economic superiority of the US would have been at sake. However, Bush achieved his objective of revenge, as Saddam Hussein was captured and executed on 30 December 2006. This marked a step towards the end of terrorism in the society.

Works Cited

Bush, George. “Address to the Nation on Iraq from Cincinnati, Ohio.” Public Papers of the President. 2002. Web.

Feaver, Peter. “The Right to Be Right: Civil-Military Relations and the Iraq Surge Decision.” International Security 35, no. 4 (2011): 87-125. Web.

Gordon, Michael. “A Prewar Slide Show Cast Iraq in Rosy Hues, ” The New York Times. 2007. Web.

GWOT Overall Strategy 2003 and 2006. National Strategies to Combat Terrorism. Web.

National Security Strategy of the United States, 2002. Web.

Woodward, Bob. The War Within: A Secret White House History, 2006-2008. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008. Web.