Prologue
Strategy is generally used to describe the use of available resources to gain any objective. In this article, the researcher shall use it in the traditional sense only that is, as meaning the art of the strategon, or military commander. ‘The strategic approach is thus one which takes account of the part which is played by force, or the threat of force, in the international system. If globalization is defined as the intersection of international politics, culture, markets, and technology, then the strategy of nation-states is economically, militarily, and politically central to this concept. Strategy may be defined as the combination of diplomatic, economic, military, and political factors used by leaders to defend their respective nation-states. In the context of highly interdependent domestic and international politics, leaders must develop strategies that address a diverse range of internal, state, and non-state challenges. In this article work of great historians and scholars like Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Napoleon and Kautilya are cases in point. Further light will be thrown on various aspects of strategy in international relations. Concise historical examples are used to illustrate and support the author’s theoretical observations and practical recommendations. We now move on to the brief study of what strategy is all about.
Keywords: International Relations, Security, Strategy, Strategic Studies, Strategic Action.
Introduction
What is Strategy?
The word ‘strategy’ is derived from the Greek words ‘strategia’ which means the office of a general, and ‘stratos’ which means an army. Denis Drew and Donald Snow defined the concept of strategy as “a plan of action that organizes efforts to achieve objectives”. The best way to explore the role of strategy in international relations is through the concept of ‘Grand Strategy’. It can be further defined as “The art and science of coordinating the development and use of the political, economic and military instruments of national power to achieve national security objectives.”[footnoteRef:2] [2: Garnett J, 1975, Strategic Studies and Its Assumptions, Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies, (London: Croom Helm, 1975), p.243. ]
1.1 The Grand Strategy Process
The above 1.1 image shows a whole depiction of what grand strategy is all about under International Relations. Towards the right shows the economic strategy which includes a strategy in the context of the geography of a state, culture and the type of the society in that state, the economic condition s etc. In the centre, it shows the military strategy which can be hybrid warfare or the battlefield strategy. The hybrid warfare is a kind of strategy that employs conventional military force supported by irregular and cyber warfare tactics. It is a combination of multiple conventional and unconventional tools of warfare like the economic warfare, cyber-attacks, diplomacy and special forces etc. Towards the extreme left is the political strategies like threats and domestic politics etc. All the above three strategies finally give a result which places a state on the face of the global world
International Relations where states are independent in an Anarchic System which there is an absence of an international arbitrator that will not come to rescue when the states are in trouble. Basically, there is no emergency body to call for help in case of any emergency, while the states themselves have to find a strategy to cope up with the challenges, nationally and internationally. The different strategies that a state requires include in the field of politics, economics, diplomacy, international agreements, cyberspace, media education and trade.
The Grand strategy process under international relations include, firstly the fundamental nature of security policy which is the National Security Policy (NSP) to protect one state from threats, secondly the external focus which involves knowledge, Control and Adversarial relations for which the government appoints Intelligence Analysts who have a thorough knowledge of the states’ concerned, thirdly the conservative inclination that arises out of two factors that are the uncertainty involved in ascertained the intentions of other states, the risk that this uncertainty poses to the survival and vital interests of the state.[footnoteRef:3] The weakness of the Conservative Inclination can be illustrated with reference to America’s Grand Strategy during the ‘Cold War’. American prepared for the worst-case scenario in the European theatre did not help them much in responding to the proxy war that arose in Vietnam. This weakness can be addressed by planning for a range of different worst-case scenarios that are qualitative rather than for a single scenario, and lastly the technological basis which can significantly augment a state’s capabilities. The best example suited, can be the development of ‘drones’ by the US (recently in US-IRAN 2019 clash) has augmented its capabilities to strike at enemies in distant locations without incurring any human casualties, but the high costs associated with this grand strategy makes it complex. [3: Harry R, 2011, Strategic Theory of for the 21st Century, The Little Book on Big Strategy (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), p. 26]
Sun Tzu was a Chinese general and philosopher who lived over 2,000 years ago and is most known for writing the Art of War. Sun Tzu often wrote about the importance of strategy and the wisdom that he shared is still extremely applicable today whether one is referring to business, sports, or military endeavours. According to Sun Tzu, Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy are the noise before defeat. He said,
“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles, if you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”[footnoteRef:4] [4: Giles L, 1987, War and Warfare, The Art of War of Sun Tzu, (London: Ross Bolton Publications,1895), available at www.bnpublicshing.com, pp.114-121]
Grand strategy is the highest level of national statecraft that establishes how states, or other political units, prioritize and mobilize with the military, diplomatic, political, economic, and other sources of power to ensure what they perceive as their interests. Depending on one’s theoretical perspective, these perceived interests focuses the most minimal goal of ensuring the state’s survival, pursuing specific domestic interests or ideational coalitions, or establishing a specific regional or global order. The term ‘grand’ in the concept is often confused for grandiose or ambitious, however, it does not suggest expansive goals but rather the managing of all the state’s resources toward the means of the state’s perceived ends. The concept emerged from the military domain to what is necessary for the successful use of military force in wartime and peacetime. The range of other instruments, beyond military force, is extensive like the alliance-building, diplomacy, economic policy, financial incentives, intelligence, public diplomacy/propaganda, and the mobilization of the nation’s political will. A decision to act only is going to be successful if the action is appropriate for the situation presented. Having a quality strategy is very important, but being able to recognize the moment to strike and execute various aspects of a strategy is a very important skill as well. In this context the researcher would like to quote Sun Tzu who said:
“The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its victim.”[footnoteRef:5] [5: Ibid.,3]
Strategy is, simply, the art and science of options. It is a matter of understanding current options, creating new options, and choosing among them. Strategic decision-making involves thinking about the long-term course one will take through a broad competitive landscape. Strategy provides the direction for operations. Operational planning and decision-making, in turn, guide the tactical decisions made in the heat of battle.
Biographers of Napoleon Bonaparte also discusses about his ability to size up a situation with a single coup d’oeil, (meaning ‘stroke of the eye or glance’) Napoleon was so knowledgeable about his strategic situation, the landscape, the enemy, available technology, similar situations from the past, that he could understand and respond quickly to ever-changing circumstances.
“Faire son theme en deux facons.” · Napoleon
The above quote said by Napoleon which means ‘to proceed with two options’ Is in itself an important strategy, because if both ‘A’ & ‘B’ options are prepared one will definitely win, even if plan ‘A’ does not work. The famous historian Liddell Hart said that “A plan, like a tree, must have branches – if it is to bear fruit. A plan with a single aim is apt to prove a barren pole.”[footnoteRef:6] [6: Hart B, 1897, Greater than Napoleon, Scipio Africanus, (United States:Da Capo Press Inc,1958), vol.2, pp.95-103]
Writing in The Art of War some 2,500 years ago, Sun Tzu postulated two dialectic forces, ‘Zheng’ which is the ordinary element that fixes the enemy in place and ‘Qi’ which is the unexpected and devastating blow. Qi does not work, though, unless Zheng is able to hold the opponent in place until the decisive blow is struck.[footnoteRef:7] [7: Giles L, 1987, War and Warfare, The Art of War, (Germany: Ross Bolton Publications,1991), available at www.bnpublicshing.com, p.114. ]
Napoleon’s strategical methods continually defeated much larger enemy forces using the principle of Qi and Zheng, though he was more likely to call it “manoeuvre sur les derrières.” In what was called the “strategy of the central position,” Napoleon placed his men between two armies, often by identifying a weak position in which to penetrate between the two. He then assigned a relatively small portion of his army to hold one army at bay, while he used his best forces to defeat the other army in detail. Once one army was defeated, Napoleon could turn his Qi forces back to join his Zheng troops and overwhelmed the second enemy.
Carl von Clausewitz, a Prussian military officer was once held captive by Napoleon, he then closely studied the Napoleonic campaigns and wrote ‘Vom Kriege’, known to us as ‘On War’. Clausewitz attributed the notion of the ‘fog of war,’[footnoteRef:8] although he never actually used that term. He spoke of fog as a metaphor for war’s ambiguities. He said once the battle begins, information that is tactically relevant can be confusing and even distorted by events. This ‘fog’ can be lifted through the optimal use of ‘competitive intelligence’ and can insight the ability to glean relevant knowledge out of ambiguous data which is gained through experience. [8: Clausewitz C, 1994, Theory of War, Campaign in Russia in 1821, (Nottingham: Oxford University Press, 1987) p.58, available at https://www.amazon.in/War-Carl-Von-Clausewitz/dp/1640320806?tag=googinhydr18418-21, accessed: 06.07.2019.]
Chankaya Kautily an Indian political-strategic thinker, in his book ‘Arthashastra’ wrote on war and diplomacy. His book has always analysed and discussed in the strategic community. Kautilya’s six-fold policy components are:
- Peace- According to him “The only time a king will make peace is when he finds himself in relative decline compared to his enemy”.[footnoteRef:9] If we analyse this dictum then we will understand that after the 1962 humiliating defeat from China, India established peace with China, because India knew that they cannot win against China. [9: Boesche R,2002, The Political Strategy, Kautilya: The First Great Political Realist.”, (India: HarperCollins Publishers, 2011), vol.01, pp.29-30. ]
- War- “When a king is in a superior position compared to his enemy, he will attack and wage war.” The best example of the above is how the U.S attacked Syria in 2018.
- Neutrality- “If a king feels that his enemy and he are equal and neither can harm the other nor ruin the other’s undertakings, then he shall choose to do nothing.” This is what India did in 1986-87 Brass tack crisis, 2001-02 border standoff and in 2008 after the Mumbai attacks. In which India first tried to coerce Pakistan militarily and politically but when it realised that it cannot win against Pakistan because of the nuclear deterrence, in the end, India had to follow its ancestor’s advice to observe neutrality.
- Marching- When a king increases his own power and has a special advantage over his enemy, he will take part in the fourth approach of Kautilyan foreign policy by making preparations for war
- Alliance- “In contrast to preparing for war, a king may require the help of another to protect his own undertakings. This idea of building an alliance is Kautilya’s fifth method of foreign policy. A king seeking an alliance must ensure that he finds a king more powerful than the neighbouring enemy”.[footnoteRef:10] India is vigorously working on this dictum. It has a strategic alliance with US, Russia, France, and Israel, and signed a 10-year nuclear deal with the US in 2008, this deal would open nuclear technology and energy market for India. Its nuclear programme would undermine Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent. [10: Kamal K, 2018, Kautilya’s Arthashastra: Indian Strategic Culture and Grand Strategic Preferences, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 27-54, available at https://idsa.in/jds/jds-12-3-2018-kautilya-arthashastra-kajari-kamal, accessed: 05.07.2019. ]
- Double Policy- “Making peace with one and waging war with another”. According to this dictum, a king must have peace with one and wage a war against others. This is what India has been doing for many decades. After the 1962 war defeat, it has never tried to go for war with China. India is improving its relations with China but pursuing aggressive designs against Pakistan. Whether it is Water, Siachen, Sir Creek, or Kashmir issue, India is not ready to make peace with Pakistan. It is constantly building its defence capabilities to undermine Pakistan’s strategic interests. Such a double policy is a clear cut shadow of the Kautilya’s six-fold policy.
Conclusion
The strategic theory offers an exact and coherent basis for investigating social phenomena. As has been shown, it is able to de-conflict the attempt to assess social activity designed to achieve goals from arbitrary moral valuations. In this manner, strategic theory facilitates clarity of understanding. The strategic theory is, thereby, mind-opening and intellectually liberating.
Epilogue
“A well-founded strategy is only as viable as the ability for a firm to execute and see it through.”· SUN TZU
Bibliography
Books/E-books
- Boesche R,2002, The Political Strategy, Kautilya: The First Great Political Realist.”, (India: HarperCollins Publishers, 2011), vol.01, pp.29-30.
- Clausewitz C, 1994, Theory of War, Campaign in Russia in 1821, (Nottingham: Oxford University Press, 1987) p.58, available at https://www.amazon.in/War-Carl-Von-Clausewitz/dp/1640320806?tag=googinhydr18418-21, accessed: 06.07.2019.
- Garnett J, 1975, Strategic Studies and Its Assumptions, Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies, (London: Croom Helm, 1975), p.243.
- Giles L, 1987, War and Warfare, The Art of War of Sun Tzu, (London: Ross Bolton Publications,1895), available at www.bnpublicshing.com, pp.114-121
- Harry R, 2011, Strategic Theory of for the 21st Century, The Little Book on Big Strategy (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), p. 26
- Hart B, 1897,Greater than Napoleon, Scipio Africanus, (United States:Da Capo Press Inc,1958), vol.2, pp.95-103
- Kamal K, 2018, Kautilya’s Arthashastra: Indian Strategic Culture and Grand Strategic Preferences, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 27-54, available at https://idsa.in/jds/jds-12-3-2018-kautilya-arthashastra-kajari-kamal,accessed:05.07.2019.