Category: Pearl Harbor

Introduction

Research background

On the seventh day of December, 1941, the Pearl Harbor was attacked by the Japanese in what appeared as a surprised assault. The Japanese managed to attack the U.S. Naval Base through airstrike and created unimaginable destruction. Within two hours after the first bombing, the U.S. had lost more than 2,000 solders, 188 fighter jets, and more than 20 ships.

The following day, there was a unanimous vote by the congress to declare war on Japan¹. Two years after the attack, the U.S. was deeply involved in the Second World War. Before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the then Asian giant and the U.S. had reached a deadlock on who to cede ground in their expansionism international policy. In fact, both sides knew that combat confrontation was just a matter of when and not how.

However, the U.S. neither prepared nor predicted that Japan would be the first to attack. Thus, this research proposal attempts to explicitly review the information processing errors in the U.S. foreign policy that led to the flawed decision making which led to the infamous Pearl Harbor attack.

Research problem statement

This research will review the inconsistencies in the U.S. foreign policy that made it vulnerable to the Attack on Pearl Harbor. The research will review information processing flaws that put the U.S. on the receiving end of the attack and eventual participation in the Second World War.

Research question

What were the information processing errors in the U.S. foreign policy that led to the flawed decision making that could have prevented the infamous Pearl Harbor attack?

Significance of the research

It is important to understand the impact of conflict on the state of relationship between countries. The type and nature of relationship may determine the scope of trade, military alliances, and other social benefits. The world has become a global village, and no country can survive on its own. Basically, countries depend on the local and international community friends to push for their interests in trade, politics, and security.

Thus, establishing the reasons behind the information processing errors in the U.S. foreign policy that led to the flawed decision making and the infamous Pearl Harbor surprise attack may provide a clear picture of the significance of a responsive and comprehensive foreign policy approach in handling situations with conflict of interest².

Specifically, the surprise attack on the Pearl Harbor will be related to the actions of the U.S. before, after the attack, and eventual participation in the Second World War.

Hypotheses

• Null hypothesis: Inconsistency in decision making resulted in the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.
• Alternative hypothesis: Inconsistency in decision making did not result in the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

Literature Review

In order to comprehend the scope of this research paper, literature review will dwell on past reports, journals, and books discussing biases and their relationship to policy making process. Specifically, the literature review will review the intelligence processes, the U.S. governments political structure, and foreign policy execution. The review will focus on the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941.

Theoretical framework

Several past reports and journals discuss biases beside their effects on the process of decision making. These reports review the policymakers psychology, conduct, and intelligence analysis. To begin with, Boin and Hart are critical in reviewing the position of cognition in global relations. The authors note that interests and power are often cognitive.

Therefore, individuals may be influenced by personal beliefs, cognition, and experiences which are significant in directing the interstate relations flow³.

Reflectively, it is probable to review any illogicality in the deeds of a global leader through applying models such as cognitive mapping, consistency theory, operational code scrutiny, and automatic content examination⁴. The authors present a well-researched article that provides an insight into the influence that an individuals cognition has on state affairs.

According to George and Stern, under the groupthink theory, international affairs are equally influenced by organizational processes and bureaucratic politics of independent administrations.

Through a critical analysis of Alisons model 2 (organizational process), Model 1 (rational actor), and Model 3 (government politics model), the authors note that there exists a strong prima facie grounds to belief that some paradigm concentrating the analysts attention on organizational characteristics or processes, other than those on which Models II and III focus, might yield significant analytical gains⁵.

Therefore, it is in order to state that organizational processes, governmental politics, and rational actor concepts have an impact on the process of making decisions at governmental policy level⁶.

Summary of theory to be used

The above sources are necessary in understanding the overall perception and public opinion on the Pearl Harbor attack. The findings of many authors provide the necessary information that identifies, validates, and corroborates the cognitive errors that policymakers make⁷.

Besides, the intelligence reports before this attack confirm that the U.S. government was aware of a possible attack. The policy makers should have used this information to avert the Pearl Harbor attack before it occurred. This research paper will be based on the organizational processes, rational actor, and governmental politics models.

Research gap

The above literature does not cover the element of intelligence usage as a policy in international relations. Therefore, it is important to establish the link between policy inconsistencies in international relations in order to ensure that decisions made are consistent.

This research paper will attempt to fill the above research gap by studying the significant of intelligence as a policy framework in making decisions covering international relations.

Methodology

Research design

The research will be carried out through quantitative research using secondary data. The research will concentrate on the current reports, journal articles, and other secondary sources that are relevant to the research topic⁸. The researcher will examine the previous relationship between the U.S. and Japan, and how the Pearl Harbor attack affected their economic, political, and military relationships.

Research identification and operationalization

Dependability will be assured by providing clear, detailed, and sequential descriptions of data collection and analysis procedures. It is a quality that is reliant on the study design being congruent with clear research question, having an explicit explanation of the status and roles of the researcher.

Besides, quality involves providing findings with meaningful parallelism across data sources, specification of basic theoretical constructs and analytical frameworks, and data collection across a range of settings. This study seeks to fulfill these criteria as much as possible.

Data collection

A full effort will be made to accurately and faithfully transcribe data from the secondary sources. The findings will be supported by credible secondary information sources. The collected quantitative data will be coded and passed through Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version seventeen.

In the process, cross tabulation will be used to review the information processing errors in the U.S. foreign policy that led to the flawed decision making which led to the infamous Pearl Harbor attack. In order to quantify the relationship between the independent and dependent variable, ANOVA will be essential.

During the data collection phase of this study, the researcher will strive to uphold ethics appertaining to scientific research. The data collected will not be used for any other purpose rather than for which it was primarily intended for. Dependability will be assured by providing clear, detailed and sequential descriptions of data collection and analysis procedures.

Research justification and summary of analysis procedure

The quantitative approach was informed by the fact that the secondary research requires a dynamic and subjective approach to establish the facts of the research. Quantitative approach is significant in gaining the accurate insight in to the facts of the case study results.

Besides, this method of data analysis is flexible and consists of tools for reviewing the degree of confidence from the primary assumptions⁹. Therefore, making use of the method of data analysis will ensure that the results are evidence based and scientific within the scope of the case study framework.

Limitations of the research design and bias discussion

One major weakness of this quantitative analysis, especially for secondary data, is that it tends to transform the data into semi-quantitative data by giving it labels and tags. In this case, the qualitative data from secondary sources will be tagged and labeled according to the research question and research objective they address, thus limiting scope of analysis.

However, a major strength of the methodology is that it helps in analyzing all themes, which have implications on the research questions; hence the bias will be minimal. In spite of its inability to highlight themes that are external to the research questions conclusively, the methodology is appropriate for this study.

In other words, the researcher will study the texts from the data collected trying to identify the concepts that relate to the research questions and objectives to minimize any bias. Besides, content analysis and thematic analysis are closely related, especially in the context of the current study. Fortunately, both of them are hinged on the research question for this research case study.

Reference List

Baron, Robert. So Right its wrong: Groupthink and the Ubiquitous Nature of Polarized Group. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 37, no. 1 (July 2005): 219- 252.

Boin, Arjen, and Paul Hart. Public Leadership in Times of Crisis: Mission Impossible? Public Administration Review 63, no. 5, (May 2003): 544-554.

Brandstrom, Annika, Fredrik Bynander, and Paul Hart. Governing by Looking Back: Historical Analogies and Crisis Management, Public Administration 82, no. 1, (Jan 2004): 191-210.

George, Alexander, and Andrew Bennet. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences: How to Do Case Studies. Massachusetts, Ma: MIT Press, 2005.

George, Alexander, and Erick Stern. Harnessing Conflict in Foreign Policy Making: From Devils to Multiple Advocacy, Presidential Studies Quarterly 32, no. 3 (May 2002): 484-508.

Jordan, Jennifer, Niro Sivanathan, and Adam Galinsky. Something to Lose and Nothing to Gain: The Role of Stress in Interactive Effect of Power and Stability on Risk Taking. Administrative Science Quarterly 56, no. 4, (June 2003): 530-558.

Maitlis, Sally, and Hakan Ozcelik. Toxic Decision Processes: A Study of Emotion and Organizational Decision Making. Organization Science 15, no. 4, (Dec 2004): 275-393.

Taylor, Andrew, and John Rourke. Historical Analogies in the Congressional Foreign Policy Process. The Journal of Politics 57, no. 2, (May 1995): 460-468.

Footnotes

¹ Robert Baron, So Right its Wrong: Groupthink and the Ubiquitous Nature of Polarized Group, Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 37, no. 1 (July 2005): 236.

² Annika Brandstrom, Fredrik Bynander and Paul Hart, Governing by Looking Back: Historical Analogies and Crisis Management, Public Administration 82, no. 1, (Jan 2004): 203.

³ Arjen Boin and Paul Hart, Public Leadership in Times of Crisis: Mission Impossible? Public Administration Review 63, no. 5, (May 2003): 549.

⁴ Jennifer Jordan, Niro Sivanathan, and Adam Galinsky, Something to Lose and Nothing to Gain: The Role of Stress in Interactive Effect of Power and Stability on Risk Taking, Administrative Science Quarterly 56, no. 4, (June 2003): 540.

⁵ Alexander George and Erick Stern, Harnessing Conflict in Foreign Policy Making: From Devils to Multiple Advocacy, Presidential Studies Quarterly 32, no. 3 (May 2002): 491.

⁶ Sally Maitlis and Hakan Ozcelik, Toxic Decision Processes: A Study of Emotion and Organizational Decision Making, Organization Science 15, no. 4, (Dec 2004): 281.

⁷ Andrew Taylor and John Rourke, Historical Analogies in the Congressional Foreign Policy Process, The Journal of Politics 57, no. 2, (May 1995): 466.

⁸ Alexander George and Andrew Bennet, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences: How to Do Case Studies (Massachusetts, Ma: MIT Press, 2005), 79.

⁹ Alexander George and Andrew Bennet, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences: How to Do Case Studies (Massachusetts, Ma: MIT Press, 2005), 79.

Introduction

Research background

On the seventh day of December, 1941, the Pearl Harbor was attacked by the Japanese in what appeared as a surprised assault. The Japanese managed to attack the U.S. Naval Base through airstrike and created unimaginable destruction. Within two hours after the first bombing, the U.S. had lost more than 2,000 solders, 188 fighter jets, and more than 20 ships.

The following day, there was a unanimous vote by the congress to declare war on Japan¹. Two years after the attack, the U.S. was deeply involved in the Second World War. Before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the then Asian giant and the U.S. had reached a deadlock on who to cede ground in their expansionism international policy. In fact, both sides knew that combat confrontation was just a matter of when and not how.

However, the U.S. neither prepared nor predicted that Japan would be the first to attack. Thus, this research proposal attempts to explicitly review the information processing errors in the U.S. foreign policy that led to the flawed decision making which led to the infamous Pearl Harbor attack.

Research problem statement

This research will review the inconsistencies in the U.S. foreign policy that made it vulnerable to the Attack on Pearl Harbor. The research will review information processing flaws that put the U.S. on the receiving end of the attack and eventual participation in the Second World War.

Research question

What were the information processing errors in the U.S. foreign policy that led to the flawed decision making that could have prevented the infamous Pearl Harbor attack?

Significance of the research

It is important to understand the impact of conflict on the state of relationship between countries. The type and nature of relationship may determine the scope of trade, military alliances, and other social benefits. The world has become a global village, and no country can survive on its own. Basically, countries depend on the local and international community friends to push for their interests in trade, politics, and security.

Thus, establishing the reasons behind the information processing errors in the U.S. foreign policy that led to the flawed decision making and the infamous Pearl Harbor surprise attack may provide a clear picture of the significance of a responsive and comprehensive foreign policy approach in handling situations with conflict of interest².

Specifically, the surprise attack on the Pearl Harbor will be related to the actions of the U.S. before, after the attack, and eventual participation in the Second World War.

Hypotheses

• Null hypothesis: Inconsistency in decision making resulted in the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.
• Alternative hypothesis: Inconsistency in decision making did not result in the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

Literature Review

In order to comprehend the scope of this research paper, literature review will dwell on past reports, journals, and books discussing biases and their relationship to policy making process. Specifically, the literature review will review the intelligence processes, the U.S. governments political structure, and foreign policy execution. The review will focus on the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941.

Theoretical framework

Several past reports and journals discuss biases beside their effects on the process of decision making. These reports review the policymakers psychology, conduct, and intelligence analysis. To begin with, Boin and Hart are critical in reviewing the position of cognition in global relations. The authors note that interests and power are often cognitive.

Therefore, individuals may be influenced by personal beliefs, cognition, and experiences which are significant in directing the interstate relations flow³.

Reflectively, it is probable to review any illogicality in the deeds of a global leader through applying models such as cognitive mapping, consistency theory, operational code scrutiny, and automatic content examination⁴. The authors present a well-researched article that provides an insight into the influence that an individuals cognition has on state affairs.

According to George and Stern, under the groupthink theory, international affairs are equally influenced by organizational processes and bureaucratic politics of independent administrations.

Through a critical analysis of Alisons model 2 (organizational process), Model 1 (rational actor), and Model 3 (government politics model), the authors note that there exists a strong prima facie grounds to belief that some paradigm concentrating the analysts attention on organizational characteristics or processes, other than those on which Models II and III focus, might yield significant analytical gains⁵.

Therefore, it is in order to state that organizational processes, governmental politics, and rational actor concepts have an impact on the process of making decisions at governmental policy level⁶.

Summary of theory to be used

The above sources are necessary in understanding the overall perception and public opinion on the Pearl Harbor attack. The findings of many authors provide the necessary information that identifies, validates, and corroborates the cognitive errors that policymakers make⁷.

Besides, the intelligence reports before this attack confirm that the U.S. government was aware of a possible attack. The policy makers should have used this information to avert the Pearl Harbor attack before it occurred. This research paper will be based on the organizational processes, rational actor, and governmental politics models.

Research gap

The above literature does not cover the element of intelligence usage as a policy in international relations. Therefore, it is important to establish the link between policy inconsistencies in international relations in order to ensure that decisions made are consistent.

This research paper will attempt to fill the above research gap by studying the significant of intelligence as a policy framework in making decisions covering international relations.

Methodology

Research design

The research will be carried out through quantitative research using secondary data. The research will concentrate on the current reports, journal articles, and other secondary sources that are relevant to the research topic⁸. The researcher will examine the previous relationship between the U.S. and Japan, and how the Pearl Harbor attack affected their economic, political, and military relationships.

Research identification and operationalization

Dependability will be assured by providing clear, detailed, and sequential descriptions of data collection and analysis procedures. It is a quality that is reliant on the study design being congruent with clear research question, having an explicit explanation of the status and roles of the researcher.

Besides, quality involves providing findings with meaningful parallelism across data sources, specification of basic theoretical constructs and analytical frameworks, and data collection across a range of settings. This study seeks to fulfill these criteria as much as possible.

Data collection

A full effort will be made to accurately and faithfully transcribe data from the secondary sources. The findings will be supported by credible secondary information sources. The collected quantitative data will be coded and passed through Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version seventeen.

In the process, cross tabulation will be used to review the information processing errors in the U.S. foreign policy that led to the flawed decision making which led to the infamous Pearl Harbor attack. In order to quantify the relationship between the independent and dependent variable, ANOVA will be essential.

During the data collection phase of this study, the researcher will strive to uphold ethics appertaining to scientific research. The data collected will not be used for any other purpose rather than for which it was primarily intended for. Dependability will be assured by providing clear, detailed and sequential descriptions of data collection and analysis procedures.

Research justification and summary of analysis procedure

The quantitative approach was informed by the fact that the secondary research requires a dynamic and subjective approach to establish the facts of the research. Quantitative approach is significant in gaining the accurate insight in to the facts of the case study results.

Besides, this method of data analysis is flexible and consists of tools for reviewing the degree of confidence from the primary assumptions⁹. Therefore, making use of the method of data analysis will ensure that the results are evidence based and scientific within the scope of the case study framework.

Limitations of the research design and bias discussion

One major weakness of this quantitative analysis, especially for secondary data, is that it tends to transform the data into semi-quantitative data by giving it labels and tags. In this case, the qualitative data from secondary sources will be tagged and labeled according to the research question and research objective they address, thus limiting scope of analysis.

However, a major strength of the methodology is that it helps in analyzing all themes, which have implications on the research questions; hence the bias will be minimal. In spite of its inability to highlight themes that are external to the research questions conclusively, the methodology is appropriate for this study.

In other words, the researcher will study the texts from the data collected trying to identify the concepts that relate to the research questions and objectives to minimize any bias. Besides, content analysis and thematic analysis are closely related, especially in the context of the current study. Fortunately, both of them are hinged on the research question for this research case study.

Reference List

Baron, Robert. So Right its wrong: Groupthink and the Ubiquitous Nature of Polarized Group. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 37, no. 1 (July 2005): 219- 252.

Boin, Arjen, and Paul Hart. Public Leadership in Times of Crisis: Mission Impossible? Public Administration Review 63, no. 5, (May 2003): 544-554.

Brandstrom, Annika, Fredrik Bynander, and Paul Hart. Governing by Looking Back: Historical Analogies and Crisis Management, Public Administration 82, no. 1, (Jan 2004): 191-210.

George, Alexander, and Andrew Bennet. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences: How to Do Case Studies. Massachusetts, Ma: MIT Press, 2005.

George, Alexander, and Erick Stern. Harnessing Conflict in Foreign Policy Making: From Devils to Multiple Advocacy, Presidential Studies Quarterly 32, no. 3 (May 2002): 484-508.

Jordan, Jennifer, Niro Sivanathan, and Adam Galinsky. Something to Lose and Nothing to Gain: The Role of Stress in Interactive Effect of Power and Stability on Risk Taking. Administrative Science Quarterly 56, no. 4, (June 2003): 530-558.

Maitlis, Sally, and Hakan Ozcelik. Toxic Decision Processes: A Study of Emotion and Organizational Decision Making. Organization Science 15, no. 4, (Dec 2004): 275-393.

Taylor, Andrew, and John Rourke. Historical Analogies in the Congressional Foreign Policy Process. The Journal of Politics 57, no. 2, (May 1995): 460-468.

Footnotes

¹ Robert Baron, So Right its Wrong: Groupthink and the Ubiquitous Nature of Polarized Group, Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 37, no. 1 (July 2005): 236.

² Annika Brandstrom, Fredrik Bynander and Paul Hart, Governing by Looking Back: Historical Analogies and Crisis Management, Public Administration 82, no. 1, (Jan 2004): 203.

³ Arjen Boin and Paul Hart, Public Leadership in Times of Crisis: Mission Impossible? Public Administration Review 63, no. 5, (May 2003): 549.

⁴ Jennifer Jordan, Niro Sivanathan, and Adam Galinsky, Something to Lose and Nothing to Gain: The Role of Stress in Interactive Effect of Power and Stability on Risk Taking, Administrative Science Quarterly 56, no. 4, (June 2003): 540.

⁵ Alexander George and Erick Stern, Harnessing Conflict in Foreign Policy Making: From Devils to Multiple Advocacy, Presidential Studies Quarterly 32, no. 3 (May 2002): 491.

⁶ Sally Maitlis and Hakan Ozcelik, Toxic Decision Processes: A Study of Emotion and Organizational Decision Making, Organization Science 15, no. 4, (Dec 2004): 281.

⁷ Andrew Taylor and John Rourke, Historical Analogies in the Congressional Foreign Policy Process, The Journal of Politics 57, no. 2, (May 1995): 466.

⁸ Alexander George and Andrew Bennet, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences: How to Do Case Studies (Massachusetts, Ma: MIT Press, 2005), 79.

⁹ Alexander George and Andrew Bennet, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences: How to Do Case Studies (Massachusetts, Ma: MIT Press, 2005), 79.

Two events that helped sculpt America into what it is today would be – the attack on Pearl Harbor and the New Deal Emergency Relief Program. These two events changed the landscape of America for decades to come, and will carry an impact far into the future.

First, a brief reminder of what happened in Pearl Harbor. On Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, Japanese planes assaulted the United States Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii Territory. The shelling murdered over 2,300 Americans. It devastated the American war vessel U.S.S. Arizona and overturned the U.S.S. Oklahoma. The assault sank or stranded a sum of twelve ships and harmed nine others. 160 airplane was crushed, and 150 others injured. The attack overwhelmed the nation, particularly the poorly arranged Pearl Harbor base. The next day United States President Franklin Delano Roosevelt declared war on Japan, and the U.S. entered into World War II.

First lady Eleanor Roosevelt, pleaded with Americans on the radio to “go about our daily business more determined than ever to do the ordinary things as well as we can and when we find a way to do anything more in our communities to help others, to build morale, to give a feeling of security, we must do it. Whatever is asked of us, I am sure we can accomplish it. We are the free and unconquerable people of the United States of America” (E. Roosevelt). Nourishment and gas proportioning, triumph gardens, Civil Defense volunteers, scrap metal drives, paper drives, elastic drives — all these remained as unmistakable proof of the solidarity of Americans in the days after Pearl Harbor.

Income from war bonds purchased of different social statuses were streaming in, and gifts for the war exertion were staking up. Bonds were a prevalent Christmas present, selling from $25 to $1,000 each. One man, too old to even consider fighting, gave $25 for the exertion; another lady sent just $5. A senior class at Baird High School in Texas utilized $37.50 made arrangements for their group cookout to purchase bonds. A man in Manhattan, George Herman Ruth Jr., needed to purchase $100,000 worth of war bonds — he was informed that the most extreme was $50,000, so he bought half in December 1941 and half in January 1942 (You may realize him better by his epithet, ‘Babe’). Archbishop Francis Joseph Spellman of New York gave $1,000 to the Red Cross, and even offered “one 16 ounces of clerical blood”, as Time magazine revealed. This single act of violence against the United States would bring together political party lines and people of all color to help win the war. Americans were rushing into recruitment offices, buying war bonds, to sending in silk stocking to be used in the war effort. This event changed America for the better because it helped unite the country as a whole. Men and women would come together and do whatever to help achieve total victory.

The next event is the New Deal Emergency Relief Program from 1933, started by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Around two months after he got down to business, Franklin Roosevelt designated a previous social laborer Harry Hopkins to head a crisis program of help to the jobless. A few pundits opposed his flurry and needed increasingly broadened thought of this government consumption. Hopkins reacted, broadly, “Individuals don’t eat over the long haul; they eat each day” (H. Hopkins). In two hours, he burned through 5 million dollars, the likeness about $70 million today.

Relief was the quick exertion to help the 33% of the populace that was hardest hit by the downturn. Rescue was additionally planned for giving impermanent assistance to torment and jobless Americans. Nearby and state spending plans were sharply decreased due to falling assessment income. However, New Deal help programs were utilized to contract the unemployed as well as to assemble required schools, metropolitan structures, waterworks, sewers, boulevards, and parks as indicated by neighborhood particulars. While the customary Army and Navy spending plans had decreased, Roosevelt shuffled relief assets to accommodate their varied needs. The entirety of the CCC camps were coordinated by armed force officials, whose compensations originated from the help spending plan. The PWA fabricated various warships, including two planes carrying ships; the cash originated from the PWA organization. PWA likewise manufactured warplanes, while the WPA assembled army installations and runways.

Emergency help was the most mainstream of the New Deal programs and has been known as a critical advance in sparing free enterprise. It introduced an example of government activity in emergencies that would some way or another turn crazy. Without emergency funding, America might not have recovered from the Great Depression, so it took a radical idea to restore the faith of the people into the government again. After years of feeling abandoned by President Hoover, America needed to feel like the government would have their backs, even when tough times happened.

The attack on Pearl Harbor and the Emergency Relief Program helped shape the country because they both gave the people something to believe in, something that was real. These events made people realize that as a whole, Americans can do anything, and nothing can keep us down. No matter how bad things get politically or socially, American will adapt and overcome, and become a stronger nation. We also, as Americans, can become very complacent in our daily lives, so as a whole, we need a wake-up call. These two events demonstrate how a sleeping giant can be brought into the forefront of greatness with one event. America has had and will continue to have events that drastically change the shape of the country, but the importance in all of this is how Americans set aside differences and band together to accomplish these feats.

Introduction

On the morning of December 7^th, 1941, the Japanese made an attack on the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor. It was an unprovoked attack which caught them by surprise. This attack is known to have been a major cause of America’s entry into World War II. Following this attack, America declared war on Japan. This attack is considered to have been highly unethical. It was an uninformed attack without any formal warning by Japan. It was conducted while negotiations between the two countries were still under discussion.

This attack resulted in a lot of damage and significant loss of life. Statistics report that 2,402 men were killed and 1,282 were wounded (USSWestVirginia 2000). The Japanese carried out a series of simultaneous attacks. “They hit the American ships, military installations, military airfields, the fleet at Pearl Harbor and many others” (Navy.mil 1991).

Through these sudden and simultaneous attacks the Japanese aimed to destroy the US planes before they could fight back or defend themselves. The immense damage that the Americans suffered included the destruction of approximately 200 aircrafts and four navy battleships were sunk. On the other hand, Japan’s losses were much lighter with only around 65 fatalities.

Ethical Issue

This attack was also unethical in the context that Japan did not attack the US pacific fleet with the aim of a direct war with them. This was only a preventative measure they took to make sure that the Japanese could carry out their plans against East Asia, China, and United Kingdom without military interference from the US. Hence, all this destruction and loss of life was merely collateral damage. This uninformed attack identified Japan as treacherous and deceitful.

Outcome

The outcome of this attack was that the very next day America declared war on Japan. All Americans united with their allies and just one attack changed the course of the war. It led to the internment of the Japanese in the western United States. This was the exclusion and detention of people with Japanese descent.

This gave rise to strong anti-Japanese sentiments and hostility towards them. The most important and drastic outcome of this event was the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by America (History.com 2011). These unimaginable bombings marked the beginning of the nuclear age.

On the 6^th of August, 1945 America conducted its first nuclear bombing on the city of Hiroshima. The bomb named “little boy” was dropped on the city. Within seconds of this bombing, “around 30% of the total population of the city was killed instantly and around 70,000 were injured severely” (Truman 1945).

All that was left of the city was just a scar in the ground and monstrous grey clouds of smoke emitting from it. “Practically all living things, human and animal, were literally burnt to death,” (Truman 1945). By the end of the year, deaths resulting from the after effects of this explosion reached up to around 166,000.

While Japan was still awestruck by this explosion, on the morning of August 9^th, a second bomb was dropped on the city of Nagasaki. This bomb resulted in instant causalities ranging from 40,000 to 75,000 people. It also released large amounts of deadly radiation that spread all across the city and its surrounding areas.

This was the outcome of the attack on Pearl Harbor. These bombings initiated the nuclear age; it was the first time the world had witnessed this. After the bombing the American president Harry S Truman stated in his press release “The Japanese began the war from the air at Pearl Harbor, They have been repaid many folds” (Truman 1945).

This statement of the president clearly implied that he believed the bombings were the correct way of avenging the attack at Pearl Harbor. He was in fact proud of it. If one considered the loss of life and destruction caused by Pearl Harbor to be brutal then it is obvious that the devastation caused by these bombings was far worse. Not only were there numerous immediate deaths but the radiation also caused a lot of diseases like cancer, birth retardations and other abnormalities.

Japan chose to surrender after the second bombing. If this decision hadn’t been made there were more bombings planned against them. This attack was conducted at a much greater scale than that made by the Japanese. Many innocent civilians were killed. Generations suffered because of the after effects of radiation from the bombs. While, Japan had targeted American security forces and equipment in their attacks, these bombings targeted the cities as a whole killing blameless people.

Innocent women and children lost their lives. Countless buildings including hospitals and schools were destroyed. This event was historically the most unethical and immoral ending to a war. The intensity and horror of it was so great that no other nuclear attack ever took place after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings (Crane 2005). Till date these are the only nuclear activities to have taken place.

Alternate Outcome

An alternate outcome to this could have been that the American government could have planned humanely. They might have targeted the security forces like Japan had done, and kept innocent civilians out of this. The bombs were used on too large a scale which was not necessary.

However, if bombing felt like the correct thing to do based on the circumstances at the time, the Japanese could have been given some kind of warning for resident evacuation from the areas. The nation was unaware of the intensity of these bombs since it was the first time they had been used. The Americans themselves were not certain of the outcome, yet they still carried out the operation.

It was stated that these bombings were carried out to put an end to World War II. If that was the case then other less destructive means could have been considered (Seligmann 2008). Most importantly, if the US was trying to highlight its hegemonic power in this war, the bombing at Hiroshima had caused enough devastation to prove it, a second bombing at Nagasaki was not necessary.

This could have saved hundreds and thousands of lives, it could have prevented the numerous diseases that resulted as a consequence of the deadly radiation. And it was after witnessing the supremacy of these nuclear attacks that other countries started investing in nuclear technology and now numerous nations’ posses it.

Sustainability

In both these incidents, sustainability of the target nation was not considered as it should have been. In the case of Pearl Harbor, an unannounced series of simultaneous attacks from the Japanese caused passionate feelings of dislike to arise against them. This resulted in incarceration of the Japanese Americans living in the West Coast.

The anti-Japanese sentiments resulted in mass removal and imprisonment of them. There was no criterion as to who should be exiled. All Japanese Americans were forced to leave their homes and were sent to camps. Even the loyal and patriotic Japanese-Americans were not given any partiality. In some instances they were deported (Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum 1999).

Those Japanese descents that had been American natives for a long time and were dedicated to the country deserved to have been shown respect and tolerance. The deporting of American national Japanese community highlighted the aspect of racism.

Some were so disturbed by the behavioral changes in the society due to Pearl Harbor that they left the country by choice. However, in 1944 a number of Japanese Americans were selected to serve in the military and intelligence services. The selection was based on merit and those who met the requirements were given positions.

List of References

Crane, Conrad C. 2005. The Atomic Bomb. Web.

Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum. 1999. The Spirit of Hiroshima: An Introduction to the Atomic Bomb Tragedy. Hiroshima: Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.

History.com. 2011. Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Web.

Navy.mil .1991. Overview of the Pearl Harbor attack, 7 December 1941. Web.

Patel, D. 2007. Hibakush. Web.

Seligmann, M. 2008. The alternatives to bombing Hiroshima were not morally superior. Web.

Truman, H. August 1945. Atomic bombings of Hiroshima press release. Web.

USS West Virginia. 2000. Pearl Harbor causality list. Web

Pearl Harbor is located at Hawaii in the United States of America. This was a military base of the US military forces during the Second World War. Japan was very keen on conquering the larger Asian region, having successfully suppressed China. It had entered into an alliance with Germany and Italy.

This alliance formed the central power that would fight the allied forces led by Britain. This country was one of the strongest nations during the Second World War and its leaders were keen on asserting their control in Asian region.

The United States of America had taken a low profile in the war at the beginning. It preferred supplying both weapons and food to both sides. This stabilized it economically, which would later help it in strengthening its military. Japan was weary of the US and wanted to suppress it as it was the only threat to Japan’s conquest.

The German soldiers convinced Japan that Britain and France were under control. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republicans was still recovering from the German attack. The only threat was the United States of America (Rottman 45).

Tension between the two countries started building up in early 1940s. Both countries were suspicious of each other. The US was keenly monitoring the rate at which Japan was arming itself. Japan was also aware that the US was heavily armed.

Japan therefore decided to attack the US for one main reason, which was to offer the US a devastating blow that would completely discourage it from going to war. They expected that after the attack, the US either would be too weak to join the war or would be scared. This would enable their advancement to other Asian countries since there could not be any threat from major powers.

In 25 November 1941, Japan decided to launch its offensive. It attacked the US military base at Pearl Harbor. This was one of the US main military bases located in Hawaii. This resulted to death of over 2400 Americans and wounded about 1300 people. Several ships were also destroyed and the harbor was damaged, though not to a large extent.

The US had expected such an occurrence but had not predicted this kind of damage. The damage would have been worse but it was poorly planned. Furthermore, the military strength of the US forces was under-estimated by the Japanese senior commanders. It did not take much to repair the ships and get them back to the sea.

The United States of American responded to this attack very swiftly. It was convinced that Japan was an enemy that could no longer be assumed. They could no longer watch this war from the fence but had to join it actively. They declared war on Japan. This immediate cause forced America to join the Second World War officially.

This reaction was expected by German and Italy, which responded immediately by declaring war on the US. However, Japan did not expect this eventuality. They expected the US to be scared meaning that it could not be in a position to join the war.

The United States of America entered the war for two major reasons. One of it was to save its friendly nations such as Britain and France, which were under siege. In addition, it had to react to the attack on its military base. Although the US helped in suppressing the all-powerful Germany, its main target was Japan.

Works Cited

Rottman, Gordon. World War 2 Pacific Island Guide. New York: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002. Print.

Findings and Analysis

From series of secondary data gathered, it is apparent that there were series of lapses in intelligence analysis, interpretation, and action due to inconsistency in interpreter the primary intelligence information gathered b the U.S. intelligence community. The foreign policy biases, which led to the attack on Pearl Harbor, are discussed as follows.

Sectionalism and Groupthink

Sectionalism was the norm of the day within the U.S. intelligence management community in the pre-Pearl Harbor attack. This phenomenon was responsible for the unprecedented devastation upon the nation, which was in the clear was a path with its attacker. To begin with, each of the intelligence-gathering units was not willing to carry out the roles presumed to the mandate of other companies, even in instances where the corporation and teamwork are in the best interest of the country. For example, “while the major concern of the Hawaiian Army intelligence was to detect sabotage and subversion dictated primarily by Army intelligence tradition… in May 1941, General Marshall requested to establish an evaluation branch within G-2 (Army intelligence) to follow activities in the Far East”[1]. As a result, the personnel within the G-2 unit were tripled from 22 to almost 80 men following the request. However, the change was only in the headcount of the personnel with minimal effort to alter procedures and relevant organizational priorities. When this alteration occurred, the intelligence within the military cycles was still “specifically concerned, particularly concerned, and practically solely concerned with anti-subversive precautions and operations”[2].

This was revealed in the year 1946 during the proceedings of the fact-finding mission on what made America vulnerable during the attack. In one of the sessions, the Chief of Military intelligence confessed that “I do not think any Intelligence officer ever thought that he could be sure of picking up a convoy or attack force or task force in Japan before it sailed and know where it was going. That was beyond our terms of efficiency”[3]. Interestingly, from this confession, it is apparent that this chief mind was preoccupied with counter-subversive measures. There was little attention directed towards the possible intentions of the enemy despite the earlier request to spread the military personnel in the Far East region.

There were poor coordination and communication between the relevant intelligence gathering and action planning units. For instance, following the alert of a possible war on November 27, the Hawaiian army commander confessed to having received information from the Navy through reconnaissance of a hostile force, despite the fact that it was one of the duties of the Navy. Apparently, there was a lot of rivalry among the intelligence-gathering units. Conflict is known to interfere with the decision process and place directive along with personal and ‘ingroup’ inclination.

For instance, the Signal Corps unit could not hand over the full control of operations to the Army Aircraft Warning Service (AWS) unit despite a series of requests and appeals. Unfortunately, Signal Corps won the argument on who is to control the operations, thus limiting the activities of the AWS. In fact, there was no coordination between these two units on real-time aircraft identification and interception. This lapse was responsible for the lack of coordination in the counter-attack strategy. For instance, “on the morning of December 7, the AWS radar centers were manned from 4 to 7 A.M. When an officer at one of the radar stations found something completely out of the ordinary on the screen at 7:02 A.M. and called the information center, no one replied to it and later one inexperienced staff”[4]. The response of the inexperienced staff was that the images captured were those of friendly aircraft. In reality, those images were the Japanese submarine in the U.S. water space.

Insensitivity

Malfunctions within the organizational management may lead to insensitivity, especially when there is an emergency. Across the globe, military officers are very keen in peacetime and are likely to pass the information on everything apprehensive or unusual. However, when preparing for war, the level of sensitivity reduces since they are worked up by the high expectations and series of concurrent duties. For instance, on the morning of the fateful day, everything around Pearl Harbor was running as usual since there were no predictions of an imminent attack by the enemy. In fact, the threat detected an hour before the actual attack was not correctly processed, and no action was taken to follow it up. The commanders simply forwarded the information to higher authorities without making an effort to follow it up.

Insensitivity may also be seen in the way information on planning for a counter-attack to any threat by the Japanese was passed down. Phrased as a long-range plan for deterring a ‘surprise attack’ by the Japanese, the U.S. war preparation was more of an institutionalized theory. For instance, “there was no practical assessment of what surprise would mean, what such an attack could do to American fleets, aircraft, and ground forces, and no calculation of probable damage to soldiers and equipment”[5]. In contrast, the Japanese had made an estimate of a one-third loss should their plan materialize. In fact, despite having full knowledge of a possible attack, the U.S. military found it unnecessary to carry out any entire 360-degrees patrol around the vulnerable islands due to their insensitivity. Such patrols would have become instrumental in deterring the enemy almost 800 miles before reaching Pearl Harbor. If the military had carried out 360-degree patrols, the U.S. would have had the advantage of preparing for a counter-attack with a reasonable time allocation of more than one hour.

As an extension of insensitivity, the ‘cry wolf’ phenomenon could also be blamed for the surprising attack on Pearl Harbor. For instance, the sighting of a submarine an hour before the attack was treated casually simply because the military officials were used to so many false alarms. Before the attack, three false warnings had been raised. Therefore, judgment based on the past false alerts eventually made it easy for the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor and retreat before recording any significant losses[6].

Rigid Group Atmosphere

The Pearl Harbor attack may also be blamed on the prevailing group atmosphere within the U.S. intelligence community and the military. Before the Pearl Harbor attack, holding the position that there is a need for maximum security alert to avoid a probable Japanese attack would have been declared cowardice since the U.S. considered itself superior to any force or nation in the world. There was a widespread fear that talking of Pearl Harbor as vulnerable would imply the imposition of social sanctions among the military units.

In the minds of most of the military personnel, the U.S. officers were superior and had better weapons which could not be challenged. Since there was no concrete information on the possibility of Japanese attack coupled with the atmosphere of unanimity, “even most conscientious military officers would take a risk in seemingly a shallow probability threat of an enemy’s surprise attack rather than in the high-probability of being scorned by questioning the group’s recent reaffirmations of its commitment to a business-as-usual and a weekend-leave-as-usual policy”[7]. For instance, in one of the high-level security intelligence meetings, the request for a security alert by the commander of the Navy manning the Far East region was turned down by his superiors on the presumptions that the current Hawaii alerts were sufficient.

Security problem

The restrictions in the U.S. server called the MAGIC carrying secret information for different intelligence analysis organs was in itself a huddle that made it easy for Japan to access Pearl Harbor and destroy it. Before the attack, intelligence on Japanese threats was shared by ‘ingroups,’ and it never reached some of the policymakers since those mandated with the duty were still not ready to share some of the information. Basically, as a secrecy policy, the intelligence on a possible attack could only be viewed by a few individuals with the hope that broader access would have compromised the secrecy of the inception methods. However, this turned out to be ineffective.

The army chief in Hawaii confessed that “I was not informed that, upon receipt of the American note of November 26, the Japanese considered that negotiations had not merely ceased but that relations with this country were ruptured”[8]. As a result of such mutual misunderstandings, Washington’s assumption that the chief had full access to intelligence on the Japanese made it very difficult to organize an immediate and effective counter-attack. Thus, “selective distribution of information tends to build a wrong assumption that someone else knows what is going on and will handle the emergency. And this reliance, so often unjustified, on other officers, may help persist in biased beliefs and ignore inconsistent information”[9].

Conclusion

From the above facts around the Pearl Harbor attack, it is in order to conclude that the Japanese assault was inevitable. The U.S. political and intelligence community were aware of the fact that the emerging Asian giant would roll out military action in the shortest time possible after the collapse of peace negotiations. Apparently, the intelligence community could not acquire qualified information on the exact method of potential aggression and target. However, the U.S. had enough intelligence information to create an effective counter-attack policy. For instance, intelligence information in the MAGIC server was specific to Japan as the aggressor and the time limit of a possible attack. Besides, if the operations control was given to the Aircraft Warning Service, the military would have had a war advantage of almost one hour to counter the approaching aggressor[10]. For instance, one of the officers attached to the AWS noticed something unusual nearly an hour before the attack but had to wait for confirmation from the Air Corps unit, which declared the image as that of a friendly aircraft. Moreover, a series of reports recommended comprehensive security alerts in addition to series of 360degrees patrols in the Far East region.

The intelligence community in the U.S. ought to have acted on sectionalism as a remedy for efficiency and agency motivation instead of supporting the status quo in the sharing of information in the MAGIC server. This would have gone a long way in minimizing mutual-misunderstandings. Despite the high risk, intelligence dissemination via the MAGIC would have prepared the military chiefs for an effective counter-attack. As a result of the ‘cry wolf’ phenomenon, the focus of decision-making was twisted to groupthink and the assumption that the US was more superior than the enemy. Instead of drawing plans to counter an imminent attack, the Hawaiian forces’ perception of the enemy was clouded with superiority complex as a result of inverted group cognition.

Apparently, wrong perception and organizational ineffectiveness were the primary factors in the foreign policy biases that led to the Pearl Harbor attack by the Japanese. Despite collecting a lot of information on a possible confrontation and eventual attack by Japan, this intelligence data was not fully integrated and used in making policies and decisions on how to deter Japan from inflicting damages on U.S. soil. In fact, bureaucratic pathology was an impairment to creating efficient and rational measures to counter or altogether avoid a possible attack on Pearl Harbor.

Through critical analysis of cognition and groupthink theories, it is apparent that inconsistencies in intelligence processing and lack of high-quality decision making led to the surprise Pearl Harbor attack. There were information processing errors in the U.S. foreign policy. These errors led to the poor decision making and subsequent Pearl Harbor attack. These errors included sectionalism and groupthink, insensitivity, security management problem, and a rigid group atmosphere. These findings confirm the hypothesis that inconsistency in decision making resulted in the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. This research adds the approach of relating cognition and groupthink to biases in decision making. There is a need to carry out further research on the relationship between groupthink and understanding and the impact of this relationship on intelligence processing in order to avoid a similar incident, such as the Pearl Harbor attack.

Bibliography

Genda, Minoru. “Analysis No. 1 of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Operation A.I.,” edited by Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside The Japanese Plans. Washington, DC: Brassey’s 1993.

Heuer, Richards. Psychology of Intelligence Analysis. Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence 1999.

Tur, Ozlem. “The Lebanese War of 2006: Reasons and Consequences.” Perceptions 6, no. 6, (2007): 109-122.

Turner, Marlene. “A Social Identity Maintenance Model of Groupthink.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 73, no. 2, (1998): 210-235.

Welch, David. “The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect.” International Security 17, no. 2, (1992): 112- 146.

Yet, Steve. “Groupthink and the Gulf Crisis.” British Journal of Political Science 33, no. 3 (2003): 419-442.

[1] Minoru Genda, “Analysis No. 1 of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Operation A.I.,” edited by Donald M.Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside The Japanese Plans (Washington, DC: Brassey’s 1993), 29.

[2] David Welch, “The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect.” International Security 17, no. 2, (1992): 136.

[3] Marlene Turner, “A Social Identity Maintenance Model of Groupthink.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 73, no. 2, (1998):228.

[4] Minoru Genda, “Analysis No. 1 of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Operation A.I.,” edited by Donald M.Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside The Japanese Plans (Washington, DC: Brassey’s 1993), 31.

[5] Minoru Genda, “Analysis No. 1 of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Operation A.I.,” edited by Donald M.Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside The Japanese Plans (Washington, DC: Brassey’s 1993), 29.

[6] Ozlem, Tur, “The Lebanese War of 2006: Reasons and Consequences.” Perceptions 6, no. 6, (2007): 109-122.

[7] Minoru Genda, “Analysis No. 1 of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Operation A.I.,” edited by Donald M.Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside The Japanese Plans (Washington, DC: Brassey’s 1993), 29.

[8] Steve Yetiv, “Groupthink and the Gulf Crisis.” British Journal of Political Science 33, no. 3 (2003): 419-442.

[9] Minoru Genda, “Analysis No. 1 of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Operation A.I.,” edited by Donald M.Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside The Japanese Plans (Washington, DC: Brassey’s 1993), 29.

[10] Richard Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence 1999), 19.

Introduction

Indeed, it was a day in infamy. December 7, 1941 marked the day that Japanese forces struck what was thought to be the defining blow to the Pacific fleet. However, this was not that case as history has shown. Although some Hollywood films have sought to recapture the events of the Pear Harbor attacks, they have all too some degree, failed. Michael Bay’s Pearl Harbor (2001) is a gleaming example of the attempt at turning the astonishing military debacle that was Pearl Harbor into a stylized pseudo loved story. Although Bay follows the life of two pilots through the attack and beyond, he does not mention the build up of tensions between American and Japanese forces that ultimately incited Japan to attack. Bay’s fascination with the, then, Army’s Air Corps leads one to believe that the Japanese planned Pearl Harbor as an attack on the aerial and ground forces, not the awe inspiring naval fleet. Finally, the battle scenes give rise to the notion that Pearl Harbor was a significant handicap from which America narrowly escaped, but history proves otherwise.

Discussion

Scholars have studied the events leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack in order to identify reasons for the Japanese bombardment of the Pacific fleet. However, Pearl Harbor did not feel it necessary to include such portions to its good war hero motif. The embargo implemented by the United States to halt trade relations within the Pacific region was the beginning of many more actions taken. (Suid, 38). Since China was seen as the ultimate power in the region, America decided to offer military support in order to spite the Japanese. (Boggs, 454). All along, the tensions are building although the United States remained neutral, figuratively, during the early portions of World War II. The Japanese, history explains, would not sit back for long.

In perhaps the single most seditious action leading to the Pearl Harbor bombing, America decided to expand the Pacific fleet and send naval vessels into Japanese waters. By sending the Navy into Japanese waters for various tasks, mostly were for intelligence gathering, the United States violated international law. (Suid, 42). This proves to be the most significant expunged piece of Bay’s Pearl Harbor. However, it makes perfect sense. Hollywood could not produce a successful war hero motif if the war is portrayed as anything but heroic. The omission of such information insures the audience will not question the history of Pearl Harbor and thus except whatever Bay was willing to put on screen as the actual events.

During moments in the movie, Bay catches images from the life of Doris Miller, played by Cuba Gooding Jr., the first African American to receive the Navy Cross. Mackie and Norton explain, “that once the battle sequence begins, Miller is shown shooting down two different Japanese fighter planes, which is completely false.” (240). The idea that Japanese fighter planes would be zooming in between the decks of ships is more than creating spectacle, it is ridiculous. The fighter planes of that era could not have pulled off such maneuvers considering the range of the ships and smoke in the air as well as the likelihood of being shot down by sailors manning the available weaponry. Miller shot at the planes and defended his ship admirably, but never shot down the fighter planes. He shot at the planes as they skimmed just above the water performing strafing runs. (Biache, 17).

Furthermore, Michael Bay creates an allure of the Air Force, then Army Air Corps, within the context of a naval attack. This concentration on two fighter pilots shooting down Japanese planes, seven to be exact, is more than a stretch considering that only twenty nine Japanese planes were shot down by the combined forces; air, land and sea. Pearl Harbor’s battle sequence spans roughly forty minutes in length, yet almost twenty five percent isolates the maneuvers of Captains Rafe McCawley, Ben Affleck, and Danny Walker, Josh Hartnett. This heroic portrayal is in contrast to the members and equipment assigned to air fields such as Hickam, Wheeler, and Bellows which were essentially demolished. These sustained losses, however, pale in comparison to the extent of damage to the Pacific fleet.

Moreover, Bay continues an inordinate fascination with the aerial aspect of the Pearl Harbor attack as shown in the following scenes leading to the Doolittle raids. The two pilots continue their missions in fighting the Japanese by volunteering as members of a covert task force headed by Colonel Jimmy Doolittle, Alec Baldwin. However, in actuality, none of the surviving pilots were stationed on the carrier, Hornet, much less apart of this raid. Again, the war hero motif took precedence over historical accounts of the military actions. Bay also emphasizes its importance to the war effort, although it was subsequently named the “Doo-Nothing raid for its immaterial impact on the Japanese”. (Smith, 48). Scholars have argued that this action was to provoke a sense of retribution in the American people following the Pearl Harbor attack, but nothing more.

Throughout the battle sequences, the audience witnesses what seems to be a disabling blow to American forces. Numerous historical sources point out that although Pearl Harbor was a significant political motivator to entering World War II, the detriment to the American war machine was quite insignificant. (Laforte and Marcello, 311). Only one battleship of the eight was laid to complete rest, and equipment from the USS Arizona was still recovered for later use. (Boggs, 460).The aircraft carriers, on the other hand, left the port prior to the attacks. (Rogers, 445). Therefore, the focal point of the Japanese was spared from any substantial losses and, as a result, the power of the United States in the Pacific was quickly restored. Historical naval battles, including Midway are prime examples of the successful restoration projects.

Overall, Pearl Harbor was not an accurate depiction of the historical events. Although, the film did not serve the purpose of propaganda, it was little more than a single battle sequence wrapped around a love story. Sixty years after that dreadful day, Michael Bay releases a movie which does little more then stretch, to say the least, the facts surrounding the other military components during the attack. Even though Bay might have wanted to focus on the other military components during the Pearl Harbor attack, he should have stuck with the historical facts of that day. Bay could have easily presented a background to the events surrounding the attack, so that the audience could be privy to a more complete story. The same could be said for those films makers who would choose to focus the Coast Guard’s role during the invasion of Normandy. The role should be told, but in the context of the entire battle.

Pearl Harbor was released only a few months prior to September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. In the months following the attacks, not much mention was made of Pearl Harbor as the attention shifted to the atrocious images and stories coming out of New York City. Since 2001, Pearl Harbor has made its claim to join many historical depictions of epic protagonists. Along with these other films, though, it remains nothing more than entertainment for those who truly want a history lesson. As such, its value becoming a classic is difficult to believe. The movie advertised itself as the truest depiction of those events ever told. Yet, the aforementioned inconsistencies are more than enough to prove that Pearl Harbor was not as advertised. Therefore, the audience was simply treated to an inflated tale of war heroes which did not perform the amazing feats shown on film.

Conclusion

Pearl Harbor, the event, was much more than a forty minute Hollywood project created by computer generated graphics. This was a day which seared the hearts of many; locking in the passion and determination that has set Americans apart from her competition. All that is left can be read in books or witnessed if visiting the watery graves of close to twelve hundred men. Pearl Harbor was said to have captured the essence of all of this. After foregoing the events leading to the attacks that prompted the Japanese to take action, continually disregarding critical points of detail involving the battle sequence and then cutting away to precipitate a love story, the movie can easily be seen as a failure in the historic portrayal of the event. Michael Bay’s Pearl Harbor can only be described as D-Day, day of dishonor.

Works Cited

Biache, Andrew Jr., et al. “Pearl Harbor.” Naval History 18.6 (2004): 6-24.

Boggs, Carl. “Pearl Harbor: How Film Conquers History.” New Political Science 28.4 (2006): 451-66.

Mackie, Ardiss and Bonny Norton. “Revisiting Pearl Harbor: Resistance and Reel to Real Events in an English Language Classroom.” Canadian Journal of Education 29.1 (2006): 223-46.

Pearl Harbor. Dir. Michael Bay. Perf. Ben Affleck, Josh Hartnett, Cuba Gooding Jr., Alec Baldwin. 2001. DVD. Touchstone, 2001.

Remembering Pearl Harbor: Eyewitness Accounts by U.S. Military Men and Women. Ed. Robert S. La Forte and Ronald E. Marcello. Wilmington: Scholatic Rescources, 1991.

Rogers, Cornwell B. “The Facts on Pearl Harbor.” Current History (pre-1986) 3.000017 (1943): 443-47.

Smith, Dale O. “Pearl Harbor: A Lesson in Air Power.” Air Power History 44.1 (1991): 46-54.

Suid, Lawrence. “Pearl Harbor: More or Less.” Air Power History 48.3 (2001): 38-44.

Introduction

The attack on Pearl Harbor was a pivotal moment in history that changed the course of World War II. It is hardly possible to underestimate the importance of the Seven Principles of Mission Command: competence, mutual trust, shared understanding, commander’s intent, mission orders, disciplined initiative, and risk acceptance (Alexander, 2020). From the importance of intelligence gathering to the effective use of command and control, the seven principles all played a crucial role after the tragedy of Pearl Harbor and remain influential in mission command today.

Role of Air Defense in Pearl Harbor

Air defense played a critical role in the attack on Pearl Harbor, which occurred on December 7th, 1941. The Japanese aerial attack was designed to destroy the United States air power and enable a successful surface attack. As such, it was important for the Japanese to disable all defensive guns and aircraft that could be used to protect the base against an aerial assault. Before the bombing, the United States Navy had implemented various defense mechanisms, including fighter planes, antiaircraft guns, and radar warning systems (Volmar, 2018). These defenses were insufficient, and the Japanese bombers significantly damaged the base’s aircraft and military infrastructure. The attack on Pearl Harbor demonstrated how important effective air defense could be when preparing for an aerial attack.

Japanese Attack

The Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor is a significant event that marks a shift in the global power balance. By using deceptive tactics to surprise American forces stationed at Pearl Harbor and attacking without issuing a formal declaration of war, the Japanese gained an advantage with minimal casualties. Furthermore, the Japanese had established clear objectives for the mission, allowing their forces to remain focused on their goals even when faced with adversity. This strategy, combined with their commitment to the purpose of their mission, helped the Japanese in their surprise attack at Pearl Harbor and contributed to the success of their operation. The attack prompted the United States to enter World War II and established the “mission command” strategy for almost the entire war. Mission command emphasizes unified effort among subordinate commanders who are free to act within their commander’s intent (Garrett, 2018).

Seven Principles of Mission Command

Mission command is a principle of military strategy that focuses on developing an understanding of the mission and then allowing commanders to trust their subordinates to take responsibility for the best way to achieve it. This method emphasizes the need for decentralized decision-making, allowing for more creativity and flexibility in battle.

Build Cohesive Teams

The first mission command in the US Army during World War II was to build cohesive teams of soldiers. The goal was to ensure that every soldier was supported by their team and had the necessary resources to complete the mission (Alexander, 2020). This went hand-in-hand with providing specialized training to prepare them for any situation they faced on the battlefield. It also required that all personnel understand the chain of command and the roles of each team member.

Create a Shared Understanding

The second mission command is to drive collaboration through effective communication, decision-making, and resource synchronization. This step stresses the importance of people coming together to work as one cohesive unit. Everyone knows the expectations and the end goal by coordinating the tasks and resources. Collaboration requires strong communication and decision-making skills to ensure tasks are completed on time and with excellence. It requires everyone involved to communicate with one another, share resources, and make decisions based on the overall goals of the mission.

Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent

Commander’s intent is a mission command concept used in the United States Army (and other military services) that distills down the commander’s intent into a single statement. This line also captures what the commander desires to accomplish, allowing subordinates to make decisions without consulting with higher levels of leadership (Alexander, 2020). It helps all involved parties understand the overall purpose of what they are trying to achieve, even when the details and context of the situation might change. It should be clear, concise, and easily understood by everyone.

Exercise Disciplined Initiative

The fourth mission command requires leaders to exercise disciplined initiative to adapt and adjust plans promptly when necessary. In ambiguous and unpredictable situations, it is essential for leaders to make quick and responsible decisions to succeed. Being able to think on one’s feet and accurately assess the situation while also being able to modify plans based on the given context can be a decisive factor in achieving goals and objectives.

Mission Orders

Mission orders are a mission command used by the US Army to provide clear and concise guidance to commanders. They clearly define task organization and give subordinates the necessary leeway to accomplish the mission. Mission orders are generally delivered in five parts: who, what, when, where, and why. The primary purpose of mission orders is to ensure that commanders have a common understanding of the mission’s purpose and that all forces involved are united in accomplishing the mission. However, the execution of tasks should not be specified to enhance creativity and freedom of action.

Accept Prudent Risk

The sixth mission command is to assume risk to seize opportunities. Taking risks, especially calculated ones, can present the leader with unforeseen outcomes that could lead to something greater than imagined. Thinking outside the box and taking a leap of faith can bring incredible rewards (Alexander, 2020). This mission command emphasizes the importance of considering all potential risks when making decisions and balancing those risks against potential rewards. Incorporating prudent risk into mission command can better mitigate risks from unexpected or unforeseen events. Prudent risk also allows leaders to understand their actions and remain flexible enough to react quickly to changing situations.

Develop a Culture of Trust

The US Army’s Culture of Trust mission command encourages leaders to trust their subordinates by giving them autonomy, freedom to make decisions without fear of failure, and a sense of purpose. It also emphasizes the importance of shared understanding among members, emphasizing communication, delegation, and clear objectives. Ultimately, it fosters a collaborative environment where all team members feel supported, respected, and valued for their contributions. This can ultimately lead to increased productivity and morale, as each member is confident in their roles, knowing their efforts are acknowledged and appreciated.

Conclusion

The Pearl Harbor attack is a harrowing reminder of the importance of the Seven Principles of Mission Command. The principles encompass competence, mutual trust, shared understanding, commander’s intent, mission orders, disciplined initiative, and risk acceptance, which significantly impacted the course of World War II and remain central components in mission command even today. The tragedy of Pearl Harbor has served as an essential lesson in recognizing the effect these principles can have on the outcome of any given mission.

References

Alexander, R. P. (2020). Mission command: The need for disciplined initiative. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth.

Garrett, T. C. (2018). Mission command principles applied to paramilitary forces in Europe during the second World War. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth.

Volmar, D. (2019). The Computer in the garbage can: Air-defense systems in the organization of US nuclear command and control, 1940-1960. [Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University].

Introduction

The Pearl Harbor massacre is one of the many historical events that will forever remain in the annals of history for its significance as far as war betweens nations is concerned. This is because, the events of the war are not only important to the American history, but to the world history, for global nations have a lot to learn from its effects.

In addition, the war between America and Japan has a lot of significance as concerns the world history primarily because, it gave World War II a great shift; a war that saw the destruction of many global communities.

It is important to note here that, although previously before the Pearl Harbor attack there existed many wars between nations, the attack triggered U.S.’s anger, making it to engage itself fully in the war, a factor that contributed to the currently existing power equalities in the world (Rosenberg pp. 3-9).

Many disagreements between leaders of these world “powerful” countries were major contributors to the onset of the war. The divisions were prevalent because of the discriminatory nature of opinions that different powerful countries shared.

For example, in the struggle by these world powers to increases their wealth and areas of jurisdiction during the World War II, majority of them had to conquer areas they considered rich of resources they were missing in their countries. Such efforts to conquer specific regions demanded many power struggles whereby, the only way of winning was through joining pacts hence, the clear differentiations that existed between these word powers.

Such differentiations led to the divided support that specific countries received where Japan was inclusive. For example, in its quest to fully rule China, Japan received a lot of opposition from America whereby, not only did America support China financially, but also it helped it improve its military prowess through provision of military aids.

This in many ways triggered Japan and its affiliate counties’ anger leading to the planning of the attacks (National Park Service: U.S. Department of the Interior p.1). This paper will discuss concepts of the Pearl Harbor attack. In addition, it will discuss reasons behind the attacks and the attack’s aftermaths.

Source: National Park Service: U.S. Department of the Interior p.1.

Background Information

The attack was on one of America’s biggest naval base in Hawaii, a factor that marked the turning point as far World War II was concerned. The invasion took place on 7^th December, 1941, an attack that Japan wanted to use as a mechanism of wrecking America’s military prowess.

Although to some extent Japan achieved its goals, it never anticipated that such an attack could lead to its total destruction. This is because, although Japan succeeded in destroying this American naval base, subsequent retaliations from America saw its destruction; both in terms of properties and numerous lives. In addition, effects from such retaliations by America are evident even today in Japan, although the nation has advanced itself technologically and industrially.

Critical analysis of the attack on the harbor clearly show that, in many ways America was one of the greatest impediment to Japan, as it sought to expand its control of some Asian regions. Therefore, because America was such an obstacle, Japan thought that, the only way of making its dream come true is by wrecking America’s military prowess, with little know how that, its destruction was on the way.

On the other hand, through the attacks, Japan thought that, it could wreck the American fleet patterns, a factor that could render it a chance of advancing its economic prospects by venturing into the Dutch East Indies and other Asian regions. This is because it considered the region rich of many resources, which were essential in terms of boosting its war prowess, when it came to dealing with the United Kingdom and America, for they were its primary antagonists.

Causalities from such a vicious attack were more four thousand, with more than two thousand dead American citizens and less than one hundred Japanese citizens. It was such a big blow to the entire American community primarily because, not only did it result to massive destruction of military property, but also it led to numerous deaths that resulted due to later aftermaths of the war as it endeavored to vengeance (Wohlstetter pp. 3-19).

In addition, it is important to note that, to some extent America could have prevented such invasions had it established itself well. This is because, as research into the attack reveal, the American defense top organs had some know how on the awaiting tragedy, a fact that they failed to make sure its naval base in the Pearl Harbor was prepared for, incase Japan advanced such attacks.

May be had the defense department communicated such impeding threats or likelihoods of attacks, the country could have avoided the blood shade that occurred during that period.

In addition, it is also important to note that, Japan had organized well on how to launch the attacks, a factor that many attribute to America’s failure to defend itself. This is because, as America was busy engrossed in peace initiatives, Japan was preparing on breaking the talks and immediately launching the attacks without giving its antagonist a chance to organize itself (Mahar p.1).

Reasons for the Attack

In any conflict scenario, there has to exist many issues of contention among worrying communities, a fact that was not an exception in this war between America and Japan. In addition, it is important to note that, whether egocentric or for good gains, such wars result due to the need for one nation to dominate and rule over the other.

This was the case in the Pearl Harbor attack, primarily because Japan wanted to outsmart America; a nation that was a great impediment towards its quest to overlook the Asian region, through enriching itself with ill acquired resources. As research studies suggest, the whole contention issue was as a result of a time concept and not the struggle to ensure international diplomacy reigns. That is, the existence of America is this region; Asia-Pacific, was not a subject of apprehension to Japan, but rather its main concern was to take over power as concerned the control of the region.

It is important to note that, achievement of such expectations was one of the hardest things to achieve for Japan, because of the great powers that America had over this region (Rosenberg pp 35-45). On the other hand, the quest to control the Asia-Pacific region to some extent was cultural, because culturally Japan had one believe that is, it was mandatory for there to be a single ruler of the region; a plan they named “hakko ichiu” (Rymer Para. 2)

Although many attribute such power controls as the main factor, which led to the attack, as Robinson (p.1) argues, to some extent, the whole war issue between America and Japan was historical. This is because prior to planning and executing of the attacks, there were many issues of contention between these two economic giants.

Such war backdates to 1930’s, when there was global economic recession that saw Japan suffer economically, as America progressed. In addition, America looked down upon Japan, as militia controlled some of its regions leading to the overexploitation of the rich Manchuria region.

To counter such failures in its control, and in obeying the desire to expand its economic resources, Japan launched such attacks on the harbor in an endeavor to bring down America. On the other hand, it is important to note that, Japanese aggression may have resulted due restriction that America imposed on Japan via commercial treaties prior to 1940, as concerned the provision of natural and industrial resources.

Such restrictions came in full application after the prohibition of scrap iron materials exchange and aviation fuel supply. The fact that, Japan bonded with Italy and Germany in the tripartite deal, made its relationship with America to further deteriorate. This is because the signing of such an agreement was a clear indication of Japan supporting the European war, a war that America took sides.

Apart from such historical injustices and sanctions that were great obstacles to Japan’s development, there were many power struggles between these two nations. For example, prior to the Pearl Harbor attacks, America denied Japan recognition as concerned its occupancy of China.

To condemn Japan’s occupancy, America gave China support, both financially and in terms of military provisions hence, igniting more anger from Japan and its allies. On the other hand, to disapprove Japan, America imposed more sanctions, in addition to the early embargoes that it had mounted on the Japanese state.

As a mechanism of eliminating such sanctions and a sign of not accepting defeat, Japan organized such attacks. In addition, to Japan, such attacks were necessary, because Japan considered America an oppressing nation, due to the fact that, it refused to acknowledge other nations occupancy in other countries, where as itself had exploited Philippines as the Spanish-American conflict raged.

To disapprove America’s power controls as concerned the invasion of other countries, Japan sought to devastate its naval convoy, primary in the pacific region, for it was an obstacle to such exploitations. By attacking the American base, Japan thought that, recovery from such impacts was to take time, a fact that could guarantee them a chance of invading the countries it wanted (Robinson p.1).

In addition to breaking the American power controls, another reason behind the attacks was the endeavor by the Japanese to demoralize America as concerned its superiority when it came to wars. Japan to some extent, achieved this goal because in the onset of 1941, there was a raging debate on whether America should engage itself in warfare or not.

This divided the American citizenry, a fact that made Japan to attack, for it thought that it could paralyze America hence, win the war of control over the pacific region. It is important to note here that, to some level Japan had made a wrong assumption because such attacks led to its later destruction, for it was the only means of ending the war between the two countries.

Another main reason behind the war was the clear signs of discriminations that certain American rulers imposed on the Japanese citizenry. Such discriminations were clear in the Roosevelt’s administration, for many took him as a racist primarily against the Japanese citizens in America.

From the onset of his reign, Roosevelt had a discriminatory liking of the Chinese and a disliking tendency on the Japanese; a fact that many researches attribute to the nature of gains he received from the Chinese nation. On the other hand, his discriminatory tendency was prevalent on the way he treated the Germans.

This is because; Roosevelt’s ruling orientation was contrary to Adolph Hitler’s ruling orientation; dictatorship hence, his favoritism for the Europeans; primary Britain. In his ruling, foreign policies were of little significance, a factor that contributed to the decline in personal relations to other world rulers of that time more so Germany and Italy.

For example, during Germany’s quest to take over Lebensraum, through amalgamation with Britain and France, they opposed such quests, a factor that increased these countries enmity, because these countries were close allies of Japan. This to some extent proves that, although majority of individuals blame Japan for the onset of the war, to some extent what America was doing is a clear indication that they wanted war.

However, to avoid blame hence, look for an excuse for attacking Japan, America had to use any means that was at its disposal to trigger an attack from Japan. In this regard, it is important to note that, actions by America might have been one main triggering factors as far as the war was concerned (Higgs Para. 6-12).

The Attack’s Aftermaths

Although Japan succeeded in wrecking the American naval base, its achievements were short lived. This is because, such attacked triggered America’s anger, hence the use of bombs to destroy many Japanese cities. The effects of such retaliations are prevalent even today in Japan as it endeavors to improve its infrastructural and industrial sector.

As a response to Japanese attacks, America launched efforts to track Japanese shipper fleet, something that never succeeded at first because of the minute numbers of American naval support. Although this was a deterring factor, as concerned revenge efforts, America still was determined to destroy Japan.

In many ways, the war gave many other nations courage of threatening America, a factor that made its revenge mission even harder. For example, because of the attack, which led to the destruction of the naval fleet, Germany and Italy started their own hostilities towards America, a fact that many attribute to many historical indifferences between these countries (McGraw-Hill Companies p.1).

Source: McGraw-Hill Companies p.1.

To counter the number of forces that were against America, America reorganized its military system, something that commenced with the recruitment of more military personnel. It is important to note here that, failure by Japan to mangle the fuel deport and repair amenities, gave America an added advantage of re-organizing its efforts to retaliate.

Although this was the case, it is also crucial to note that, subsequent attacks by Japan; second and third, were aimed at destroying the two important facilities. However, because of the anticipated dangers that were associated with such attacks; revenge from the American carriers, Japan stopped its second and third mission hence, giving America an added advantage.

After the re-organization and success in the efforts to salvage the remaining ships after the attack, America started to launch its revenge mission on Japan. Such revenges were in form of attacks the Japanese troops, something that never succeeded at first. Although this was the case, America continued in its quest to outsmart Japan hence, leading to its first victorious raid of 1942; the Doolittle attack. In many ways, this marked the onset of the many later raids that America instigated against Japan.

To avoid problems that were associated with short-range bombers, it used long-range ones, although it failed to achieve its goals of salvaging such bombers if they landed in China. In addition, because of such failures, America lost many of its crewmembers, due to the massive deaths that occurred.

Such attacks, led to more extended attacks from Japan on American territories for example the Midway Islands. Many losses resulted from such attacks, with Japan loosing four of its best carriers and a good number of its citizens. Suffering of innocent civilians was prevalent, a factor that was of less concern to these warring nations primarily because, their main concern was to defeat each other (Martin p.1).

As the war raged, America’s control increased, as it endeavored to control the pacific region through taking control of many areas in the pacific region. To some extent, such captures were of little significance primary because, such captured islands could not give a firm base of launching its attacks.

To ensure they captured an island that could guarantee them a chance of dealing with Japan properly, America through its military strived to capture the Iwo Jima Island, something that caused the demise of many American soldiers. It is crucial to note here that, such loses were of little significance to America, because finally in 1945, America took control of the island.

Capturing of the island saw the destruction of Japanese resources through vicious attacks from America, because at least they had a firm base of launching its attacks. Although this was the case, Japan also never surrendered something that prompted America to capture its Okinawa Island. Such an achievement was not easy and painless on the America, because out of it America lost approximately twelve thousand lives (D’Amato p. 1).

Such enormous causality numbers further ignited America’s anger, leading to the launching of the Atomic bombs against Japan. The first Japanese city to receive such attacks was Hiroshima, an incident that later happened in the city of Nagasaki. At this point Japan was defenseless hence, it had to surrender.

Although this marked almost the termination point of this war, its termination opened another page as concerned the war among nations; World War II. This is because; many other nations for example the Soviet Union joined America in the quest to destroy Japan and its supporters.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the initial attack on the harbor and the aftermath retaliation by the America had many negative impacts than these countries had anticipated. This is because, apart from the massive deaths that resulted from such veracious attacks, its impacts are clear even today as concerns the health status of the Japanese citizenry. In addition, the countries wasted many resources in the war, a factor that they could have prevented did they take the peace negotiations seriously.

Primary lessons that nations can learn from such a war include need for respect among nations, the need for negotiations when problems arise instead of extreme fights, and the importance of respecting human life. Although this is the case, it is a few nations, which have learnt for such an experience, because of the daily wars between different global communities.

Works Cited

D’Amato, Paul. Pearl Harbor, internment, and Hiroshima: historical lessons. Third World Traveler. 2010. Web.

Higgs, Robert. How U.S. Economic Warfare Provoked Japan’s Attack on Pearl Harbor. The Independent Institute. 2006. Web.

Mahar, Ted. The battle that ignited America. 2010. Web.

McGraw-Hill Companies. Aftermath. Glencoe. 2010. Web.

Martin, James. Pearl Harbor’s place in History. Institute for Historical Review. 2010. Web.

National Park Service: U.S. Department of the Interior. Arizona Project. 2010. Web.

Robinson, Bruce. Pearl Harbor: a rude awakening. British Broadcasting Corporation. 2009. Web.

Rosenberg, Emily. A date will live: Pearl Harbor. Durham: Duke University Press, 2003. Web.

Rymer, Eric. Attack on Pearl Harbor: events leading to December 7, 1941 and the attack on Pearl Harbor. 2010. Web.

Wohlstetter, Roberta. Pearl harbor warning and decision. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1962. Web.

Despite the great industrialization of the Japan, it has never had any natural resources such as petroleum and Ores. Therefore, it had always depended on importation of ores and petroleum in order to supply its industries with the needed raw materials. Before 1939, the United States of America was Japan’s major supply of ores and petroleum. Nevertheless, the situation changed when Japan continued its hostility towards China.

In an effort to stop the hostility of Japan towards China, the president of United States of America president Roosevelt and the Secretary of States Cordell Hull exerted pressure on Japan. When Japan refused to yield up to their demand, the United States of America stopped supplying Japan with the raw materials that were needed to run their industries.

Japan’s refusal to heed to the demand of the American government was highly attributed to the fact that Japan was not willing to give up the control of the Manchuria region in China that acted as a very strategic location, where it could get unlimited supply of raw materials for its industries as well as a strategic market for its manufactured products. Japan had always coveted the rich resources that were present in British and Dutch colonies of Southeast Asia.

Thus, with the shutdown of U.S.A. supply, Japan increasingly looked southwards for the supply of raw materials for its industries. Japan considered the U.S. as its only hindrance in its effort of obtaining raw materials from the Southeast and especially its naval base at Pearl Harbor (U.S. Army Center for Military History par. 2-4)

The United States of America Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor was the only existing power that could negate Japan’s navy. From a long time association of Americans and Japanese as they transacted business along the Pacific, the Japanese knew that the American had established a very strong naval base at Pearl Harbor.

Therefore, they knew that by bombing the Pearl Harbor which held Americans naval force, they will be able to completely destroy the American military force in Pacific region. Subsequently, the bombing of the Pearl Harbor surely enabled the Japanese to completely cripple down any American immediate retaliation effort.

The Japanese also understood that the American military bases at Philippines could also interfere with their effective communications between Japan home Island and the East Indies. Therefore, after bombing the Pearl Harbor, Japan proceeded with an immediate attack of the American military bases that were located in Philippines in order to negate any immediate Americans retaliation force (Answers. Com par. 3).

Every oil tanker that was heading to Japan had to pass through the Pearl Harbor that was heavily manned by the American troops. Consequently, the Japanese did not have another option, but to attack the Pearl Harbor in order to weaken the U.S. fleet that was based there.

The Japanese organized a surprise attack on the U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor in order neutralize the American fleet at the Harbor. Consecutively, Japan had planned to destroy American central pacific bases at Guam and Wake Island as well as those located in Philippines. Japan believed that by crippling the American naval power at Pearl Harbor, Japan will be better placed to conquer Malaya, Singapore, Burma as well as Dutch East Indies.

Through this process, Japan had anticipated to establish a defensive ring around its conquered areas by fortifying island in the south and Central Pacific. The attack of the Pearl Harbor was meant to convince the Americans to participate in World War II, which Japan anticipated was a strategic move that will force America to accept a negotiation of peace in the Pacific region (Christie 85).

The Pearl Harbor was preferred as the best Japanese striking spot because of its strategic location. The Japanese had other options where they had planned to strike the Americans. San Francisco as well as the large costal cities were among the other options that Japan had anticipated to strike.

They opted for Pearl Harbor due to its proximity to Japan than other alternatives they had considered. Those Islands that comprised of Philippines and Pearl Harbor were located 8,000 miles from the American west cost, but only 200 miles away from Japan. Therefore, Japan troops had had considered that they had lesser distance to travel compared to the American troops. Japan knew that the closer they came to American coasts, the higher their risks of being detected was.

They also realized that they could not attack Americans from the mainland because they had to pass the Hawaii on their way back which will make the Americans retaliation force catch up with them. Therefore, by Japan considering all those factors, they opted for the Pearl Harbor as the most strategic location for striking.

Japan had anticipated that by striking the U.S Pacific Fleet that opposed its conquest of the South East Asia and the Pacific Island, they would be successful to conquer all the territory they had desired to conquer. They believed that even if the American will be able to rebuild their Fleet back, they will not be in a position to dislodge the Japanese from their conquered territories.

America had established an international movement to isolate Japan economically in order to force it to withdraw its control over Manchuria in China. Subsequently, the USA had already taken some appropriate measures by cutting off credit to Japan that was tailored to make Japan economically unstable to afford to purchase petroleum which was a vital resource for its industries and military. Japan petroleum mainly originated from USA, Dutch East Indies and Burma with the last two being British colonies.

Japan knew that by destroying the USA naval forces in the Pacific region, Japan navy will then be the strongest in the pacific region which will help Japan to overcome the economical consequences of the USA ultimatum. By defeating the USA navy, Japan had anticipated to conquer the Dutch East Indies as well as Burma and control the oil that was produced there in order to use it in their industries and military.

The striking of the Pearl Harbor was as anticipated by Japan. Japan was successful in crippling the American Fleet. Consecutively, Japan was successful in defeating the Dutch East Indies and Burma. The British navy under the instructions from Churchill tried to intervene and contain the Japan naval, but was not successful to fight the Japan strong navy. Therefore, Japan eventually succeeded to control all the oil producing areas in Southeast Asia (Marshall 216).

In addition, Japan opted to attack the Pearl Harbor because they believed that since America was a nation that was comprised of diverse races of people that Americans could not act as a united singular force. This was a mistake for the Japan, because when Japan continued with their attacks on US navy and Air forces in order to extend their territory to include China; the United States of America was successful in negating Japan’s efforts and thus defeated Japan when it bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki towns in Japan that led Japan to surrender (Rosenberg par. 3).

Works Cited

Answers. Com. “Why did the Japanese attack Pearl Harbor?” 2011.

Christie, Clive.Southeast Asia in the twentieth century. New York: Tauris Publishers.

Marshall, Jonathan. To Have and Have Not: Southeast Asian Raw Materials and Source of Pacific War. California: University of California Press, 1995

Rosenberg, Jennifer. Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 2011.

U.S. Army Center for Military History. “A Brief History of WWII: Japan on the Offensive.”2011.