Pearl Harbor Attack: Paranoia and Conspiracy

Conspiracy theories are hypotheses that represent a sequence of socially significant events, some historical phenomenon, or the course of history in general as a result of a conspiracy organized by a group of people that manage this process in personal, group, or other interests. The theory of global conspiracy excites the minds of millions of people all over the world from ancient times. People believe in the power of the alien or the collusion of doctors, covering thus their fears, inaction, and hope for the future.

According to a conspiracy theory related to the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt was informed of the impending attack and had not warned military commanders in Hawaii in order to involve the country in World War II while the majority of Americans and, in particular, members of Congress were against entering the war in Europe (King 2012). It is argued that Roosevelt had been warned by the authorities of Great Britain, Australia, Peru, Korea, and the Soviet Union. However, the President did nothing to minimize the US government losses. In this connection, the core issue under discussion is why people believe in the above theory and even support it.

First, in order to analyze the question in-depth, it seems essential to point several crucial moments of this story. December 7, 1941, Japanese aircraft carrier crept to the Hawaiian Islands in the strike distance and hit at 7:55 AM (King 2012). Also, several planes carrying bombs, torpedoes, and depth bombs suddenly attacked the US Atlantic Fleet. The results were disruptive: 343 aircraft were destroyed, 2, 459 soldiers and civilians were killed, and 1, 282 people were injured. Within twenty-four hours after the attack, the United States declared war against Japan.

The conspiracy theory supporters consider that the US government was aware of the preparation of aggression. However, it should be noted that the vast majority of historians do not share a similar suspicion. Therefore, plenty of Americans have heard of this theory in the form of an open question. Most conspiracy theory arguments came from the Day of Deceit book by Robert Stinnett that was published in 2001. The book contains an innuendo over the previous 59 years.

Perhaps, the most suspicious is the fact of the absence of all three US aircraft carriers in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor during the attack. It is logical to assume that knowing about the possible attack, the President should bring the most valuable ships. The events that occurred a few hours before are less known to the public. At 6:42 AM, the four hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the midget submarine was discovered by the Japanese Navy (Stinnett 63).

Further, at 7:02, Opana Point, fleet post radar, found the approach of the Japanese aircraft. It was reported to Kermit Tyler, a commander of the post, who took the station operators for breakfast. This inaction is discussed with great suspicion by supporters of conspiracy theories.

Then, ten days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Kimmel was ordered to deploy ships in the defensive formation. During the Japanese aviation attack, US ships were in Pearl Harbor, the sailors slept, and the planes are not dispersed, making them an easy target (Stinnett 72). Also, combined with the fact that the Americans deciphered Japanese diplomatic code called Purple, had some progress in breaking the JN-25 military code, and have access to the Japanese intelligence service, conspiracy theorists consider these events as allowing Japan attacking the US Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor.

It should be emphasized that many other authors do not agree with Stinnett and, in particular, Henry Clausen, who published Pearl Harbor: the final conclusions in 1992. In 1944, the US Secretary of War ordered Clausen, a lawyer, to conduct an independent investigation of the events preceding the tragedy of Pearl Harbor (Clausen 25). The report was declassified before the date of publication of the book. Clausen found plenty of flaws, but nothing to talk about cold-bloodedly planned conspiracy. Roosevelt knew no more than the others. Historians and conspiracy theorists found the only one consensus: Admiral Kimmel was made a scapegoat for the tragedy at Pearl Harbor as almost everything that happened at Pearl Harbor was the result of his orders.

Let us discuss the factors that make people believe in the mentioned conspiracy theory. Sociologists and psychologists have found that conspiracy theories arise after the occurrence of alarm events: acts of terrorism, technological and natural disasters, the death of the famous figures of politics, or economic crises. Although it is impossible to uniquely reject or accept the conspiracy theory, many of them describe the actually existing or existed events. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that these conspirators are so coordinated and accurate. The development of the world is not a one-way process as there is plenty of factors and trends, and sometimes all it occurs deliberately and controllably. However, conspiratologists collect only the necessary arguments discarding those that contradict them.

One of the key causes of conspiracy theories is the secrecy inherent in the political and public activities. While this area of privacy of security services exists, there is the audience that will always have a reason to question the official version of some significant events. There are a number of factors, but probably one of the most significant in this case is that, paradoxically, this conspiracy theory gives people a sense of control (Kenrick par. 7).

A study of psychological phenomena revealed the following features: it is psychologically easier for a person to explain the events in bad faith or the will of individuals as well as their negative traits, not taking into account objective factors of the environment—natural, economic, social, or political. People hate randomness as they are afraid of disorder that can destroy the course of their lives. Speaking as a mechanism against the fear, it turns out that it is much easier to believe in conspiracy. When people have someone to blame, then it is not just a coincidence. Belief in this theory pushes people to control their lives better, explaining the surrounding events.

At the heart of this conspiracy theory, there is a need or a motive to believe in this theory, and it is a psychological trait of thinking that is different from the one based on the evidence. The most difficult thing related to conspiracy theories is that “they’re usually based on farfetched claims that are nearly impossible to disprove, or prove” (Shrira par. 3). In other words, the conspiracy theory is not susceptible to the evidence. If the theory rejects the evidence or gets another interpretation, it is called an airtight argument. First of all, any unusual event will be accompanied by a conspiracy theory. Whatever happens tomorrow, this will be linked to the conspiracy theory.

In this connection, it is crucial to the point that this conspiracy theory meets human needs. Stress, tension, and emotions caused by alarming and frightening events affect the productivity and lead to the formation of the individual needs, a person seeks to satisfy including:

  • The need for security;
  • The need for group support;
  • The need to restore the emotional balance;
  • The need for a rational explanation of the ongoing situation;
  • The need to place their experiences;
  • The need to be heard.

Another reason for believing in this conspiracy theory is stress. Stressful situations impair the ability to think analytically. If people experience a stressful event in their life, they are more prone to a certain type of thinking. Namely, they tend to recognize certain patterns and events which do not exist. Therefore, stressful events can sometimes help to strengthen conspiracy thinking. Thus, the theory itself is a response to the crisis that has happened and arose in connection with the experience.

However, the continuous support of the theory is the intention to meet the above needs. Kenrick believes that “The human brain is designed for conspiracy theories” (par. 2). The human brain is a complicated mechanism that reacts according to evolutionary peculiarities. In particular, the ancestors of modern people had to worry about safety and response to any threats immediately. Likewise, people are prone to believe in strange, mysterious, and frightening events, even if there is no truthful evidence.

In its turn, the media also contributes to the expansion of this conspiracy theory. For example, in his article posted in The Telegraph, Goddard states that the attack was not a surprise as the US Navy was aware of it. He notes that “The information, contained in a declassified memorandum from the Office of Naval Intelligence, adds to the proof that Washington dismissed red flags signaling that mass bloodshed was looming, and the war was imminent” history is primarily driven by randomness 12 (Goddard para. 3).

This proves the fact that controversies around Pearl Harbor are never to stop as the topic is always among the most disputed ones. No matter how many journalists conduct investigations related to conspiracy theories, supporters are not to become fewer. Another media source tries to explain why people tend to believe in the mentioned theory from the perspectives of psychology. Zimmerman points out that “The American people reeled with a mind staggering mixture of surprise, awe, mystification, grief, humiliation, and, above all, cataclysmic fury” (par. 1). In other words, media might play both a positive and negative role in the conspiracy theory expansion.

Why do people believe in it? The conspiracy theory of an attack at Pearl Harbor creates the illusion of global manipulation. At the same time, it gives meaning to everything that happened as well as a sense of control. Even if the control in the hands of the villains, it is still better than to acknowledge that history is primarily driven by randomness. Another reason is that this theory of conspiracy is to simplify everything. Despite the apparent complexity, it gives an explanation that can be easily understood by people. The real reasons might be too complicated, too numerous for a clear explanation, or might even be incomprehensible to anyone.

Works Cited

Clausen, Henry C. Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement. New York, NY: Crown, 2001. Print.

Goddard, Jacqui. “Pearl Harbour Memo Shows US Warned of Japanese Attack.” The Telegraph. Telegraph Media Group. 2011. Web.

Kenrick, Douglas. “Why the Human Brain Is Designed to Distrust.” Psychology Today. N.p. 2011. Web.

King, Jamie. Conspiracy Theories: A Guide to the World’s Most Intriguing Mysteries. Chichester, UK: Summersdale, 2015. Print.

Shrira, Ilan. “Paranoia and the Roots of Conspiracy Theories.” Psychology Today. N.p.. 2008. Web.

Stinnett, Robert B. Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor. New York, NY: Free, 2001. Print.

Zimmerman, Dwight. “Pearl Harbor Conspiracy Theories Live On.” Defense Media Network. N.p. 2011. Web.

The Impact of the Attack on Pearl Harbor

Introduction

Towards the end of the 1930s, Japan had managed to expand its military influence in the Pacific. This nation was also pessimistic that the United States’ entry into the ongoing global upheaval could affect its hegemonic position. In order to prevent this possible outcome, Japan designed a powerful plan to cripple the United States’ army and make it impossible for it to engage in war. This strategy led to the infamous Pearl Harbor attack that claimed the lives of over 2,400 people. This historical event would have long-term impacts that would eventually change the world forever.

The Impacts of the Pearl Harbor Attack

Toland indicates that the Pearl Harbor attack compelled the U.S. government to investigate an attempt to understand the issues surrounding this event (31). The report led to the dismissal of different commanders who had failed to offer adequate protection. The short-term impact of this attack was that the government designed several camps on the country’s mainland. The purpose of such encampments was to confine all people who had Japanese descent. The same treatment was also used to punish Italians and Germans in the country.

Many historians have indicated that this attack informed the United States’ decision to declare war against Japan (Bode and Heo 135). Since this surprise assault led to the destruction of eight battleships and around 200 planes, the Japanese believed that America had a crippled navy that could not sustain the ongoing war. Fortunately, the country managed to join the Allies to deal with the challenges facing the world. Within a short duration, most of the battleships damaged after the attack were repaired and launched to engage in different battles.

The wave of militarism that had existed after the end of the 19th century forced many countries to form and sign treaties. Such pacts were crucial due to the existing rivalry in Europe and beyond. The Tripartite Pact that had been signed by Germany, Japan, and Italy explained why the United States attracted new enemies. America’s declaration of war against the state of Japan forced the Axis to be against it (Nagata et al. 361). Consequently, America was forced to join the ongoing wars in Europe and Asia. With the country focusing on the reality of the Pearl Harbor attack, it was quite clear that there was a need to join the Allies (Russia, France, and Britain) and make the world safe again.

America’s entry into the war was critical since it sealed the fate of the Second World War and the future of the world. By the year 1940, the Allies were finding it hard to deal with the challenges and problems experienced in Europe. Toland indicates that the Germans were unstoppable and unpredictable during the time (73). They boasted of competent engineers and professionals who produced superior and sophisticated machines such as warplanes, submarines, and missiles. The infamous “enigma codes” used by the Germans were hard to monitor and crack (Bode and Heo 139). These aspects had made it impossible for the Allies to deal with the German problem in Europe.

The United States’ decision to retaliate after the Pearl Harbor attack sealed the Allies’ victory in Europe. This was the case because the war was not being fought on American soil (Bode and Heo 141). Consequently, the country’s citizens and professionals offered adequate materials and resources that turned the tables in Europe. Domestic workers in American produced different foodstuffs and commodities that met the needs of many soldiers in Europe and Asia. The country’s army was also equipped with superior resources and weapons. This means that the Americans provided essential assistance that made it easier for the Allies to emerge victoriously.

Toland goes further to acknowledge that the Pearl Harbor attack should be outlined as the most important event that made the United States a global superpower (64). The country’s engagement in Second World War proved to the world that a new order had emerged. The Japanese and Germans eventually realized that they had engaged a superior nation that possessed adequate resources and expertise.

Another consequence of this attack that cannot be taken lightly is the invention of the atomic bomb. In 1945, Japan surrendered after the Americans dropped two weapons in Japan’s Nagasaki and Hiroshima cities With these bombs claiming the lives of over one hundred thousand people and others perishing after several months, the world acknowledged that the nuclear age had come (Nagata et al. 362). These explosive devices marked the end of the Second World War. However, America realized that it had attracted a new enemy (Russia) after 1945. This rivalry would result in the infamous Cold War that transformed the nature of international relations.

Conclusion

Although Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor can be described as a small event, historians have admitted that it forced the United States to join the war in Europe. This decision would result in the defeat of Japan and Germany in 1945. The country would also emerge victoriously and develop the world’s first nuclear weapon. These subsequent events led to the Cold War, thereby changing global relations forever.

Works Cited

Bode, Ingvild, and Seunghoon E. Heo. “World War II Narratives in Contemporary Germany and Japan: How University Students Understand their Past.” International Studies Perspectives, vol. 18, no. 2, 2017, pp. 131-154.

Nagata, Donna K., et al. “Processing Cultural Trauma: Intergenerational Effects of the Japanese American Incarceration.” Journal of Social Issues: A Journal of the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Studies, vol. 71, no. 2, 2015, pp. 356-370.

Toland, John. Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2014.

Pearl Harbor and 9/11: Intelligence Failure

Introduction

Some of the most dreadful incidents in the US are easy to pinpoint. Such cases include the death of President John Kennedy, the Pearl Harbor attack, and the 9/11 terrorist assault. In particular, the Pearl Harbor and the 9/11 may be viewed as the most traumatic events, considering the tension they caused in the entire US. Remarkably, many studies have continuously compared the two events pointing that they share many similarities. The most prominent claim, which forms the basis of the discussion in this paper, is that both events were a case of intelligence failure. Indeed, the cases of intelligence failure reoccur with disappointing regularity.

Subsequently, a committee is formed to identify the faults and/or recommend how they can be averted. Both traumatic events led to the formation of a body to investigate of the shortfalls. Based on the findings of the bodies and the ongoing discussion among Americans concerning the similarities, the ensuing discourse compares the events of 7 December and 11 September. The initial section will briefly describe the facts of the incidents. Subsequently, it will offer a comparison of the intelligence failure in both cases with a substantial consideration of the intelligence process. The discussion will conclude that the events were more different, rather than similar as many people suggest.

Facts of 9/11 and the Pearl Harbor Attack

The Pearl Harbor Incident

The attacks of the Pearl Harbor began during late 1941. About 350 Japanese planes struck the US Pacific Fleet based in Pearl Harbor and the neighboring airfields. The synchronized attack lasted for about two hours, leaving appalling results. About 2,400 Americans died while 1000 others suffered injuries. Close to 10 battleships were dented while more than 160 American planes were damaged. The Japanese people only lost about 30 aircrafts and five submarines. About 185 Japanese soldiers were also killed while others were injured. Evidently, Americans lost in the attack. Traditionally, the expected ratio of an aggressor against a defender should be three to one. At the close of 1941, the ratio was nothing close to the normal ratio. One Japanese casualty accounted for every twenty Americans deaths or injuries. The scenario was not only disheartening but also unforeseen.

Americans were devastated. Four investigative bodies were established to examine the probable causes of the attack and/or recommend the way forward. Justice Owen J. Roberts led the first panel. He was serving as the Supreme Court Associate Justice. The panel also comprised retired Army Generals and Navy admirals. After conducting its investigation, the Roberts Commission concluded that top Army and Navy officials in Hawaii should have been held accountable for the traumatic events that occurred in 7 December. Subsequently, according to Blewett (2015, p. 86), the Navy and Army who were in charge of the Hawaii jurisdiction were relieved of their duties.

After the Roberts Commission completed the assignment, the Army Pearl Harbor Board was instituted under the leadership of the Secretary of War, as well as Secretary of the Navy, to examine information concerning the calamity. The panel performed its duty for three months, collecting data from 151 witnesses. Its investigations were far much overstretched compared to the Roberts Commission. Soon after, Senator Alben W. Barkley led a Joint Committee in analyzing the consequences and factors that caused the Japanese people to attack America (Cole 2010, p. 8).

The committee, which comprised members of different parties, condemned the performance of national defense structure as being responsible for the distressing impact of the Pearl Harbor assault. Indeed, the subsequent investigations that were conducted after the Roberts Commission mainly due to the congressional dissatisfaction with the findings of the presidents initiated the establishment of a panel to recheck the matter (Markham 2005, p. 217).

Cole (2010, p. 14) asserts that the findings of the investigating panel constantly implied that the US should have foreseen a potential attack from Japan. The apprehensive relationship between the US and Japan began when the US confronted the Philippines back in 1898. The Japanese government considered the American action an assault on Japan. The situation was further exacerbated when America pushed Japan to opt for a warship ratio that they had disliked in 1922. Japan did not welcome this diplomatic triumph. Instead, it created a hostile relationship between the two governments. However, American intelligence had sources that spied the Japanese military prowess. Hence, the US had no need to fear.

Meanwhile, Japan was constantly disturbed by on its conquests. It sought to take actions to cripple the Americans. Attacking America’s principle war instrument, namely the US Pacific Fleet, and/or defending any counter attacks appeared as the most viable option to remove America from the Japanese territories in East Asia. Conversely, the US did not conceive that such an attack could occur since it underestimated Japanese potential (Markham 2005, p. 219). However, consuls, shipmasters, and other relevant officials were reporting on Japanese forces moving southwards. Despite receiving information on Japan’s potential, the US government only viewed such an attack as irrational, especially because it (the US) was a superpower. Therefore, the notion that the Pearl Harbor was an intelligence failure is defensible. This claim will become clearer in the subsequent sections of this paper.

The 9/11 Attack

According to Perrow (2005, p. 99), the 9/11 assault comprised a sequence of four synchronized extremists attacks that were perpetuated by the Al-Qaeda, an Islamic terrorist movement. The attackers directed their assault on key figurative American landmarks. About 20 Al-Qaeda extremists seized four airplanes headed to California and directed them to specific buildings in the US, including Pentagon, North and South Towers of the World Trade Center, and in Pennsylvania. The results of the attack were tragic. About 2,996 lives were lost and property worth $10 billion demolished. In total, the cost of damage was $3 trillion. Several police officers and firefighters died in the process of rescuing the victims. The attack destabilized the American economy, particularly the Lower Manhattan area where it affected citizens from more than ninety nations (Blewett 2015, p. 86).

Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al-Qaeda, initially refuted any involvement in the attack but later accepted responsibility. He asserted that the assault was a response to the US constant funding of Israel and other non-Islamic regimes in Muslim-dominated countries. Khalid Sheikh Mohamed did the investigations in 1996 before bin Laden authorized him (Mohamed) to continue with the idea in 1999. Under the leadership of bin Laden, the terrorist movement identified jihadists who were best qualified to perform the attack (Marrin 2011, p. 182).

Accomplishing the task relied highly on the capability of the attackers to get American visas and successfully go through the US Immigration Checkers. Moreover, they sought to live in America unnoticed to perfect the plan. Consequently, the hijackers acquired the necessary documents, entered the country, and adopted a normal life of the inhabitants. For instance, in preparing the September 11, the perpetrators even took flight training in American schools. The hijackers acquired the skills that could help them to operate the planes (Lowenthal 2014, p. 20).

The situation led to the reorganization of the government, legislation of new policies, and the formation of panels to investigate the assault. The Department of Homeland Security was established to devise mechanisms for preventing terrorist activities in the US. Nonetheless, suspicions also rose among citizens who questioned how the government could fail to detect such an attack (Marrin 2011, p. 184). The Joint Inquiry was formed to respond to such doubts. However, the citizens did not welcome the findings. Markham (2005, p. 219) asserts that the 9/11 Commission had to go through many setbacks before submitting its reports. Reports such as the 9/11 have shown that the US had the capability to predict the occurrence of the Al-Qaeda-driven incident. The intelligence failure in 9/11 reminded most Americans of the Pearl Harbor and probably triggered the popular assertion that the attacks share many things. The subsequent section will examine the intelligence failure of these two traumatic national disasters in the American history.

Intelligence Failure

According to Blewett (2015, p. 87), there are several similarities between the Pearl Harbor and the 9/11 attacks. Both are claimed to have occurred because of intelligence failure. To determine the validity of this claim, consideration has been made on whether there was sufficient information to point to the probability of occurrence of an attack and/or whether the attacks would have been curtailed by proper analysis and dissemination of the information. It is also important to understand the role played by American intelligence bureaucracy concerning the inability to stop the attacks. In December 1941, the Pearl Harbor attack occurred in Hawaii. The strategic intelligence was aware that an attack on the US was likely to occur.

Admiral Kimmel and General Short of the Navy and Army respectively were tasked with preparing for war with Japan in Hawaii in 1941. The war was caused by the role that the US was playing in trying to quell Japanese aggression in Asia. An official message of preparation for war was disseminated from the superiors in Washington, including Admiral Harold R. Stark and General George Marshall. The information was released in November 1941 warning of an impending and probable attack over the following few days because of the failure of their negotiations with Japan and Japan’s acts of aggression.

In the September 11 attacks, the strategic intelligence was also aware of the probability of an attack occurring on the US soil. The Al-Qaeda had attacked the World Trade Center in 1993, the Kenyan and Tanzanian US embassies in 1998, and Yemen in 2000. These acts were indicators to the intelligence offices of the likelihood of the US being the target of a terrorist attack (Lowenthal 2014, p. 31).

Strategic intelligence was aware of the probability of Hawaii being the target of an attack during the December 7 attacks. After the two officers, Kimmel and Short had taken office, they received official reports of the possibility of a surprise attack commencing Japanese hostilities. The attack was probably going to be on the Fleet or Naval Base at Pearl Harbor. The report also gave information that the most likely means of attack would be air bombing or air torpedo, which would require aircrafts as carriers. There was also intelligence information to the US on the probability of the World Trade Center and Pentagon.

Following the Islamic extremists attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, it became apparent to the US intelligence that it was probable for it to be a target of attack. On the other hand, the Pentagon is the control and command center of the US Armed Forces. For this reason, it was a very probable target. Information was available proving that the attack on a US target was imminent before the Pearl Harbor assault. The information was disseminated from Washington on November 27, 1941. It mentioned the possible target areas and the means of attack, as well as the timeline, which was within a few days from the time of the notice (Blewett 2015, p. 87).

Conversely, although there was information showing the probability of an attack occurring, there was none to indicate the imminence of the US being attacked before the 9/11 attacks. There was no information to indicate the specific location of either the Pearl Harbor or the 9/11 attacks. Decrypted messages from the Japanese diplomatic agencies indicated that there would be an attack on the US soil on 7 December 1941.

However, the information was not of any help to the officers because the intelligence indicated that the most probable targets of attack would be their forces in Guam or Philippines. Although there was the lack of intelligence, the sinking of a submarine at 6.40am at the Pearl Harbor should have acted as intelligence or a tactical warning that would have given the intelligence team one and a quarter hours’ notice that would have made a difference in how the attack played out. There was no information that indicated to the US intelligence that the Pentagon or World Trade Center was going to be attacked by the Al-Qaeda in the immediate future (Marrin 2011, p. 185).

Before both the Pearl Harbor and the 9/11 attacks, there was intelligence on the methods of attack that were deemed most probable in the event of an attack. Both of them were predicted to be carrier airstrikes or commercial airliners. In 1924, after his Asia tour, Brigadier General Bill Mitchell indicated that Hawaii was likely to be attacked by a carrier airstrike. Additionally, in 1930, Naval War College conducted war games, which indicated that a carrier attack was most probable (Perrow 2005, p. 101). The message that was given from Washington on 27 November 1941 also indicated that an airstrike was the most probable means of hitting in the impending attacks.

Before the 9/11 attacks, intelligence experts conjectured for over ten years that a commercial airliner would be used by terrorists as a flying weapon to attack the US. 1n 1993, a report by Marvin Cetron indicated that airplanes posed a threat of being used for bombing. According to the report, an airstrike would make it possible for the US White House and Pentagon to be hit concurrently. The officers who were tasked with preventing the Hawaii attack had more information to examine as compared to those who were in operation during the 9/11 attacks (Lowenthal 2014, p. 32).

In both attacks, there was no information to indicate that the Japanese or the Al-Qaeda would use airliners or carriers. There was no certainty, but only information of probability. The US Navy was aware of Japan’s intimidating carrier capacity. However, the Navy failed to know about Japanese policies that allowed carriers’ autonomy of operation from the rest of the surface ships. The Navy was also oblivious of the planned Japanese airstrike on the US Fleet based in Hawaii. As for the 9/11 attacks, despite the speculation by Marvin Cetron of an airstrike as a means of attack on the US, the counterterrorism unit of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) considered an airborne suicide bombing one of the many probable means of attack on the US. However, the US intelligence had no knowledge by concerning Al-Qaeda’s plot to hijack a commercial airliner for the purpose of aerial bombing (Lowenthal 2014, p. 33).

Before the Pearl Harbor attack, the US Navy was aware of the Japanese capability to conduct an air attack on Hawaii. Information available to intelligence agencies indicated the probability of the attacks on Hawaii being airstrikes. They were also aware that Japan was well armed and that it was capable of unleashing an attack. They were also aware that Japan preferred surprise attacks and that the US no longer had a track of the Japanese carriers. Conversely, before the 9/11 attacks, the US did not have information that the Al-Qaeda had the capacity to unleash an airstrike on Pentagon and the World Trade Center.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was aware that Al-Qaeda had used high explosives on previous occasions to bomb the US targets. However, the agency did not have information that the Al-Qaeda had the capacity to operate an airstrike. Although it was aware that the Al-Qaeda could hijack commercial planes, it did not imagine that the terrorist group had the expertise to fly the plane independently and convert it into an aerial bomb (Lowenthal 2014, p. 34).

Contrary to the case of the 9/11 attack, there was the tactical intelligence of an attack on the Pearl Harbor. In December 1941, the USS Ward sank a submarine at the Pearl Harbor entrance. This event alone would have given the US a tactical advantage of seventy-five minutes. Additionally, the Army sensor discovered an increased number of aircraft approaching Oahu. This discovery was made early in the morning. It would have been an indicator of the predicted Japanese attack. However, the officers in charge dismissed the signs, speculating on the significance of the occurrences. It was only after the first bomb was released that they realized that the attack was occurring. For the 9/11 attacks, the first plane struck the World Trade Center at some few minutes to 9 a.m., although the case was misreported by media as an accident (Marrin 2011, p. 185). Nevertheless, fifteen minutes later, the second plane hit the south tower. The nature of the attack was then realized.

The above situation brings up the issue of indications and warnings, which may be more apparent in cases of war as compared to terrorism. Terrorism comes mostly with the element of surprise and less need for large numbers of people, thus making it harder to detect. Indications and warnings had been present during the December 7 attacks, including the encrypted diplomatic messages and the sinking of the submarine, as well as the increase in the number of the aircraft in the army’s radar. However, the officers dismissed the warnings. There is a possibility that the US would have found indications and warnings for the 9/11 attacks, had there not been a great underestimation of the capacity of the Al-Qaeda to attack (Marrin 2011, p. 186).

Both the December 7 and September 11 attacks are examples of intelligence failure. However, a difference is evident in the circumstances that surrounded them. The former had more information about the attack as compared to the latter. Therefore, it is important to scrutinize the difference in the cause of intelligence failure in the two cases. In the Pearl Harbor attack, the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) was to collect information that would have protected Hawaii from the attacks. Only the Navy and Army had the intelligence services to gather such information.

Given the impending threat posed to Hawaii and Guam, ONI had the responsibility to keep track of Japanese aircraft, ships, ordinance, and any of the Japanese policies that would be a threat to the US. Because ONI did not have spies in Tokyo, it used an American Naval attaché who gathered information from print media and other public information sources. Linguistic and cultural barriers made it even harder for the body to collect information (Cole 2010, p. 3). Therefore, the US intelligence remained in the dark about the attack. As for the 9/11, it is argued that if the US had missed several opportunities, and that had it had been more skillful in considering the threat posed by Al-Qaeda, the plot would have been uncovered (Blewett 2015, p. 88).

Conclusion

The world is quickly transforming and becoming more hostile. Any slight mistake from the security department may have significant consequences. Intelligence practitioners should consider all information they receive with much gravity. Otherwise, any laxity may lead to tragic events such as those of Pearl Harbor and 9/11 attacks. While most individuals believe that 7 December and September 11 have a lot in common, the two had obvious differences. As a matter of intelligence failure, the nature of the two catastrophes was disparate. While Hawaii Army and Navy officials had adequate facts to anticipate the occurrence of the Pearl Harbor attack, FBI did not have a proper intelligence to avert the attack.

References

Blewett, D 2015, ‘Surprise Attack: From Pearl Harbor to 9/11 to Benghazi’, Library Journal, vol. 140, no. 15, pp. 85-92.

Cole, L 2010, ‘Special National Investigative Commissions: Essential Powers and Procedures (Some Lessons from the Pearl Harbor, Warren Commission, and 9/11 Commission Investigations)’, McGeorge Law Review, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 1-61.

Lowenthal, M 2014, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, SAGE Publications, New Delhi.

Markham, I 2005, ‘The New Pearl Harbor: Disturbing Questions About the Bush Administration and 9/11’, Conversations in Religion & Theology, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 217-236.

Marrin, S 2011, ‘The 9/11 Terrorist Attacks: A Failure of Policy Not Strategic Intelligence Analysis’, Intelligence & National Security, vol. 26, no. 3, pp.182-202.

Perrow, C 2005, ‘A Symposium on the 9/11 Commission Report’, Contemporary Sociology, vol. 34, no. 2, pp. 99-107.

The History of the Attack on Pearl Harbor

Introduction

Originally known as Wai Momi, Pearl of Harbor doubles as the home for the United States Navy base and the US Pacific Fleet in contemporary times. The history of Pearl of Harbor is long; however, some events that happened here evoke sad memories of a sad past. The most important event that took place here is the attack of the American Pacific Fleet by Japan in 1941.

Many American warships berthed in Pearl Harbor on different occasions but the activities around this place went unnoticed just like in any other lagoon harbor around the world. Nevertheless, the events of Sunday December 7, 1941 opened up Pearl Harbor to the world. The attack did not happen overnight; no, it was a culmination of a long-standing feud between the US and Japan.

Seemingly, the attack was the only feasible way out of the tension that was developing between America and Japan day after the other. This library project focuses on the ill-fated Japanese attack that occurred at the Pearl Harbor in Hawaii.

The Attack

Before the attack, the Imperial Japanese Navy was planning to attack the British and the Dutch armies in South East Asia; consequently, because the Japanese Navy feared the American army would get involved in protecting the Britain, they decided to attack the American navy first before proceeding with their mission (Peattie & Evans 64).

Therefore, the Japanese army embarked on intense training, which Barnhart describes as training for war founded on decisive battle philosophy that sought to destroy all battleships involved or at least the maximum number possible (23). The events that preceded the December 7 attack indicated an impending war whose time had come. According to Takeo, the relationship between Japan and America was tense and each knew war would be the ultimate eventuality (45).

The United States of America had continually opposed Japan’s extension into Asia and especially into China. The imminent tensions surfaced in 1940 following Japan’s invasion of Indochina after which the US retaliated by stopping gasoline and airplane export to Japan. In 1941, President Roosevelt deepened the tensions by moving the Pacific Fleet from San Diego to Hawaii coupled with the subsequent establishment of military exercises in the Philippines; a move seen as an attempt to deter Japan’s interest in Fareast.

America was increasingly becoming Japan’s obstacle in her exploits to control greater parts of Far East; finally, Japan decided that, attack was the best defense; as a result, the Japan Navy planned to strike the US Pacific Fleet located at the Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, this was going to be a high stake gamble, which called for serious preparations.

The Japanese Navy took their time to prepare for the attack. The preparation part of it entailed formulating objectives of the attack, a subject that has drawn deep controversies in the recent past. Nevertheless, the chief objective was to destroy as many as possible American warships to cripple the Pacific Fleet’s involvement in any defense strategy towards shielding the Britain in Far East should Japan strike (Willmott 76).

The cause of the attack notwithstanding, Japan was determined to strike the American Pacific Fleet and she never relented on this pursuit. On November 26, 1941, six aircraft carriers left Japan for Hawaii as the battle day drew near. On the other hand, fleet submarines left for Oahu to wait for the day of attack (Hixson 46). The attack strategy entailed two phases, the primary wave aimed at grounding all major military establishments on the Pearl Harbor, and the secondary wave aimed at destroying the remains of the primary wave.

Just before the attack, two aircrafts went ahead to survey Oahu and identify the constitution and position of the American Pacific Fleet. Japan then declared war on the US by sending message that, any peace negotiations were unwelcome and that Japan would announce her next course of action after few days (Donald & Dillon 79). Unfortunately, due to its bulkiness, the message delayed and only managed to reach Washington a day after the war (French 6).

Then the attack came; the first wave of attack encompassed 183 warplanes attacking Oahu followed by the second wave, comprised of 171 warplanes among other war machines including battleships. The primary wave was divided into three groups each attacking from a different frontier while the secondary wave boasted the same number of groups. The groups launched their attacks simultaneously, a show of how to some extent, the attacks were organized.

Calvocoressi, Guy, and Pritchard posit that, among the important war machineries grounded in this attack were, “Helena the light cruiser, Shaw the destroyer, Curtis the seaplane tender, and Oglala the minelayer among others” (73). According to Higham and Harris, about four Japanese warplanes stalled in the middle of the attack possibly due to a technical hitch (97).

The attack lasted for one and half-hours leaving behind “2,386 Americans dead…1139 wounded, eighteen ships sunk, and five battleships grounded” (Toland 9). At this point, the Pearl Harbor was grounded. Fortunately, the American Pacific Fleet retaliated in time to prevent any attempt to launch a third wave of attack.

By the time, the Japanese Navy launched its second wave of attack; the American side had recollected itself and responded appropriately. In the retaliation, the American side managed to destroy Japan’s 414 aircrafts, killing 55 Japanese soldiers (Levine 132). After the attack, salvage efforts started led by Captain Homer Wallin and managed to re-float several ships even though it took almost six months to clear the first ship of debris and water. Conroy and Harry observe that, it took over one year to complete the salvage work (60).

One day after the attack, the then USA president, Roosevelt called for formal resolution of war against Japan, something that the Congress approved within one hour (Raymer 19). Following the America’s declaration of war against Japan, Germany and Italy announced war against the US and this heralded the subsequent birth of World War II.

Conclusion

Were it not for the December 7, 1941 Japanese attack, the mention of ‘Pearl Harbor’ would go unnoticed by many people in the contemporary America. However, the events of the morning of December 7, 1941 left many Americans puzzled by what seemingly incapable Japan would do. No one would have imagined Japan attacking the USA; nevertheless, to the surprise of many, she did. Japan wanted to guard her growing interests in the Far East at any cost and not even the apparently powerful America would stand in her way.

To prove this, Japan sniffed America’s invisible hand in defending the Britain in the Far East and she resolved to destroy the master before destroying the servant. Unfortunately, the contrivers of this attack were shallowly informed; consequently, they laid down weak strategies doomed to fail, and they did fail indeed. After the attack, the US recollected herself, declared war against Japan, and later entered into World War II without relenting. Pearl Harbor became known, courtesy of this attack.

Works Cited

Barnhart, M. Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941. London: Cornell University Press, 1987

Calvocoressi, P, Guy W., and Pritchard J. The Penguin History of the Second World War. London: Penguin Group, 2001.

Conroy, H., and Harry W. Pearl Harbor Reexamined: Prologue to the Pacific War. USA: University of Hawaii Press, 1989.

Donald, G., and Dillon K. Eds. The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans. VA: Brassey’s, 1999.

French, H. “Pearl Harbor Truly a Sneak Attack, Papers Show”. The New York Times 9 December 1999. Print.

Higham, R., and Harris S. Why Air Forces Fail: The Anatomy of Defeat. USA: University Press of Kentucky, 2006.

Hixson, W. The American Experience in World War II: The United States and the Road to war in Europe. London: Routledge, 2003.

Levine, E. A Fence Away from Freedom: Japanese Americans and World War II. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Son, 1995.

Peattie, M, and Evans D. Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in The Imperial Japanese Navy. USA: Naval Institute Press, 1997.

Raymer, E. Descent into Darkness. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1996.

Takeo, I. Demystifying Pearl Harbor: A New Perspective from Japan. Japan: I-House Press, 2010.

Toland, J. Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath. New York: Berkley Publishing Group, 1986.

Willmott, P. The Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies, February to June 1942. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1983.

Attack on Pearl Harbor: Effects of Foreign Policy

Introduction

Research background

On the seventh day of December, 1941, the Pearl Harbor was attacked by the Japanese in what appeared as a surprised assault. The Japanese managed to attack the U.S. Naval Base through airstrike and created unimaginable destruction. Within two hours after the first bombing, the U.S. had lost more than 2,000 solders, 188 fighter jets, and more than 20 ships.

The following day, there was a unanimous vote by the congress to declare war on Japan1. Two years after the attack, the U.S. was deeply involved in the Second World War. Before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the then Asian giant and the U.S. had reached a deadlock on who to cede ground in their expansionism international policy. In fact, both sides knew that combat confrontation was just a matter of when and not how.

However, the U.S. neither prepared nor predicted that Japan would be the first to attack. Thus, this research proposal attempts to explicitly review the information processing errors in the U.S. foreign policy that led to the flawed decision making which led to the infamous Pearl Harbor attack.

Research problem statement

This research will review the inconsistencies in the U.S. foreign policy that made it vulnerable to the Attack on Pearl Harbor. The research will review information processing flaws that put the U.S. on the receiving end of the attack and eventual participation in the Second World War.

Research question

What were the information processing errors in the U.S. foreign policy that led to the flawed decision making that could have prevented the infamous Pearl Harbor attack?

Significance of the research

It is important to understand the impact of conflict on the state of relationship between countries. The type and nature of relationship may determine the scope of trade, military alliances, and other social benefits. The world has become a global village, and no country can survive on its own. Basically, countries depend on the local and international community friends to push for their interests in trade, politics, and security.

Thus, establishing the reasons behind the information processing errors in the U.S. foreign policy that led to the flawed decision making and the infamous Pearl Harbor surprise attack may provide a clear picture of the significance of a responsive and comprehensive foreign policy approach in handling situations with conflict of interest2.

Specifically, the surprise attack on the Pearl Harbor will be related to the actions of the U.S. before, after the attack, and eventual participation in the Second World War.

Hypotheses

  • Null hypothesis: Inconsistency in decision making resulted in the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.
  • Alternative hypothesis: Inconsistency in decision making did not result in the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

Literature Review

In order to comprehend the scope of this research paper, literature review will dwell on past reports, journals, and books discussing biases and their relationship to policy making process. Specifically, the literature review will review the intelligence processes, the U.S. government’s political structure, and foreign policy execution. The review will focus on the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941.

Theoretical framework

Several past reports and journals discuss biases beside their effects on the process of decision making. These reports review the policymakers’ psychology, conduct, and intelligence analysis. To begin with, Boin and Hart are critical in reviewing the position of cognition in global relations. The authors note that interests and power are often cognitive.

Therefore, “individuals may be influenced by personal beliefs, cognition, and experiences which are significant in directing the interstate relations flow”3.

Reflectively, it is probable to review any illogicality in the deeds of a global leader through applying models such as cognitive mapping, “consistency theory, operational code scrutiny, and automatic content examination”4. The authors present a well-researched article that provides an insight into the influence that an individual’s cognition has on state affairs.

According to George and Stern, under the groupthink theory, international affairs are equally influenced by organizational processes and bureaucratic politics of independent administrations.

Through a critical analysis of Alison’s model 2 (organizational process), Model 1 (rational actor), and Model 3 (government politics model), the authors note that there exists a “strong prima facie grounds to belief that some paradigm concentrating the analyst’s attention on organizational characteristics or processes, other than those on which Models II and III focus, might yield significant analytical gains”5.

Therefore, it is in order to state that organizational processes, governmental politics, and rational actor concepts have an impact on the process of making decisions at governmental policy level6.

Summary of theory to be used

The above sources are necessary in understanding the overall perception and public opinion on the Pearl Harbor attack. The findings of many authors provide the necessary information that identifies, validates, and corroborates the cognitive errors that policymakers make7.

Besides, the intelligence reports before this attack confirm that the U.S. government was aware of a possible attack. The policy makers should have used this information to avert the Pearl Harbor attack before it occurred. This research paper will be based on the organizational processes, rational actor, and governmental politics models.

Research gap

The above literature does not cover the element of intelligence usage as a policy in international relations. Therefore, it is important to establish the link between policy inconsistencies in international relations in order to ensure that decisions made are consistent.

This research paper will attempt to fill the above research gap by studying the significant of intelligence as a policy framework in making decisions covering international relations.

Methodology

Research design

The research will be carried out through quantitative research using secondary data. The research will concentrate on the current reports, journal articles, and other secondary sources that are relevant to the research topic8. The researcher will examine the previous relationship between the U.S. and Japan, and how the Pearl Harbor attack affected their economic, political, and military relationships.

Research identification and operationalization

Dependability will be assured by providing clear, detailed, and sequential descriptions of data collection and analysis procedures. It is a quality that is reliant on the study design being congruent with clear research question, having an explicit explanation of the status and roles of the researcher.

Besides, quality involves providing findings with meaningful parallelism across data sources, specification of basic theoretical constructs and analytical frameworks, and data collection across a range of settings. This study seeks to fulfill these criteria as much as possible.

Data collection

A full effort will be made to accurately and faithfully transcribe data from the secondary sources. The findings will be supported by credible secondary information sources. The collected quantitative data will be coded and passed through Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version seventeen.

In the process, cross tabulation will be used to review the information processing errors in the U.S. foreign policy that led to the flawed decision making which led to the infamous Pearl Harbor attack. In order to quantify the relationship between the independent and dependent variable, ANOVA will be essential.

During the data collection phase of this study, the researcher will strive to uphold ethics appertaining to scientific research. The data collected will not be used for any other purpose rather than for which it was primarily intended for. Dependability will be assured by providing clear, detailed and sequential descriptions of data collection and analysis procedures.

Research justification and summary of analysis procedure

The quantitative approach was informed by the fact that the secondary research requires a dynamic and subjective approach to establish the facts of the research. Quantitative approach is significant in gaining the accurate insight in to the facts of the case study results.

Besides, this method of data analysis is flexible and consists of tools for reviewing the degree of confidence from the primary assumptions9. Therefore, making use of the method of data analysis will ensure that the results are evidence based and scientific within the scope of the case study framework.

Limitations of the research design and bias discussion

One major weakness of this quantitative analysis, especially for secondary data, is that it tends to transform the data into semi-quantitative data by giving it labels and tags. In this case, the qualitative data from secondary sources will be tagged and labeled according to the research question and research objective they address, thus limiting scope of analysis.

However, a major strength of the methodology is that it helps in analyzing all themes, which have implications on the research questions; hence the bias will be minimal. In spite of its inability to highlight themes that are external to the research questions conclusively, the methodology is appropriate for this study.

In other words, the researcher will study the texts from the data collected trying to identify the concepts that relate to the research questions and objectives to minimize any bias. Besides, content analysis and thematic analysis are closely related, especially in the context of the current study. Fortunately, both of them are hinged on the research question for this research case study.

Reference List

Baron, Robert. “So Right it’s wrong: Groupthink and the Ubiquitous Nature of Polarized Group.” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 37, no. 1 (July 2005): 219- 252.

Boin, Arjen, and Paul Hart. “Public Leadership in Times of Crisis: Mission Impossible?” Public Administration Review 63, no. 5, (May 2003): 544-554.

Brandstrom, Annika, Fredrik Bynander, and Paul Hart. “Governing by Looking Back: Historical Analogies and Crisis Management,” Public Administration 82, no. 1, (Jan 2004): 191-210.

George, Alexander, and Andrew Bennet. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences: How to Do Case Studies. Massachusetts, Ma: MIT Press, 2005.

George, Alexander, and Erick Stern. “Harnessing Conflict in Foreign Policy Making: From Devil’s to Multiple Advocacy,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 32, no. 3 (May 2002): 484-508.

Jordan, Jennifer, Niro Sivanathan, and Adam Galinsky. “Something to Lose and Nothing to Gain: The Role of Stress in Interactive Effect of Power and Stability on Risk Taking.” Administrative Science Quarterly 56, no. 4, (June 2003): 530-558.

Maitlis, Sally, and Hakan Ozcelik. “Toxic Decision Processes: A Study of Emotion and Organizational Decision Making.” Organization Science 15, no. 4, (Dec 2004): 275-393.

Taylor, Andrew, and John Rourke. “Historical Analogies in the Congressional Foreign Policy Process.” The Journal of Politics 57, no. 2, (May 1995): 460-468.

Footnotes

1 Robert Baron, “So Right it’s Wrong: Groupthink and the Ubiquitous Nature of Polarized Group,” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 37, no. 1 (July 2005): 236.

2 Annika Brandstrom, Fredrik Bynander and Paul Hart, “Governing by Looking Back: Historical Analogies and Crisis Management,” Public Administration 82, no. 1, (Jan 2004): 203.

3 Arjen Boin and Paul Hart, “Public Leadership in Times of Crisis: Mission Impossible?” Public Administration Review 63, no. 5, (May 2003): 549.

4 Jennifer Jordan, Niro Sivanathan, and Adam Galinsky, “Something to Lose and Nothing to Gain: The Role of Stress in Interactive Effect of Power and Stability on Risk Taking,” Administrative Science Quarterly 56, no. 4, (June 2003): 540.

5 Alexander George and Erick Stern, “Harnessing Conflict in Foreign Policy Making: From Devil’s to Multiple Advocacy,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 32, no. 3 (May 2002): 491.

6 Sally Maitlis and Hakan Ozcelik, “Toxic Decision Processes: A Study of Emotion and Organizational Decision Making,” Organization Science 15, no. 4, (Dec 2004): 281.

7 Andrew Taylor and John Rourke, “Historical Analogies in the Congressional Foreign Policy Process,” The Journal of Politics 57, no. 2, (May 1995): 466.

8 Alexander George and Andrew Bennet, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences: How to Do Case Studies (Massachusetts, Ma: MIT Press, 2005), 79.

9 Alexander George and Andrew Bennet, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences: How to Do Case Studies (Massachusetts, Ma: MIT Press, 2005), 79.

Intelligence Failure Leading Up to Pearl Harbor

Introduction

This research proposal aims to examine the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which is considered the greatest intelligence failure in the history of America, at least until September 11, 2001. The historical event remains relevant and important today not only due to its significance but also because it has demonstrated the example of intelligence failure that American society still remembers. After 9/11, intelligence professionals have argued that the situation was similar to Pearl Harbor – even though there were warning signs of an upcoming threat, the most trained intelligence community in the world could not grasp the danger and prevent the attacks adequately.

By implementing a reassessment of events associated with the intelligence efforts surrounding Pearl Harbor, the research implies answering a specific question.

Research question: Despite the abundance of warnings of approaching hostilities in the Pacific, why did American intelligence fail to prevent the Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941?

Answering the research question requires providing an overview of different types of intelligence information that had been provided to the decision-makers in the American government leading up to the attack (Levy 2007). In addition, it is essential to conduct a detailed analysis of the various tactical and strategic indications of warnings that the decision-makers have received before the attack (Bar-Joseph and Levy 2009; Flanagan 1985). Notably, the intelligence failure examination should consider how receptive the decision-makers were toward the warnings provided to them, including the strategic, tactical, and operational failures.

The Pearl Harbor intelligence failure is vital to study even today because the events were ambiguous. The conventional perspective is that intelligence failure typically takes place when the warning signs are available but get lost amidst other information (Carter 1990). Before the 1960s, it was widely accepted that the primary source of strategic surprise was the lack of information about the upcoming threat (Carter 1990). Thus, it was expected that had the US been provided with abundant information about the attack, it would have anticipated and even avoided the attack of the Japanese on Pearl Harbor (McKechney 1963). However, the available information could not be preserved due to the hectic international environment and possibly got limited by different parties’ bureaucratic interests.

Studying the failure of intelligence associated with the attack on Pearl Harbor is essential not only because the event launched the US into World War II but also since it could inform the public about the multi-dimensional nature of intelligence and the circumstances that could lead to its failure. The prerequisites for studying this topic are justified by variable reasons that could affect the inability of American troops to prevent the attack timely. Nonetheless, when assessing the main gaps, scholars note that analytical, organizational, or psychological mistakes are viewed as the causes of intelligence failure (Copeland 2022; Prange, Goldstein, and Dillon 1981). Based on this information, a research hypothesis can be compiled.

Research hypothesis: Ignoring strategic and tactical warnings (independent variables) about the impending attack on Pearl Harbor was the key failure of the American intelligence service (dependent variable).

The issue of decision-makers’ ignorance is disputed by some researchers. For instance, Prange, Goldstein, and Dillon (1981) note that the US military leadership and policymakers were not ready to open hostilities. Nevertheless, it is essential not to dismiss the capabilities of the Japanese to deceive the enemy and surprise them with the attack. Overall, studying a multitude of factors that come into play when discussing Pearl Harbor as an intelligence failure can help answer the set research question.

Preliminary Literature Review

The review of literature on the topic allows for analyzing the issue from different perspectives while taking into account several critical factors that caused the attack. The review can be broken down into the strategic, tactical, and operational intelligence indicators that were available to the decision-makers in America to analyze the responses to relevant indicators. Once WWII had begun, various intelligence sources would be collected, including documents from the prisoners of war, to benefit from press reporting about Japanese diplomatic and political affairs.

Strategic Level Intelligence

From the strategic standpoint, the findings in academic literature demonstrate a large number of critical intelligence indicators provided before the attack. As Wirtz (2006) notes, at that time, the military and governmental leaders should have recognized the severity of the warnings and taken effective precautions to prevent the attack. The first report to mention was the Bloch memo, which was prepared by Rear Admiral Claude Bloch, who commanded the 14th Naval District, which covered Hawaii (Prange, Goldstein, and Dillon 1981). On December 30, 1940, Bloch directed the following message to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington: “aircraft attacking the base at Pearl Harbor will undoubtedly be brought by carriers” (Prange, Goldstein, and Dillon 1981, 74). This confirms the warnings about the impending threat, which should have been heeded.

The second notable document was the Martin-Bellinger Report made to discuss military planning in the event the attack would take place. The report was dated March 31, 1941, and stated that the Japanese air force could appear in Hawaii without warning from the intelligence and that “it appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack” (Shafter 1945, 349). The third important report was the Farthing Report, which argued against complacency and stated that plans based on the conviction that Hawaii was the strongest outlying naval base and could withstand attacks were “inherently weak and tend to create a false sense of security with the consequent unpreparedness for offensive action” (Prange, Goldstein, and Dillon 1981, 65). Thus, there were official warnings of a potential attack by the Japanese army.

Tactical Level Intelligence

In addition to strategic issues, some researchers offer to consider tactical gaps. The first tactical level indicator relevant to the intelligence surrounding the attack was “The Bomb Plot Message,” which was the note sent by the Japanese Foreign Ministry on September 14, 1941 (Wohlstetter 1962). In the message, the Honolulu consulate was asked to provide a detailed report on the ships present at Pearl Harbor (Wohlstetter 1962). A later message, dated November 15, directed the consulate to make similar reports twice a week and divide the Pearl Harbor waters into five sections to give feedback on the positioning of warships and carriers (Wohlstetter 1962). Notably, the Washington intelligence agencies did not inform military leaders in Hawaii about these notes, which was an omission.

Another significant event occurred on December 7, the day of the attack. Opana radar operators noticed a group of aircraft that appeared 137 miles north of Oahu (Wohlstetter 1962). When the operators reached Lt. Kermit Tyler, an Air Corps officer in training that was available on the shift, he told them that the planes were a flight of American B-17 bombers that were expected to return from the mainland that morning and said that the privates could forget about it (Wohlstetter 1962). Even though Tyler tracked the aircraft further, he later confirmed that the planes were navy bombers that were practicing at Pearl Harbor (Wohlstetter 1962). As a result, these tactical failures are crucial to note in the context of the overall intelligence failure.

Theoretical Framework

The theoretical framework represents the structure that may hold or support a theory of a research study. It is intended to introduce and describe the theory that can explain why the research problem under study exists. The study will be focused on the theory of intelligence failure. The concept discusses the presence of various paradoxes that take place within units of intelligence and do not allow eliminating risks and attacks (Betts 1978). According to Betts (1978), intelligence failures are not only inevitable but also natural. This is due to the fact that such omissions are rather the causes of political and psychological gaps than analytical or organizational ones (Betts 1978). Therefore, the concept of intelligence failure is relevant to studying the issue in question.

The research proposal argues that the intelligence failures that occurred during Pearl Harbor are still relevant today. Therefore, Betts’ (1978) notes about the theory of intelligence failure are sound and can be applied within the context of the twenty-first-century challenges. His article was written in the wake of the Vietnam War and the reforms of the United States Intelligence Community after the inquiries of the Church Committee (Betts 1978). Even though the theory of intelligence failure includes considerations of the causes of omissions, areas of gaps, as well as imperfect solutions, the discussion of the theory itself occurs within a particular time and space.

While drawing from the theoretical framework, the qualitative research design suits the goals and objectives of the study. As Little (2016) remarks, in the context of the historical event associated with an intelligence failure, the qualitative design may help describe and examine past events to understand the present and anticipate potential effects on the future. Koshinsky (2021) states that there is currently an abundance of qualitative information on the Pearl Harbor intelligence failure. Due to a systematic literature review, it will be possible to identify, select, and critically appraise the available evidence to answer the question that has been formulated.

Preliminary Conclusion

To summarize, the mistakes that the decision-makers of the US intelligence team made during the Pearl Harbor events remain relevant for analysis today. There were strategical and tactical warnings of the upcoming attacks, but the decision-makers did not take them seriously, which resulted in the intelligence failure. Since such omissions take place regularly, which is evidenced by the concept of intelligence failure, this is essential to find out how teams should act to ensure that decision-makers respond to the warnings that the intelligence team discovers and delivers.

The attack on Hawaiian Pearl Harbor is one of the most tragic pages in recent American history. The Japanese forces launched an attack on the United States at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, which devastated the American troops and caused up to 3,500 casualties (Russett 1967). As a result of the attack, the United States launched itself into World War II. Today, the event is notable not only due to its historical significance and context but also as an example of intelligence failure. Historians have presented different explanations for why the intelligence available to the decision-makers did not prevent the attack (Russett 1967). There are contradictory opinions; some blame the intelligence community for failing to analyze the crucial sign of the attack prepared by the Japanese, while others accuse the military commanders who were unprepared to respond (Betts 1978; Wohlstetter 1962). Therefore, the objective prerequisites for the tragedy are worth studying.

This research is aimed at conducting a systematic review of relevant academic literature to answer the question of why American intelligence failed to prevent the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. After synthesizing the primary and secondary resources on the defined topic, it was found that it was not the intelligence failure per se that caught the American Navy off-guard during the attack but rather the inability of decision-makers to use the intelligence information effectively. While there were gaps in tactical intelligence, there were plenty of strategic indicators pointing to the fact that war could affect Hawaii suddenly, and the political and military leaders disregarded those signs.

Thesis statement: The intelligence failure in the time leading to the Pearl Harbor attack occurred due to the poor understanding of how the information could be disseminated to ensure its effective application.

Literature Review

Intelligence Failure

The incorrect or inadequate interpretation of the data is one of the critical causes of the tragedy. Betts (1978) places the failure of intelligence on the shoulder of the consumer of the information. The scholar states that the most vital mistakes have rarely been made by the ones who collect raw information, “occasionally by professionals who produce finished analyses, but most often by the decision makers who consume the products of intelligence services” (Betts 1978, 61). The theorist suggests that there is no room for improvement for intelligence institutions, and failure is caused by psychological and political factors rather than operational gaps (Betts 1978). Importantly, Betts (1978) argues that improvements can be made in the analytical processes while paying attention to the political and psychological challenges at play. Even though the empirical study of intelligence failures has been well-developed, the lessons are not always learned from the mistakes.

Thus, even in instances when the intelligence process is perfect and provides abundant information to decision-makers, the consumption of the intelligence can never be perfect because there are psychological limitations and political factors. In Betts’ (1978) theory, this is essential to locate the gaps between information analysis and decision-makers’ approaches. Importantly, there are three pathologies of intelligence that are the most prominent, such as during attack warnings, operational evaluations, and defense planning (Hanyok 2008). An essential challenge in providing warnings of attacks is the inherent problem of discerning and predicting the intentions of an enemy timely. Pearl Harbor is an example of a major surprise attack in which the evidence of the intended action existed but was not passed sufficiently quickly through different tiers of management to reach decision-makers in time and prevent the disaster.

Assessment of Strategic Level Intelligence

During the time before the attack, several strategic intelligence indicators were collected, with the evidence pointing to the fact that the Japanese had been planning a military offense. Importantly, on November 1 and December 1, 1941, the Japanese changed 20,000 of their radio signs, which made it more difficult for American intelligence to read message traffic (Wohlstetter 1962). This was an indicator of hostile activity preparation which would likely occur on a larger scale, as reported in the 14th Naval District intelligence summary (Prange, Goldstein, and Dillon 2014). As a result, the implications of the attack showed the unpreparedness of military decision-makers to evaluate intelligence data.

The loss of contact with Japanese carriers in mid-November 1941 is another indicator of the possible attack. As Hanyok (2008) claims, the US analysts could not agree on where they were likely to be located. In addition, there were deadline messages sent by Tokyo to its Washington embassy in November 1941, warning the diplomats that a deadline had been set on November 29 for concluding negotiations with the United States (Hanyok 2008). After the deadline, Tokyo stated that “things are automatically going to happen” (Hanyok 2008, 190). However, these statements were not taken with all possible seriousness.

Ignoring Japanese messages led to active actions on their part. After the deadline, on December 1 and 2, the officials at Tokyo ordered several of its diplomatic posts in Asia and those in Washington and London to get rid of their codes and code machines, with the intelligence about this sent to Hawaii on December 3 (Prange, Goldstein, and Dillon 2014). As to last-minute signals, an important event was the “pilot message” sent on December 6 to the embassy in Washington that Tokyo would send a reply to the latest American proposals in fourteen parts (Wohlstetter 1962). The parts of the message were intercepted by Americans and forwarded to Washington by teletype as soon as they were received, mainly throughout the morning and the afternoon. Notably, the last part did not come until 3:00 in the morning on December 7, which was the message to the Japanese ambassador to submit a reply to the US government at 1:00 p.m. on December 7 (Ikuhiko 1994). The order was followed by the next message to destroy all documents after deciphering incoming messages.

Considering the reporting available to Senior Army and Navy intelligence officials, who had the full picture of all available reporting, it was clear that war was imminent in the Pacific, although there was no expectation that it would be aimed at the US. The common conclusion was that the hostilities would start with the attack of the Japanese to the south toward Thailand (Wohlstetter 1962). It was expected that after seizing control or occupying Thailand, the Japanese would immediately attack British possessions in Singapore and Burma (Wohlstetter 1962; Hanyok 2008). The US officials concluded that either war or the rupture of diplomatic relationships with Japan was inevitable (Ikuhiko 1994). Even though the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, had prepared a warning for the US fleet, it was not sent because the superiors felt that the previous warnings were sufficient (Ikuhiko 1994). This overconfidence was misguided, given the clear signs of an impending threat.

Assessment of Tactical Level Intelligence

From a tactical perspective, several factors should also have been taken into account when evaluating the upcoming events in Hawaii. The “Bomb Plot message” was a significant indicator entailing the event on September 14, 1941, of the Japanese Foreign Ministry contacting the Honolulu consulate and asking for a detailed report on ships stationed at Pearl Harbor (Butow 1996). Importantly, the consulate asked to divide the waters into several areas to make the reporting more efficient, while the intelligence agencies in Washington did not mention this to Hawaii’s military commanders (Butow 1996). After the attack, the message exchange between the consulate and the foreign ministry became known as the bomb plot message and was later cited in congressional investigations as a crucial warning of the attack, which had been missed.

The Opana radar plot is another tactical-level intelligence sign that was not taken seriously. At various points around Oahu, truck-mounted radars were set up, with one position being the northern top of Oahu, at Kahuku Point, which was referred to as Opana (Wohlstetter 1962). Early in the morning on December 7, the operators noticed an unusual occurrence on their screen – a group of aircrafts approaching Oahu in the range of 137 miles (Wohlstetter 1962). The operators reported the occurrence to Lt. Kermit Tyler, an Air Corps officer in training who guessed that the aircraft was most likely the American B-17 bombers that were in bombing practice, which he later mentioned in his report (Wohlstetter 1962). What the operators and Tyler failed to consider the spotting of Japanese bombers.

The upcoming hostilities were not perceived seriously by military leaders. When responding to the tactical level intelligence indicators, the Navy intelligence officers stationed in Hawaii felt that the war would soon arrive with Japan (Wohlstetter 1962). Nevertheless, similar to their Washington-level counterparts, they agreed that the Japanese were incapable of implementing an attack on Pearl Harbor (Hamblet 1995). This agreement was most poignantly expressed in an exchange between Admiral Kimmel and LCDR Edwin Layton, the Fleet Intelligence Officer (Lambert and Polmar 2003). Because the Japanese Navy had changed its call signs, most analysts believed that the fleet carriers were likely in home waters, with Layton reporting, “Unknown – home waters?” (Lambert and Polmar 2003, 79). To this, Kimmel replied, “What! […] you are the Intelligence officer of the Pacific Fleet and you don’t know where the carriers are? […] For all you know, they could be coming around Diamond Head, and you wouldn’t know it?” (Lambert and Polmar 2003, 79). Later, Layton testified that he wished he had considered the possibility that the Japanese carriers were under radio silence approaching Oahu. Thus, the level of tactical intelligence proved to be ineffective.

Receptivity Toward Intelligence

Given the availability of strategic and tactical indicators that the Japanese had been planning an attack on Pearl Harbor, there was no unity among the Washington officials that the naval base would be attacked. Despite the warnings of the possibility of a surprise attack on Hawaii, military leaders discounted the threat, referring to it as a rumor (Dahl 2013b). For instance, Admiral Harold Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, wrote a memo to the Pacific Fleet’s Commander in Chief, stating that his division “places no credence in these rumors […] No move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future” (Dahl 2013a). Such a statement testifies to the misinterpretation of critical intelligence data.

The majority of senior staff and operations officers shared the confidence that no attack would take place and thus were dismissive toward those who expressed more significant concerns. Such a view was described by Layton, who stated that the following Sunday after November 29, he expected a crisis to occur (Dahl 2013a). That Sunday passed without any incident, and on Monday, he was greeted with mocking statements: “What happened to your crisis, Layton? Layton and his Sunday crisis” (Dahl 2013a). Notably, Kimmel and other senior advisors were sure that the attack would not take place and noted that “the only signal that could and did spell ‘hostile action’ to them was the bombing [of Pearl Harbor] itself” (Dahl 2013a). As a result, important nuances indicating the upcoming hostilities were not analyzed effectively by the command.

Methodology

The research implies conducting a systematic review, which is a critical and reproducible summary of the results of the available research on the topic of intelligence failure during the Japanese attack. The chosen variables are strategic and tactical warnings about the upcoming attack (independent variables) and the failure of the American intelligence service (dependent variable). The main challenge of the chosen methodology is to identify all studies relevant to the current research question (Snyder 2019). At the stage of planning, before the systematic review of articles, the statement on the inclusion and exclusion criteria should be made (Patino and Ferreira 2018). The exclusion criteria entail online magazine articles, blog posts, and other non-peer-reviewed sources available online. The inclusion criteria for the systematic review entail peer-reviewed articles and primary sources, such as books, essays, and conference proceedings covering the topic of intelligence failure that led to the Pearl Harbor attack.

The criteria for inclusion do not consider the dates of publication as essential defining criteria because Pearl Harbor was a historical event and the research published closer to its occurrence remains relevant. However, most of the studies that are included in the review were published a few decades later after the attack because they synthesized historical information from an abundance of sources. It is essential to mention the resources that include information from primary sources, such as quoted data from those who witnessed the events.

To find this information, the snowball sampling method has been implemented. It entails tracking down references or citations in different documents. The snowball method is a mechanism of finding literature by using key documents on the subject as a starting point (Wohlin 2014). To search for the relevant pieces of information, different resources have been screened to find as many mentions of primary data as possible. Snowball sampling is the most appropriate method for locating the studies for the systematic review because the searches through databases only provide peer-reviewed articles (Hiebl 2021). To find primary sources, the screening of those articles has been conducted. Titles and abstracts of electronic search results have been checked to identify the studies that are relevant to include in the systematic review, with the emphasis placed on the intelligence during Pearl Harbor and not the historical event in general.

In terms of the validity of the chosen methodology, systematic reviews represent an important source of valid evidence. They allow for identifying, appraising, and synthesizing the available information on the topic in question (Verdejo et al. 2021). Since the inclusion and exclusion criteria are clearly defined, the applicability of the gathered data gives sufficient information for judging the external validity and applicability of the findings.

The implemented methodology had both strengths and some limitations. The main barrier is the selection bias caused by snowball sampling, which is a non-probability technique (Raina 2015). In addition, because this sampling type does not select articles for review based on random selection, this is impossible to determine the potential sampling error and make statistical inferences from the sample (Sharma 2017). Addressing the limitations that come with the purposive sampling of research is not possible because the articles included in the systematic review have to fit the selection criteria, and choosing them randomly is not an option.

Analysis and Findings

The systematic review of the literature proves the hypothesis that the failure of American intelligence associated with Pearl Harbor warnings entailed the inability of decision-makers to respond to the warnings of the threat. The technologies used for maintaining high levels of intelligence were utilized for gathering data on the Japanese. However, the challenge was not in the inefficient use of espionage technologies but rather in the inability of some commanders, who pursued a middle policy between confrontation and appeasement, to provide adequate responses to the warnings of the upcoming attack.

Even though the US Navy had a history of war games and drills focusing on the threat of the Japanese surprise attack, the Operational Commanders did not take the danger of the attack on Hawaii as serious (Coox 1994). Importantly, Kimmel’s exchange with Layton about the missing plane carriers meant that they both were aware of at least a remote possibility that the Japanese attack could take place (Stillwell 2016). The fact that operation officers mocked Layton for the “Sunday crisis” means that the majority of the senior advisors in Hawaii were quite confident that no surprise attack from the Japanese would take place (Stillwell 2016). Therefore, there were no problems with long-range strategic intelligence because the leadership, both in Washington and in Hawaii, understood that sooner or later, a war would break out with Japan (Hanyok 2009). Thus, even though the intelligence officials were charged with estimating the threat, they did not firmly believe that the Japanese would have the capability to launch a long-distance attack.

Therefore, intelligence itself was not responsible for the failure to predict and prepare for the Pearl Harbor attack. Rather, the lack of belief in the seriousness of the threat on the part of crucial decision-makers in the US was the defining factor that led to the failure. Samuels (2019) suggests that the disbelief was attributed to the lack of specific, tactical signs. However, as the systematic review has shown, there were some tactical warnings that could have been further analyzed and considered during the decision-making. Therefore, the overall lack of receptivity toward intelligence on the part of senior leaders was the main issue.

In the presence of sufficient intelligence indicators, they were misunderstood and even ignored as a result of the improper analysis. Even though there were some gaps in intelligence, particularly in the tactical indicators, the failure of receptivity was the key cause of the unpreparedness of Americans for the attack (Dahl 2011). Moreover, it is unlikely that even better intelligence of a tactical level would have been needed to prevent the Pearl Harbor bombing (Grabo 2004). Some of the warnings were accurate, but since they were based on strategic level intelligence, the decision-makers did not take them as viable signs that called for the Navy to get better prepared for the upcoming attack.

Conclusion

The reassessment of the intelligence events leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor provides the implications both for the theoretical understanding of intelligence failure as well as for the practical efforts necessary to prevent surprise attacks from occurring in the future. Indeed, before the attack, there was indeed a great deal of intelligence available that warned decision-makers about the possibility of Japanese aggression in the Pacific. Intelligence failures do not always result from the lack of information but rather stem from the inability of decision-makers to respond to the information collected effectively.

Drawing from the examples of the available tactical and strategic warnings leading up to the attack, the study can conclude that the intelligence failure took place because the decision-makers did not consider the incoming information to be worth analyzing. This means that to avert similar failures in the future, more efforts should be placed on the issue of receptivity. The intelligence community should have developed closer connections with senior officials and policymakers who made crucial decisions. Future research may focus on evaluating the US military doctrines prior to World War II and comparing them with those adopted after the attack on Pearl Harbor, including both strategic and tactical methods of warfare.

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