American space exploration programs have been associated with several disasters that changed the way people see crisis and project management. They also were the cause of substantial changes in the US aviation and space-related policies.
The accidents with Challenger and Columbia are two disasters that shaped such policies. It is possible to compare the two cases to understand fundamental errors that led to the loss of peoples lives and multimillion-dollar spacecraft.
The two disasters are very different. Thus, the Challenger exploded several minutes after the launch of the spaceship ( Challenger Disaster Live on CNN n. pag.). Columbia exploded on its return to the earth (Associated Press n. pag.). The failure in the joint of the elements of the rocket motor caused the Challenger catastrophe ( Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident n. pag.).
Columbia disintegrated as a result of the break off of the insulation foam that had hit the wing during the launch ( Columbia: Accident Investigation Board 49). It is necessary to note that disasters could have been prevented. For instance, Columbias return could have been successful if the problem had been detected.
The malfunction occurred during the launch, and there was time to fix it. Clearly, there had to be a proper detection system that could identify such issues. When it comes to Challenger, several problems were detected before the launch (Forrest n. pag.).
However, the group of engineers and managers made the decision (that the spaceship was ready) that led to the catastrophe. Apparently, the disaster could have been prevented if they took the decision to implement the necessary diagnostic measures instead of focusing on the date of launch.
Therefore, it is possible to note that the two catastrophes were caused by physical malfunctions and poor management. The analysis of the accidents led to the development of a number of recommendations. As far as Columbia is concerned, it was recommended to develop an aggressive program aimed at the elimination of possible malfunctions in the tank with a focus on thermal protection ( Columbia: Accident Investigation Board 225).
Another recommendation was to develop improved impact-resistant materials and a sophisticated inspection program (including software, peoples training, and so on) that would enable the crew to identify malfunctions when they occur.
It was also recommended to launch a comprehensive training program with a focus on various situations that may occur and the cooperation between different teams ( Columbia: Accident Investigation Board 226). These recommendations have been implemented.
As for Challenger, recommendations were mainly aimed at the improvement of management systems. For instance, one of the recommendations was to improve project management systems. It was also recommended to develop a new structure of the rocket motor with an emphasis on joints ( Report to the President 11).
The essential idea was to include astronauts in the project management team, which strengthened the team through the use of astronauts extensive experience ( Report to the President 14). Finally, it was also recommended to improve safety measures. All the recommendations were implemented, and the system of management was significantly improved.
It is noteworthy that the two disasters provide valuable lessons to be learned. Obviously, the development of technology enables scientists and constructors to create more operational systems due to the creation of more suitable materials.
Apart from that, the Challenger accident made the stakeholders understand that there should be complete confidence that all the systems are operating correctly, and the spaceship, as well as the crew, is ready for the successful launch and return.
There also should be standardized procedures that ensure that all safety measures have been undertaken. At that, the Columbia disaster made the stakeholders understand the need for an operational inspection system that should detect any malfunctions in all the systems of the ship during the flight. At that, both programs showed that astronauts, as well as various teams, could benefit from training aimed at the development of efficient cooperation and addressing different situations.
Importantly, the implementation of the recommendations resulted in the development of (and changes in) a number of policies. Thus, the Challenger accident led to the establishment of policies aimed at improved standardization, efficient communication management, and sophisticated flight readiness review ( Report to the President 3). The disintegration of Columbia revealed the flaws in these policies that also underwent various changes aimed at improved safety and communication.
It is necessary to note that the two disasters had a particular impact on the Shuttle Program. They revealed some flaws in the systems and management. They also enabled NASA to develop more efficient programs and policies that ensured successful launches and landings of many other shuttles.
Clearly, the loss of peoples lives and costly crafts was a very expensive lesson to be learned. However, NASA, as well as other organizations that are now working in the sphere of space exploration and aviation, have made a lot of progress. It is clear that shuttles should be employed as this is an effective and sustainable way to explore space.
Works Cited
Associated Press. NASA Reports New Details of Columbia Deaths. NBC News 2008. n. pag. Web.
The Challenger disaster of 1986 led to the deaths of seven crew members (Jenab & Moslehpour, 2016). After the disaster, an inquiry was established in an attempt to identify the potential causes of the failure. The inquiry was also aimed at presenting appropriate guidelines that could be used whenever constructing new space shuttles. A fault tree analysis (FTA) can be used to identify and examine the major factors that led to the failure of the O-rings in the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs).
Fault Tree Analysis of O-ring Construction and the Explosion
Fig 1: Fault tree analysis (FTA) of the O-ring construction
Analysis of the FTA
The Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) model can be described using the Boolean algebra. This is usually represented using the symbol (+) and is equivalent to the OR-gate. The Boolean equation is Q=A+B. This means that events A or B (or both) must occur for disaster Q to take place. That being the case, the Challenger disaster took place because of several factors. The above FTA model shows clearly that the explosion was caused by three major factors.
Such issues contributed (wholly or partly) to the failure of the O-rings in the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs). For instance, the tree analysis shows clearly that the temperatures at the launch site and the communication barriers between Thiokol Engineers and NASA led to failure to adhere to test data limits (Jenab & Moslehpour, 2016, p. 403). The other problem was caused by the failure of the O-rings. This failure was caused by the defective nature of the O-rings and existing temperature variations (Jenab & Moslehpour, 2016). The O-rings could not perform effectively at lower temperatures. The shuttle lacked effective alarm systems to report failures (Jenab & Moslehpour, 2016). These three contributing factors led to the explosion of the Challenger.
Summary of Risks Observed
The above Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) of the O-ring construction shows critical issues that must have been considered before launching the Challenger. The failure of the O-rings led to the explosion of the space shuttle after 73 seconds. The first issue was associated with the construction of the O-rings. The O-rings in the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) were constructed in such a way that they could close tightly due to the forces produced during ignition (Jenab & Moslehpour, 2016, p. 404). A phenomenon known as joint rotation occurred during the launch process. The occurrence of this phenomenon forced combustion gases to escape through the safety O-rings. The joints failed due to increased erosion of gases.
The FTA can also be treated as a powerful risk assessment matrix. The matrix indicates that the shuttle did not have effective instrumentation to send signals after the O-rings failed. This fact explains why the crew could not cancel the launch after combustion gases escaped though the failed O-rings. The members of the crew were not warned about the leakage (Donovan & Green, 2003).
The third issue notable from this FTA is that NASA failed to adhere to existing test data limits. This is true because the shuttle was launched at a time when room temperatures exceeded those recorded during various test missions. This issue emerged because of poor communication between NASA and the engineers responsible for constructing the SRBs (Jenab & Moslehpour, 2016). The involved parties failed to monitor the critical weather conditions recorded at the launch site. Nonetheless, NASA decided to launch the space shuttle despite the existing concerns.
Ways to Mitigate the Risks
Several measures might have been undertaken to mitigate the risks identified above. To begin with, the failure of the O-rings shows conclusively that they were unable to seal gases completely after ignition. The two O-rings used to separate various chambers failed. This event allowed gases to escape. The use of three O-rings could have improved the effectiveness of the SRBs. The three O-rings would have sustained the gases and eventually prevent the disaster (Hall, 2003). This fact explains why every future space shuttle was equipped with SRBs containing three O-rings in every combustion chamber.
The issue of communication should have been taken seriously throughout the pre-launch period. The teams should have carefully analyzed test data and flow of different information. The space shuttle was launched at reduced temperatures compared to those specified by Thiokol Engineers (Jenab & Moslehpour, 2016). This disaster should have been avoided by focusing on this critical information regarding the performance of the O-rings.
The involved parties should not have launched the shuttle. Technicalities should have been identified and communicated to every member in the team. This approach would have played a positive role towards averting the disaster (Donovan & Green, 2003).
Future shuttles should be equipped with effective warning systems and corrective devices. Such systems can inform the crew members about the performance of every critical element in the space shuttle (Hall, 2003). The engineers and technicians on the ground should also be informed about the performance of such elements. These lessons should therefore be taken seriously whenever designing and launching space shuttles in the future.
Reference List
Donovan, A., & Green, R. (2003). Setup for Failure: The Colombia Disaster. Teaching Ethics, 1(1), 69-76.
Hall, J. (2003). Columbia and Challenger: Organizational Failure at NASA. Space Policy, 19(1), 239-247.
Jenab, K., & Moslehpour, S. (2016). Failure Analysis: Case Study Challenger SRB Field Joint. International Journal of Engineering and Technology, 8(6), 401-405.
Modern inner space explorers have created many vehicles to support oceanography all over the world. The avid need to explore underwater world became more significant when geologists and oceanographers realized that weather changes, erosion of rocks, and sediments have settled down on sea floor which can be useful in estimating fundamental information about earth. In order to reveal secrets of earth and its origination, modern vehicles have been discovered. This paper shall discuss some latest tools and vehicles invented by modern oceanographers. Also, differentiating characteristics of these vehicles will be covered.
Underwater vehicles are used by divers to stay for longer time in water. There are three common types of underwater vehicles such as autonomous underwater vehicle, human occupied vehicles (HOVs), and remotely operated vehicles (ROVs).
Human Occupied Vehicles are very expensive carriers that allow one or more persons to travel in it. It helps discoverers to go deeper inside water but it allows them to stay underwater for limited hours only. On other hand, explorers have remotely operated vehicles that do not allow human drivers as they have wired or remote systems. These are controlled by an expert from a remote location. It is designed to go to such areas under water that might be considered dangerous for humans (Seas, 2003). Therefore, they are especially designed with circuits that enable scrutiny in danger areas.
Types of ROVs
There are three basic types of ROVs depending upon the size of vehicle, such as small ROVs, middle-sized ROVs and large or working class ROVs. Small ROVs are simply made up of tiny camera that goes 300 meters deep inside water and send images, while middle-sized ROVs have more electric capability to go 7,000 meter deep under the water and it is usually used by scientists. Working class ROVs are most advanced form of remote control vehicle especially designed to drill and repair sea bed (Steele, Thorpe, & Turekian, 2009). These vehicles have several functioning grabbers and manipulators that help performing some serious subsea functions.
Types of HOVs
There are various types of Human Occupied Vehicles which include Navel Submarine, Merchant Submarine, Human Torpedoes, Deep Submerge Rescue Vehicle, Deep Sea Submerge Vehicle, Personal Submarine, and Midget Submarine. These inner space vehicles have distinguishing attributes, designed to perform different functions deep under water. As these vehicles are different from each other thus, their characteristics also affect its uses.
For example, Naval Submarines are considered defense submarines that are used only during war time in the country (Sharda, 2011). Similarly, Deep Submerge Rescue Vehicles are also used during war time for naval rescue operations. However, personal submarines are used by oceanographers and explorers for research purpose. In addition, there are some human occupied vehicles that are simply used to visit life under water (Steele, Thorpe, & Turekian, 2009). Such vehicles are known as pleasure submarines which allow people to go inside water just for entertainment.
Basic Difference between HOVs and ROVs
Basic difference between HOVs and ROVs is that ROVs are controlled by people on land surface with the help of remotes whereas HOVs are driven by explorers sitting in the control area of human occupied vehicles (Steele, Thorpe, & Turekian, 2009). Also, ROVs are attached with the cables therefore they can travel as far as cable will permit them while HOVs do not have any cables and these can travel distance limited to their range.
Reference List
Seas, N. R. (2003). Exploration of the Seas:Interim report. Washington DC: National Academies Press. Web.
The Challenger was initially referred to as the STA-099. The shuttle was built to work as a test vehicle for the Space Shuttle program and was named after the HMS Challenger, which was a British Naval research vessel. The HMS Challenger sailed in the Atlantic Ocean as well as the Pacific Ocean during the 1870s.
When the Challenger was built it underwent intensive vibration and thermal testing for a year. NASA awarded Rockwell, a Space Shuttle orbiter manufacturer, a contract in 1979 to build the Challenger by converting the STA-099. The Challenger arrived at the Kennedy Space Center in July 1982, and it became the second orbiter to be operation in the center.
The Challenger had been designed to be a historic craft and many were optimistic it would outlive the rest. The Space Shuttle took its maiden flight on April, 1982 for the STS-6 mission, which saw the first ever space walk in the space shuttle program. The EVA (Extra Vehicular Activity) was done by Astronauts Donald Peterson and Story Musgrave.
This lasted about four hours and it was also during this mission the first deployment of a Tracking and Data Relay System constellation was done. After completing nine successful missions, on January 28, 1986 the Challenger was launched on the STS-51L and after a mere 73 seconds it exploded killing all the seven crewmembers (NASA, 2011).
This paper will look at the SHUTTLE 51-L MISSION, the organization that was involved in the Challenger project, the mechanical failure of the Space Shuttle Challenger, the organizational behavior and management shortcomings that contributed to the disaster and finally make organizational behavior and management changes that can be adopted to prevent a reoccurrence of the same disaster.
Discussion
NASA Program
As the Challenger Space Shuttle progressed, there was an increase in the demands being placed on NASA and this resulted to an increased risk of disaster (Jarman & Kouzmin, 1990). The NASA team had a false sense of security having carried out 2Kramer, & James, 1987 missions, which had been successful.
Prior to the launch, there were many wrangles within NASA, and managers were working in a place with heavy overload and turbulence (Kramer & James, 1987). The management at NASA was characterized with a disease full of decay and destruction (Kramer & James, 1987 p.14).
There was lack of a formal DSS program at NASA initialized before the launch for the shuttle operations. There were strong indications that decisions were being made through satisficing and short cuts.
There were lots of compromise and operations were greatly affected. NASA was accused of having semi-uncontrolled decision making as they tried to satisfy the needs of the military, scientific community, industry and this led to the space shuttle being declared operational even before the development stage of the shuttle had been completed (Kramer, & James, 1987).
Decision making at NASA was done by default as there lacked DSS. The organizational structure at the program was political and manipulations were done to meet requirements of the political power.
When the Reagan Administration declared the Space Shuttle operational , many employees at NASA lacked motivation and left with the impression that decision making on the project should be made by the political administration (Jarman & Kouzmin, 1990).
Employees began being complacent and safety of the shuttle was highly compromised, as they tried to keep the shuttle on schedule and satisfy the clients. This presents the situation at NASA prior to making the decision to launch the space shuttle (Dunbar & Ryba, 2008).
Shuttle 51-L Mission (Challenger Flight)
The 51-L mission was the 25th mission that NASA was going to undertake in its STS program. Shortly after launching the Challenger on 28, January 1986, the Challenger exploded mid air, destroying the vehicle and killing the entire seven crew members on the mission. This mission was aimed at deploying a second Tracking and Data Relay Satellite as well as the Spartan Halles Comet Observer.
The mission was also going to be the first time there were observers or passengers participating in a program called NASA Teacher in Space Program ((Dunbar & Ryba, 2008). S. Christa McAuliffe was one of the crew onboard and she was going to conduct live broadcasts that were going to be broadcasted to schools throughout the world (Dunbar & Ryba, 2008).
The destruction of the Challenger and the loss of life had profound impact on the society and the way it viewed the Space program and particularly NASA. As this paper will discuss, the tragic decision that was made to allow the launching of STS 51-L was as a result of long term contributing factors that were further increased by bad or weak organizational behavior and management strategies. The outcome of this tragedy caused loss of life, resources and made people to mistrust the space program.
Although the accident of the Challenger was blamed on the hardware failure of the SRB O ring (known as Solid Rocket Boost), the decision that was made by the management was also flawed. The decision was based on faulty organizational behavior and management and this was further aggravated by the mismanagement of initial information that suggested the launch be postponed (NASA, 2008).
Other factors that besides organizational behavior and management played a major role in contributing to the accident occurring. They included the demand NASA was getting from the political ruling class to deliver and launch on the scheduled day (NASA, 2008)
The process of proving to the American people and the political system that there was need for a reusable space shuttle had begun in the 1960s. The Challenger was one of the ways that this could be proven and thus a lot of pressure and expectation was put on the program. Unlike the previous missions such as the Apollo, the Space Shuttle was going to be used in space operations without having a defined goal (Jarman & Kouzmin, 1990 p. 3).
This presents the first contributing factor in the Challengers accident. Without a defined role for use, the Challenger was going to be used as a utility vehicle for space operations and thus there lacked a strong support for the project, both financially and politically. In order to gain favor and political support for the project, the Challenger was sold and presented to the political elites as a quick payoff (Jarman & Kouzmin, 1990 p. 8).
The project also gained support by predicting that it could be used by the military as a means that could be used to enhance the national security. To the industry, it was sold as a commercial opportunity, where companies could offer clients an opportunity to visit space. Many scientists in the program told the American public that the Challenger Shuttle was going to be an American Voyage that was going to have great scientific gain (Jarman & Kouzmin, 1990 p. 10).
To the world, the Challenger project was sold as a partnership that was going to include the ESA (European Space Agency) as well as a means that was going to improve the relations between nations and bring together people of different nationalities, sex and races by serving as crew members during missions (McConnell, 1988).
The process that was used to gain support in the economic, social and political arena for the space shuttle can be cited to be the second contributing factor that resulted to the accident (McConnell, 1988).
There was use of heterogeneous engineering, which means that the engineering and management decisions in the project were structured in ways that were going to be appealing to the political, economic, and organizational factors rather than being structured into a single entity mission that was aimed at achieving specific goals (Jarman & Kouzmin, 1990 p. 9).
When the Space Shuttle became operational, it was faced with many operational demands from many people. It had to live up to the promises that had been given by NASA. This placed a lot of pressure on the management team as they tried to coordinate the needs of the military, political elites and the scientific community.
The political pressure was to provide a space vehicle that was going to be reliable and could be reused. It was also supposed to be difficult to achieve this as it was going to hinder the ability of creating an effective system for integration and development. It was also going to be infeasible to create a management support system that could cater for the diverse requirements.
There was also a low moral within the NASA employee, which was created during the Reagan Administration when the shuttle was given the green light for operation even when the development stage had not been completed (Jarman & Kouzmin, 1990).
The American Congress expected that the Shuttle program was going to be financially self supportive after billions of dollars had been used to go to the moon (Jarman & Kouzmin, 1990, p. 15). With this lack of support from Congress, NASA adopted and operated as a commercial business instead of a government program. It can therefore be concluded that the environment of the program prior to launching had been one mucked wih conflict, short cuts and managerial stress (Jarman & Kouzmin, 1990, p.15).
Mechanical failure of the Challenger
Before the launching date, concerns had been raised about the integrity of carrying on with the launch when the temperatures were as lower than those expected for optimal performance. On a previous mission, 51-C, it had been noted that the booster joints were covered with soot and grease after launching on a cold weather.
Tests were carried out in the laboratory on the effect of low temperatures on the O-ring resilience. It was recommended that they be replaced by steel billets and this would have meant a redesign of the field joint. By the time of the accident, the steel billets were not ready.
Engineers at Alan McDonald made a presentation that detailed on the effects the cold weather was going to affect the booster performance. This was necessary because the temperatures of the launching date were expected to be lower than 350F. After the concerns were raised a meeting was convened and various heads and engineers attended.
The people in attendance included, engineers, top management of Marshal Space Flight Center, Kennedy Center, and Morton Thiokol. The meeting was called to discuss on the effect the cold weather was going to have on the mission especially the boosters performance.
Engineers gave a clear presentation that argued that the cold weather would have a major effect on the joint rotator and the O- ring seating. The test carried out had only gone to a low of 530 F and this presented a problem of the unknown (Rogerss, 1989).
Thiokol provided NASA with information concerning the launch and thought that the low temperatures were going to affect the O-rings to a point they were going to be ineffective. The mission had been cancelled previously due to the cold weather and NASA was not ready for another cancellation (Kramer, & James, 1987 p.23).
Although information had been provided by a GDSS from another company showed that the O-rings were going to work under the predicted weather, engineers from Thiokol were skeptical about the data they had inputted into the GDSS. This meant that NASA was relying on a GDSS that had flawed information (Kramer & James, 1987).
At this juncture, NASA asked for a definitive confirmation or rejection of the planned launch from Thiokol. The representatives from Thiokol responded by recommending the launch be delayed until the temperatures were favorable. NASA continued to pressure Thiokol to change their minds and NASA level three managers is reported to have retorted to the representatives, My God, Thiokol, When do you want me to launch, next April? (Kramer, & James, 1987, p.7).
It was after this that Thiokol representatives asked to be given time to rethink their recommendations. An engineer with Thiokol was asked to stop reasoning as an engineer and start thinking as a manager, which suggests that the group was placing organizational needs in front of safety of the shuttle.
Thiokol representatives returned to the GDSS and recommended that the launch be done as planned. When NASA asked if there was any objection to this no one from the GDSS objected. During the launch the O-ring were severely affected by the cold weather and this mechanical failure caused the accident and the eventual loss of the crewmembers (Kramer, & James, 1987).
Critical analysis of the organizational behavior and management shortcomings that contributed to the disaster
The environment, organizational behavior and management which NASA and its developers operated in gave a large margin for human error. However, Thiokol and NASA had a chance to avert the accident during the GDSS meeting before the launch. The organizational behavior and management fallings can be attributed to the accident.
First, the team especially Thiokol had prior knowledge that the O-ring was going to be affected by the cold weather months before the launching. However, the primary goal of the project was to meet the launch date. NASA warned about the problem, but it downplayed it. This presents the first element of the mismanagement of information and bad organizational behavior that resulted into the accident.
Any suggestion and proposals of the launch-taking place were met with positive support from the management while all suggestions of delays were shot down without taking into consideration the risk involved in carrying out the launch (Turban, 1988).
Third, there was a strong feeling among the people involved in the project management to live up to the promises made. Despite the fact that Thiokol engineers were skeptical about the planned launching, their management went ahead and agreed with the other members of the GDSS to continue with the launch (Turban, 1988).
Fourth, there was bad organizational behavior and management on the part of Thiokol, because they agreed with the other teams although their engineers were telling them to stop the launch (Priwer, & Philips, 2009).
Fifth, all people involved in the top management of the project were afraid of how the political elites and the public would react if another cancellation was done. In the previous one year the launch had been postponed six times. Many in this group were starting to rationalize that if they had succeeded in the past they were as well going to succeed this time (United States Congress, 1986).
Finally, the group as stated before was working with flawed data and even when Thiokol engineers began to question the integrity of this information, nobody took action. People in the GDSS meeting who were proposing that the launch be delayed were unwelcome and therefore the management had its mind made on the launching date.
During the meeting, it was seen that NASA representatives were at times assertive and intimidate the other players to a point where they disregarded warnings given. The meeting is also faulted as a bad organizational behavior and management, because it was easy to downplay the personal opinions held by each member.
Instead of the speaker conversion, the meeting should have been held at a place where all members were present and maybe the outcomes would have been different. The GDSS failed the point where Thiokol asked to be given five minutes to conduct a private meeting. Before this point Thiokol had maintained that the launch should be cancelled, but after the private meeting it changed its mind.
Conclusion
The failure of the spaceship Challenger can be blamed on the organizational behavior. NASA has a variety of risk avoidance system. Their aim is to ensure that the missions are safe. NASA is one of the smallest federal agencies and operates under a strict budget of US$ 15 Billion (NASA, 2010).
This removes any flexibility during risky situations. This agency has been known to be dependant to their history for decision making. Since their establishment in 1958, their main aim was to beat the Soviet Union spaceflights. Though their budget keeps being cut, they still stick to their mission.
The cut costs made NASA realize that they could include the private business sector. This increased their pressure for success, which was also coming from the government. They had to research and develop the operations with limited time.
NASA Budget in billions of American Dollar (NASA, 2010).
The normalization of deviance is another short coming on the management of the NASA. This is a term, which is used to explain the way sometimes some technical flaws are not scrutinized by the various safety bodies over time. This is because they are both expensive and time consuming. Due to the pressure to produce, it is seen as absurd to spend resources on problems, which are not a risk (Launius, 1992).
The postponing of the launch can be because of many reasons. Maybe the problem was the O-rings significance was not considered so much hence the problem with it was a minor one to them. The other reason would be, because the president was using the flight as a reference in his speech or maybe it was because of the much pressure, which was being exerted by both the private sector and the government.
Recommendations
Failures can happen no matter the safety systems applied. Though the cause of the failure was technical, the organizational failure caries a huge part in it. There are numerous things that NASA can do to avoid these types of organizational failures ever happening (Lewis, 1988).
One of them is the Hierarchical power. Some of the managements personnel at the high posts have no interest in the hierarchy. Some of them would rather not make decisions that would jeopardize their work. The congress, a body of the NASA which offers regulatory oversight, has no desires to jeopardize the central district of NASA through their decisions. These are huge obstacles to the changes that should be made in the organizational behavior and management.
They should create a way in which the engineers can have the ability of by passing the hierarchy and bureaucracy before launching unsafe missions. If the engineers had had their way during the Challengers disaster, the O-rings would have been replaced or the launch postponed. Though these activities would be very costly to NASA, it would not be as expensive as losing the crew and the vehicle (United States Congress, 1986).
The bureaucratic procedures should be sometimes be exempted from getting some data. This is because hunch or intuitions which the engineers might have may take a long time to be researched on and analyzed (Hall, 2003).
Hall, J.L. (2003). Space Policy. Columbia and Challenger: Organizational failure of NASA. Berkley: University of California at Berkley.
Jarman A. & Kouzmin, A. (1990). Decision pathways from crisis. A contingency-theory simulation heuristic for the Challenger Shuttle disaster , Contemporary Crises.
Kramer, C. & James A. (1987). The Space Shuttle Disaster: Ethical Issues in Organizational Decision Making. Michigan: Western Michigan University Press.
Launius, D. (1992). Toward an Understanding of the Space Shuttle: A Historiographical Essay . Air Power History, Winter.
Lewis, R.S. (1988). Challenger; the final voyage. New Yolk: Columbia University press.
McConnell, M. (1988). Challenger: A Major Malfunction. London: Routledge.
NASA. (2011). The Mission and the History of Space Shuttle Challenger. Web.
Priwer,S. & Philips,C. (2009). Space exploration for dummies. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons.
Rogerss commission. (1989). Report Of the President Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. Washington DC. G.P.O
Turban, E. (1988). Decision Support and Expert Systems, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company.
United States Congress. (1986). Investigation of the Challenger Accident; Report of the Committee on Science and Technology, House of Representative, Ninety-Ninth Congress, Second Session. Washington: U.S. G.P.O.
The Challenger disaster of 1986 led to the deaths of seven crew members (Jenab & Moslehpour, 2016). After the disaster, an inquiry was established in an attempt to identify the potential causes of the failure. The inquiry was also aimed at presenting appropriate guidelines that could be used whenever constructing new space shuttles. A fault tree analysis (FTA) can be used to identify and examine the major factors that led to the failure of the O-rings in the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs).
Fault Tree Analysis of O-ring Construction and the Explosion
Fig 1: Fault tree analysis (FTA) of the O-ring construction
Analysis of the FTA
The Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) model can be described using the Boolean algebra. This is usually represented using the symbol (+) and is equivalent to the OR-gate. The Boolean equation is Q=A+B. This means that events A or B (or both) must occur for disaster Q to take place. That being the case, the Challenger disaster took place because of several factors. The above FTA model shows clearly that the explosion was caused by three major factors.
Such issues contributed (wholly or partly) to the failure of the O-rings in the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs). For instance, the tree analysis shows clearly that the temperatures at the launch site and the communication barriers between Thiokol Engineers and NASA led to failure to adhere to test data limits (Jenab & Moslehpour, 2016, p. 403). The other problem was caused by the failure of the O-rings. This failure was caused by the defective nature of the O-rings and existing temperature variations (Jenab & Moslehpour, 2016). The O-rings could not perform effectively at lower temperatures. The shuttle lacked effective alarm systems to report failures (Jenab & Moslehpour, 2016). These three contributing factors led to the explosion of the Challenger.
Summary of Risks Observed
The above Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) of the O-ring construction shows critical issues that must have been considered before launching the Challenger. The failure of the O-rings led to the explosion of the space shuttle after 73 seconds. The first issue was associated with the construction of the O-rings. The O-rings in the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) were constructed in such a way that they could close tightly due to the forces produced during ignition (Jenab & Moslehpour, 2016, p. 404). A phenomenon known as joint rotation occurred during the launch process. The occurrence of this phenomenon forced combustion gases to escape through the safety O-rings. The joints failed due to increased erosion of gases.
The FTA can also be treated as a powerful risk assessment matrix. The matrix indicates that the shuttle did not have effective instrumentation to send signals after the O-rings failed. This fact explains why the crew could not cancel the launch after combustion gases escaped though the failed O-rings. The members of the crew were not warned about the leakage (Donovan & Green, 2003).
The third issue notable from this FTA is that NASA failed to adhere to existing test data limits. This is true because the shuttle was launched at a time when room temperatures exceeded those recorded during various test missions. This issue emerged because of poor communication between NASA and the engineers responsible for constructing the SRBs (Jenab & Moslehpour, 2016). The involved parties failed to monitor the critical weather conditions recorded at the launch site. Nonetheless, NASA decided to launch the space shuttle despite the existing concerns.
Ways to Mitigate the Risks
Several measures might have been undertaken to mitigate the risks identified above. To begin with, the failure of the O-rings shows conclusively that they were unable to seal gases completely after ignition. The two O-rings used to separate various chambers failed. This event allowed gases to escape. The use of three O-rings could have improved the effectiveness of the SRBs. The three O-rings would have sustained the gases and eventually prevent the disaster (Hall, 2003). This fact explains why every future space shuttle was equipped with SRBs containing three O-rings in every combustion chamber.
The issue of communication should have been taken seriously throughout the pre-launch period. The teams should have carefully analyzed test data and flow of different information. The space shuttle was launched at reduced temperatures compared to those specified by Thiokol Engineers (Jenab & Moslehpour, 2016). This disaster should have been avoided by focusing on this critical information regarding the performance of the O-rings.
The involved parties should not have launched the shuttle. Technicalities should have been identified and communicated to every member in the team. This approach would have played a positive role towards averting the disaster (Donovan & Green, 2003).
Future shuttles should be equipped with effective warning systems and corrective devices. Such systems can inform the crew members about the performance of every critical element in the space shuttle (Hall, 2003). The engineers and technicians on the ground should also be informed about the performance of such elements. These lessons should therefore be taken seriously whenever designing and launching space shuttles in the future.
Reference List
Donovan, A., & Green, R. (2003). Setup for Failure: The Colombia Disaster. Teaching Ethics, 1(1), 69-76.
Hall, J. (2003). Columbia and Challenger: Organizational Failure at NASA. Space Policy, 19(1), 239-247.
Jenab, K., & Moslehpour, S. (2016). Failure Analysis: Case Study Challenger SRB Field Joint. International Journal of Engineering and Technology, 8(6), 401-405.
The Challenger was initially referred to as the STA-099. The shuttle was built to work as a test vehicle for the Space Shuttle program and was named after the HMS Challenger, which was a British Naval research vessel. The HMS Challenger sailed in the Atlantic Ocean as well as the Pacific Ocean during the 1870s.
When the Challenger was built it underwent intensive vibration and thermal testing for a year. NASA awarded Rockwell, a Space Shuttle orbiter manufacturer, a contract in 1979 to build the Challenger by converting the STA-099. The Challenger arrived at the Kennedy Space Center in July 1982, and it became the second orbiter to be operation in the center.
The Challenger had been designed to be a historic craft and many were optimistic it would outlive the rest. The Space Shuttle took its maiden flight on April, 1982 for the STS-6 mission, which saw the first ever space walk in the space shuttle program. The EVA (Extra Vehicular Activity) was done by Astronauts Donald Peterson and Story Musgrave.
This lasted about four hours and it was also during this mission the first deployment of a Tracking and Data Relay System constellation was done. After completing nine successful missions, on January 28, 1986 the Challenger was launched on the STS-51L and after a mere 73 seconds it exploded killing all the seven crewmembers (NASA, 2011).
This paper will look at the SHUTTLE 51-L MISSION, the organization that was involved in the Challenger project, the mechanical failure of the Space Shuttle Challenger, the organizational behavior and management shortcomings that contributed to the disaster and finally make organizational behavior and management changes that can be adopted to prevent a reoccurrence of the same disaster.
Discussion
NASA Program
As the Challenger Space Shuttle progressed, there was an increase in the demands being placed on NASA and this resulted to an increased risk of disaster (Jarman & Kouzmin, 1990). The NASA team had a false sense of security having carried out 2Kramer, & James, 1987 missions, which had been successful.
Prior to the launch, there were many wrangles within NASA, and managers were working in a place with heavy overload and turbulence (Kramer & James, 1987). The management at NASA was characterized with a disease full of decay and destruction (Kramer & James, 1987 p.14).
There was lack of a formal DSS program at NASA initialized before the launch for the shuttle operations. There were strong indications that decisions were being made through satisficing and short cuts.
There were lots of compromise and operations were greatly affected. NASA was accused of having semi-uncontrolled decision making as they tried to satisfy the needs of the military, scientific community, industry and this led to the space shuttle being declared operational even before the development stage of the shuttle had been completed (Kramer, & James, 1987).
Decision making at NASA was done by default as there lacked DSS. The organizational structure at the program was political and manipulations were done to meet requirements of the political power.
When the Reagan Administration declared the Space Shuttle operational , many employees at NASA lacked motivation and left with the impression that decision making on the project should be made by the political administration (Jarman & Kouzmin, 1990).
Employees began being complacent and safety of the shuttle was highly compromised, as they tried to keep the shuttle on schedule and satisfy the clients. This presents the situation at NASA prior to making the decision to launch the space shuttle (Dunbar & Ryba, 2008).
Shuttle 51-L Mission (Challenger Flight)
The 51-L mission was the 25th mission that NASA was going to undertake in its STS program. Shortly after launching the Challenger on 28, January 1986, the Challenger exploded mid air, destroying the vehicle and killing the entire seven crew members on the mission. This mission was aimed at deploying a second Tracking and Data Relay Satellite as well as the Spartan Halles Comet Observer.
The mission was also going to be the first time there were observers or passengers participating in a program called NASA Teacher in Space Program ((Dunbar & Ryba, 2008). S. Christa McAuliffe was one of the crew onboard and she was going to conduct live broadcasts that were going to be broadcasted to schools throughout the world (Dunbar & Ryba, 2008).
The destruction of the Challenger and the loss of life had profound impact on the society and the way it viewed the Space program and particularly NASA. As this paper will discuss, the tragic decision that was made to allow the launching of STS 51-L was as a result of long term contributing factors that were further increased by bad or weak organizational behavior and management strategies. The outcome of this tragedy caused loss of life, resources and made people to mistrust the space program.
Although the accident of the Challenger was blamed on the hardware failure of the SRB O ring (known as Solid Rocket Boost), the decision that was made by the management was also flawed. The decision was based on faulty organizational behavior and management and this was further aggravated by the mismanagement of initial information that suggested the launch be postponed (NASA, 2008).
Other factors that besides organizational behavior and management played a major role in contributing to the accident occurring. They included the demand NASA was getting from the political ruling class to deliver and launch on the scheduled day (NASA, 2008)
The process of proving to the American people and the political system that there was need for a reusable space shuttle had begun in the 1960s. The Challenger was one of the ways that this could be proven and thus a lot of pressure and expectation was put on the program. Unlike the previous missions such as the Apollo, the Space Shuttle was going to be used in space operations without having a defined goal (Jarman & Kouzmin, 1990 p. 3).
This presents the first contributing factor in the Challengers accident. Without a defined role for use, the Challenger was going to be used as a utility vehicle for space operations and thus there lacked a strong support for the project, both financially and politically. In order to gain favor and political support for the project, the Challenger was sold and presented to the political elites as a quick payoff (Jarman & Kouzmin, 1990 p. 8).
The project also gained support by predicting that it could be used by the military as a means that could be used to enhance the national security. To the industry, it was sold as a commercial opportunity, where companies could offer clients an opportunity to visit space. Many scientists in the program told the American public that the Challenger Shuttle was going to be an American Voyage that was going to have great scientific gain (Jarman & Kouzmin, 1990 p. 10).
To the world, the Challenger project was sold as a partnership that was going to include the ESA (European Space Agency) as well as a means that was going to improve the relations between nations and bring together people of different nationalities, sex and races by serving as crew members during missions (McConnell, 1988).
The process that was used to gain support in the economic, social and political arena for the space shuttle can be cited to be the second contributing factor that resulted to the accident (McConnell, 1988).
There was use of heterogeneous engineering, which means that the engineering and management decisions in the project were structured in ways that were going to be appealing to the political, economic, and organizational factors rather than being structured into a single entity mission that was aimed at achieving specific goals (Jarman & Kouzmin, 1990 p. 9).
When the Space Shuttle became operational, it was faced with many operational demands from many people. It had to live up to the promises that had been given by NASA. This placed a lot of pressure on the management team as they tried to coordinate the needs of the military, political elites and the scientific community.
The political pressure was to provide a space vehicle that was going to be reliable and could be reused. It was also supposed to be difficult to achieve this as it was going to hinder the ability of creating an effective system for integration and development. It was also going to be infeasible to create a management support system that could cater for the diverse requirements.
There was also a low moral within the NASA employee, which was created during the Reagan Administration when the shuttle was given the green light for operation even when the development stage had not been completed (Jarman & Kouzmin, 1990).
The American Congress expected that the Shuttle program was going to be financially self supportive after billions of dollars had been used to go to the moon (Jarman & Kouzmin, 1990, p. 15). With this lack of support from Congress, NASA adopted and operated as a commercial business instead of a government program. It can therefore be concluded that the environment of the program prior to launching had been one mucked wih conflict, short cuts and managerial stress (Jarman & Kouzmin, 1990, p.15).
Mechanical failure of the Challenger
Before the launching date, concerns had been raised about the integrity of carrying on with the launch when the temperatures were as lower than those expected for optimal performance. On a previous mission, 51-C, it had been noted that the booster joints were covered with soot and grease after launching on a cold weather.
Tests were carried out in the laboratory on the effect of low temperatures on the O-ring resilience. It was recommended that they be replaced by steel billets and this would have meant a redesign of the field joint. By the time of the accident, the steel billets were not ready.
Engineers at Alan McDonald made a presentation that detailed on the effects the cold weather was going to affect the booster performance. This was necessary because the temperatures of the launching date were expected to be lower than 350F. After the concerns were raised a meeting was convened and various heads and engineers attended.
The people in attendance included, engineers, top management of Marshal Space Flight Center, Kennedy Center, and Morton Thiokol. The meeting was called to discuss on the effect the cold weather was going to have on the mission especially the boosters performance.
Engineers gave a clear presentation that argued that the cold weather would have a major effect on the joint rotator and the O- ring seating. The test carried out had only gone to a low of 530 F and this presented a problem of the unknown (Rogerss, 1989).
Thiokol provided NASA with information concerning the launch and thought that the low temperatures were going to affect the O-rings to a point they were going to be ineffective. The mission had been cancelled previously due to the cold weather and NASA was not ready for another cancellation (Kramer, & James, 1987 p.23).
Although information had been provided by a GDSS from another company showed that the O-rings were going to work under the predicted weather, engineers from Thiokol were skeptical about the data they had inputted into the GDSS. This meant that NASA was relying on a GDSS that had flawed information (Kramer & James, 1987).
At this juncture, NASA asked for a definitive confirmation or rejection of the planned launch from Thiokol. The representatives from Thiokol responded by recommending the launch be delayed until the temperatures were favorable. NASA continued to pressure Thiokol to change their minds and NASA level three managers is reported to have retorted to the representatives, My God, Thiokol, When do you want me to launch, next April? (Kramer, & James, 1987, p.7).
It was after this that Thiokol representatives asked to be given time to rethink their recommendations. An engineer with Thiokol was asked to stop reasoning as an engineer and start thinking as a manager, which suggests that the group was placing organizational needs in front of safety of the shuttle.
Thiokol representatives returned to the GDSS and recommended that the launch be done as planned. When NASA asked if there was any objection to this no one from the GDSS objected. During the launch the O-ring were severely affected by the cold weather and this mechanical failure caused the accident and the eventual loss of the crewmembers (Kramer, & James, 1987).
Critical analysis of the organizational behavior and management shortcomings that contributed to the disaster
The environment, organizational behavior and management which NASA and its developers operated in gave a large margin for human error. However, Thiokol and NASA had a chance to avert the accident during the GDSS meeting before the launch. The organizational behavior and management fallings can be attributed to the accident.
First, the team especially Thiokol had prior knowledge that the O-ring was going to be affected by the cold weather months before the launching. However, the primary goal of the project was to meet the launch date. NASA warned about the problem, but it downplayed it. This presents the first element of the mismanagement of information and bad organizational behavior that resulted into the accident.
Any suggestion and proposals of the launch-taking place were met with positive support from the management while all suggestions of delays were shot down without taking into consideration the risk involved in carrying out the launch (Turban, 1988).
Third, there was a strong feeling among the people involved in the project management to live up to the promises made. Despite the fact that Thiokol engineers were skeptical about the planned launching, their management went ahead and agreed with the other members of the GDSS to continue with the launch (Turban, 1988).
Fourth, there was bad organizational behavior and management on the part of Thiokol, because they agreed with the other teams although their engineers were telling them to stop the launch (Priwer, & Philips, 2009).
Fifth, all people involved in the top management of the project were afraid of how the political elites and the public would react if another cancellation was done. In the previous one year the launch had been postponed six times. Many in this group were starting to rationalize that if they had succeeded in the past they were as well going to succeed this time (United States Congress, 1986).
Finally, the group as stated before was working with flawed data and even when Thiokol engineers began to question the integrity of this information, nobody took action. People in the GDSS meeting who were proposing that the launch be delayed were unwelcome and therefore the management had its mind made on the launching date.
During the meeting, it was seen that NASA representatives were at times assertive and intimidate the other players to a point where they disregarded warnings given. The meeting is also faulted as a bad organizational behavior and management, because it was easy to downplay the personal opinions held by each member.
Instead of the speaker conversion, the meeting should have been held at a place where all members were present and maybe the outcomes would have been different. The GDSS failed the point where Thiokol asked to be given five minutes to conduct a private meeting. Before this point Thiokol had maintained that the launch should be cancelled, but after the private meeting it changed its mind.
Conclusion
The failure of the spaceship Challenger can be blamed on the organizational behavior. NASA has a variety of risk avoidance system. Their aim is to ensure that the missions are safe. NASA is one of the smallest federal agencies and operates under a strict budget of US$ 15 Billion (NASA, 2010).
This removes any flexibility during risky situations. This agency has been known to be dependant to their history for decision making. Since their establishment in 1958, their main aim was to beat the Soviet Union spaceflights. Though their budget keeps being cut, they still stick to their mission.
The cut costs made NASA realize that they could include the private business sector. This increased their pressure for success, which was also coming from the government. They had to research and develop the operations with limited time.
NASA Budget in billions of American Dollar (NASA, 2010).
The normalization of deviance is another short coming on the management of the NASA. This is a term, which is used to explain the way sometimes some technical flaws are not scrutinized by the various safety bodies over time. This is because they are both expensive and time consuming. Due to the pressure to produce, it is seen as absurd to spend resources on problems, which are not a risk (Launius, 1992).
The postponing of the launch can be because of many reasons. Maybe the problem was the O-rings significance was not considered so much hence the problem with it was a minor one to them. The other reason would be, because the president was using the flight as a reference in his speech or maybe it was because of the much pressure, which was being exerted by both the private sector and the government.
Recommendations
Failures can happen no matter the safety systems applied. Though the cause of the failure was technical, the organizational failure caries a huge part in it. There are numerous things that NASA can do to avoid these types of organizational failures ever happening (Lewis, 1988).
One of them is the Hierarchical power. Some of the managements personnel at the high posts have no interest in the hierarchy. Some of them would rather not make decisions that would jeopardize their work. The congress, a body of the NASA which offers regulatory oversight, has no desires to jeopardize the central district of NASA through their decisions. These are huge obstacles to the changes that should be made in the organizational behavior and management.
They should create a way in which the engineers can have the ability of by passing the hierarchy and bureaucracy before launching unsafe missions. If the engineers had had their way during the Challengers disaster, the O-rings would have been replaced or the launch postponed. Though these activities would be very costly to NASA, it would not be as expensive as losing the crew and the vehicle (United States Congress, 1986).
The bureaucratic procedures should be sometimes be exempted from getting some data. This is because hunch or intuitions which the engineers might have may take a long time to be researched on and analyzed (Hall, 2003).
Hall, J.L. (2003). Space Policy. Columbia and Challenger: Organizational failure of NASA. Berkley: University of California at Berkley.
Jarman A. & Kouzmin, A. (1990). Decision pathways from crisis. A contingency-theory simulation heuristic for the Challenger Shuttle disaster , Contemporary Crises.
Kramer, C. & James A. (1987). The Space Shuttle Disaster: Ethical Issues in Organizational Decision Making. Michigan: Western Michigan University Press.
Launius, D. (1992). Toward an Understanding of the Space Shuttle: A Historiographical Essay . Air Power History, Winter.
Lewis, R.S. (1988). Challenger; the final voyage. New Yolk: Columbia University press.
McConnell, M. (1988). Challenger: A Major Malfunction. London: Routledge.
NASA. (2011). The Mission and the History of Space Shuttle Challenger. Web.
Priwer,S. & Philips,C. (2009). Space exploration for dummies. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons.
Rogerss commission. (1989). Report Of the President Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident. Washington DC. G.P.O
Turban, E. (1988). Decision Support and Expert Systems, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company.
United States Congress. (1986). Investigation of the Challenger Accident; Report of the Committee on Science and Technology, House of Representative, Ninety-Ninth Congress, Second Session. Washington: U.S. G.P.O.
The beginning of NASA was based on both military and scientific pursuit. After the World War II, United State department of defense started a series of research into the rocket and atmospheric sciences to thump their leadership in technology. The science was based on having better understanding of the earth through observation system, through research and exploration (Harvey, 2003). The plan involved data collection from the outer space. The Naval Research Laboratorys Vanguard was selected to support this program afterwards but the technological requirements outweighed the funding and this jeopardized its success.
The US satellite program was put in crisis by the launch of Russian Sputnik in 1957 but she subsequently launched her own in 1958, the explorer. The launch of Sputnik alarmed the congress and they perceived this as a threat to their security and technological leadership (Madders, 1997). They later agreed to establish a separate agency to conduct non-military studies and research within the space and also to develop space technologies. The agency launched research into mercury to ascertain whether man could live in this planet, whether they could recover both man and the spacecraft safely. The agency issued guidelines on the technologies used and the existing equipment, and the approach to this task.
Since the inception of NASA, the society has had benefits ranging from public safety to industrial productivity. NASA developed fiberglass that was coated with Teflon which has been used for roofing in buildings and stadia worldwide. The agency had been responsible for the transfer of information from space to the community; it had improved the communication sector (Madders, 1997). NASA developed cooling systems for treatment of patients with medical ailments like spiral and sport injuries. This was from the garments that they wore that had the capabilities to protect them from high temperatures. They developed a lightweight breathing system for firefighters and subsequent reduction in inhalation difficulties for people in this sector. Every major petroleum and mining companies use data, pictures and images that are provided from space, courtesy of NASA research and explorations.
The benefits of space program can be grouped into
Earth surveying; the satellites launched into the space by NASA were responsible for this function. The benefits could be felt in the sectors such as agriculture, geology, geography and oceanography. The satellites had improved the remote sensing department globally with more and precious information concerning the earth system. Given that the dangers of famine, depletion of natural resources and permanent ecological changes were a challenge to all nations globally, the request for such information and data normally generated revenue for the agency. If the funding for NASA at that time could have been stopped, it would have taken time to develop such information and data (ABA, 1976).
Communications and meteorology; the benefits of communication satellites has so far overtaken the cost of their installation and development. They are generally used to provide transoceanic links for commercial purposes (Slaton, 2010). The satellites that provide direct delivery and broadcast television has the potential to provide educational, medical and remote services to areas that could not have received such services. The weather satellites that were launched provided constant and daily information to the global weather services, offering the platform for accurate long-term weather forecasting.
Technology utilization; the technology advanced by NASA into the space had a multiplier effect in the economy for the general public that had the capacity to solve certain categories of problems. Some of the facilities and equipment were being used for law enforcement, pollution control, air transportation, maritime port planning and conservation (Harvey, 2003). The successful of technology to fields such as industrial, medical and social problems demonstrated the productivity and improvement in the quality of lives of the global village.
The rule of law in space; since the inception of space program in the US, the program had been put to the concept that space should be the common heritage of the entire mankind for peaceful functions. The research and subsequent exploration of space should be of the common interest of all mankind. There should be mutual co-operation for peaceful functions, exchange and dissemination of information.
Given that the agency was formed to achieve among other things greater national pride, enhance the United States leadership in technology, there were very few/hardly any opposition to the creation of NASA. The agencys goal was the emphasis on the value of partnership with both private and international agencies to enhance deeper understanding of the space (Harvey, 2003). However, the critiques point to the sometimes the lack of focus in its finding; citing the fact that sometimes the purpose for funding does not reflect the interests of the down to earth citizens of the United States thereby resulting to assumed wastage of resources. They argued that the amount of dollars that were allocated to this program could have been used to solve other problems affecting mankind. Some of the departments had shown deteriorations in their performance (ABA, 1976). By the year 1967, the tide started turning against the NASA with their budgeting dropping from $5billion by $600 million, although this was as a result of scheduled development goals being met rather than a budget cut. Their budget was later cut by President Kennedy, though he was one of the supporters of NASA.
The supporting institutions included the Ames Research Center. It was founded to conduct research on areas such as wind tunnel and the aerodynamics of aircrafts and aeronautics. It played major roles within NASA. They were responsible for the development of efficient and safer space explorations. The Army Ballistic Missile Agency was also an agency that became part of the NASA mission; led by Dr. Wernher von Braun they were responsible for the development and subsequent launch of Saturn V. This provided the platform for the development of Apollo program by NASA. The group organized a trip to the Antarctic wastelands in the summer of 1966-67 to verify the usefulness of the space trip. They were mainly interested in checking whether the experience they gained could be useful in space technology (Harvey, 2003)
Reference list
ABA (1976). Ecospace: The Economics of Outer Space- and the future. ABA Journal, Vol. 61, Issue 3, pp. 268- 395.
Harvey, B. (2003). Europes space programme: to Ariane and beyond. Springer Publishers. New York.
Madders, K. (1997). A new force at a new frontier: Europes development in the space field in the light of its main actors, policies, law, and activities from its beginning up to the present. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
Slaton, E.A. (2010). Race, Rigor, and Selectivity in U.S. Engineering: The History of an Occupational Color Line. Chicago. Harvard University Press.
Unveiling the secrets of the unknown has ever been a basic instinct in human beings. Throughout the history of human civilizations, man has been eager to know the soil and the sky around which he lives in. all these eagerness resulted in great findings and finally man happens to live in an age of absolute wonders. Apart from this, knowledge about the earth and the space made profound changes in every-day human affairs.
No system is devoid of criticisms. The space missions undertaken by the United States of America had to face severe criticisms throughout the decades. Even in the midst of Americas enviable space achievements, a large number of people oppose the undertakings saying they would not satisfy the common mans requirements.
They are worried over the billions of dollars spent for space activity. They add that its dangerous, expensive and uncertain. However, a deep probe into the concepts and objectives of space missions would reveal its multilayered opportunities. Such a study will underline the fact that any capital invested in space projects will no not be in vain.
Exploring the Unexplored
Since Alan Sheppard, the first American astronaut, an array of people has come forward to explore the outer regions of less familiarity. Whats there out in the space? This question has been the root cause behind all ventures.
The modern man, living in the advanced scientific world needs to resolve all enigmas concerning the Planet Earth and even beyond that. Mere hypotheses will not satisfy his analytical brain. All theories have to be supported by solid evidences. Only an objective study can stabilize the uncertain speculations.
Undeniably, space activities open a vast realm of knowledge. The present prosperity and dominance of America could not have been possible had the nation failed to design missions like these. All of the discoveries we have made that directly benefit us on the ground are only a small part of the potential of human space flight.
The true benefits of our steps into space are probably little known as of yet. Who would have assumed, even 60 years ago, that there would be thousands of pieces of metal orbiting the earth reflecting radio waves for our communication purposes, or who then could have dreamed of the satellite pictures we take for granted now.
The technologies from our space travel that are most important to our survival and happiness we may not know until they hit us in the face years, or decades from now (Nicholson, 2003). A number of superb discoveries that help people to lead an easy life made possible by space activities. By and large, all space missions are undertaken with great purposes.
To Sustain Domination
America has been a capitalistic and dominating country for the last few decades. However, one cannot be blind to the fact that the rigidity of the financial foundation the America is under suspicion. Even though, the country is on the move to recovery, it needs to prove it. Past glories are immaterial while considering the prominence of a country.
More than that America is not a country which rests upon the long-ago achievements. It is a country with much dynamicity and potentiality. In the recent years, it is a fashion among people to use the countrys name synonymous with scientific and technological advancements. Space operations are emerging as the one of the distinctive attributes of the sole remaining superpower.
While a few other countries conduct military, civil or commercial space programs of some significance, no country can meaningfully contest American dominance of any of these sectors, and surely no other country could rival American dominance of the full spectrum of space operations&. The Russian space program is but a pale shadow of that of the Soviet Union, with annual flight rates having declined from 125 a each year in the late 1980s to no more than roughly two dozen annual launches recently (Pike, 1998).
In the midst of the global financial crisis, America has to show to the world that it still is a leading power. For that, more explorations in different fields are necessary. The outer space is a significant and challenging realm to be studied. America is noted for its knowledge production. The nation pockets a huge amount by selling information unattainable to other countries. Space
To Monitor Energy Crisis
The rapid increase in the rate of population necessitates more electricity. In order to meet the power requirement of the existing generation, a great source of energy has to be discovered. The outer space can be a stock house of massive energy. Those sources of energy can be brought to the earth to produce energy in a large scale.
It is nothing but a kind of energy that makes the heavenly bodies move. More researching can open more sources of energy. But it is a proven fact that the energy in the sun is huge and immeasurable. The principles behind the production of energy in the sun can be studied deeply through space undertakings. The solar energy that reaches the Earth is about 10,000 times total human energy production today and the energy available in near-Earth space is limitless.
Research is being done on many different ways of using solar power economically on Earth, and many of these will be successful. Terrestrial solar energy is going to become a colossal business. However, sunlight is diffuse and not available continuously at the Earths surface. So one additional possibility is to collect solar energy 24 hours per day in space, and transmit it as microwave beams to receivers on Earth (A limitless source of energy, n. d.).
To Uncover the Secret of the Origin of Life
There have been many superstitious beliefs regarding the origin of life. Religious institutions and traditional institutions hold some out of date stands. It essentially hinders scientific thinking and material richness. A noted technological country like America needs to be scientific in each of its aspects. In order to derive objective formulation of speculative statements, a science-oriented thinking has to be brought in to everyones lives.
In addition to knowing how life originated in the universe, it is much needed to know how the universe was formed. If that secret is found out, it will lead to a ground-breaking change in the world of science. If more evidences can be traced, the scientist community can put forward measures to sustain its life.
Space Travel-The Final Frontier
An average man had not even dreamt of travelling through the skies until a few decades ago. The enchanting accounts in the science fiction stories become a reality with the development of technology in the present world. Basically, man is a pleasure loving creature. Sky is the limit for his aspirations and it crosses the horizons in a rapid pace.
Space tourism is the latest trend for the techno-centered people. Space tourism is no longer just the outlandish vision of science fiction writers. While still only affordable to the very wealthy, space tourism offers a unique type of adventure that is sought after by a large percent of the traveling population. From the mind-boggling thrill of looking at Earth from space to the feeling of weightlessness, space trips offer the experience of a lifetime to well-funded travelers (All about space program, n. d.).
Steps have been taken to set up the ever first hotel in the space to attract the people towards the concept. This new development aims at gathering money through space missions. For the American society, it can be a good source of monitory benefit.
A Way to Economic Well being
It has been a persistent criticism aimed at Americas Space programs that they eat up much of the peoples revenue. They hold the opinion that no money is gained out of such big-budget programs.
But the things have changed now. Apart from gathering money from space tourism, the government gets a huge amount by scientifically and technologically assisting other nations in various space missions. And also, the country sells some important spare parts to the needy to bag billions.
In order to make the missions less money eating, many innovative and effective technologies are developed in the nation. Reusable space shuttle is a classic example. A single device can be used for a number of times without any error. We explore space and create important new technologies to advance our economy.
It is true that, for every dollar we spend on the space program, the U.S. economy receives about $8 of economic benefit. Space exploration can also serve as a stimulus for children to enter the fields of science and engineering (Dubner, 2008).
The Space as an Alternative Home
The human civilization is under a great threat due to the increase in the rate of population. More people always mean more food. It results in the scarcity of natural resources. An uncontrolled use of non recyclable resources can create a severe condition and even wipe out the entire humanity without a trace of it.
The concept of setting up an alternative shelter in the space is a recent and brilliant idea. The first step is to find out an appropriate place in the space. Space history tells that the moon is an appropriate one if the present discoveries prove to be true.
The American aided Chandrayan I of India put forward that there is a trace of water content in the moon. If more inquisitions are made, the concept of setting up a home in the moon can be materialized. Sooner or later people should go away from the earth. Therefore it is better initiate exploring at this moment.
Satellites and Tele-Communication
The twentieth century witnessed an explosion in the field of tele-communication. Dozens of satellites are launched to make communication efficient. This is the field America can proceed to formulate notable findings. With the advent of each innovative mechanism, people wait for the new one.
Extended researches can lead to better findings in the field of communication. Other space-based communications applications have appeared, the most prominent being the broadcast of signals, primarily television programming, directly to small antennas serving individual households. A similar emerging use is the broadcast of audio programming to small antennas in locations ranging from rural villages in the developing world to individual automobiles (Satellite Telecommunications, n. d.).
Great Findings
All these years, space missions have served as a key to knowing something that the people have never heard before. People could understand more about the radiation zones. This new facts accelerated the functioning of tele-phone, cell phone and the internet. Transmission of artificial radiations became trouble-free.
The space missions made it easy to know the details about the earths magnetic field. All branches of science and all categories of people got benefited out this great finding. Astrobiology is an advanced branch of knowledge which brings together the aspects of astronomy, biology and geology. All these branches are highly developed through missions.
The universe is full of heavenly bodies. It is necessary for us to study the movements and features of them as some of them can hit the earth to make massive devastation. A space study can spot different comets and asteroids and trace their movement. With the aid of advanced space technology, even the direction of such heavenly bodies can be altered.
Even in forecasting the climate conditions, the space explorations put in a lot. As well, it makes tsunami and earthquake alert quick and accurate. In this sense, space technology is much needed to save the earth from external assaults.
Space Technology for a Better world
Since being a principal global power, America is in the position to monitor the space missions conducted in the vast expanse of the world. With such extension works, the country can promote international cooperation and mutual understanding.
In the present world order noted for its transparency, it is beneficial to have a tactical tie-up between countries in the field of space technologies. The concept of globalization connected the countries with a single network. For America, this can be of use to find a global market for space mission devices and other technologies.
However, the need for a good relationship between countries is essential. It is a good sign that, Russia, an important world power, came forward to have understanding with America. Today, instead of aggressive adjoin one another, Russia and America are alive together, planning the architecture of an all-embracing amplitude station. On June 29, 1995, the American amplitude shuttle Atlantis docked with the Russian amplitude base Mir.
This was the aboriginal abutting of Russian and American amplitude ability back 1975 (Krylov, 2008). In the recent years, a number of spatial missions are done by establishing a spatial cooperation between France and the United States, and all of them proved to be fruitful. In order to achieve spatial superiority, what a nation has to do is to promote collaborations among countries and start exploring the unknown to contribute to the betterment of the entire human race.
The Other Side of the Issue- It is Expensive, Dangerous and Uncertain
Every mechanism has two sides. One cannot deny the fact that space missions are much money eating. Each new project of spatial exploration creates a huge hole in the nations funds. There are a number of people who moan over the billions of dollars spent for space activity.
While vast majorities of the people are put under poverty line, it seems that technological orientation of America is too much. Every year, the World Health Organization reminds us that because of under nutrition, a lot of children are died before they reach adolescence. With the money put aside for technological advancements, the country can feed millions of poverty stricken mass. In this sense the nation can attain glory in the field of Human Welfare too.
Apart from financial matters, there are many other aspects that negate the idea of space activity. Foremost of all, it is a dangerous affair for a man of flesh and blood can do. Each and every undertaking involves numerous risk factors. In recent times, America has witnessed a few mission failures. The Columbia Space Shuttle disaster remains to be one of the black marks in the American Technological world. Above and beyond, space missions are uncertain. No one can predict the outcome of the mission.
Conclusion
Mans interest on space explorations roughly begins with the findings of Thales and Pythagoras that the earth is round. Since then, the human race witnessed many outstanding discoveries. However, the vast outer space still remains to be unexplored.
The veteran scientific country like America can do a lot of things to uncover the hidden truths and thus provide the mankind with novel and factual account about the universe. Nothing is unachievable if tried hard. Space missions with a purpose can always be beneficial for the development of any nation. The journey must move on from the Moon to the Mars and even beyond.
Dubner, J. Stephen. (2008). Is Space Exploration Worth the Cost? A Freakonomics Quorum.
Krylov, N. Alexei (2008).A study of the dynamics of contaminants in the own external atmosphere of orbital stations. Russian Journal of Physical Chemistry B, Focus on Physics, Vol. 27, No. 10, pp. 7783.
Nicholson, M. (2003). Space exploration necessary for progress.
Introduction-The Case for and History of Manned Flights
Manned flights to space promise several rewards for the space industry and for humanity in general. Some of these rewards relate to the flight itself while others address themselves to the improvement in space exploration capabilities when man is present. First, manned flights require simpler flight control techniques and equipment since a human operator checks and adjusts flight parameters. The need for advanced equipment required for unmanned flights characterized by many sensors, actuators, and diagnostic tools reduces.
The net effect is the reduction of vehicular costs since these controls form a substantial part of research and development costs of space vehicles. Secondly, the need for manned flights lies in the realization that technology, no matter how developed, never adequately substitutes human judgment. Space knowledge is still infantile to allow for a complete simulation of anticipated conditions informing the design of craft. Human presence reduces the mission risks associated with unpredictable situations and environments.
Thirdly, the presence of man either at the Moon or in Mars, a product of manned flight, will improve data collection and analysis capacity on site. While there have been great strides made in the exploration of space in the last half of the twentieth century, a great portion of the Moon and Mars remain unexplored. Armed with a space lab, an astronaut remains capable of performing many experiments and tests, and making many more observations than what a Lander can do, no matter how sophisticated.
The fourth reason necessitating manned flights to space is that development of requisite technologies will lead to innumerable spinoff advantages in various aspects of human life. Olla notes that space technology, is used to provide services and fulfill the goals for people on earth (413). Finally, man will not be satisfied to experience space behind the controls of sophisticated equipment millions of miles away. True scientific inquiry will drive man to seek to experience space through his senses.
The Apollo 11 landing on the surface of the Moon represents the highest point yet in the conquest of the cosmos by man. The Apollo project arose amid many circumstances that had a rare confluence at the time. This was the height of the cold war and Russia had beaten America to space via the Sputnik. This was the United States way of reclaiming its place as a pioneer in the space race.
President Kennedys administration was pivotal in providing the resources NASA needed to accomplish this goal. In scale, the project compares to the construction of the Panama Canal and the Manhattan Project. This was the first time that a space vehicle delivered a man to an extraterrestrial body and later safely returned him to earth. Through this project, the world saw for the first time pictures of the earth taken from a different vantage point.
The key lessons of the Apollo project are that it takes a multidisciplinary team to attain the heights of space. It requires a careful balance of politics, project management, and favorable public opinion to pull off such projects. The project gave way to the shuttle program.
The shuttles development came about as a means of encouraging reusability of space vehicles as opposed to the hitherto single use rockets. The shuttles are not entirely reusable. They have external thrusters that propel them into space and drop off while their engines take over for the rest of the flights.
The shuttle itself reenters the earths atmosphere and later lands on a conventional runway. While not entirely reusable, the shuttles have reduced the costs of spaceflight significantly since there is no need to construct new shuttles every time there is need to go to space. They represent the model that will be the basis for new space vehicles.
There have been two disasters involving shuttles. One of them, the Challenger, blew up during take-off because of a fault in its external thrusters. The other, Columbia, blew up as it was reentering the earths atmosphere. The lesson from these disasters is that space vehicle design is ongoing and will remain a risk for as long as space travel excites man.
For an industry literally reaching for the heavens, the technology is still nascent and requires a great deal of refinement. The future of space vehicles lay in reusability. The shuttle is half way there. When we develop technologies, where space vehicles will only require refueling without external thrusters, then the industry will be mature.
Current development of space vehicles mills around the use of single-stage-to-orbit vehicle, which unlike the shuttle has only one rocket engine. The design reduces the number of opportunities for mishaps and increases the number of reusable parts. Other concepts attracting the imagination of designers include the runway- to-space design, where a vehicle takes off, not from a custom-built platform, but from a runway.
This will reduce the takeoff-associated risks and the very high temperatures a conventional takeoff generates. The need for new vehicles is acute as the shuttle program winds down. The International Space Station requires a regular means of access to provide supplies and to transfer experiments.
The shuttle program provided this means. Some new vehicle must replace it. Its design will reflect the state of the art of space vehicle design. Conley warns that in the area of space technology design, new designs will not necessarily do away with old problems but will come with a new set of challenges.
Exploration and Colonization of Moon and Mars
The need to colonize the Moon is no different from the needs that drove humanity to colonize every known corner of the world. It has always been about discovering the unknown, finding new grounds for habitation, location of fresh resources to meet the rising needs, and conquest. When science expands, humanity improves for it.
It is not always without risk, but more often than not, science provides practical answers to humanitys problems. Exploration and colonization of the Moon and Mars will stretch our imagination beyond the basic instinct to survive. In the process, new knowledge that will contribute solutions to our earthly problems will arise.
The earth is finite. There is a limit to how much it can do for us. Eventually, the century old practice of searching for new grounds will catch up with us and once more, we will need to find fresh ground to settle our burgeoning population. As unlikely as it seems now, the Moon and Mars are the next frontiers.
They are vast, uninhabited, and with some work, they might just be habitable. The human race has never been comfortable with just knowing where the boundaries are. It is time to look elsewhere, outward, since we have mapped every inch of planet.
The colonization of the Moon and Mars provides a unique opportunity to uncover new resources that hold solutions to earths problems. In those environments, the possibility of discovery of elements not native on earth that may provide us with energy, chemical formulae for medication, materials for construction and with herculean creativity maybe arable land.
Observing the environment there will provide us with a better understanding of our own planet. For instance, if through research on Mars, evidence of life, past or present surfaces, questions such as where did we come from and how can we ensure our survival will be easier to answer.
The final reason to colonize Mars and the Moon is to facilitate a systematic conquest of the universe. It has always been in the nature of man to explore and conquer new grounds. Angelo states, Space technology also helps us respond to another very fundamental human need: the need to explore (3).
These two grounds are within a bowshot from us. Conquering them will provide us with the opportunity to conquer the rest of the universe. Indeed, this will not be possible unless we are able to build and commission new vehicles, which will transport the Columbuss of this day. There is something in the human spirit that will never be quiet until we answer conclusively the question of whether we are alone in this universe.
The Moon provides an interesting possibility for facilitating a manned mission to Mars based on the difference in the force of gravity between the earth and the Moon. The earth has approximately six times the gravitational force of the Moon. It takes almost the same amount of energy to get an object out of earths gravitational pull as it does to power it all the way to Mars.
Therefore, it means that a Mars destined lunar takeoff would use much less energy as compared to a direct Earth to Mars flight, which means that it will be possible to launch a larger mass from the Moon at one-sixth the energy requirements of doing the same from the earth.
In reality, because of the law of conservation of energy, the process will still consume the same amount of energy provided all materials are leaving earth for Mars. The opportunity lies in the option of delivering small portions of a larger space vehicle to the Moon for assembly, then taking off from the Moon towards Mars.
This will reduce the technical difficulties of a very huge take off required for a large Mars bound Vehicle directly from earth. This makes it possible to have larger vehicles necessary for a manned flight to travel to Mars.
Energy is the key ingredient that determines how far a craft could cruise from the earth. With successful manned flights to Mars, explorers can scour Mars for potential sources of energy. If found these can form an extraterrestrial power source to provide energy for further colonization of the planet and the larger cosmos.
As a planet, Mars must be teeming with diverse natural resources some of which may provide supplies for space exploration reducing the need for expensive earth takeoffs. After their location because of successful manned flights, there will be the need to construct light industries capable of processing raw materials to forms of useable supply materials such as energy sources. This will reduce the cost of take-off from earth because any craft will need just enough fuel to get to Mars, from where it refills for the return trip.
The colonization of space will remain illusory until man can set foot on Mars, as humankinds first planetary extraterrestrial colony. Just as man has literally colonized every part of the earth, ranging from the sweltering Sahara to the sub zero Tundra, it will take man to figure out how best to colonize Mars for successful human habitation. While robotic agents have explored the planets in the solar system no equipment, no matter how advanced will do it for us (Harra and Mason 1).
The universe remains unexplored. Through the centuries, man peered into the distance through spyglasses and after spying the heavens for thousands of years, he set foot on the Moon. With the Moon conquered, Mars is the next frontier. The lure to find out what lies beyond the horizon is as old as life.
Indeed, Mars now lies just a little beyond humanitys technological capability, but is essentially the next target for mans conquest. Barlow reports that, Mars has been a major spacecraft destination ever since the early days of space exploration (5). Mars remains the stepping-stone to conquering the cosmos. A manned flight to Mars will bring this dream to reality.
Man in Space
Placing a man in deep space, away from the atmosphere of the earth presents an unnatural situation in every sense of the word. The minimum conditions for life remain necessary. If anyone will stay on the Moon and in space for extended periods under conditions of low gravity, certain health problems arise.
In particular, there is loss of muscle tissue and loss of bone material. There is also risk of development of psychological problems associated with long term isolation such as a trip to Mars would entail. The question of provision of adequate in-flight medical attention remains difficult to answer in extraterrestrial locations.
Secondly, the human body needs oxygen for metabolism. Man can barely survive for more than a few minutes under oxygen deprivation. The Moon and Mars do not have any oxygen, and as such, the earth is the source of the full supply for missions. This requires storage that will last for the entire duration of extraterrestrial missions or a reliable means to produce oxygen on site.
There has never been a need to produce enough oxygen to last the extended periods that a mission to Mars would entail. This means that a reliable means for producing oxygen is a prerequisite for a successful manned mission to Mars and for extended stay at the Moon.
Thirdly, Nutrition is a prerequisite to the survival of human life. The long-term effects of the exclusive use of preserved foods remain unascertained. There is a knowledge gap in the risk of contamination of food supply by extraterrestrial environments because the knowledge of these environments is only introductory. These basic needs outline the basic requirements for a successful manned mission to Mars. The space vehicle must address them, and after arrival on site, there must be a means to provide them.
There some essential desirable elements of a new space vehicle designed to support manned flights to Martian and lunar destinations. They include reusability, multi-docking capabilities, high-level diagnostics, and long-term life support with rescue support capabilities. The NASA space shuttles remain the undisputed symbol of reusability as a desirable element of new space vehicles. It is very expensive to construct space vehicles. If they have reuse capabilities, then the operational costs of space exploration falls significantly.
The element of multi-docking capabilities means that the vehicles should be suited for surface landing on earth, the Moon, and Mars. In addition, they should be able to dock onto space stations in between to allow for servicing of equipment, and personnel movement. This coupled with high-level diagnostics will mean prompt discovery of faults that may threaten the people inside. Finally, they require long-term life support capacity with rescue capabilities.
This feature will avail time for rescue operations on whatever surface the space vehicle is on, even if a craft must leave earth for Mars to rescue stranded astronauts. The safety of the astronauts is the life of interplanetary expeditions. If these four elements feature in future space vehicles, then there will be quick progress in discovery of new frontiers.
Space Project Management
Space exploration is a very expensive affair. The insertion of small unit of equipment into space costs billions of dollars, and requires very large multidisciplinary teams to pull off. Until recently, only governments have had the capacity to run such projects. Over the last decade, the private sector has shown a growing interest in the space industry. It is therefore an issue of interest to examine these two approaches to financing the space expedition.
State governments through agencies such as NASA and intergovernmental agencies such as ESA have the budgetary capacity to meet the cost of research and development, and indeed to successfully run space projects. The development of new space vehicles to enable interplanetary flights stands to benefit from this capacity.
However, governments have too many issues to deal with. Political will, which in turn depends on public support, determines which projects get off the ground and which ones do not. With the economic crunch of the closing years of the last decade, yet to wear off completely, large-scale projects such as space exploration suffer.
Public support for space exploration in the United States has remained high enough to influence political will. However, with growing voices of discontent over the state of the economy and with a much more rights oriented environment, space projects face criticism from many quarters.
They include animal rights activists who feel use of animals for space tests is inhumane, environmental groups that blame the space exploration industry for release of large quantities of greenhouse gases, and others that want to see a stop to all nuclear related experiments-a key to fueling space vehicles. These factors hinder public sector participation.
The private sector on the other hand has a freer hand at what it does. It has much less public scrutiny and has multiple options to deal with poor public perception. They are also devoid of the red tape that slows down government action. This provides the private sector with the ability to quickly develop and implement projects. The private sector therefore, if sufficiently capitalized can propel space exploration much faster than the public sector. Its entry into the space industry is an encouraging phenomenon.
The most serious challenge that the private sector has when it comes to space exploration is the complex business models required to return a profit. Some of the projects have a very long profit cycle requiring vast sums of capital. The risks are very high too. Some aspects of space exploration are almost non-profit.
This does not auger well with stakeholders. The tendency for the private sector will be to drift towards targeted participation in space exploration to avoid the low profit or very risky components. This will limit their capacity to take on whole projects, and if they do, they may compromise on some elements to ensure they have a good return. If those compromises are on safety issues, it will put the very lives of the astronauts in danger.
Additionally, there is the challenge of ownership. What will happen if a privately run exploration project to Mars is successful in discovering a substance of universal value? Determination of the ownership structures of the exploration, which traditionally belongs to the discoverer, will be complicated. Since no one really owns Mars or the Moon, laying stake on anything there can produce conflicts of international proportions.
Works Cited
Angelo, Joseph A. Space Technology. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2003.
Barlow, Nadine G. Mars: An Introduction into its Interior, Surface and Atmosphere. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Conley, Peter. Space Vehicle Mechanisms: Elements of Successful Design. New York, NY: Wiley-IEEE, 1998.
Harra, L K and Keith O Mason. Space science. London: Imperial College Press, 2004.
Olla, Philip. Space Technology for the Benefit of Human Society and Earth. Livonia, MI: Springer, 2009.
Ronal Reagan, the 40th president of the United States, was the speaker of the speech. That speech was given from the Oval Office at the White House. The President spoke at 5 p.m. on January 28, 1986, when the Space Shuttle Challenger broke after 73 seconds of the flight. The speech was given to address the American grief about the disaster that happened to the Space Shuttle Challenger and support the families and the nation. The position of the speaker (the US President) and the responsibility of the government to explore space even at the cost of human life made Reagan qualified to give this speech.
Delivery
In the speech, Reagan emphasized such words as our, loss, mourn, Challenger, and today. A slow rate of speaking was used to appreciate the level of grief but changed to medium speed when the goals of space programs were explained. Reagan spoke softly to demonstrate his understanding of the situation. A positive but mourning tone was applied because it was important to support and motivate the nation. The speaker properly used non-verbal gestures like constant eye contact with the viewer, correct facial expressions of sadness, and pauses.
Overall Impression
Reagan used logos to underline the importance of astronauts work in space exploration, ethos to show his presidential authority and the necessity to continue space journeys, and pathos to share his sadness about the accident. The logos example, But they, the Challenger Seven, were aware of the dangers, but overcame them and did their jobs brilliantly, explains the events clear reason ( Challenger Explosion and President Reagans Address to the Nation 00:03:35-00:03:41). Pathos we share this pain with all of the people of our country shows the mourning appeal to the audience ( Challenger Explosion and President Reagans Address to the Nation 00:03:11-00:03:14). Apart from the conditions under which it was delivered, Reagans speech was successful because of its emotional appeal and intention to support and motivate Americans for dedication and new achievements.
