The first Gulf war was a war that emanated between Iraq and Kuwait following accusations of oil theft on the Iraqi government by Kuwait. Indeed, the enmity increased when the Iraq government sent its troops to Kuwait to counter the continued oil loss. All this occurred in august 1990 and the months that proceeded. Moreover, this war attracted international interventions where about 34 nations colluded with the United Nations in helping the Kuwait government to defeat Iraq. The nations joined to form a coalition that sent troops over to the Kuwait territory and fight against the Iraq troops. Among the states which colluded in forming the coalition of the gulf war including the United States, Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom, and Egypt; the nations also contributed towards furnishing the troops and ammunitions expenses. From the records, the war heightened the enmity between the then United States president George H. W. Bush and the Iraq president Saddam Hussein. This paper will aim at analyzing the first gulf war which can be claimed to be going on, whether this was just war or an economic or ideological war, and the perception/views of the US and its allies on the main causes of the war.
It is true to say that the first gulf war is still going on even to date because, even after the Iraq government surrendered, there has been a soaring relationship between the United States and the Iraq government; thus, it is better to classify the first gulf war as an ideological war where the US government wanted to bring to an end the dictatorial system of government exercised by the then Iraq president Saddam Hussein. President George W. Bush senior initiated the war and though the Iraq government removed its troops from Kuwait, the war against Iraq was revived in May 2003 by Bush Junior claiming that bad leadership dominated the country. The 2003 war was also undertaken to disarm the Iraq nation which was said to have nuclear weapons (Lind & Tamas 155-160).
The first gulf war can however be taken as an ideological war because, as it can be established now, the United States together with its allies and the United Nations has succeeded in ending the Saddam dictatorial regime, thus replacing it with a democratic system of leadership. Therefore, with the new democratic regime, the Iraqi citizens can freely take part in the running of their government, something they never enjoyed during the Saddam reign. Consequently, the arguments on whether the gulf war is still on or not, and whether the war is just a mere war or otherwise seem to raise very many questions. This is because there seems to be a strong coalition between the Western countries, who continuously oppose the dictatorial regime established by Saddam Hussein (Malpas 63-74).
The United States of America views the first gulf war as a war against bad and cruel leadership; the west claims that the Iraq leadership is cruel and harsh to its citizens something which has greatly hampered the country’s economic activities. However, human rights violations are also on the rise according to United Nations and other UN bodies. Human injustices which included mass killings dominated the country making it extremely hard for the residents to exercise their day-to-day activities. The first gulf war can also be partially termed as an economic war because oil was the major factor that triggered the war. Moreover, Banyard (1999) is on the view that the united state feared the economic empowerment of the Iraqi government since an economic boost to the Iraqi government could have threatened the entire security in the world. The argument revolved around the fact that Iraq supported terrorists and another Muslim extremists like the Al-Shabab group which threatened other countries’ peace, more so the American citizens (Atkinson 104&105). In addition, the Iraqi government was accused of financing and providing hiding places for extremist groups such as the Palestine suicide bombers. The move by the Iraqi government to extend its oil mining in Kuwait could greatly boost the country’s economic background and consequently worsen the security status.
Thorough scrutiny of the first gulf war shows that the dictatorial regime triggered the war, the main reason being aimed at stopping the Saddam dictatorial regime which supported and financed Muslim extremists. As it was later noted in the 2003 war against Iraq, no weapons of mass destruction were found in the state despite the intensified accusation by the United States and its allies. Further prosecutions and sentencing of Saddam Hussein prove the extent to which the United States, together with its allies was ready to go to ensure that they stem out the cruel regime (Munro 65). The new election of Obama as the US president and the introduction of democratic government in Iraq has marked a great improvement in the relationships between the two countries. It has also led to the withdrawal of many US and its allied troops from Iraq; the troop’s withdrawal is gradually undertaken since fear of the extremist regimes such as Al-Qaeda has continued to threaten the newly established form of government in Iraq. The war is not yet over since the United Nations, the United States, and its allies feel that democracy is not fully developed in the country.
In conclusion, the first gulf war was just the beginning but not the end of the ongoing war between the Iraq government and the Western nation, given that the war revolved around the difference in the type of leadership. Moreover, the West still presses on to ensure that a dictatorial system of government is no longer exercised in Iraq and that a democratic form of government is upheld in the country. Indeed, the government that acknowledges the interests of the public and allows citizen participation in the government running process is advocated for in Iraq. However, until a strong government that suits the above specifications is put in place, the war continues.
Works cited
Atkinson, Rick. Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War. New York, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 1994. Web.
Banyard, Philip. Controversies in psychology. New York, Routledge. 1999. Web.
Lind, Nancy & Tamas, Bernard I. Controversies of the George W. Bush presidency: pro and con documents. New York, Greenwood Publishing Group. 2007. Web.
Malpas, Simon. The postmodern. New York, Routledge. 2005. Web.
Munro, Alan. Arab storm: politics and diplomacy behind the Gulf War. New York, I.B.Tauris. 2006. Web.
The First World War of 1914-1918 encountered the United States with one of the most horrible crises in human history. The military politics of the greatest states of the world caused disruption and psychological frustration that germinated even more ruinous consequences for later generations. The horrors of the Great War, human tragedy, and games of politicians who resorted to mass violence – all these factors effected American people and distorted their culture and social welfare. In particular, the war contributed to formation of political ideology, which is commonly known as Wilsonian idealism. This policy consisted in democracy proliferation and freedom of speech manifestation both in the United States and in the European countries suppressed by common rivals. However, the concepts were accepted by people differently, as the majority criticized the principles of overt demonstration of capitalism leading to unnecessary military invasions.
Thesis Statement: On the one hand, the Wilson planned to advocate the democratic principles at the international level and to provide a shelter for ethnical minorities. On the other hand, American society experienced great changes that led to a total reevaluation of the meaning of war. The United States did not fully realize their relation to the European conflicts and the reason for sacrificing lives in the ideological war. The Wilsonian policy is also brightly reflected in the ideological strategies of George Bush Jr. whose reasons for invading to Iraq have still been disputable.
Main Discussion
Overview of preconditions and events of the First World War
German invasion to European countries and heavy repressions
German invasion was not only aimed at manifesting the absolute power of the nation. The Nazi troops were also attempting to suppress any displays of political independence and uniqueness. Indeed, the declaration of warfare had very sophisticated undertones spread at the international level. However, the most evident motive of the War was the creation of a powerful Empire with homogenous political strategies and ideologies deprived of any displays of liberal thinking and freedom of choice. Germany took a firm path of destruction and declared itself as the supreme nation.
As the result of these futile repressions, Germany managed to reveal the most vulnerable points of such powerful economies as France, Britain, Italy, and Russia. Michael Howard writes, “The Germans prided themselves on a uniquely superior culture that held the balance between the despotic barbarism of their eastern neighbor and the decadent democracy of the West” (2003, 11). It meant that this nation wanted to prevent the prosperity and modernization of the best European democracy and their technological advancement.
German intervention on all frontiers and the distortion of socialism and liberalism
As the United States were keeping pace with the events taking place in Europe, the government realized that this war could gnaw the entire world and the American nation in particular. They also understood that the military actions were directed against the democratic display as Germany was geared up for the elimination of all geographical and ideological boundaries. Their first raids on France and Belgium made those countries.
The outbreak of the First World War was also a calling to socialist systems and isolated policies of such countries as France and Great Britain. France and Britain expressed their pacifist spirits and were reluctant to accept the war. Liberal tendencies were also disclosed through the creation of liberally oriented trade unions so that middle class intellectual heritage had little impact on the country development (Strachman 2003, 132).
The war was also an outcome of the arm races and the result of concealed debates over these issues. The fight for military supremacy considerably contradicted the policy of pacifism and the international liberalism in the nineteenth century. In fact, those races were aimed at forming the military alliances and enhancing the political and social positions of the countries. Political and military confrontations and rapid growth of European countries could not make American people be indifferent. As a result, the world witnessed the creation of antagonistic and polarized Eastern and Western blocks.
Viewing the War as an effective tool for economic and social reforms
The political economy and American consciousness with the advent of the First World War
Kennedy states that Americans “elaborated vigorous and quite various ideas about the war and its meaning for America” (2004, 45). Their false remoteness from the war and a two-decade position of neutrality still kept Americans attached to the ongoing actions in Europe. This period allowed the United States to ponder on the significance of the war for American society and how the government could benefit from it. Hidden motives of entering the war provoked numerous discussions concerning the veritable stakes of military actions on the American part.
The American government firmly believed that war could become the immediate trigger of economical and social reforms. It sought for the reason to penetrate to the European Arena and established its firm ideological ground. Political leaders managed to make American soldiers to fight for the ideological principles of freedom and democracy.
Wilsonian Idealism and American relation to war in Europe
In the beginning of the Great War, Americans were trying to hold the positions of neutrality and, therefore, the government believed that, according to the international law, they had the right to conduct free trade with both sides. In this respect, Woodrow Wilson thought that the countries involved in the War completely ignored the possibility of peaceful negotiations. Instead, the President was confident that their neutral position would serve as an outright example for other nations to terminate the war (Keene, 2006, 5). The Great War has brought such elements as technological advancement and social marginalization into one course. The global industrialization and the arm races made all world nations face the modernity generating ethnic and international conflicts.
Neutral Policy of the United States based on of Wilson strategy
America’s intricate policy of neutrality revealed the ideological ground of Wilson’s political philosophy. Wilsonian idealism originated from a particular culture and social class. The supporters of these concepts discouraged mass politics and firmly believed that political groups had been formed to protect their own interest but not the common good (Steigerwald, 1994, 9). As a result, their politics was more oriented the international liberalism and democracy proliferation. This is why the economic needs of the European countries contradicted the American international policy. This, probably, influenced the Wilson’s decision to enter the First World War.
Wilson’s ideology also involved cultural and ethnical issues; “Wilsonians drew from America’s common-sense tradition and defined the common good as the result of enlightened self-interest tempered by human reason” (Steigerwald, 1994, 11). In this respect, the policy of self-interest revealed by German government was another solid ground for the United States to start a military invasion. Germany was the country that neglected the interests of American economic partners thus striving to restore the imperialistic dictatorship.
International Dimension
For Wilsonians, the internationalism was the best instrument for upholding liberal idealisms. Internationalism contributed to reconciliation of technological outbreak, as the world interdependence and cooperation lessened people’s necessity for creating technology of mass destruction.
In respect to the World Wars, America resorted to belligerence owing to Wilson’s assumption that “a saving mission was a part of the providential plan for the world” (Streib 1948, 272) The idealism presented in this War could be compared with Utopian concept about an ideal political and social system peacefully cooperating. Hence, the main slogan of the Great War sounded as follows: “They are fighting to uphold the principles and ideals of civilization and human process” (Streib 1948, 277). The American state took the role of the national hero that would save the world from the totalitarian invasion. The above-cited slogans showed that most of American people did not perceive the veritable scope of their sacrifices in the War. This reveals the ambiguous motives of America’s participation both in First World War and in the Second World War and the idealistic accent made it even more absurd.
The post war period and current situation
Wilsonianism its application in the policy of George Bush
Wilsonianism policy of global policy and international democracy sounded like a utopia, especially for times of the Great War. This was a calling to the age of technological modernization and revolution and the fight for the international liberalism. Therefore, the controversy of this political ideology continues to be the main topic for discussion nowadays, as most Wilson’s provisions have become the main principles of ‘American democracy’ (Clements 2004, p. 63). Wilson’s policy has not gained a unanimous approval as on the other hand the declaration of war was no the most reasonable decisions for satisfying the political and ideological purposes. On the other hand, German politics did not have any reasonable justification at all.
Historical heritage predicted the future of America’s international cooperation. Wilson’s strategies have been also perpetuated in the policies of George Bush Jr. in Iraq. His military action against the East, which had no rational ground, fostered a wave of indignation and disapproval on the part of European and Asian countries. Indeed, the situation was aggravated by the fact that Bush had apparent motives of material enrichment rather than other noble incentives.
The outcomes of the First Word War of contemporary America
The events of the Great War have remained rather disputable and ambiguous due to many nuances and unsolved disputes. Wilsonian idealism, therefore, have greatly contributed to contemporary image of the government and its political culture.
Conclusions
The Great War was a logical outcome of the economical and ideological crises. Therefore, this war has different meaning for each country pursuing different ambitions. American society, hence, perceived the warfare as the ideological struggle generated by Wilsonian idealism.
Annotated Bibliography
Clements, Kendrick. 2004. Wilson and World War I. Presidential Studies Quarterly. 34, no. 1: 62-82.
The article investigates the underpinning of America’s decision to enter World War I. Clements argues that Wilson’s policy against German government as the result of complex interactions of ideological assumptions and historical personalities during 1914-1915. The peaceful politics and neutral position of the United States led Americans to misconceptions concerning the real intentions of German government. By applying the qualitative approach to research, the author tries to discover the evidence of inevitability of America’s entering the war. Hence, he provides numerous arguments in defense of his points of view and relies of legal issues stipulating the freedom and right of American submarines to pass though the war territory freely. In this way, Clements proves that Wilson’s decision was superficial and did imply any in-depth analysis of the situation. The article is of great value for this particular research, as it disclose some aspects of reasons of American’s participation in the Great War.
Howard, Michael. 2003. The First World War. US: Oxford University Press.
The books is a historical narration about the origins and outcomes of the international conflict between Germany and other developed countries of the world seeking for political and social self-determination. According to the author, the war embodies the principles of the governmental policy, military activities, and personal factor. This, perhaps explains some gaps of Wilson’s rational concepts and, therefore, it will be of high importance of the research under consideration.
Keene, Jennifer D. 2006. World War I. US: Greenwood Publishing Group.
The book is based on narrated experiences of American victims of the horrific war. The author also describes the events of trench warfare and brave soldiers coping with devastating military actions. Impressive bibliographies narrating the abhorrent pictures of military actions provide a better idea of strategies of political leaders. The book will greatly contribute to our research as it places an emphasis of the ambiguity of motives established by German government and Wilsonian ideolism.
Strachan, Hew. 2003. The First World War: To Arms. US: Business Media, Inc.
The main aspects of the book are more focused on the impact of the First World War on further events in the twentieth century. The author manages to cover the economic, diplomatic, and social history and combine these angles with military actions held in 1914-1918. Further, the researcher provides an analysis of such events as arms races and issues of national security as the trigger of the war. Therefore, the book will be rather helpful for the research, as it clarifies some ambiguous points.
Streib, Gordon F. 1948. Idealism and War Bonds: Comparative Study of the Two World Wars. Oxford University Press. 12, no.2: 272-279.
Streib provides a comparative analysis of motives and outcomes of two Word Wars that have totally changed the contemporary world and international policies. In particular, the author puts forward the idea that the First World War was more ideologically predetermined, as it encompasses solid strategic and political incentives of the rise of military actions. The researcher also compares cultural and social underpinnings of the wars and their outcomes thus submitting an assumption that in both cases America had an insufficient ground for entering the war. The article closely relates to the thesis of the given research, as it discloses certain motives of participation of the United States in the international conflict.
Streigerwald, David.1994. Wilsonian Idealism in America. US: Cornell University Press.
The book presents the chronicles of the main concepts of Wilsonian Idealism as the introduction of American policy against modernization and technological revolution. The author also pursues the development of the American internationalist movements, and the rise Wilsonian liberalism based on self-interest as an access to political prosperity. The author also describes the post-idealistic views and the way they influenced the free market irrespective of the World Wars and ongoing repression in first half of the twentieth century. The article is of great values for our scientific exploration, as it also investigates the future outcomes of the international liberalism and its contribution to liberal industrialization.
Reference
Clements, Kendrick. 2004. Wilson and World War I. Presidential Studies Quarterly. 34, no. 1: 62-82.
Howard, Michael. 2003. The First World War. US: Oxford University Press.
Keene, Jennifer D. 2006. World War I. US: Greenwood Publishing Group.
Kennedy, David M. 2004. Over Here: The First World War and American Society. US: Oxford University Press.
Strachan, Hew. 2003. The First World War: To Arms. US: Business Media, Inc.
Streib, Gordon F. 1948. Idealism and War Bonds: Comparative Study of the Two World Wars. Oxford University Press. 12, no.2 (Summer): 272-279.
Streigerwald, David.1994. Wilsonian Idealism in America. US: Cornell University Press.
The cruelty of World War I was distinctly emphasized by the massive attacks on all fronts. The Eastern front is a focus in the paper, for it corresponds to the idea of how the greatest generals were struggling for the liberation of their territories from aggressors. In this respect, the figure of General Aleksei A. Brusilov provides a scope of heroic and quite successful estimation of the features which took place in the Eastern Front of the warfare.
The main primary sources by Norman Stone Eastern Front 1914-1917 and A Soldier’s Note-Book, 1914-1918 by Aleksei Brusilov are taken into consideration. The first source states the contemporary vision of war while the second incorporates trustworthy facts about the events which took place during the apogee of the war. Further still, he developed unique tactics in war, known as the Brusilov offensive.1
Norman Stone provides a scope of notes on World War I and the participation of different allies in the struggle against the main aggressors. Thus, the success of General Brusilov is seen by Norman Stone to be the most rational way to overcome the enemy despite the lack of supply and people.
The main enemy of the Russian General in the Eastern front was Austro-Hungarian Empire and the German army. This is why the main schedule of tactics against Austro-Hungarians was applied to the area in the Carpathian Mountains and across the mountain chain. Norman Stone is quite interested in his book about this event. The author indicates the advantage of Russians over Austrians: “Brusilov was told to go ahead, although, since he had not much superiority of any kind – except leadership – over the Austrians…”2 It is no wonder that Brusilov always chose the most verified and adjusted way to attack the enemy.
Thus, he was aware of everything characterizing the Austro-Hungarian way of warfare. Hence, he could have dared to brilliantly clash the powers of the enemy (though, at great cost of life). Moreover, as evidenced by Stone, the advantage in powers was more on the Austro-Hungarian part. This is why the voice of the author in the book is shaped clearly in terms of the rational approach toward tactics Brusilov had chosen in order to overcome the enemy. General Brusilov was highly experienced at the time after having gone through Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) and Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). Looking at all pros and cons which were presumable in both wars, Brusilov gained the victory spirit of making changes in understanding war. In part, it was loaned from Carl von Clausewitz’s On War.3
Quite a good perception of Brusilov’s leadership on the battlefield cannot be underestimated, as Stone admits. It is a clear fact that Aleksey Brusilov always took advantage of different methods in warfare borrowed from predecessors and some contemporary generals. The thing in question is that Stone remarks the features of the war and Brusilov’s offensive, in particular, owing to the archives which he accessed having spent three years in Vienna.4
However, to scope out the main feature which was genuine of Brusilov, one should approach his manner of leading the army. Brusilov was widely considered to be very successful “soldier” general since 1914.5 Thus, he could encompass the power of the Russian army focusing on the main targets to be reached out to. The main assumption is that after two wars in which he directly participated, Brusilov had made allegations. Moreover, he had understood the significance of individual leadership skills to enforce rationality and tactic deliberateness in conditions of war. That is exactly what Stone identifies as a purely Russian approach in arranging things together.6
Stone touches upon Brusilov’s leadership through his strategically well-crafted incentives for the Eighth Army. His ability to succeed other Russian generals in planning future attacks and by taking more attention to soldiers’ training gave him grounds to come up with the way to obtain victories easily. It was stimulated by preliminary deep rumination of the General on the mistakes done by the Russian army in the Russo-Japanese war.
Nevertheless, Brusilov took notice of how to connect the traditional ways of warfare with those emerging at the very beginning of World War I. The question is that while commanding the Eighth Army, he did his first attempts toward further success. Brusilov dared align cavalry and infantry troops along with armor and aviation.7 The paradox of the Eighth Army is that it used (to a degree) Austrian-made weapons. It is when Stone notes: “Two corps of VIII Army were armed with Austrian riffles, and the Department always suspected that there were many more in existence.”8 This is why Stone correlates personal suggestions with real troubles experienced by the Russian army at the time.
The decisiveness of Aleksey Brusilov was one of his main weapons during the war. The author’s observation of the main questions in the book contemplates quite deeper insights into the way Brusilov followed his tactics. In this respect one supposes Stone being unbiased as of any of the parties discussed. The thing is that he never hesitated too long about making concrete aspects of the war comprehensive. Brusilov, however, sparks Stone’s special interest.
It was Brusilov who did stop the attack on Austro-Hungarian troops in summer 1916 while Stavka still doubted the success of the operation. Nevertheless, Brusilov usually ignored those minds aimed at competing more with him than serving the interests of the country on the whole. This patriotic evaluation of General Brusilov magnified all among his best attacks. Hence, the Eastern front could move on. The culmination is accounted for the Brusilov Offensive in 1916, of course.
Nonetheless, he never lost his chance to counterattack, even though there is a lack of provision and guns.9 It does not mean that he aimlessly tried to sacrifice the rest of the forces counting on his personal pretenses. Never! The only thing is that he had different ways to attack as well as to retire throughout the Southwestern front line. Thus, the decisiveness of Brusilov never betrayed him in leading the army.
Stone notably evaluates Brusilov as one who put trust in thoroughly designed cooperation with allies. He was not a man of rigid intentions when the case touched upon the security of humanity at large. Coping with French, Italian, and British allies, Brusilov considered their interests as being cohesive to his own tactics in war. It is no secret now, that the Brusilov offensive had been planned by the General taking into consideration an effort to relieve tension on the Western front.10
Despite the financial problems which took place in the Russian army at that time, Stone delineates a scope of expenditures and statistical survey on the armies’ potentiality for the enforcement of thrusts.11 Brusilov’s tries to find a common language with allied generals were all successful. It is even noted that the authority of General Brusilov was taken for granted among the foreign commanders, even from the side of the enemy.12
What is more, the Russian Army was in most points dependent on the strategy of Brusilov in warfare and in anticipating further perspectives with the allies. All in all, it explains the success of Brusilov over General Ivanov after the Offensive.13 Thus, the invigorating and rather witty steps which Brusilov followed in unifying the general aim to clash with the enemy were his attribute.
The main attention of Stone is grabbed to the arrangement of armies participating in war actions. This simple assumption goes ahead with the way the author selected the main themes for discussion. Thus, his viewpoint is largely taken to the qualitative and quantitative analysis of Russian, Austrian, German, French armies. It is peculiar to state that Stone moves the central ideas within each topic toward juxtaposition in similar points. Thus, he clearly depicts, perhaps, the most grandiose Brusilov Offensive. The event took place in the western regions of contemporary Ukraine, near the town of Kovel in Galicia.14
The beginning of the operation was preceded by the telephone talks between General Alekseev and General Brusilov. As has been aforementioned, Stavka was hesitating on either to postpone such a marginal operation or not. However, Brusilov could not give up at the time. He insisted on the inevitability of the preparations and tactics to serve further victory. This standpoint by Brusilov was taken into account at night. Without the consent of the tsar, the offensive started on 4 June 1916.15
The main aim was to attack German troops from the northern wing in order to distress Austrian armies and simultaneously crash it from four sides at once.16 It was a far-reaching tactic that prophesied the advance of the front line further to the west. Nonetheless, the commandment by Brusilov was enough to work out this complicated warlike “game” in favor of the Russian party and of the Eighth Army, in particular.
Launching the attack in four different places at once, Brusilov made the enemy confused about his own reserves. This was seen and felt since the very beginning of the offensive. No wonder that Brusilov could manage the main arrangement not solely of the Eighth Army but of the Eleventh, Ninth and Seventh as well. In other words, the primordially anticipated with generals the destination of these armies in delivering a thrust solely on Habsburg forces.17
Hence, the positioning of the Russian Armies varied in terms of strictly delineated tasks for each army, battalion, division, etc. The four forces which were planned to deliver an overall thrust were considered to be the four Russian armies located in the area. A special task for Brusilov’s Eighth Army was to prevent Austro-Hungarian armies from getting closer to Kovel. The main drawback was the constancy of shell fire. In this respect, the command followed the decision to rapidly strengthen the railroad near Kovel was dismantled in order to create more protected positions for the soldiers.18 It incorporated the coherence in actions adjusted to each among four armies.
The main methods implemented by Brusilov in the Austrian offensive were highly adapted to the location and awareness of the arrangement of enemy forces among fronts. In this case, Brusilov was one to suggest the wide-front attacking to reach out new frontiers in advancing the front line.19 As it has been mentioned already, the sequential thrust on the positions of the enemy emphasized the main target on the German corps. It was needful to break Austrian counterattacks near Styr.20
All in all, the idea was quite logical and full of rational observation on the particular distribution of powers at the enemy’s location. The next suggestion by Brusilov was to provide many-front attacks in the area between Volhynia and Romania. It served the interests of dissemination of the enemy’s powers among several battlefields in the Eastern front.
The arrangement of powers was done by Brusilov in order to decrease the losses of Russian soldiers. Thereupon, before the offensive, Brusilov made more emphasis on keeping guns loaded with six shells.21 There was a danger of having a disadvantage in shell fire at the very beginning. However, infantry and cavalry were well-supported with weapons. After the first weeks of the offensive, the losses were substantial on the part of Russians. Thus, when Germans had lost approximately 16,000 soldiers, Russians had lost 80,000.22
At this point, Brusilov commanded to stop two moving fronts on each wing. That was a coercive measure to recover the conditions of all four armies at Brusilov’s disposal. However, the plans of offensive employment changed not a jot. Stone sounds quite enthusiastic while commenting on this point. It was a principal measure, as Brusilov admits in his notes, not to stop two basic elements of the offensive, namely: spontaneity and dissemination of the enemy’s reserves.23
That was the idea fix of the whole operation. However, heavy criticism pounced upon Brusilov due to his persuasion in following this way of broad-front tactics. As a matter of fact, Brusilov needed some more time to break the enemy’s reserves down, beginning with the most aggressive Habsburgs troops.
Visiting battlefields in person, Brusilov could put himself into the picture about needful or extremely necessary corrections within the theatre of war operations. This quality of the General helped him to invigorate exhausted and tired soldiers in their attempts to provide breakthroughs in the enemy’s defense line. It was such an uneasy task for Brusilov to incorporate his personal vision of warfare at the moment with what he saw in reality. Thus, with less advantage in personnel (at least 132,000 men), Brusilov had the deepest interest in the success of the operation by means of dispersion of reserve troops among Germans and Austrians.24
Hence, there was no ostensive superiority in Russian troops as compared to the enemies. It only concludes the tactical wisdom of the General. Moreover, the thrusts which were delivered at each point of the front line were aimed at bewildering the main enemy’s forces. It was presumably done by Brusilov to introduce psychological decline in the camps of enemies while having raise of spirits among Russians.
Attacking from different wings, the Russian army could devastate the enemy’s forces in a month after the beginning of the offensive. It is clear that even with fewer amounts of troops at hand, Brusilov could turn German and Austrian counterattacks aback from Russian positions. Thus, it gave an opportunity to advance deeply in Galicia.25
To say more, the main attention of General was grabbed to having more Austro-Hungarian troops imprisoned or liquidated. It is amazing that at the very start and some weeks afterward 200,000 Austrian soldiers were taken prisoner.26 Moreover, the success of the operation was highlighted by the additional dispersion of the Austrian and German troops owing to the simultaneous British and Italian offensives in the Northern and in the Southern fronts.
The Brusilov’s offensive was greatly accompanied by the support of allies on other frontiers of the battlefield. However, Brusilov was highly dissatisfied that, though he showed the efficiency of his tactics, his fellow officers and generals were still criticizing him. It was the main drawback for Aleksey Brusilov, namely misunderstanding in the fighting formation.27 Moreover, he could only go ahead to achieving victory in the operation. All in all, he showed the strength of the tactics which put the enemy in peril.
The success of the Brusilov offensive was in the fact that after the first month of passage of arms Austria-Hungary was at the edge of the total crush. It goes without saying that most of the Austrian and German generals were amazed about the dissemination of attacks by Russians. It went apart from what was entirely practiced in the warfare. It also demonstrated an illogical arrangement of forces instead of accumulating the main forces at a single point. At this line starts the key prospect for the success of the Brusilov offensive.
Several thrusts just speeded up shifting the front line deeper into the main positions of the enemy. In turn, it guaranteed further collapse of the Central Powers. At least, the enemy was shaken by the tactics more than by the predicted advantage of the artillery (wherein it was wrong) and infantry.28 Therefore, Austria felt the first ostensive attributes of senseless attempts to win the war on the whole.
To make the battle even more confusing for Linsingen, Brusilov enforces the thrusts by wings, especially in the area near Lutsk. It was a correlative breakthrough aimed at enlarging the power of dissemination and surprise among primary positions of the enemy. It was also inconvenient for the enemy to prevent Russian attacks because the reserve troops were suffering from devastation within. In this area, one of the most significant roles that Brusilov outlined was that of General Kaledin. Owing to his command, Russian troops acquired additional support of 50,000 men in the northern part of the front.29 In the stretch of 48-kilometer front, this reinforce proved the supremacy of the Brusilov offensive at large.30
Furthermore, Army Group Bohm-Ermolli felt a heavy clash on the part of the Russians and, particularly, Kaledin’s command. This was a great moment for the hope that there was little time until proving the success of the whole operation.
In the middle of July 1916, there increased a need for having additional reinforcement on the part of allies. Thus, Brusilov followed this idea in order to involve so needed Romania as a new ally in the operation. Stone comments that Russia had a lack of supplies and human resources composed mainly of ordinary people. Thereupon, the author is fair to note the following fact: “The Russian army was not, like western European armies at the time, largely dominated by upper-class figures.”31
It was known that with the advancement of the long-lasting offensive the troops were highly depressed, for Russian manufactures and other facilities could not fulfill the entire needs of the army.32 Thus, provoking Romania to join the camp of allies was quite necessary for the success of the late stage of the Brusilov offensive. It was an obsession that Brusilov wanted to carry out soon. “Russia was a poor country, without that plethora of jobs in the economy that attracted the socially-mobile in more advanced countries.”33
Brusilov’s position as of it sounds quite patriotic in the book by Stone. Thus, Brusilov accompanied in opinions with Alekseev insisted on battling over the Kovel area which is known to be the “Kovel Pit.”34 The aims were clearly stated, and the reasons were comprehensive as well. There should be an additional source for giving the armies a “fresh breath” to advance the line of resistance in terms of newly delineated borders of the Eastern front.
Brusilov’s offense was crucial for the enemy to realize the inevitable loss of Romania. In this respect it is no secret that conquering new territories step by step, Russians make their target closer, even though they were at the edge of lack of the resources and ammunition. In fact, Brusilov was that persuaded in the positive idea of anticipation with Romania which belonged to the Central Powers, that he did not even deprive the rest of armies of needful units.35
That was a sincere step toward Russian hope for Romania, as an ally. This step further proved its significance and reliability. The enemy could not restrict Romania anymore, for the southern parts of the front on both banks of the Dniester the Central Powers could not take Brusilov’s methods as a given.36
That was an essential prerogative of the whole offensive. Thus, Brusilov saw no obstacle for joining Romania in line with the members of the Entente. By contrast, Russian troops were amplified with more units of infantry. It was a measure to make sure Romania was out of the menace from the Central Powers. All in all, even with little causeways to deliver additional thrust to the enemy’s positions southern line of the front followed unprecedented Brusilov tactics despite requests of the majority of generals in the headquarters.
Romania joined Entente in August 1916 ensuring the needed reinforcement for the Russian army. This fact was another collapse for the Central Powers. Rumination which Stone provides on that point is subtly strict but persuasive in emphasizing mistakes by German and Austrian armies. “Ludendorf, as the correspondence of Conrad’s liaison officer shows had doubts as to the Carpathian offensive, but suppressed them, no doubt in order to convince Falkenhayn that his own East Prussian scheme was a necessary complement to Conrad’s.”37
Brusilov was at his height in terms of the inevitable success of the operation. However, Stone embodies a sort of personal ravishment by contrasting Brusilov as opposed to Austrian and German generals. In this feature, one can understand Stone in his little sympathy for the genius of the Russian General. This could not fail to reflect on his persistence in breaking down the last strongholds of Austrian and German troops. Romania was that necessary partner to point out the entire advantage of Russian thrusts from all wings. Along with Romania being intervened in the warfare, Brusilov aimed his main forces at the southern parts of the battlefield. Here, the situation was emphasized by the worries of the enemy to lose Bulgaria as well.38
General Brusilov could not stop going ahead. However, he did it along with quite firm, though, scantily gathered armies. Hence, the many-front tactic with long lines of front shifted Austrian Fourth, First, Second, and Seventh along with German Süd Armies aback toward Kovel and Halicz.39 Such an arrangement of the main forces took place due September 1916. Hence, Romania was a necessary ally for making the front line even more turned into the enemy’s back land. That was the point to shape Brusilov’s methods in pursuing the tactics ahead.
The way in which General Brusilov comments on the offensive of his entire life is quite critical and full of reasonable objectives as even shown in Stone’s survey. The main impulses which are seen in the memoirs of General Brusilov are those concerning misunderstanding on the part of the tsar, Alekseev, and the rest of fellow generals and officers as well.40 That was his personal cry for getting no significant support from the Stavka, but the senseless provision of what to do. Of course, it was out of Brusilov’s personal vision of the success in the operation. Consequently, Norman Stone recognizes the pressure which was made on Brusilov to be of a significant obstacle, particularly, in forcing southern part of the front.41
Historians shape the figure of General Brusilov as a self-critical person who could not forgive the lack of infantry and cavalry units at his disposal when they were so needful. This case along with others usually served for Brusilov to be the elements of so-called stimulation to get the victory at all hazards. Hence, General Brusilov gained special appreciation and place on the pages of world history as an irrepressible commander who always had his own opinion on how to reach the victory in Brusilov Offensive.
Bibliography
Brusilov, Aleksei A. A Soldier’s Note-Book, 1914-1918. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press Reprint, 1971.
Dowling, Timothy C. The Brusilov offensive. Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008.
Stone, Norman. Eastern Front 1914-1917. 2. London: Penguin Global, 2004.
Strachan, Hew. The Oxford illustrated the history of the First World War. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Footnotes
Aleksei A. Brusilov, A Soldier’s Note-Book, 1914-1918 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press Reprint, 1971), 32.
Norman Stone, Eastern Front 1914-1917 (London: Penguin Global, 2004), 235.
Hew Strachan, The Oxford illustrated history of the First World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 204.
Stone, Eastern Front 1914-1917, 8.
Stone, Eastern Front 1914-1917, 218.
Stone, Eastern Front 1914-1917, 9.
Timothy C. Dowling, The Brusilov offensive (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press), 1.
Afghanistan has been predominantly a Muslim nation since its invasion by Arabs who converted the natives from their diverse faiths into the Muslim faith. The country’s population is however diverse in terms of ethnic and linguistic divisions. It comprises the Uyghur, Turkmen, Tajiks and Aimak among other groups (Rubin, p. 20).
The Afghanistan war is attributed to the Soviet’s involvement in internal affairs of the then-Democratic republic of Afghanistan, conflicts of the superpowers, internal anti-government rebel groups and interference from Pakistan. The coup that occurred in 1975 ushered in the Democratic government under the Democratic Peoples’ Party led by Nur Mohammed Taraki who was also the president of the democratic republic of Afghanistan (Fry et al. p. 356). This government was supportive of the soviet ideologies and against western activities. This led to its division into two groups; the extremist and the moderate factions. The extremist group led by Hafizullah Amin had the president assassinated thereby prompting the soviet invasion of Afghanistan on the 24th of 1979. Under the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev, the soviet’s invasion was to ensure that a government is in place that was loyal to the Soviet Union in order to overcome the USA and Chinese influence in the east and the Islam-dominated regions. The Soviet forces killed Amin and installed Barbrak Karmal as the new president of the democratic republic of Afghanistan. Consequently, the movie made the Karmal government unpopular even among its Army (Fry et al. p. 356).
The Soviet Union’s invasion and involvement in the internal affairs of the Afghan Government signaled the beginning of the Afghanistan War that lasted well over ten years. The war was fought with the Soviet Unions troops that were supporting the Marxist government of the Karmal government on one hand and the Mujahideen rebels on the other. The move by the Soviet Union also prompted the involvement of the USA, UK, Pakistan and Egypt in the war. These latter countries were all in support of the Mujahideen resistance to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. The war was fought from 1979-1989 with the exit of the last Soviet Union troops under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev (Goodson, p. 3).
This paper seeks to give an account of the activities that lead to the war. It provides in-depth discussions into the Soviet Union’s involvement in the war, the international position on the activities of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, foreign involvement and help to Mujahideen, the withdrawal and exit of the Soviet Union’s troops in addition to the Consequences of the war.
The Afghanistan War
The Soviet Union’s involvement in the War
The end of the Second World War is marked by the signing of numerous treaties between nations. One such treaty had been signed between the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The treaty allowed the Afghan government to seek military assistance from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union used this treaty as an excuse to invade Afghanistan and help the Afghan government in fighting the Mujahideen rebels (Artyom, p. 5). The first group of the Soviet paratroopers arrived in Afghanistan without their paraphernalia and worked as presidential aides for President Taraki. As time went by, the Afghan government made more requests to their Soviet counterparts for more military support since Taraki’s government had become unpopular even among its army. However, the Soviet government was not ready to commit its military to its interests in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the USA had begun providing financial aid to the anti-government rebels long before the Soviet Union responded to the Afghan government’s requests. The propaganda operations that were being carried out by the US officials that they were supplying the Mujahideen rebels with arms further pushed the Soviet Union to retaliate upon the occurrence of the coup that saw Amin assassinate president Taraki and rise to power (Garthoff 1023). Amin’s involvement with the US and the signing of the SALT II treaty between the US government and the communist government of Afghanistan finally got the Soviet troops to invade Afghanistan in December 1979. Their main aim was to offer military support to the communist government in order to stabilize and preserve it.
The initial invasive troops of the Soviet Union comprised of the KGB and GRU officers who accomplished their first mission which was to kill Amin and install Karmal as the new leader within a single night. They called their intervention a friendly move that complied with the provisions of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighborliness signed in 1978 between the two countries. Meanwhile, more troops were en route and within the next two weeks, the number of Soviet military personnel had reached about 100,000 (Fisk, p. 40). Their battles with the rebellious groups involved both ground attacks and air battles thereby taking control of major towns and military bases. However, the invasion did not achieve much as more rebel groups were up on arms in a war that saw the Soviet forces fall short of airpower and artillery (Fisk, p. 41). The war changed patterns with the Soviet troops taking control over major cities and the Mujahideen waging guerrilla battles. With the rise into power of Mikhail Gorbachev as the Soviet leader, he issued orders to increase the military personnel in Afghanistan and by 1985; the Soviet military personnel had reached 108,800. During this period, the war became fierce and bloody though it did not serve to counter the Mujahideen resistance.
The international position on Soviet’s activities
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan did not receive much support especially from its international relations and agencies. The move by the Soviet government to launch battles on foreign soil prompted about 34 Islamic countries to protest against the move and in unison, they demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan soil. Additionally, the UN committee agreed in unison on efforts to protest against the offensive activities of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan (Artyom, p. 12).
Foreign involvement in the war and the help to Mujahideen
Foreign intervention in the war intensified in the mid-1980s with countries such as the US, UK, Pakistan, China and Saudi Arabia offering financial support to the resistant groups in Afghanistan. This move served to hurt the Soviet Union financially and destroyed the international relations between the participating nations and the Soviet Union. The Afghanistan war was once again viewed as a Cold war by many nations especially the US which got involved in the war through the operation cyclone in collaboration with Pakistan (Weiner, p. 149). The United States’ involvement in the war started long before the Soviet invasion and continued in the later stages of the war particularly after the rise into power of Ronald Regan as the United States president during which time the financial aid to Mujahideen increased significantly. US officers were also involved in training and sometimes fighting with the Mujahideen. Moreover, after the Soviet invasion, the Pakistan government started mobilizing financial aid from the western powers in order to support the Mujahideen insurgents. Pakistan also took in millions of Pashtun refugees fleeing the Afghan war. Similarly, other Muslim countries allowed their willing civilians to cross the borders and participate in the guerilla battles in the faith of Jihad. This period also served to bring Osama bin Laden into the international picture together with his terrorist group better known as al-Qaeda (Artyom, p. 43).
The war went on until the mid-1987 when the Soviet Union expressed interest in withdrawing from Afghanistan. This move saw the rise of Sibghatullah Mojaddedi into power as the leader of the Islamic Interim Government of Afghanistan thereby signaling the victory of the invasion resistance (Goodson, p. 56). This also allowed for the signing of the Geneva accord that was meant to settle the differences between the Afghanistan and Pakistan governments with the United States and the Soviet Union overseeing the process. The accord also provided the timetable for the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in addition to spelling out that the United States and the Soviet Union should stop interfering with the internal matters of the Afghan and the Pakistan governments.
The Consequences of the War
The war destroyed international relations with the US terming the invasion as the greatest threat to world peace since after the end of the Second World War. The war heightened tension and anxiety among the western nations, which felt that the Soviet Union was getting closer to the Persian Gulf which was known to be rich in oil. Consequently, the invasion signaled the beginning of other events such as the Iranian revolution and the tension between Pakistan and India among others which hurt the diplomatic relations among many nations in the Middle East. These also made the Middle East one of the volatile regions in the world during the period of the war (Artyom, p. 7). The Soviet Union was also weakened by the war in terms of losses suffered through the army personnel who lost their lives or suffered injuries. After the war, about 13,836 men were either dead or missing. Moreover, the Soviet Union suffered a lot of material losses in terms of destroyed or stolen aircraft, tankers, artillery guns and cargo trunks among other army gears.
The death toll on the Afghanistan civilians and rebel fighters is estimated to be 100,000-1,000,000 by the end of the war. Millions of other civilians and Mujahideen fighters sustained serious injuries and others became disabled. The war reduced the Afghan population significantly with reports indicating that 3-4% of those who survived were disabled. It also hurt the agricultural sector in terms of the destroyed irrigation systems and lack of manpower. This increased malnutrition among the Afghan children most of which were refugees. In addition, the Afghanistan culture was severely hurt with the country being split along ethnic lines.
The Geneva accord that saw the withdrawal of the Soviet forces left the country in a critical condition with the beginning of the civil war which further hurt the already destroyed economy making the country one of the most undeveloped nations in the world (Goodson, pp. 133-167).
Conclusion
This research paper offers an in-depth review of the Afghanistan war that was fought in 1979-1989. The paper also provides the major participants in the war and the reasons behind their participation. Finally, the paper gives the consequences of the war on all the participants. As indicated, the war was initiated by nations such as the Soviet Union and the United States which had some vested interests in the Persian Gulf. Consequently, many people got hurt, others killed and the economies of many nations suffered huge losses. But of particular significance, in this case, is the impact that the war had on the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan which has seen the country suffer economically, politically and culturally in the aftermath.
Works Cited
Artyom, Borovik. The hidden war: a Russian journalist’s account of the Soviet war in Afghanistan. USSR: International Relations Publishing House, 1990. Print.
Fisk, Robert. The Great War for Civilisation: the Conquest of the Middle East. London: Alfred Knopf, 2005. Print.
Fry, Graham M., Goldstein, Erik and Langhorne, Richard. Guide to international relations and diplomacy. New York: Continuum, 2002. Print.
Goodson, Larry P. Afghanistan’s endless war: state failure, regional politics and the rise of the Taliban. USA: University of Washington Press, 2001. Print.
Garthoff, Raymond L. Détente and Confrontation. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1994. Print.
Rubin, Barnett R. The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995. Print.
Weiner, Tim. Blank Check: the Pentagon’s Black Budget. New York: Warner Books, 1990. Print.
The events of the First World War which took place from 1914 to 1918 were a part of the grand struggle for domination in the world (including the top-priority territories in Europe, Asia and colonial areas) between the world powers. Before the war, the two antagonistic camps of the Central Powers and the countries of Entente alliance were organized. During the main course of the war, the dominance of the Central Powers treaty was absolutely evident. The troops of Germany and Austria-Hungary managed to win all the major battles, and annex a vast number of territories belonging mainly to Russia and France. However, in 1916 the character of war changed greatly demonstrating to the high officials of the Central Powers’ Army that it was necessary to start peace negotiations. That was a breaking point of the course of the war. Here, the question was why the countries of the Central alliance appeared in such a troublesome situation for themselves which eventually led to their defeat, and signing the shameful Treaty of Versailles. It was suggested by some historians that those countries found themselves in the economically disadvantaged situation which limited their resources, and became the reason for significant problems in the battlefields. However, the evaluation of the facts suggests that the resources of the countries of Entente alliance were also limited to the greatest extent; especially this situation became very complicated for Russia and France in 1914 and 1915. Thus, the reasons of Central Powers’ overthrow are to be searched in a different field. Overall, the analysis of the situation suggests that among the real reasons of negative outcome of the war for the Central Powers were strategic mistakes by military generals in the battlefields and the failure of the German Schlieffen plan; heroic actions by the soldiers of the Entente army, especially Russia and France; developing new types of armament by the scientists of Great Britain and Russia; and entering the war by the United States in support of the countries of the Entente alliance.
First of all, evaluating the real reasons of the defeat by the Central Powers in the First World War, it is important to identify the countries of this alliance and the economical situation in those countries before and during the war. The term “Central Powers” in the First World War was applied to define the wartime alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary; during the second and the final stage of the war, this alliance also included Turkey and Bulgaria (Herman 1992). Regarding the economical situation in the counties of the alliance, it should be stated that it was more than prosperous which can be proved by the following facts. In Germany, the population of the country was 65,000,000 people; the foreign trade was 1,030,380,000 £; GNP was 244.3 £; and the steel production amount was 17,024,000 tons. In Austria-Hungary, the population was 49,882,231 people; the foreign trade was 198,712,000£; GNP was 100.5£; and the steel production amount was 2,642,000 tons. In Turkey, the population was 21,373,900 people; the foreign trade was 67,472,000 £; GNP was 25.3£; the facts concerning the steel production amount were not available because Turkey did not engage in this industry actively during that period (Cawood 2001). Evaluating these data, it appears that the countries belonging to the alliance of the Central Powers were more than prosperous economically. This can be proved even by the mood prevailing among the leaders of German nation who were sure in their economical superiority, and were motivated by this fact to begin the war. According to Cawood (2001, p. 40-41),
In Germany, Walther Rathenau, President of the huge electrical combine AEG, had in 1908 predicted a long war of attrition, writing, ‘Modern wars will no longer be decided by the hand-to-and fights of homeric heroes.… The War God of our times is economic power’.
Rathenau was one of the primary figures in Germany responsible for economic preparations to the war. By 1914, he reported to the country’s high officials that Germany was ready economically, and the war could be successfully won by the country (Cawood 2001). This person’s opinion was a part of the whole picture of the situation before the beginning of the war. In reality, the heads of different branches of German economy stated that they were economically ready to the war in such a manner that would win (Hubatsch & Backus 1963). Therefore, the Central Powers were better prepared to the war economically than the countries of the Entente alliance. Such conclusion can be also made after comparing the situation in Germany and Austria-Hungary with the state of affairs in the countries of Entente alliance. While Great Britain had a rather competitive situation, in Russia, the economics was in its worst condition which could be explained by the effects of unstable political situation in the country, and the general arrearage of the country which continued during the centuries. According to Cawood (2001, p. 43),
Russia possessed 4.5 million rifles in 1914, but by 1915 had conscripted 10 million men. Consequently, some soldiers were issued with cudgels and in some units only one in five soldiers had a bayonet. By the end of 1914, front-line troops were without boots, mobile field kitchens or medical supplies. The shortage of heavy artillery pieces and shells was desperate. Existing government suppliers received huge orders for war materials, but this was insufficient to meet demand. The transition to war production was halting, and mobilisation robbed industry of 40 per cent of its skilled workers, which hit production during the first year of the war. Moreover, railway transport was requisitioned by the army, leaving raw materials sitting idle in sidings.
Russia was in economic ruin. Similar occurrences could be observed in France. For example “the national daily production of shells in August 1914 was a mere 13, 000, but the army demanded 100,000” (Cawood 2001, p. 45). This sad reality was explained by the lack of finance for the troops in the French Army. Besides, the situation, when the Central Powers were stronger economically even in spite of significant exhaustion on the reason of massy offensive operations, was preserved in all the stages of the war. Hence, the evidences prove that the reason of the Central Powers’ defeat was not in their disadvantaged economical situation. Below, the factors which affected the outcome of the First World War will be addressed in detail.
The reasons of the Central Powers’ defeat are to be searched in different areas. First, after devastating military campaigns held in the beginning of the war and tremendous military victories leading to annexing huge territories, German and Austrian troops decided that the whole course of the war was predestined. High officials of the Central Powers began underestimating their rivalry which marked their mistaken military course in 1915. As a result, the troops started suffering great defeats, and it was clear that the German Schlieffen plan failed. This, in turn, demoralized the soldiers who were also affected by the terrible weather conditions in the majority of battlefields, especially in Russia. German troops in the Eastern front experienced the situation similar o the one that Napoleon did. Moving fast to Russian depth, they did not expect such extreme weather conditions. Cold winter and spring along with their extreme frosts and snowfalls paralyzed not only the soldiers, but the military techniques which were designed for different weather conditions. In addition, Russian territories were full of bogs where German shells could not move.
As a consequence, in the beginning of 1916, the state of affairs for Russian army started changing for the better. The control over the situation in the Eastern front was lost by the German army which predestined its defeat in the other areas. When Russian Army managed to expel German troops out of its territory in the end of 1916, the war course changed. After this victory by Russia, the troops of the Entente were strengthened by the soldiers and armament from the United Sates. This development complicated the situation for the Central Powers’ alliance to the greatest extent. Even despite Russian exit from the war on the reason of Bolshevist revolution in the country, the Entente Army was already strong enough to win in the rivalry. In this situation, in 1917, the outcome of the war was predetermined for the countries of the Central block.
Moreover, while the Central Powers’ army became demoralized due to its losses in 1916, the army of Entente was inspired by patriotic hopes to expel the enemy who annexed vast territories of their Motherland. Exemplary spirit was shown by Russian soldiers who were ready to fight till their last drop of blood to protect their land (Cawood 2001). This spirit of Russian people was known for centuries. When some nation managed to invade their land, Russian people were able to attain unattainable. This was shown in the cases of Vikings, tartars, the French, and that was what German and Austrian soldiers had to face. Similar patriotic moods were observed in France where vast territories were also annexed by the troops of the Central Block. There, patriots organized multiple operations aimed to destroy both the enemy’s supply of armament and provision, and the enemy’s soldiers. Their success in the number of cases was mind-blowing as secret operations by partisans were often more successful than military battles in destroying the enemy’s power.
Further, after the beginning of 1915, the situation for the Army of Entente improved, and that signified a period of economical development in the countries of Entente alliance. As a result, the military industry of the Entente countries began supplying the Army with the newly developed weapons. Remarkable achievements were made in this area by Russian and British scientists who developed new types of naval, air and field armament along with chemical and biological weapons. According to Robbins (1993, p. 87),
Chemical warfare seemed to offer endless possibilities. Physicists and chemists were recruited and urged to put their knowledge to good use on the pretext that countless lives could be saved by drawing the war to a speedy end. Brains which later gained Nobel Prizes (and even a Stalin Prize) busied themselves on the notion. Tear gas was first used at the beginning of 1915.
Among the other advanced military technologies of those days were lighter shells from Russia, and British steams which were better adjusted for the naval campaigns than German military ships. As a result, the Army of Entente began its triumphal path to the victory in the end of 1916 expelling the enemy form its own territories, and capturing the enemy’s territories.
Finally, the crucial moment in the war occurred in 1917 when it became clear for the United States that the Central Powers were going to lose, and the country entered the war supporting the troops of Entente alliance. By 1917, the recourses of Germany were already exhausted whereas the Army of the United Sates was in its full tactical efficiency (Spiering & Wintle 2002). Germany did not expect that the United States would join the Entente Alliance. Instead, secret data prove that before initiating the war, Germany and the United States had negotiations concerning their possible alliance (Hubatsch 1963). American authorities were not in hurry to decide which party of the conflict they would join. Only when it became clear that Germany was going to loose, the decision was made to enter the war supporting the Army of Entente. Joining the troops of Great Britain and France in the Western front, the Army of the United Sates became the determinate power in the First World War. Fresh American troops were arriving in the amount of 10, 000 a day. With regards to such development, it was already impossible for German troops to replace their battlefield losses. In the spring of 1918, Germany started conceding the initiative in France. By the autumn of this year, the battlefield had moved to Germany. On November 11, 1918, the joint Army of the Central Powers announced its defeat which became the official date of the end of the First World War. Germany and its allies had no choice but to initiate peace negotiations which ended after the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles on June 28, 1919 (Robbins 1993).
Concluding on all the above-discussed information, it should be stated that the supposition that the Central Powers lost in the First World War on the reason of their disadvantaged economical situation does not seem to be just. Such conclusion is especially just with regards to the initial period of the war which took place before the end of 1915. The evaluation of the facts shows that even under the effects of serious exhaustion of the Central Army due to the massy offensive campaigns, the economical situation in the courtiers of the Entente alliance (especially Russia and France) was much worse during the whole course of the war from its beginning in 1914 to the moment of the entering the war by the United Sates in 1917 when the war was about to end. Therefore, the reasons of defeat should be searched in the other areas.
Examining the situation, a few major factors become evident which seem to affect the real situation during the war. First of all, in the end of 1915 and in the beginning of 1916, the armies of the countries of the Central Powers had a number of unsuccessful campaigns. The main German Schlieffen plan failed. Such state of affairs could be explained by strategic mistakes of the generals and undervaluation of the enemy, and by heroic action of the soldiers of the Entente armies especially by Russians who were ready to fight till the very last drop of their blood to save their Motherland. In addition, after 1916, the war machine by of the Entente countries was empowered by progressing technologies in the air, sea and field produced by the Nobel prize winning scientists from Russia and Britain which paralyzed the Army of the Central Powers. Eventually, some of the most important developments during the war became joining the Entente Alliance by the United States. As a coward, this country was waiting during the whole course of the conflict to support the side of those who were going to win. As the course of the war was rather complicated, it was long unclear who was winning. Only in the end of 1916, it became obvious that the Entente was going to win. Thus, in 1917, the United States entered the war in support of the Entente alliance which became the finish of the winning hopes by the countries of the Centre. Very soon the joint American, British and French armies defeated the enemy in the Western front. Germany and its allies had no choice but to engage in shameful peaceful negotiations which ended in 1918 after the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles.
References
Cawood, I 2001, The First World War, Routledge, London.
Herman, G 1992, The Pivotal Conflict: A Comprehensive Chronology of the First World War, 1914-1919, Greenwood Press, New York.
Hubatsch, W & Backus, O 1963, Germany and the Central Powers in the World War, 1914- 1918, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS.
Robbins, K 1993, The First World War, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Spiering, M & Wintle M 2002, Ideas of Europe since 1914: The Legacy of the First World War, Palgrave, New York.
The American military is one of the most structured units in the world. It is governed by strict rules and regulations of behavior and attitude. Men and women go through unbelievable hardships while in the army but especially in combat. It is impossible to describe the emotions and thoughts that a person feels when one cannot hear another because the rockets are falling and bullets are flying. Often Soldiers have to deal with trauma, physical pain, and loss of close friends and fellow men and women. There are special laws that describe the way a person has to behave when such a horrible thing happens and Soldiers know that. When they are being admitted into the army they sign a contract, which outlines their duties and responsibilities, as well as their actions and prohibitions about extreme cases.
The first casualty of the war was Hospitalman Burnett. He was my junior corpsman, which meant that we knew each other closer than the rest of the troops. Since I was a Patient movement tracker, I was not allowed to see the body of a member who was killed in action. This is stated in the contract and agreement of DOD and the Department of the Navy. There is a specific person who is made responsible for this sort of occurrence before anything happens. As this is done before any of the troops get to know each other, it might be a person who is not close. Perhaps it is done so that there is less emotional connection involved but at the same time it is sad and unfair. I was very upset by the fact that I was not allowed to see Burnett. Even though the fighting requires strength and hard nerves, as well as mental stamina, it does not mean that a person can lose all feelings and sever all contact with emotions, love, and friendship. I was outraged by such a decision, even though I knew about it and have signed the agreement in a form of a contract. This was the start of the friction between me and my chief because I insisted to see the body of my junior corpsman and my fellow sailor who put his life in battle. The chief would not let me do it. But the Commanding Officer of the Marine Corps eventually allowed me to see the body of Burnett before sending him off to the US. This happened without the knowledge of my chief. I knew that I violated and breached the contract that I signed but USMC CO understood my feelings regarding the sailor who was in my team and my junior corpsman.
It is not uncommon for Soldiers to have memorial services and grieving moments. As in 2003, the second war of the US in Iraq, fifteen Soldiers were struck down in a helicopter and there was a memorial service. Everyone was allowed and expected to show emotions, to feel the pain of the loss and anger, because nothing can be done to bring those fellow fighters back (Sherman, 2007). My situation was very similar and it is hard to understand how it is expected of a human being to behave like a piece of rock and not want to say the last goodbye. This was the only way to show my respect to my fellow corpsman and that was the human thing to do. I decided that I will accept any punishment for the breach of contract. I knew that it was the right thing to do and that people will understand my reasons.
Reference
Sherman, N. (2007). Stoic warriors: The ancient philosophy behind the military mind. New York, United States: Oxford University Press.
The Second World War, being probably the biggest military conflict in human history, influenced the political, social, economic, and technological development of our civilization. And despite the fact that it is ethically controversial to praise the positive outcomes of the war there were many reasons for the United States to enter WWII and there is little evidence of its staid impact.
The beginning of the war for the United States
A number of political and economic reasons determined America’s entrance into WWII. First, the Great Depression after October 29, 1929, caused millions of unemployed and social unrest all over the world. The crisis split the world community and gravely destabilized the global economy, which played its role in the political and regime changes that followed it. With the national-socialistic party in Germany, Fascists in Italy, the USSR’s and European dictatorships, the economies of these countries changed. Therefore, as Oakes et al. pointed out, ‘the threat of fascism forced Americans to ask whether their economy and government could compete in the world’ (749).
After the outbreak of war in Europe, the American public was divided. Interventionists wanted to enter the war to stand for European democracy, and isolationists were ready to enter the war to defeat communism. The official motive for entering the war was the answer to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, and some considered that it was an inevitable and necessary measure. In spite of the formalized reason, there were many other factors. The world economies became interdependent, and America needed to make an alliance with France and the United Kingdom for economic reasons, and with the Soviet Union because of its military resources.
Changes launched by the war
The first thing that became apparent after the mobilization was the limits of resources. As for the food and supply, it was strictly rationed in wartime, which did its service with the aim to economize. On the other hand, the way to defeat the shortage in production was to engage more civilians – especially women – to work to produce weapons and other supplies. However, regarding other social and gender groups, as Oakes et al. described it, the military ‘leadership struggled to preserve racial traditions amid wartime changes’ (758).
Positive and negative outcomes
Surprisingly, during the war and shortly after it, the United States experienced a demographic increase. The levels of industrial productivity in the United States during the war were rising as well, and the country brought to life ‘the miracle of production that was winning the war and rising living standards’ (Oakes et al. 762). Later on, the developments in military technologies reached an entirely new level, as both sides of the war tried to create nuclear weapons.
Soon enough everyone began to realize this kind of war could endanger the population of the whole planet, and humans could not possibly survive the path it was on. It was noticed that despite the modern patriotic representation of the war in American media, the mood in the country at that time was ‘free of high-minded idealism’ (Oakes et al. 766).
Conclusion
The Second World War is the most drastic and the most influential event of the 20th century. Despite its positive outcomes for American industry and social changes, it took a dangerous turn and brought more evil than good.
Works Cited
Oakes, James, Michael McGerr, Jan Ellen Lewis and Jeanne Boydston. Of The People: A History Of The United States, Volume 2. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Print.
The First Gulf War was fought between Iraq and Iran from 1980 to 1988. Before the onset of this conflict, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 led to the fall of Shah’s regime. This outcome led to the establishment of the new Islamic Republic of Iran. This new leadership was characterized by new ideas and ideologies. Saddam Hussein became the president after his Iraqi forces invaded Iran. The unresolved issues arising from the Algeria treaty of 1975 were attributable to such challenges. Some of the driving forces towards this invasion included the political challenges Saddam Hussein faced, the existing power vacuum in the Islamic Republic, and Saddam’s hegemonic ambitions.
Saddam wanted to portray the image of a protector of Iraq and its people. He also wanted to deliver a quick victory by fighting Iran and consolidating his power. The fact that Iran had a power vacuum made it an easy target. He believed that Iraq would record victory within 2-3 weeks. The move would maximize his potential and occupy the oil rich regions of Iran, such as Shatt al-Arab River. He nicknamed this new war “Saddam’s Qadisiyya”.
Three phases defined the Iran-Iraq War. The first one was characterized by the rapid success and victory in the South-Western parts of Iran. The second phase occurred when Iran launched a counterattack and recaptured most of the regions under Saddam’s control. Between 1982 and 1988, the war was in the third phase whereby no side was able to record decisive victory. Consequently, Iran solidified its army and eventually became stronger. It relied on “human waves attack” to achieve positive gains. This war increased Iraq’s debt to tens of billions, and claimed thousands of lives. Additionally, the region experienced an unprecedented economic and social crisis.
Second Gulf War
After failing to achieve his goals in Iran, Saddam’s troops chose to invade Kuwait. Within a week, the Iraqi army announced Kuwait as its 19th province. The ruling family in Kuwaiti chose to move to Saudi Arabia. Saddam wanted Kuwait to pay around 10 billion US dollars and cancel the accrued debt during the First Gulf War. Peaceful resolutions efforts failed to deliver timely results. The US government chose to intervene by leading an international coalition to support Kuwait. This move gave birth to Operation Desert Storm. The first stage of this project entailed aerial bombardment of Iraqi troops in both Iraq and Kuwait. The second stage, which lasted one hundred hours, compelled Iraq to accept the formulated UN resolutions. The two nations agreed to a ceasefire on 28th February, 1991. This conflict redefined the nature of national relationships. The region experienced internal discord and focused on international support and aid.
This war led to additional challenges and transformations that would redefine the region’s history forever. For instance, the Arab World witnessed additional roles of states that were non-Arab, including Israel and Turkey. The US also expanded its influence in the region. The war also compelled most of the countries to focus on Islamic fundamentalism. This new trend led to additional manifestations, such as reformism and internationalism. These forces led to the establishment of Al-Qaeda, a terror group led by Osama bin Laden. The impacts and issues surrounding the First Gulf War and Second World War reshaped the future of global terrorism. surrounding the First Gulf War and Second World War reshaped the future of global terrorism. Consequently, September 11 would challenge the United States’ military power, homeland security, and economic power. These developments would set the stage for the U.S. War on Terror.
Third Gulf War
After 9/11, the United States informed the international community that Iran, Iraq, and North Korea were the centers of evil. The American leaders believed that there was a need for all countries to join hands if they were to overcome the challenge of global terror. In October 2001, the US invaded Afghanistan with the aim of overthrowing the Taliban regime. This decision was the first step towards addressing the problem of global terrorism. The US presented several justifications to support such a move. First, the leaders in the US believed that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. Second, there was a strong link between Al-Qaeda and Saddam’s government. Third, there was a need to liberate the people of Iraq from Saddam’s dictatorship. Some sceptics have indicated that the occupation of this Arab country was primarily intended for its oil reserves.
However, the Bush administration gave convincing reports that indicated that oil was intended to play any role in the invasion of Iraq. According to those in leadership positions, the primary aim was to get rid of Saddam’s regime and put an end to global terrorism. Within the eight years of invasion, the U.S. managed to overthrow Saddam’s regime and destroy Iraqi state agencies and institutions. Unfortunately, the events forced many Iraqis to become refugees or be internally displaced in their own nation. Iran gained a new opportunity to expand its influence and role in Iraq. The level of security declined significantly during the period. Sectarian violence also increased between Sunnis and Shiites. The ongoing conflict also expanded the number of Al-Qaeda members in Iraq and across the region. Some of these developments explain why the Third Gulf War still remains one of the most controversial and contentious conflicts in the world today.
After the collapse of USSR, the world of two super powers ceased to exist. At present, scholars agree that the future of the world is multipolar, i.e. the world will be divided into several superpowers effectively cooperating with each other. Though, it is necessary to note that some scholars are less optimistic and stress that conflicts will still occur in the future and those conflicts can even lead to wars. At the same time, many scholars admit that there can be conflicts but they will not cause wars. Adam Roberts, Robert Jervis, and John Ikenberry agree that wars are unlikely to happen in the future due to the development of a new world order, though the researchers have different views on the future world order.
There Will Be No War in the Future
First, it is necessary to stress that the researchers believe that there will be a community of states cooperating efficiently. The community will have certain charts or sets of rules. These rules will regulate the states’ activities and policies. The researchers agree that the very existence of such a community will ensure peace as all the states will share similar values (Art & Jervis 373). The states are likely to strive for the good of all. Admittedly, there can be certain conflicts within the community. However, the conflicts will not lead to wars as the states will find different solutions. The community ensures that the states are interested in peaceful solutions rather than wars which will be equally detrimental for all members of the community.
It is also necessary to note that the researchers agree that the world will be multipolar. Therefore, the researchers rely on the hierarchy used in the power transition theory. The community will still have certain traits of hierarchy. Dominant states will have more power while small powers will have to follow the rules created by the former.
Different Viewpoints
As has been mentioned above, the researchers agree that there will be a community of states existing in terms of new world order. Thus, Roberts notes that conflicts will be present as dominant powers will strive for more power due to their economic and social stability (Art & Jervis 376). The researcher also claims that ethnic issues will still be burning and can threaten the existence of the community and the peace in the world.
Ikenberry is more optimistic about the future as the researcher believes that international institutions will ensure peace in the world. The researcher claims that institutions can help states cooperate effectively and achieve a certain balance. Remarkably, the researcher also stresses that these institutions can enable states to gain more power as well as achieve internal stability (Art & Jervis 386). The researcher notes that international institutions will also be effective in preventing conflicts as members of those institutions will have similar goals and will understand possible threats to their peaceful future.
Jervis is also very optimistic about the future as the researcher claims that the major reason for wars is anarchy in the world. The existence of the community ensures balance in the world (Art & Jervis 547). Admittedly, there will be certain conflicts or tension between the members of the community. Nonetheless, such conflicts will not lead to wars.
Conclusion
On balance, it is possible to note that existing international institutions can be regarded as an illustration of the effective cooperation of different states. The global community is possible and it can help people avoid military conflicts in the future. Though, it is necessary to remember that some conflicts will never cease to exist.
References
Art, Robert J., and Robert Jervis, eds. International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues. Boston: Longman, 2011. Print.
A submarine is a watercraft that can move and operate underwater. Types of submarines include civilian exploration and scientific works for depths not suited for divers and military which were extensively used during World War I.
The first recorded submarine was constructed in 1620 by Dutch Cornelius Jacobszoon Drebbel under James I of England but was based on the design of its inventor, William Bourne. In 1775, the first military single-crew, a screw-propelled submarine called the Turtle was created by American David Bushnell which was unsuccessfully used to sink a British warship HMS Eagle during the American Revolutionary War.
During World War I, diesel-electric propulsion and periscopes were the standard design in military submarines. Countries continuously modified their submarines which greatly influenced the nature and results of the First World War. The British submarine fleets greatly benefited from the development of the periscope and self-propelled torpedoes. On the other hand, German ships successfully utilized depth charges. In addition, the Germans widely used U-boats (from Unterboots) which were considered to be more of submersibles than submarines since they were mostly above water with regular engines and occasionally submerged when attacking using battery power. These U-boats had a cross-section of triangular shape with a pronounced keel to prevent rolling while surfaced (Historylearningsite.co.uk; Uboats.net).
The British submarine technology during World War I was characterized by submarines propelled by steam with boilers and funnels which were designed for quick deployment during battle to serve as mobile minefield against the German fleet. The failures of the K Class led to the construction of the M Class Submarine which used a diesel engine as a source of power. Its guns were incorporated on the deck while its torpedoes were notoriously unreliable. Developments in the torpedoes include oxygen-powered torpedoes which left no tell-tale traces after firing, circling torpedoes for hitting other targets after missing primary and acoustic or magnetic torpedoes which used the enemy’s noise to guide it (Historylearningsite.co.uk).
The German submarine warfare during World War I was considered unrestricted. There were six types developed during the war. These were the gasoline-powered U-boats, the Mittel-U, the U-Cruisers, the UB Coastal Torpedo Attack Boats, the UC Coastal Minelayers and the UE Ocean Minelayers. Weapons installed to these boats were torpedoes, deck guns and mines (Uboat.net).
The British submarines attained successful campaigns in the Baltic Sea by cutting off iron ore transport towards Germany. In Dardanelles, B Class submarines played psychological support while in the North Sea they played observation and naval blockade of German sea forces (Historylearningsite.co.uk).
German submarines on the other hand were noted to attack by groups. U-boats usually patrol and then ambush passing British merchant and military ships. Their strategy is to detect and follow ships on naval routes. They wait until other U-boats have chanced upon their target and then they attack in full force. Due to the speed and power of U-boats, they can run on diesel and charge batteries and then quickly submerge to attack spied enemies. However, this strategy led to the demise of these ships due to the distance to be traveled and the isolation which rendered them vulnerable to ambush themselves (Uboat.net).