Category: Taliban

Research Essay

Assess the effectiveness of the counter-insurgency strategies used by the US and NATO in Afghanistan between 2001-2014. What lessons can be drawn to improve counter-insurgency strategy in the future?

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 on the World Trade Centre towers and the Pentagon shook the world from the heart of New York. The unprecedented lethality caused and the coordination of events on that day redefined terrorism. Yet, it also left the United States of America (US) with a tough decision to make in the aftermath. This essay will assess and in counter-insurgency strategies used by the US and NATO between 2001 and 2014 in Afghanistan, point out the reasons to why they failed in achieving their goals in winning the war and draw out lessons to be learned on how to improve counter-insurgency strategies in the future.

In a speech that received a standing ovation at the US Congress, George W. Bush’s declared the wat on terror just one week after the attacks (Staff, 2017). Two consecutive US administrations followed counter-insurgency strategies that focused on fighting the Taliban in its initial stages (Eikenberry, 2013); a classical shape-clear-hold strategy that was used in the Malaya emergency that prioritised killing over restoring government authority (Thruelsen, 2010).

Washington was not ready for war; however, the Bush Administration strongly believed that there was no other way to defeat Osama bin Laden but through a military intervention (Peceny and Bosin, 2011). The US’ unreadiness turned them to rely on Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance. Warlords who had been expelled Kabul government by the Taliban, the Northern Alliance were the best proponents to the US counter-insurgency (Witte, 2019). The joint surge was so successful that it was reported to be “one of the greatest military successes of the 21st century” (O’Hanlon apud Peceny and Bosin, 2011). Kabul was captured in only three months after September 11 attacks, Osama bin Laden’s forces fled to the neighbouring Pakistan and the Taliban regime was overthrown (Peceny and Bosin, 2011). Yet, this victory was only short lived.

The Bush administration’s counter-insurgency strategy also included a restoration of Afghanistan’s authority (Council on Foreign Relations, 2019). Northern Alliance relations remained on a military level and the US turned to develop an alliance with the Pashtun, a southern minority, in fears of any opposition, or worse, a support for the Taliban in retaliation (Peceny and Bosin, 2011).

Bringing the warlords’ power back into Afghanistan was only a beginning of a corruption that plagued the Afghan state that endued a hopeless future to Afghanistan. President Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun, was elected in October 2004 as a result of a trade-off between votes from warlords for local autonomy according to the Independent Election Commission (apud Peceny and Bosin, 2011). Subsequently, notorious warlords became members in parliament who used their power for the the mal distribution of foreign aid and control of opium cultivation, drug trafficking, foreign investment through security contracts and private enterprises through joint ventures (Peceny and Bosin, 2011).

The Afghans’ faith in their country’s future, in effect, began to drop according to the Asia Foundation’s Survey of the Afghan People (apud Thruelsen, 2010). Increased dissatisfaction combined with the deteriorating security situation was the perfect opportunity for the Taliban’s insurgents to return (Thruelsen, 2010). They continued targeting urban areas to damage any legitimacy of the Afghan government and intimidate the population. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, Taliban attacks quintupled within a year proving counter-insurgency attacks and enhancing national police and military efforts unsuccessful.

The US and NATO’s failed counter-insurgency strategies and corruption were not the only drivers for the growth of the Taliban. Thruelsen (2010) also credits Taliban’s success to a new and modern insurgency model that combined war and religious beliefs; much in contrast to traditional structures based on ethnic backgrounds. The lack of security mentioned previously also paved the way for the Taliban to move into urban centres which continue to weaken US and NATO’s credibility and military strength (Thruelsen, 2010).

The Taliban’s modern insurgency model also supported them in their information operations. According to Thruelsen (2010), they were able to reach international media before international forces did; for example, when a Taliban officer had placed an explosive device that killed women and children, the insurgents were able to spread the story first and accuse international forces (Thruelsen, 2010). Kilcullen (2006) explains that both classic and modern counter-insurgency is contingent on insurgents. However, this strategy gave the Taliban the ability to manipulate local perceptions and convince Afghans otherwise. In later years, we see that information operations also contributed insurgents’ global recruitment through new forms of media such as YouTube, dark web, immigrant communities in the west…etc. such as in the cases of ISIS fighters from Europe or even Australia.

The failed Afghan economy also gave the Taliban the opportunity to reach out to the public through economic incentives and financial gain. For instance, they began safeguarding farmers’ opium fields, an important source of revenue (Thruelsen, 2010). It is also worth to mention that this a drastic change from when banned opium cultivation earlier; safeguarding field and controlling trade generated profits to the Taliban as a result of trafficking (Thruelsen, 2010).

Their quick response to the lack of trust in the central government and loss of confidence for a better future allowed the Taliban to grow in numbers and support by 2008 (Threulsen 2010). By the time the Obama administration stepped into office, more coalition troops in Afghanistan than in Iraq (Thruelsen, 2010). Nevertheless, the new administration that inherited this insurgency carried on with same strategy and deployed more troops in response (Council on Foreign Relations, 2019).

The military, political, economic and social, development of Afghanistan was carried out through means of institution building, providing basic services to the people and training local military and police forces…etc. (Thruelsen, 2010). Yet, the permeating corruption impeded every aspect of Afghan society (Indurthy, 2011). President Karzai’s re-election in November 2009 was covered in fraud; even his runoff victory remains a matter of question (Council on Foreign Affairs, 2000). He was still favoured by warlords who relied on him for continued foreign aid that they benefitted from (Peceny and Bosin, 2011). It was the same battle all over again.

It was not only President Karzai’s power that reinstated the warlord system in Afghanistan, however. According to Indurthy (2019), the US continued to rely on warlords for their own safety and paid them millions of dollars for the protection of NATO convoys; the warlords, in turn, bribed the Taliban to clear any attacks on those convoys.

Consequently, warlords’ power became rivalled to that of national forces. Although the latter was better trained and equipped to fight the Taliban, they lacked the motivation to fight (Indurthy, 2011). The US even failed to win the support of locals, such as opium farmers for example, who were not convinced to switch to other cash crops that did not generate the same income (Indurthy, 2011).

A democratic, strong and prosperous Afghanistan was far from achieved. Warlords continued to shake the government’s stability and controlled private armies in their areas. According to Peceny and Bosin (2011), targeting warlords would have only intensified the war by creating a new enemy and an increased opposition from the population for the US to counter and handle. With the warlords in power, there were more losses than gain for the Afghan government and the US and NATO’s counter-insurgency strategies.

Former US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Einkenberry (2009), describes the Obama Administration’s new strategy in December 2009 as a far more expensive troop surge to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan and their safe havens in Pakistan and train national forces before their withdrawal from the region. Obama’s new goal was to withdraw US troops and leave the responsibility of fighting the Taliban under the Afghan government by 2014 (Council on Foreign Relations, 2000). Peceny and Bosin (2011), criticise that the administration was more concerned with building capacity rather than democracy.

Nevertheless, neither military nor civil surges saw any success. The operation on the Taliban governed city of Marjah, for example, was poorly planned. It came of no surprise to the public as they were forewarned of the attack which gave Taliban fighters the chance to flee the city and reappear again carrying out more terrorist activities (Indurthy, 2011). Members of the Afghan parliament also became concerned of their ability to take over the responsibility of the war (Council on Foreign Relations, 2000).

Yet, the administration remained committed to their strategy. Even firing Gen. McChrystal, who referred to the strategy as a ‘bleeding ulcer’ (Indurthy, 2011), or successfully killing Osama bin Laden in Pakistan did not lose sight on US and NATO’s goal (Council on Foreign Relations, 2000).

Expanding their strategy beyond Afghanistan to target Taliban havens in Pakistan may have reflected on awareness of the modern insurgent tactics. However, the continued drone strikes in Pakistan only generated more anti-American sentiments from the public thus contributing to the insurgence of the Taliban in the aftermath of Osama bin Laden’s killing (Einkenberry, 2013). Additionally, the Pakistani army needed the Taliban as potential loyal constituencies and continued to support them as a result and their insurgents continued to grow (Council on Foreign Relations, 2000).

Ultimately, the Obama administration was left with no choice but to negotiate with moderate members of the Taliban to fight off irreconcilable insurgents through similar deals and means provided to warlord allies in counter-insurgencies in 2001 (Peceny and Bosin, 2011); quite ironic and contradictory to what former President Bush had promised to eliminate all insurgents. Instead the strategy remained the same, but the actors were changed. So far, no talks have been finalised between both parties even after the withdrawal of international forces in 2014 (Council on Foreign Relations, 2000). The fact that the Taliban have established an active political office for negotiations in Doha according to Deutsche Welle (2019) only adds to their legitimacy and proves the failed counter-insurgency strategies by two consecutive US administrations and the NATO.

The US should have been aware of the Taliban’s new structure and modernity through the execution style of the September 11 attacks. In his article, Young (2019) relates the US military intervention in Afghanistan to the US’ defeat in Vietnam. The similarities of how both corrupt governments bred armed insurgents prove that US national security rushed to forget the lessons from the Vietnam war and disregarded what was necessary to win (Young, 2019).

Although a short-term victory was achieved by driving out the Taliban in the beginning, it clearly proved that it did not bring an end to the war. Eikenberry (2013) argues that a more effective strategy would be to remove anarchy with security to avoid any growing perception of international forces as invaders. Modern counter-insurgency has become less military and more political (or possibly not military at all!) (Kilcullen, 2006). Avoiding a military surge requires a control of the environment (Kilcullen, 2006); henceforth a combination of political, military, social, infrastructure and information campaign was necessary to defeat the Taliban. As Young (2019) states, “Knowing how to kill people is far from sufficient to defeat insurgencies”.

Reviving the warlord system was another mistake that inadvertently placed them into power. Their abuse of their political power only weakened the Afghan state and brought corruption that added to the Afghans’ dismay that played in favour of the Taliban.

Kilcullen (2006) states that today’s insurgents no longer operate from one geographical point anymore; they can remotely recruit, and receive funding form a virtual sanctuary. Until December 2009, the US and NATO counter-insurgency only focused on Afghanistan. And ignored their growth and support from the neighbouring country of Pakistan.

The Taliban successfully adapted to new information operations for global outreach. They provided economic incentives that responded to different (and sometimes opposing) tribes and ethnicities in Afghanistan. With the Afghan state in anarchy, the Taliban was to win the war on local perceptions and gain further support.

Resorting to peace talks with moderate or reconcilable Taliban members does not mean that the US and NATO have won the fight. Rather, with the former establishing an office in Doha only legitimised their existence (Graham-Harrison and Roberts, 2017).

In short, modern-day insurgents are able to gather support and recruit globally using multiple resources (Kilcullen, 2006). The military dominant counter-insurgency strategy carried by both the Bush and Obama administrations revived weakening the Afghan state. Warlords’ political power impeded any development to the country. Growing resentment towards the new Kabul government only contributed to the Taliban’s insurgency that came back to threaten the former. The US and NATO lost the war against the Taliban.

Reference list

1. Council on Foreign Relations. (2019). A Timeline of the U.S. War in Afghanistan. [online] Available at: https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan.
2. Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com (2019). Afghan war — What to expect from the US-Taliban Doha talks | DW | 27.08.2019. [online] DW.COM. Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/afghan-war-what-to-expect-from-the-us-taliban-doha-talks/a-50187254 [Accessed 29 Sep. 2019].
3. Eikenberry, KW 2013, The Limits of Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Afghanistan : The Other Side of the COIN, Council On Foreign Relation, New York.
4. Graham-Harrison, E. and Roberts, D. (2017). Taliban peace talks: “Peace and reconciliation” negotiations to take place in Qatar. [online] the Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/18/us-peace-talks-taliban-afghanistan [Accessed 22 Sep. 2019].
5. Indurthy, R. (2011). The Obama Administration’s Strategy In Afghanistan. International Journal on World Peace, [online] 28(3), pp.7–52. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23266718.
6. Kilcullen, D. (2006). Counter-insurgency Redux. Survival, 48(4), pp.111–130.
7. Peceny, M. and Bosin, Y. (2011). Winning with warlords in Afghanistan. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 22(4), pp.603–618.
8. Staff, G. (2017). Text of George Bush’s speech. [online] the Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/september11.usa13 [Accessed 25 Feb. 2019].
9. Thruelsen, P.D. (2010). The Taliban in southern Afghanistan: a localised insurgency with a local objective. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 21(2), pp.259–276.
10. Witte, G. (2019). Afghanistan War | History, Combatants, Facts, & Timeline. In: Encyclopedia Britannica. [online] Available at: https://www.britannica.com/event/Afghanistan-War [Accessed 29 Sept. 2019].
11. Young, S.B. (2019). Why America Lost in Afghanistan. [online] Foreign Policy. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/05/why-america-lost-in-afghanistan-counterinsurgency-cords-vietnam/ [Accessed 29 Sept. 2019].

The words, “You either die a hero, or you live long enough to see yourself become the villain . . . ‘ ring all too true for the Taliban uprising in Afghanistan. In 1996, this young fundamentalist group built on harsh regulations and strict implementation of Islamic Sharia law took over the country. The rise of the Taliban’s power in Afghanistan would create the formula for future radical organizations to follow and set the stage for the Taliban’s resurgence in late 2001. The people of Afghanistan turned to the Taliban to restore order after a Soviet invasion and decades of internal conflict only to find an even more repressive regime.

Decimated by the effects of Soviet invasion, the Afghani people prayed for a miracle. Following World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union competed for global hegemony in what would become the Cold War. Afghanistan increasingly turned to the Soviet Union for support after the United States established military ties with Pakistan. Like his predecessors, King Zahir Shah, leader of Afghanistan’s crumbling and vulnerable government, could not merge the existing indigenous societies with a central government. This created a separation of classes, which led to the Saur Revolution of April 1978 in which the Afghan communist party, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, seized power in a coup d’état and killed the country’s prime minister. Afghanistan became a country that lacked a legitimate government, allowing Soviet forces to overtake the broken nation. The Soviets used the strategic location of Afghanistan to create a military base to challenge the United States’ alliance with Pakistan and the surrounding Middle Eastern nations. In December 1979, teenage Soviet soldiers drove tanks into Kandahar on their way to the capital to support the pro-communist party of Afghanistan. They had driven for two days from the Soviet Republic of Turkmenistan to Kandahar, Afghanistan. The Soviets had entered Afghanistan with the intention of making it an economic base with trade possibilities and access to the Middle Eastern oil supply. According to “A History Covering the Time Span between Alexander the Great and the Collapse of the Taliban,” some one million Afghans died during this period, and more than 8,000 people were executed after being put on trial between 1980 and 1988. The Soviets imposed military and social reforms that caused the indigenous population to resent them. The Soviets, “…initiated reforms that troubled tribal leaders, implemented economic measures that worsened conditions for the poor, and tried to curb ethnic uprisings by mass arrests, torture, executions of dissidents and aerial bombardments.” These strict government regulations caused backlash from the U.S.-backed Mujahedeen or Afghan freedom fighters. Amin Tarzi and Robert Crew’s chapter in Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan details the resolution of the Soviet conflict. In 1986, the U.N. General Assembly called for the withdrawal of Soviet forces. This call to action led to The Geneva Accords, signed by the United Nations, United States, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Russia in April 1988, which effectively ended the war. The treaty outlined a policy of non-interference and contained a timeline for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in May 1988.

Despite the withdrawal of Soviet forces, civil war continued in Afghanistan. The Mujahedeen refused to resolve their disputes with the Soviet-backed government of President Mohammad Najibullah. The Mujahedeen ousted Najibullah in 1992 and then helped the Taliban take control of the government. The Taliban’s strict regulations, combined with support from the Afghan citizens, ended the fighting.

The Taliban rose to political and social power by taking advantage of the weakened state of Afghanistan. In 1978, following a series of coup d’états, a civil war began in Afghanistan between its pro and anti-communist parties. The Soviet Union sent military forces to support the Communist party; however, this invasion was met with extreme resistance and led to the deaths of over one million Afghan people. After fighting the Soviets, Afghanistan saw various warlords and extremist groups —such as Mullah Dadullah, Al Qaeda, and Lashkar-e-Taiba—vie for control of the country. In 1996, a fundamentalist group that believed in harsh regulations and strict Islamic Sharia law took over the country. They called themselves the Taliban. The people of Afghanistan turned to the Taliban to restore order after a Soviet invasion and decades of internal conflict only to find an even more repressive regime.

Enigma surrounds how Mullah Omar organized the Taliban. Amir Manzar explores the most credible theory of how the Taliban started in Taliban in Pakistan: A Chronicle of Resurgence. In Kandahar, 1994, people from the neighboring village of Singesar came to Omar saying that a warlord had abducted two teenage girls. The warlord had shaved their heads, taken them to a military base, and repeatedly raped them. This crime disgusted Omar and drove him to immediately mobilize thirty college students. With only sixteen rifles among them, they attacked the base, freed the girls, and hung the commander’s body from the barrel of a tank. A few months later, two commanders confronted each other in Kandahar after fighting over a young boy both men wanted to sodomize. As they fought, shrapnel, bombs, and stray bullets hit civilians. The group of college students re-formed when they heard about these innocent people dying and freed the boy, which caused people to ask them to settle other disputes. When asked about this, Omar said, “How could we remain quiet when we could see crimes being committed against women and the poor?” These good deeds created an environment that allowed the Taliban to easily win over the Afghan people. The exhausted, war-weary population saw them as saviors and peacemakers. The students chose the name Taliban, from the plural of talib, meaning an Islamic student; this name separated them from the power-hungry warlords and showed that they were a movement cleansing society made up of common university students and children of Allah. Although the Taliban’s members all believed in jihad, they became deeply disillusioned with factionalism and the criminal activities of the once idolized but now corrupt leaders. They saw themselves as, “…cleansers and purifiers of a guerrilla war gone astray, corrupt social system, and corrupt Islamic way of life.” The Taliban soon began tripling in numbers. This momentum and social hype allowed them to swiftly take over Afghanistan. People readily surrendered to the Taliban. In areas under their rule, they disarmed the population, enforced law and order, imposed strict Sharia law, and opened the road to traffic. The long-suffering population welcomed the new measures.

The Taliban’s thirst for power caused them to sink deeper into corruption as time progressed. In 1998, the Taliban denied emergency food from the UN’s World Food Programme “for political and military reasons” which left over 160,000 people with no food for the upcoming winter in an attempt to make them surrender to Taliban rule. In “Taking Tea with the Taliban,” Michael Rubin delves into one of the most controversial injustices of the Taliban, women’s healthcare. The Taliban’s decree that women could only attend hospitals completely staffed by women gained them national attention. Under the Taliban’s rule, women could not go to school, work, or walk outside the house without a male family member. These laws made the existence of a hospital staffed by women both impossible and illegal. Maternal mortality rates soon reached the highest in the world, with nearly 6,500 deaths per 100,000 live births. The rape-culture of Afghanistan caused many women to contract horrible diseases with no access to treatment or pain reducing drugs, which led the desperate women to quickly turn to Opium to ease the pain from inadequate health care. Coincidentally, the Taliban’s major source of income came from the Opium trade.

Beatings, mutilations, and arbitrary executions became routine under the Taliban’s rule. When a Taliban raid discovered a woman running an informal school in her apartment, they beat the children, threw her down a flight of stairs, and then imprisoned her. The Taliban threatened to publicly stone her family if she didn’t sign a declaration of loyalty to the Taliban. During this time, soldiers often savagely beat toddlers and infants, to the point of death or deformity, for the alleged crimes of their parents. A Taliban official said in an interview with Amid Rashid, ‘At night when it was quiet and dark, we took about 150 Taliban prisoners, blindfolded them, tied their hands behind their back and drove them in truck containers out to the desert. When we pulled the bodies out of the containers, and their skin was burned black from the heat and the lack of oxygen. We lined them up, ten at a time, in front of holes in the ground and opened fire. It took about six nights….” Over 1,400 people died at every ethnic cleansing.

The Taliban’s reign left lasting scars on Afghanistan. The Taliban records some of the effects the Taliban have had on modern day Afghans. Nearly 79% of Afghan women cannot read nor write. College enrollment remains at less than 9% due to the Taliban’s assassinations of teachers that drifted from strict Islamic teachings. Taliban soldiers arrest men without beards for treason if they are not shot on the spot. According to Princeton writer Thomas Barfield, many prisons contain majority children detainees. On one occasion, The Taliban kidnapped the nephews of an escaped political prisoner – aged 10, 13 and 19 – and tortured the subjected them to torture and a mock execution.

The Afghan people followed the Taliban in the hopes that they would stabilize the government of Afghanistan after the turmoil the nation had endured in previous years; however the Taliban’s rule became stricter and more violent than the people ever could have anticipated. After the Taliban took control of Afghanistan following the Soviet invasion of the 1940s, they quickly put an end to the country’s internal conflict and began constructing a real government. The Taliban declared aims to restore peace, disarm the population, enforce Sharia law and defend the Islamic character of Afghanistan, but never carried them out. The Taliban tricked the Afghan people into trusting them by offering the villages protection from the warlords and stimulating a better economy. Once they took control of a majority of the country, they began enforcing rigorous Islamic rules on the people and abusing their power. This blatant abuse of power caused the U.S. to ally with Afghan forces and launch a large-scale attack on the Taliban on October 7, 2001. This attack led to the Taliban’s dissipation in late 2001 after abandoning their last stronghold in Kandahar. The Taliban may have brought temporary hope to the people of Afghanistan, but their tyrannical rule thrust the nation into an era of unrest and conflict with lasting consequences.

The Pakistani Taliban, also known as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), is an extremist terrorist group in Pakistan that formed in the year of 2007. Seeing that the Afghan Taliban was formed years before 2007, TTP can be thought of as the Taliban movement of Pakistan. This breakdown makes sense because there has not been true unification within this group, instead, they are different sectors within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa of Pakistan that work with each other. Before the beginning of this group working together, the individuals within these sectors were supporting Afghan Taliban’s war against the United States in 2001. However, Pakistan’s military began to target groups that were trying to escape from the war, which caused the sectors to separate from Afghan’s Taliban and work together against Pakistan’s military, which is when the Taliban movement of Pakistan began. Furthermore, their goals now include to implement an Islamic caliph and Sharia by overthrowing Pakistan’s government/military, and also removing United States’ forces from Afghanistan.

Recently, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa have merged into one, now just Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), and this is where the Pakistani Taliban operates, but it also has been said the some operation takes place in Afghanistan and United States. However, these main operations take place in Northwestern Pakistan and around the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, which is called the Durand Line. In the KPK area, the main ethnic group is Pashtun, with Sunni being the dominant religion and Pashto the official language.

Since there is no unification within this group, it is also safe to say that they do not hold one simple hierarchy. Instead, they have different agencies within the areas of KPK, which is: Khyber, Kurram, Mansehra, Mehsud, Mohmand, North/South Waziristan, Orakzai, Swat, etc. However, even though there is not a simple hierarchy, there are still leadership positions throughout these agencies. This group has a shura, who typically oversees the functions of the different agencies and makes the vital decisions. Next, there is a leader of the central Pakistani Taliban whom has several “deputies” working with them. Within the central point of this group, there also is a central spokesperson. After the central spokesperson, the leadership position within the central point of the group stops and you begin to see different leaders and spokespersons for each agency within KPK (Abbas, 2008). Although there are different leaders throughout these agencies, they all report to the shura, who is over the entire group and not just certain agencies.

The complicated hierarchy within the Pakistani Taliban can make this group very disorganized, which can make them become very weak. Each agency has different responsibilities, and this can cause a disruption in the focus of the central goals of the group. For example, the South Waziristan sector is mainly responsible for attacks against Afghanistan’s International Security Assistance Force. If the different groups are not successfully handling their responsibilities, then it would be difficult to maintain and reach the goals they have. At times, it is helpful for everyone to work on different smaller goals to reach one bigger goal. However, when there is no unison, this can cause a group just working towards no end. This could be the case of the Pakistani Taliban since they never fully merged into one actual, unified group. It is not unhealthy to have more than one leadership role, but it may be overbearing for this group to have different leaders and spokespersons for every single sector within KPK. There are at least eight different agencies within this group, and to have a different leader and spokesperson for each one, can create a very sticky situation.

Due to their poor organization and different sectors, it is difficult to pinpoint an actual number of members this are active in the Pakistani Taliban. However, about 4 years ago, it was noted by the UN Security Council that “Some estimates suggest that the Pakistani Taliban has between thirty thousand to thirty-five thousand members.” As stated earlier, it can be an issue for the many different sectors that exist within this one group. Being the devil’s advocate, they may believe that since there are a lot of them, they may possibly be able to actually overthrow the military and government. However, one of the Pakistani Taliban’s former spokespersons once gave an interview and was explaining that these different sectors would often have fights regarding leadership (Yousaf, 2017).

As stated earlier, although there are different leaders for each agency, there is still one central leader over the entire group. This individual goes by the name of Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud, and he was appointed as leader last year, 2018, after the death of the former leader. Mehsud is a 41-year-old man from the Mehsud tribe in the South Waziristan sector of KPK. He differs from former leaders and members because he is well-educated, which is typically uncommon for these individuals. According to Danish Institute for International Studies, after studies on these individuals, it was learned that “little or no formal education [and] religious education was received from a reputable madrassa “ (Siddique, 2010). This is what differentiates him from the others because he received initial education from one of Pakistan’s most successful madrassas, known as Siddiqia. He also received a higher education, as well as a degree from one of Pakistan’s best universities, Jamia Ahsan-ul-Uloom, Karachi. It is also said that he wrote two books, with one being 700 pages regarding Mehsud militants and their history.

Mehsud first began his “militant career” in the late 90’s when he would join forces with the Afghan Taliban while they were fighting a military front known as the Northern Alliance. He also fought alongside them after the attacks of September 11, 2001. With the help of his education, he earned the role of a judge for the Afghan Taliban. He later began to work with the Pakistani Taliban, where he would become leader of the Mehsud sector of the group. In 2018, after the former leader, Mullah Fazlullah, died from a targeted drone strike, Mehsud became the new leader of the central point of the Pakistani Taliban (Yousaf, 2017).

When it comes to majority of the members of this group, they tend to be mid-aged, around thirty-five. Many of these individuals joined forces due to their disagreements with Pakistan’s military/government. Many of these individuals remain upset that them and their people were targeted after fleeing from the war in 2001. Ever since then, these individuals have been working towards overthrowing their government and military. Aside from the older individuals in this group, there also are some whom are way younger because these are said to be the main ones who are being recruited. Children in madrassas tend to be preyed on by the older members who are willing to recruit and teach them. This could be an explanation for Mehsud’s fascination with the Taliban and militant forces. According to the Danish Institute for

International Studies, the Pakistani Taliban have lured and even taken some young children against their own will. One boy who had been recruited when he was thirteen said, “ They take us to a madrassa and teach us things from the Quran…they teach us how to use Kalashnikov and machine guns, rocket launchers, grenades, bombs…they tell us to use them only against the infidels. Then they teach us how to do a suicide attack,” (Siddique, 2010). These recruiters are training these young boys and instilling their principles into them while they are still very young. As stated earlier, the Pakistani Taliban plans to implement Sharia law, which is why they are teaching them the Quran. They also are teaching these young boys that Pakistan’s military/government is the enemy, which makes it their religious duty to attack them.

Aside from the actual members whom are part of this group, they also have a list of ways to financially support their movement. One way this group earns income to support themselves is through holding important societal individuals against their will in order to receive money for their return. An example of this would be kidnapping a politician and demanded money in order to return them. This type of tactic would only work with “higher-status” individuals, because if you kidnap someone that comes from a family who does not have a lot of money or someone who barely has family, then they most likely would not have a lot of money to offer or they may not even be looked for. Another way these individuals earn money is through taxing people within the society. An example of this is trucks that are coming in and out of the area to deliver shipments. With this method, they would charge these drivers in exchange for “safe” road access. It has also been speculated that these individuals take part in drug trading, in which they send illegal drugs to foreign countries. Lastly, another way of earning money is through fining civilians whenever he/she is caught violating Sharia law. This could be compared to law enforcement, so, for example, if an individual is caught listening to music, then that person may be fined and the money will be kept by the Pakistani Taliban.

Aside from gaining money through these tactics, this group also has supporter who are willing to donate to the cause. These donations are typically given at Islamic institutes, with the proceeds going directly to the group. It has also been found that this groups holds fundraisers through an illegal radio channel that they are responsible for. Besides donations and fundraisers, it has been found that the Pakistani Taliban has been funded by Al-Qaeda. This was proven when a contribution of fifteen million dollars was found to be given to the group by a charity ran by Al-Qaeda. Former spokesperson for the group, Ehsanullah Ehsan, also claimed that outside sources, such as Indian and Afghanistan intelligence agencies has helped fund the group, but these claims have not been yet to be proved true or not (Siddique, 2010).

When deploying attacks, one of this group’s most common method is suicide bombings. The individuals most physically responsible for carrying out these suicide bombings are the young boys that have been recruited from these madrassas. After being recruited, these boys whom are chosen to be a suicide bomber has to to go through extra training in order to prepare for the attack. According to the Danish Institute for International Studies, in a document about the Pakistani Taliban, children are heard reciting ‘If you try to find me after I have died, you will never find my whole body, you will find me in little pieces,” (Siddique, 2010).

When carrying out these attacks, most of their targets have included government agencies, militants and even innocent civilians. The most common methods of these suicide attacks tend to be carried out through vehicles or the usual of having explosives attached to the individual. If a vehicle is used, then a suicide bomber would be driving a vehicle with explosives on it, in which they will drive to the targeted destination. Once they reach the destination, the suicide bomber would either ram the vehicle into the building or park outside of it and detonate the explosives, (Siddique, 2010). On the other hand, if they are committing a suicide attack with explosives strapped to them, then they typically would go to a crowded location, such as a school, then detonate the explosive.

One of the Pakistani Taliban’s most infamous attack was carried out on May 13, 2011. It has been said that this attack was planned as revenge for the killing of Osama Bin Laden, whom was the former leader of Al-Qaeda that was killed due to a targeted kill ordered by President Obama. This attack took place at a police force in Shabqadar, which was being used as a training center. On the day of the attack, these cadets whom have just been trained for the duration of six weeks, were loading into buses to go home to their families. As they were awaiting departure, two suicide bombers drove towards these buses full of cadets and detonated their explosives. It has noted that they killed ninety-eight individuals, and injured more than one-hundred, in which this included civilians (Cassman, 2017).

Another method that the Pakistani’s Taliban uses to carry out attacks is shootings. A couple of years after the attack in Shabqadar, this group also committed an attack at an army-ran school in Peshawar, Pakistan. The reasoning behind this attack was vengeance for a prior attack that their government had taken against them a couple of months before. That day, after school had begun, a group of Pakistani Taliban members had entered the establishment and began taking fire against everyone, including students and staff administrators. However, according to one of their spokespersons at the time, “They had instructions not to harm the children…we selected the army’s school for attack because the government is targeting our families.” Although this does not seem to be their preferred method of attacks, it happened to be one of their hugest (Cassman, 2017). It was noted that they killed almost one hundred and fifty individuals in total.

Lastly, their most significant attack is one that had zero casualties. In 2012, a member of the Pakistani Taliban boarded a school bus and shot a young girl by the name of Malala Yousafzai in the head. Malala was targeted due to her speaking out against rules that this group had implemented into her society. The rule that mostly affected her and caused her to speak out was one which restricted her, and her fellow female counterparts, from going to school. This led her to write a blog speaking out against it, which eventually led her to being documented and interviewed. After all of the attention she was gaining about her shedding light on this issue, the Pakistani Taliban took it into their hands to try to eliminate her. Thankfully, though, Malala Yousafzai survived the shot and is not a Pakistani activist (Biography, 2018).

Knowing that the Pakistani Taliban appointed a new leader shortly after the targeted killing of their last leader, it is safe to say that this group is still active. The group has committed at least five acts in the year of 2019 alone. Their last known attack was a month ago, in which they were responsible for killing four Pakistani soldiers after a bomb attack in North Waziristan. Their current leader, Mehsud, spent a portion of his life fighting alongside Afghanistan’s Taliban, so it is to be believed that he has close ties with them. One could imagine that if he has a relationship with this group, then the two groups may begin to eventually work together. It would be a very dangerous situation if forces from both of these groups come together to commit attacks. However, some individuals believe that the Pakistani Taliban’s movement may fall apart one day and take their own paths due to the different sectors and responsibilities they each hold (Farmer and Mehsud, 2018). On the other hand, if the Pakistani Taliban continues working together, then their terror acts may continue for quite some time because of the extensive goals they have. In reality, overthrowing an entire military and government is not something that happens overnight, so this will take some time for them to achieve, if they ever do. If they were to ever accomplish this, then this does not mean that they would not have civil issues within their country, meaning that their fight may not ever end. However, the point is that if these individuals do not reach these extensive goals that they wish for, then they will continue carrying out attacks and creating chaos. The other alternative to this would be if forces joined to eliminate the group, but this may also be hard to complete because of the many different sectors of the group. There are so many different groups within this one group that it would be difficult to eliminate all of them. It can be tried to hit the center of the group, but we saw this happen in 2018 when former leader, Mullah Fazlullah, was killed by a drone strike. Officials probably hoped that the group would collapse after killing the central leader. However, the group remained active and simply appointed a leader from one of the group’s sectors. I believe that this is a clear indication that terrorism will remain an issue in today’s world.

References

1. Abbas, H. (2008). CTC Sentinel. January 2008, Volume 1 Issue 2. A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. doi:10.21236/ada493402
2. Cassman, D. (2017, August 6). Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. Retrieved November 10, 2018, from http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/105
3. Farmer, B., & Mehsud, S. (2018, June 24). Pakistan Taliban’s new leader faces challenge to keep militants together.
4. Hamee, K. (n.d.). Literature on KPK. Retrieved November 10, 2018, from https://cmdo.org.pk/literature-on-kp/
5. Malala Yousafzai. (2018, October 09). Retrieved November 22, 2018, from https://www.biography.com/people/malala-yousafzai-21362253
6. Sheikh, M. (2016). Guardians of God: Inside the religious mind of the Pakistani Taliban. New Delhi, India: Oxford University Press.
7. Siddique, Q. (2010). Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan. An Attempt to Deconstruct the Umbrella Organization and the Reasons for its Growth in Pakistan’s North-West.
8. United Nations. (2014, July 3). Pakistan: Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), including structure, objectives, areas of operations, militant activities and targets; state response (2011-June 2014). Retrieved October 22, 2018, from https://www.refworld.org/docid/54ca27c24.html
9. Yousaf, K. (2017, April 26). Former spokesperson Ehsanullah Ehsan rips apart TTP in confession video. Https://tribune.com.pk/story/1393995/ispr-releases-former-ttp-spokesperson-ehsanullah-ehsans-confessional-video/

The last two objectives are natural. Anyone who understands the Geo-strategic importance of Afghanistan, would exploit this position, if granted the presence.

None of these objectives could be achieved without the presence of US in Afghanistan. Contrary to what US thought, it failed miserably in Afghanistan, with addition of military and financial losses. The BBC quoted the US Forbes Magazine (9th January, 2016) and said, “The war in Afghanistan has cost America up to $ 1 trillion and $ 70 Billion, in addtion to the killing of more than 2,400 US troops, the injury of tens of thousands of people with permanent deformation and disabilities, and despite these human and financial losses, America has failed to eliminate the movement.” And since the initial strategy was no longer possible, US had no option but to call for peace negotiations. For which US appointed Zalmay Khalilzad on 5th September, 2018 with a specific mission: “The US State Department summerized in a previous statement the task of Khalilzad, of coordinating and directing US efforts aimed at ensuring Taliban’s presence in the negotiating table.” (Turkish Anatolia Agency, 12th January, 2019). US wanted these negotiations to be between Taliban and Afghan Government, but it failed, as Taliban rejected to recognise Kabul Government and viewed it as a puppet regime of US. Therefore, the negotiation option shifted towards US, which Taliban accepted. The peruse of peace is not an event of 2019, but it began in 2013, when Obama addressed the State Union on 12th February, 2013 and said, “Tonight, I can announce that over the next year, another 34,000 American troops will come home from Afghanistan. This draw down will continue and by the end of next year, our war in Afghanistan will be over.” and once again, for US, it didn’t go as planned. In the elections of May 2011, Imran Khan gain power in the North Western Frontier Provence of Pakistan, who spoke in favor of negotiations at every opportunity he got. And made the image that he wants to peruse US for peace talks, as a solution for US Afghan War. And when he become Prime Minister, in the elections of 2018, he gave his above mentioned speech.

In order to make sure that US demands be met by the Taliban. US divided its efforts in two sections, one in the shape of internal operations and the other by mobilization of puppet leaders around the world.

Internal Operations: US focused its operations on the Taliban leaders, especially those who rejected the negotiations. Few examples, “US officials said that the United States launched a drone attack on Saturday against the Afghan Taliban leader Akhtar Mansoor… The Pentagon described him as an obstacle in the face of peace and reconciliation between the Afghan government and the Taliban.” (Dunya Al Watan 22nd May, 2016) That is to say that he was killed for rejecting the negotiations. This was under Obama administration. Same policy of US was continued during Trump administration. “NATO Support Mission, said in a press release on Wednesday evening: “Two Taliban commanders were killed in Kaspia province in a US raid to support the Afghan Special Security forces in Tajab district on July 22.” (Russian Sputnik News Agency, 25th July, 2018) and there was another incident in which another Taliban leader was killed: “Col. Dave Butler, spokesperson for US forces in Afghanistan, said: “We can confirm a US air strike conducted yesterday, resulted in the killing of the Taliban leaders, Mullah Manan,” adding: “We drive towards a political solution.” (CNN Arabic 2nd December, 2018).

Mobilization of Rulers Serving US Agenda: Let us look to it from country to country.

Iran: It is believed that Iran is a “State hostile to America.” (Taliban also believe it). Iran extended its hand towards Taliban and pushed it towards political solution with America. “Iran said that representatives of Afghan Taliban held negotiations with Iranian officials in Tehran on Sunday, as the Islamic Republic seeks to push peace talks in the neighboring country to curb the influence of other Islamic Groups.” Bahram Qasimi, a spokesperson of the Foreign Ministry said on Monday that the talks took place with the knowledge of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and are aimed at drawing up the parameters of negotiations between Taliban and the Afghan Government.” (Euro News, 31st December, 2018). Moreover, the assassination of the Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour, happened just as he was coming back from Iran, and on its borders, was probably by an American-Iranian coordination.

Qatar: Qatar opened the office for Taliban in Doha. Taliban thought that Qatar did this because it recognize the strengthening of the movement, but Qatar has publicly the real reason for opening the office. During its crisis with the siege countries, Qatar said: “Former CIA director David Petraeus’ statements are sufficient to say that the meeting of Taliban and Hamas in Doha was at the request of the US government, which in itself proves that Qatar did nothing to hide, and that was with the knowledge of everyone and not behind their backs… the presence of Hamas and the Taliban in Doha was at the request of the United State s of America to find a way out of the Palestinian cause and the Taliban.” (Qatar Al Sharq Newspaper 4th July, 2017). In other words Taliban fell into a trap. As the crisis intensified on Qatar from the countries of the siege, it begged the Trump administration to paid its money to protect its regime, Qatar, an English agent, increased its approach to America and pushed the Taliban to the negotiations, in the hope that the Trump administration would ease the Saudi risks from it… Thus America made the issue of its service by pushing the Taliban to peace negotiations, making it a competition between rival states in the Gulf. The UAE competes with Qatar to drag the negotiations to the city of Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia to Jeddah. Reuters quoting a Taliban military commander participating in negotiations, who asked not to disclose his name: ‘In fact, the differences between Saudi Arabia and Qatar have completely destroyed the peace process,’ he said, ‘The Saudis are pressing us unnecessarily to declare a ceasefire…’ (Russian Sputnik Newspaper, 14/1/2019), and with this tension, which is apparent in contradiction and difference, the Taliban found itself strapped with three Gulf cords, with apparent contradiction, but with one direction, the negotiations with America. America’s agents in Saudi Arabia compete with the British agents in the UAE and Qatar to serve America and obtain its satisfaction, but during this competition in falsehood entrapping Taliban and unifying its orientation towards the American negotiations and a political solution is the target. Britain does not oppose Qatar’s approach as a defense of the Qatar regime, and the UAE has been put by Britain on the front lines with America’s agents for other purposes.

Pakistan: Pakistan started of with extreme operations against the Taliban in it’s west and with the elections of 2018, it softened the atmosphere towards the Taliban. The statements of Imran Khan shows closeness towards Taliban, which as previously discussed, was build from the moment he won elections in North Western Frontier Province back in 2013. Furthermore, circumstances are created to increase Taliban’s trust in him, not realizing that it is a trap set up for making it enter in the US negotiations. Thus Taliban fell in the trap, and is bitten twice from the same hole, the government’s hole that only implements the US policy: it supported it in 1996 for the Afghan Taliban to rule, and then abandoned it in front of George W. Bush’s attack in 2001 and beyond. It even participated in America’s attack by pursuing the Taliban inside Pakistan… Now that America failed to eliminate the Taliban and decided to return to negotiations as the only option, to resolve and maintain its influence in Pakistan, Islamabad went back to building its old bridges with the Taliban, but with the sole aim of implementing the new American strategy and maintaining US influence in Afghanistan. The Taliban therefore fell into the hole again! Although things were clear and not hidden: Pakistani Prime Minister, Imran Khan said on Monday that US President Donald Trump has asked for his help in the Afghan peace process, Geo news quoted Khan as saying that he ‘received a letter from the US president earlier in the day, in which he asked Pakistan to play a role in the Afghan peace talks, and help bring the Taliban to the negotiating table.” (Russian Sputnik news agency, 3rd December, 2018)

And then the Pakistani Prime Minister met with the US special envoy Khalilzad in Islamabad for two days, stressing the progress of Pakistan in the American plan in Afghanistan, “for his part, Imran said that ‘Pakistan wants a political settlement for peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan” (Masrawi 5th December, 2018). The Prime Minister Imran Khan said on Tuesday that his country will do its best to promote the Afghan peace process, adding that his country has contributed to the dialogue between the Taliban and the United States of America in Abu Dhabi recently. (AlYoum7 18th December, 2018). Imran himself revealed on his Twitter on 19th November, 2018 in his defense of his service to America, he said: ‘Pakistan chose to participate in the US war on terrorism, Pakistan suffered 75 thousand casualties in this war, and lost more than $ 123 billion of its economy, while US aid was only $20 billion.’ Pakistan’s former defense minister, Khawaja Asif, also confirmed the betrayal of the rulers of Pakistan, and he is one of them, he wrote on 19th November, 2018 on his Twitter account: ‘Pakistan is still sacrificing with blood for America, because we are fighting wars that are not ours, we have wasted the values ​​of our religion to make it compatible with American interests and destroyed peaceful nature and replaced it with division and intolerance.’ There is no more frankness than this: Pakistan fought a war that is not its war and shed the blood of the Muslims for America… and wasted the values ​​of its Islamic religion to serve US interests… The role of Pakistan in Afghanistan is similar to the role of Turkey and its ruler Erdogan in Syria, and his services to America by exerting pressure on the armed factions and subjecting them to the American solutions, despite the repeated America‘s humiliation to him.

These are the local conditions within Afghanistan and the regional movements of America’s agents and non-agents that America used to push firmly the Taliban towards negotiations and political solutions. The Taliban, wherever they turned, to Pakistan or Iran or Saudi Arabia or Qatar or the UAE found themselves on the path of America‘s negotiations to maintain US influence in Afghanistan! The Taliban, however, if they understood and have managed America’s pursuit to negotiate with it and the extent of pressure on its agents to do their best using malicious twisted tactics to persuade the Taliban to accept negotiations… if they understood the depth of America’s military and financial suffering in 17 years of their heroic jihad. If they realized America’s insistence on negotiating with the Taliban, even though it labels them as terrorists, as usual, by accusing everyone who resists US’s terrorism and arrogance as a terrorist… If they understood all this, they will know it is an announcement of America’s defeat in Afghanistan informally. America wants to exit before these defeats crushes it, exposing it as a great state crumbling down. They should have used this and put the pressure on America to expel it with humiliation, rather than giving it the warrior’s rest by going to the negotiations, no one can trust America:

[لَا يَرْقُبُونَ فِي مُؤْمِنٍ إِلّاً وَلَا ذِمَّةً وَأُولَئِكَ هُمُ الْمُعْتَدُونَ]

“They do not observe toward a believer any pact of kinship or covenant of protection. And it is they who are the transgressors” [At-Tawba: 10]

America does not accept the Taliban‘s concessions, no matter what they are through the negotiations only if the American influence remains in Afghanistan, even if the representatives of America smiled in the face of the Taliban, what is hidden in their hearts is far greater.

Demands of United States in Negotiations:

After all of this, the demands of US are not something which will come as a shock. US major demands are as follows:

1. Few military bases would remain in Afghanistan.
2. Taliban, along with, the Kabul regime would create a government, which will run under a constitution which would be acceptable for US.
3. The Taliban would have to ensure that their lands will no longer be used for any “terrorist” activities, against any other country and Taliban would sever their ties from all other Jihadi groups.
4. In return, US will give money for all the damage caused due to the war and build all the infrastructure through the aid of civil societies, Private contractors and NGOs.

Even a superficial glance on these demands would reveal the following factors:

1. By ensure military bases US will continue to gain its objectives and also its privileges, coming from the untapped resources of Afghanistan. It will also allow US to be strengthen its grip in Asia.
2. By making a coalition government between Taliban and Kabul government, US will be able to use the soil and blood of Afghani people for its own causes.
3. The third demand will allow US to increase divide and rifts among the Jihadist factions. This will further give control to US in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, in accordance to same old divide and rule policy.

Demands of Taliban:

However, these demands are not agreed by the Taliban and their demands are in contradiction to US’s interests. Which are as follows:

1. Taliban don’t recognize the Kabul government and none of the members of the government would be tolerated on the negotiating table.
2. All of the US forces will completely evacuate Afghanistan. Whenever the US agree to this, after that the negotiation talks would commence further.
3. The internal affairs of Afghanistan are the affairs of their own. In these matters they are answerable to no one. The constitution of Afghanistan will be in accordance to Islam and all the political parties of Afghanistan would be included in the government.

The problem with these demands are following:

1. The US may agree to pull out all of its military forces, but in addition to US military there are about 26,000 private contractors (according to 2017 report, the number of contractors have increased since then). Even if the US forces leaves, what about the private contractors?
2. It is true and agreeable that Taliban would make their constitution in accordance to Islam, but, Islam demands the expansion of borders, which contradicts US’s third demand.

Negotiations Current Status:

After all of this, it’s sad to hear, when Wahid Mugdeh, said that the two sides agreed a great deal about the withdrawal of foreign forces and that Afghanistan is not a threat to any part of the world. He explained that the movement is seeking a guarantee to the suggested peace process with international protection. He added: ‘The agreement was not finalized in Doha because of some technical issues and the drafting of the agreement.” (Anatolia Agency 26th January, 2019) or when, Reuters news agency reported on 26th January, 2019, from Taliban officials that: ‘They agreed on some items with Washington to include the final agreement, and one of these items confirms the necessity of the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan within 18 months of signing the agreement in exchange for guarantees from the Taliban; not to allow al-Qaeda or ISIS of using Afghan territory against America…’ It is clear from the text “not to allow al-Qaeda or ISIS”… that America wants to give the Taliban a place in the system because it required guarantees from it to stand in the face of other organizations, so it wants to use it for this purpose as well.

This was also confirmed by the US officials, when th
US Special Representative, Zalmay Khalilzad, wrote on Twitter: “after six days of talks with the Taliban in Qatar, the meetings which took place here were more fruitful than in the past. We have made significant progress on vital issues.’ (Deutsche Welle Arabic, 26th January, 2019)

Thus, the draft Doha agreement is a major breach in the wall of the Taliban, which was solid. The agent government worked to weaken it further, and despite some conservative statements from the Taliban that it will not negotiate with the government of Kabul, and the similar US statements that the agreement must be on everything or nothing. However, the rush of the two parties to other rounds of negotiations is based on the momentum provided by the Doha negotiations and the firm push of the agents. Therefore it can be said that America finally after 17 years of war has found a light at the end of the tunnel to get out of its predicament in Afghanistan. Unless the faithful current inside the Taliban rise, destroy this agreement, and make it vanish, and extinguish that light in which America saw a safe way out of the Afghanistan war.

Conclusion:

Therefore, the Taliban and all the Mujahideen resisting the Crusader American and Atlantic occupation should not concede to America and its regime, and must not participate in it, and should remain steadfast in resisting them until America is forced to get out broken and humiliated and war is but an hour’s patience. The US has not accepted the negotiations until it was unable to break the will of the Mujahideen. They must be warned of falling into the quagmire of negotiations, which means to the Americans and Westerners a concession from the other party, and to win through the negotiations what they could not by war, i.e. the defeat of the opponent on the table without shedding a drop of blood or spend any cent! This is according to their pragmatic political concepts… America is a criminal aggressor that must be held accountable for its aggression and its crimes. It has killed, wounded, disabled, and displaced millions of Afghans and destroyed the country. Its crimes are countless and greater than the crimes of the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan. As the Soviet Union was expelled humiliated and broken, this could also be the fate of America if the Taliban is steadfast on what they came out for, fighting America and are patient. Allah (swt) promised victory for those who are patient and steadfast even if they are less than the enemy.

Allah (swt) says:

[الَّذِينَ يَظُنُّونَ أَنَّهُمْ مُلَاقُو اللَّهِ كَمْ مِنْ فِئَةٍ قَلِيلَةٍ غَلَبَتْ فِئَةً كَثِيرَةً بِإِذْنِ اللَّهِ وَاللَّهُ مَعَ الصَّابِرِينَ]

“But those who were certain that they would meet Allah said, ‘How many a small company has overcome a large company by permission of Allah. And Allah is with the patient.” [Al-Baqara: 249]

And they must not accept the participation in the agent regime in Afghanistan, but to demolish it, and establish the rule of Islam, the Khilafah Rashidah (guided Caliphate) on the method of Prophethood, that our Messenger (saw) gave the glad-tidings of its arrival «ثُمَّ تَكُونُ خِلَافَةٌ عَلَى مِنْهَاجِ النُّبُوَّةِ»“Then there will Khilafah on the method of Prophethood”

[ لِمِثْلِ هَذَا فَلْيَعْمَلِ الْعَامِلُونَ]

“For the like of this let the workers [on earth] work” [As- Saffat: 61]

2001 year. How the war started.

The war had started during years when the Taliban was controlling Afghanistan. In the evening of 7 October 2001, the military operation, performed by the USA and the UK, began. Around 40 combat aircraft and 50 missiles were activated. During the first month, the fighting was reduced to strikes by US aircraft on military targets of the Taliban. Anti-aircraft warfare was disabled almost immediately; all aviation they had was destroyed at the airfields. At this time Talibs spread false information of combatant actions, they said that UK and USA were defeated. Their reports have been refuted by the US Central Command.

After US attack The Afghan Northern Alliance, which was officially called “United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan”, launched a military offensive against the Talibs. After a month of bombardment, the Taliban’s mobility was declined: it lost all of its aircraft (the presence of which had previously been a noticeable advantage over the Northern Alliance), and the rear supply lines were broken. On the 9th of November, the Northern Alliance liberated the major city of Mazar-i-Sharif. At the same time, many people of the Taliban were killed and the city was subjected to looting. The loss of Mazar-i-Sharif dealt a serious blow to the Taliban. Many field commanders, who supported him, chose to move to the side of the Northern Alliance after the first defeat.

On the 13th of November Talib without military resistance liberated Kabul, which was under their authority since 1996. A few days later, they controlled only the southern part of Afghan istan and the city of Kunduz in the north. The siege of Kunduz continued from November 16 to 25 and ended with the surrender of the Taliban forces holding the city.

By the end of November Talib had only one big city – Kandahar, the center of the Taliban movement. The leader of the movement Mullah Omar was here. On the 25th of November, the first large US military contingent landed in Afghanistan – about 1,000 marines were deployed from ships in the Arabian Sea to the area south of Kandahar, where they created Camp Rhino, the forward operating base. The next day, a small column of Taliban armored vehicles advanced to the camp, which was destroyed by AH-1W helicopters. Although the marines did not participate in ground combat, the position of the Taliban in besieged Kandahar gradually deteriorated, and the city fell on the 7th of December. Some of the militants managed to escape to neighboring Pakistan, others went to the mountains (including Mullah Omar), the rest surrendered to the Northern Alliance. The capture of Kandahar ended the main stage of the fighting.

When the capture of Kandahar finished, the US military went to Tora Bora side, where Osama bin Laden was hiding. The battle of Tora Bora started from 12 till 17 December. The Afghan Northern Alliance with US and UK attacked the territory of Tora Bora:the main purpose of this attack was a large cave complex. When they won the battle, US started to cave inspection to find Osama bin Laden, but their quest failed because he managed to leave his refugees before the US offensive began. Despite this, the military operation, which continued two and a half months, crowned with success – the Taliban movement was removed from power and lost capability.

When the operation ended, in December the UN hosted the Bonn Conference. The Taliban were not participants `cause the UN didn`t allow them. At this conference they created the Afghan Interim Administration and head of AIA was Hamid Karzai. To help monitor security in the country the UN deployed an ISAF (International Security Assistance Force), which was a military mission of NATO. At first, its zone of responsibility extended only to Kabul and territories environing it.

2002 year. “Anaconda” and Post-Anaconda operations

The first year after the fall of the Taliban regime was quieter in Afghanistan than in 2001. But on January 5 and 19 the Americans suffered small losses. On the 5th of January because of the actions of the enemy the first time an American soldier died. On 19th there was a crash due to engine failure, in a mountainous area in the Kabul region 40 miles south of Bagram airbase, which was destroyed to prevent the falling into the hands of enemy. 2 crew members were killed and 5 injured.

In the same year on March US and international coalition began an operation “Anaconda”, which was one of the most significant and known operations of the global war on terrorism. It was the biggest battle between terrorist organization “Al-Qaida” and US troops, since the beginning of the war in Afghanistan. During spring and summer military of US and ISAF continued operations in the south, but it was easy `cause the enemies didn’t impede. After the combat at Shahi-Ko, “Al-Qaida” created a refuge on the Pakistani border. Partisan detachments which numbered from 5 to 25 people constantly crossed the border to shoot coalition bases, ambush, patrol and organize attacks. The remnants of the Taliban hid in four provinces: Kandahar, Zabul, Helmand and Uruzgan.

2003 – 2005 years. Guerrilla war. Return of the Taliban.

After “Anaconda” the Department of Defense start the operation “Jacana”, which include such kind of missions like Operation Snipe, Operation Condor, and Operation Buzzard. Taliban avoiding the battle with the international coalition after the ‘Anaconda’, began to recover its strength.

In 2003–2004, the Taliban gradually heighten hostilities in southern Afghanistan. The first indicator of Taliban recuperation was the battle of January 27, 2003, when US military conducted operation which named “Mongoose”. In this operation killed 18 Taliban militant and “Hizb-e-Islami”. In this time began terrorist attacks in cities: in Kabul suicide-bomber in a mined car rammed a bus with soldiers from Germany and 1 peaceful Afghan.

On autumn of 2003, the Taliban entrenched in some southern areas and appointed their governors in cities. Because of this critical situation the UN give a permission for ISAF to extend responsibility beyond Kabul. In spite of Taliban, general economic and politic situation in Afghanistan was improved.

In January,2004 the first constitution was adopted and on October 9, was the first presidential elections in the history of the country, where Hamid Karzai won.

In 2005 there were new acts of violence and terrorism. Increased losses of ISAF, military of US and Spanish. The number of attacks, where partisans used improvised explosive devices has increased. However, in September, the Karzai government was able to successfully organize and hold parliamentary elections.

2006-2007. NATO in Southern Afghanistan. ISAF war against Taliban.

From January 2006 started the accommodation of ISAF on the south of Afghanistan. ISAF began to recapture the territories, which were captured by the Taliban. Some provinces were liberated: Helmand, Zabul, Kandahar, Paktika, Uruzgan. In September, Operation was help an Operation Medusa, later – “Mountain Rage”. A substantial part of the coalition was lost. Near to 14people was died from UK, 191 from US and etc.

When on autumn of 2006 British troops left the town of Musa Kala and handing over control to local elders, the Taliban took advantage of this and in February 2007 occupied the city, which was their biggest success since the beginning of the war. When they occupied city there were closed schools, introduced sharia law and residents was forced to pay taxes.

The situation in other parts of Afghanistan was better, the first large offensive against the Taliban was launched in the north of the country in October and November. In this attack German, Norwegian, and Afghan units was participated. Unfortunately, during the hostilities, ISAF had to strike at civilian buildings and homes, resulting in the death of civilians.

Coalition combat operations in Afghanistan in 2008

In this year the situation in country was changeable. The Taliban were not going to give up. They recovered from their wounds and gathered new forces to attack. By this time, the Taliban had established an authoritative position on the Pakistani border in the province of Waziristan, with the support of local residents they built shelters and training camps.

In April-May Taliban started attack a county Garmser which was strategically important, the NATO contingent and the Afghan National Army suffered a defeat. Taliban occupied territory. On April 27, an assassination attempt against Afghan President Hamid Karzai was organized in Kabul.

At the same time, there are disagreements between NATO, ISAF and US. Уach of them wanted to be the commander in chief of all the armed forces. Рowever, as a result of negotiations, the United States continued to command throughout the Afghan region.

In July, the Taliban attacked the prison in Kandahar; more than 1,000 prisoners were released, including arrested Taliban members.

In general, throughout 2008, the Taliban used guerrilla warfare and small-scale skirmishes, avoiding participation in major hostilities. Attacks on patrols, shelling of convoys, road mining, attacks on roadblocks increased markedly. NATO continued (with varying success) to pursue a policy of ‘power democracy’. There was growing discontent among the local population about the presence of NATO in the region. This was largely triggered by the propaganda of the Taliban.

2009 and 2010.

In August 2009, the German side of ISAF with the Afghan security forces started a new operation, whose mission was to liberate Chahar Dara from Taliban`s power. They were able to liberate the county only for a few months, then the Taliban again occupied the territory.

In October, the Taliban attacked a small American outpost in the province of Nuristan near to Pakistan. After night exchange of fire, the Americans left the base and from this time on, there is no foreign military presence. All control is exercised by the Afghan side.

On 12th February began operation ‘Moshtarak’, which was successful. The main participants of this operation, were the American, British and Afghan military.

Durind April-May German and Afghan troops launched an operation in Baghlan-i-Markazi to regain control of the county. In the north-east of Afghanistan in the province of Nuristan, a Taliban detachment invaded Kamdesh and Barga Matal from Pakistani territory. The province after the departure of NATO forces since October 2009 was under the control of the Afghan police. Due to the superiority of the Taliban and the lack of reinforcements, the Afghan police on May 30 surrendered the county of Barga Matal and retreated. The county was ruled by the Taliban. Black and green Taliban flags were raised above administrative buildings in Barga Matal.

The Taliban intimidated the local population, forbidding it to cooperate with the authorities, strenuously mined the roads, armed attacks on the patrols of the Afghan security forces and NATO increased.

2 August Holland began withdrawing troops from Afghanistan. On August 6, the Taliban killed ten unarmed employees of the international charitable Christian organization International Assistance Mission, who provided medical assistance to the Afghans.

According to representatives of the Pentagon, the NATO forces did not achieve any improvement in the situation in Afghanistan by the autumn of 2010, and some analysts said that the general situation in the country had deteriorated.

2011 – 2013

On January 10, 2011, militants of the Islamic Emirate said that they had established control over the district center of Dawn in Balkh province. It was stated that they did not suffer losses and captured trophies in the form of weapons, ammunition and jeep.

On July 12, the brother of the president of Afghanistan, Ahmad Wali Karzai, was killed by Sardar Mohammad. The Taliban stated that the murder was committed by their fighter.

On August 1, 2011 in Khairpur, militants attacked a NATO supply convoy, wounded 4 people and destroyed 10 fuel tankers.

Then the Taliban attacked the territories that were under the protection of foreign troops such as NATO, ISAF and US. Started an open supply of drugs and weapons. 2011 was a year of victory for the Taliban

In 2012, ISAF and its allies tried to save the territories under their protection. Too big losses from NATO and ISAF lead to the fact that they are going to withdraw their troops from the territory of Afghanistan. Foreign troops are attacked by the Afghan security forces. Too much controversy is taking place among the allies, which gives an advantage to the Taliban.

In June 2013, Afghan President Hamid Karzai announced that from June 19, 2013, the Afghan armed forces would assume a major role in ensuring the country’s security.

2014-2015.

When US, UK, ISAF and NATO troops began withdrawing from the territory of Afghanistan, insurrections began to gain momentum. In 2014, after the United States and the Allies complete a number of special operations in Afghanistan, the decision is made to end this phase of the war.

At the ceremony which was in Kabul UK officially ended its role in this war. Also, Britain gave its ultimate base, Camp Bastion, to the soldiers of Afghanistan. As a result, after 13 years, UK completed its mission in war in Afghanistan.

On May 27, 2014, US President Barack Obama announced the completion of US military operations in Afghanistan. The United States transferred its last base, Camp Leserneck, to Afghan soldiers. The United States concluded two bilateral and long-term security arrangements between Afghanistan and the United States of America. And the some of US troops remain on the territory of Afghanistan in order to train the Afghan security forces. They also had to support counter-terrorism operations against al-Qaida remnants.

In December 2014, NATO also officially announced the cessation of hostilities at a ceremony held in Kabul.

. In 2015, the Taliban grew stronger and regained their strength after the last battles. From the side of the neighboring states were adherents of the Talib movement, they were joined by more than 1,000 people. At the same time, foreign troops completed their operations in Afghanistan. Afghan troops did not have enough military equipment in the field of aviation and intelligence. Russia in May 2015 closes the path through its territory, which NATO used to transport and transfer military cargo.

After a series of US battles to assist the Afghan side sends troops of the 2nd Battalion.

Next, we are going to talk more about the impact of Afghanistan war on mainly Afghan and generally all other countries or spheres of economy. The Afghanistan is now insecure than it was ever. Since 2001 the Taliban has a control of the main part of the country. And it has increased from that day aggressively. The Afghan war is already second longest war in the US history after Vietnam war. And still US government continue to send their troops with the help of some EU countries and mainly UK.

Let’s begin with the impact of the war on the Afghan society. Of course, the first and main effect we should deal with is the Civilian casualties. Started from 2001 till today, many people in Afghanistan are dying without having any guilt. In 2009 UN had reported that more than 50% of the civilians had died they were blamed for ‘anti-government’ processes. The Weekly Standard website mentioned that almost 80% of the civilian deaths had been caused by Taliban terrorist group, and these innocent people doesn’t keep any anti-government elements on them for their death. There are lots of cases relating to the civilian death. But we would like to touch some statistic numbers and to show how actually big this problem is in our world. According to UN the children and women death number are very huge in the civilian casualties. The statistics show that more than 10 thousand people were killed in just 2017 and this number have increased more in 2018 as too.

As we can see from the graph from 2009 till 2017 the number of civilian deaths is increasing year by year. And this actually means lots. Because this means that every day how many people our community loose, how many children how many women we are losing for the war. And how the global economy is deprived of such people. Since Trump had been president of the USA, he has unveiled a new strategy for the Afghan war. They began to put more military pressure on the Taliban and they did it by with new airstrikes, special military forces, thousands of more US military soldiers and totally 14000 personnel. The new strategy also included some pressure on the Afghan government to take more severe actions to the Taliban. In the following map we can see the main areas that Taliban.

Despite, the many efforts were put against this war, unfortunately all these things have failed. The military army of the US has slowed the Taliban but they couldn’t stop it yet. Many fighters including some important commanders have been killed over the years, but they could keep their manage area under the danger. And despite so many bombings so many losses the Taliban doesn’t face with the financial crisis. In fact, their wealth has been grown in the last years. Islamic scholars, governments, have also joined to many meetings to solve the Afghan war problem, but unfortunately with the US they could only sign few agreements and these agreements generally have bring nothing to solve the problem.

Another problem arising from the war is the health. According to the UN despite so many challenges the healthcare has been increased over the years in the Afghanistan and it has helped the people who have suffered from the war.

The next problem that war has caused is refugees. Since 2001 almost 6 million have returned to Afghanistan but still more than 2 million refugees are still in the outside of the country for the fear of war and death. According to the UN more than 500 thousand people were internally displaced person.

Despite so many challenges the Afghanistan is trying to give better education service to the students to the women as well. Aid Afghanistan for Education (AAE) is one of the best opportunities for the Afghan nation. Since 2003 AAE was established and give the opportunities to the girls and boys who fell out the normal education system in the country. It helps students to get their high school diplomas in 7 to 8 years and provide many trainings and studies for them.

On 11 September 2001, a huge attack in US, in which more than 3000 people killed. Then, Osama bin Laden (Head of Al-Qaida) found guilty of it. Then US government demanded Al-Qaida to expel Osama bin Laden. But, Talibans protected Osama bin Laden and refused to hand him over. Due to this behavior of Talibans, the United States lauched air strikes in Afghanistan. Since then, US troops is doing operation against Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan. The operation’s code-name Operation Enduring Freedom.

After decades of the longest running US war against Talibans, the matter between US and Afghan Taliban is finally sorted out. They finally signed a agreement in Qatar. Qatar government played a central role in the negotiations. Qatar played an acting role in this agreement. They hosted month long discussions between Afghan Talibans and US officials in Doha (capital of Qatar).

Now, according to this agreement, US said it is committed to lessen the US troops from 13000 to 8600 within 135 days of this US-Taliban treaty. And also said, if Aghan Talibans remained consistent on their commitments, then they would decrease the coalition forces from the Afghanistan, as US also working with its allies to proportionally decrease the number of allies. The complete withdrawal of all US forces and allies would occur in 14 months after this agreement, if Talibans uphold terms and conditions of the agreement.

On March 1, 2020, when government of Afghanistan was not a part of US-Taliban agreement, they declined the US and Talibans request for exchange of prisoners by 10 march 2020, Ashraf Ghani said that, such type of agreement require more talks. On March 10, 2020, Ashraf Ghani signed an agreement agreeing to exchange 15000 Talibans prisoners starting 14 March 2020. On the condition that they sign a decree of non-participation in war again. That day, it was moreover revealed that there were no plans for a full US withdrawal from Afghanistan. On March 10, the United Nations Security Council by and large upheld the US-Taliban concordance deal. On March 11, 2020, in any case, the Taliban excused Ghani’s prisoner swap suggestion. On March 14, 2020 the US-Taliban congruity deal became endangered when Ghani deferred the appearance of Taliban prisoners. United States also take promise from Taliban’s that they terminate their relations with Al-Qaida and keep on war with ISIS (Islamic state group).

And in return, Afghan-Taliban would not allow terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida or the Islamic State (ISIS) and any other group in Afghanistan to use Afgan base to threatened US forces or its allies. Afghan Government also said they are ready to talks and terminate truce with Talibans.

Impact on South Asia:

Islamabad’s policy of pushing a negotiated settlement with the radicals, the stone in the shoe of its relationship with Washington, was vindicated by the agreement. For more than 10 years, it had withstood effectively unprecedented weight from the US for its enduring refusal to act against or expel self-exiled Taliban pioneers subject to Pakistani soil, tolerating that the White House will manage the pointlessness of the country’s longest war. The US-Taliban deal, which envisions the withdrawal of remote forces from Afghanistan before the zenith of April one year from now, is a triumph win for Pakistan. Having played peacemaker, it can never again be blamed for any deferment in intra-Afghan talks

India would also not see this agreement beneficial for regional peace or relationship with United States. It comes scarcely seven days after Trump’s India visit, which made it agonizingly evident that common vital concerns are the main thing keeping the nations together. New Delhi remembers that India isn’t, on paper, a US ‘accomplice’ in such manner, a heightening of dread put together abuse centering with respect to India, as happened the last time the US pulled once again from the territory, would not be an encroachment of Trump’s understanding. One potential outcome: over time the governing body in New Delhi, which has immovably attempted to keep its ties with Kabul fundamentally political, may need to step up security joint effort. Nobody knows where that would lead. The agreement of United States would create many problems for South Asia in near future. The future of Afghanistan which we can’t control is in-confident and is dangerous for India.

Abstract

Operation Anaconda was a hastily planned attack on the largest concentrations of al Qaeda and Taliban fighters known to be in the Shahikot Valley. On September 12th, 2001 directly following the devastating attacks on American soil, The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) commander was designated the overall support commander and coalition/joint force commander for operation Enduring Freedom (Major Fleri, Colonel Howard, Hukill, & Searle, 2003, p. 2). A battle planned to last a duration of two or three days, U.S. forces planned tactics and procedures around earlier successes in similar areas of Afghanistan in a simple search and destroy mission. Upon early staging of battle, stronger enemy resistance was met and a combat environment with challenging terrain and obstacles resulted in major changes being made to the initial plan. Joint force air support had to be established rapidly and reactive movements enabled an overall mission success. Had proper command and control and strategical asset placement been present from the beginning, forces would have been aided in quicker response time, and wounded and casualties would have been reduced.

Operation Anaconda is the direct result of the rapid development of Operation Enduring Freedom in early March 2002. Due to its hasty development, irregular organizational structures existed with CENTCOM, Commanders were selected with headquarters operating out of MacDill Air Force Base in Florida while the rest of the coalition and joint forces were operating in the Shahikot Valley of Afghanistan. Although there are many reasons why difficulty was met, it’s important to note the complexity of the battle was attributed to the rugged mountainous area, weather conditions, military organization, misinformed intelligence, and equipment needs. Operation Anaconda was a battle that started with a tactical plan that had to be rapidly adjusted due to an adaptive enemy. Below we will analyze the shortcomings and tribulation points utilizing the six principles of mission command in the effort to identify critical fail points.

Building Cohesive Teams Through Mutual Trust

Air Force, Naval, Marine Corps, Army, Special Operation Forces, Coalition SOF, and friendly Afghan forces could all be found through the involvement. With the quick buildup into the area of operations, it’s not hard to see the importance that mutual trust holds throughout the operation. Original planning had friendly Afghan forces and U.S forces dominating the ground attacks in a commonly employed military tactic called Hammer-and-Anvil. To be successful mutual trust must be established between U.S forces and local allied ground forces. Due to local intelligence reports, it was decided to keep some of the key mission specifics such as when and where forces would be striking, and the friendly Afghan forces. This was done out of fear that sensitive information would get back to the enemy and compromise the mission. “Trust is gained or lost through everyday actions more than grand or occasional gestures” (Odierno, 2012, pp. 2-1 (2-5)). As the battle started to unfold an unanticipated and early withdrawal of friendly Afghan forces caused more U.S involvement than originally planned, “Withdrawn Afghan forces removed about 50 percent of Anaconda’s planned ground forces for the valley battle and exposed U.S. ground forces to the enemy’s full blows” (Kugler, Baranick, & Binnendijk, 2009, p. viii) This turn of events resulted in an increased need for air support in and around the valley region.

Creating Shared Understanding

Shared understanding begins when there is a clear understanding of the operational environment, this encompasses the operation’s “purpose, problems, and approaches to solving them” (Odierno, 2012, pp. 2-2 (2-9)). Operation Anaconda was thoroughly planned and coordinated from a distant headquarters while numerous key service entities began entering the theater without a clear mission understanding. Forces were consolidated under Joint Forces Special Operations Component Commanders (JFSOCC) and Combined Forces Land Component Commanders (CFLCC), making up much of the conventual ground forces. The Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) oversaw aviation support. A major downfall was the late involvement due to a naval carrier rotating out of the theater. Although channels of communication were established among the different commands, the overall authority of operations was not clearly assigned which resulted in an evident lack of command and control. Although forces were commanded by the 10th Mountain Division under the name Task Force Mountain, Anaconda showed the struggles and challenges of executing war operations with a distant headquarters and a lack of unity among joint forces.

Providing a Clear Commander’s Intent

Providing commanders’ intent is hugely important for overall success, it’s a necessity to have a clear and concise vision of what the commander’s desires are. The intent is designed to be the “basis on which staffs and subordinate leaders develop plans and orders that transform thought into action” (Odierno, 2012, pp. 2-3 (2-14)). In the instance of Operation Anaconda, clear and concise information was directed from higher chains of command revolving around incorrect intelligence on enemy involvement in the area. Briefed as a mainly ground combat operation with a total of enemy combatants numbering 200 strong, enemy forces realistically were 800 to 1000. The original commander’s intent was to employ ground forces with little air support to push enemy forces out of hiding and prevent movement in neighboring countries. Anaconda was to utilize similar military tactics that had proven successful in earlier conflicts in Afghanistan. Joint forces were faced with a much larger and stronger enemy force resistance, resulting in the increased need to call in additional air support and alter the designation of internal force operations.

Exercise Disciplined Initiative

Exercising disciplined initiative requires leaders and subordinates to act in the absence of orders, specifically when the existing orders no longer apply to the situation at hand, or when impending threats arise. During Operation Anaconda, exercising disciplined initiative was a key aspect of overall mission success. The case study supports that the commanders of Anaconda should have adopted battle plans that could be carried out with the forces at hand in the best way possible to defeat the enemy. Originally planned as a primary ground force operation, with a foreseeable index three days after D-day. Commanders anticipated a mixture of light ground fighting and detainment of hostile personnel, “the mission was to search and destroy an estimated force of several hundred al Qaeda and Taliban troops” (Kugler, Baranick, & Binnendijk, 2009, p. 5). When the ground fighting began, it was evident that the viable plan was far more complicated than anticipated, enemy force numbers were larger than originally reported and armed with artillery, mortars, and small arms weapons. Out of the 400 U.S. Army soldiers scheduled to participate in D-day movements, only 200 were deployed due to bad weather and enemy fire preventing movement. U.S. ground forces were faced with battle immediately, fighting platoon-sized elements of enemy soldiers in predesignated landing areas reportedly clear from enemy contact. It was evident that dedicated Combat Air Support was needed, rapid reconfiguration of support assets was made, and the assistance of various F-16s, F-14s, and A-10s was flown in to support.

Use Mission Orders

The use of mission orders allows commanders to assign tasks, align resources, and issue guidance on how results are to be attained, this is not to be confused with direct guidance on how to achieve goals. “In Early January 2002, the CFLCC reported that the largest concentration of al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan appeared to be in the area between the towns of Kowst and Gardez” (Major Fleri, Colonel Howard, Hukill, & Searle, 2003, p. 7). Operation Anaconda’s mission orders were to search and destroy identifying the largest concentration of enemy fighters that would be hiding in caves and amongst the civilian populations. Army Task Force Mountain took lead as the organization during the planning and execution of Operation Anaconda; however, joint planning didn’t happen and involvement of the CFACC wasn’t presented until seven days prior to the start of the battle. “Because such changes had not been expected or prepared for, U.S. forces initially had some difficulties integrating their service component actions into true joint operations” (Kugler, Baranick, & Binnendijk, 2009, p. vi)

Accept Prudent Risk

When accepting prudent risk, it’s understood that commanders are making decisions that have the potential for injury or loss, often referred to as the “willingness to accept prudent risk is often the key to exposing enemy weaknesses” (Odierno, 2012, pp. 2-5 (2-24)). As coalition and U.S. Forces were establishing battlefronts on the eastern ridge the immediate need for Combat Air Support was identified, during this time numerous attempts to provide support were conducted averaging approximately five minutes apart between strikes according to USAF data. Those pilots knew that there were enemy assets in the area pining down friendly forces with mortar and artillery, by assuming prudent risk they continued to provide air support regardless of the circumstances surrounding them. Forces on the valley floor continued to push forward and fight off enemy combatants, on D-day as original battle plans started to fail, this enabled al Qaeda to declare jihad, ultimately calling for reinforcements by fighters outside the Shahikot Valley. Faced with setbacks to critical missions “U.S. objectives were met: U.S. forces killed many al Qaeda fighters and drove the remainder from the Shahikot Valley” (Kugler, Baranick, & Binnendijk, 2009, p. vii).

Operation Anaconda was a military battle carried out against al Qaeda and Taliban forces. While this operation was considered an overall success, in the end, initial mission plans and the intent were far from being met. There were many factors during this operation that could have led to added failure. Key aspects directly affected overall mission progress with the initial commander’s intent not being met such as Task Force Mountain not accounting for the importance of Combat Air Support and establishing joint operations, the presence of artillery and mortar enemy assets, U.S forces lacking structured command teams and strategic placement during initial strikes, initial lack of organized logistical assets, and time spent waiting for confirmation of information was often a timely battle within itself. Operations Anaconda resulted in an American lead victory at the end of a 14-day battle, eight U.S. Military personnel were killed in action and more than 50 were accounted as wounded.

References

1. Kugler, R. L., Baranick, M., & Binnendijk, H. (2009, March). Operation Anaconda Lessons for Joint Operations. Center for Technology and National Security Policy.
2. Major Fleri, E. U., Colonel Howard, E. U., Hukill, J. D., & Searle, T. R. (2003, November 13). Operation Anaconda Case Study. College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education Maxwell AFB Alabama.
3. Odierno, R. T. (2012, September 10). ADRP 6-0. Mission Command. Headquarters, Department of The Army.