In todays world, the use of cell phones is a fashion trend for young people to identify themselves, their skills, and future opportunities. Foley, Holzman, and Wearing (2007) aim to confirm the improvement of the quality of human experiences in public spaces through the application of cell phones. The relationship between mobile phones and consumptive leisure will be discussed as a possibility to reinforce personal freedoms and identities.
Cell Phones and Consumptive Leisure
The authors use in-depth interviews with adolescent girls and review recent literature findings to identify the peculiarities of preferred leisured lifestyles and the conditions under which their freedoms are achieved. They investigate mobile phones as a means for the development of a sense of self-confidence. Their main finding is that modern devices impart young peoples sense of autonomy because they provide access to public space for young ladies (Foley et al., 2007).
Conspicuous consumption (the use of mobile phones) determines the establishment of personal identity. Young people can move away from their families, decrease the level of parental control, and share their experiences with peers. The idea of freedom gains new meaning with the emergence of new technologies. At the moment of writing the article, the authors are concerned that cell phones positively contribute to the creation of new images and identities as a part of their leisure activities.
Conclusion
After reading the article, one should admit the benefits of mobile phones as available conspicuous leisure consumption. When young women decide to share their thoughts with peers via mobile phones, they take their first step outside their families and try to understand the essence of freedom and the worth of identity in the modern world. In general, the authors achieve their goals in this study and introduce strong evidence to support the connection between the chosen concepts.
References
Foley, C., Holzman, C., & Wearing, S. (2007). Moving beyond conspicuous leisure consumption: Adolescent women, mobile phones and public space. Leisure Studies, 26(2), 179-192.
In todays world, the use of cell phones is a fashion trend for young people to identify themselves, their skills, and future opportunities. Foley, Holzman, and Wearing (2007) aim to confirm the improvement of the quality of human experiences in public spaces through the application of cell phones. The relationship between mobile phones and consumptive leisure will be discussed as a possibility to reinforce personal freedoms and identities.
Cell Phones and Consumptive Leisure
The authors use in-depth interviews with adolescent girls and review recent literature findings to identify the peculiarities of preferred leisured lifestyles and the conditions under which their freedoms are achieved. They investigate mobile phones as a means for the development of a sense of self-confidence. Their main finding is that modern devices impart young peoples sense of autonomy because they provide access to public space for young ladies (Foley et al., 2007).
Conspicuous consumption (the use of mobile phones) determines the establishment of personal identity. Young people can move away from their families, decrease the level of parental control, and share their experiences with peers. The idea of freedom gains new meaning with the emergence of new technologies. At the moment of writing the article, the authors are concerned that cell phones positively contribute to the creation of new images and identities as a part of their leisure activities.
Conclusion
After reading the article, one should admit the benefits of mobile phones as available conspicuous leisure consumption. When young women decide to share their thoughts with peers via mobile phones, they take their first step outside their families and try to understand the essence of freedom and the worth of identity in the modern world. In general, the authors achieve their goals in this study and introduce strong evidence to support the connection between the chosen concepts.
References
Foley, C., Holzman, C., & Wearing, S. (2007). Moving beyond conspicuous leisure consumption: Adolescent women, mobile phones and public space. Leisure Studies, 26(2), 179-192.
The process of shaping a personal identity is rather complex and often convoluted since it is defined by multiple forces, some of which may turn out to be quite contradictory. The exploration of a personal identity becomes even more difficult for immigrants, who have been affected by sudden changes in their environment and the influences that often appear to be too intrusive ad dominant. However, due to openness to new ideas and the ability to retain my cultural values, I have managed to shape my personal identity in a unique way that included both the core values of my native community and those of the cultures that have influenced me profoundly.
On the surface, the portrait that I have painted of myself over the entirety of my life is quite basic. Regarding my ethnic roots, I have always viewed myself as a member of the Latino/Hispanic community, which implies following the relevant major traditions and philosophy. For example, motherhood and the related roles, including those of nurturing and educating, have always been a priority for me. However, I have managed to overcome the gender-conforming standards that the specified roles suggested by exploring career opportunities that the related qualities provided. Namely, I have found my calling as an educator for PreK children, to whom I provide support, guidance, and the necessary instructions.
Connecting my experiences and current self-perception, I will have to mention two key people who have influenced me profoundly. These were my mother and my grandmother, who introduced me to the idea of self-determination, helped me to embrace my womanhood and encouraged my education and, later on, my professional development. At the same time, they have been supporting me as a mother, thus helping me with my self-actualization tremendously. They have taught me to overcome the limitations set for me by gender roles, prejudices, and cultural misconceptions, while choosing the available opportunities wisely to grow as a person and a professional. As a result, none of the roles that I have assumed, including that one of a mother and a teacher, have ever restricted me in the options for personal development and communication.
Although religion has never been the focus of my spiritual development due to the impact of the Socialist philosophy of my country of origin, several key Catholic values such as the importance of human life have defined my career and personal evolution. Speaking of the cultural values that have defined my identity as an educator, a parent, and a learner, I must mention the value of human life and respect for others, which have been ingrained in me since childhood due to the family values and the cultural principles. Being appreciative of every opinion and valuing human life as the ultimate treasure is what has affected the development of my identity, both as a teacher and a parent. Specifically, I have been approaching the issue of early childhood development with especial care, making sure that the needs of every child are met and that none is deprived of an essential learning resource.
Although the concept of a cultural identity is quite pliable, and I expect mine to be enriched with new elements in the future, my current perception of self has been shaped largely by the idea of valuing human life, as well as my Latino/Hispanic heritage. The multiple influences that I have experienced throughout my personal journey have contributed to the creation of a unique concept of self that I hope to improve and enrich with new ideas in the future. Overall, my current life as a mother and an educator is entirely fulfilling, yet I am always open to new opportunities.
Generally, it is easier to predict the behavior of people based on the nature of social group they closely interact with. The interaction with each other is vital in shaping personal perceptions. The aspect of being in a group has raised a number of question concerning the impact such involvement have on the individuals identity. Generally, people have different personalities, which are significantly influenced by parental figures and other relevant factors including the general environment. However, people have the ability to change and adapt to the behaviors portrayed and embraced by the community. In other words, how individuals are raised in society is essential in facilitating the ability to predict the conduct and even future roles within the group. Factors such as education, norms, relationships, church teachings, and gender are critical aspects of society that enable the community to influence an individuals character.
Main Discussion
Generally, schools play a vital role in influencing the perception and shaping the self-identity of people in society. In other words, individuals usually develop their characters mainly from learning institutions. When people attend schools, they are more likely to build effective relationships and discipline needed for better coexistence. In any given day, we interact with a multitude of other humans, whether we encounter them in person, virtually, or symbolically, intimately or simply in passing, (Kang and Bodenhausen 548).
Based on Kang and Bodenhausen, the continuous interaction enables people to acquire unique behaviors. The knowledge gained through schooling has the potential to impact general conduct, thus making the facet essential for determining and influencing the required attributes. In such a situation, the social group will automatically impact the behavior of any person within the society and makes them believe and appreciate the importance of education and its outcome.
Similarly, culture as an aspect of the community is fundamental in shaping the perspective of an individual in society. The community values that are embraced and respected are more likely to be adopted by the people in the society (Gkargkavouzi et al. 154).
In other words, some common characteristics such as love and friendliness, can be harnessed based on how the community views them. When people in a given social group value one another and have an effective relationship, such features will be viewed as core reasons that promote peaceful coexistence. Therefore, it becomes easier for an individual to value and acquire such characteristics. When the community embraces a particular behavior, the likelihood of people in the vicinity practicing the same is high, thus making it becomes part of the public. In such cases, the community contributes to the development of personal identity.
Furthermore, communities that value their people are likely to enhance the aspect of self-respect. In most cases, the experience a person has is essential in influencing how they treat each other. A system that encourages respect will make the people in such surrounding to as well establish similar attributes (Gkargkavouzi el al. 148). In other words, the individuals will perceive themselves as respectful and thus value others as well. In such a scenario, it is the picture that the community creates about the aspect of respect that impacts the publics perception.
In addition, the community having the aspect of shared interest is capable of shaping the identity of its members in a positive manner. For instance, people will be encouraged to explore their potential and aim higher to achieve their individual goals. Therefore, in such cases, individuals develop the will to perform exceptionally from the societal construct (Wang, et al). It can be noted that the motive and drive as factors that prompt people to take a given action are obtained majorly from the individuals surroundings. Hence, the community has the power to enable a person to shape the character and determination necessary for personal development.
Moreover, the value that the community places on gender has a significant impact on the perception of personal identity. For instance, if society values women, then it is more likely that females in society will develop a sense of belonging, which will make them highly integrated into all aspects of the social group. The same case applies to the degree they accord males in the community. When there is an effective relationship between the two genders and emotional development, any person in society will embrace such aspects and develop relevant attributes that support the conduct (Kang and Bodenhausen 555). In other words, people will have a positive attitude towards each gender and thus treat them accordingly. When the community creates normative expectations on particular gender roles, society promotes a picture that depicts all aspects that are necessary for self-identity.
Even though the community is capable of influencing the identity of people in a positive way, it is can further create a negative impact on individual behavior. For instance, a social group that does not value women will raise people who do not accord the necessary respect to females. In other words, it will be a norm in such a setting that women are inferior to men. Young ladies will grow with such notions the same as boys; thus, the circle will continue over generations. It might be challenging to reverse such belief because people grow up having a fixed mind.
Furthermore, the aspect of social status has the potential to create a negative impact on the identity of people in the community. According to Kang and Bodenhausen (551), race and gender are defined on the perspective of order of social class. The interactive dynamics of race and gender are further complicated by a higher-order interaction with socioeconomic status, implying that people will likely to associate based on where they belong in the society (According to Kang and Bodenhausen 551).
The persons without the ability to fit in a given category will feel isolated from the setting and thus become insignificant (Hope et al. 69). The conduct is not appropriate and has the potential to create an unhealthy relationship between the two classes. The rich in society might opt to disrespect the poor because that is what the facet of social class cultivates in the community. In other words, young children will mature; having the notion that being poor makes people unworthy.
In addition, society, through specific cultural beliefs, has the potation to impact the viewpoint of people negatively. For example, when the community believes and values the marriage institution, it will create a perception that discriminates the single parents and individuals who have chosen not to be engaged in marriage (Wang et al.) In other words, such environment will make individuals to involve in the practice even if they do not feel interested.
Conclusion
Based on the argument, it is evident that communities significantly influence ones identity. People are more likely to develop behaviors that are predominant in the society. For instance, values and cultures that are practiced by the social group can be used to determine and influence the perception of individuals. Furthermore, the aspect of education as a key part of society is vital in instilling relevant attributes that shape the conduct of people. Therefore, interacting with different persons in the community enables people to have perspective aligned to the individuals they frequently associate with.
Hope, Elan C., et al. Engaged Against the Machine: Institutional and Cultural Racial Discrimination and Racial Identity as Predictors of Activism Orientation among Black Youth. American Journal of Community Psychology, vol. 63, no. 1-2, 2019, pp. 61-72. Web.
Personal identity and self-reflection agree well with narrative since it is through language that human beings co-exist. The relationship between personal identity and narrative originates from Humes theory, which claims that how we connect with ideas as a product of memory constructs our sense of self. While Hume does not talk about narratives, it is apparent that narratives are ideas that appear as product of memory constructs. Hence, narration is a key way of connecting reflections and offering a sense of identity.
Narratives connect many incidences to create an ideal object such as a historical event. Narration and the selves play a major role in the creation of these ideal objects, although this does not necessarily apply to the creation of all ideal objects. Tolstoys narration connects many incidences to explain to us about the death of Ivan Ilych. He starts by showing us the kind of life that Ivan Led.
Ivan led a life that was full of hypocrisy. He lived by the standards of the aristocratic society rather than using his individual reasoning to determine his life. Ivan married because the society expected a brilliant young lawyer with money to have a wife from a good family like Praskovya. Ivan Ilych married&because his social circle approved of the match (Tolstoy par. 65).
He also purchased a house in the city so that he could have a symbol of material status, as dictated by the aristocratic society. As the story develops, we get to know more about Ivan through his self-reflection.
In the reflection, Ivan examined his past life and the values that he had lived by in all of his life. After self-scrutiny of his life, Ivan recognized the inevitability of death and the hypocritical nature of his past life. Following these realizations, he decided to defend himself but he realized that he had nothing to use for his defense. He had to admit that he had spent all of his life unrealistically and that his perception on life and death was a lie. Apparently, Tolstoy connects all these incidences to explain the death of Ivan.
We also argue that observers ascribe identity, as it is not intrinsic in the associated things. Ivans peers are the ones who recognize that than Ivan does not like associating himself with unpleasant things. Later in the novel, we see this aspect establishing itself as a central feature of Ivans personality. Ivan begins to exclude himself from indecorous elements of life. He leaves his expectant wife when her behavior begins to depress him.
..Ivan Ilych hoped to escape from the unpleasantness of this state of affairs by the same easy and decorous relation to life that had served him heretofore (Tolstoy par. 23).
He separates himself from his family and resorts to office life. He starts looking at his marriage life from a formal perspective. And Ivan Ilych evolved such an attitude towards married life (Tolstoy par. 45). He only required of it those conveniences. Similar to how he views his profession, he begins to see his marriage as a contract.
He makes sure that he keeps away from his wife by inviting friends whenever he is at home for dinner. Ivan begins playing games with his wife as he unable to handle his personal and emotional life. He strictly adheres to his professional duties and separates his personal life from is profession. However, Ivan is unable to direct his personal life fully.
Personal identity is indissoluble from self-reflection as the observer recognizes it during reflection and not through spontaneous connection of ideas in the mind. From this perspective, personal identity is a product of constant reflections as depicted by Ivan. Ivan was reflecting one day while staring at Gerasims face when he started to wonder whether he had lived a correct life. Maybe I did not live as I ought to have done (Tolstoy par. 108).
A few minutes later, he realized he had lived a life full of lies. All aspects of his life including his family life, as well as his professional and social life were all full of lies. And his professional duties and the whole arrangement of his life and of his family, and all his social and official interests, might all have been false (Tolstoy par. 126).
Following the realization, he decided to defend himself but he realized that he had nothing to use for his defense. He had to admit that he had spent all of his life unrealistically and that his perception on life and death was a lie.
This revelation compelled Ivan to seek for the truth. He approached the doctor together with Praskovya and asked them to tell him the truth about his life. What bothered him a lot was the thought that he might have had led all of his life in the wrong way. Even with the new revelations, Ivan did not wholly dismiss the hope that he might have led a correct life.
From the above discussion, we can see that there exists an in-depth connection between narration, personal identity and self-reflection. A narrative is an informative tool that communicates social expressions of the self. The self is not an object, but a being and a creation that reflects on itself to discover and restructure itself completely through symbols of self- interpretation.
It is only through narrative constructions of memories that we can understand our past because the past is indefinite. The way we connect with past ideas as a product of memory constructs our sense of self. Narratives are also ideas and therefore, a key way of connecting reflections and offering a sense of identity.
Works Cited
Tolstoy, Lev Nikolayevich. The Death of Ivan Ilych. Trans. Louise and Aylmer Maude. New York: Pennsylvania State University, 1886. Web.
The Ship of Theseus will always be the same. This is due to some reasons. Correlation between identity and change in the world of idealistic field of metaphysics might appear easy but there are some complexities. Whenever an object transforms, it always changes in a certain way.
For instance, a child develops to something different implying that it transforms in terms of size and age. For reptiles such as snakes, they shed their skins. Both the child and the snake remain the same in one way or another. Therefore, properties of an object determine its shape. For illustrative purposes, an item A changes with regard to property B. This could only take place when an object A has property B but at later stage B does not have A.
Regarding the Ship of Theseus, the ship changed a lot but it remained the same in terms of its properties. It is the same thing with human life. People change from childhood to mid-adulthood and further to old age. An individual remains the same irrespective of whether he or she is at childhood, mid-adulthood or old age.
The Ship of Theseus could have changed in size and shape but it still had some characteristics that distinguished it from other ships. What happened to the ship was mere refurbishment. The ship could have changed completely if the owner decided to destroy it and use the materials to construct something different that does not look like a ship. The concept of recreation vs. destruction is applied explaining this case.
The ship cannot be any different because it has all parts that the previous ship had. In case the changes are taken seriously, things would be different whenever we view them for the second time. This would mean that any slight change in properties of an object would affect its existence. Therefore, it is true that properties should be explained in terms of time.
Indeed, they are indexed to time. A property is temporarily indexed meaning that it is subject to change. According to Leibniz, the ship is the same at all times (Browne 182). This is because ship A has properties that would be found in ship B. On the other hand, ship B has properties that could have been found in ship A. In this case, the common property is the mast. Ships A and B have indexes that are temporary.
Irrespective of philosophical theories applied, the Ship of Theseus would always remain the same. Endurantist theory holds that an object will always be the same throughout its history. At each moment in history, the object exists with all its properties. Perdurantist theory on the other hand would claim that objects are four-dimensional entities, which comprises of a sequence of temporal parts (Graves 445). An object is likened to a movie.
If someone recollected all boards that had been discarded and reassembled them by adding the original sail and mast then the person would still have the Ship of Theseus. Even the ship that had been sailing continuously is still the Ship of Theseus. The real meaning of the word same depends on the context. For illustration, the original ship will be assigned letter X, the ship that had been sailing continuously would be labeled as Y while the assembled ship will be branded letter Z.
In case the original ship was to be demanded by the original owner because of one reason or another, ship Z would be given to him or her. It would be illegal to give the owner ship Y. It is therefore true to argue that ships X, Y and Z are the same. Ship Y belongs to a different owner because the first owner did not take part in producing it. Materials used in making the second ship that is, Y, have the same features as those used in making both X and Z. Part or whole of Z is the same as X.
In fact, the materials used to construct Z are the same as those used in manufacturing X. This does not mean that Y is different. For further illustration, materials used in making ship Y might be changed but the crew remains the same. The crew might as well be transferred to work in ships X and Z.
The issue of sameness is a matter of convention. There are some factors that people consider before declaring something to be the same with another. Two things might be declared the same based on one principle. For the Ship of Theseus, X was the same as Y because materials used in constructing them had the same characteristics.
Equally, Y could be said to be the same as Z in terms of properties. Conversely, X and Z are said to be the same because materials from X were used in manufacturing Z. The three ships are also the same because the same crew can operate them.
In conclusion, the problem of personal identity is related to change. An elderly person in his or her late 80s was the same person when he or she was in his or her early 20s.
Works Cited
Browne, Ray. Objects of Special Devotion: Fetishism in Popular Culture. New York, NY: Popular Press, 1982. Print.
Graves, Robert. The Golden Fleece. London: Hutchinson, 1983. Print.
Thesis Statement: Foucault suggests that the deployment of sexuality is closely connected with the deployment of integrity, which is the main principle of the social and political welfare of the state. This process reveals the formation of sexual identities through the emergence of political and legal rules and principles that greatly influenced the contemporary perception and understanding of this concept.
Introduction
We live in a society that is heavily saturated with sexual imagery from sexually explicit films to ad campaigns primarily based on sexual titillation or innuendo and which now pervade almost every aspect of our lives. Sexuality has come to be regarded as an integral part of human nature. But how many of us have asked the question what is sexuality? or how and why have we come to view our identity as inherently linked to our sexuality? Perhaps far too few. Yet for Foucault, a French philosopher, historian, and sociologist, this question holds within it, a vital truth, crucial to the human experience.
In his book, The History of Sexuality, his main aim was to determine why and how sexuality has been so vigorously pursued as an object of knowledge, and more importantly, why we perceive it as possessing the power to reveal who we are and to liberate us. Foucault does not focus on the nature of sexuality per se, but rather on our pursuit of knowledge about sexuality, the kind of knowledge this pursuit has obtained, what we expect that knowledge to tell us about ourselves and the social power that it contains. Sexual proliferation is not primarily restricted, as it constructs subjects by means of incitement of desire and in the process of forming the identities. This means that the construction of subjectivity is the outcome of social practices. In particular, the knowledge proliferation on sexuality by means of rejection propelled the emergence of modern identities that as if rebel this rejection. This denial triggered the transformation of a sexually passive society into the revolutionary one. More importantly, this has become a means of a particular display of self-affirmation.
With the advent of capitalism and industrialization, sexuality was restricted and carefully confined; it moved into the home (Foucault 3). In this way, the concept of sex and sexuality was shrouded in secrecy. It also became the main instrument of social and political manipulation. Those restrictions triggered the emergence of a new temporal trend of social life Victorian Puritanism, which forbade any displays of sexuality and imposed taboo and silence on the subject. It is understandable that the vision of sexuality was reduced to its minimized function of life reproduction, as the eighteenth century was the time when labor capacity was being systematically exploited and therefore, there was no place for dissipation and sexual pleasure (Foucault 6). The restriction imposed in the Victorian era implicitly influenced the contemporary outlook on the hypocrisy and rise of overt discussion on sex and sexuality. At this point, it is worth stressing that sex has become the key to the development of personal identity in contemporary society since our sexuality reveals our ego and, therefore, we always strive to have this concealed self-knowledge that engages us in the discourse on our sexuality.
Main body
In the first part of the book, Foucault tries to define the relationships between sex and politics and, thus, identify its main purpose. In particular, he intends to prove that sexuality is controlled by power; instead, power generates sexuality through the incentive to discourse. Sexuality was gradually transformed into discourse and arose out of the necessity to address this concept in the scientific world only. Foucault views the incessant discussions regarding sexuality and secrecy as paradoxical, as people were forced to constantly speak of sex as a forbidden subject, all the while, keeping it hidden. In this respect, this figurative silence and taboo on speaking about sex also became an inherent part of the discourse.
According to Foucault, the deployment of sexuality was a political necessity for integrity and cooperation. Hence, the initial goal of the government and upper layers of society was directly connected with sophisticated political intentions to organize a powerful hierarchy for controlling people. Indeed, this deployment of sexuality did not encompass the concept of sex as pleasure. Its dutiful designation was an effective means for suppressing the desires of humans and directing them in a leading ideological flow. However, the implementation of sexuality was not through the prohibition of pleasures and sex; this concept was used as a legally forbidden notion. In other words, the concept of sexuality was converted into a theoretical basis for discussions.
Foucault is more focused on the deployment as the process of intensification of the body and its excessive exploitation, and the instrument of consolidation and protection of power. Sex acquired another meaning: i, it acquired the features of taboo. Foucault explains the peculiar relationship of sex and power as follows:
We must not think that by saying yes to sex, one says no to power; on the contrary, one track along the course laid out by the general deployment of sexuality. It is the agency of sex that we must break away from if we aimthrough a tactical reversal of the various mechanisms of sexualityto counter the grips of power with the claims of bodies, pleasures, and knowledge, in their multiplicity and their possibility of resistance. (Foucault 157).
A vigorous desire to learn the truth is explained by the fact that modern sexual identities demand that sex speak the truth&and&demand that it tell [them] truth& (Gutting 150). Sexuality and sex, thus, became the benchmark of the truth about selves.
Due to the fact that sexuality was the starting point of power relations between genders and generations, its influence spread over several oriented unities: womens bodies, childrens sex, procreative behavior and perverse pleasure. When focusing on these realms of impact, Foucault argues that sexuality is the name that can be given to a historical construct: not a furtive reality that is difficult to grasp but a great surface network (Foucault 106). The above shows the mechanism of knowledge and power that fostered the emergence of those images thus converting sex into both an overt reality and historical construct.
In the book, the transformation of body pleasure is also seen through several stages as described in the book. These stages postulate the gradual transformation of sexuality into a legal concept. Hence, Foucault suggests that power is not based on exterior principles and their outlook on this phenomenon is presented as the rule of immanence and presupposes the introduction of ideological and political prohibitions that engage the concept of sexuality into a vigorous dispute (Foucault 98).
Foucault declares that we must not look for who has the power in the order of sexuality (men, adults, parents, doctors) and who is deprived of it& but seek rather the pattern of the modifications which the relationships of force simply by the very nature of their process (99). Social and political groups Society and political power used this knowledge as an instrument of consolidation and cooperation of labor power. Once again, this rule renders the concept of sexuality as an ideological unity so that sex is no more real, primordial, or discursive than sexuality (Grosz 154).
The principles of double conditioning and tactical polyvalence of discourses are closely connected with each other, as they cover dual notions participating in the deployment of sexuality as a political and social tool of manipulation. In this part, the author considers the contrastive concepts of irreconcilable and overarching , silence and discourse, subjection and resistance all those dual pairs constitute the basis of a power mechanism, which was introduced in motion. This duality is also revealed in larger scales of power proliferation, namely, with the advent of restrictions on sex regarded as the function of reproduction and its proliferation of overt discussion on sexuality, which creates the illusion of permissiveness. Analyzing these rules and principles, the author makes a conclusion that self-orientation and individualization emphasize the prevalence of power over the privilege of law with the viewpoint of the objective, the privilege of prohibition with the viewpoint of the tactical efficacy, the privilege of sovereignty with the analysis of multiple and mobile fields of relations (Foucault 102).
Despite the fact that the capitalist era witnessed the deployment of sexuality as a solid veritable reason for discussions, it was not still repressed and limited. On the contrary, Foucault believes that the disputes about sexuality that emerged at that time were the only effective weapon of political power. Discourse also served as a means of proliferation and popularization and, therefore, it occurred in the form of confessions and rejections. What is more important is that the discourse was the only way to enhance control over people; the repression drove/forced people to openly discuss sexuality and sex and enjoy those discussions. The deployment of sexuality fostered the discussions regarding perversity, which was imposed by the political powers to make people think that this phenomenon was the reason for the sexual prohibition.
By advocating the discourse on sex and sexuality the powers managed to change for a cultural retrospective of the problem. Hence, the eighteenth-century society could not consider sexing anything but the object of knowledge (as opposed to sensual pleasure).
Nowadays, the deployment of sexuality has been deeply infused in our culture and developed has infiltrated various social spheres such as healthcare, politics, art and culture. According to Foucault, sexuality is nothing more than a social construct that has been used to exert political control over the human body. For a society so deeply preoccupied with sex, thats quite a revelation. The history of our sexuality is a complex one, says Foucault, involving hundreds of years of viewing sex as a valuable social commodity and associating sexuality with the need to confess. The result? We have come to see our sexuality as something hidden deep within us and that requires deeper probing in order to comprehend its nature or our nature, for that matter. At the same time, it reveals itself in every facet of our lives. We have inherited a notion, a Logic of Sex , which influences and defines our personalities and social conduct. Our fundamental identity has gradually become intertwined with our sexuality.
Conclusion
Our notions regarding sexuality have been so deeply penetrated by scientific discourse that we subconsciously believe it to hold the key to our true nature. Furthermore, the deployment of sexuality has been so thoroughly infused in our culture that we have come to see our liberation from sexual repression and perhaps our personal liberation and happiness in general, as being dependent upon the bourgeoisie conception of healthy sexuality. Foucault skillfully points out the irony that this very belief is a by-product of the power oppressing us. The answer? Foucault suggests that in order to resist this power, we should focus on the physical pleasures of the body, the Ars Erotica, rather than focusing on sexuality itself as appropriated by the Scientia Sexualis or the discursive approach. His conclusion is that sexuality is not something we can intellectually discover and enjoy. Those seeking personal or sexual liberation need only refrain from thinking of sex, sexual pleasure, and our bodies, as a part of a sexuality that defines us.
Works Cited
Foucault, Michel. History of sexuality. US: Vintage, 1990.
Grosz, Elizabeth A. Volatile bodies: toward a corporeal feminism. US: Indiana University Press, 1994.
Gutting, Gary. The Cambridge Companion to Foucault. UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
The idea of personal identity has been discussed by both Locke and Hume firstly on a more general sense to the general idea of identity before narrowing down specifically to the subject itself.
As such before I narrow down to the idea of personal identity, it is important that I first take a look at how they present their claims with regard to this general idea of identity.
Some surprising claims by Locke suggest that, identity is an impression or idea we come to arrive at when we tend to associate and one thing at a particular time with the same thing as it exists in a different time. In his essay, Concerning human understanding, he says;
When we see anything to be in any place in any instant of time, we are sure, (be it what it will that it is that very thing, and not another, which at that same time exists in another place, how like undistinguishable soever it may be in all other respects: and this consists identity, when the ideas it is attributed to vary not at all from what they were that moment, wherein we consider their former existence, and to which we compare the present. (Locke, I, XVII, 5)
In his conceptualization of identify, Locke brings forth the notion that something at a particular time is of the same identity in a derivative sense as one would come to think of its transitive sense being a derivative of it.
He quickly brings forth as is suggested in the above quoted text the concepts of place and time in identity and diversity. He claims that not two things could be assumed or taken to have come at the same time and place and as such the identity of something in its first application comes forth taken in terms of location by time and its space.
To prove his claim, Locke introduces the distinction between God, finite intelligences and bodies. He says that, since God is without a traceable start, perpetual, unalterable and omnipresent, his identity is of no doubt.
However, concerning finite spirits that each have their particular place and time they started to exist, their likening will always be in relation to that time and place in which they started to exist as long that place remains to exist. Similarly, bodies for which no addition or subtraction of matter has been made could not be two at the same place and time.
Discussion
Of unity of consciousness and personal identity
From the surprising claim in which Locke defines the identity of bodies, there arises the concept of individuation or personal identity. According to Locke change of mass does not necessarily distort the identity of a body, so long as it remains contact with all particles of matter as is in the place and time of the beginning of its existence.
As such in living things, the identity lies not in the various parts that makes up the body but on the spirit that that gives life to that body that is constant even if the various part of the body may change. Life however that makes that living thing live and that makes it be what it is, remains constant despite the change of part.
He brings forth the account of the identity of a human being. He argues that, the identity of a soul alone in an embryo of man is one and same that is the identity of it in a fully grown up man.
It should not whatsoever arise a time when an embryo with the identity of a soul of man be confused with something else as is also the soul that is the identity of a mature man.
An embryo of man maybe lacking in some way ion the nature of matter, but that very individual spirit, being same as is in the embryo, as is in a mature human being, and which has its beginning from the embryo leaves no doubt that it is one and the same thing (Parfit). This is same for all other living things.
In Lockes notion of identity of the self, a person is a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection which by it can thus consider itself as itself having the same thinking albeit in different times and places (Locke, 1975).
In this notion therefore the sense of a person is associated with the consciousness that brings forth the self-consciousness of itself. According to Locke (1975), that consciousness that accompany thinking makes the rational being same in different moments and times and as such is what comprise the personal identity.
He further argues that, so long as that consciousness can be viewed at a moment a while back, any action or thought as is far connects the identity of person as the self was at that moment before and is now, as reflected in the self now casts no doubt that that action was done by the same self (Locke, 1975).
For as far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of any past action with the same consciousness it has of its present thoughts and actions, that it is self to itself now, and so will be the same self as far as the consciousness can extend to actions past or to come; and would be by distance of time or change of substance no more two persons &the same consciousness uniting those distant actions into the same person. (Locke. II Chapter XVII, 20-30)
In Humes theory of the mind however, he pointedly differs with the Lockes notion of consciousness to the idea of personal identity. According to Hume, memory and not consciousness comprise personal identity on the account that it brings forth the association of causes in its strain.
He argues that, a self can only be identified based on the bundle of perceptions it so holds at a particular point in time (Hume, n.d.). He holds that, it is the perceptions that are in the self at a particular time that defines that self and hence its identity (Hume, n.d).
He asks and concludes that, what if such perceptions were removed for instance by deep sleep or death, then the self becomes insensible, and as well, the identity of that self is lost.
From the notion held by Locke of personal identity as the unity of consciousness, there arise two conflicting points when we try to relate it with Humes bundle of, mind theory; substance and succession.
Concerning substance, Locke holds that the change of the thinking substance does not in any way rob the identity of oneself to another as it is the consciousness or spirit that defines the identity and not the substance (James, 2009).
And concerning succession, he says that it being a present representation of a past action then the identity remains the same as was of the beginning self and could have therefore been transferred. To this he argues is like trying to differentiate the same thing from itself.
Conclusion
Both notions of personal identity by Locke and Hume present some interesting things and may elicit a lot of arguments and hence differences to different people. In my conviction however, I hold that Humes argument of the identity of self has more strength than Lockes unity of consciousness.
I have got my own reasons to this conviction and I will provide two arguments in account of this. Firstly, lets take an account of insanity. Insanity is a condition where a person loses their mind.
When a person goes insane or loses his or her mind, it is possible and convincing to say that they have also lost their identity until in such and such a time that they get to regain their mind.
I say so because, a self is such identified as one and the same through their behavior that is generally woven in their way of thinking that makes them behave the way they do (Sacks, n.d.). What comes of an insane person is that it is even difficult for them to tell of their identity and through their behavior, anybody else who there in the past knew the identity of the sane and now insane person can clearly make that they are of different identity.
It is possible that, should someone come to know of the insane person in their present conditions they will probably not be able to conceptualize their identity while they were in sound mind.
Secondly also relating to the mind is intoxication by drug. Intoxication of mind can lead the person to behave in a manner that is not as we know that of the real self. Intoxication therefore robs off the self the identity of that self albeit momentarily.
It is therefore not very correct the notion by Lockes of continuity. It is possible to be of a different mind now and of a different one in another time that taken separately could yield two identities.
References
Hume, D. (n.d.). extract from Of Personal Identity, Book I, A Treatise of Human Nature, pp. 251-253.
James W. (2009). Pragmatism. Echo Library: Teddington, Middlesex
Locke, J. (1975). extract from Of Identity and Diversity , An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, pp. 341-343.
McCann, Edwin (1999). Locke on Identity: matter, life, consciousness. In Margaret Atherton, ed (1999). The Empiricist: Critical Essays. Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham MD Parfit, D. (n.d.). extract from Why our Identity is not What Matters from his Reasons and Persons. Sacks, O. (n.d.). A Matter of Identity from The Man who Mistook his Wife for a Hat, pp. 103-110.
The stimulus is an extract from ‘The Office’ in which Jim dresses up as Dwight, such that he looks similar to Dwight. The stimulus brings up issues surrounding identity as, when Jim dresses up as Dwight, Dwight considers this ‘identity theft’. Moreover, other people, such as Pam, around the office consider Jim dressed up as Dwight to be Dwight. Therefore, this gives the impression that Jim’s identity is purely made up of his physical appearance. Hence, it evokes the question concerning to what extent an individual’s identity is made up of their physical appearance, and whether consciousness may play a role in making up an individual’s identity. Throughout this essay, I will argue that one’s identity is composed of a mixture between his physical appearance, alongside his psychological continuity, and thus consciousness, an idea explored by Locke (Locke, 1689). I will reach this view by examination of Parfit’s reductionist view (Fields, 1987), and I will build this argument by evaluating Locke’s focus on the consciousness (Locke, 1689). I will also consider the ‘psychological continuity’ that both Locke and Parfit explore, and contrast this with Reid’s response of fading memories (Copenhaver, 2009). Ultimately, I believe that an individual’s identity is composed of both the physical and their consciousness; however, I would place a focus on the consciousness, as this builds a person’s character, and that their physical appearance acts as an initial ‘separatory barrier’ between individuals.
My first approach is that one’s identity is composed of a mix of their physical appearance and their mental state; this idea is one advocated by Derek Parfit. Like me, Parfit believes in a ‘reductionist view’ (Fields, 1987) this can be explained by an analogy: a nation is nothing over and above a number of individuals inhabitation of a territory. Therefore, this idea can be linked back to identity, thus the analogy suggests a person’s identity is defined by the psychological connectedness, such as the continuity of their memories, which act as the individuals in a territory, representing the body. I can extend this idea to an example such as the ‘Ship of Theseus’ (Hughes, 1997), which asks a similar question to mine, if a ship has all its parts replaced is it the same ship? From my reductionist view, it would be the same ship, as the individuals who once sailed it would still see it as the same ship, hence there is a psychological connectedness. It is important to notice that a reductionist view does not see the experiences of the individual as separate to the body, but instead one and a part of the body. Therefore, according to Parfit’s reductionist ideas, identity is composed of one’s physical appearance, however not exclusively their external appearance, but also by their internal chemical make-up and biology, as explored by Dennett (Dennett, 1978). Hence, I can link this concept back to the stimulus; one could somewhat say that Jim has assumed Dwight’s physical appearance, as their physical appearance is similar. Nonetheless, according to this view, Jim has not assumed the identity of Dwight, as their experiences are different, and hence there is no psychological continuity.
A counter-argument to Parfit’s ideas can be found in the philosophies of Locke. Whilst Locke places emphasis on the consistent presence of consciousness (Locke, 1689), Parfit’s view is entirely focused with the physical form. I can use Shoemaker’s thought-experiment to illustrate this issue (Shoemaker, 1991). In this experiment, Shoemaker poses the idea that if I removed person A’s brain and put it in person B’s head has person A’s conscious been transferred to person B’s body or has person B acquired a new brain. On the one hand, Locke would dictate that person A’s conscious has been transferred to a new body, as this is what composes his identity. However, Parfit’s reductionist view would stipulate that person B is a mixture of person A and person B, as they still have the physical form of person B, but have the psychological connectedness of person A. I would largely agree with Locke in this thought-experiment as it seems illogical that the new person could be part of person A and B, as identity is a ‘distinct concept’ (Fearon, 1999). Thus, having evaluated these views against each other, I agree that identity is composed of a mixture between physical appearance, and consciousness; however, I would place the focus on someone’s consciousness, as this makes up their personality, which is a large portion of their identity. Finally, I can link this concept back to the stimulus, and hence this would also suggest that Jim has not assumed the identity of Dwight, as despite appearing physically similar, he has not obtained Dwight’s consciousness or memories which are integral to his identity (Fields, 1987). This conclusion also largely agrees with Parfit’s view (Fields, 1987) as, despite some concern with the physical appearance, I believe he places greater emphasis on psychological connectedness, as can be seen by my application of the ‘Ship of Theseus’, and thus one can dictate that psychological connectedness is an integral aspect of identity.
An alternative approach could be found in Locke’s philosophy. Locke places importance of an individual’s identity on their consciousness (Locke, 1689), which I will define by the ‘subjective character experience’ (Nagel, 1974), meaning that there is something it is like to be that individual. Consequently, this Lockean concept agrees with Parfit’s criteria of ‘psychological connectedness’. However, Locke places his whole emphasis on the individual’s consciousness, explicitly stating that their physical appearance plays no part in the construction of their identity (Locke, 1689). For example, Locke would argue that if I took a person’s brain and put it in a jar, they are the same person as before, as their physical appearance does not matter to their identity, as long as their consciousness remains the same. This idea is contrasted by Dennett (Dennett, 1978) who further explores the view that identity is composed of consciousness, but he posits that identity is inherently linked with the physical form, as he explores this idea of lobotomy in more depth in ‘Where am I?’. Therefore, it is clear that memory and psychology are key in an individual’s identity. Nonetheless, a counter-argument can be found in Reid’s views (Copenhaver, 2009).
Reid criticizes the necessity for a subjective character experience, and the retention of memories, as he uses the example of memories fading over time. For example, an individual cannot remember the moment they are born, nor can they remember the first year of their life, hence, according to Locke, they are not the same person, as they cannot remember these experiences. This idea can be further exemplified in a person who has Alzheimer’s disease: if Locke and Parfit’s views were correct then a person with this disease would change identity every few hours, which is not true. However, here one can add another dimension to the argument to allow a response to Reid’s views. This factor would be that, if someone has seen you grow up, they could remember your own experience. For example, the carer for the person with Alzheimer’s can remember what they did, and said, one hour ago, so they are sure that it is the same person, with the same identity. Hence, I can link this concept back to the stimulus, this time introducing the character of Pam into the determination of Jim’s identity. This would demonstrate that Jim has not assumed Dwight’s identity, as those who can remember what Dwight did five minutes ago, such as Pam, know that Jim dressed up as Dwight, and is therefore not Dwight, as Dwight was already in the room before Jim entered. Hence, they have the psychological continuity of Dwight’s identity to ensure that Jim is not Dwight.
Hence, having combined the views of Locke and Parfit, and contrasting these views with counter-arguments of Reid and Locke, it is important to recognise that I have reached the definition of identity being that: a person’s identity is primarily concerned with their psychological connectedness, and subjective character experience. However, when a person enters a society, their bodily continuity also plays a role in their identity. This is because it acts as an indicator to other members of society that the individual has an identity, and thus they exist, and might begin to build the individual’s identity in the eyes of other members of society. Nonetheless, if an individual is unable to maintain their psychological connectedness, as explored before, then an objective observer can guarantee their identity, as they know what the individual said and did previously.
Before reaching a conclusion, it is important to, again, clearly define the issue presented in the stimulus. The issue lies in that Jim has dressed up as Dwight, assuming his dialect and mannerisms, thus it raises the issue of what identity is composed, as Dwight believes that Jim has stolen his identity by assuming his physical appearance. It is imperative to also recognise the role of Pam, as I draw to answer the question, as an external observer on the matters at hand, and thus can act as if the carer for an Alzheimer’s patient.
In conclusion, having examined the approaches of several philosophers and applying their concepts to the stimulus, it has become clear that identity is not exclusively composed of an individual’s appearance. One can conclude this by application of Locke’s ideas and Parfit’s reductionist view (Fields, 1987), alongside my slight modifications to it. Jim’s physical appearance is similar to Dwight’s, so are his mannerisms; however, when one looks at the required ‘psychological continuity’ and ‘subjective character experience’ it becomes evident that Jim has not assumed Dwight’s identity, as they still have distinct psychological experiences. Moreover, this idea is supported by my concept of an ‘objective observer’, in this case Pam, who can vouch that Jim is not Dwight, as she can remember what Dwight was doing, before Jim entered the room dressed as Dwight. However, you could criticize my idea as an objective observer cannot necessarily guarantee the psychological continuity of Dwight, therefore Pam can only guarantee that someone who looked like Dwight, and has the same mannerisms, was sitting in the room, before another person dressed to look like Dwight entered. Nonetheless, as Jim has separate experiences to Dwight, and in the ‘confessional’ speaks as Jim not Dwight, it is evident that identity is something beyond the physical appearance. This ‘something’ probably takes the form of the consciousness, as explored by Locke. One could expand on my argument of identity by the use of Annette Baier’s ‘second-selves’ (Baier, 1986), an idea which explores the differing meanings of identity, depending on setting. This idea suggests that, in the setting of society, identity is concerned with the physical appearance. Hence, Baier would argue, that, in this social setting, Jim does assume the identity of Dwight, as his physical appearance, mannerisms and dialect is identical to that of Dwight’s. Furthermore, Dennett may add another, more complex, dimension to this argument of identity in the form of ‘Where am I?’ (Dennett, 1978) which explores the belonging of the consciousness and posits that it is inherently linked with the physical form, thus stipulating that one’s identity must be composed of one’s physical appearance. However, by consideration of the philosophies applied in this essay, of which there are many more, it can be shown that identity is not necessarily exclusively composed of physical appearance, but also involves an aspect of consciousness, as discussed by Locke (Locke, 1689).
In this paper, I shall attempt to discuss personal identity and the different theories of personal identity. I shall make the particular case of the Cartesian theory, and provide a refutation against the soul theory, and a counter-refutation to the same from Indian philosophical thought.
Personal identity theory is a philosophical investigation into the concept of self. Decoding the problem of personal identity means exploring the concept of the persistence of “entities”. Truthmaker theory establishes a link between the truth and what there is. To decipher personal identity is to identify the truth-makers of statements about personal identity – how do we know the true value of the statement that a person A at time t1and a person B at time t2 are the same? (Cameron, 2008).
The persistence question deals with personal identity across the span of time and attempts to answer important questions about the conditions of survival or mortality. Philosophers explore two aspects of personal identity – the epistemological question of necessary and sufficient conditions for a person P2 at a time, t2 to be the same person as a person P1 at an earlier time t1 (Locke, 1700/1975) and, what evidence of observation and experience can support this surmise (e.g. Shoemaker 1970).
Western philosophy has approached the question “What is the self?” in many ways. The most obvious theory of personal identity is the body theory. A is the same person as B if B’s body is the same body as A’s body. It is in line with Aristotle’s general account of the identity of substances. For Aristotle, the essential properties would include not merely shape and physiological properties, but a manner of behaving and the ability for thought and feel. (Graham, 1987).
Another widely discussed view is the memory theory of personal identity, made popular by John Locke. In this view, a person can think reflectively and think of himself as persisting over time. He is accountable for his actions, as he can think for himself over time and can anticipate future punishment or reward. (Locke, 1700/1975). The ‘memory theory of personal identity” treats the connection between consciousness and memory as central to personal identity.
Major objections arose to the memory theory, arising from the possibility of duplication and that memory claims that “cannot be checked are plausible, provide explanations of unexplained facts, and so on” (Williams, 1973). Contemporary philosophers tend to focus on the brain, as it takes into account the insight of memory-and-character, while still being the part of the body that constitutes the continuity of the identity. The brain theory, however, faces the same obstacle of duplication as the memory theory.
Derek Parfit advocated one way out of this duplication problem through the complex theory in which he outlined the logical possibility, of in-between cases of persons who are to some extent the same as; and to some extent different, from original persons. (Parfit, 1971). An alternative way out of the duplication problem is to say that personal identity is distinct from both memory and brain continuity, but both provide evidence of the identity.
This leads back to what is known as the Simple view propounded by Plato, Descartes and a host of religions, that persons are “immaterial souls or pure egos” (Corcoran, 2001). The soul theory treats the body as contingent, as souls can live after bodies cease to exist. While the soul theory may be passé in Western philosophical thought, it has numerous proponents such as Plato, Descartes, Thomas Reid (1785/1969) and Swinburne (1984, 2013). The Cartesian theory assumes a mental subject is a non-physical entity that is distinct from a human body, and any part thereof. Cartesian dualism is the view that personal identity consists of two parts – a material part, the body; and an immaterial part, the soul. The soul provides the answer to the persistent question of personal identity, and while it is connected to the body, it can be delinked and reconnected to a new body.
“We may say that there is stuff of another kind, immaterial stuff, and that persons are made of both normal bodily matter and of this immaterial stuff but that it is the continuity of the latter which provides that continuity of stuff which is necessary for the identity of the person over time” (Swinburne 1984, p. 27).
Refutation of the Soul Theory
The dilemma with the soul theory comes from the question of whether souls remain the same. Either souls change over time or they do not. If souls change over time, the problem is analogous to the problem of personal identity (Berger,2017).
Hume presents some arguments against the persistence of the soul in The Treatise. If sensations can exist in isolation, there is no need for the self, as mental states must inhere in the soul. In his view, as impressions are transient, it is impossible to have a persistent self. Since sensations can themselves be independent of anything else, it does not require a soul, in which they reside. A soul is supposed to be something permanent. However, since mental states change constantly, there cannot be a concept of an enduring soul (Bettcher, 2009).
Swinburne argues that souls are essential parts of human beings, however, he argues against souls being individuated by their mental properties. Souls can change their lose mental properties, however, the underlying soul substances are themselves indivisible and unchanging. (Graham, 1987)
If souls have to change mental states and intentions, then a soul S1 at time t1 need not have the same mental properties at a later time t2. If souls can have distinct sets of mental properties over time, then the soul theory faces the same challenges as the body theory of personal identity. Consider Locke’s thought experiment (1690/1975) that involves the prince and the cobbler. If the minds of the cobbler and the prince are interchanged, the cobbler inhabits the prince’s body. If one could alter the mental states of souls suddenly, and if the soul of Gandhi bearing a set of mental states M1 became the soul of Hitler bearing a set of mental states M2 at time t1 would Gandhi continue to exist at t2 as it has the psychological profile of Hitler, or is Gandhi Hitler at t2? (Berger, 2017). By Swinburne’s argument, the soul of Gandhi would remain the soul of Gandhi, despite taking on psychological features of the soul of Hitler, because its unchanging substance persists.
On the other hand, if the souls are not individuated by their psychological properties, then it is unclear how to answer the question of whether or not souls persist, and more importantly, why does the underlying soul substance persist? If souls are individuated by their mental states, then it is similar to the psychological-continuity-based view defended by Locke. This kind of soul theory faces the fission problem (Parfit 1971; Lewis 1976). Or what happens when the souls S1 at t1, splits at t2 into two psychologically equivalent individuals S3 and S4? Whom is S1 identical with in this case? Likewise, if a soul S1 at t1 could “fissure” into two psychologically equivalent souls S3 and S4- which of them is identical with S1? Changing souls do not resolve the issue of diachronic soul identity and hence, cannot solve the personal identity issue (Berger, 2017).
Counter refutation of refutation to soul theory
The question of personal identity makes sense only within a subjective context. (Correia,2009). Western philosophy approaches issues of identity from the outside in; from the metaphysical to the epistemological. Personal identity is a central theme in classical Indian thought. The defining characteristic of classical Indian philosophy consists in the elucidation of a concept designated by “âtman”. References to the word ‘Ātman’ are found in the Rig Veda. It is also a central idea in the Upanishads and is explained as an all-pervading organism in which other elements are united and it has the ability to perceive feelings (Easwaran, 2007).
Buddhist philosophy inquires into the nature of self and outlines that the experience of the Self is given in the existence of a personality(skandhas) comprising five attributes, namely, form (rûpa), sensations (vedanâ), perceptions (saññâ), emotions (sankhâra) and consciousness (viññâna). Vasubandhu presumes that the external world can only be comprehended through the five external senses and that a pudgala is part of the external world. (Tuske, 2017). Since only the aggregates are perceived, the self does not have an existence over and above the aggregates, affirming that the skandas are real, while the self is unreal.
In conclusion, all theories of personal identity come with their own challenges. Western philosophical thought has always approached issues from a metaphysical perspective and tried to examine things as substances, whereas Indian philosophical thought has approached things from the perspective of cognition. This creates remarkable differences in the study of the issue of personal identity, and I personally subscribe to the soul theory because of its close interlinkages to my Vedic upbringing and belief in karma and reincarnation.
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