Category: Refugee

The refugee regime has encountered areas of considerable challenge in the modern sphere. The most striking of these challenges is the terminology used to specify what constitutes a refugee in the 1951 Convention of Status of Refugees; ‘a well-founded fear of persecution’ was undoubtedly fitting following World War II when the convention was drafted, when ‘indeed, refugees were primarily the persecuted victims of highly organized predatory states’ (Shacknove, 1985: p.276). However, the current period has expanded the boundaries of what constitutes a refugee as we are faced with increasingly different causes of displacement i.e. climate refugees, famine, economic hardships.

People who find themselves in the absence of state protection because of reasons other than persecution, experience impediments to migrate or seek refuge because they fall outside the category of what depicts a refugee. A second key challenge of refugee protection is the lack of international cooperation in sharing the burden and duty to offer assistance. A third of the world’s refugees are hosted by the world’s poorest countries, highlighting the lack of resettlement programmes initiated by wealthier nations (Turk, 2017). For these reasons, the lack of humanitarian funding of refugee protection plans has caused millions of refugees facing persecution to remain helpless in accessing protection because countries with potentially the most resources and the most able to assist, are refusing to accept the burden. A third issue surrounding refugee protection is the challenge to human rights norms; state sovereignty allows for nations to reject refugees by controlling who they open their borders to. Not only is there a complicated relationship between national sovereignty and human rights when considering a refugee’s right to indefinite residency, but there also arises the question about the universality of our rights to seek refuge from persecution (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 14.1) if states have the option of closing their borders to some people and not others.

Perhaps the most crucial contemporary challenge of refugee protection derives from the definitional framework of the word ‘refugee’. The United Nations 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as a person who: ‘owing to a well- founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such a fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.’ (Article 1, UNHCR Convention 1951)

The problematic element of this definition is the use of persecution as the only measure for refugee status, overlooking other ways in which citizens may be in the absence of state protection. Causes of displacement may not necessarily be due to mistreatment; ‘societies can disintegrate because of their frailty and not always their ferocity’ (Shacknove, 1985: p.276). Threats to security can lack persecution and can be as a result of weak and fragile states’ incapacitation rather than the brutality of regimes. Therefore, the Convention ‘simply ignores many of the drivers of cross-border displacement in most of the developing world’ (Betts, 2013: p.15) and so can restrict displaced persons from receiving refugee protection simply because they do not fit the narrow criteria of having a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’. States may, for example, be vulnerable to natural disasters such as floods and droughts; in this case, the government may be incapable of providing physical security which would establish a valid claim to refugee status despite not being persecuted. The state’s basic duty to protect its citizens can be neglected, for example, the Great Bengal Famine occurred because of corruption in distributing materials. In this sense, it is clear that this overly narrow conception of a refugee only includes one who has suffered a tyrannical government but disregards the citizen who has suffered from a completely absent or deficient government; there are numerous ways in which the social contract can be severed. Displaced individuals may find themselves in situations that are not specified in the refugee definition of the UNHCR Convention; in these cases, it can be challenging to access refugee protection for those who have not been oppressed by a government and they can often be denied safeguarding.

Not only this, but there is controversy regarding the test of a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ being an ‘examination of the emotional state of mind of the claimant’ (Adjin-Tettey, 1997: p.130) rather than an assessment of risk. The problem with using ‘fear’ as a criterion, is that this is an emotional response that would vary amongst individuals. Hathaway (1991: p.66) suggests that to use such a subjective and personal term produces inconsistent results seeing as individuals suffering identical severities of persecution may cope differently and express differing levels of fear due to natural attitude and temperamental diversity. This has potentially detrimental consequences for children and mentally disabled individuals who essentially ‘cannot have a well-founded fear of persecution because they cannot internalise the harm feared even though there is a strong objective basis for fear of persecution’ (Adjin-Tettey, 1997: p.131), therefore excluding them from international protection because they do not meet the accepted criteria of a refugee. Ultimately the criticism of the test for a well-founded fear excludes those who may genuinely be at risk but do not exhibit fears associated with this risk; in doing so, denying refugee protection to those who do not qualify yet need it.

Legislative factors were shown to potentially operate as both facilitators and barriers to refugee women’s access to PPH in Australia, and were evident in 31.5% of studies. At times, policies put in place with the intention of helping refugees, instead created barriers to their access of PPH. For instance, the requirement for all healthcare appointments with non-English speaking patients to be attended by an accredited interpreter, created challenges for PPH strategies involving bilingual workers who did not have this accreditation (Riggs et al., 2012). Similarly where policies exist to prioritise the care of pregnant refugee women, (such as with dental services), both refugee women and midwives, were not aware of these entitlements (Riggs et al., 2012). Another barrier identified by Mangesha et al. (2017) was the lack of government funding for all levels of women’s health.

Interactions

While each of these barriers and facilitators experienced by refugee women in accessing PPH have been siloed for data extraction, considerable evidence exists that they do not operate in isolation. For instance, English language proficiency impacts refugee women’s access to PPH (Wiley et al., 2018). So too does the availability of culturally appropriate PPH services (Hawkey et al., 2017), and the access of refugee women to transport and infrastructure to utilise such services (Stapleton et al., 2013). Similarly, the fulfillment of other settlement priorities, such as the need for housing and employment was identified as a prerequisite to refugee women seeking PPH (Ngum Chi Watts et al. 2014). Consequently, analysis of these findings would be remiss to ignore the inter-connectedness of these barriers and facilitators, and the compounding impact they have on refugee women’s access to PPH in Australia.

Links to Extant Literature

The findings of this study are both substantiated and novel. Aligned with the findings of Taylor and Lamaro Haintz (2018), Mangesha et al. (2017) and Wohler and Dantas (2016), this study also found English proficiency, cultural factors and environmental factors to operate as barriers and facilitators to refugee’s access to healthcare. Likewise, supporting the findings of Taylor and Lamaro Haintz (2018), this study found organisational, legislative factors and education to play a role in refugee’s access to health services. A novel finding of the present review was the impact of settlement priorities on refugee women’s utilisation of PPH. Research findings suggest that when more immediate settlement needs, such as housing and employment are not met, refugee women tend not to pursue PPH (Riggs et al., 2012). Thus, the satisfaction of settlement priorities was shown to be a pre-requisite for refugee women’s efforts to engage with PPH. Examination of the results within the conceptual framework of the SEM reveals the complex interplay of the barriers and facilitators experienced by refugee women in Australia in accessing PPH. These factors do not only operate in isolation, they interrelate. Likewise, they are not merely experienced at the individual level for refugee women, but a compounded effect can be seen, as they function on multiple levels of the SEM. This is aligned with Taylor and Lamaro-Haintz’ (2018) findings on the impact of the social determinants on refugee’s access to health services. Here they state, “all levels of the SEM were shown to exist independently and in interactive ways” (p.26).

Interrelationships between culture, education and language were apparent across the literature and over varied levels of the SEM. At the interpersonal level, in cultures where it was considered shameful to talk about sex, a significant impact on the SRH education of refugee women at the individual level, was clear. One Sudanese woman explained “I wanted to know more [about contraception] but at that time there was no internet… I never asked anybody” (Metusela et al., 2017, p. 845). The cultural discourse of shame, silence, secrecy and taboo surrounding SRH meant that women turned to less reliable sources for SRH information, such as films and peers, resultantly forming misconceptions about their SRH (Metusela et al., 2017).

Further, refugee women reported cultural constraints on their education, as it was considered the role of the female to carry out domestic duties. Watkins et al. (2012) explained the complexity of this inter-relationship at both the individual and interpersonal levels, stating “…women required English language to interact effectively with services and be successful in their activities…, but these responsibilities meant they were unable to devote time to education” (p. 132).

Language challenges also interacted with education and culture, at the individual, interpersonal, organisational and environmental levels. At the individual level, refugee women exhibited low rates of literacy in their native language, and even lower levels in English. This affected their ability to understand and interpret PPH messages. At the interpersonal level, limited English proficiency impacted their ability to make social connections, and to interact with health professionals, with simply booking an appointment being considered a monumental task (Riggs et al., 2012). At the organisational level, language barriers created the need for interpreters to attend appointments to promote understanding between the refugee women and health professionals, however, these were not always available. At the environmental level, women experienced challenges in accessing suitable transport to attend PPH appointments, at times resulting in failure to attend scheduled appointments. In turn, this impacted refugee women’s knowledge and understanding of PPH, as it robbed them of the opportunity to engage with the education available through these services.

While refugee women are afforded many rights and entitlements for PPH at the legislative level, Riggs et al. (2016) reported a lack of knowledge of these entitlements at the individual level for both refugees and several midwives. This had a direct impact on refugee women’s access of these services. Further, many PPH providers expressed their need for professional development in refugee care, reflecting a gap at the organisational level in training employees for their care of this demographic (studies 1, 9, 11, 17-18).

Several refugee women expressed their desire to make social connections within their community at the interpersonal level. Language barriers, as well as a lack of understanding of Australian cultural norms and behaviours at the individual level, operated as a barrier to the establishment of such connections at the interpersonal level (Walker et al., 2015). Social support was also shown to have the potential to operate as a facilitator to refugee women’s access of PPH. In cases where PPH had been experienced and validated by peers, refugee women were more likely to engage with these services. Thus, social support had the potential to operate as both a barrier and facilitator to refugee women’s access of PPH (Mangesha et al., 2017).

These language, cultural and knowledge factors also operated at the organisational level, as refugee women had limited understanding of how the health system works in Australia, many having no prior experiences with PPH (Riggs et al., 2012). At times, this meant women’s attempts to access health services were in vain, with one mother reporting she had walked to a MCH centre with her children, only to be given a phone number to book an appointment (Riggs et al., 2012). Walker et al. (2015) reported that the fostering of social connections through peer support groups both promoted learning of host cultural norms, and enhanced personal support networks. This impacted refugee women’s integration in their new host country, and illustrates the interrelationships between culture, language and social support, and their compounding impact on access to PPH.

The findings of the present review convincingly demonstrate the inter-woven nature of the barriers and facilitators experienced by refugee women in Australia in accessing PPH. Not only did the barriers and facilitators operate in a bi-directional fashion, one barrier was shown to have the potential to exacerbate or even create another (ie. low English language proficiency  reduced access to knowledge). Similarly, the barriers and facilitators functioned at all levels of the SEM, suggesting that it is essential for PPH strategies to adopt a multi-level approach in order to improve PPH access for refugee women.The findings of this review strongly support the need for future PPH initiatives targeted towards refugee women to adopt a multi-level and multi-faceted approach. A multi-level approach would be one where various levels of the SEM are addressed, while a multi-faceted approach would be one that addresses the many factors that impact refugee women’s access to PPH.

While the SEM is a powerful tool for analysing the impact of a determinant of health across multiple levels, it does not visually represent the inter-relationships of factors across these levels. Therefore, a theoretical implication of this review’s findings is to propose the re-development of the SEM so that it visually depicts the complexities of the functions of its use.

The review of qualitative data was aligned with the social-constructivist approach taken by this review. It enabled rich examination of the lived experiences of the barriers and facilitators experienced by refugee women in accessing PPH in Australia. Despite this, a methodological implication for future examination of this area would be to adopt a mixed-methods approach. Including quantitative data alongside qualitative would enable larger research samples and increase the generality of findings, without subtracting the rich and insightful data obtained through qualitative methods.

Given the paucity of Australian-based research on refugee women’s access to PPH, more studies need to be conducted. The findings from this review may be utilised by researchers to direct their investigation and build on existing understandings of the factors impacting refugee women’s access to PPH services. While the present review provides a comprehensive overview of the barriers and facilitators experienced by refugee women in accessing PPH, further exploration into the preferences of refugee women in terms of modes of delivery of PPH needs to be conducted.

Strengths and Limitations

The utilisation of the SEM to analyse the findings of the data included in this review provided a solid theoretical framework from which to evaluate the complex interactions of the factors impacting refugee women’s experiences in accessing PPH, on multiple levels.

The findings of this review align with the conclusions drawn by other researchers in similar fields (Taylor and Lamaro Haintz, 2018; Wohler and Dantas, 2016; and Mangesha et al. 2017). They are also novel, as this is the first systematic literature review to focus on the experiences of refugee women in Australia in accessing PPH. Thus, a notable contribution made by this review is the potential for its findings to be used by policy makers and health authorities to inform the development of future PPH initiatives.

A limitation of this study is the lack of research that focuses solely on refugee women and their access to PPH services. Thus, to collect a reasonable sample of studies, the eligibility criteria was expanded to allow for studies to be included with a refugee women focus group. This means that the data may be somewhat skewed, as some data also included CALD women, who weren’t refugees. Further, PPH services are often implemented by treatment and care providers, resulting in some studies including access to these types of services in their findings.

Another challenge encountered in this review was that maternal and child health are often researched and discussed concurrently. This meant that some PPH measures examined did not just involve PPH for refugee women, but also discussed that of their children.

Concluding Comments

The factors impacting refugee women’s access to PPH are complex, interactive, and operate at multiple levels of the SEM. As such, PPH initiatives attempting to address the barriers in isolation and at only one level of the SEM are likely to be futile. Research findings strongly support the need for PPH initiatives to be both multi-level and multi-faceted to effect change and improve the experiences of refugee women accessing PPH in Australia. More action needs to be taken to address the barriers and promote the facilitators experienced by this marginalised group within Australia. The development of effective PPH strategies will serve to bolster refugee women’s health outcomes and reduce the current health disparities between them and the general Australian population.

“Only the dead have seen the end of war” but in the midst of wars the surviving doesn’t necessarily reap the benefits (Plato). Escaping death to arrive in countries where people hate you instead of sympathizing is what you get as a refugee. As per oxford dictionary refugee is a person who has been forced to leave their county in order to escape war, persecution or a natural disaster. However, when instead of warmth you receive backlash, some unseen wounds may remain unspoken for rest of your life and invites a sense of helplessness and despair. Many countries have been welcoming to refugees including Canada, promoting ways to create better situations for refugees when they arrive. In the report prepared by Canadian commission for UNESCO, efforts by municipalities that can be taken to make Canada more refugee friendly is brought to limelight by means of interconnectedness these municipalities can promote to make refugees feel safe and helping them overcome post traumatic issues of displacement. Possible situations for refugees on their arrival can be created by integration of refugees in citizen communities and making citizens realize long term contribution of refugees towards economy. However, backlash on the accuse of being threat to safety has to be tackled and efforts to provide better mental health care to refugees should be emphasized on.

Municipalities can create a strong social environment for refugees and citizens to help refugees resettle by helping them combat racialism and help adjust to new society promoting diversity. “Ensuring the integration and social cohesion of newcomers, including refugees, asylum seekers and other groups of immigrants”( Holley, Paul 12). Municipalities can act as corridors connecting citizens and refugees by organizing more programs involving community enrollment for diverse communities. These interactions can help boost knowledge about each others culture and promotes diversity. The “Living Together” approach which means recognizing all forms of diversity, fighting discrimination and working to facilitate peaceful co-existence should be promoted (12). This living together approach can help in overcoming language barriers which often forms a major back hold in getting a desirable job in spite of being qualified. A number of times qualified refugees may remain unemployed or work on survival jobs due to language difference of the host country and the origin country and also due to lack of “Canadian experience”. Municipalities should act as front-line coordinators to ensure wellness among refugees by providing them with safe unbiased community to thrive in and help them cope up with discrimination promoting justice and equality so they can resettle in Canada and can overcome their pain of losing near one’s and decreasing trauma of displacement. Municipalities can help refugees get easy housing facilities and getting employment to help resettle in accordance and coordination with territorial and federal government along with enforcement officials to maximize their impact to build safe, sustainable and promoting inclusive communities.

Making citizens realize the long term benefits of immigrants and refugees on their country’s economy can help cope anti-refugee sentiment which can be beneficial to provide incoming settlers with welcoming attitude rather then hateful and biased opportunities. “We have seen the enormous contributions made by refugees in Canada. Canada wouldn’t be where it is today without refugees. But it takes patience. The short term costs are considerable, but the investment pays off in a few years. We have a shortage of patience today”(Ratna Omidvar). It is true that influx of refugees may be a burden on the country for a while as they need assistance in resettlement and other health services but this investment eventually pays off with interest when each person forms a part of economy and helps boosting the economic growth. In the article by brooking educations in which Dany bahar a fellow for global economy and development program states accepting refugees is a “win to win approach” as they may get a better life and host county gets more workforce and prove to be a productive member of society.

According to some people, the Canadian Government should secure its citizens safety by monitoring muslim refugees as they are closely associated with terrorism and can be a threat to nation. These people insist that a number of terrorists seem to enter canada in the disguise of refugees. In countries like U. S there has been outright rejection of Muslim refugees as an attempt to secure citizens and this rejection is becoming visible in attitude of few Canadians towards refugees. This rejection arises out of islamophobia created by the terrorist groups by attacking a number of countries. For example, the attack of sept 11,2001 in which the perpetrators were muslim terrorists. Public debate is based more on myths rather than evidence terming Muslims a threat to peace. In my opinion, This hatred for muslims is also fueled by political parties who seem to secure votes by portraying themselves as well wisher for citizens and avoiding threats. Also, the xenophobia or threat of outsiders arising out of increasing competition for opportunities and too many immigrants around, along with islamophobia has been a reason for preventing muslim refugees from entering Canadian borders. These ruthless terrorists are being portrayed as an image of muslims around the world by politicians and other religious groups to spread their own religion by disgracing other. But the truth is, muslims are one of the most peaceful community on earth. Lust for power in name of religion and spreading fear is what terrorists do not muslims. Muslims appear to be most number of Nobel prize for peace securers . How can a person form certain community be a Nobel peace prize winner and be labeled as terrorist at the same time? Certainly, the truth is muslims are not how they are being portrayed. It may be true that some terrorists are infiltrating as refugees, but this shouldn’t be a reason to deny other humans their basic right to safety on basis of religion. Government can be more careful at the time of admission rather than being biased and focussing on muslims, as terrorism has no religion and can enter in any disguise.

Creating possible situations for refugees is incomplete without considering their mental health. The traumatic experience of leaving one’s country and adjusting to new may require strong heart and assistance to overcome. “Canada is well positioned to provide incoming Syrian refugees with support for good mental health. There is a strong evidence base that can be drawn upon to guide mental health service interventions for refugees; however for many communities and practitioners, there are gaps in knowledge about what tools and resources exist” (Agic Branka 4). Canada due to integrated systems, along with strategic alignment of services will be able to provide refugees with appropriate access to mental services and support they may need to overcome their experience of losing close members and resettling to a new country and adapting to a diverse community(4). Special attention towards the needs of displaced can help easing the pain of loss and separation. In report of year 1988 named After the door has been opened, three principles which focused on eliminating risk inducing factors and making reparation accessible to all. Also the attitude of people who interact with these can also form a major factor to invite or eliminate distress depending on how they are treated. These people include immigration officers, settlement workers , teachers , neighbours , health and mental care personnel and many more which on proper behaviour can provide warmth to the refuges but can also show backlash that can haunt them in years to come. And lastly every level of policy making government must consider needs and perspectives of refugees so these strategies and policies can prove beneficial. Moving on, recovery approach should be drawn across all sectors to develop comprehensive and coordinated support system to grow and resettle, promoting wellness among refugees and making mental health care facilities easily accessible since the trauma experienced and diagnosis of trauma may remain hidden for years.

Concluding, in order to create possible situations for refugees every sector of society including government, coordinators, enforcers and common people have to work in coordination so refugees can resettle and start a new life and help easing the pain of losing close one’s and displacement. We have to work together to provide them their basic rights since everyone has a right to life and making sure our actions and sentiments do not threaten someone’s freedom and inhibits their growth.

Work cited

1. Agic, Branka, et al. Supporting the mental health of refugees to Canada. Mental Health Commission of Canada, 2016.
2. Holley, Paul & Jedwab, Jack. (2019). Welcoming Immigrants and Refugees to Canada: The Role of Municipalities Toolkit for Inclusive Municipalities in Canada and Beyond.
3. Bahar, Dany. “Why Accepting Refugees Is a Win-Win-Win Formula.” Brookings, Brookings, 20 June 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2018/06/19/refugees-are-a-win-win-win-formula-for-economic-development/.

Introduction

An increase in internal conflicts between Rohingyas at the Ukhiya and Teknaf camps in Cox’s Bazar has caused crime rates in the area to skyrocket. In the last 14 months, 22 Rohingyas have been murdered by their fellow refugees, and certain groups within them are involved in kidnapping for ransom, extortion, rape, forced disappearances, robberies, gunrunning, drug dealing, and smuggling. Moreover, hundreds have been injured in internal skirmishes. With over 250 cases having been filed against Rohingyas at nearby police stations, locals have become increasingly wary about their foreign neighbors.

The situation is exacerbated by the fact that all this has happened despite the camps being guarded by police, RAB, army officials, and other law enforcement agencies, who have all strengthened their guard and set up regular patrols to tackle the situation.

Problem statement

After 700,000 Rohingyas migrated from the military persecution in Myanmar’s Rakhine State starting August 25 last year, the total number of the community in the Ukhiya-Teknaf area rose to 1.1 million. These people currently live in 30 camps spread over 6,000 acres in the region. Rohingyas are misusing donations and facilities given to them and committing crime after crime, with even guns and yaba tablets being recovered from the possession of some. Many of them are coming in other districts and commiting crimes. Even Bangladeshis are creating violence on them. Our main theory says that, due to various internal and external issues, Rohingya refugees are being attacked by the local people. Even sometimes Rohingya people are initiating violence on them. The Rohingya camps are now full of crimes and violence. A study by Akhther and Kusakabe shows that gender-based discrimination and violence increased among the Rohingya at Cox’s Bazar. As refugees, they are not permitted to search for employment; however, the support provided by the Bangladesh Government and NGOs is limited. This situation leaves Rohingya families with no choice but to supplement their livelihoods through any means possible. Because the movement of Rohingya men is restricted by law due to violence that has occurred in the past, women must often perform menial work outside the refugee camps to support their families. However, the refugee women face humiliation both inside and outside of the home and are vulnerable to violence due to their low position in the family hierarchy and the cultural boundaries or gender-based stereotypes that exist in Muslim society.

Research Objectives

With uncertainty shrouding the Rohingya repatriation, crimes – from petty thefts to drug peddling, abduction to murder — have become a commonplace at the refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar. Many of the Rohingyas, sheltered in Bangladesh, are now living in a state of panic. They blame unemployment in the camp and rivalry among their leaders for the situation there. Rohingyas are committing crimes inside and outside the camp, there is no doubt in it, but many crimes are being committed inside the camps which affects Rohingyas as the main victims. The role of law enforcement forces remains questionable in some cases. Criminal groups are emerging with various motive and support backing them. As a whole, the reputation of Rohingyas as well as local people is in stake. The objective of this particular research is-

The study broadly focuses on the matter of law and policy. The chance seekers from Rohingyas are trying to make the best out from this adverse situation. This study brought out the actual scenario and situations both inside the camp and outside the camp. The locals who are suffering from the activities that are done by the Rohingya criminals, their screaming for help was enlightened in this study.

This paper is a qualitative research paper and everything is discussed here in a detailed way. It is described to gain an understanding of underlying reasons, opinions, and motivations. This method of research provides insights into the problem or helps to develop ideas or hypotheses for potential.

To make this paper, between primary and secondary source method the author has chosen to work on a secondary source research process. As secondary source official web pages, biographical works, reference books, encyclopedias, articles from magazines, journals, newspapers, literature reviews, annual reviews etc have been used as research materials. All the sources are reliable and trustworthy.

Context analysis

The Rohingya refugee crisis is no longer a simple humanitarian issue but now poses a potential threat to internal security and stability of Bangladesh and may represent a wider threat to transnational security in the Southeast Asian region. The ARSA militant group has already shown its ability to recruit Rohingya jihad soldiers from refugee camps for cross-border fighting and smuggling of small arms and drugs. A local terrorist group named Al Yakin has emerged taking the rohingya extremists to create havoc inside the camp. The background of this group remains a mystery. No information was found on its leaders, financial sources and other aspects. Even general refugees are afraid to give any information on them. The basic crimes occurring in those camps are human trafficking, smuggling, robbery, domestic violence on women and children etc. Though the local people are quite unhappy with the gesture of rohingya people, they are not involved in most crimes. Rohingyas along with some national and international terrorist groups are conducting the crimes.

Thinking of the solution of this problem plethora of predicaments emerge. It is not entirely possible to monitor this huge number of people. One suitable solution is to repatriate the Rohingya people through diplomatic means. Providing them with a high standard of lifestyle might also contain the spread of crime, but that is not possible for a country like Bangladesh. So, one thing that can be done is increasing the number of law enforcement agency members to monitor the whole area. Also it is needs to have support from both local people and the Rohingya people.

Conclusion

The plight of refugees worldwide today is a grim reminder of the inability of international human rights organizations, democratic nations, and humanitarian aid agencies to prevent the persecution, violence, and abuse of people which is forcing them to flee their homes. According to the UNHCR, forced migration in 2017 has reached unprecedented levels and is threatening security in nearly every region of the world. Although it is but one part of a much larger global dilemma, the Rohingya crisis and its impact on Bangladesh has become one of the most serious humanitarian crises in the world. As such, it is vital that research helps to reveal more about these refugee events and to learn ways of preventing them or resolving the multitude of problems that eventuate, particularly for host countries. Crimes in Rohingya camps needs to be contained for having a healthy situation in that region. Government, NGOs, INGOs , and international organizations need to look into this predicament first to avoid any further quandaries.

Introduction

In 2019, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR] reported that 70.8 million people had been forcibly displaced worldwide (UNHCR, 2019a). Within the 70.8 million displaced, there were 25.9 million refugees and 3.5 million asylum seekers (UNHCR, 2019a). According to the 1951 Convention for Refugees, a refugee is “someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (UNHCR, 2001). An asylum seeker is an individual who has fled their country of origin to seek international protection but have not received their claim decision from their new host country (International Organization for Migration [IOM], 2019). Every two seconds there will be 1 person displaced from their home due to persecution or violence (UNHCR, 2019a). UNHCR reports this to be the highest number of displaced individuals on record (UNHCR, 2019). With such prevalence, guidelines for international protection, human rights, and security have never been so important.

The 1951 Refugee Convention and The Protocol of 1967

Currently, the global protection of refugees and other forcibly displaced people are outlined in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (Turk & Dowd, 2014). According UNHCR (2019b), the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 protocol are the foundational and only legal instruments that provide guidelines surrounding displaced individual’s rights and the responsibilities of nation states to protect them.

After millions of people were displaced and resettled after WWI and WWII, many nation states attended an international diplomatic conference and signed the 1951 Convention (UNHCR, 2001). The Convention of 1951 defined the term ‘refugee’ and outlined the needs and rights of refugees (UNHCR, 2001). The Convention states that refugees should not be punished for entering countries illegally and deserve basic human rights to safety, housing, education, work, and the right to the freedom of movement (UNHCR, 2001). Additionally, the Convention provided a key revision of non-refoulement stating that “a refugee should not be returned to a country where he or she fears persecution” (UNHCR, 2001). Nearly 17 years later, the 1967 protocol expanded the application of the terms, agreements, and protections of The Convention by removing the previous geographical and temporal restrictions implemented in 1951 (UNHCR, 2001). The Protocol then allowed countries to sign the Protocol and agree to the terms of the 1951 Convention without ratifying the convention itself (UNHCR, 2001). New countries could then respect the preceding principles of non-refoulement and refugee protection without being an original party member.

However, even with the Convention of 1951 and Protocol of 1967, there are still many issues and protection gaps that surround the migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees. The ambiguous definitions, terms, and guidelines outlined are often misinterpreted, incorrectly implemented, or disregarded by nation states. For example, asylum seekers are not overtly covered by the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol despite their obvious right to most, if not all, of the fundamental protections (Türk & Dowd, 2014). More generally, the presiding legal structure also lacks key protection frameworks to address historical challenges like protracted situations worldwide (Türk & Dowd, 2014).

Protection Gaps and Protracted Situations

One of the biggest drawbacks of the Convention and Protocol are that there are no legal ramifications or consequences for not adhering the terms of the agreement. Rather the Convention is merely grounded on international solidarity (Türk & Dowd, 2014). Within the current international framework, there is a lack of accountability and sharing of responsibilities to ensure refugee rights and protection needs are met (Türk & Dowd, 2014). With this, many countries do not adequately care or provide protection for refugees and displaced persons. Türk and Dowd (2014) identify such gaps as protection shortcomings in the current international agreement and framework. Türk and Dowd (2014) state that protection gaps take place when provisions of refugee international law do not apply to certain situations, merely do not exist, are limited in capacity, or misinterpreted to provide inadequate protection. One way this is seen is through protracted situations. A protracted situation is when a displaced person or refugee’s ability to return to their habitual residence, resettle in new host community, repatriate, or achieve other mobility opportunities is stalled for three or more years (IOM, 2019). The following provides general background information and global prevalence of protracted situations.

Prevalence and General Background of Protracted Situations

UNHCR defines protracted situations with a cruder measure by stating that such situations take place when “25,000 people or more from the same nationality remain in exile for more than five consecutive years in a given host country” (UNHCR, 2018). It is important to note that with such varied definitions the precise number of protracted situations are challenging to record and as such is a limitation. Based on the preceding definition, by the end of 2018 an estimated 15.9 million refugees lived in protracted situations worldwide (UNHCR, 2018). Regardless, existing protracted situations can last for 40 years or more causing extreme challenges for entire generations of displaced persons (UNHCR, 2018). With a malleable international legal framework, the percentage of refugees living in protracted refugee situations has significantly increased from 66% in 2017 to 78% in 2018 (UNHCR, 2018). Of the protracted situations mentioned, some situations have lasted for 20, 30, or even more than 40 years causing many challenges and hardships for generations of refugees (UNHCR, 2018). Lastly, nine new refugee situations became protracted in 2018 with more than 25,000 refugees living in exile beyond five consecutive years (UNHCR, 2018).

Extensive research shows that political impasses cause and contribute to enduring protracted refugee situations (Milner, 2011). The political actions and inactions of both host country and country of origin cause protracted refugee situations around the world (Milner, 2011). The situations persist due unresolved problems in either the host country and or country of origin (Milner, 2011). However, refugees become stuck in limbo when host countries enact common restrictions on refugee mobility, camp confinement, and educational opportunities to address large numbers of refugee arrivals (Milner, 2011). There are severe consequences to unresolved protracted situations for refugees and displaced individuals.

The first main consequence of protracted refugee situations are human rights violations (Milner, 2011). Typically, the rights of vulnerable people groups like children, women, and the elderly are disproportionately affected in periods of persistent exile (Milner, 2011). Ironically, the rights outlined in the 1951 Convention like the right to seek job opportunities, education, or freedom of mobility are not implemented in many protracted situations (Milner, 2011). For example, it is common for many host countries to confine refugees to one specific area or camp without an opportunity to leave to find work (Milner, 2011). According to Milner (2011), these restrictions increase an already vulnerable population’s susceptibility to poverty and dependence on unstable institutions.

References

1. Türk, V. and Dowd, R. (2014). Protection gaps. In E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, G. Loescher, K. Long, & N. Sigona (Eds.). (2014). The Oxford handbook of refugee and forced migration studies. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199652433.013.0024
2. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2019a). Figures at a glance: Statistical Yearbooks. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html
3. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2019b). The 1951 Refugee Convention. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/1951-refugee-convention.html
4. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2018). Global Trends 2018: Forced Displacement in 2018. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/5d08d7ee7.pdf
5. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2001). The 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/3bbdb0954.pdf
6. IOM (International Organization for Migration). (2019). Glossary on migration. International Migration Law (34). Retrieved from https://publications.iom.int/books/internationalmigration-law-ndeg34-glossary-migration
7. Milner, J. (2011, January). Responding to protracted refugee situations: Lessons from a decade of discussion. Refugee Studies Centre. University of Oxford. Retrieved from https://yorkspace.library.yorku.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10315/8011/Milner-Responding-Brief.pdf?sequence=1

“Throughout the dangerous six-day drive across the Sahara, the group only stopped for shelter and food. But on one occasion when they stopped for sleep at a desert village, some of the drivers picked out female migrants among the group, took them away and only returned the next morning.” (The Harrowing, Step-by-Step Story of a Migrant’s Journey to Europe). The purpose of this report is to highlight the causes of the European Migrant Crisis, the treatment of refugees, the process of applying for asylum, how the European Union is handling the crisis, and public opinion about the crisis. The research conducted consisted of 17 online articles, 2 online films, and one survey. The European Migrant Crisis is the mass migration of refugees flooding into Europe from the Middle East and Africa due to conflict and little economic opportunity. Refugees first started fleeing Syria when the Syrian Civil War started, while at the same time refugees came from Africa because of corruption, no economic mobility, and little education and infrastructure. Migrants from Syria traveled to Turkey, then took a boat across the Mediterranean to Greece, and trekked through the Balkans to reach Germany. Refugees originating from Africa crossed the Sahara Desert, then sailed across the Mediterranean to either Italy or Greece. The European Union was not ready for this mass migration and tension rose between the countries in the south that took in the most refugees and the countries in the north. People will keep fleeing the conflicts and stagnation in the Middle East and Africa, so the European Union needs to reform its immigration laws and start helping the countries that refugees and migrants cross through to make them want to stay in those countries.

The civil war in Syria causes the most refugees to flee to Europe, however, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and economic hardships in Africa and Kosovo also cause people to migrate (Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe Explained in Seven Charts).

The Syrian Civil War started in 2011, when the President of Syria, Bashar al-Assad, order the army to fire upon peaceful Arab Spring Protests. Over time, soldiers defected from the Syrian army and citizens take up arms, creating the Free Syrian Army. About a year later, the Kurds (who wanted autonomy in Northern Syria), seceded from President Assad. During this time Iran, who was President Assad’s closest ally, started sending troops and supplies to Syria. In response, Turkey and the Persian Gulf States started sending aid to the rebels to counter Iran. In 2013 the Persian Gulf States ramped up their support for the rebels, and Jordan started sending supplies to the rebels. Russia sent President Assad aircraft to bomb the rebels in September 2015 (Syria’s War: Who Is Fighting and Why). Recently Turkey launched airstrikes and a land invasion of Syria to create a buffer zone from the Kurds and to resettle Syrian refugees living in Turkey (Why Turkey Is Invading Syria). President Assad has committed numerous atrocities against his own people, the most well known being his use of chemical weapons. He first used chemical weapons in August 2013, attracting worldwide condemnation. Throughout the war, he has bombed rebel cities and towns, killing many citizens and destroying crucial infrastructure. President Assad has tortured thousands, including children (8 Reminders of How Horrible Syrian President Bashar al-Assad Has Been to His People). Since the beginning of the war, an estimated 400,000 civilians have died, 5.7 million Syrians have fled the country, and an additional 6.1 million Syrians are displaced inside Syria (Syrian Civil War Fast Facts).

Similar conflicts are happening in Iran and Afghanistan, where the ruling regimes rule with an iron fist. In Afghanistan, the government and the Taliban have been fighting for control of the country, causing civilians to flee. The Taliban’s extremist views also cause other to flee Afghanistan.

In Africa, people are migrating to Europe for better economic opportunities to provide for their families. Their home countries lack schools, healthcare, and well-paying jobs for their families. Most of these countries don’t have stable governments, and corruption was rampant. A refugee named Serge told United Nations researchers “The idea to try and reduce the weight of migration is to look at the causes. It is… the governing policies that entrench people in poverty, that don’t develop anything. Schools that don’t exist, failing health and corruption, repression. That pushes people to emigrate.” (More than 90 per Cent of Africa Migrants Would Make Perilous Europe Journey Again, despite the Risks).

To save their children and themselves from the militant groups, terrorists, and President Assad’s brutal war tactics, Salma and her husband Tarek, their two young children, their niece Jana, Salma’s mother, friends, and neighbors planned to escape Syria and head to Germany. As they passed through government and ISIS-controlled territory, they wiped their phones and changed their appearances. In government territory they put on makeup to look free, but while in ISIS-occupied territory, they covered in niqabs (black and completely covers the head and neck with just small holes for eyes). The bus Salma rode in switched between extremist and militant-controlled areas until they got close to the Syrian-Turkish border. To get to the border from her hometown, it cost Salma $2000. From there they traveled on foot into Turkey where they stopped at a refugee camp and got trapped. Salma and her family had to pay to leave the camp. For $2000 per person (except the children, as it was $2000 for both of them) they made their way across Turkey and were crammed onto a small boat to cross the Mediterranean in. The boat dropped them off on the Greek Island of Samos, from there Salma and her family walked across Greece and waited to cross the border into North Macedonia. After this, they took a train from Macedonia to the Serbian border, and after crossing were moved into a refugee camp in the southern tip of Serbia. While walking through Serbia the group was warned by a friend that they would receive jail time if they were caught, and that police were violent against migrants. This dampened their spirits greatly as they were waiting for the travel documents. Salma and her family took a bus to Belgrade, then another to the border between Serbia and Hungary. At the border, there was another processing camp, during the time they were there news reached them that Hungary was allowing refugees through the border. Salma didn’t waste the opportunity, and they quickly crossed into Hungary. After crossing, word spread that the Hungarian police were ahead of them, so they hid in the surrounding trees. On the way, they meet a trafficker who took them to Budapest for $200. Once in Budapest From Budapest, Salma’s family took a train to Vienna, Austria. They then boarded another train and finally made it to Germany. When they arrived, Salma said “Everything that happened to us will put behind us. This is a new life for my children and for me,” (Salma’s Story: One Refugee Family’s Journey From Syria to Germany). The journey was over 1500 miles, crossed through five different countries, and the whole trip cost approximately $14200 (Salma’s Story: One Refugee Family’s Journey From Syria to Germany).

With a faulty economy and climbing unemployment rates in Nigeria, Andrew (real name withheld) decided it was time to join his parents in Germany. His parents would disapprove of him migrating to Germany, so he traveled in secret. He paid an “agent” (shady middlemen that pay smugglers to traffic people) $1750 to get him from Nigeria to Europe. Andrew was stuffed into a bus with 21 other immigrants wishing for a better life. They drove from southern Nigeria to the capital, then from there, they kept driving north towards Abuja. The bus stopped a few times at different government checkpoints, and they were able to pass through. In Abuja, they switched from the bus to cars, and later to motorcycles. The guards took a bribe from each migrant, and they let them pass into Niger. Throughout the journey, smugglers do roll calls to make sure everyone who was with them has paid. The first roll call was done in southern Niger, and everybody was accounted for. Andrew’s group then made their way to Agadez and stayed in a safe house with appalling conditions. Meals were infrequent, and the migrant slept on the ground outside while they were there. Migrants were packed onto the back of trucks with extra fuel to not be able to stop. At the border between Niger and Libya, the guards again demanded a $7 from each migrant, if they didn’t pay, the migrants would get beaten then allowed to pass through. While driving, bones and skeletons could be seen in the sand, and if someone fell off, they would be left behind. Once Andrew’s group made it into Libya, being on the roll call became a matter of life or death. In Libya, if the “agent” doesn’t pay for passage to Europe, migrants are tortured and either has their family pay a random or get sold into slavery. In Andrew’s case, his “agent” paid for him to reach Libya, but not Europe. For Andrew, “The first lashes of a thick rubber water hose landed on his sore feet and back after his limbs were chained. To frighten him even more—and offer a taste of what was to come—the smugglers began flogging other duped migrants who had been detained for much longer. The message was simple: pay up or this will be your fate.” (The Harrowing, Step-by-Step Story of a Migrant’s Journey to Europe). Andrew’s brother and girlfriend were unable to get the $2500 ransom, so Andrew was forced to contact his parents. They paid off his $2500 ransom and Andrew was allowed to cross the Mediterranean. Andrew and other migrants were loaded into an empty oil tanker and taken to a camp on the Libyan coast. The camp had around five-hundred other migrants patiently waiting for the right time to cross the Mediterranean. The best time to cross the Mediterranean in July and August, but Andrew arrived in March. Andrew ended up waiting on the Libyan coast for six months. Once the time was right, one hundred migrants crowded into three small boats, their survival depending on a migrant that given a compass, a satellite phone, and taught how to use the motor for the boat. This migrant was told to dial an emergency number to contact the Italian coast guard once they weren’t in Libyan waters. Andrew and the other migrants were escorted by armed Libyan militants to avoid being harassed by the Libyan coast guard. The migrants were picked up by the Italian coast guard and brought to centers created to process incoming migrants and refugees. While there, Andrew and other migrants are interviewed, fingerprinted, and photographed so Italy’s government can decide they are eligible for asylum status and international protection. Andrew decided to make his way from Sicily to Carpi, in northern Italy to meet us with his uncle, even though it puts his asylum status at risk. For two years Andrew has been working in his Uncle’s shop waiting for the proper paperwork (The Harrowing, Step-by-Step Story of a Migrant’s Journey to Europe).

The conditions for migrants and refugees vary depending on the route and if the migrant is male or female. Many people take advantage of migrants, whether it be the “agents” who strand migrants to pocket the money they spent to be smuggled into Europe. In Turkey, migrants who get jobs are paid very little and sometimes their pay is not given to them with no way of getting it as migrants lack the funds to fight for their pay. All migrants live in deplorable conditions with very little food, water, and other basic living necessities. Once Eyad Awwadawnan and his family reached Greece they were brought to a camp for refugees, “We thought they would put us in a container or tent, but the camp official pointed to an empty patch of ground and said, “Find a place and make that your house.” I asked an official if it was possible to give us a small tent to protect my 9-month-old sister from summer insects. The answer was shocking: “I am sorry. This is not my decision to make. Good luck.” As if to say, “Who you are to ask for a tent?” (I Have Become Lost Like My Homeland). Beatings and rape are commonplace in migrant camps in northern Africa. The Libyan coast guard actively attacks and sinks rafts with migrants on them. Throughout the trek from Africa to Europe female migrants are victims of rape and sex trafficking. “For some, forced prostitution begins long before arriving in Europe as traffickers promise to fund their trip only to Libya after which the women would have to source for money to refund the traffickers and also pay for the remainder of the trip to Europe. Once in Libya, they are turned over to local madams in brothels and begin working as prostitutes to pay off often large “debts.” But paying the traffickers that got them to Libya is only half the task. The women may also have to pay off the local madam who provides room and board. To make matters worse, traffickers and local madams are known to separately charge double the $1,000 fee migrants typically pay to get from Nigeria to Libya.” (The Harrowing, Step-by-Step Story of a Migrant’s Journey to Europe).

For refugees seeking asylum, the first step is to make their way to immigration center where they will be fingerprinted and uploaded to the EURODAC (European Dactyloscopy) database. This database takes all the fingerprints of refugees from anywhere in the European Union and stores them together. Once the fingerprints are stored safely, officials decide which country the applicant will apply for asylum in as each country has different numbers of refugees they accept. They decide using multiple factors, such as if there are any family in European Union countries, if they entered the country legally or illegally, and if they have a residence permit or visa. While waiting for their application to be reviewed, EU countries are urged to provide free legal assistance and find the refugee work within nine months. European Union countries are also required to provide health care and education. After this the refugee is given a case worker who will determine if the refugee qualifies for asylum. If the application is denied then the refugee can appeal to a judge or is sent back to their country of origin. This process has not worked very well for the European Union due to numerous refugees entering into a few countries, clogging up the system as EU law prohibits refugees from leaving the EU country that they first set foot on.

The European Union’s handling of the recent mass migration has been nothing but disastrous, and has turned member states against each other. The two agreements that regulate refugees and moving between countries are the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin agreement. The Schengen Agreement creates the free borders between the member states of the European Union (Ireland and the United Kingdom are the only exceptions). While the Dublin agreement forces refugees to apply for asylum in the European Union Country that they arrived in. This led to the unintended consequence of most refugees and migrants being stuck in poorer Southern Europe. The ability to move freely between countries but not being able to because of their refugee status is frustrating for migrants and refugees. To add to this, every European Union member state has to agree to reform agreements (The Migration Crisis and the Future of Europe). At a summit of European leaders in June 2018, the President of the European Parliament Antonio Tajani said, “The instability, insecurity, terrorism, poverty, famine and climate change besetting large parts of Africa and the Middle East are the root causes of migration, but EU governments have come around to this too late, engaging essentially in damage-limitation exercises at our borders” (The Migration Crisis Threatens to Destroy the EU. We Must Not Let It). Relations have strained between the countries where migrants first arrive (such as Greece, Italy, and Hungary) and wealthier countries in Northern Europe (Germany, Sweden, and France to name a few) (Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe Explained in Seven Charts). This tension has led talks about migration quotas for each member state breaking down, “As one migration official in Brussels recently commented, “migration has broken the trust lines … coastal countries like Greece, Italy, and Spain do not trust other member states that they will help with arrivals and the main countries of asylum in Europe do not trust the Mediterranean countries that they will register the arrivals”. (All at Sea: Europe’s Crisis of Solidarity on Migration).

To reduce the strain of migrants on Southern Europe and EU relations, the European Union needs to help improve the countries that migrants travel through. The EU has already made a deal with Turkey to fund healthcare and education for refugees in Turkey to stop refugees from migrating into Europe. There are plans to implement a similar deal with North African countries to reduce the amount of migrants dangerously traveling across the Mediterranean (The Migration Crisis Threatens to Destroy the EU. We Must Not Let It). The European Union has also wanted to shift centers to process incoming asylum seekers to countries like Turkey and Libya, that way the responsibility for the migrants is more in the hands of countries like Turkey and Libya rather than southern European countries like Italy (All at Sea: Europe’s Crisis of Solidarity on Migration).

Public opinion generally supports taking in refugees that are fleeing persecution and war, with the median for all European Union members being 77% approving of taking in refugees (Europeans Support Taking in Refugees – but Not EU’s Handling of Issue). However, Hungary is the only country in the Eu that opposes taking in more refugees, at 54%, while only 32% support taking in more refugees (Europeans Support Taking in Refugees – but Not EU’s Handling of Issue). All European Union member countries disapprove of the way that the EU is the refugee crisis. Greece has the highest disapproval with 92%, which makes sense as Greece is one of the countries with the most refugees, the country with the lowest disapproval rating is the Netherlands with 58% (Europeans Support Taking in Refugees – but Not EU’s Handling of Issue).

In conclusion, the European Migrant Crisis, while not talked about as often as other world events, is still an ongoing issue that hasn’t been resolved. The causes of the mass migrations have no end in sight, with more fleeing every day. Refugees and migrants lived in atrocious conditions, with very little to eat and drink. Violence and rape was common, and migrants were often cheated out of their passes through Africa and Europe. Stories from refugees shocked the world at the dangerous journey these migrants took. It exposed the faults in the European Union immigration system and strained the relationships between members of the EU. These countries were unable to compromise and tried to put the burden on the surrounding countries. The refugees and migrants will keep coming, whether European leaders like it or not.

Abstract

Since Cain and Abel, the years have passed peacefully less than the ones with the war in the world. Wars are one of the main reason for immigration. Since people tend to escape from dangerous areas instinctively. When secured areas are not in borders of their own countries, people have to seek asylum from countries which war victims are a border of. What rights these people should have or not is one of the most debated points since the Geneva Convention, the convention focuses on war crimes on civilians. While some people think refugees ought to have equal rights after some acquisitions, some people think the rights they could acquire must be determined, and they can not exceed this border by education or other acquisitions. This paper examines the refugee situation ambidextrously by citing some works made on this topic worldwide. It mostly focuses on the ethical aspect of the issue, also mentions Turkey’s case, which became a crucial social issue after the Syrian civil war(2014), and includes my ideas about the topic.

Who is (not) a refugee? 3

Leon Gordenker explains being a refugee as ‘ Unaccepted where they are, unable to return whence they came.’

Emma Haddad says that it might be easier to ask who a ‘refugee’ is not. What makes a refugee different from other moving individuals are; firstly decision, a refugee does not decide moving, circumstances require, secondly, the aim of moving, while migrants hope for a better life, refugees merely trying to rebuild the life they lost.

The Term of Refugee

Nina Porzucki claims that the first refugees were white protestants and first occurred to stop religious persecution against Protestants in 1682 by Edict of Nantes advocate equality of Catholics and Protestants.

Through history, many local refugee issues were observed, but the most common refugee issue observed after World War I, especially in Germany. Since the creation of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), access to refugee aid has been globalized but has also become more and more stratified. The UNHCR has expanded its activities beyond the frontiers of Europe but has also tailored aid for specific groups. This is because protection work increasingly articulates different modes of classifying refugees. Three modes of ordering are explored here in the Central African case: the right approach, the labour (or developmental) approach and the basic needs (or vulnerability) approach. These modes refer to different regimes of action, different actors of protection and eventually different subjectivities. Each mode of classification, it is argued, is the product of a specific period of the UNHCR’s history. (Glosman, 2017)

Before anything else, the refugees have been left from their roots, as obligatory. They have been left from birthplace, the experiences in there, and their memories. No longer, they have not a house, a job, and a former social environment. They must learn a new language, and take part in a cultural environment. All of them eradicate the feeling of a state of belonging to a community and a culture. The refugees can feel themselves in a space. To shelter is an essential problem for refugees. The adaptation to a new environment is challenging. The refugees can not find a job. The income and social assurance of them are absent. The futures of them are uncertain. The refugees experience many health problems, such as physical, psychological, and social. Psychosocial problems can cause mental disorders, too: Anxiety, depression, adjustment disorder, somatization, paranoid disorders, alcohol-substance abuse. As psychiatrists, we move in this phase. We make an effort to understand them and treat. We have to keep in mind that the success of these will be together sociocultural policy. ( Doğan, 2016)

Refugee Rights

Refugees can apply for asylum. However, even if their asylum application is not approved yet, UNHCR states that the refugees should not only be protected physically but in all other means, which an ordinary citizen is protected, such as the protection of freedom of speech, movement and freedom from torture, which are accepted as the basic human rights granted to all people around the world no matter what their race, colour or religion is. Moreover,refugees also have the right to access schooling, work and medical means of the country they are staying in. If the power of the country in question is not enough to provide the refugees with these means, then the UNHCR will provide the help needed until the refugees come to a point, where they can take care of themselves on their own (UNHCR, 2002).

Criticism of International Refugee Law

A new vision of global refugee law is needed, one that integrates the various diverse frameworks that exist in practice under a coherent and comprehensive conception of what refugee law now is. In rising to this challenge, refugee law scholars must devote effort to overcoming certain conceptual and methodological obstacles inherent in our approach to research. If we are able to do so, then we may find ourselves well placed to make a substantial contribution to the future status and development of not just refugee law but also broader refugee protection dynamics. ( Canter, 2017)

The Future of Refugee Issue

These proposals are centred on challenges to refugee protection in the industrialized world. No one involved in refugee matters can fail to notice the ripple effect, or so-called export value, of every restrictive provision instituted by a western country. A useful study could be done to document the phenomenon; at present, much of the material is anecdotal. The call from an eastern European government is seeking the precise text of the unhappy EU ‘persecution by third parties’ provision, that they might put it in their own legislation. The trip to Europe by a delegation of officials from a country hosting multitudinous Afghans, that they might uncover the key to some countries’ ability to send Afghans back. The citing of the US practice of interdiction when rusty vessels, brimming with Liberians fleeing war and mayhem, are prevented from docking in West Africa. The parallel drawn by an African minister who, confronted with allegations of mass refullment and killings, noted that European governments were permitting refugees to be pushed off boats in the sea and elsewhere to be burnt alive, without facing commissions of enquiry into these atrocities ( Landgren, 1998).

Refugee Policy of Turkey After Syrian Civil War

As Memişoğlu (2017) puts it, The Syrian refugee issue became a global problem due to its international aspects such as security issues and involvement in non- state coercive actions. Memişoğlu argues further the lack of descriptive analysis of the current situation on the issue of asylum-seeking refugees in Turkey at the moment (Memişoğlu, 2017). Although initially, Turkey adopted an ‘open door’ policy towards the Syrian refugees, in 2012 the government announced that it would not accept more than 100,000 Syrians (‘red line’), and began proposing a safe zone in northern Syria, where the refugees would return (Sanchez, 2012). The government has also tried to limit the number of refugees by assisting NGOs within Syria to manage camps for the internally displaced civilians, and by implementing a ‘passage with careful control’ (İçduygu, 2015, p. 7) to limit the entrance of individuals from some ethnic, religious, and ideological backgrounds. These measures, however, had little effect on the continuous inflow of refugees. The local population has also become increasingly discontent with the refugees’ presence (Ferris, 2016): some blamed them for the increase in housing prices (Sak, 2014), the rise in unemployment, competition with local businesses (Çetingüleç, 2014; Güler, 2014), and even for social ills such as thefts, murders, smuggling, and prostitution (Erdoğan, 2015). The ethnic makeup of the host communities to a large extent predicts their attitudes towards the refugees: for example, areas in Hatay with predominantly Turkish-Alawite population (related to the Syrian Alawites) strongly opposed the settling of Sunni Syrians in their areas. ‬(Getmansky, 2019)

Conclusions

The refugee issue is one of the most urgent social problems in societies. Refugees may be classified according to why they seek asylum into six subcategories which are anticipating, semi, impelled, war, expellees and ex-champ inmate refugees. (Mesic, 1995) And climate refugees a new type refugee a natural result of the climate crisis. Refuge problem will be a permanent issue of humanity. Since people will not stop to damage nature and themselves. Today, refugees annoy mostly western countries, they lead to wars and crisis worldwide, and westerns do not have any difficulties in their secured areas. Refugees in their borders are signal of an earthquake for their comfort zones. Thus, they finance countries such as Turkey to keep refugees out of their countries. For instance, EU and USA convinced Turkey to host Syrian refugees on the condition that they would finance Turkey. Turkey could not have to manage refugee policy successfully since the government preferred to apply temporary solutions instead of permanent ones.

A refugee is human, and no human is illegal, so authorities guaranteeing their bright future do not have the right to determine the rights of the others, refugees, women, and homosexuals. Refugees should have to the same rights with a typical citizen of the secured country regardless of her ethnicity as long as she proves that she did not commit a crime against humanity or other lives and nature. Moreover, if she commits a crime while she is judged, she must have an equal right of defence as a collective world citizen.

REFERENCES

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3. Gardenler, L. (1987).Refugees in International Politics( Beckenham: Croom Helm),p.213
4. Getmonsky, A.(2019). Refugees, geography and foreign policy preferences in Turkey. Journal of Political Geography,74.
5. Glasman, J.(2017). The beginning of international refugee protection. Journal of Refugee Studies,30/2, 337-362
6. Haddad, E. (2008). The Refugees in International Society: Between Sovereigns. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 27. https://www.refworld.org/publisher,UNHCR,,MEX,,,0.html. Protecting refugees(01. February 2002)
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Introduction

Hanna Arendt conceptualized statelessness soon after the Second World War. In her concept she drew attention to the notion that “statelessness” first necessitates a pre-existing state that does not acknowledge a person as its member. Statelessness as a political phenomenon can emerge through the creation of the state. After the WWII borders were redrawn, several states disappeared, thus millions lost their home and their country of origin. At that point though, the terms of refugees and stateless persons were not clarified. [1: Hanna Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, (New York: Harcourt, Brase Company, 1951), 267] [2: Laura Van Waas, Nationality Matters: Statelessness Under International Law, School of Human Rights Research Series, vol. 29 (The Netherlands: School of Human Rights, 2008), http://www.institutesi.org/Nationality_Matters.pdf, accessed 22 April 2019]

This paper aims to analyse the notion of statelessness. It overviews the definition of statelessness, describes the causes and consequences of being a stateless person. It also examines international and regional instruments on statelessness and refugees, then it concentrates on the legal situation of stateless individuals and refugees in the Middle East, highlighting the special situation of asylum seeking Syrian Kurds in Lebanon and Jordan.

Causes of Statelessness

Many causes can result in statelessness of a person. It can happen with the formation of new states or changing of borders. During these changes a specific group or groups are being left out of the members of the new nation. For instance, after the disruption of the Soviet Union many people became stateless due to border changes in Central Asia and Europe. Owing to the creation of the Sate of Israel and the war between the Israelis and the Arabs, incredible amount of Palestinians turned into stateless in the Middle East. [3: Ibid] [4: Susan M. Akram, The Search for protection for Stateless Refugees in the Middle East: Palestinians and Kurds in Lebanon and Jordan, International Journal of Refugee Law, 2018 30 (3) 411-443, 411]

Nationality can be acquired through three legal ways: States in which the jus soli law principle are applied nationality can be obtained through birth on the territory of the country. According to jus sanguinis the nationality can be acquired only through descent. In that case statelessness is passed on to children, thus, multiple generations can be confined into the status of statelessness. In several countries it is not possible for the parent to pass on nationality to the child, therefore, it can happen that if a child is born in a foreign country, then she or he might become stateless. If a child at birth is not registered, she or he can be also stateless, as she or he has no any proof of where she/he was born or what her/his parents’ nationalities are. Gender based discriminatory laws can also lead to statelessness. In several states women cannot pass their nationality to their children. In that cases statelessness is a result of gender based discrimination. The third possible way to acquire nationality is jus domicilii, by way of naturalisation. [5: Zahra Albarazi, The Stateless Syrians, Report of the Middle East and North Africa, Nationality and Stateless Research Project, May 2013, 13] [6: Ibid 14 ] [7: Susan Akram and Terry Rempel, Temporary Protection as an Instrument for Implementing the Right of Return for Palestinian Refugees, Boston University International Law Journal, (1 Spring 2004), http://www.bu.edu/law/journals-archive/international/volume22n1/documents/1-162.pdf, accessed 22 April 2019] [8: Albarazi, 7] [9: Albarazi, 10]

Consequences of statelessness

Statelessness has serious consequences for the person who is affected. As without citizenship she/he does not possess legal protection from any State. Her/his basic human rights are not taking into account, therefore, she/he is more vulnerable for abuse. as they can easily be exploited physically or sexually, and they can be victims of human trafficking. As children do not have evidence of their true age, they are even more subject to exploitation. Without valid identity documents freedom of movement is seriously restricted. Stateless persons without citizenship cannot access health care, education, or property rights, they suffer from social exclusion, and restricted from travelling freely. They do no have the right to vote, buying properties, sign contracts or participate in political activities. They are often faced forced displacement, as they do not possess the required documents for staying in a state. There status is similar to illegal immigrants, they risk detention constantly. [10: Thomas McGee, The Stateless Kurds of Syria, Ethnic Identity and National I.D, Tilburg Law Review 19 (2014) 171-181, https://www.academia.edu/5677728/The_Stateless_Kurds_of_Syria_Ethnic_Identity_and_National_I.D, accessed 19 April 2019] [11: McGee, 172]

International treaties on refugees and statelessness

The UN does not give a universal definition both for refugee and stateless person, and their rights to protection. In 1948, after the Second World War the UN adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). This document includes the right to seek and enjoy asylum, the prohibition of depriving a person from her or his nationality, and the right to leave and return to one’s country. In 1949 ECOSOC created a Study of Statelessness that suggested a treaty concerning the rights of both refugees and stateless persons. Though Member States did not agree in distinguishing issues concerning refugees from stateless persons. In 1951 the Convention adopted the Status of Refugees. The Convention includes group and individualized definition of refugees. The individualized definition in the Refugee Convention’s article 1A(2) concerns such persons who have a nationality and also those who are stateless. ECOSOC’s Study differentiate two types of stateless persons. Persons who are refugees as well, and persons who are not refugees but stateless. The Study states that de jure stateless persons are those who ‘are not nationals of any state, either because at birth or subsequently lost their own nationality and did not acquire a new one’. De facto stateless persons are those, according to the Study, who “have left their country of nationality, (and) no longer the protection and assistance of their national authorities’ for whatever reason”. [12: Akram, 412] [13: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (adopted 10 December 1948 (UNGA res 217 A(III) arts 13-15., UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3712c.html [accessed 23 April 2019] ] [14: UN Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons, ‘A Study of Statelessness, UN doc E/1112, E/1112 Add. 1, (1 August 1949) (A Study of Statelessness), https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae68c2d0.html [accessed 22 April 2019] ] [15: ‘UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, UN doc A/CONF.2/SR.19 (November 1951), https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae68cda4.html [accessed 22 April 2019] ] [16: Ibid] [17: Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954), 189 UNTS 137 (Refugee Convention), https://www.refworld.org/docid/3be01b964.html [accessed 20 April 2019] ] [18: Refugee Convention, 1A(2)] [19: A Study of Statelessness 8-9. ]

A refugee is not stateless, by definition, though, a refugee also lacks the protection of a State. A refugee encounters similar political and social disadvantages as a stateless person.

The UN passed a Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons in 1954. This Convention deals with those persons who are stateless but not refugees. According to the Convention a stateless individual is ‘A person who is not considered as a national by any States under the operation of its laws’. [20: Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (adopted 28 September 1954, entered into force 6 June 1960) 360 UNTS 117 (Stateless Persons Convention) art 1. https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3840.html [accessed 21 April 2019] ] [21: Ibid]

The definition of the Convention is regarded customary international law. The same rights should be guaranteed by the host State as for refugees. The Convention does not include a non-refoulement provision, therefore a stateless person is not guaranteed with a right to enter a State, and stateless persons are allowed only ‘lawfully staying’ in the territory of the State. It is also not a prerequisite that a State would issue identity documents to all stateless individuals in its territory who do not possess valid papers. The Convention only requires that a State should provide travel documents. [22: Akram, 412] [23: Stateless Persons Conventions arts 15, 17, 19] [24: Ibid art 27] [25: Ibid art 28]

In 1961, the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness was adopted. This convention incorporates provisions on the prevention and reduction of statelessness. The Final Act of the Convention of 1961 requires that a ‘persons who are stateless de facto should as far possible treated as de jure’ in order to hold a nationality. Article 11 requires the establishment of an organ that is responsible for determining a person’s status as stateless. In 1974 UNHCR was mandated by the General Assembly to be this body. [26: Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (adopted 4 December 1954, entered into force 30 August 1961) 989 UNTS 175 (Reduction of Statelessness Convention), https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b39620.html [accessed 18 April 201] [27: Final Act of the UN Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness’ UN doc A/CONF.9/14 and Add.1 (29 August 1961), https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6af970.html [accessed 24 April 2019] ] [28: UN General Assembly, Question of the establishment, in accordance with the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, of a body to which persons claiming the benefit of the Convention may apply, 10 December 1974, A/RES/3274(XXIX), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f17723.html [accessed 20 April 2019] ]

Stateless refugees: the example of Syrian Kurds

A stateless person who is also a refugee, makes her or him more vulnerable. The miseries of stateless refugees are doubled. The host States do not recognize them as refugees nor as stateless. The status of Syrian Kurds is a clear example for this phenomenon.

The 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1954 Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons as well as the 1961 Convention on the Reduction on Statelessness have not been ratified by most countries in the Middle East. Some regional documents on the protection of refugees exist, but most of them breached or disregarded. Several countries do not apply any domestic law governing the status of stateless persons or refugees, instead ad hoc policies are applied.[29: Akram, 414] [30: Ibid, 416]

The estimated population of the Kurds is around twenty-two million people around the world. The Kurds are one of the largest ethnic groups in the Middle East. Their population is spread along Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey, and in some parts of the former Soviet Union. [31: Albarazi 13] [32: IbidFor ajanib who have silable at: nal Law, less KurdsInternationaliduals and refugees in the Middle East, highlighting the special]

In the seventh century Kurdistan was conquered by Muslim Arabs. Most part of the Kurdish territory fell under Ottoman rule in the 16th century. To get rid of the foreign restraint, Kurds supported the Allies in order to regain independence from the Ottoman Empire. In the Treaty of Sevres of 1920 the Allies included a provision for n independent Kurdistan, but Turkey did not agree to sign. After WWI the Kurdish population were split into four countries, Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey. In all of these countries Kurds suffered severe discrimination. [33: Ibid, 14]

Kurds comprises about 2 million ethnic minorities in Syria. 300 000 of these 2 million were already stateless long before the civil war. [34: Zahra Albarazi and Laura van Waas, ‘Statelessness and Displacement Scoping Paper’ Norwegian Refugee Council, http://www.institutesi.org/stateless_displacement.pdf, 15 April 2019]

In Syria Kurds were not discriminated during the French Mandate and could fill important employment positions until 1944. After its independence Syria began to proclaim a strong Arab nationalism. Owing to this Arab nationalistic attitude the non-Arab Kurds were excluded from getting nationality status automatically. Kurds suffered not just political but also cultural suppression. [35: Akram, 422] [36: Akram, 423] [37: Albarazi, 17] [38: Chatty Dawn, Displacement and Dispossession in the Middle East, (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 271-73]

The census of 1960

In 1960 Syria organized a census in the al-Hasaka region. Syria’s aim with the census was to decrease the amount of Kurds who claim Syrian citizenship. The census determined three categories of people. Those who could documented their residency in Syria before 1945, those whose proof of residency prior to 1945 were not sufficient, and those who could not be present in the census or whose presence was not recorded. [39: Albarazi, 7-10] [40: Ibid]

The first category of people became “Syrian nationals”, the second were considered foreigners (ajanib), and the third were regarded “illegal residents” (maktoumeen). 120 000 Kurds, 20 per cent of the Kurdish population of Syria were bereaved from their citizenship in a day. The majority Syrian Kurds became stateless. Many of the denationalized Kurds fled to Lebanon when the civil war broke out in Syria. [42: Ibid, 14]

In Syria nationality can be passed with the jus sanguiinis law, but children of denationalized Kurds born in Syria have not been granted to citizenship. Another constraint of the application of jus sanguiinis in Syria is based on gender discrimination: only father can pass Syrian nationality to their children born outside Syria (except when the father is unknown). In 2011 at the beginning of the Syrian uprising the government adopted a Presidential Decree no 49. The Decree stated that Syrian nationality would be granted to foreigners (ajanib) in al-Hasaka province. 37 000 ajanib Kurds had claimed Syrian citizenship, but still about 300 000 ajanib and maktoumeen could not become citizens.

The maktoumeen and ajanib are de jure stateless. For ajanib who have citizenship de jure on paper but not in practice, the problem is the de facto statelessness. [46: Akram, 423]

In the case of the Kurds the cause of their statelessness is relating to discriminatory legislations, state successions, and the conflict of laws between the host States and the Sates of origin. Though Syrian Kurds fled to several countries across the globe, in Lebanon and Syrian Kurd stateless refugees can be found in great numbers. Lebanon and Jordan are not part of the 1952 Refugee Convention/1967 Protocol or the 1954 Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention. They are are reluctant to sign international treaties regarding stateless persons and refugees. The reason for that can be traced back to the Palestinian displacement and the formation of the State of Israel. [47: Akram, 424] [48: Ibid] [49: Akram, 428]

Neither of these countries apply the jus soli law. It means that a child cannot acquire citizenship automatically. Therefore, for Kurd stateless refugees it is almost impossible to get child and school certificates, travel documents, when they are trying to get naturalization. Without documents they remain limbo in third States which try to send them back to a country from where they cannot prove persecution and can get a refugee status due to the fact that they are not eligible to return again. [50: Albarazi, 21] [51: Laura Van Wass, The Situation of Stateless Persons in the Middle East and Africa, UNHCR Oct 20109, 3, 17), https://www.refworld.org/docid/4cea28072.html [accessed 17 April 2019] ]

The role of UNHCR and regional instruments in the Middle East

UNHCR is the only agency for protection of non-Palestinian stateless persons and refugees in the Middle East countries like Jordan and Lebanon. UNHCR can help in a resettlement procedure within an exact time frame. If resettlement is not possible, the protection of UNHCR does not mean much, as UNHCR has no legal status. [52: Ibid] [53: Akram 438]

According to the definition of asylum seekers in the Lebanese judiciary system an asylum seeker is a person who seeks asylum in a country other than Lebanon. Refugees are granted to stay temporary in the territory of Lebanon seeking resettlement in third States by UNHCR. For refugees other than Palestinians, like Kurds, Lebanon establishes a temporary status that must be renewed. [54: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Country Operations Plan 2004 – Lebanon, 1 September 2003, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3fd9c6a14.html [accessed 22 April 2019] ] [55: Akram, 429]

In Jordan asylum seekers can stay for maximum six months. During that period UNHCR must resettle them in a third country. Though Jordan is not part to the Refugee Convention but respects non-refoulement, non-discrimination, and several other rights of refugees if they register with UNHCR. Though most stateless Kurd are unable to secure resettlement. [56: Akram, 430] [57: McGee, 6]

The Arab League (LAS) aimed to form a regional system of human rights. On 24 May 2004 a revised Arab charter on Human Rights was adopted. This second Arab Charter entered into force in 2008. Lebanon and Jordan ratified this charter as well. It guarantees for every person the right to a nationality, the right to acquire another nationality, the right to seek political asylum from persecution, the right to freedom of movement. [58: League of Arab States, Charter of Arab League, 22 March 1945, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3ab18.html [accessed 20 April 2019]] [59: League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights, (22 May 2004, entered into force 15 March 2008), https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38540.html [accessed 20 April 2019]

In 2017, the Arab League held a conference on “Arab States on Good Practices and Regional Opportunities to Strengthen Women’s Nationality Rights’. The result of the conference was a declaration which called on Arab states to secure the rights of all refugees and stateless children to gain a nationality, and to reform their nationality laws granting equal nationality rights for women and men. [60: ‘The First Arab Conference on Good Practices and Regional Opportunities to Strengthen Women’s Nationality Rights’ League of Arab States Secretariat General (1-2 October 2017), https://www.refworld.org/docid/5a256c4a4.html [accessed 20 April 2019] ]

Conclusion

Stateless refugees face insurmountable difficulties gaining nationality. Several Middle Eastern States are reluctant to sign international treaties on statelessness and refugees. As several Arab States are reluctant to ratify the Refugee and Statelessness Convention, international treaties and regional agreements together can help gain more rights for refugees and stateless persons in the Middle East than either international treaties or regional agreements alone. [61: Akram, 443]

Lebanon and Jordan predominantly respect the non-refoulement principle for refugees facing inhuman treatment, though temporary protection is not a robust protection for Kurd stateless refugees. Though Lebanon and Jordan allow Kurds to enter their States and basic services from humanitarian organizations are secured, but it is attached to renewal status. UNHCR does not have the legal basis to issue documents to register individuals as stateless after a statelessness determination, as it can register refugees following a refugee status determination. Statelessness could be reduced significantly introducing such procedure. A similar registration would help defeat the tension between de jure and de facto statelessness.[62: Ibid] [63: Van Waas, 9]

Bibliography

1. Albarazi, Zahra. The Stateless Syrians, Report of the Middle East and North Africa, Nationality and Stateless Research Project, May 2013, https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/52a983124.pdf, Accessed 19 April 2019
2. Akram, Susan, M. The Search for protection for Stateless Refugees in the Middle East: Palestinians and Kurds in Lebanon and Jordan, International Journal of Refugee Law, 2018 30 (3) 411-443
3. Akram, Susan and Rempel Terry. Temporary Protection as an Instrument for Implementing the Right of Return for Palestinian Refugees, Boston University International Law Journal, (1 Spring 2004), http://www.bu.edu/law/journals-archive/international/volume22n1/documents/1-162.pdf, accessed 22 April 2019
4. Albarazi, Zahra and van Waas, Laura. ‘Statelessness and Displacement Scoping Paper’ Norwegian Refugee Council, http://www.institutesi.org/stateless_displacement.pdf, 15 April 2019
5. Arendt, Hanna. The Origins of Totalitarianism, (New York: Harcourt, Brase Company, 1951)
6. Dawn, Chatty. Displacement and Dispossession in the Middle East, (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 271-73
7. http://www.institutesi.org/Nationality_Matters.pdf
8. McGee, Thomas. The Stateless Kurds of Syria, Ethnic Identity and National I.D, Tilburg Law Review 19 (2014) 171-181, https://www.academia.edu/5677728/The_Stateless_Kurds_of_Syria_Ethnic_Identity_and_National_I.D,
9. Van Waas, Laura. Nationality Matters: Statelessness Under International Law, School of Human Rights Research Series, vol. 29 (The Netherlands: School of Human Rights, 2008), http://www.institutesi.org/Nationality_Matters.pdf, accessed 22 April 2019
10. Van Waas, Laura. The Situation of Stateless Persons in the Middle East and Africa, UNHCR Oct 2010) https://www.refworld.org/docid/4cea28072.html [accessed 17 April 2019]

The Kuwait Conflict (1991)

Since 1896, the relationship between Iraq and Kuwait has experienced a series of conflicts that has not been appropriately solved. The conflicts acted as factors in the 1990 invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. The conflict has its roots in the Mubarak Al-Sabah’s ascension to the throne, an action that was facilitated by a termination of his two brothers, Jarrah and Mohamed. The family and followers of the two murdered brothers took refuge in Basra but proved to be a threat to the ruling Al-Sabah. This forced him to sign an agreement for protection with the British Government in 1899. Although the supporters and family of the late brothers have launched several attacks since then, they have never actually had a break through because the British government has always been there to support the Kuwait government. Kuwait has experienced attacks in 1901, 1902, 1938, 1961 and the recent attack in 1990 (El-Najjar, Chapter 6).

Prior to the Iraqi invasion of 1990, the Iraqi Kurds had been fighting for a meaningful autonomy and self governance. 4 million Kurds who inhabited Iraq just after independence had engaged the government into revolts that never had an end. Desperate to stay in power, the Ba’ath Party extended some self governance powers tot the Kurds but were cautious not to offer them dominion over the oil rich regions which were rightfully Kurdish lands. The Kurds were confined to Erbil, Suleimaniyeh and Dohuk which was just half the lands that belonged to the Kurds. At the same time, the Ba’ath Party embarked on the process of ensuring that the oil rich regions of Kirkuk and Khanakin were Arabic. This was achieved by the eviction of Kurdish inhabitants and settling of poor Arabs from the southern regions. In 1974, under the support of the United States, Israel and Iran, the Kurds embarked on another revolt under the rule of Mulah Mustafa Barzani. In 1975, the revolt was brought to an end after agreement on the border between Iraq and Iran was reached. As an aftermath, thousands and thousands of Barzani tribesmen were forcibly relocated to the southern region of Iraq which was barren and situated deep into the desert (Barbara, 1996).

In the late 70s, the Kurdish population in Iraq experienced another attack from the regime. Hundreds of thousands of Kurdish inhabitants at the borders of Iraq and Turkey and Iraq and Iran had their villages destroyed completely. The victims were forcibly taken to settlement camps in that were crudely prepared for them in regions that were under army control. They were not supposed to move back to their original homes. In the mean time, the Iraqi government continued to “Arabize” the oil rich northern regions. This continued till the 1990 conflict (Barbara, 1996).

The Faili Kurds are among the groups of people that have experienced the test of bitterness from the Iraqi government. Most of them being inhabitants of urban centers in the southern and central regions of Iraq especially in Baghdad, about 130,000 of them were forcibly deported by the Iraqi government to Iran claiming that they were not Iraqi citizens. In real terms, they were being deported because they were not loyal to the government (Human Rights Watch, 1993).

In addition to the above mentioned, the Iraqi government had reduced the garrisons in the Kurdistan regions were reduced or abandoned. Most of the army soldiers that had been deployed in the region were removed. This resulted into a better life for the Kurdish inhabitants who were referred to as the Peshmerga which translates to ‘those who face death.’ They thrived once again. Under Barzani’s son, Mas’oud, they formed an alliance that helped the Iranian government to capture Haj Omran, one of the border towns. The response from Iraq was swift; Iraqi troops attacked the Barzani settlements and took with them between 5000 and 8000 young men aged 12 and above who, up to this moment, have never been found. It is said they were killed. Later, under the increased collaboration between the Kurdish guerrillas and the Iranian government, the Iraqi government launched the anfal campaign by using a chemical weapon that left 5000 Kurds dead while another population of between 50,000 and 200,000 Kurds were killed during the operation. About 3000 Kurdish habitations were destroyed. The rest, about 500,000 people were relocated forcibly to mountain regions and others into concentration camps (human Rights Watch, 1993).

Immediately after the war in Kuwait, the inexperienced and disorganized Kurds launched revolts against the Iraqi Government. They wrongly thought that eth Iraqi government would collapse soon and that they would get protection from the US in case of trouble. This was a miscalculation as the government of Iraq launched attacks that left most of the Kurds for refugees. On the other part, the Shi’a in the Southern parts of Iraq also launched an uprising. With their life styles completely based on rivers Tigress and Euphrates, the Marsh Arabs would not survive without the waters. This acted as the weapon for the Iraqi government. They diverted the waters of the two rivers subjecting the Shi’a Arabs into water prone diseases like cholera and diarrhea. This was, according to the Iraqi government, a punishment for supporting rebels who were against the government. Furthermore, the Shi’as were subjected to arrests, detentions, military operations, tortures and summary executions. In 1999, their leader and spokes person Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al Sadr was assassinated. This again resulted into more riots and arrests and summary executions. Houses were burnt villages destroyed as a form of punishment for those villages that were labeled rebellious. It is estimated that the tribulations against the Shi’a Arabs persisted until 2001. Reports by Amnesty International also point out that the population of Shi’a Arabs has since reduced from 250,000 to 40,000 since 1991 to 2003 (Amnesty International; Human rights Watch, 2003).

During the retaliation by the Iraqi government, most of the Kurd refugees had to run for shelter in the neighboring countries. On its part, Iran welcomed the fleeing refugees. However, Turkey closed its borders purporting that welcoming refugees would cause a destabilization of the country. This left hundreds of thousands in the cold mountains that were inhospitable. The international community reacted very slowly and reluctantly. They failed to order Turkey to open up the border for the Iraqi Kurds. It was later that the Turkish government proposed for safe haven for the Kurds in the Northern regions of Iraq. To be precise, more than 400,000 refugees were denied entry on the Turkish frontier while Iran took up about 1.4 million refugees.

Basing on the great overflow of refugees within the country and in neighboring States, and the Turkish government’s refusal to offer refuge to the Kurd refugees, it is estimated that about 1000 refugees died every day from the harsh weather conditions and lack of humanitarian support. The UN had to come up with solutions that would solve the problem. As a result, they came up with resolution 688 that ordered for the stoppage of repression by the Iraqi government and also to allow the humanitarian organizations to offer aid to the refugees. It also called upon the neighboring countries to assist in the humanitarian activities (Human Rights Watch, 2003). The Kurdish refugees were also offered a safe zone in the northern parts of Iraq where the US, UK and France banned the Iraqi government from deploying any of its aircrafts to that area.

Rwandan genocide

Several factors led to the Rwandan genocide. According to African scholars, one of the greatest causes was the ethnic grouping of the Rwandan population into two ethnicities, the majority Hutus and the minority Tutsi ethnicities. These divisions were laid by the Belgians during colonization period (Lang, p. 4). Studies show that the Belgians introduced and constructed the ethnic identities and aligned themselves with the Tutsi minority who wanted to remain on the helm of power. During the 40s and fifties, the Hutus were agitated by the spirit that swept the African continent; the spirit of democratization and decolonization. The Hutus wanted to participate in the process of governance. This triggered the on set of the conflict. The Tutsi could only suppress the majority Hutus with the help of the Belgians. Unfortunately the Belgians had to leave. As a strategy, they hand picked their allies and put them in leadership positions. Come the year 1962, Rwanda was an independent nation with a government that was a majority Hutu. The elites who also controlled the most of the decision making processes were Hutus. The first president Gregoire Kayibanda and the second president Juvenal Habyarimana were both Hutus.

Under the second president, Hutus formed the elite that formed intricate systems that assisted them to stick to power and access political and social benefits. The Tutsis felt that the Hutus blocked democracy and infringed human rights. This caused the Tutsis to flee to Rwanda before coming back from the North in a revolt as Rwandan Patriotic Front under Paul Kagame. The war eventually came to an end in 1993 after the Arusha cord was signed.

According to Lang (p. 11) it was this accord that let hell break lose. He points out that the peace accord was signed with an international guarantee that was not seriously observed. This leads to serious consequences when the accord breaks down. Jones therefore points out that trouble erupted when the implementation of the Arusha accord failed. The accord proposed that a neutral force be deployed in Rwanda to maintain peace. The United Nations estimated that 7000 to 8000 peacekeepers would be adequate. However, the Security Council knew that they could not deploy such a large peacekeeping force to Rwanda. This shows that while the United Nations took part in the Arusha accords, they failed to honor the accord by failing to provide the appropriate number of peace keepers in Rwanda.

Melvern (p. 31) identifies another failure of the United Nations in terms of the than secretary General, Boutros-Ghali. According to the investigative journalist, Egypt had been supplying small arms to Rwanda. These very arms were used as weapons during the genocide. She points out that it was Ghali who intervened into a deal to supply the small weapons after the contract seemed to be heading on the wrong side. This means that Boutros-Ghali the then Secretary General of the United Nations had pushed for a contract to supply small arms to Rwanda by Egypt.

Several institutions and nations have been accused of laxity in the prevention of the Rwandan genocide. Among the accused are the United States, the former colonizers especially France and the United Nations. On its part, the United Nations has been the most criticized by critiques. This is because the United Nations has the responsibility of maintaining and keeping international peace and security. Failure to achieve this in Rwanda therefore leaves all critiques pointing their fingers at the organization.

The structural functions of the United Nations mandates that the security Council is the only arm of the united Nations that can order deployment of peacekeeping forces to a region and that the authority to mandate such missions lies only in the same arm of the United Nations. After the Security Council has decided to embark on a peace keeping mission, it is the responsibility of the Secretariat to provide adequate information and analysis that will facilitate the activity. Finally, the General assembly funds the operation. This complex interrelationship between the different arms of the United Nations is blamed for having caused the genocide in Rwanda. It was from such complicated structural formations that critiques believe the Secretariat failed to offer appropriate information to the Security Council and thus fueled the Rwanda genocide (Melvern, p.111). A good example is the way the Secretariat refused to report to the Security Council the fact that what was actually happening in Rwanda was an ethnic cleansing. They maintained that it was a civil war and thus the UN was not supposed to take part.

Barnett (pg.6) further points out the weakness of the UN in terms of the Secretariat’s culture of decision making. He points out that the Secretariat decides on what amount of information the member states should know about an affair. In the Rwandan case, Brigadier-general Dallaire sent a telegram to the UN headquarters asking informing them that an informer had pointed out that the Hutu dominated government had collected enough weapons and were planning for a mass slaughter of the Tutsis. He wanted the mandate to confisticate the weapons and also protect the informant but the UN headquarters refused to give him the mandate to do so. This decision was justified within the specifications and operations of the UN peacekeeping. This is also cited as a weakness.

During such crises, it is normal for humanitarian agencies to work hard in the assistance of the victims of the war. This was the case in Rwanda. Unfortunately, the agencies were faced by a great dilemma in terms of their moral responsibility. According to the ethics, it is expected that the humanitarian organizations offer assistance without any conditions and to who ever and wherever need be. According to specifications of the humanitarian agencies, the responsibility of the wellbeing and safety of citizens is solely on the respective governments. The humanitarian agencies only come in when the governments have failed to or are unwilling to shoulder this responsibility. In the Rwandan case, most of the refugees in the Zairian camps were themselves the perpetrators of the violence. In addition, the refugee camps acted as sanctuaries and also places where recruitment took place for the Hutus. It was therefore the responsibility of the Zairian government or the United Nations to ensure that they disarmed the camp dwellers. On the other part, it was the humanitarian agencies that were responsible for the existence of these camps. Without them, the camps would not be there. As a result, some agencies left an example was the medicins sans frontier. Others remained and continued assisting the refugees. Eventually, the Rwandan army attacked the camps and killed even more people (Schweizer, p. 549).

The soviet-afghan war

Before the 18^th Century, Afghanistan was a region prone by invasions and attacks from India’s Moghuls and the Safavids of Persia. It was until the 18^th Century that the Pashtuns had gathered enough power to govern themselves. During the same period, the Durrani got authority over their homeland regions around Kandahar. Under Ahmad Shah Durrani, they formed an empire that was second to the Ottoman and which was Muslim oriented. After his death, the empire experienced a series of revolts from tribal chiefs that eventually forced Shah’s son to move to Kabul from Kandahar making it the capital.

When Shah’s grand son Zaman took over from his father, he wanted to establish power over India which was already under the British interest. This made the British approach the Shah of Persia to threaten Zaman’s empire from the west so that his attention is diverted from India. To achieve this, the Shah equipped Zaman’s brother and made him take over Kandahar. And later proceeded to Kabul where he captured his brother, blinded him and sent him to jail. The region continued with wars between tribes and chiefs until after the Second World War when Abdurrahman Khan took power in Kabul and gained control on almost all parts of the modern Afghanistan.

Abdurrahman was interested in the creation of a single unified kingdom. O achieve this, he had to end the rule of tribal chiefs. He did this by forcibly moving unfriendly Pashtuns to non Pashtun regions in the North. To further cause divisions in the tribes, he formed provincial governorships within the kingdom. These boundaries were not in coincidence with the tribal settlements. It was during this reign that the modern Afghan boundaries were formed. The boundary between Afghanistan and the British India were formed in 1893 which are currently the Afghanistan-Pakistan boundaries. They were called the Durand line and were formed to mark the regions of interest between the India and Afghanistan.

It was the interest of Russia in Afghanistan that caused pressure on British India to develop interests in Afghanistan. The British were interested in establishing power in India and the greatest threat to achieving this did not lie within the disjointed afghans nor did it lie in the French but it was viewed to come from Russia who were expanding their empire from the North. On its part, Russia was interested in accessing the warm waters of the Indian Ocean and the only way through which they would achieve this was through India. However, they would not reach India without passing through Afghanistan. They, therefore, had to conquer this nation that impeded their movement. To be precise, the British did not have any interest in Afghanistan. They only engaged a battle for Afghanistan after discovering that the Russians were moving closer to their region. On their part, the Russians did not have interest in Afghanistan either. It only happened that the Nation was on their way to the warm waters.

During the First World War, Afghanistan was none aligned. It remained neutral throughout the war. The years that followed were marked by struggle to modernize the nation. These were years after the Anglo-Afghan war which resulted in a treaty that marked the independence of Afghanistan in 1919. Several institutional reforms were undertaken. This included the reforms in the education sector. In 1921 the Afghans signed a treaty of friendship with the Bolshevik. The institutional reforms infuriated Muslim leaders who organized revolts which overthrew Amanullah. The forty years that followed were marked by relative calm before a constitution was drafted in 1931 that shared power between the monarchy, religious leaders and encouraged free enterprise fro citizens. This facilitated economic development.

In 1933, the 19 year old Zahir overthrew Nadir Shah and was crowned king. He steered development and also improved on foreign relations. This went on until the Second World War where Afghanistan remained neutral. When Daud Khan took power in 1953 as the prime, he reverted to the 1921 friendship pact with the Bolshevik and thus developed a total reliance on Russia for assistance both economically and militarily. On seeing the increased support of Afghanistan by Russia, the United States also came in to support the same country so that it wins its allegiance. The two countries therefore embarked on a stiff competition. In 1973, Daud Khan seized power from Zahir and abolished the constitution proclaiming himself as leader of the republic and chairman of the central committee. In 1977, two parties, The Banner and the Khalq formed a coalition under the name People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan. They seized power in 1978 before the coalition failed to agree on the Marxist reform programs. This triggered another war and rebellion.

It was under this disorganized governance torn apart by war and without a constitution that Russia decided to invade. It wanted to support its clients so that they don’t get overthrown. The war did not go unresisted. The mujaheddin mounted gorilla resistance that was backed by the United States who supplied them with weapons and humanitarian aid which found its way to them through Pakistan. The destructive Russian troops inflicted suffering upon millions of Afghans who were forced to seek for refuge in neighboring Iran and Pakistan.

Colville (1997) points out that more than 600000 afghan refugees had fled to either Pakistan or Iran. The number kept increasing to staggering heights. By 1990, the number of afghan refugees was 6.2 million both in Pakistan, Iran and other parts of the world. The two countries have played an important role in effort to provide refuge to the afghan refugees. Both countries welcomed the refugees with their open door policies. They both readily offered refuge to the refugees. One difference that is open in the two countries is that while Pakistan housed the refugees in “villages,” Iran had most of its refugees free and allowed them top mingle with the Iranian society. They are free to access benefits in terms of education, employment and medical facilities. Only a very small percentage of refugees are housed within Camps, about 20000.

The refugee treatment by the internal communities differed greatly between Pakistan and Iran. While Pakistan refugees received great assistance and generosity with the international agencies embarking on what was by then the greatest humanitarian aid in history, Iran barely received any assistance due to their poor relations with the Western world (Colville, 1997). It is said that Iran did not make any effort in asking for assistance. This remained so until 1986.

Although the refugees started returning home before the soviet troops had withdrawn, the greatest flow of refugees back home was witnessed in 1992 when more than 1.2 million refugees found their way back home with increased optimism. By 1997, a total of 3.9 million refugees had returned to Afghanistan. Repatriation has completely stopped in Iran. By 1995, about 200,000 had returned to Afghanistan from Iran. The next 20 months witnessed only 10,000 refugees returning back home. The rest remain in Iran.

References

1. Amnesty International, ‘Iraq: The Human Rights Consequences’.
2. Barbara, Robson. ‘Iraqi Kurds: Their History and Culture’, Center for Applied Linguistics, The Refugee Service Center Refugee Fact Sheet Series No.13, 1996
3. Barnett, Michael. Eye Witness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda. New York: Cornell University Press, 2002
4. Barthorp, Michael. Afghan Wars and the North-West Frontier 1839-1947. London: Cassell, 2002
5. Colville, Rupert. “Afhanistan: The Unending Crisis.” UN Human Council for Refugees. 1997. Web.
6. Cultural Orientation.net. “Afghans: Their History and Culture.” 2002.
7. El-Najjar, Hassan. The Gulf War: Overreaction and Excessiveness.” New York: Amazone Press, 2001.
8. Forced Migration.org. “Causes and Consequences.”
9. Human Rights Watch, ‘Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds‘, 1993. Web.
10. Human Rights Watch, ‘The Iraqi government assault on the Marsh Arabs’, 2003.
11. Lang, Anthony. “Global Governance and Genocide in Rwanda.” Ethics and International Affairs. 2002.
12. Melvern, Linda. A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide. Zed
13. Schweizer, Beat. “Moral Dilemmas for Humanitarianism in the era of “Humanitarian”
14. Military Intervention.” IRRC 86(855), 2004: 547-563
15. Stone & Stone. “Afghanistan During World War Two.” Second World War books. Web.
16. Vogelsang, Willem. The Afghans, pp. 245–334. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002

Introduction and thesis statement

It is commonplace that hospitality and generosity signifies the hallmark of true gentlemen in the African societies. Modernization and the recent turn of events have instigated a serious change of values and preferences with respect to this. As a result, persons and societies in general tend to prioritize individual gratification and safety before thinking about those with deficiencies. This paper examines the ramifications of hosting refugees, with respect to security and coexistence in the society.

Security

“I fled from my country, not as a result of national conflict or political clash, but with the wild dream to achieve a rich American life style.” As mentioned in my earlier essay, this reason ranked highest among factors that coerced me to quit my home nation. Just like me, most nationals of the war ravaged, or impoverished countries often seek asylum in foreign countries.

In the whole of East and Central Africa, Kenya is always the destination of choice. This may happen due to several reasons, with the relatively peaceful atmosphere most common. For other immigrants like me, the level of infra-structural development and economic stability lures them to the nation.

They travel hoping that they may establish themselves as business personalities, or have it easier to maneuver from as they seek to travel overseas. While a vast majority of these reasons may appear genuine, experience has revealed that considerable populations of these immigrants bear evil intentions.

It should be noted that some camps are in proximity with the borders, hence increasing the security threats tremendously. This happens incase militia disguise themselves as civilians and infiltrate the refuge stations. Given the global terror threat due to the existence of militia groups which are solely focused on destabilizing nations, it is advisable for governments to enforce strict immigration policies.

These rules will bind all people moving into the nation, and explicitly state the qualifications they are to attain before gaining access. It should be noted that Kenya has received several threats from the Al-Shabaab militia group which is widely believed to be a branch of Al-Qaeda, with respect to security of the citizens and the homeland in general. This warning calls for apprehension by the respective governments in a bid to protect their citizens.

Security within the camp is also vital. Continued instances of rape are commonplace in these camps. New arrivals are the most vulnerable, with predators originating both within and outside the camp. It is difficult to identify these sex pests since they wait for the nights in order to carry out their operations.

They have not shown a preference for any age group, since elderly women, the middle aged and young girls all fall victims to these attacks. In the same breath, the female persons living outside the camp are often victims of rape during cattle rustling, operations by the government forces and attacks by bandits targeting their property.

Co-existence in the society

In the case of Kenya, the nation I went to, a majority of these camps are located in the Arid and Semi Arid Lands (ASAL zones). This implies that the locals have to contend for the meager utilities and natural resources. By hosting some of the largest settlements worldwide, the nation has subjected inhabitants of these regions to intense competition for the vital resources. “Scarcity of medical service made it impossible to prevent unwanted deaths that easily could have been prevented if there had been a proper medical care.

“That is why there was death news daily”, serves as a pointer to the dire situation experienced by the inhabitants of these camps and members of the society in general, since they have to share hospitals and the essentials therein. It is noteworthy, that numerous charity and other health organizations have labored tirelessly in a bid to supplement the available resources.

In addition, to poor Medicare, residents have to compete for water. This commodity is a necessity of life, both for human beings and animals. Residents require it in large amounts to sustain livestock farming, which is their main source of livelihood. This does not take away the fact that they also need to satisfy their physiological needs.

Consequently, a collision course is unavoidable, since all interest groups focus significantly on supplying the camps with water at the expense of the natives. This served to heighten the “deeply rooted xenophobic feelings”, felt towards the immigrants. It becomes hard to coexist under such circumstances, since one party feels aggrieved by the other.

Nutrition also poses a formidable challenge in this region. Malnourished children constitute the landscape of refugee camps. This is often attributed to the starch based rations that are distributed by the aid agencies. In addition, grown ups have weakened body immunity systems due to the same set of reasons.

It should be noted that the situation in the villages is not any better. While the children in the camp have something to eat irrespective of the quantity, children outside these camps often go hungry for days. Most of them have stunted growth in addition, to nutrition-related infections. This makes it difficult for them to interact due to impoverished health.

Conclusion

While the competition for resources and security threats make it hard for these distinct societies to interrelate, it is clear that they are faced with a similar set of problems. Subsequently, the government and other stake holders need to rethink their strategy, by implementing policies that guarantee members of the society similar, if not a higher percentage of benefits. This is because their predicament and that of the refugees are analogous.