People remember the Space Race mainly as the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union for the Orbit of, the Moon, and Mars. However, there was another celestial object that attracted the interest of scientists from both sides. It was Venus, a planet with a highly toxic atmosphere located between Mercury and Earth. Surprisingly, astronomers back then believed that Venus is habitable and that its atmosphere and climate are similar to Earth (Howell, 2019). However, a series of probes sent to the planet in the 60s showed that the environment on Venus is close to the Christian description of Hell (Howell, 2019). The ambition to colonize Venus quickly faded away, but the enthusiasm for the study remained.
So Soviet scientists launched a series of spacecraft to explore the surface of Venus in more detail in the 80s. According to Howell (2019), “Venera 13, a Soviet spacecraft, was the first lander to transmit color images from the surface of Venus” (para. 1). It is worth mentioning that Soviet astronomers experienced both successes and failures in transmitting any data from the toxic planet before the launch of Venera 13 (Howell, 2019). It was a significant achievement for both Soviet astronomers and the world scientific community.
I consider this event important for the history of space exploration because it was one of the first steps toward a complex study of surfaces of astronomical objects with extreme atmospheres. The case of Venera 13 showed that earthly materials are robust enough for extraterrestrial conditions and that the technological capabilities of humankind are sufficient to collect various data not only from the Moon. Venera 13 gives hope to astronomers and other scientists from the field of space exploration to study not only the surfaces of planets but also their depths.
One of the major results of the Second World War was the emergence of two world super powers; the United States of America and the Soviet Union. These two powers appeared to be pitted against each other from an ideological point of view resulting in high polarization.
The United States favored communism while the Soviet Union was pro communism and aimed to spread this ideology to its spheres of influence. The Soviet Union was seen as an aggressor, keen on expanding by influencing weaker states and exporting its communism ideals to the countries.
As a result of this, there arose the need for the United States to take steps to deter this spread of the Soviet Union. This paper shall conduct a concise yet informative research on the US containment strategy as with regard to the Soviet Union and discuss the evolution of containment. The reasoning behind the adoption of this policy and the subsequent results of the same shall also be articulated.
Birth of the Containment Policy
As a result of the victory of WWII, the Soviet Union gained considerable prestige and power on a global scale. However, the Soviet states where dictatorial in nature as opposed to the democratic West. A core ideology of the Soviet regime was to secure and make absolute its power over Russian society as well as the outside world.
This move towards absolute power began by the liquidation of capitalism in Russia and a stress on the evils of capitalism and the Western nations. This status quo led to a need to “contain” the Soviet State by limiting its spheres of influence. The major aim of “Containment” from the onset was therefore to prevent the Soviet Union from using the power and position that it had won in shaping world politics
The term “containment” was coined by the United States diplomat George Kennan and it was primarily a policy designed to curb Soviet expansionism that seemed eminent following the end of the Second World War[1]. The threats of expansion by the Soviet Union were not idle ones as was seen by the increasing influence of its communist ideology in Eastern Europe and parts of Asia.
Perhaps the spirit of the containment policy as adopted by the American government can be best summed up in the Truman Doctrine in which the US pledged to “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”[2]
The rationale behind the Containment policy was that the Soviet Union was not sustainable and over time, it would collapse under its own weight. As such, the policy was endorsed not out of fear of Soviet strength but rather to speed up the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union.[3]
Balance of Power
Apart from the defeat of NAZI Germany, another significant production of the Second World War was the Cold War. While there was never a major military confrontation between the two major adversaries in the Cold War (Soviet Union and the U.S), there were proxy wars waged and extensive economic competition and assistance of ally states. The Containment policy was without a doubt one of the major U.S means by which the Soviet Union could be kept at bay.
The first proxy wars waged were in Greece where communist guerrilla groups threatened to topple the British backed democratic government and in Turkey where the Soviet Union threatened the sovereignty of the country by imposing its will to build naval bases on the country’s shores. The then U.S. president, Harry Truman, implored congress to approved $400 in economic and military aid to the two countries to help fight communism.
Evolution and Implications of the Containment Policy
While the containment policy started off as a reactive policy that was aimed at blunting the spread of communism, it led to U.S. involvement in many countries. The political aspects of the containment policy were mostly ignored with preference being given to the military aspect.
Hoffmann and Fleron note that the policy had a big military implication on American foreign policy.[4] Within ten years of its adoption, nearly half a million U.S military personnel were stationed in bases all over the world; from South Korea, Japan, and Greece to Turkey[5].
Zinn notes that the US proceeded to build military bases on the borders with communist nations in a bid to “contain” communism.[6] This further antagonized the Soviet Union which also sought to increase its military capabilities.
From an economic angle, the Marshall Plan which was to assist in the re-building of war torn Europe was a move to implement the containment policy. This plan was developed to prevent European states which had been devastated by the war from falling prey of the Soviet Union. This plan resulted in the creation of a stronger economy for European nations and the containment of Soviet power that was beginning to manifest in parts of Europe.
Nuclear deterrence was also one of the means employed in the containment policy in later years. The idea of nuclear deterrence was based on preventing an attack and thus preventing war altogether. It was one of the policies adopted to restrain the Soviet Union from attacking the United States or its interests.
Gaddis documents that the U.S Administration in the 1950’s “persuaded the allies that nuclear deterrence was the most credible and least costly way of discouraging a Soviet conventional attack.”[7] This was followed by a dispatch of tactical nuclear weapons to Europe. Deterrence therefore became a strategy not only for preventing war, but also for enforcing a policy of containment”.
However, The United States nuclear monopoly was offset by the attainment of nuclear capability by the Soviet Union which detonated its first nuclear test device in 1949. This resulted in increased nuclear proliferation in the following decades. The US in particular increased its military hardware by developing more nuclear warheads.
One of the ills of the Containment policy was that it resulted in the aiding of governments that were far from being democratic simply to stop them from falling into the control of communism.
Abrams notes that while Turkey was far short of the democratic ideals that the Western nations championed, its aid was guaranteed on its simple contrast with communism[8]. The United States Undertook the task of funding governments that were anti-communism regardless of their popularities and constantly sought ways to undermine communist governments.
Discussion and Conclusion
The Containment policy was a means of keeping at bay the Soviet powers during the cold war era and as such, the end of the Cold War led to the official end of this policy. While the success of the Containment Policy can be seen in the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, many historians argue that the Containment plan was a faulty policy as it led to the involvement of the United States in countries that were of little strategic or economic interest to it.
In addition to this, the containment policy led to the nuclear armament of nations and at any time, this faulty policy could have resulted in the nuclear annihilation as a result of the proliferation of weapons.
This paper set out to give an informative research on the US containment strategy that was adopted in the post war years. From the discussion presented, it is clear that the policy was a success since it prevented the spread of communism and also speeded up the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union.
However, the policy had its major setbacks that would have resulted in dire consequences for the entire world. It is plausible that a more diplomatic oriented policy based on negotiations would have had similar or even better outcomes without the placing the world at a risk of nuclear annihilation.
Bibliography
Abrams, Richard. “America Transformed: Sixty Years of Revolutionary Change, 1941-2001.” Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Gaddis, Lewis. “Strategies of Containment: a Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War”. Oxford University Press US, 2005.
Hoffmann, Erik. & Fleron Frederic. “The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy” Transaction Publishers, 1980.
Watson, Cynthia. “U.S. National Security: a Reference Handbook” ABC-CLIO, 2002.
Zinn, Howard. “Postwar America, 1945-1971”. South End Press, 2002.
Footnotes
Cynthia Watson, “U.S. National Security: a Reference Handbook” (ABC-CLIO, 2002), 44.
Richard Abrams, “America Transformed: Sixty Years of Revolutionary Change, 1941-2001.” (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 69.
Cynthia, 20.
Erik Hoffmann & Frederic Fleron, “The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy” (Transaction Publishers, 1980), 214.
Abrams, 70.
Howard Zinn “Postwar America, 1945-1971” (South End Press, 2002), 75.
Lewis Gaddis, “Strategies of Containment: a Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War” (Oxford University Press US, 2005), 215.
International relations have been tense since the beginning of human civilization. The world’s most powerful nations have been fighting for dominance and power over the less powerful countries. One big way of showing dominance is through war and possession of weapons of mass destruction that would create fear to a nation’s real and imagined rivals.
In 1962, Cuba became a hub for the Soviet missile launch due to its proximity to the United States, as well as the conflict that existed between President Fidel Castro of Cuba and President John F. Kennedy of the US.
Consequently, the conflict made Castro vulnerable to the influences of President Nikita Khrushchev of Russia, who needed to set up sites for nuclear missiles near the United States.
Consequently, the Cold War became more intense due to the vulnerability of the Cuban president to the Russians, who came in to protect Cuba against the US military attack, in exchange of offering Russia a space for their nuclear missiles.
However, in 2002, forty years after the events of the Cold War between Russia and the US, Fidel Castro admitted to have been fooled by Khrushchev, who did not care much about the welfare of Cubans, but rather the interests of Russia to invade the United States.1
Apparently, Fidel Castro realized, albeit belatedly, that his country was being used to aid Russians’ mission more than Cuban citizens. The research question for this paper is why Cuba was willing to deploy Soviet missile from its territory. This paper seeks to answer this research question by drawing information from primary sources on the issue.
Why Cuba was willing to deploy Soviet missile from its territory
Economic vulnerability and deteriorated international relations pushed Cuba to be willing to deploy Soviet missile from its territory. International relations form a crucial element of economic growth and development in every country across the world.
Good international relationships enhance trade between a country and others in the international phenomenon. During the events of the Cold War in 1962, Cuba experienced rough relationship with the United States over the relationship between Castro and Khrushchev, which to the United States was a threat to international security.
The United States was aware that Cuba would fall into the Soviet’s communism trap where it could have been used to attack the United States.2 Cuba’s relations with the United States were at stake due to the continued disagreements between Kennedy and Castro’s administration, which led to the invasion of Cuba by the American military combat.
Cuba formed a strategic place for the Soviet mission against the United States, and hence the ill-fated relationship between the United States and Cuba, which presented a great opportunity for the Soviets to court Cuba in the pretext of offering protection against the invasion by the United States3.
The Cold War had reached an intense state where it could have easily broke into a nuclear war and both the United States and Russia, which were at loggerheads, were busy finding strategic positions where attacking each other would cause massive destruction.
Fidel Castro was a dictator in the eyes of the United States, as his administration seemed to conform to communism for government controlled everything, thus denying its citizens the freedom to carry out trade freely like in other capitalist nations.
The rough international relations between the two countries nearly put the United States at the receiving end as the Soviets were at an advantage of attacking the United States from a nearby territory. All other nations across the larger American continent were against the Soviets, which had made it hard for the Russians to get closer to the United States.
In addition, the United States’ allies were ready to offer their military support in case a war broke out between the two countries.4 The United States was against any world regime that seemed to overcome the authority of its people due to its support for capitalism.
Russia was against capitalism and it supported communism whereby the government and the entire state owned all forms of production activities in the economy5. Both regimes were going around the world using political influences to win other countries and influence them to adopt either form of the political regime.
However, Cuba was already a capitalist nation, just like both Caribbean and American countries, but the dictatorship of Castro’s regime put the country at risk of becoming a communist state as the government seemed to demand to control all forms of production in the economy, thus denying private ownership in trading activities.6
Cuba did not have a strong military force that could have engaged the military combat of the United States into a meaningful battle. However, the effort by the United States to overthrow Castro’s regime in 1962 failed due to various factors, which included the fear of killing innocent citizens that the government had held hostage.
On the other hand, Castro needed to protect his regime against the efforts of the United States to overthrow him. He knew that no capitalist nation would have helped in any way to restructure his relationship with the United States.
Hence, the only available option was to enter an agreement with the Soviets, which was done in October 19627, whereby the Russians agreed to protect Cuba against invasion by the United States, and Cuba would allow Russians to the set up nuclear missile sites.
In addition, the aggression of Castro’s administration against the United States seemed to have played a major role in his decision to agree with Khrushchev that Russia would set up nuclear missile sites in Cuba.
Aggression crowded Castro’s decision-making capacity and thus he failed to calculate the risks that his country was being exposed to by making an agreement with the Russians, as his sole intention was to have his regime survive the oppression of the United States.
This assertion holds as after the withdrawal of Soviet mission in Cuba, some nuclear missiles were left behind and Castro suggested that they be fired against the United States, but some Russian officials disagreed.8
In 2002, Castro said it could have been disastrous if they succeeded to fire against the United States, but he admitted that it could have been of no use to take such an action, as it would have destroyed the entire world.
Conclusion
Cuba agreed to deploy the Soviet nuclear missile from its territory due to economic inferiority and the need to be protected form the United States’ aggression. The most influential world nations have flourished economies and they are capable of adopting most advanced technologies that would defend them from rivals’ invasion.
Cuba found itself in the middle of both communism and capitalist war as the United States had demanded the end of Castro’s regime, which seemed oppressive to capitalism.
On the other hand, communist Soviets took advantage of the deteriorated international relations to promise protection against future invasion by Americans to the Castro’s regime, while it took the advantage of setting up nuclear missile sites near the United States.
In addition, deteriorated international relations between Cuba and the United States also contributed to the acceptance of Cuba to have Soviet nuclear missiles sites in its territory.
Furthermore, during the Cold War era, the world seemed not to have believed so much in democracy like it is in the contemporary times. The world had not yet healed from the events of the World War II, and thus the tension was still high in international relations.
This aspect made one country aggressive against any other that seemed to interfere with its internal affairs. The United States was afraid that Soviets took advantage of the world’s tense moment to influence other small countries to embrace communism.
Hence, President Castro’s administration saw the interference of the United States as an effort to show authority over world economies, and hence it had to adopt mechanisms that would have countered the United States’ aggression.
The readily available mechanism was to denounce the influence of Americans and instead get into an agreement with Russia, which had the means to counter any form of aggression from the United States.
Castro’s move association with the Russians was symbiotic, whereby Cuba would receive protection while Russia would get missile launching space in Cuba, which is close to the United States.
Bibliography
Barrett, David, and Max Holland. Blind over Cuba: the photo gap and the missile crisis. College Station, TX: A & M University Press, 2012.
Dobbs, Michael. One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War. New York: Knopf, 2008.
Gibson, David. Talk at the Brink: Deliberation and Decision during the Cuban Missile Crisis. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2012.
Stern, Sheldon. The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory: Myths versus Reality. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012.
Trahair, Richard, and Robert Miller. Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies, and Secret Operations. New York: Enigma Books, 2008.
Footnotes
1Richard Trahair and Robert Miller, Encyclopedia of Cold War Espionage, Spies, and Secret Operations (New York: Enigma Books, 2008), 127.
2David Gibson, Talk at the Brink: Deliberation and Decision during the Cuban Missile Crisis (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2012), 106.
3Ibid, 77.
4Michael Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War (New York: Knopf, 2008), 88.
5Ibid, 116.
6David Barrett and Max Holland, Blind Over Cuba: The Photo Gap and the Missile Crisis (College Station, TX: A & M University Press, 2012), 71.
7Ibid, 84.
8Sheldon Stern, The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory: Myths versus Reality (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 94).
The topic of healthcare has always been relevant in the USSR, and during Stalin’s reign, this sector started developing significantly. During the Soviet era, people had an opportunity to undergo wellness treatment in specialised places called sanatoriums, and free trips to such facilities were offered. Particular attention was paid to water procedures as essential health programmes. The cult of bathhouses became a symbol of the Soviet era, which speaks about citizens’ love to hygiene and their respect for traditions and habits, and these customs took their roots in the birth of Christianity and were associated with purification.
As a result of the Stalinist plan for the development of medicine, a large number of sanatoriums were opened from 1933 to 1936 during the restoration of Sochi as the main Soviet resort, and the trend of wellness was common (Geisler 18). The healthcare system in the USSR was largely based on using water procedures for the treatment and prevention of various ailments, and a special attitude to water became part of not only the physiological but also the psychological profile of the Soviet citizen.
Trend of Using Natural Resources for Treatment
The Soviet healthcare system was famous for its commitment not to contemporary developments in the field of rehabilitation but to traditional healing technologies. According to Geisler, physicians in the USSR adhered to the strategy of using natural resources as valuable sources for the prevention of various diseases (2). As a result, the trend of naturalness became a cult trend in the country, and most people considered it their duty to trust specialists promoting such methods of treatment. Therefore, promoting water procedures was one of the key areas in the healthcare system of the state.
During the renovations of Soviet resorts, one of the most important procedures was the adoption of radon baths as a traditional way of healing. Veselova agues that this trend was maintained both in the era of the Soviet Union and in modern times, although in many spas, new and modern treatment methods have developed (497). Soviet citizens’ physiological need for water was natural and due to not only the desire for hygiene but also some other motives, in particular, religious beliefs. According to Vujosevic, the Orthodox Church has always encouraged the cleansing of not only the soul but also the body, and regular washing was a psychological characteristic of both Soviet citizens and their ancestors who lived in this territory (2).
Natural resources were used in the USSR as those few and affordable means of healing because, at all times of its development, the country had difficult relationships with many powers. The isolation of the state explains why borrowing from foreign wellness practices was limited (Geisler 39). Therefore, the development of local sets of procedures by using water as one of the most accessible natural elements was a reasonable prerequisite.
In order to meet the needs of Soviet people in water procedures, the government built resorts on sea coasts. Conterio remarks that the renovation of Sochi during the Stalinist period was justified by the convenient location of the city in the subtropical zone and access to the sea (92). The author compares the work in this region with that carried out in Miami to build recreation centres and notes that the south of the USSR was the most promising region for the development of wellness tourism (Conterio 92). Geisler notes that Soviet geography was so diverse and boundless that the local government had an opportunity to build sanatoriums in different areas (39).
However, the development of the country’s southern regions was identified as a priority. As Omidi states, in accordance with the Stalinist plans of the first and second five-year plans, renovations in the field of wellness rehabilitation led to the fact that “by 1939, 1,828 new sanatoriums with 239,000 beds had been built.” This outcome allows talking about the significant interest of the local government in the development of this industry and meeting citizens’ needs in desirable water procedures.
Cult of Bathhouses
Even before the USSR, the ancestors of Soviet people were anxious about body hygiene and spent much time with water, taking part in various customs associated with baths. These procedures, as a rule, had a religious background and were connected with purification as one of the main covenants of the Orthodox Church (Vujosevic 3). The most accessible and easiest place to access the water was in banyas, or bathhouses, small insulated buildings where the temperature was brought to high degrees due to the glow of stones (Vujosevic 1).
Steam was one of the essential elements of washing in banyas. This cult overgrew with traditions quickly, and in the future, Soviet citizens began to use these places not only for washing but also as a tribute to the rituals maintained for many generations (Lissitzky 48). According to Vujosevic, at the initial stage of the country’s inception, this trend was maintained, but after the end of World War II, when the power’s economy was in decline, people were puzzled by other problems (1). Banya traditions started losing their relevance, and even after the stabilisation of public life, less attention was paid to this recreation.
However, in the era of mass shortages and bans in the USSR, interest in banyas began to revive. Pollock remarks that the government needed to restore an independent economy that experienced significant problems, and in 1970, at the congress of the Communist Party, it was decided to upgrade the status of bathhouses and other municipal institutions to supplement the country’s budget (225). Despite an extended time period that passed since the change in attitude to baths, Soviet people took this initiative positively, and it became a tradition to spend free time in many city bathhouses.
In addition to municipal institutions, private banyas were also built actively, and, according to Klett, every self-respecting landowner considered it one’s duty to construct a bathhouse (264). Although many old bathing ceremonies gave way to a more modern pastime, some traditions were preserved and maintained, and their violation was unacceptable. Such a passion for bathhouses proves that during difficult times in economic and social life, the country’s population did not lose interest in such a phenomenon as joint bathing. Thus, the renewal of traditions became a natural aspect proving people’s love for hygiene.
In addition to the craving for water procedures as an integral principle of spiritual and physical purification, some other principles and unwritten laws were promoted in the bathhouses of the USSR. For instance, Klett mentions the “no women” rule and notes that gender-separate visits to bathhouses were mandatory for Soviet citizens who adhered to strict moral principles and, at the same time, respected patriarchal foundations (264). Jargin notes that, despite the healthy nature of steam therapy, in Soviet traditions, visiting a banya was closely associated with alcohol consumption, which was an integral attribute of bathing, and today, this tradition is maintained in many post-Soviet countries (1).
People were ready to spend their weekends time in bathhouses, and in the views of many citizens, they perceived this pastime as a healthy and pleasant holiday and considered it extremely necessary. Moreover, various bathing technologies existed, and specially trained people held the positions of professional bathhouse attendants who steamed others and controlled temperature conditions (Pollock 110). All these aspects prove the traditional character of Soviet banyas that have changed little over many decades and remained an integral element of the life of citizens.
Building Sanatoriums to Preserve Traditions
The large-scale construction of sanatoriums during the Stalinist period of rule was associated not only with the trend for wellness but also with the attempt of the Soviet authorities to preserve the traditions of recreation within the country. Assipova and Minnaert argue that, in accordance with the state law, all citizens of the state had the right to leisure and rest (217). Nevertheless, when analysing the history of the USSR, one can note that the government had a strict course to prevent the penetration of Western culture, and to attract the interest of citizens, the construction of rest houses and sanatoriums was maintained. In addition, it was not easy for an ordinary Soviet person to leave the country, which was favourable for promoting local recreational areas. The arrangement of resort complexes in the area of water resources was of great importance for citizens because, based on the aforementioned religious and healing practices, spiritual and physical cleansing was perceived inextricably.
In the context of the country’s development, the availability of sanatoriums was an important aspect. Geisler notes that Soviet medical practices relied heavily on the social determinants of public health, which became the fundamental course determining the local healing system (2). The country that was rich in thermal and mineral waters used this potential to the full extent (Ile and Ţigu 75).
The desire of the authorities to maintain a course towards wellness allowed them to ensure that the number of people wishing to visit sanatoriums and rest homes increased constantly. According to Assipova and Minnaert, in 1983, 45 million Soviet citizens spent their holidays in these establishments, although in 1975, this figure was 30 million (218). Such excitement proves the success of the chosen wellness strategy and confirms that rest in conditions of proximity to water resources was extremely widespread and in-demand in the state.
Although the health system was a significant sector in the context of the economic development of the USSR, the level of rest was different from that promoted in many foreign resorts. Koenker gives the concept of proletarian tourism that was modest in its manifestation and did not differ in a wide variety of services (53). Conversely, narrow-profile procedures, as a rule, were promoted in the country’s sanatoriums, and many of them were preserved for decades.
This constancy can be interpreted as the desire of the government to protect citizens from the penetration of foreign culture into the masses and support the unique health-improving practices that were characteristic of specific regions. Such procedures as mud baths, bathing in mineral waters, and other integral components of traditional medicine made it possible to maintain public interest in local health sites (Geisler 115). Thus, the preservation of wellness traditions was associated with political motives and the government’s desire to provide people with access to national healing practices with an emphasis on water resources.
Soviet Holiday Customs and Sanatorium Vacation
The attitude of the Soviet people towards weekends was special in view of the political reforms promoted by the government. According to Frost, in 1929, the ruling Communist Party led by Stalin decided to abolish a single day off (Sunday), setting up a special schedule for workers and supporting continuous production in factories. Since the course towards industrial development was strict in that era, such a measure was considered effective for improving economic performance. However, this reform was not effective and was perceived negatively. As a result, ultimately, it was abolished in 1940 (Frost).
The country retained Sunday status as an official day off that which many citizens preferred to spend with their families. At the same time, visiting public banyas was common on Saturdays, which became a tradition among people and was perceived as a natural pastime.
The Stalinist course towards a policy of wellness was perceived positively among the population, which led to the intensified construction of recreational complexes and the establishment of a vacation system for trips. Voon remarks that during World War II, many establishments of this plan were destroyed or remodelled as hospitals. However, in the future, the course for renovation was laid, which was the beginning of the era of the mass wellness policy.
Mcguire argues that spending holidays in Soviet sanatoriums was possible due to “a state-funded voucher system” that included full or partially paid vacations in specialised recreational facilities. As the author states, significant funds were invested in the construction of such rest homes since these buildings were distinguished by innovative architectural solutions and increased comfort for visitors (Mcguire). The proximity to the water was encouraged; therefore, the resorts of the southern regions of the USSR were greatly appreciated.
Access to sanatoriums was promoted in a variety of ways, including both financial incentives and transportation facilities. Cowan notes that the USSR government encouraged the creation of a unified system of railways leading to most popular resorts. Rest in sanatoriums was considered a privilege and a valuable opportunity for many citizens to spend time with benefit. Water treatments were in demand, and, as Cowan remarks, even government elites used the services of some recreational facilities.
The author calls the entire system of Soviet wellness utopian but emphasises that it was stable and appreciated by people for an opportunity to travel around the country and receive affordable medical services for free (Cowan). Thus, the peculiarities of weekends and holidays in the USSR were closely associated with a healthy lifestyle, and the state plan for the mass construction of sanatoriums confirms the relevance of this type of vacation among Soviet citizens.
Uniqueness of the Soviet Wellness System
The uniqueness of the Soviet wellness system consisted not only in its attachment to traditions but also in addressing those ailments that were not only of a chronic origin. As Geisler argues, in the USSR, the issue of social diseases was acute, in particular, tuberculosis, nervous disorders and other illnesses caused by the close interaction of people (4). An opportunity to help people with these problems through a unified system of assistance as a rest allowed strengthening the faith of the population in the power of the government and its favour for citizens. Although Orthodox religious trends were condemned by the authorities, increased access to water procedures encouraged the preservation of the traditional practices of spiritual purification, along with the education of the population (Migacheva and Frederick 161).
Unlike many Western countries, local wellness institutions were based solely on domestic healing practices, in particular, utilising the useful power of water and its valuable components. Such a traditional nature was intentional, but strict adherence to it was unique for such a large country.
The government of the USSR managed to not only create a wide network of recreational complexes throughout the country but also promote a healthy lifestyle successfully. According to Starks, “the healthy body became the manifestation of socialist triumph,” and the widespread slogan about the unity of a body and mind was evidence of the impact on people’s self-awareness (1720). In addition, as Geisler notes, nature was an integral part of this course, and adherence to traditional healing practices proves this assumption (13).
The use of water as one of the main components for the treatment of local and general health problems confirms had its objective reasons, and Soviet scholars’ research programmes were aimed at searching for the alternative ways of utilising this natural resource for medical purposes (Smith 365). While considering the size of the USSR, such attention to water was strange for many foreign countries, where various anti-ageing and wellness treatments were offered. However, Soviet citizens supported domestic wellness practices and wanted to get access to water constantly either at resorts or in local urban environments, in particular, bathhouses.
While taking into account the social isolation of the USSR, the collective principles of wellness were not unique to this communist state. Nevertheless, socialist tourism, as Rosenbaum argues, allowed creating unified leisure habits, which was part of the state development plan (158). In the end, political fluctuations caused a decline in this area, but the interest of post-Soviet citizens in the affordable ways of healing and, in particular, water remained. This outcome confirms deep-rooted traditions and demonstrates the value of natural wellness practices for the population.
Conclusion
Adherence to traditional practices was a characteristic feature of the Soviet wellness system in which using water as a key resource was determined not only by physiological but also by psychological attachment to hygiene and purification. The cult of banyas promoted in the country proves how deeply the rituals of bathing were widespread.
The wellness trend promoted during the era of Stalin’s rule was supported, and the state system of vouchers offered free services in sanatoriums and rest homes, most of which were located in close proximity to water resources. Preserving traditions was an important aspect of national socialist politics, and the maintenance of a healthy lifestyle was a significant achievement of the communist government. The system of weekends and holidays was ambiguous at the initial stage of the country’s formation, but afterwards, people were given separate days as mandatory components of their labour weeks. The uniqueness of the Soviet wellness system lies in various aspects, including traditional medical practices, a system of access to recreational facilities and the unification of people’s leisure habits.
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Pollock, Ethan. Without the Banya We Would Perish: A History of the Russian Bathhouse. Oxford University Press, 2019.
Rosenbaum, Adam T. “Leisure Travel and Real Existing Socialism: New Research on Tourism in the Soviet Union and Communist Eastern Europe.” Journal of Tourism History, vol. 7, no. 1-2, 2015, pp. 157-176.
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Starks, Tricia A. “Propagandizing the Healthy, Bolshevik Life in the Early USSR.” American Journal of Public Health, vol. 107, no. 11, 2017, pp. 1718-1724.
Veselova, E. Sh. “Medical Tourism: Tourism with Health Benefits.” Problems of Economic Transition, vol. 59, no. 6, 2017, pp. 480-500.
The fundamentals of Soviet policy in relation to the Middle East
When writing about patterns of Soviet policy in relation to the Middle East, it is necessary to highlight some fundamentals of the issue. So, first of all, there is a need to clarify the nature of the policy. Generally, one is to keep in mind that the Soviet central direction was reactive in nature. However, it should also be pointed out that the character of the policy depended upon two key questions.
For instance, the nature of the central direction was determined by the goals, which Moscow defined; on the other hand, to understand better the nature of the policy, it is important to be familiar with the strategies Soviet leaders had to follow. In other words, it should be clarified whether the leaders of the USSR relied on the only strategy, or their actions were determined by the so-called country-by-country approach. Of course, one is to keep in mind that the questions are not so easy to answer. There are certain contradictions in the historians’ views concerning the answers to the questions.
The offensive policy of the USSR and the reasons for its development
Of course, nobody will deny the fact that the leaders of the USSR wanted to control the Middle East, as they were interested in the affairs of the region. For this reason, some scientists say that Soviet Policy towards the Middle East was mostly defensive (the USSR did not want the region to be used as a station for numerous military attacks); while others are considered to be the supporters of the opposite opinion, i.e. some historians say that Soviet Middle Eastern policy was mostly offensive, as the leaders of the Soviet Union wanted to limit the influence of the West.
Generally, a defensive policy meant the USA had to cooperate with the USSR; while offensive one meant the Soviet Union wanted to weaken Western influence. When analyzing the goals of the USSR in relation to the Middle East, it becomes obvious that the nature of the policy was most offensive. Generally, one is to keep in mind that the policy of the USSR was regarded as a field of economic and strategic importance.
Marxist-Leninist ideology determined the strategy Moscow relied on. In other words, the policy was not determined by a country-by-country basis. So, while the policy of the USSR was offensive, it is necessary to highlight the ways the Soviet Union relied on to limit Western influence. The most important tactic is considered to be military aid as well as an economic one. “Finally, Moscow has offered the Arabs military and diplomatic aid against Israel, although, that assistance has been limited in scope because the USSR continues to support Israel’s right to exist” (Freedman 1985, p. 42).
In spite of the fact that the Soviet Union used numerous tactics, it should be pointed out that serious problems still took place. Regional conflicts prevented the USSR from the successful implementation of the tactical move. On the other hand, Communist parties, which were formed in the Middle East, were recognized to be the obstacles for Soviet policy implementation. Finally, to achieve success, the political leaders of the USSR decided to create the so-called anti-imperialist bloc of the countries. In my opinion, such a strategic decision was not wrong.
Freedman (1985, p. 43) stated that the leaders of the Soviet Union wanted the countries to bury their “internecine rivalries and, along with such political organizations as the Arab Communist parties and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), form a united front against what the USSR has called the linchpin of Western imperialism in the Middle East: Israel”. However, this idea failed, unfortunately. Thus, the so-called unity of Arab countries appeared not due to the efforts of the Soviet Union, but it was an Egyptian President who created unity.
The relations between the USA and the Soviet Union after the events, which took place in World War II, were obvious. Of course, the Cold War was unavoidable. The political leaders of the USA wanted to limit the access of the USSR to petroleum resources as well as military bases of the Middle East. On the other hand, one is to keep in mind that the USA wanted to limit the Union’s access to Middle Eastern lines of communication. The only interest of the USSR in the petroleum industry of the Middle East gives us an opportunity to suppose that Soviet leaders wanted to weaken oil companies in the USA.
“Egypt, Syria and Iraq were all viewed by Moscow as progressive regimes that had broken with Western imperialism and were in the process of laying the foundations for a socialist socio-economic orientation” (Kanet 2006, p. 335). In other words, for the USSR, it was extremely important to set the states against the West; although, the policy the Soviet Union relied on was chosen carefully. Economic and military support allowed the USSR to establish warm relations with the Middle East.
In the early sixties, the Soviet Union tried to establish strong relations with the countries of the Third World. At the same time, the Middle East decided to sort out the conflict with Israel. Unfortunately, the consequences of the conflict caused really great damage. Kanet (2006, p. 336) says that
Overall Soviet involvement in hot wars throughout the Third World remained limited largely to political encouragement and support, military training, the provision of equipment, and advice. This, however, was about to change, as the relative power positions of the two superpowers, at least as seen from Moscow and Washington began to shift.
The USSR’s hidden tactic
The main aim of Soviet policy towards the Middle East was to limit the access of the USA to Middle Eastern resources. Soviet policy is considered to be offensive, as the leaders of the USSR wanted to eliminate Western influences. Military assistance as well as economic one the USSR provided the Middle East with was the so-called hidden tactic to weaken the power of the USA.
References:
Freedman, R 1985, Patterns of Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East, Sage Publications, Inc. Thousand Oaks, CA.
Kanet, R 2006, The Superpower Quest for Empire: The Cold War and Soviet Support for ‘Wars of National Liberation’, Web.
The crisis relating to the Cuban missiles has occupied a key section in the international relations theory as well as in the United States foreign policies. For policymakers, the Cuban missile crisis established various tenets concerning the use of supremacy in the world of nuclear weapons and the way any association formed with Soviet Union ought to be best handled. According to Nathan, the deployment of the missiles by the USSR in Cuba represented an essential and triumphant retort to the vital interests of the Americans in Cuba that caused challenges to the Soviet Union (p.265). Nathan raised various fascinating questions relating to the implications of the USSR policy on the missile deployment in Cuba (p.267). Nathan claims that national leaders had their foreign affairs policies built on their deeply held values before the deployment of the USSR missiles in Cuba (Nathan 265).
Despite being challenged by other scholarly literature, Bernstein confirmed Nathan’s claims by offering warranted evidence on the deployment of the USSR missiles in Cuba (p.267). The scholar claims that policy issues played some roles in the Cuban missiles crisis. Bernstein gave two striking instances namely; the associated and deeply entrenched beliefs in the deterrence efficacy and the capacity of the political managers in steering their nations through the nuclear crisis shoals. Prior to the discovery of the deployed USSR missiles in Cuba, the policies of Soviet Union were construed to be in agreement with the former beliefs (Pachter 87). However, Khrushchev Nikita and Kennedy victories in solving the missile conflict in Cuba are provided in the literature to support the latter example. Thus, based on the Soviet policy and the deployment of USSR missiles in Cuba, literature asserts that Khrushchev acted rationally in the Cuban missile crisis (Lebow 440).
Literature tends to justify the claims on whether Khrushchev was unintentionally misled to deploy the USSR missiles in Cuba. Kennedy (1969) together with Pachter (1963) stressed that the US and USSR had political and cultural differences. These differences might have distorted the perception of Kennedy on the willingness of Soviet to accept risks and the perception of Khrushchev with respect to the resolutions offered by America to Cuba. Wohlstetter (1965) argues that the behavior of Kennedy offered grounds and contributed to the mistaken perceptions of the Soviet Union. In fact, Kennedy issued various warnings to Khrushchev, hence making such efforts to offer grounds that justify the miscalculations made by Khrushchev. According to Wohlstetter (1965), Khrushchev might have been obligated to assess the political contexts and the meaning of the warnings issued by Kennedy. Khrushchev could have been encouraged to deploy the USSR missiles in Cuba by three situational aspects relating to the doubts on the viability of the Americans resolutions. Khrushchev was encouraged to refute Kennedy’s warnings and deploy USSR missiles in Cuba because the American electoral politics had peculiar characteristics, John had poor office record, and he lacked desirable personal traits (Abel 1966).
Bernstein (1980) claimed that Khrushchev underrated Kennedy by assuming that he was irresolute, inexperienced, and weak (p.99). Such judgments accrued from how Kennedy managed Vienna in the fiscal 1961, poor management of the fiasco in the Pigs Bay, and his comparatively youthful age. These scholars state that the deployment of USSR missiles in Cuba showed the incorrect image of the Soviet Union after they realized that Kennedy could not change his stand on the deployment of missiles in Cuba. Abel cited that Khrushchev hardly believed that a young man like Kennedy could confront the USSR leader in the test of willpower (p.22). Hence, Khrushchev was forced to doubt the resolution offered by Kennedy. For instance, when the Pigs Bay was invaded, Kennedy failed to commit troops from America to fight invaders thus making his credibility to be undermined by Khrushchev. According to Khrushchev assertions, the Americans had irresistible authority, but they forgot the manner in which the great powers ought to conduct themselves (p.511).
According to Ulam (1968), the internal sphere and the Soviet policymakers including Khrushchev, became conscious about the likelihood that the discovery of missiles in Cuba would intensify its crisis with the U.S. In accepting this, the USSR anticipated to benefit from the ample tactical and political gains if the missiles were unnoticed and became operational. Knorr (1964) who realized the likely benefits argues that to resolve the tough dilemmas facing the Soviet overseas policy, Soviet leaders were moved with the irresistible aspirations in the fiscal 1962. The bold fondle to resolve the intricacies, the Soviet tactical inferiorities, as well as the Chinese and German tribulations came in the course of introducing the nuclear tilted missiles in Cuba. Knorr (1964) acknowledgement of the Soviet eagerness to induce Peking with the aim of stopping nuclear weapons manufacturing was generally unrealistic.
Ulam (1968) hypothesized that Moscow planned not just to bring the Chinese on board, but also to persuade China to join the Formosa special consideration. Ulam articulated that Khrushchev as a policymaker thought that America would be appreciative due to the policies and strategies he implemented (p.604). His gambit aimed at instituting the political prerequisites for an influential American-Soviet divergence agreement, getting rid of the prospects of Chinese having nuclear armaments, and resolving the German troubles. As Ulam (1968) claims, it was a reasonable risk for the entire scheme to lie on the ability of Soviet to install missiles in Cuba without being discovered by the U.S. (p.603). He postulated that America would not perhaps act in response to it by providing a nuclear wallop even if they became aware of such missiles in Cuba.
It was logical for Soviet to consider deploying USSR missiles in Cuba if Moscow operated according to its prospect and became acquainted to the outcomes. This means that the ideas sought from the beginning by Moscow would obtain a similar representation compared to the definite consequence of the crisis. As a leader, Khrushchev developed the allegations relating the deployment of USSR missiles in Cuba (Bernstein 17). In fact, Khrushchev deployed USSR missiles in Cuba to haul out a no-invasion promise made to the American president after he became adamant that his government had the information about the Americans preparation for a different attack on Cuba. The Soviet Union regime reiterated its concurrence to the confiscation of all the ballistic skyrockets from Cuba. Khrushchev disagreed that the confiscation intent accord corresponded to the improvised lateral thinking (Lebow 442). He declared that this only worked out in the cooperative headship since it was a guiding principle from the time of inception.
When the value attached to literature review is assessed, it becomes apparent that more than a solitary analyst acknowledged Khrushchev’s explanations. It is an oversight to salvage the wreckage for brilliant policy steering while regarding the effects of Cuban missiles disaster to be corresponding to the Soviet wellbeing or intents (Horelick 365). Together with other analysts, Horelick (1964) points out the noticeable incongruity between the closing stages and the extent of the means purportedly sought by Khrushchev. The scholars alleged that suspicions radiated from Khrushchev’s demonstration on the nature of armaments initiated during the Cuba missile assault. Finally, the subject of political outlay emerged because other world principals concluded in opposition while Khrushchev declared the Cuba missile crisis a triumph for Soviet. Knorr censured Khrushchev and the Cuban debacle made the Soviet loose persuasion and reputation inside the socialist campsites (p.457).
Works Cited
Abel, Elie. The Missile Crisis. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1966: 19-110. Print.
Bernstein, Barton. “The Cuban Missile Crisis: Trading the Jupiter in Turkey?” Political Science Quarterly, 95 (1980): 97-125. Print.
Bernstein, Barton. “The Week We Almost Went to War.” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 32 (1976):13-21. Print.
Horelick, Arnold. “The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Analysis of Soviet Calculations and Behavior.” World Politics 16 (1964): 365. Print.
Kennedy, Robert. Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Crisis. New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1969: 24-26. Print.
Khrushchev, Nikita. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, trans. Strobe Talbott. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1974: 509-14. Print.
Knorr, Klaus. “Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Cuban Missiles.” World Politics, 16 (1964): 455-67. Print.
Lebow, Richard. “The Cuban Missile Crisis: Reading the Lessons Correctly.” Political Science Quarterly, 98.3 (1983): 431-458. Print.
Nathan, James. “The Missile Crisis: His Finest Hour Now.” World Politics, 27 (1975): 265-81. Print.
Pachter, Henry. Collision Course: The Cuban Missile Crisis and Coexistence. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1963. 87. Print.
Ulam, Adam. Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-67. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968: 602-71. Print.
Wohlstetter, Roberta. “Cuba and Pearl Harbor: Hindsight and Foresight.” Foreign Affairs, 43 (1965): 691- 707. Print.
Operation Lemon-Aid was a carefully crafted plot by the American FBI to fool the Soviet’s KGB to understand how the Soviets were working to obtain intelligence from American agents. In this operation, Art Lindberg- a Navy lieutenant commander- was used as a bait to trap Soviet spies. Lindberg was almost retiring, and his financial woes made it easy for the Soviets to believe that they could use him to gather intelligence about United States military operations and plans in exchange for money. Vladimir Zinyakin, Rudolf Chernyayev, and Valdik Enger were the KGB spies who were to receive intelligence from Lindberg and pass it on to the top Soviet forces (Carriger, 2013).
What the Soviets failed to understand was that Lindberg was a bait given to them, and most of the information he supplied them with were declassified. The Soviets fell into this trap, and it enabled the American forces to have a deep understanding of the strategies used by the Soviets to gather intelligence and how the intelligence they gather is acted upon by various security agencies. This operation also led to the arrest of the Soviet spies.
Detailed Analysis of the Operation
Operation Lemon-Aid of 1977 was one of the most sophisticated plots organized by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to help understand the operations and behavioral pattern of the Soviet’s KGB. The motive of the plot was to discover strategies used by KGB to gather intelligence about U.S. military operations and plans and to arrest Soviet spies operating within the United States (Jomata,
2009). The mechanism was to convince KGB agents that Lindberg, a Navy commander who is broke and nearing his retirement, was able to pass classified information about United States’ military plans and operations in exchange for money. This mechanism worked and the FBI was able to monitor the activities and operations of the Soviet spies. The FBI took time to understand how KGB agents contacted their sources, made payments, and gathered their intelligence. They also took time to understand how the Soviet military and other government agencies, acted upon the intelligence gathered from these spies. It was a huge success. The only failure was the inability to arrest Vladimir Zinyakin who at that time had diplomatic immunity.
The Soviets did not discover the plot until the arrest of their agents was made (Bell & Ostrow, 2006). The plot was made by the FBI by deliberately luring the Soviet’s KGB agents into believing that Lindberg could help them access classified data. The activities that went on between Lindberg and KGB agents were authorized and closely monitored by the FBI. The Soviets never realized that their plot against the United States was a trap to them. The plot caused massive damage to the Soviet’s KGB. First, it became apparent that they had lost a long of money and time paying Lindberg who was working in the interest of the United States.
The information that they received from their plot was misleading and declassified hence could not effectively inform their major decisions on how to deal with the United States. What was worse was the fact that instead of getting to know more about the United States military intelligence, it is the United States that came to understand the Soviet’s military intelligence system (Carriger, 2015). Two of the KGB agents were also arrested by the United States forces.
Role of Law Enforcement and Intelligence Personnel in the Operations
Law enforcement and intelligence personnel played a critical role in this operation. They worked very closely with Lindberg to monitor every step that the KGB agents took in their quest to mine data about United States military operations and plans. They were able to determine that the exchange of money and messages was done using cigarette parks, orange juice cartons, magnetic key-holders, rubber hose, soda cans, and other everyday items (Mickolus, 2015).
It was not by sheer luck that the bad guys were caught. It was a well-coordinated effort of various intelligence agencies and law enforcement officers that the operation achieved the desired success. The most interesting fact, in this case, is that the Soviets ended up using their resources to reveal to the Americans their weaknesses and intelligence gathering strategies instead of gathering intelligence as they had hoped for in their plot (Soldatov & Borogan, 2010). LE and American intelligence communities learned that Soviet was keen on using corrupt senior U.S. military personnel to gather intelligence. This enabled the top commanders to review its relationship with these personnel and the nature of the information that would reach them.
Conclusion
Operation Lemon-Aid was a successful pilot that was planned and executed by the FBI in its bid to gain more understanding of how the Soviets gathered its intelligence about U.S. military operations. The Soviet’s KGB failed to realize that this was a trap and ended up revealing important strategies of their data collection strategies to the FBI. The KGB agents were finally arrested and were only released after the Soviet government met the conditions set by the United States.
References
Bell, G. B., & Ostrow, R. J. (2006). Taking care of the law. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press. Web.
Carriger, G. (2013). Curtsies & conspiracies. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company. Web.
Carriger, G. (2015). Etiquette and espionage. London, England: Atom. Web.
Jomata, K. (2009). Society of Former Special Agents of the FBI. New York, NY: Turner Pub. Co. Web.
Mickolus, E. F. (2015). The Counterintelligence chronology: Spying by and against the United States from the 1700s through 2014. New York, NY: Cengage. Web.
Soldatov, A., & Borogan, I. (2010). The new nobility: The restoration of Russia’s security state and the enduring legacy of the KGB. New York: PublicAffairs. Web.
One of the principal concerns of international relations entails the need to foster the growth of the spirit of nationalism while protecting national territorial integrity. As a result, any differences between nations do not result in global conflicts. As witnessed in the case of Soviet Union’s influence in Eastern Europe, some nations did not cede from seeking to maintain their power to control other countries in the world after the Second World War. In fact, as Kirchner and Dominquez (2011) assert, while advancing the concerns of international relations, harnessing diverse perspectives of nationalism held by people from different nations was critical soon after the end of the Second World War. This research argues that the discourse of international relations is instrumental in understanding experiences such as the Soviet Union’s suppression of the uprisings in Eastern Europe after 1945.
The Second World War left the Soviet Union victorious. However, its economy was enormously negatively affected. Its largest segment of agricultural and industrial output was significantly affected compared to the post-war period. In the effort to rebuild the war-torn nation, the Soviet government accepted limited support from Sweden and Britain. Nevertheless, it turned down any US support that had been proposed through the Marshall plan. The Soviet Union feared that such support would undermine its territorial integrity while eroding its strong spirit of nationalism that had been acquired through Second World War victory. Thus, as the research reveals, the Soviet Union’s suppression of the uprisings in Eastern Europe after 1945 was part of a strategy for ensuring a steady flow of raw materials and the necessary machinery for rebuilding the nations after 1945 consistent with its spirit of nationalism.
Objectives of the Research
The discourse of international relations underlines the necessity of nations to live without animosity. It emphasises the need to foster peaceful coexistence. Hence, any regime that engages in the oppression of other nations or acts that erode the territorial integrity of a particular group of people is inconsistent with the concerns of international relations. Using the case of the suppression of the uprisings in Soviet Union’s occupied territories in Eastern Europe after 1945, the current research seeks to achieve two objectives. The first objective is to discuss the experiences of the uprisings in the Eastern Europe under occupation by the Soviet Union after 1945. The goal is to understand the gains of the Soviet Union following such oppression, especially in helping to rebuild the devastatingly destroyed nation following the Second World War. The second objective extends from the first objective. It focuses on whether the gains or the reason for occupation had any meaningful connection with concerns such as nationalism as advanced through the discourse of international relations.
Research Question
Research projects have research questions as their core foundation. Indeed, all aspects of research projects such as research methodology, mechanisms for analysis, data collection, and even reporting are dependent on the research question, which begins with the identification of the problem under study. The current international relations study project argues that the suppression of an uprising based on the motives of the oppressed by occupying a state may be inconsistent with the concerns of international relations. Therefore, the containment of the uprising in Eastern Europe after 1945 by the Soviet Union is an important problem that may be analysed in the context of the discourse of international relations with reference to the goal of ensuring peaceful coexistence between nations. In line with the aforementioned objectives, this discussion narrows to the research question: Why did the Soviet Union suppress the uprisings in Eastern Europe after 1945? This question is answered through an intensive literature review as the main research methodology.
Literature Review
The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact provided support to the USSR expansionist policy from 1939 to 1940. Soviet authorities were quick to initiate a campaign for the Sovietilisation of all annexed areas assigned to it under the Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty. It sought to make agriculture a collective endeavour (Roberts 2006). It also nationalised and distributed property owned by authorities in eastern European’s occupied territories such as Poland (Roberts 2006). While taking note of the invasion of Soviet Union by the West and Russia, Stalin, the USSR ruler during the 1929-1953 period, had a clear resolution of creating buffer zones in East Europe. The Red Army had occupied these areas after 1946 (Wettig 2008). Indeed, the authors note while ‘taking advantage of its military occupation of these countries, the Soviet Union actively assisted local communist parties in coming to power’ (Wettig 2008, p.91). This influence was so high to the extent that by the end of 1948, seven nations in the East Europe bloc already had working communist governments in place. Hence, Soviet Union had managed to instil its nationalist principle of communism in these blocs. Hence, any uprising that opposed this Soviet Union’s nationalist principle suffered the risk of facing intense suppression.
Beginning from 1945, the erosion of Soviet Union’s nationalist paradigm of communalism in Eastern Europe’s occupied territories by various uprisings was a critical concern that led to the suppression of the uprisings. In fact, nationalism is an important aspect of international relations that may contribute to a peaceful coexistence of nations or people within a nation. The term international relations is deployed to mean collective interaction that prevails between international communities. These communities include nations, individuals, and even states (Nau 2008). The discourse of international relations is advanced from two main theoretical paradigms, namely, post-positivist and positivist perspectives. The positivist theories attempt to look into the manner in which the relations between nations are established based on the role that material forces play in shaping the animosity between nations (Roskin & Nicholas 2009). In the analysis of the suppression of the Eastern European upspring, this paradigm is important since the Soviet Union was able to exercise its control analogous to its military capability. Therefore, its communalist nationalist perspective prevailed.
Post-positivist paradigm argues that a social science world is impossible to study from a value-free and objective approach. To this extent, the post-positivists nullify the perception and ideas that liberalist ideologies such as rational choice theory can exhaustively be used to explain the international relations (Mingst, Ivan & Arreguín 2010). The implication of this argument is that scientific methodologies are inadequate and/or cannot be used entirely to provide an explanation of the social world. Therefore, international relations science is impossible. Consequently, it is imperative to note that communalist perspective shaped the nationalism of Soviet Union in terms of how, why, and who exercises power on the uprisings in Eastern Europe. A similar perspective is offered by positivist paradigm through its sub–theoretical facets such as neo-realism. These aspects are the main subjects of the post-positivist theoretical paradigm approach to international relations (Nau 2008).
The commitment of people to particular nation’s agenda defines their deeply ingrained social creed and political ideology (Heywood 2000). Any opposition to such ideological perceptions and affiliations may explain the suppression of the uprisings that were in conflict with communalism in the Eastern Europe after 1945. Hence, the chief reason for the suppression of the uprisings from 1945 may be argued as an attempt to fight for the Soviet nationalism. In the analysis of reasons why the Soviet Union suppressed uprisings in Eastern Europe after 1945, looking at the Soviet Union’s nationalism from the point of international relations, primodialist is also important. From the primodialist paradigm, nationalism is principally a depiction of the perceived and ancient evolutionary ability of people to organise themselves into different groups that are peculiarly defined by a particular affinity (Motyl 2001). In this context, both Soviet Union’s occupational regime and the members of the uprisings in the Eastern Europe were organised in terms of the acceptable systems of governance.
In 1939, the USSR finalised a treaty with the Nazi regime. The agreement advocated for non-aggression. However, afterwards, Nazi attacked Poland. The USSR also endeavoured to secure a share of Poland. This experience precipitated the emergence of the Second World War. Indeed, Saxonberg (2001, p.47) asserts, ‘Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were occupied (1940) by the Soviet Union, and in mid-1940 were transformed into constituent republics of the USSR’. An attempt by the Soviet Union to invade Finland was encountered with heavy resistance. However, the 1939 to 1940 war between Finland and the union left the USSR victorious, thus heralding its clear control of Finland. Indeed, in all controlled territories, the USSR introduced communalism. Considering that this system was not dominant in the occupied territories, the uprisings endeavoured to oppose this new governance approach. Since the USSR had already established control over various regions in Eastern Europe, it exerted its authority over the uprisings to remain compliant to the sources of the occupier nation’s nationalism.
People defend geographical regions in which they perceive that the whole society they associate with was born. Hence, regime occupiers who believe they have the responsibility and the right to keep and run their occupied territories have no option rather than to suppress any uprising that challenges the status quo. Any endeavour to defend Eastern Europe from Soviet Union’s foreign intrusion for material gain or any other interest was an incredible catalyst for the rise of uprisings (Saxonberg 2001). This argument introduces an important perspective in the discussion of reasons why the Soviet Union suppressed uprisings in the occupied territories in Eastern Europe after 1945.
The war between the USSR and Berlin led to an immense loss of material and human life (Myant & Drahokoupil 2010). Agricultural production capacity was negatively impaired. Hence, the USSR developed total dependency on the Eastern Europe to support its economy. The Soviet Union’s industrial production threshold was also highly negatively impaired. Therefore, it depended heavily on machinery and materials derived from Eastern Europe in the reconstruction process after the end of the Second World War. Hence, any uprising that resisted the continuous flow of materials in Eastern Europe was met with heavy resistance from the Soviet Union.
Detlef and Wielgohs (2004) describe the materialistic interests of the Soviet Union in its suppression of any uprising, whether a political party or a civil society. They argue that the Soviet Union was highly interested in any form of organised groups (Detlef & Wielgohs 2004). In all encounters with the Soviet Union, organised groups (currently known as civil societies) were repressed. Arguably, this move was adopted to ensure that they would not initiate any form of resistance towards the Soviet Union’s materialistic interests in all occupied territories in Eastern Europe after 1945. Roberts (2006) insists that Stalin had immense mercantile interest. He ensured that German factories in Eastern Europe were deported to the Soviet Union. The author supports this assertion by noting, the Soviet Union literally occupied, packed up, and shipped out of Eastern Germany, out of much of Hungary and indeed much of Poland, which was not well known at the time, factories, train tracks, horses, and cattle’ (Roberts 2006, p.56). Hence, every material good was extracted from the occupied territory in Eastern Europe and shipped to the Soviet Union. Therefore, any uprising that sought to challenge the material deportation interest of Stalin was subject to suppression.
The Soviet Union struggled to ensure that its influence reached the western part of Europe. This motive was implemented consistently with the creation of homogeneous states. Homogeneity was acquired through ethnic cleansing. Millions of certain races were physically transferred from one region to another by means such as trains. For example, through the policy, ‘millions of Germans physically had to be removed and replaced by Poles or the Sudetenland replaced by Czechs and Slovaks’ (Harrison 2011, p.103). Ethnic cleansing was so popular among the communists to the extent that it was not considered a suppression of the affected ethnic communities.
The case of deportation of Germans in Eastern Europe was considered an immense success for the communist parties. The success was celebrated amid the activity being accomplished through some brutal ways that were dominated by cruelty while not negating the fact that it was unfair in many situations. For example, Germans in Eastern Europe who had collaborated in the Polish resistance were also mass transferred alongside those who supported the Nazis. Hence, the suppression of uprisings in Eastern Europe was not only driven by materialistic motives, but also by the need to create homogeneity in the distribution of ethnic communities.
Discussion
The literature review section suggests that the Soviet Union had a strong conviction on the importance of instilling communalism not only in the occupied territories in Eastern Europe but also at home. It wanted its influence to be felt in all places that it ruled and even in new territories that it endeavoured to secure. After 1945, other equally powerful nations had their systems of governance that they also strongly believed were right. For example, the USA had already installed a democratic system that embraced capitalism (Gretchen 2012).
It was argued in the literature review that issues such as material deportation from the occupied Eastern Europe territories back to the Soviet Union to boost its industrial growth were among the important reasons for the suppression of uprisings in Eastern Europe. However, considering that mass deportation of people to guarantee ethnic cleansing was another policy that was widely pursued by Soviet communists in the occupied territories, materialistic concerns cannot solely explain the suppression of the uprisings in Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union. Rather, an alternative pedagogy such as nationalism can help to capture all crucial concerns that led the Soviet Union to suppress uprisings in Eastern Europe after 1945.
A peaceful coexistence between the Soviet Union and people in the occupied territories was limited to the extent that the individuals did not resist or object the Soviet Union’s communalist system of administration, its policies such as ethnic cleansing and mass transfer of materials, and industries back home. Hence, peace only existed in compliance with the principles under which the Soviet Union operated. Such principles define the nationalist aspect that is critical for peaceful coexistence between states and people within a country as advanced in the discourse of international relations (Anderson 2003; Heywood 2000). As evidenced in the literature review, the conception of people’s nationalism (in this case, the Soviet nationalism exercised in the occupied territories in Eastern Europe) is based on the universal acceptance of various groups or individual levels that promote common interest and national identity.
The first level entails the inter-group stage where ‘humans respond to competition or conflict by organising groups to either attack others or defend their assembly from hostile parties’ (Motyl 2001, p.18). The Soviet Union clearly defended its communalist position by treating organised groups that could otherwise challenge its ideological positions implemented in all occupied territories in Eastern Europe. In this context, ethnic cleansing objected to guarantee the homogeneity of people for the ideological position that the Soviet Union deployed to define its nationalism to be implemented easily without resistance. The cleansing would make control and governance through communalism easier.
In the second level, namely, the intra-group stage, different persons can acquire competitive advantage via cooperating with other people to secure goods that can only be accessed through combined effort. Intervening in such cooperation raises the animosity between nations because a nation would define the intra-group coming together to develop collectively (Breslin 2011; Beeson & Broome 2010). In the last level, namely, the individual level, ‘self-interested concerns over personal fitness by individuals either consciously or subconsciously motivate the creation of group as a means of security’ (Motyl 2001, p.18). Attempts to dismantle the formed groups solicit the need to defend them from being disintegrated. The Soviet Union put energy to ensure that its influence would not be disintegrated. The need to retain its influence perhaps explains well why it collectively cleansed ethnic communities, including the Germans who collaborated with it in Poland.
Conclusion
The Soviet Union was not ready to permit the emergence of any groups or subgroups that would challenge its ideological positions in Eastern Europe. Such unpreparedness was anchored strongly on its nationalism that was defined by communalist perspectives. Nationalism is an important theoretical paradigm developed in the discourses of international relations. Hence, considering the case of the suppression of Eastern Europe’s uprisings by the Soviet Union, it sounds imperative to infer that nationalism cannot be separated from international relations discourses. Indeed, the paper holds that the sources of Soviet Union’s nationalism are critical in analysing the motives towards the Soviet Union’s suppression of uprisings in Eastern Europe after 1945. This assertion stems from the fact that the suppression was anchored on the need to enforce a certain ideological position that asserted the Soviet Union’s way of thinking and interpretation of systems of governance. Points of disagreement would emerge where the enforced ideology failed to correspond to that of the people who occupied the territories of Eastern Europe.
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My report contains information about the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the country’s political and economic indicators, as well as interaction with China. Also, significant conflicts and foreign policy are analyzed to obtain a comprehensive picture. To compile a report, the basic facts about China and the USSR are taken as a basis, and in accordance with the data presented, the development prospects will be considered.
The Economic Development of the USSR in the Postwar Years
After the end of World War II, the USSR acquired the status of one of the leading world powers and led a specific world block promoting the ideas of socialism. In the social life of the country, there was an emotional upheaval associated with the victory in the war. At the same time, the totalitarian system continued to strengthen, and the main task of the postwar period was the restoration of the destroyed economy.
Joseph Stalin, who was the leader of the USSR, refused to borrow loans after the war, seeking to revive the country with the help of internal resources. The policy of demilitarizing the economy and modernizing the military-industrial complex has become key. The heavy industry was declared the priority area, and such spheres as engineering, metallurgy, and the fuel and energy complex were primarily supported.
By 1948, production reached the pre-war level due to a number of factors. In particular, they were the increased labor of the Soviet people and the free work of the Gulag’s prisoners. Also, such activities deserve attention as the redistribution of funds in favor of heavy industry, the transfer of money from the agricultural sector, the raising of funds from Germany’s reparations, and tough economic planning.
It is worth noting that in 1945, the gross agricultural output of the USSR was 60% of the pre-war level, and the government tried to bring this industry out of the crisis by punitive measures. The policy of repression strengthened, and the massive persecution of those who disagreed with the state work plan was supported. Nevertheless, numerous reforms were ineffective, and only by the 50-s, the country had managed to reach the pre-war level of agricultural production.
After the death of Stalin in 1953, the policy of the new leader, Khrushchev, became more loyal to the population and the course towards the development of socialism. However, the country’s foreign policy was quite aggressive, which ultimately led to a significant division of opinions between the two leading blocs – the communist and capitalist. Strengthening the country’s economy made it possible to achieve a number of benefits, in particular, addressing the issue of pensions and increasing the incomes of the population. The beginning of Khrushchev’s rule was marked by the exposure of the Stalinist system’s crimes, and the population discovered the consequences of totalitarianism. Due to these factors, a new stage of the political and economic life of the country began.
China’s Internal Issues
After the end of World War II, China also suffered significantly from the Japanese bombing. Being in second place after the USSR in terms of the number of victims, the People’s Republic of China counted on the help of the Soviet republic not only in politics but also in other areas: military, economic, ideological, and social. Stalin’s authority was substantial, and Mao Zedong was ready to support the socialist movement promoted by the Soviet leader. As a result, agreements were signed between the USSR and China, establishing friendly relations between the two powers. Stalin supported our country, hoping that his instructions would be carried out without question.
However, during the life of Stalin, differences arose in relations between the PRC and the USSR. The Soviet government violated the principle of equality between the two socialist states. After Stalin’s death, Mao Zedong managed to stop various instructions regarding China’s domestic policy, and today, our country has an opportunity to develop independently, establishing contacts with other states.
One of the existing contradictions in the evaluation of the Soviet experience of socialist construction. Khrushchev considers it universal and criticizes Chinese experiments sharply, thereby straining interaction. As ideological relations between China and the USSR sharpen, interstate relations are deteriorating day by day.
The outlined split between our country and the USSR can cause a significant deterioration in relations and partnerships. Nevertheless, it is likely that the further situation may worsen; therefore, China needs to strengthen its free economic position by establishing essential contacts with other powerful powers. In the light of these events, the rapprochement of the PRC with the United States can be considered a form of struggle against the USSR.
In case of help from Moscow ceases, which is likely enough, our government will have to take measures in order to prevent political provocations and intra-state split. Using the example of the Korean War of 1950–1953, we know that a split within a country is fraught with serious consequences for the well-being of its inhabitants. Therefore, under the conditions of the current situation, the course towards strengthening the independent Chinese economy is essential and one of the priority directions of the state’s development.
Implications of the Conflict
The ambitions of the Chinese government and the desire for sovereignty are regarded by the USSR negatively; therefore, further cooperation with Moscow can be difficult substantially. Despite the agreements concluded, it is likely that the Soviet authorities will decide to stop helping our country and to isolate it. In this regard, strengthening border controls is desirable to prevent possible provocative actions by the USSR. Although trusting relationships are established, our leader, Mao Zedong, argues that the position on the final goal remains the same – to build a communist society that will not depend on external economic and political differences.
The Soviet government possibly sees the enemy in the eyes of the PRC. Therefore, in order to protect our country and its inhabitants from the threat of further conflicts, joining any coalitions and alliances is undesirable. Based on the preceding, it can be noted that the current stage of Chinese development corresponds with the course presented by Mao Zedong and is approved by people, which is the indicator of the correctly chosen policy of the internal organization.
Conclusion
China largely adopted the course of the USSR’s development regarding the political and internal economic features of the post-war structure. Nevertheless, despite friendly relations, significant differences and divisions in the interests appeared. Today, the Chinese authorities show a bold and confident attitude towards maintaining the independence of the country and its interests. Strengthening the economy and preserving the ideas proposed by Mao Zedong are priority areas, and through joint efforts, the PRC can achieve a high level of prosperity due to clear and positive goals.
The Soviet Union was ruled by a one-party rule of the Bolsheviks, which was dominated by liberal politicians. The government had less control over the streets than workers’ and soldiers’ councils, which were the soviets dominated by the socialist parties (Phillips 89). The one-party rule was apprehended because it eradicated capitalist exploitation in the Soviet Union and ensured peoples would be represented by the democratic centralism principles. It was dominated by liberal politicians.
Vladimir Ilych Lenin and Trotsky were the best known influential figures in the Bolsheviks rule (Communist Party). Being the trusted aides of Lenin, Joseph Stalin had earned himself an authority in the communist party. He influenced the hiring of every top government official and hiring the new government lower-level workers. He out-maneuvered his rivals by hiring communists who were loyal to him in the government posts. A new post of the General Secretary was proposed by Kamenev to oversee and co-ordinate the different arms in the Communist Party.
On April 3, 1922, Stalin became the General Secretary of the communist party of the Soviet Union. This made Stalin accumulate great power in the party. In March 1922, Lenin suffered a severe stroke leaving him mentally weakened and physically impaired, paralyzing his right side. Stalin was made in charge of Lenin’s medical staff and ensured that Lenin took a break in political work as well as taking rest. Lenin’s failing health could not have allowed him to get back to his full duties as a leader since he suffered another stroke.
He expressed Stalin and Trotsky as the most competent leaders in the Central Committee in a letter meant to be read after his death. On January 4, 1923, Lenin wrote that Stalin is rude and holds enormous power, which he knows not how to use it. He, therefore, urges Communists to remove Stalin in the post as the General Secretary.
Preparations to replace Lenin began, and Leon Trotsky seemed to be the greatest opponent to Stalin. Stalin held the advantage of understanding how leadership and politics worked. He made use of a party rule that outlawed factions by allowing members of the Communists to debate on a proposal until it became a policy. On Lenin’s death on January 21, 1924, Stalin organized a funeral ceremony for Lenin, where his body was laid out in the casket for display.
Stalin stood beside the casket to win the public’s attention on his close bond with Lenin as mourners viewed the body. Stalin later highlighted Lenin’s key philosophies published in a book as “The Foundations of Leninism” (Havlat 45). Stalin joined forces in the left wing with Gregory Zinoviev and Lev Kamenev to keep Trotsky out of power, for they believed that Trotsky would dismiss them from the government once he becomes the leader.
On the other hand, Trotsky had long been opposed to NEP, which was an unacceptable compromise to Socialism. Trotsky then called for a Marxist policy ‘Permanent Revolution’ based on the Marxist theory. Stalin gave an alternative to this policy, stating that a ‘Socialist state could survive and prosper within a capitalist world.’ This led to the damage of Trotsky’s reputation in the party and the public. Stalin eliminated Kamenev and Zinoviev by publishing criticizing articles with Bukharim on issues concerning NEP.
Stalin, emerging as the Soviet Union leader, continued the New Economic Policy, which allowed farmers to sell their produce in open-air markets and employ workers. He embarked on an industrialization program, creating hydro-electric dams, power stations, factories, and other necessities. Stalin began accusing kulaks (farmers who expanded their farms) of not producing enough food for industrial workers. He proposed small farmers to join forces and form large-scale units setting up collective farms. He argued that this would enable farmers to afford machinery. Farmers were reluctant to this, and local communist officials were instructed to confiscate kulaks property resulting in the execution of thousands of the kulaks.
On the evening of December 1, 1934, Sergey Kirov, whose laws believed to be Stalin’s potential rival, was assassinated. This led to the arrest and execution of Kamenev, Zinoviev, and other party members (Zuehlke 2006). Nikolai Yezhov, who was appointed as the head of the Communist Secret Police, arrested top political leaders who were critical of Stalin. They were accused of planning a coup and were forced to sign confessions to the accusations after intense interrogations. Members who were accused of being involved with Trotsky plot against Stalin were assassinated after being found guilty.
The members included Alexei Rykov, Nikolai Krestinsky, Christian Rakovsky, Genrikh Yagoda, and Bukharin. In June 1937, fifty percent of the army officers were executed together with eight Red Army commanders accused of planning a coup. Stalin later appointed Lavrenti Beria as the new head of Communist Secret Police (NKVD) who allegedly arranged the execution of all senior figures in the party. This was to ensure that anyone who knew of the executions was eliminated from the party. These purges destroyed any threat of opposition to Stalin’s rule and all independent thought in the Soviet Union.
Works Cited
Havlat, Alexander. Victims of the Bolsheviks: 1917-1953. Norderstedt: GRIN Verlag, 2011. Print.
Phillips, Steve. Lenin and the Russian Revolution. Oxford: Heinemann, 2000. Print.
Zuehlke, Jeffrey. Joseph Stalin. Minneapolis: Twenty-First Century Books, 2006. Web.