Overview
Incorrect assumption in alleviating the threat posed by industrial terrorism is the main setback in the fight against acts of terror that target industrial chemical establishments. In the past, much of the effort had been directed towards responding to disasters caused by terrorism with minimal consideration of protective measures that can be put in place.
Although the September 11, 2001 incidence did not target chemical plants but real human life, first responders have made significant progress strengthening capabilities needed to defend the nation against the threat of WMD (Kosal, 2006). The DHS national guidelines developed and implemented nationwide have provided a durable framework for multi-agency coordination and cooperation.
This is important because terrorist attacks or major disasters often are beyond what a single jurisdiction can respond to effectively. However, whether levels of preparedness are adequate at all levels of government may prove difficult to assess. Many emergency response and management professionals believe that the nation is better prepared than it was prior to 11th September 2001, but still has plenty of room for improvement.
For example, priority missions identified in Homeland Security Strategic Plans have associated capabilities taken from the DHS Target Capabilities List. Each capability must reach target levels of performance if an adequate level of preparedness is to be achieved. It is clear that the emergency response community benefits from national standards that allow response entities to coordinate more effectively than before.
However, to reiterate, is this level of preparedness where it needs to be? If not, what are the shortfalls and how should they be addressed? The biggest challenge for achieving an appropriate level of preparedness nationwide remains the need for continued strengthening of multi-agency capabilities.
Multi-agency preparedness, in terms of multi-agency capabilities achieving target levels of performance, is critical for safeguarding the country. This paper offers a succinct overview of industrial terrorism with cross reference to regulatory measures in place and some of the loopholes that need to be sealed in fully addressing the menace.
Incidents
It is highly possible that close to 2.4 million people may either sustain serious injuries or be killed altogether in the event that a terrorist attack is directed in a heavy industrial plant establishment with several employees (Perrow, 2007). Secondly, it also worth to note that substantial quantities of industrial chemicals emanating from over 15,000 chemical plants are transported, stored and produced.
It is against this background that a worst vase release was determined by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1996 and established the fact that over 100 of the identified chemical facilities had the potential of jeopardizing over one million lives located near the plants.
Further, it is also estimated that between100, 000 and 1,000,000 people are currently at risk of the chemical facilities should they turn to be targets of industrial terrorists. Indeed, these are staggering numbers that authorities cannot merely develop policy documents without implementing the proposals.
While politics has played a significant role in aggravating industrial terrorism, the international terrorist groups targeting industrial chemical plants has been uniquely identified as a thorn in the flesh in domestic security platform. It is an urgent threat to the security of people, whether viewed in terms of loss in life or destruction of property.
Unfortunately, the relative efforts to improve the status of domestic security have not seriously embarked on setting up robust measures against safeguarding industrial plants. The chemical plants remain as potential points of accidents yet to be caused by terrorist.
Owing to this precariously dangling scenario, there are interest groups that have incessantly pressured Washington to institute safety measures. On the same note, the chemical industries themselves are fighting hard to see into it that the federal government put up measures that will protect them against organized international terrorism.
Even after the September 11 attacks and the subsequent creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), critics continue to assert that security measures adopted by the Homeland Security Act f 2002 on industrial chemicals are quite weak.
The Act does not fully take into account the growing technological trends in industrial terrorism. Most chemical plants do not have any robust security structure since the federal standards in place are relatively weak.
Critical infrastructure
Why then are the chemical industries considered to be critical infrastructure? It is definite that employees in chemical industries are at a higher risk exposure due to threats of industrial terrorism. It is also evident that the worst-case scenarios present staggering numbers of people that are highly likely to be either injured or killed.
The Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) estimated over 2,000 sustained injuries in over 2,000 facilities each year. It is important to note that these figures are drawn within the U.S borders alone. The statistics could even be higher bearing in mind that the total number of chemical establishments in United States is continually growing.
Contrary to the expectation, most of these injuries are sustained when the chemicals are being transported, not just within the chemical plants themselves. Besides, the worst impact of industrial terrorism is felt on the performance of the economy over and above the mass causalities and injuries. Much of the export from U.S emanates from the chemical industry.
For instance, the year 2001 witnessed more than 80 billion dollars of exports from the chemical industry. This accounted for slightly over 10% of the total exports from United States. Besides, the industry employs more than one million workers at the local level while Research and Development consumes over 31 billion dollars on an annual basis.
It is against this background that any terror attacks on industrial chemical facilities can grossly jeopardize the economy and as such, it is considered to be a critical infrastructure. In any case, the ability to communicate risk as soon as they are noted is crucial since it marks an integral step of responding to risks as well as being strategically prepared.
The fact that strategic risk management has not been visibly put in place implies that some of the safety measures put in place may not be well received by the people and especially those employed in the industrial facilities targeted by terrorists (Chess, 2001).
To date, industrial facilities that are considered high risk to acts of terrorism are being safeguarded by the SARA Title III. According to this title, the task of reporting and communicating risk has been mandated to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
For comminutes that are located within the proximity of facilities earmarked as high risk, local Emergency Planning Committees have been formed bridge the gap between the local governments and the grass-root level. One of the fundamental roles of this committee is to set up procedures and measures for manufacturing emergencies.
Additionally, the committee also serves as an open forum where concerned groups or individuals can air their concerns regarding the chemical industries located near them.
For instance, health and safety officials, industry representatives, government officials as well as individual residents can make use of this committee to deliberate on safety concern issues emanating from industrial establishments within their locality. Realistically speaking, it is vital step to take. The impact would even be larger if it were replicated in the at all levels of the government namely local, state and federal.
The American Chemistry Council has also been on the forefront towards implementing the initiatives set forward by the state and federal government. For example, there are SARA Title III requirements that must be met by chemical industrial plants. In order to meet these minimum requirements, the council is proactive in creating community advisory panels.
These panels provide a forum through which the community can dialogue on matters related to safety of industrial facilities within their areas of residence. Besides, the public health officials are also mandated to see into it that the manufacturing principles are not only safe enough for the exposed populations but also meet the optimum requirements for anti-terror attacks.
Furthermore, the Responsible Care Security Code was incepted after the 9/11 terror attacks. The code ensures that there is re-alignment between law enforcement and industry relationships. The protection of the high-risk chemical sites is also a top priority agenda under this code.
Furthermore, the chemical companies are required by law to safeguard information that may be lethal should they fall on perpetrators of terror alongside striving to improve the security of their environment (Linden, 2007). This requirement is contained in the Responsible Care Practitioners Site chapter.
Hence, both the individual companies and the industry at large are redirecting their efforts in developing components crucial to combat industrial terrorism. In order to achieve this, risk communication plans have been devised and implemented by many players especially those in the explosive toxic chemical industries.
Although such efforts are apparently appealing, there is lack of positive reporting on the impacts derived from these measures. For example, environmental information and how the same is communicated to citizens is still a matter of concern. There are mixed reactions on how both the councils and committees have been relaying the vital information to the highly vulnerable communities.
It is feared that although such community based organizations have existed for long, most residents seem not to be aware of their operations (Heath, Bradshaw & Lee, 2002). On the other hand, the intended functions of these organizations have been approved by slightly over 60% of residents.
Nonetheless, it is unanimously agreed that a communication structure that is fully functional is necessary so that uncertainties can be managed a lot easier. Industrial responsiveness is indeed paramount even as the integral role of risk management is being given due consideration by both the federal government and industry players.
Federal regulations
The Department of Homeland Security was created by the federal government in a bid to tame domestic security, this being one of the largest overhauls in security systems and structures ever experienced in a fifty-year period (Sloan, 2008).
The rationale behind this monumental task was to harness and consolidate the federal governments protective and anti-terror systems so as to ascertain that the process of deploying and coordinating security services is done in a more harmonious and effective way.
The emergency preparedness and response branch takes care of disaster preparedness at the domestic level alongside offering training and capacity building to First Responders. Furthermore, this division accelerates the process of recovering from acts of terror and disasters.
In fact, the key role of the directorate is to ensure that there is a high level of disaster preparedness among various teams charged with emergency response. This would be of great importance to industrial terrorism setting where mass causalities are highly likely in the event of terror attack.
Hence, an emergency response plan is one of the many strategies employed by this division to cater for hazards and attacks. Under this division are FBIs National Domestic Preparedness Office and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Moreover, a national crisis management system is part and parcel of the distinguishing tasks of this wing. In order to achieve this, it coordinates the working of emergency response teams using some public safety organizations located at the local and state governments.
The science and technology division specifically deals with technology behind technological advances in Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) that are often used attacking industrial chemical facilities. Hence, all catastrophic acts of terrorism applying either biological or chemical warfare are under the control of this wing of DHS.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 also mandates the science and technology division to set up a national emergency strategy teams at all levels of the government (Sloan, 2008). For example, the local and state governments should be well equipped with response teams that are well versed with both the management and disaster recovery skills following nuclear attacks, radiological or chemical terrorism.
The overall aim is to synchronize the various response plans to improve efficiency. Further, the development of diagnostics antidotes, antibodies and vaccines is under this division. Better still, the Act provides plenty of room for devising countermeasures that can be instrumental in minimizing the threats of WMD attacks.
Data collection and analysis is under the docket of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Division. The data to be analyzed are obtained from relevant federal agencies like Departments Drug Enforcement Agency and National Security Agency. The Homeland Security Act 2002 also established two main units under this division. These are the Critical Infrastructure Protection as well as the Threat Analysis and Warning.
As a core duty, the division ensures that all data gathered and analyzed before the September 11 attacks are not only accurate but also relevant in the actual security operation. Hence, information has been centralized by this wing of the homeland security.
The given information is assessed in terms of the potential threats to national security. Additionally, relevant response actions are conveyed to the right teams spread across the federal government.
Disparate intelligence information is compiled by the Threat Analysis and Warning wing of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The level of vulnerability of the nation in terms of catastrophes caused by either man or natural factors is also assessed.
The security information at the domestic level is evaluated by the Critical Infrastructure Protection. In particular, the internal security components of the nation are analyzed by this division of the Homeland security. While the roles of the division are far reaching, the individual officials deployed at this branch are mandated to come up with sound policies that can assist in protecting targets labeled as high risk.
Apart from the provisions of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 outlined above, this grand piece of legislation also stipulates that explosives should not be possessed beyond certain restrictions.
Further, the Act also permits training of pilots on how to defend their crew just in case they are exposed to danger of airborne terror attack. It goes further stating that airport screening can only be done by either U.S nationals or citizens. The U.S immigrants are excluded under this provision.
Although the Act has addressed myriad of security concern issues on terrorism, there are latent weaknesses that cannot be ignored if the department is to fully safeguard the growing threats to industrial terrorism. For instance, the creation of Operation TIPS is strictly forbidden in the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
According to critics, this controversial security organ would have transformed the Department of Homeland Security into a swift intelligence agency with the power and ability to efficiently handle and manages homeland security in totality including industrial terrorism.
Nonetheless, the main point of concern by the American Liberties Union is that the integration of such legislation into the countrys constitution would grossly jeopardize civil liberties protection. According to the proposals contained in the TIPS provisions, the Liberties Union argue that it will be impossible to grant citizens and other American nationals the right to privacy as granted in the constitution.
The fact that the Department of Homeland Security has express right over controlling infrastructure, a director at ACLU, Laura Murphy, maintained that the department was given superfluous powers over vital infrastructure thereby limiting the public from conducting any significant scrutiny (Sloan, 2008).
According to the provisions in the Act, certain infrastructure information may not be availed to the public especially if the government presumes it unfit for purposes of national security. Indeed, one of the apparent weaknesses in the Act is the fact that any disclosure of the critical infrastructure information by a government official may lead to heavy imposition of criminal offence on the offender.
Hence, whistle blowers on certain matters directly affecting the American public may as well be branded criminals since they will have contravened this law. The online privacy of individuals is also undermined at great length by this piece of legislation. The Center for Democracy and Technology argue that the Cyber Security Enhancement Act is a real setback to personal online privacy (Sloan, 2008).
According to the provisions in this Act, the government has the right, through telecom companies, to access and retrieve personal online data such as internet transactions and emails. The governments rationale behind this legal provision is that accessing such personal information is pertinent especially in the event that national security is at risk.
For telecommunication companies, they have been quite reluctant to avail personal information unless there are court warrants to do so. Cyber criminals like those who hack computers may be sentenced to life imprisonment as a maximum charge.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is also permitted by this law to access and utilize intelligence materials courtesy of the office of TIA. William Safire, a New York Times columnist dismissed this legislative arrangement as Big Brotherism. At the same time, TIA was also limited by the Congress. The appropriations bill of the Congress also witnessed a heavily cut down of the TIA budget.
In yet another separate but related developments about the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the indemnification provision has equally sparked widespread protests. This provision has it that class-action law suits filed by citizens against individual or corporate contractors are restricted up to some level.
Although the provision does not favor individual citizens and American nationals interested in lodging their complaints against public health menace caused by contractors, the government argues that companies which manufacture lethal vaccines necessary in biological or chemical warfare should be given some incentives to continue with the tedious task of production.
This, according to the government, will shield them from high liability overheads. Worse still, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 that led to the inception of the Department of Homeland Security has faced equally tough criticism from city mayors who lament that the Act failed to provide money to cities to fight terrorism (CNN Politics, 2002).
In recap, it is pertinent to reiterate that the chemical industry is highly visible in the eyes of terrorists and is equally potentially dangerous upon attack by terrorists. It is therefore necessary for the federal government to reinforce anti-terror planning and strategies. Emphatically, It is also worth to note that there are certain pieces of critical industrial information that may be instrumental in terrorist planning.
However, rather than creating a cowed community, risky information should be utilized in such a way that it empowers the community. In spite of the growing concerns on industrial terrorism, the security status in the transportation sector is equally important since terrorists are well known to target industrial chemicals on transit.
References
Chess, C. (2001). Organizational theory and the stages of risk communication. Risk Analysis, 21(1), 179-188.
CNN Politics (2003). Bush signs homeland security bill. Web.
Heath, R. L., Bradshaw, J., & Lee, J. (2002). Community relationship building: Local leadership in the risk communication infrastructure. Journal of Public Relations Research, 14, 17-353.
Kosal, E.M. (2006). Terrorism Targeting Industrial Chemical Facilities: Strategic Motivations and the Implications for U.S. Security. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 29, 719751.
Linden, V.E. (2007). Focus on Terrorism, Volume 9 New York: Nova Science Publishing Inc.
Perrow, C. (2007). The Next Catastrophe: Reducing Our Vulnerabilities to Natural, Industrial and Terrorist Disasters. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Sloan, E. (2008). Continental and homeland security: From Bush to Obama. International Journal, 64(1), 191-200.