Category: Ottoman Empire

Introduction

Ibn Khaldun (Abu Zayd Abd al- Rahman ibn Muhammad ibn Khaldun al- Hadhrami) was a 14th-century Arab historiographer and historian credited of laying foundation to the specialized field of Ilm al- Umrān (Sociology) , who was considered in his Muqaddimah of Kitab al Ibar that, every zenith had a downfall having a central theme of his creative writing is why nations rise to power and what causes their decline. Ibn Khaldun stressed on studying the realities of human society and attempted to draw conclusions based on observation, rather than trying to reconcile observation with preconceived ideas. Therefore, drawing an inference from the work of the renowned Ibn Khaldun assessing the causes of the decline of the Ottoman.

1.1 An overview of the decline of the ottomans

Prior dealing to with the causes of decline, first of all having a cursory look at the developments that took place in Europe at that time provided Europe with a position of strength. An eminent scholar has nicely analyzed these developments by observing that during the period sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, Europe experienced the thrust towards modernization, ushering in:

• (a) the scientific and philosophical revolution,
• (b) the cultural and theological revolution,
• (c) the political and democratic revolution, and
• (d) the technological and industrial revolution.

The industrial revolution brought with its revolution in technology, production processes, the generation of energy, transport, the markets, agricultural revolution, urbanization, and all-around commercial expansion. The Ottomans allowed penetration of European commerce into their empire which had a crippling effect on the native craft industries, shifted the balance of trade against the Ottomans, and made them dependent on European traders. The grant of capitulations to various European countries not only gave them commercial privileges but made the residents of those countries subject to the jurisdiction of their country’s law (not the Ottoman law) and they could claim a right of hearing in a consular court. All this gave a relative superiority to the West.

The eighteenth-century defeats on the battleground placed Turkey on the defensive; a general decay was apparent; loss of military glory had resulted in loss of political importance, and loss of power had demoralized the nation. Intellectual life had been affected too. It appeared as if the Ottomans have lost their absorptive and expansionist power. It was Tsar Nicholas I of Russia who in 1833 described the Ottoman Empire as ‘the Sick Man of Europe.’

Ottoman society on the other hand was extremely traditional with a legitimized hierarchy comprising the Sultan, the Ulema, the army, and the administrative elite at the top. Occupational groups like peasants, craftsmen, and tradesmen formed the lower stratum of society. That society had a totalitarian and centralized state which controlled the whole socio-economic and cultural-political life from above. In such a set-up of society, decay at the top gradually led to the disintegration the entire system.

However, the decline of the Ottoman Empire actually as a result of very complex factors. By putting the decline of the Ottoman Empire into an international context, identifying five key areas which stand out as explanations for the decline and fall of the Ottoman Empire. These five factors were:

1. the moribund nature of the Ottoman government and its relative decline economically,
2. the spread of nationalism in the Balkans;
3. the attempts to revive Turkey by the ‘New Ottomans’ and ‘Young Turk’,
4. the German attempts to generate a sphere of influence in the Middle East,
5. the impact of the Balkan wars.

Based on the five key areas above, it should be noted that the conservatism of the privileged ruling elite in Constantinople, corrupt military leaders, and the decline of their economy, resulted into the broken state. Particularly if we compare it with the rising of the industrial power in the West, it conditions placed the Ottoman in a backward position. Besides that, the rising inflation which was worsened by financial mismanagement, misappropriation of state revenue, and fierce competition from the West, also reduced the empire’s vitality. All of the economic problems lead the increasing costs of the state. Due to the concentration of the internal problems, the Ottoman Empire became less intended toward their provincial lands. Accordingly, the Empire felt difficult to protect the frontiers of the empire was rendered obsolete by the European advance. Finally, when Napoleon Bonaparte landed an invasion force in Egypt in 1798, he defeated the army of the Ottoman decisively. Ironically, in the face of this new competition, instead of finding a strategic way, the conservative leaders fell back on their faith in the ‘inherent superiority of Islam. This solution did not result in a victory, but the Ottomans lost any effective power over the periphery of their empire.

World War I led to the complete end of the Ottoman Empire, and the birth of a Turkish nation as aftermath of the defeat in the war. It further accompanied by the occupation of the Western powers to the Ottoman Empire territory. Then, after a nationalist struggle that ended the occupation, and also a brief civil war between nationalists and the Ottoman dynasty, the Turkish Republic was proclaimed by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. The events of 1919 and 1920 vividly demonstrated the strength of the nationalist tide sweeping through Anatolia. Although the Sultan’s government was supported by the Allies, the condition proved unable to withstand the nationalists under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. Then, in 1920 he was elected President of the Embassy, and by the end of 1922, he had defeated the Greeks and expelled the Allies. Further declaring the abolishment of the Caliphate in 1924 and the emergence of the modern state of the Republic of Turkey.

1.2 Transition from empire to nation (1908–1923)

July 23, 1908, brought a dawn with the restoration of the constitution of 1876, put at bay nearly 30 years before by the then Sultan Abdul Hamid. It became the moment of significance, considering it would alter their life beyond expectation. Thus in reality it was a dawn, the credit of such drastic change owes to the series of movements likely; Tanzimat, Young Turks. The leaders of the religious-ethnic communities welcomed the restoration of the constitution, they were quite sure that the end of absolutism would enhance their own power and influence. They were very optimistic in their view. Their expectation was to be a part in sharing political power in both the cabinet and the assembly in accordance to their demographic and material strength in the empire. Their influence can be greater if authority be decentralized thus, they vehemently supported the liberal faction of the Young Turks led by Prince Sabahuddin who had been the key exponent and speaker favouring the ‘decentralization and private initiative’.

The transition phase of the Ottoman Empire also witnessed an important development, the emergence of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in 1889, it was the progressive group that were the supporters of the political regime or in other words, they were the constitutionalist and having the same ideology like that of the Liberals (i.e. the Young Turks or the upper class of the Ottoman Society). Unionists viewed to overthrow the autocracy, the first step toward the social and economic transformation that the constitutional government was expected to carry out. They lack faith in the laissez-faire policies popular among the earlier reformers. The Unionists were immensely inspired by Germany and Japan, optimistically expected the new state to bring about ‘union and progress’ in the empire. They favoured curbing of power of the Palace and the Porte and vesting authority in the assembly which they envisioned to control after elections were held.

The Unionists basically belong to the lower middle class, the class which had suffered the consequences of the progressive integration into the world market due to the erosion of the indigenous economy. The transitional period also witnessed a latent struggle for power between the sultan, supported by conservatives and reactionaries, the high bureaucrats, supported by the Liberals, and the Unionists who relied on their organizational strength in the army and society at large. Elections were held in November-December 1908, leading to the victory of the Committee (CUP), but very soon dramatic episodes occurred leading Grand Vizier Mehmed Kamil Pasha to dissolve the ministry, and appointing his own men to the key positions. Later the Charismatic Unionist leader Enver Bey, played vital role leading to the fall of the Grand Vizier Mehmed Kamil Pasha through vote of no confidence.

The following timeline can clearly indicate the transition from the Empire to Nation :

• 1912 A national uprising against rule in Albania launches a full-scale Balkan War.
• Turkey, beset by troubles elsewhere, cedes to Italy her north African province of Libya.
• An Albanian uprising against the Ottoman empire is so successful that the Albanians are able to capture Skopje in Macedonia.
• By a prearranged pan Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia together launch the First Balkan War against Turkey.
• 1913 Bulgaria launches Second Balkan War, in the end to the great detriment of Bulgarian interest.
• The Balkan states and the Ottoman empire agree an armistice in Bucharest, ending the Second Balkan War.
• A coup led by Enver Pasha brings the Young Turks to power in Istanbul.
• 1914 Germany and the Ottoman empire sign a secret treaty of alliance.
• Turkey, launches an attach on Russian ports in the Black Sea, enters the war on the German side.
• Russia declares war on the Ottoman empire.
• Britain and France declare war on the Ottoman Empire.
• 1916 Sharif Hussein, the emir of Makkah, proclaims himself the leader of the Muslim world, thus launching an Arab revolt against the Ottoman empire.
• 1918 an armistice was signed between Turkey and the Allies on the warship Agamemnon in the Greek port of Mudros.
• 1920 A punitive peace treaty, negotiated at Sevres, is designed to dismember the Ottoman empire.
• The Sultan of Turkey signs the Treaty of Sevres with the Allies but it is rejected by the new nationalist government.
• 1922 The nationalist government in Turkey abolishes the sultanate and the last Ottoman emperor, Mehmed VI, goes into exile.
• 1923 The Treaty of Lausanne, with more favorable terms than those negotiated at Sevres, finally bring peace between Turkey and the Allies.
• Turkey becomes a republic with Ataturk as president and Ankara as its new capital.

1.3 An era of one-party democracy (1923-45)

Mustafa Kemal – lovingly known as Kemal Atatürk – emerged as a leading figure of stature. Atatürk’s model of Turkish nationalism was quite different from the pan-Turkic ideas of stalwarts like Enver Pasha. Kemal believed that the once-great Ottoman Empire had become burdensome on the Turkish people, who now needed a homeland of their own. He and his supporters sought to establish a new Turkish state based on Anatolia, where most of the empire’s Turkish population had traditionally lived.

Later onwards Turkish attitudes began to harden; the interim Ottoman government came under increasing pressure from the Allies to suppress the nationalist groups. In the end, they were reluctantly forced to act. In the face of this crackdown, on 23 April 1920, the nationalists convened a Grand National Assembly in Ankara, deep in central Anatolia. They elected Mustafa Kemal as its first president, effectively establishing an alternative government.

The proclamation of the republic brought tensions between Kemal and his military rivals to a head. There were even rumors of a general’s plot against him. In order to neutralize their power in the army, Kemal had the Assembly pass a law obliging officers who wanted to be in politics to resign their commissions. Some Kemalist generals left the Assembly and returned to their military commands; the dissidents who wanted to continue their opposition to Kemal in the Assembly resigned their commissions thereby severing their links with the army. The long-term result of this law was to disengage the army from politics for the next generation.

It was during this period that Mustafa Kemal felt threatened to his authority which came from within his own party. He had not as yet carried out measures such as state intervention in the economy, protectionism, or even secularist reforms though such measures were under discussion. With rivals actively exploiting the very real economic discontent then widespread in the country, it would be virtually impossible to enact any radical legislation, legislation which the Kemalists considered vital for transforming Turkey. Kemal first considered dealing harshly with what he described as a counterrevolutionary threat. But he was dissuaded by moderates in the party to refrain from such action and persuaded instead to appease liberal opinion by replacing Ismet (Inönü), who was generally viewed as a hardliner, with Fethi (Okyar), the de facto leader of the liberal wing of the ruling party. Thus further crushing the Progressive Republicans.

Later in around the 1930’s the ideology of Kemalism was launched, adopting the six ‘fundamental and unchanging principles of (1) Republicanism, (2) Nationalism, (3) Populism, (4) Statism, (5) Secularism, and (6) Revolutionism/Reformism. These principles of Kemalism became part of the constitution of Turkey in 1937. The Constitutional Article reads as: ‘The Turkish State is a Republican, Nationalist, Populist, Statist, Secularist, and Revolutionary-Reformist.’

The death of Mustafa Kemal ‘Ataturk’ on November 1938, tended toward the process of thinking toward a Multi-Party system, it due to the success of the Ataturk could not maintain the cohesive bond within the party. It further paved way to the end of the party’s control over the bureaucracy so that party officials would no longer hold state office.

The World War II period was of difficulty for Turkey and the government could not control the ongoing unrest, and the introduction of the ‘Capital Tax Law’ was a deadly blow to the public, thus further causing unrest and heading towards the end of the One-Party Rule in 1945.

Although many political parties were established between 1945 and 1950, only the Democratic Party was successful., the first party was the National Development Party, a religious conservative party. It was established by Nuri Demirbas, Huseyin Avni Ulas, and Cevat Rifat Atilhan on July 18, 1945, but they did not achieve to be a part of the democratic system.

The member of the RRP, on January 7, 1946, Adnan Menderes, Celal Bayar, Fuat Koprulu, and Refik Koraltan led to the establishment of The Democratic Party. It grew rapidly in a very short time, with the election of 61 deputies in the 1946 elections. The eighth Assembly (1946) was the first real multi-party Assembly, but the first completely free and openly contested election in Turkey was not achieved until 1950. The period of 1946-50 could be named as the ‘Transitional Period’ to the multi-party system.

The Democratic Party won the election with 53.35% of the popular vote and 83.57% of the Grand National Assembly seats while RPP gained 39.78% of the votes and 14.40% of the seats. The populist politics, good weather conditions, inflationary economic policies, and foreign capital brought social and economic welfare for the people. Menderes’ Democratic Party won a splendid election victory in the 1954 elections.

Adnan Menderes’ despotic and neurotic behavior and politics led to his downfall and his party’s end by the 27th May 1960 overthrow. Menderes’ deviation from democracy, privilege given to his own supporters, and declination from Kemalist principles, all together, was an invitation to young patriots and Kemalist soldiers.

A new constitution was prepared and this Constitution was very civilized and radical. Under the 1961 Constitution, Turkey enjoyed a greater degree of freedom than ever before. People had more civil rights, the universities had greater autonomy, and students were given the freedom to organize their associations. Workers were given the right to strike.

By the 1960s Turkey had been thoroughly politicized and ideological politics were permitted. In those years the ultra-nationalist and neo-fascist National Action Party (NAP) and the Socialist Workers Party (WPT) had been founded. The Socialist Workers Party would get 16 seats in Parliament in the 1960s. It was the first and the last great success of the Turkish Socialists in Turkish modern history. The Islamist movement had also become quite powerful.

Two new political parties were formed as the inheritors of the Democratic Party in 1961: the New Turkey Party (NTP) and the Justice Party (JP), for the first election realized under the new election law. The two biggest parties were RPP and JP in all the elections during this period. The 1960s could be named the period of coalition governments.

As a result of high inflation, high political tension, rising unemployment, and rapid social-political change, Turkey dissolved into chaos. The Islamist movement had become more aggressive and its party, the National Order Party, openly rejected Ataturk and Kemalism. On account of this, the generals presented a memorandum to the President and the chairmen of the two chambers in 12 March 1971. The Generals demanded the formation of a strong, credible government capable of implementing the reforms envisaged by the constitution.

Nihat Erim constituted the government in 1971. According to Erim and the Military High Command, the liberal constitution of 1961 was a luxury for Turkey. They started an operation against civil rights and liberties. Political terrorism had become a regular feature of Turkish social life. There was a fundamental difference between the terrorism of the left in the early 1970s and the terrorism of right and left in the mid/late 1970s: In the first period, the action was against imperialism, western influences and capitalism whereas in the second period, the aim was to create chaos and demoralization.

In 1977 Ecevit established a minority government but he could not get a vote of confidence. This was the beginning of one of the darkest periods of Turkey in her modern history which would eventually bring the 12 September 1980 Coup D`etat. Enabling the Junta to set up the National Security Council (NSC) under the chieftainship of the chief of Staff Kenan Evren. The other members of the National Security Council were the chiefs of the armed forces that were army, navy, air force, and gendarmery. They ruled Turkey until November 1983. They attempted to change all areas of social life except foreign policy and the economic stabilization program which had been in place since 24 January 1980. In the first place, they suspended the Constitution and dissolved Parliament, then they closed down the political parties, detained their leaders, and suspended the professional associations and confederation of trade unions. The 1980s created a society of a society of haves and have-nots’ in Turkey.

Why did they decline? What are their major legacies?

1. Ottomans (1335-1920) – Istanbul, Turkey

The Ottoman Empire first began as the Turks Tribe under the Rum Seljuk Sultanate in Anatolia after the Mongolian invasion in 1243. They were pushed to Western Anatolia and started to create small states, called be like, under loose Mongol overlordship. Osman, I was the leader of one of those beyliks which then led to the creation of the Ottoman Empire (Streusand, 2011, p.34-6). In the early thirteenth century, the Ottoman Empire began its expansion on Byzantine territories from near the Sea of Marmara and successfully took over Bursa in 1326 which then became their first capital (Ruthven, 2004, p.84-5). In 1453, the Ottoman Empire under Mehmed II took over Constantinople which then became their basis for further expansion. The expansion continued over Modavia, the Crimea, and Trebizond, turning the Black Sea into an Ottoman Lake. With Constantinople as their new capital, the Ottoman Empire had control over the trade of the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean (Streusand, 2011, p.31-2:41-2). In addition to that, Constantinople became the center of the Sunni world, not in Syria or Damascus anymore (Streusand, 2011, p.113-4).

The great periods of the Ottoman Empire showed by its massive expansion until the reign of Sulyman. Under Sulayman, the Ottoman Empire controlled most of Southern Europe, parts of Central Europe, Western Asia, parts of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, and North Africa (Wikipedia: Ottoman Empire). Malise Ruthven in his book “Historical Atlas of Islam” summarizes the chronology of the Ottoman Empire expansion as listed below:

• The Ottomans successfully occupied Greece, Macedonia, Bulgaria, and the Western Balkans in 1389 as the Byzantine weakened.
• They defeated the Safavids at Chaldiran in 1514 and took control of the central Asian trade routes linking Tabriz and Bursa.
• In 1514, the Ottoman Empire merged eastern Anatolia and northern Mesopotamia.
• They took control over the holy places of Hejaz after defeating the Mamluk Empire in Syria and Egypt in 1516-1517.
• In 1521, the Ottomans captured Belgrade from the Hungarians.
• In 1529, the Ottomans made their expansion to Vienna, they reached the Habsburg capital but failed to occupy Vienna.
• The Ottomans took over Algiers in 1529, Tunis in 1534, Jerba in 1560, Malta in 1565, and Cyprus in 1570.

At first, the Ottoman Empire relied its economic sources on agricultural land, then commerce became major source of wealth. Bursa as the first Ottoman capital became a major center of international trade, particularly because it used as the destination for caravans carrying silk from Iran. After the conquests of Mehmed II and Bayazid II in the last half of the fifteenth century, the empire dominated the trade of the Black Sea as well as the eastern Mediterranean. Then later, the conquests of Selim and Sulayman gave the empire control of both of the traditional trade routes between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, the Euphrates River, and the Red Sea. Control of trade routes determined the Ottoman grand economic strategy and allowed the acquisition of agricultural land (Streusand, 2011, p.31-32).

In addition to that, the conquest of Belgrade made the Ottomans the central player in European politics. The Ottoman state was strongly influenced by Greek culture, especially from the Roman-Byzantine Empire. The Ottomans created a millet system of the non-Muslim community, each had its own communal leadership, civil law, and system and provided its own social welfare and educational system (Streusand, 2011, p.31).

Although religious autonomy was allowable through the millet system of autonomous minorities the Ottoman state was extremely centralized. The rulers appointed the qadis (judges) however in most other alternative respects allowed alternative spiritual establishments like the mosques and madrasas to flourish severally. The Ottomans dominated, controlled, and formed the societies they ruled. The Sultans supplemented the law with decrees regulating the status and duties of all their subjects. They brought ulama, the Sufi lodges, and the guilds of artisans under state control by dictating appointments, grading, and licenses. Society was divided into two classes: the rulers and the ruled, the principal distinctions being the right of the rulers to exploit the wealth of the subjects through imposts and taxes (Ruthven, 2004, p.86-87).

The entire governmental machinery, civil administration and military forces, and even religious functionaries were treated as part of the military establishment and they were considered as the ruling class (Streusand, 2011, p.31). Douglas E. Streusand in his book “Islamic Gunpowder Empires” said that “The constitutive principles of the Ottoman Empire thus included Islamic and Turko-Mongol ideological components; central, provincial, and frontier armies; extensive transit trade and agriculture; the integration of civil, military, and religious authority, including non-Muslims, into a single ruling class”. As for the military matter in the Ottoman Empire, the soldiers were recruited through “devshirme” or blood tax. Christian boys from Eastern and Southeastern Europe were taken into the palace and to be raised for later to serve the state. This kind of tax was imposed on non-Muslims who live under the Ottoman Empire. The boys were later converted to Islam and were provided military training, offered for military or civil service to the empire. Through this system, the Ottoman Empire got what so-called “free soldiers” to strengthen its military power.

As the expansion of the Ottoman Empire continued, huge territories became an issue. It was not easy to control a very large territory, threats to the empire territories came from almost everywhere: threats from the north by the growing power of Muscovy, threats from the east by the Safavids and the Mamluks, as well as the threats from the west by the Hapsburgs. In addition to that, the decline of the Ottoman Empire was due to the incapability of the ruler and lacked experience in the politics and military. Provincial governors got the position through bribes, hiring private armies, or raising taxes for themselves. There were large-scale nepotism and misrule in the administration. Land that should have for nurtured agriculture became tax farms, driving cultivators off the land, creating gangs of rural bandits or urban migrants who drifted into cities already overcrowded and subject to famine, plague, and disorder. The millet system, which allowed the Christian and Jewish communities a high degree of administrative autonomy, undermined the legitimacy of the state by privileging Western traders and encouraging Greek and Balkans Christians to look toward the empire’s enemy in Russia and Western Europe for inspiration and support (Ruthven, 2004, p.90-1).

During the reign of Mustafa (1617-1618), Osman II’s brother, he was incapable of dealing with the uncontrolled armed forces, led to an uprising in Istanbul which then creating a financial crisis because the provincial governors refused to remit revenue to the capital. When Sultan Ibrahim (1640-1648) took over the throne, official corruption once again became rampant, and the financial mechanism of the empire broke down (Streusand, 2011, p.41-59). Weakened military and economic power due to internal administration issues gave no power to the Ottoman Empire against the rising of European power due to its better military and economic systems.

In the Ottoman times, there were great achievements in Islamic Science, arts including architecture and painting, music, prose, and poetry. Douglas E. Streusand in his book “Islamic Gunpowder Empires” listed some of the Ottoman Empire legacies as below

1. Fatih Jami, Sultan Mehmet II Mosque Complex in Istanbul was built as a symbol of the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople, it replaced the Byzantine Church of the Holy Apostles.
2. Selimeye Jami, Sultan Selim II Mosque Complex in Edirne was built by a military engineer named Koca Sinan under the Ottomans sultans Sulayman, Selim II, and Murad III.
3. Sultan Ahmet Jami, Ahmet I Mosque in Istanbul or is known as the Blue Mosque symbolized the political and cultural order of the Ottoman Empire.

2. Safavids (1510-1722) – Isfahan, Iran

The Safavid Empire was first established through the Safavid Sufi order found by Shaykh Safi al-Din (1252-1334) in the city of Ardabil, Azerbaijan (Ruthven, 2004, p.92; Streusand, 2011, p.140-2). In 1501, his descendant, Shah Ismail, successfully conquered Tabriz, the most important commercial center of western Iran, and then became the capital of the Safavids Empire (Streusand, 2011, p.143). Shah Ismail claimed himself as the Hidden Imam, a reincarnation of Ali and a manifestation of God and he established Shi’ism as the state religion. Although the dynasty was started by a Sufi teacher and mujaddid of Sunni allegiance, the Safavid Sufi order later altered by Ismail to fit his Twelver Shi’ism belief (Ruthven, 2004, p.92).

In 1537, the Safavid Empire under the reign of Tahmasp successfully conquered the city and province of Qandahar from Timurids. Qandahar controlled an important overland trade route between the Iranian plateau and the Ind-Gangetic plain. The capital of the empire also moved from Tabriz southwest to Qazvin during his time (Streusand, 2011, p.148).

The power of the Safavid Empire began when Shah Abbas took over the throne. He changed the administration system from provincial to central administration. The central government took over control over the silk – the most valuable export-producing regions and ensured that most of the profits went into the central treasury. With this new revenue, Shah Abbas constructed a new capital in Isfahan, Iran. He also reformed the military system by expanding the infantry, cavalry, and artillery units with soldiers primarily of slave origin. In 1603, he successfully took Tabriz back from the Ottoman Empire and Erivan in eastern Anatolia in 1604(Streusand, 2011, p.152). Streusand (2011) said that “This victory marked the transformation of the Safavid Empire into a bureaucratic polity with a gunpowder army”. In 1662, Shah Abbas conquered back Qandahar from the Mughals and established a new port which became the major outlet for exports (Streusand, 2011, p.153).

Under the reign of Shah Abbas, the establishment of Twelver Shiism dominated the social, religious, and cultural history of the Safavid Empire. The Twelver Shiism became the principal source of legitimacy which gave the ulama domination in the regime. In terms of military power, the Turkmens tribes had the most military manpower in the country. The settled population had a little military potential. The Safavids recruited few peasants for military service, and they never became a political force, unlike in the Ottoman case; Muslim nomads and mainly Christian outsiders recruited primarily through the mechanism of military slavery dominated the armed forces (Streusand, 2011, p.139). The lack of military power caused the decline of the empire. In addition to that, the later Safavid rulers had no interest in politics or military matters, only focused on their own piety. The Ulama had no political interest only cared about their own agenda of eliminating all other religions in Iran including Sunni Islam (Streusand, 2011, p.198). Streusand (2011) said that “the unmilitary nature of the leadership reflected the change in the character of Safavid rulers, which may well have reflected a change in the conception of monarchy, with piety replacing military prowess.”

The decline of the empire was also caused by the economic weaknesses of the Safavid regime, the inability of the administration to halt the steady outflow of specie, currency devaluations, and price inflation. In the 1660s and 1670s, the empire suffered a series of poor harvests which led to famines. In 1680, the empire also suffered from serious outbreaks of plague. These events caused a serious shortfall in the empire’s revenue (Streusand, 2011, p.155). Furthermore, Streusand (2011) emphasized that “The fall of Isfahan was an inevitable consequence of the steady weakening of the empire after the death of Abbas I, of the darkness of the fanatical religious orthodoxy amid military, political and economic chaos and weak leadership at the center”.

The Safavid Empire produced some of the greatest achievements of Iran-Islamic civilization including art, architecture, and paintings. Douglas E. Streusand in his book “Islamic Gunpowder Empires” listed some of the Ottoman Empire legacies as below:

1. Feast of Sada: folio from the Shah Tahmasp Shahnama, containing the finest paintings in the history of Persian arts. This Shahnama manuscript was among the gifts from Shah Tahmasp to the Ottoman Sultan Selim II in 1568.
2. Firdawi’s Parable of the Ship of Shiism: folio from the Shah Tahmasp Shahnama. It emphasizes the Safavid`s claim to descent from Ali.
3. The Maydan-i Shah in Isfahan, it is the forecourt of the Shah Mosque, the Ali Qapu, and the Shaykh Luftullah Mosque and a venue for state ceremonies and public entertainments.
4. The Ali Qapu was the main royal residence with a loggia where Shah Abbas and members of the court could observe activities on the Maydan.
5. The Shaykh Luftullah Mosque, was used by the Shah’s family as a women’s sanctuary.

3. Mughals/Timurids (1526-1857) – Delhi, India

In 1526, Timur’s grandson Barbur captured Delhi and developed the Timurid Mughal Empire with Delhi as its capital. The Mughal Empire absorbed many independent Muslim dynasties that had been established in Bengal, Kashmir, Gujerat, and the Deccan.

The Mughals/Timurid Empire was an Islamic dynasty built by Muslims on Hindu land. The religious differences had a strong effect on the division between Muslims and Hindus which most of the time led to conflicts between the two communities. However, Barbur emphasized religious tolerance by permitting the Hindus to build temples as well as forbidding the killing of cows to respect the Hindus. The practice of slavery was diminished during his times as well. The high point of Hindu-Muslim religious harmony was reached until the reign of Akbar who instituted the Din-i-Elahi, an imperial cult with Akbar at its center combining the roles of Sufi master and philosopher-king (Ruthven, 2004, p. 96). He believed in religious tolerance, the Hindus were allowed to regulate themselves with their own law and institutions. He removed the tax practice that had been imposed on non-Muslims.

However, everything changed when Akbar’s grandson, Aurungzed, took over the empire. Aurangzeb was inspired by the more orthodox teachings. He imposed the Sharia law, deemphasizing the solar Ilahi calendar, banning music performances at court, and even destroying the Hindu temples. He imposed the tax on non-Muslims again (Streusand, 2011, p.235-6). His actions were to define the Muslims as the ruling class of the Mughal Empire. Despite his controversies, the Mughal Empire successfully extended its territories from Kabul, Ghazni, and Qandahar beyond Bengal into Assam and south to the Cauvery River under the reign of Aurangzeb. He conquered the city of Bijapur and Golconda which gained the empire’s political and economic power (Streusand, 2011, p.233-8). Streusand (2011) mentioned that “Mughal expansion was most successful in Arid India and in those parts of Monsoon India that were accessible by riverboats. The Mughal unification of the subcontinent consists of a series of “nuclear zones of power” that had the desired combination of agricultural surpluses, extensive grazing lands, and access to major trade routes”.

The Mughal/Timurids Empire started to decline due to Aurungzed intolerance, the taxation he imposed as well as the larger territories that became harder to control. The constant threat from the Hindu Maratha Empire supported by the British added to the struggle faced by the empire (Streusand, 2011, p.238-9). Irfan Habib argues that the “Mughal administration inevitably produced a steadily increasing agriculture-revenue demand and thus growing privation of the peasantry. Hunger and oppression produced a series of revolts” (Streusand, 2011, p. 283) which then led to the loss of economic power in the Mughal/Timurids Empire.

One of the Mughal/Timurid’s greatest legacies is the Taj Mahal: the tomb of Shah Jahan’s wife Mumtaz Mahal in Agra – a symbol of sovereignty, spirituality, and romance. The other well knows legacy is The Humayan’s Tomb in Delhi, the first monumental Mughal dynasty mausoleum, which formed a symbol of Mughal rule and continuity (Streusand, 2011, p. 280-1).

Geography:

Turkey has a very unique geographical position that is accompanied by even more unique geographical features. Turkey stretches about 1,000 miles west to east and about 300-400 miles north to south and has about a 4,000-mile boundary. Unsurprisingly, Turkey is one of the largest countries in its surrounding area, both in terms of territory and in terms of population. Turkey has the largest land area in Europe and the ninth largest land area in Asia with a staggering 302,535 mi² of territory (World Population Review) (Britannica). Turkey also has the third largest population in Europe and the ninth largest population in Asia with a substantial 82,887,000 citizens as of 2019 (WorldOMeters) (World Atlas). Turkey is bordered on the north by the Black Sea, on the northeast by Georgia and Armenia, on the east by Azerbaijan and Iran, on the southeast by Iraq and Syria, on the southwest and west by the Mediterranean Sea and the Aegean Sea, and on the northwest by Greece and Bulgaria. Since Turkey is bordered by the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, and the narrows that connect the Black Sea and the Aegean Sea (the Bosporus, the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles) about ¾ of Turkey’s 4,000-mile boundary is maritime. Because of Turkey’s massive size, it lies in both Europe and Asia, however, 95% of the country is within Asian territory and only 5% is in European territory. The section of Turkey within Asian territory is referred to as Asia Minor and is also known as Anatolia/Anadolu. The far eastern portion of Asia Minor is also very mountainous and is often referred to as the Armenian Highlands of Eastern Anatolia/Anadolu. The other 5% of Turkey lies in far southwestern European territory, this area is referred to as the Turkish Thrace or just the Trakya and is just a small remnant of the once mighty Ottoman Empire that ruled over most of the Balkans (Britannica). Throughout Turkey’s history, it has acted as a source of both protection and transportation because it is in both Europe and Asia and bridges the gap between the two continents (History World). Turkey is a very large country that contains unique geographical features and is situated in a unique geographical position.

Climate:

Turkey has a climate that varies greatly because of its geographical features and geographical position. Turkey’s coasts and most of its inland territory has a mild Mediterranean climate, with warm, dry summers and rainy, moderate winters. Most regions of Turkey receive an average of 20-25 inches of rain per year. Eastern Anatolia/Anadolu has a much more extreme climate than the rest of Turkey. Most of Eastern Anatolia/Anadolu is far from the sea and has an average elevation of 5,000-6,500 feet. These two factors combined create a harsh continental climate with long winters and short summers. During the winter, Eastern Anatolia/Anadolu is very cold and snowy, during summer the weather is cool in the highlands and warm in the lowlands. The region has the lowest average temperature of all Turkish regions, -13 °F. However, it can get below -40 °F. The average summer temperature in the Eastern Anatolia/Anadolu region is about 68 °F (Britannica). Turkey’s climate varies based on a region’s geographical features and geographical position.

History:

Turkey has a very rich history, yet the nation has had to endure chaotic and trying times to get to where it is today. Turkish history spans a time frame of more than 4000 years. The Turkish people first inhabited Central Asia in 2000 BC. Years later, many Turks left Central Asia and began to spread out. These migrating Turks established many independent states and empires in Asia and Europe. These empires included The Great Hun Empire (3rd Century B.C.), the Göktürk Empire (552-740), the Uygur Empire (741-840), the Avar Empire (6-9 Century A.D.), the Khazar Empire (5-10 Century A.D), the Great Seljuk Empire (1040-1157) (TCF). Turkish history is long and has seen many great empires over its time.

The Turks began to settle Anatolia in the early eleventh century with migrations and incursions. Victory against the Byzantines at the Battle of Manzikert in 1071 left the gates of Anatolia open to the Turkish people. After 1071 the Turks fully conquered all of Anatolia and established the Anatolian Seljuk State. This was the first Turkish state in Anatolia and was sometimes referred to as the Konya Sultanate after its capital city (TCF). The first Turks settled and conquered Anatolia and established the Seljuk state there.

The Seljuk state quickly broke down after the Mongol invasion of Anatolia in 1243. During the time of the collapse of the Anatolian Seljuk state and after it completely disappeared, many Turkish territories were established at the end of the thirteenth century. One of these Territories was the Ottoman Beylik/Territory. The Ottoman Beylik was named after its founder, Osman who founded the territory in 1299. The Ottoman Beylik was located in the environs of Söğüt in Eskişehir, which is simply just the northwestern corner of modern Turkey. The Ottoman Beylik expanded rapidly during the fourteenth century and grew into the Ottoman Empire (TCF). The Ottoman Empire grew from a small beylik/territory into a vast and powerful sultanate.

The Ottomans won control of Constantinople in 1453 under the rule of Sultan Mehmet II. The Ottoman victory at Constantinople caused the Byzantine empire to fall. The fall of the Byzantine Empire also marked the end of the Middle Ages and the start of the New Age. During the rule of Sultan Mehmet II the Ottoman state entered into a time of great prosperity that would last until nearly the end of the sixteenth century (TCF). At the height of the Empire, the Ottomans ruled over what is now Greece, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Romania in the Balkans, over all the islands in the Eastern Mediterranean, and over what is now the Middle East (Geopolitical Futures Team). The massive borders of the Ottoman Empire extended from Crimea in the North to Yemen and Sudan in the South and from Iran and the Caspian Sea in the East to Vienna in the Northwest and Spain in the Southwest (Geopolitical Futures Team). The Ottoman Empire was one of the largest and most powerful empires in history.

In the 16th century, the Ottoman Empire slowly lost its economic and military superiority compared to Europe. Europe had developed much faster than the Ottoman Empire with the Renaissance, its conquest of new territories, Its access to raw materials, and the Industrial Revolution. The Ottoman Empire wasn’t able to adapt to these new advancements. This caused the power to shift to the European States. More factors piled onto that as well, like the rebellions of the Balkan nations. These rebellions were supported by Europe and Russia. All these factors combined slowly brought the Ottoman Empire into a state of decline (TCF).

The weakening of the Ottoman Empire continued until World War I. The Ottoman Empire went into the First World War in 1914 with the allied powers and came out defeated from the war in 1918. The Empire was pressured into signing the Mondros Armistice on October 30, 1918. Under this Armistice, the territories of the Ottoman Empire were occupied by Britain, France, Russia, and Greece. This was finally the end of the Ottoman Empire (TCF).

A national resistance and liberation movement surfaced after the Ottoman Empire fell. The Turks wanted the land of the former Ottoman Empire back. The land was now occupied by Greece, Armenia, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The resistance was led by Mustafa Kemal. Kemal was an Ottoman military commander who mobilized Anatolia in his quest for Turkish national independence. Kemal united disorganized resistance groups in Anatolia and organized them into a somewhat structured army. Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (later given the last name Ataturk meaning ‘Father of Turks’), the resistance was coordinated. The Turks were now finally ready to fight the war for Turkish national independence (TCF). Under Kemal, the Turkish resistance was able to unite and prepare to fight for their independence.

The Turkish National Liberation War was an attempt to create a new state from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. The war lasted four years, from 1919 to 1922. During the war, a small army of volunteers fought and won against leading world powers such as Britain, France, Greece, and Armenia. There were over 38,000 Turkish casualties, 35,000 soldiers were wounded and 7,000 were taken, prisoner. Greece was shaken the most, however, Sustaining 24,600 military casualties and a massive 264,000 civilian casualties. In the end, the Turks came out on top and rightfully won their independence. Kemal’s victory was military, as well as diplomatic. The Turkish military victory was certain with the diplomatic signing of the Lausanne Peace Treaty on July 24, 1923. The treaty was signed with Britain, France, Greece, Italy, Armenia, and others. The Treaty addressed the creation and international borders of a new Turkish State and guaranteed its complete independence (TCF). Turkey had to fight very hard for its independence and won it against all odds.

The Republic of Turkey was finally declared on October 29, 1923. This meant that the people of Turkey enjoyed self-rule. Mustafa Kemal was also elected as the first president of the Republic of Turkey. Kemal was president for 15 years until he died in 1938. During his presidency, Mustafa Kemal introduced many reforms in the political, social, legal, economic, and cultural areas of Turkey. He created a new political and legal system based on the principles of parliamentary democracy, divided government powers, and worked on modernizing Turkey. Soon, Turkey became a modern nation and is still a good example for Third World countries trying to break into the modern world (TCF). Kemal positively affected his country unlike any leader in the world at the time.

Economy:

Since Turkey’s creation in 1923, it has operated a mixed economy. In this mixed economy, both the government and private enterprises help economic development. Until about 1950 Turkey was leading the world in industrialization. The country used most of its money for structural improvements like building railways, ports, and shipping facilities and for the establishment of industries like mining, metallurgy (the study of the chemical makeup of metals), and chemicals. Turkey also invested in manufacturing, such as the food-processing, textile, and building-material sectors. During this time foreign trade only played a small role in the Turkish economy. By the late 1970s, the economy of Turkey was riddled with high inflation, high unemployment rates, and a massive foreign trade deficit. In the 1980s there were further shifts in Turkey’s economy, including a strong drive to export goods to other countries. By the 1990s inflation was still a very serious problem. Inflation had reached nearly 100 percent by 1997. To combat the inflation problem Turkey started an 18-month economic monitoring program. The program succeeded and greatly decreased the rate of inflation for the next two years. A financial crisis in 2000-2001 forced Turkey to create more reforms to get out of the economic slump. Economic growth was strong in the first decade of the 21st century, until 2009. In 2009 a Turkish global economic crisis pushed the country into a short recession that was followed by a recovery. The end of this final Turkish recovery effort resulted in the modern Turkish economy (Britannica). Turkey has had a troublesome economy and the Turkish government had to fight to establish the economy we see today.

The official currency of Turkey is the Turkish lira (abbreviated TL). The lira has greatly dropped in value many times since it was introduced in 1844. The lira’s value fluctuates so much that the Guinness Book of Records gave it the world’s least valued currency record twice, in 1995 – 1996, and from 1999 – 2004. Today the Turkish lira is equivalent to 0.17 USD (XE). Currently, in Turkey, there are 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, and 200 lira banknotes and 1, 5, 10, 25, and 50 kurus coins (100 kurus make up one lira) and 1 lira coins (Global Exchanges). The Turkish lira is an extremely unstable currency that changes value frequently.

The Turkish employment rate was 43.37% on average from 2005 to 2019 (Trading Economics). The Turkish unemployment rate was 13.9% in July of 2019 (Trading Economics). Turkey’s agricultural sector is the largest source of employment in Turkey. Agriculture employs about one-fourth of the entire Turkish workforce (Britannica). Agriculture has provided the most jobs in Turkey even as other more modern industries have started to grow (Chatham University). Textile and clothing production also employs about one-third of the industrial workforce, making it the biggest industrial employer (Britannica). Turkey has average employment and unemployment rates compared to other countries around the world and depends on the agricultural and textile and clothing sectors to employ most citizens.

The biggest industry in Turkey is services, which was responsible for a massive 53.37% of the country’s GDP in 2017 (Pletcher). Turkey’s largely free-market economy over time has been driven increasingly more by its service sectors (CIA). The services sector of Turkey includes wholesale, retail trade, transport, financial services, education, health care, tourism, and real estate (The Global Economy). Turkey greatly depends on its services sector to strengthen the economy.

Turkey houses a large amount of manufacturing enterprises. Manufacturing was responsible for about 29.16% of the country’s GDP in 2017 and is the second biggest industry in Turkey (Pletcher). A large amount of Turkey’s manufacturing industry’s production comes from four industrialized zones. These zones include Istanbul and the area around the Sea of Marmara, the Aegean coast around İzmir, the Adana basin, and the region around Ankara. The most manufactured things in Turkey are chemicals, food, beverages, tobacco, textiles, clothing, and shoes. Turkey is also the Middle East’s leading steel producer. Turkey produces so much steel that the country supplies themselves with it. The main steel plants are at Karabük, Ereğli, and İskenderun. Metallurgy happens at several sites. Metallurgy sites are located in Göktaş, Ergani, and Antalya (Britannica). The manufacturing sector is incredibly important to Turkey and is one of Turkey’s biggest sources of economic gain.

Agriculture is Turkey’s third biggest industry and was responsible for 6.08% of the country’s GDP in 2017 (Pletcher). Turkey’s agricultural sector is the largest source of employment in Turkey. Agriculture employs about one-fourth of the entire Turkish workforce. About one-third of Turkey’s land area is used for agriculture. The most important field crops in Turkey are cereals. Cereals take up one-half of all farming area in Turkey. Cereal land plants are wheat, with smaller areas of barley, rye, oats, corn, and rice. Other important crops are cotton, sugar beets, tobacco, and potatoes. Livestock farming is also a major part of the Turkish agricultural industry. Turkey has large numbers of cattle, sheep, goats, and water buffalo on their livestock farms. Turkish agricultural products also make a lot of money from exports. Cotton, tobacco, fruits, vegetables, nuts, livestock, and livestock products are the main agricultural items Turkey exports (Britannica). The agricultural sector of Turkey is incredibly important, not just in strengthening the economy, but also in employing citizens.

Foreign trade has played a very important role in Turkey’s economy since World War II (Brittanica). Turkey has the 27th largest export economy in the world. In 2017, Turkey exported $166B and imported $214B. Turkey’s top exports are Cars ($13.2B), Gold ($6.96B), Delivery Trucks ($5.04B), Vehicle Parts ($4.64B), and Jewelry ($3.39B). Turkey’s top imports are Gold ($17.1B), Refined Petroleum ($9.8B), Cars ($8.78B), Vehicle Parts ($6.34B), and Scrap Iron ($5.84B). The top countries Turkey’s exports include Germany ($17.4B), the United Kingdom ($10.1B), Italy ($9.4B), the United Arab Emirates ($9.2B), and Iraq ($9.1B). Turkey imports goods from China ($23B), Germany ($22.5B), Russia ($13.2B), Italy ($11.4B), and the United States ($11.3B) (OEC). Turkey has a large export economy with many leading countries that it depends on to make money.

Government:

Turkey experienced a short time of authoritarian rule under Mustafa Kemal and his successor Ismet İnönü. Parliamentary democracy was established in 1950 and has mostly remained in power since then. Turkish parliamentary democracy has been interrupted by short periods of military government at times when civilian rule was ineffective. These periods of military government occurred in 1960–61, 1971–73, and 1980–83. After the military’s rule ended the citizens were given a revised constitution. The modern Turkish constitution was established in 1982 and has been amended many times since then (Britannica). The Constitution also outlines the separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers in Turkey (Bacchanal).

Executive power in Turkey was originally divided between the prime minister, house of ministers, and the president. But, in 2017 the majority of voters wanted to get rid of the prime minister and house of ministers and expand the president’s power (Britannica). Today, the president is the main executive body. The president is able to call or dissolve the Grand National Assembly, return legislation to the assembly, refer laws to the constitutional court, declare a state of emergency for up to six months, submit constitutional changes, appoint a cabinet, form and regulate ministries, declare a state of emergency, and draft the budget (Sansal). Presidents also have a term of five years and can be re-elected one more time unless the assembly allows him/her to serve a third term. The current president of Turkey is Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

The main legislative body in Turkey is a 600-member parliament. This parliament is called the Grand National Assembly. The assembly is elected by Turkish citizens for a five-year term. members of the assembly are chosen based on how much their specific political party represents the national vote. Extremist parties are banned from joining the assembly and no party that has less than 10 percent of the national vote can be represented in the assembly. The assembly has the power to enact, amend, and repeal laws and can veto the president. The assembly also decides the budget and makes decisions about the printing of currency. In addition, the assembly approves international treaties and has the power to declare war (Britannica).

Judicial power in Turkey is held by independent courts and supreme courts. The Turkish judiciary system is divided into an administrative judiciary, a legal judiciary, and a special judiciary. The Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeals, the Council of State (highest court), the Supreme Military Court of Appeals, the Supreme Military Administrative Court, and the Court of Jurisdictional Conflicts are the Turkish supreme courts. The current chief justice of the Council of State is Zerrin Güngör. Higher court decisions also influence lower courts to make punishments for the same crime similar to make the system fairer (Turkish Politics & Elections).

The Economy of the Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman economy had a strong basis of many clever trade policies, transportation networks, and an abundance of diverse natural and land resources. It contributed to both European, Asian, and African economic processes, and influenced the economies of many other states in different periods of time. It had great potential for development and for becoming one of the greatest economies in Europe and the Middle-East. However, due to Ottoman conservatism, foreign intervention, and the absence of proper reforming that would let the economy develop, it never evolved to the level of the European industrial economies, lost its significance and power, and fell into decay.

Agriculture

As I said before, agriculture was the main aspect of the Ottoman economy. The Ottomans tried to develop their economy mainly by continuously expanding their empire, by conquests, in order to provide more land for farming and extracting natural resources for export. Ottomans believed that agriculture was more important than industry, private entrepreneurship, or trade. The Ottoman empire possessed a wide range of agricultural resources from the territories captured in Eastern Europe, Middle-East, and South Africa, that were used and consumed domestically, and exported to other countries. For example Barley was grown mainly from the western coasts of black sea; dried and fresh fruits were transported from Thessaly and Western Anatolia; cattle from the Balkans; cloth and wool from North Africa; gold and slaves from Sudan; spices, porcelain, silk and dyes from the East.

Before the 18th and 19th century (when urbanization started to take place with higher rates) the majority of the population used to live in rural areas, earning their living from small family holdings, growing crops both for themselves and for markets in big cities like Constantinople, to which they traveled to sell their harvest. Unfortunately, peasant population still had little income from their holdings. A big part of the Empire’s annual income came from agricultural taxation revenues and custom duties from agricultural exports. This was due to very high taxation rates for farmers in many regions of the Empire. Thus, the rates of growth of wealth among the people working in rural areas remained quite low until the 18th 19th century, when the Ottoman Government did a lot for the development of agriculture. In the 19th-century sedentarization programs took place, that were needed to integrate the nomadic tribes into the economy to get maximum economical control over them, and to involve more people in production. This coincided with refugee influxes, and as many refugees were granted land in Syria and Anatolia, the amount of land that was being farmed increased. The 19th century seen multiple irrigation projects and the introduction of modern agricultural technologies and tools, such as plows, reapers, and combines. As railroads were built across the empire, the effectiveness of transportation of agricultural goods increased multi-fold. Farmers began to increase the amount of time at work. Many people moved to urban areas. The urbanization process started to take place more with higher rates, and hence, the demand of consumer goods (manufactured in urban areas from materials from agricultural areas) increased. And finally, the new government policies that demanded a greater portion of taxes to be paid in cash also stimulated the increase in production.

Agricultural schools and model farms were founded. In order to increase the export values, and develop agriculture in general many agrarian specialists were educated. During the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II), the value of agricultural exports from Anatolia increased by 45%.

Transportation

Transportation played an important role in the agricultural and trade spheres of Ottoman economics, as the Empire occupied vast territories in three continents, and had agricultural production in different regions, that were quite far apart from each other, and goods needed to be effectively transported to markets in Istanbul and other cities that were exporting and trading centers of the Empire. Even before the era of transportation modernizations, Ottomans had an effective system of roads and caravanserai (that they inherited from Seljuk Turks), due to which they carried out very effective land transportation.

With the introduction of steam engine (in 19th century) the sea and river trade significantly increased in importance, as the ship voyages became predictable (sail ships depended on seasonal wind changes), and ships became able to travel upstream the river. The duration of voyages from Istanbul to Venice became eight times shorter, and the load-carrying capacity of trade ships increased almost by 1000% on average. Railroads were built around the Empire, revolutionizing agricultural and trade transportation, and providing employment in for over 30 000 people.

Manufacturing

Manufacturing had always been a much less developed part of the Ottoman economy.

Although the majority of the workforce was distributed in rural areas, there were some craftsmen living in urban areas, whose numbers increased as urbanization took place, and demand in more commodities increased. Same as in medieval Europe, some guilds emerged among the urban societies of the Ottoman empire. But as the Ottoman manufacturing sphere of economics developed much slower (the urbanization took place slower because of many people being bound to the land and being unable to move to the urban areas) and less effective than the European ones, professional guilds became a well-established aspect of the Ottoman society only in the late 16th century. But in the 19th-century guilds finally came to decline.

The process of mechanization of production in all parts of economy was deterred and slown down by the population’s inability to accumulate capital (caused by a number of different factors, including an unwise taxation system). Despite this, some factories still were built in urban areas in the 18th and 19th centuries, leading to the decline of guilds. Factories now were dominating over the market by controlling the prices because of their production abilities being much bigger than those of handicraftsmen. Guilds lost their control over the market and their power to restrict production. But factories still were an insignificant part of the economy, and many handicraft businesses kept functioning. For example, hand-made yarns and leathers, and later raw silk and carpets were actively exported to other countries.

As the Ottoman Empire followed liberal free-market trade policies, it lacked protectionist policies (as of those of European Countries), that could help support domestic manufacturing (factories) and let the Empire industrialize successfully. Although Ottoman Domestic production still struggled with Asian and European competition in the 18th and 19th centuries, it was often undercut by imports of cheap industrially produced goods (For example, cheap commodities from European colonies, that were produced by slave labour). The handicraft industry declined, also being undercut by imports. However, some historians state that decline of some industries was compensated by rise of other industries. The decline of handicraft production was compensated by increase of output in agricultural commodity production.

Overall, Ottoman Empire stayed deindustrialized, which made it a weaker economic power than other European States. Deindustrialization remained a big problem for a long time and contributed to the fall of the Empire. Only one part of the Empire nearly achieved industrialization. Namely, Ottoman Egypt (which was quite independent from the rest of the Empire, and had a developed economy comparable to European countries like France) under the reign of Muhammad Ali. Unfortunately, after his death, all the industrialization projects were canceled, and later Egypt (as well as Ottoman Empire in general) became an exporter of unprocessed goods.

Trade

Trade in the Ottoman empire was diverse and well-established. The government took no part in the trade process and developed a free-market system from which they could get tax revenue. Despite this, they sometimes moved away from such policies, but usually for a short period of time and not often. (For example, in 1544 the ottoman government was involved in the spice trade.).

Due to liberal free-market policies the Ottoman government followed, trade (both international and domestic) had no political barriers, and was affected mainly by territorial losses, and sometimes by foreign pressure (most significant examples seen in the 19th century – eg. Treaty of Balta Liman, that forced Ottomans to abolish all trade monopolies and give British merchants full access to Ottoman markets).

Domestic trade

Due to the vagueness of the original sources, and lack of detailed evidence, the is not a lot of information about the domestic trade in the Ottoman Empire (because most European sources do not describe internal trade of the Empire), and so, the domestic trade is often underestimated. However, from the sources that give some description of the domestic trade, it can be estimated that it was of a much larger volume and value than the foreign trade. More than 75% of the agricultural goods produced in the empire was traded within the Empire. In some provinces, the amount of domestically produced goods that were sold was 400% bigger than the amount of imported goods that were sold there every year. Only about 4% of the population wore imported textiles. Some statistics of late 19th century say that the interregional trade of 3 certain towns (that obviously were not leading trade centers) was comparable in its value and volume to the twentieth part of all the Ottoman annual export at the time. From this, we can only assume how ‘‘big’’ Ottoman domestic trade was.

External Trade.

Ottoman Empire exported a lot of agricultural goods from its own territories. Due to high rates of export the Empire kept a positive trade balance (exporting more than importing). and exported to other countries. For example, Barley was grown mainly from the western coasts of the black sea; dried and fresh fruits were transported from Thessaly and Western Anatolia; cattle from the Balkans; cloth and wool from North Africa; gold and slaves from Sudan.

Ottoman Empire was the intermediary between the East and West, re-exporting many Asian luxury goods, silks from the Far East spices, porcelain, silk, and dyes. The Empire controlled the mainland trade routes to Asia and Africa, and this gave the Ottomans a significant economical advantage, and for quite a long time the Ottoman Empire as the only country trading with India, Arabia, Iran, Ethiopia, and many other countries. However, this economic advantage had become insignificant when the Europeans discovered other sea routes to Africa and Asia. But later the Ottoman Empire turned into one of the major European naval powers (during the rule of Suleiman I the magnificent), and started to develop sea trade along the Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea, Black Sea, and the Persian Gulf.

The Ottoman trade system began to lose its efficiency in the 18th and 19th centuries. Ottomans began to import more luxury goods and many products from European factories (undercutting domestic production). Handicraft manufacturing declined. All Ottomans were left with were unprocessed goods (that were in demand in the manufacturing industry of Europe), that became their main exports. The trade balance became negative. In the 19th century, the Ottoman Public Debt became a problem, and when the Ottoman Empire declared bankruptcy, its European creditors were able to get some of the Empire’s trade monopolies, and gain considerable economic influence over the empire.

The main reasons why the Ottoman economy was ineffective, were the government, its conservatism, and the clergy’s influence over the government. The government did not let the country industrialize, and advance technologically, often on religious grounds.

Due to this, at the end of the 19th century Ottoman Empire was a deindustrialized, economically weakened country, that suffered territorial losses, debts, and both political and economic pressure from European imperialistic powers. The Ottoman economy was rich with potential and poor with wise administration.

Introduction

The Ottoman Empire was one of the largest and most powerful empires in history. It was founded in the late 13th century and at its peak spanned three continents, covering much of south-eastern Europe, western Asia, and northern Africa. The Ottoman Empire was known for its military might, advanced system of governance, and rich cultural heritage. While the heritage of the Ottoman Empire has had a significant impact on the evolution of modern Turkey, Western influence has also played an important role in the country’s development.

Political System

The influence of the Ottoman Empire can be seen in Turkey’s political system in a number of ways. First, the administrative and legal structures of modern Turkey are based on the institutions and practices that were developed during the Ottoman period. This includes the central role of the Turkish parliament, which was modeled after the Ottoman legislative council, as well as the Turkish legal system, which is based on the Ottoman system of law (A Tale of Two Turkeys 2:40). The ruling party in Turkey, the Justice and Development Party, has its roots in Islamic political thought and has sought to revive some of the Ottoman Empire’s cultural and religious traditions. This has included efforts to promote the use of the Ottoman Turkish language and to restore and preserve Ottoman-era buildings and monuments.

Society

The impact and heritage of the Ottoman Empire is also evident in many aspects. The Ottoman legacy includes a rich cultural heritage, with a strong emphasis on Islamic traditions and values. Many of the country’s customs and practices, such as the traditional Turkish greeting and the importance of hospitality, have their roots in the Ottoman period (Turkey: The Quest for Identity, 23). In addition, this heritage continues to shape the way in which Turkey views its place in the world. Many Turks see themselves as the heirs to the Ottoman legacy of military and political power (The Passenger: Turkey, 126). This legacy has also been a source of national pride for many Turks, who see the Ottoman Empire as a symbol of the country’s past greatness and a source of inspiration for its future development.

Culture

Cultural life in Turkey also keeps the evidence of the country’s imperial past. Many of the country’s most famous buildings and landmarks, such as the Topkapi Palace in Istanbul and the Blue Mosque, were built during the Ottoman period and are a testament to the empire’s architectural and artistic achievements. Many of the country’s most celebrated writers and artists were inspired by the empire’s culture and history. In addition, the Ottoman legacy continues to influence the way in which Turkish culture is expressed and celebrated (Many Turks Believe Erdogan Will Bring About New Ottoman Empire 3:12). The empire’s rich musical traditions can still be heard in modern Turkish music, and many of the country’s traditional dance and folk performances draw on Ottoman-era influences (The Passenger: Turkey, 93). The Ottoman legacy can also be seen in the country’s cuisine, which features many dishes and ingredients that were popular during the empire’s heyday.

Western Influence

While Western influence has certainly played a role in shaping modern Turkey, it is just one of many factors that have contributed to the country’s development. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Turkey underwent a series of significant political and cultural changes as it emerged from centuries of Ottoman rule and began to modernize. During this period, the country was heavily influenced by Western ideas and institutions, as it sought to modernize and become more integrated with the broader international community.

The late 1800s and early 1900s can be seen as a period of westernization in Turkey. During this period, the country adopted aspects of Western culture such as a secular legal system, a constitutional government, and a public education system (Philosophy of Kemalism 5:35). Prior to this time, Turkey operated under a legal system based on Islamic law, which governed all aspects of life, including family law, criminal law, and commercial law (Mustafa Akyol on Turkey 4:17). However, as part of the process of westernization, Turkey adopted a secular legal system that was based on the Napoleonic code. This legal system, which is still in place today, separates religion and state and is based on principles of individual rights and the rule of law.

The concept of a constitutional government, in which the powers of the state are limited by a written constitution, is another Western idea that was introduced to Turkey as part of westernization. Turkey’s current constitution is heavily influenced by Western examples, particularly those of European countries. The constitution includes provisions on individual rights and freedoms, the separation of powers, and the role of government, which are all concepts rooted in Western political thought (Power Struggle Around the Scarf 3:45). Finally, Turkey’s membership in international organizations such as the Council of Europe and the European Union, which are both based on Western political and legal principles, has also contributed to the country’s constitutional government (Turkey’s Economy: How It Started; How It’s Going 2:32). These organizations have helped to shape Turkey’s political and legal systems, and have encouraged the country to adopt Western norms and standards in these areas.

Conclusion

It can be concluded that all these changes were largely driven by a desire to modernize and become more competitive on the global stage. In addition, the development was influenced both by the country’s Ottoman legacy and the Western ideas and practices, as Turkey sought to modernize its economy and integrate with the global economic system. Today, the legacy of the Ottoman Empire and the process of westernization can still be seen in modern Turkey. The country continues to navigate its place in the world and balance its cultural heritage with its aspirations for the future.

In the Ottoman Empire, there was religious tolerance because religion played a critical role in enhancing peace and stability. Religious leaders were respected because they were depended upon during calamities and disasters. Moreover, religious leaders had a big role to play in ensuring that people lived in harmony.

Religious tolerance in the Ottoman Empire could not be compared to religious tolerance in the Roman Empire because diversity was not allowed in the Roman Empire. Non-Muslims, often referred to as dhimmis, were allowed to practice their forms of religions, but under close supervision.

Christians were allowed to exist freely, as long as they accepted the fact that Islam was the supreme religion in the empire. In matters related to religion, the Ottoman Empire formulated policies that favored freedom of religion. This was because the clergy had the role to play in the running and management of public affairs.

Religion was treated as an institution of government with powers to execute governmental policies. In this regard, the government formulated a number of policies aimed at regulating the performance of religious organizations. The empire had strong relationships with other empires that respected religious institutions, such as the Greek Orthodox Church (Karpat 78).

Religious tolerance in the Ottoman Empire was very important in two major ways. One is that the empire was surrounded by states that practiced Christianity. In fact, it was the only state, which practiced Islam as its major religion in Europe.

The neighboring states embraced Christianity meaning that it could have lost its status in case it proscribed other religions. For instance, the neighboring states, such as Greece, never tolerated Islam. It could be disastrous in case the state neglected the rights of other religious groups supported by major powers in Europe.

To avoid political inconsistencies, the state allowed other religious groups to exercise their rights. Moreover, the state had an ambition of expanding to other regions. This ambition could not have been achieved in case religious tolerance was not adopted.

It became easy to conquer other states because conquered states could be allowed to practice their cultural beliefs. Many kingdoms and chiefdoms resisted foreign powers because they interfere with their cultural rights and freedom. By embracing religious tolerance, the empire negotiated easily with other foreign powers on matters related to cooperation and security.

The millet system refers to the system of governance in which minorities are given powers to conduct their activities without interference from dominant groups. Arabs in the Ottoman Empire introduced the system after the adoption of Islamic religion.

Before the establishment of the Ottoman Empire, the millet system was used to cater for the needs of the poor in society. The government would provide basic needs such as food to the needy. In the Ottoman Empire, minor religious groups were given a set of norms that would control their behavior in the empire.

Their existence in society was recognized legally because they were allowed to worship their gods without interference. Under the millet system, the majority was viewed as the mainstream while the minority was expected to conform to the norms and regulations of the majority.

Christians and other minority groups were supposed to follow the Islamic laws, by appreciating the fact that Islam was the main religion in the Ottoman Empire. In this case, Christians and other minorities were not supposed to act in a way that would compromise the belief system of Muslims.

Individual millets in the Ottoman Empire were taken care of by their local leaders. The millets lived in groups and could form their own states within the larger empire. They could be allowed to establish their own taxation system.

However, their agencies could only be functional after receiving approval from the Ottoman Empire officials. Moreover, the millets could have their own set of laws, which could only apply within their boundaries. In case of an inconsistency with non-millets, Islamic laws could be invoked (Imber 12).

Millets were left to enjoy their rights, but they were supposed to show loyalty by paying taxes to the main government.

The millet system applied to the confessional communities only. Each community could come with its own laws, as long as the laws were not contradictory to the laws of the Ottoman Empire. In the current international system, the word nation is used to mean the same thing as the millet.

Each person was supposed to respect the laws of his community under the millet system. The system was very effective, though a number of European states opposed it.

Millet system is used by various countries, including Israel, to solve issues related to religion and culture. The millet system is used mainly because of cultural diversity among the Israeli populace. Israel is a state that was established in 1948 under the supervision of United Nations.

Its population has a diverse culture, which makes it difficult for the government to use a single set of rules. The application of the millet system is aimed at enhancing Jewish identify. Moreover, the country cannot afford to apply Jewish laws to all people because it would risk being isolated by other states.

Therefore, the state allows various groups to apply their private laws to resolve internal conflicts. Scholars observe that legal pluralism (millet system) in Israel has not been successful.

Under the millet system, the Israeli government gives various groups the power to establish courts that would resolve issues related to the family and marriage. Moreover, each group is given the power to establish its own religious court, which is charged with the responsibility of resolving issues related to faith.

In this case, groups can only endorse marriages that their cultures support. In the Islamic culture, Muslim men can marry Christian women, but a Muslim woman cannot marry a Christian man because it is against the Arabic culture. In matters related to divorce, each religion has its laws and regulations.

The millet system allows each group to apply the set of laws that are recognized culturally. In the Israeli society, a Muslim should not marry a Jewish because it is unconstitutional (Turchin 14). This rule is in the constitution implying that the millet system cannot be used in such cases.

In some parts of France, the millet system is applied effectively. For instance, women are expected to wear hijab while men are expected to keep long hair. In such regions, there are tight laws regarding the sale of certain commodities.

For instance, alcohol is not sold to certain age groups while pork is prohibited. Moreover, there is a public order regulating the licensing of clubs, cinemas, and theaters. Social places are termed places of sin because they do not conform to the provisions of the Islamic religion.

In the Ottoman Empire, the regime tolerated religious diversity because of the factors discussed in the previous sections. However, religious tolerance was weak because it favored one religious group. The political elites observed that Islam was the supreme religion and other religious groups had to obey it.

This was unacceptable because favoring one religious denomination amounted to discrimination. Religious toleration emerged from Islamic teachings, not the constitution. This meant that Islam would be applied in interpreting major religious issues.

For instance, it was against religious codes to practice homosexuality and abortion because Islam was against it. Moreover, Islam never allowed Muslims to interact with other groups socially. Religious tolerance in the empire was weak because Muslims were not allowed to convert to other religious denominations.

Moreover, leadership was supposed to be offered by religious leaders from Islamic religion only. In public places, all non- Muslims were expected to wear clothes that would distinguish them from Muslims.

In fact, no-Muslims were restricted from participating in key political processes such as voting and applying for senior positions in government.

Other religious groupings were supposed to pay a special tax referred to as jizya. This was a tax paid by all non-Muslims for them to be allowed to practice their cultures peacefully.

In other words, non-Muslims were allowed to buy their freedom, unlike Muslims who could be allowed to exercise their freedom without restriction. All adults living in the Islamic states were supposed to pay taxes as a sign of loyalty to the government.

Christians who never showed loyalty to Islam were often persecuted and oppressed. Ottoman tolerance was based on goodwill and cleverness because it only benefited Turkish Muslims.

Works Cited

Imber, Colin. The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650: The Structure of Power. Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Print.

Karpat, Kemal. The Ottoman state and its place in world history. Leiden: Brill, 1974. Print.

Turchin, Thomas, and J. Adams. “East-West Orientation of Historical Empires”. Journal of World-Systems Research 12.2 (2006): 219–229. Print.

Introduction

The history of Turkey and Greece relationships is long and filled with the mutual wariness combined with occasional increases in tensions. Following the downfall of the Ottoman Empire, the political landscape of the Eastern Mediterranean region has undergone major transformations. However, this part of Europe continued to demonstrate sporadic surges in hostility. Thus, the relationship between Turkey and Greece, which holds the Ottoman Empire’s heritage, have served as an area of intense interest for political experts and researchers across the globe. The geostrategic importance of the region for both Western and Eastern powers, combined with the general uncertainty surrounding the region, contributes to the topical nature of the discussion.

From a historical perspective, Greek-Turkish relations have seen periods of improvement, as well as intermittent phases of conflict. The latter included overt military operations that eventually culminated in the division of Cyprus in the 1970s. The positivity in the bipartite connections was mainly observed in the first decades after the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the Turkish administration made considerable steps toward the normalization of the atmosphere between its s country and Greece. The 1930s became the most important period within this context due to the mutual efforts of leaders from both sides. Nevertheless, as the result of World War II, tensions arose, and the prior convergence of the countries’ interests became replaced by mutual distrust. Cyprus is often associated with the primary causes of disagreements between these Mediterranean nations. Consequently, the island became the center of military tensions in the second half of the 20^th century, which explains the interest in its role within the framework of the current discussion.

This paper explores the historical context of the relations between Greece and Turkey after the Ottoman era. Even though this period encompasses one century, it demonstrates an array of points of interest. Over a relatively short timeframe on the scale of global history, these bilateral relations went to both extremes between friendship and conflict. The countries made honest attempts at normalizing the situation, but the subsequent events prompted a different outcome. As the 21^st century approached, both nations joined the same military alliance. This step had the potential to mitigate the tensions, but the uncertainty persisted. As a matter of fact, uncertainty appears to be a fitting denomination for the context of the relations between Turkey and Greece throughout the past hundred years. Accordingly, further historical research is required to enable a better understanding of the historical perspective that entailed the present state of the situation.

Methodology

In order to cover such a controversial topic related to recent history, the current paper relies on an in-depth analysis of the literature. The Turkish-Greek relationships in the 20^th and the 21^st century became a matter of considerable importance for the global society. Accordingly, there exists a substantial body of knowledge that explores and analyzes the situation from both perspectives. Considering the recency of the discussed events, it appears relevant to include a range of primary sources in the discussion. These materials provide a contemporary view of the key events that form the history of Greek-Turkish relations. In addition, the paper incorporates the findings obtained from secondary sources, containing valuable opinions of expert political researchers and historians. Overall, the methodology of the study can be described as a systematic review comprising a comprehensive review of relevant literature and primary sources. The findings are synthesized in accordance with the corresponding historical period of Greek-Turkish relations and presented in the subsequent sections.

Discussion

The 1920s and 1930s: the Initial Normalization of the Relations

The first quarter of the 20^th century marked the end of several world empires, and the Ottoman nation was one of them. After World War I, the Mediterranean and the Balkans experienced another surge of violence. More specifically, as the Ottoman Empire was crumbling, thousands of Armenian and Greek Christians were slaughtered amid the revolutionary campaign by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (Corbic 170). From the Turkish perspective, the genocide was considered to be a fitting response to the mass killings of Muslims committed by the Greek side earlier. However, by 1923, the geopolitical landscape of the region changed to a considerable degree. The multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire collapsed, and the independent Republic of Turkey emerged led by general Atatürk. During the same year, Turkey and Greece instigated a massive population exchange, during which over one million Christians and 380,000 Muslims returned to their respective states (M. Y. Metintaş and M. Metintaş 75). This point marked a new age of reconciliation between the two rival nations of the Eastern Mediterranean.

The downfall of the Ottoman Empire combined with peace-related policies from both sides made a positive contribution to region’s consistency. The peace treaty signed in 1923 in Lausanne restricted the expansion ambitions of the countries but opened new avenues for co-existence and cooperation. In 1930, the Ankara Convention was held, which led to the historical visit of the Greek Prime Minister to Turkey (Corbic 170). This period of reconciliation is associated with the names of Eleftherios Venizelos Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Both leaders made significant attempts to establish trust between their nations. In fact, the former played a key role in the latter’s nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize (Corbic 171). The alliance was further strengthened by a series of international agreements. Among them, the 1934 Balkans Pact, signed by Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Romania, became the most important step to stability. This document revoked the territorial claims of the nations and guaranteed the preservation of existing borders. Overall, the 1930s became one the most positive decades in the long history of tensions between Turkey and Greece.

Turkey and Greece in World War II

Following the initial normalization of the bilateral relations, the two nations entered a new phase of negativity amid World War II. This period remains one of the darkest pages of global history, during which multiple conflicts emerged around the main battle against Nazis. As the global war erupted, Turkey opted for a neutral position. Nevertheless, the country still signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Nazi Germany as a means of protecting itself against a possible attack (Corbic 171). According to the contemporary British press, the pact ensured a favorable position for Turkey, as it still had an “escape clause under which Turkey continues to abide by her obligations under the Anglo-Turkish alliance” (Nazi-Turkish Pact Reported Ready to Sign). Under the new circumstances, the Turkish government felt comfortable enough to begin the oppression of its non-Muslim population. Residents of Greek origin were among those who became subject to elevated taxes and compulsory conscription for labor battalions (Corbic 171). These measures inflicted serious damage on the Greek communities in Turkey, causing a strain in the bilateral relations.

A New Phase of Bilateral Tensions

World War II became a challenge of unprecedented magnitude on the global level, and the complicated geopolitical landscape translated into a new phase of tension in Greek-Turkish relations. The policy of non-Muslim oppression in Istanbul persisted through most parts of the war, and the restrictions were only lifted in 1944 (Corbic 171). In the 1950s, the nations made another attempt at improving their relations. However, this time the reconciliation was mainly determined by the emergence of a new geopolitical threat. According to Corbic, a new Balkan Pact of 1953 united Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia against the expansion ambition of the Soviet Union (171). Therefore, the risks of the Cold War became the only common ground for the countries. Simultaneously, the West decided to incorporate the Balkan region into its defense framework against the U.S.S.R, making Turkey and Greece NATO member states in 1952 (Naumescu 188). These facts suggest that the presence of a common threat outweighed the existing disputes between the countries.

Evidently, the 1950s rapprochement of Turkey and Greece did not have a solid foundation. The legacy of the 1930s policies could hardly survive the War and corresponding issues. The formation of a common defense framework was executed under the command of the West, but, on a local level, a new cause of tensions emerged. In 1950, the problematic question of Cyprus arose for the first time in the 20^th century (Corbic 171). At that time, the island’s government held an enosis – an official referendum regarding Cyprus’s potential union with Greece. According to the original historical documents, the turnover amounted to over 220,000, and 95% of voters supported the enosis idea (Zypern, 22). Turkey responded aggressively, seeing enosis as a threat to its interest in the Mediterranean. Simultaneously, rumors were spread regarding Greek’s plans to oppress Turkish residents of Cyprus. Following the bombing of Atatürk’s house in Thessaloniki by the Turkish forces, anti-Greek riots erupted in Istanbul (Corbic 171). The clashes resulted in multiple casualties and serious property damage, which led to the Greek exodus from Turkey. Ultimately, the Cyprus question launched a new stage of confrontation.

The 1970s and the Division of Cyprus

The period after the 1970s is characterized by the most substantial conflict in the Turkish-Greek relationship since the downfall of the Ottoman Empire. As established previously, Cyprus became the central element of the confrontation, as the island’s population voiced the desire to join Greece. The proposed political resolution of the crisis implied joint Turko-Greek governing of independent Cyprus. However, Greek authorities objected to the 70/30 distribution of power, as it did not reflect the demography of the former British colony (Corbic 172). As a result, all negations failed, and the conflict entered a new phase. Following a coup d’état in Greece, Turkish armed forces began the bombings of Cyprus in 1974 to impede the projected union. The internal issues prevented Greece from reacting in a timely manner, and Turkey managed to occupy one-third of the island. Consequently, Cyprus became divided into two major territories: The Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Corbic 172). This conflict had an immense impact and determined the subsequent course of joint relationships between two examined countries.

Relations between Turkey and Greece until Present-Day

The annexation of a considerable part of Cyprus had serious implications on the geopolitical landscape of the area. In the 1980s, the United States Congress expressed the position of the West by condemning the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus (U.S. Congress). This development made Turkey’s membership negotiations with the European Union highly complicated. Due to the territorial disputes, Greek governments did everything possible to prevent Turkey from joining the organization.

Furthermore, in the fallout of the Cyprus conflict, new territorial disputes followed. More specifically, several parts of the Aegean Sea became the cause of heated disputes between the two countries. Greece aimed to extend its territorial waters in order to enable the extraction of oil while promoting national security. Naturally, the Turkish side saw such plans as a threat to its own interest, actively resisting the envisaged expansion. The 1970s saw several skirmishes between the navies that resulted in casualties from both sides. However, the sides still managed to avoid open military engagement, resolving the shelf disputes through negotiations. In this scenario, the countries’ membership status in NATO may have become the key factor that prevented a local war from starting.

Remaining under serious geopolitical pressure, Greece and Turkey had to acknowledge the necessity of relationship normalization. In the post-Cold War era, both governments have been attempting to introduce positive initiatives that, however, did not eliminate the repercussions of past disputes. In 1999, significant progress was made as Greece changed its position in regards to Turkey’s membership in the EU (Dokos et al. 2). This point marked a new period of normalization under the flag of Europe and NATO.

However, the existing crises appear to not have received a proper resolution, as the tensions continue to resurface in the 21^st century. Europe’s leading political experts relate modern issues to the surge in nationalist and revisionist rhetoric in Turkey associated with Tayyip Recep Erdogan’s coming to power (Christofis et al. 67). Dokos et al. state that Erdogan’s government has taken an aggressive stance that aims to reinforce the national awareness of the Turkish people (3). Such ideas rely on the unresolved crises of the past, and the disputes around the Aegean Sea are a prominent example of such issues. Simultaneously, as long as Cyprus stands divided, the Greek side cannot fully reconcile with its counterpart. Amid these concerning tendencies stemming from the occasional re-emergence of past disputes, the expert community actively discusses a possibility of war between Turkey and Greece. Such a possibility is alarming, as an open military conflict between two NATO member states has the potential to undermine the global security framework in its entirety.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the post-Ottoman period of Turkish-Greek relationships can be identified as generally uncertain. In the first decades after the formation of the Turkish Republic, both sides demonstrated their readiness to overcome past crises. As such, the Lausanne treaty was a serious step toward normalization. However, the turmoil of World War II prompted further complications within the framework of bilateral relations. In the post-war era, the Cyprus issue emerged as the cornerstone of all disputes between the nations. While Turkey and Greece have been a part of a common security framework, their local disagreements never faded. Despite the efforts of the governments, such issues as the division of Cyprus and territorial claims over the Aegean Sea continue to define the bilateral relations in the 21^st century. The prevailing role of imperial revisionism in present-day Turkey aggravates the problems that did not receive satisfying closure for either side. Overall, effective political resolutions are to be provided to avert further conflict growth that would compromise the stability in a globalized world.

References

Christofis, Nikos et al. “The View from Next Door: Greek-Turkish Relations after the Coup Attempt in Turkey.” The International Spectator, vol. 54, no. 2, 2019, pp. 67-86.

Corbic, Dusan. “An Overview of Greek-Turkish Relations in the 20th Century.” VI International Scientific Conference Safety and Crisis Management – Theory and Practise Safety for the Future – Secman 2020, 2020, pp. 169-174.

Dokos, Thanos et al. Greek-Turkish Relations and the Cyprus Dispute: Impact on Turkey-EU Scenarios. FEUTURE, 2018. Web.

Metintaş, Mustafa Yahya and Melike Metintaş. “Analysis of Turkish-Greek Population Exchange in the Context of Greek and Turkish Foreign Policy.” Türk Dünyası Uygulama ve Araştırma Merkezi Yakın Tarih Dergisi, vol. 2, no. 4, 2018, pp. 73-88.

Naumescu, Valentin. “Stability, Ambiguity and Change in the Discourses of NATO allies in the Black Sea region: The Cases of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey.” Croatian International Relations Review, vol. 23, no. 80, 2017, pp. 187-209.

“Nazi-Turkish Pact Reported Ready to Sign.”Middlesboro Daily News, 1941. Web.

United States of America, Congress. Condemnation of the “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus”, H. Con. Res. 220. The House of Representatives, 1984.

Zypern, 1950 : Anschluss an Griechenland,1950. Web.

“Sectarianism is a form of bigotry, discrimination, or hatred arising from attaching importance to perceived differences between subdivisions within a group, such as between different denominations of a religion, nationalism, class, regional or factions of a political movement.”¹

The conceptual reinforcements of insolences and actions considered as sectarian are extremely diverse. The followers of a spiritual, state or party-political assembly may have confidence in that their own redemption, or the accomplishment of their specific purposes, necessitates belligerently looking for adapts from other assemblies; moreover, the supporters of this particular group may have confidence in that for the accomplishment of their own party-political or spiritual mission their interior adversaries have to be rehabilitated or eliminated.

Sectarianism may not have been the state-policy of the Ottomans; however, they sought to keep a large empire unified and by doing that they suppressed non-Sunni Muslim minorities in the region they ruled. Sectarianism was thus only a byproduct of a more finance-oriented policy that Ottomans followed. The main objective of this essay is to observe and reflect the evidence towards or against the policy of sectarianism during the reign of the Ottoman Empire on the territories under its commandment; moreover, the research conducted while writing this essay will determine whether the sectarianism under Ottoman rule was or was not a state policy.

From time to time, an assembly that is below financial or party-political compression will execute or try to attack the associates of other groups that it concerns as accountable for its own deterioration. It can more severely describe the description of conventional faith in its certain assembly or society, and eject or exclude those who fail to sustain this fresh originate elucidated description of the party-political or religious convention. In other instances, dissidents from this convention will separate from the conventional organization and announce themselves as experts of a rehabilitated faith scheme, or containers of an apparent former convention. In other cases, sectarianism can be the appearance of an assembly’s chauvinistic or national determinations, or subjugated by agitators.

The situation of Jewish and Christian minorities among the population in the Ottoman Empire is a subject matter that endures to be in doubt and widely discussed up to this day, just about a hundred years after the formal termination of the Ottoman Empire itself. Spiritual connotation characteristically resulted in obtaining the rank in the Muslim Ottoman Empire for the most part. As Moshe Ma’oz mentioned in the study, Christians and Jews has been always observed as substandard matters or as unlawful quantities².

As a consequence, these social groups were frequently distinguished in contradiction of the state entity. On the other hand, other academics would contend that the place of social, religious, and ethnical subgroups under the Ottoman Rule was compassionate in comparison to the behavior towards the minorities elsewhere around the globe, such as in particular areas of Europe. According to Edward Said, “abuses of Orientalism, that is a Western way of ‘dominating’ or ‘restructuring’ the history of the Middle East because of prejudice against Arab-Islamic peoples, has caused a misconstruction of the historical narrative.”³

According to Bruce Masters, Westerners were classically predisposed against the representatives Muslims; moreover, they frequently biased veracities in the relations among Christians, Muslims and Jews under the rule of the Ottoman Empire⁴. In isolation, it has to be distinguished that historic explanations, or misapprehensions, must be forcefully inspected while deliberating the situation of Jews and Arabs under the rule of the Ottoman Empire.

In order to evaluate the place of Jews and Christians for the duration of the era of the Ottoman Rule and determine whether there was a state policy of sectarianism, the official statuses of the Jews and Christian minorities have to be designated. They were deliberated as ‘Ahl al-Kitab’, or ‘people of the book’ (this term means that there were people that apprehended monotheistic principles). As a result, their handling by the government of the Empire could have been a lot different from that of the supporters of the polytheistic beliefs under Ottoman regulation, from the time when the Muslims acknowledged the diviners of Christianity and Judaism.

As a consequence, they were provided by the defense of the government, or Ahl al-Dhimma. The following custom of defense for social, cultural, and ethnical subgroups still are able to be observed in the present-day Tehran. A lot of groups of people that follow Christianity still continue to exist in Iran. From the time when it has been with authorization documented that the religions still revel in dhimma, the groups of people that follow Christianity are assured to receive defense from the government. A vivid instance of this defense is the representative image of a stern viewing Ayatollah Khomeini on the external side of an Armenian minister in Tehran.

The image signifies the Ayatollah’s defense over the minister, as a result, that he implies that he will provide their safety by himself. They delighted in independence in spiritual matters and, furthermore, several areas including schooling. From this point of view, Jews and Christians relished particular civil liberties under the regulation of the Ottoman Empire that was not settled to the ethnical, cultural, and social subgroups in Europe, on which territory Jews and Muslims were frequently mistreated or were in an inferior position because of the religious preconception.

It has to be said, on the other hand, that Jews and Christians experienced comprehensive liberty and even autonomy under Islamic regulation of the Ottoman Empire. These minorities were observed as mediocre by not only the administration of the Empire but by a lot of its citizens. If observed in simpleminded expressions, the dominance complex established by Muslims in the Ottoman Empire could most expected to be accredited to their recognition of the Prophet Muhammad in the role of the concluding prescient, a part of the faith that Christians and Jews failed to follow in their beliefs.

Their failure follows the path of the Muslims in so many ways has resulted in the Muslim monarchs to observe the Jews and Christians in deficient dimensions. Moreover, as a consequence, they were obligatory to provide a fee in a distinctive election tariff, also called jiyzya. While the Jews and Christians were permitted to obtain definite senior-level ranks, for example, financial consultants or general practitioners, they were at all times obligatory to obtain only those ranks subsidiary to their Muslim corresponding positions. They were even from time to time exposed to limitations in clothing or were beleaguered by definite bureaucrats and fellow citizen.

These facts of history represent that in spite of the conceding of dhimma to the non-Sunni Muslims and non-Muslims, unsanctioned performances of preconception were from time to time overlooked. There was an assured sagacity of communal separation between Muslims and non-Muslims. Typecasts classifying Christians and Jews were frequently exploited in multiplying the break among them. Even in zones of adjacent immediacy in the middle of these groups, where they existed and functioned as fellow citizens, they were infrequently comprised in the common being of the environs.

Jews and Christians, as well as the non-Sunni Muslims and non-Muslims, were rather infrequently apportioned with on a discrete foundation; as an alternative, they were stomped into a millet organization that dispensed with them as a municipality. For instance, “the Rabbi, in a millet-bashi, acted as the administrative officer responsible for acting as the representative of his community to the state. Rather than collecting the jiyzya individually, they paid the state collectively, with a Chief Rabbi administrating. This was the case for all recognized Christian and Jewish communities.”⁵ The millet scheme permitted the corresponding societies to appreciate a particular rank of managerial independence under their legislator. The millet forerunner could possess the ability to hold particular controls in order to implement and establish regulations. Moreover, he also helped to implore the origins of his municipality to the administrations of the Ottoman Empire as well.

According to Roderic H. Davison, millets assisted to some point as the negotiators of transformation and progress, they facilitated in implementing assured reconstruction and renovation in the Ottoman Empire. Roderic H. Davison, along with many other researchers, connects the fact of the existence of millets to the connection characters in the framework of the relations that the non-Muslim millets possessed with Europe. Armenians, Greeks, and Jews assisted in importing the letterpress media inside the Ottoman Empire.⁶

Furthermore, the administration also required alterations with the intention of reviving the Ottoman Empire, as well as refining the armed forces and founding delegations in Europe. An announcement by the Sultan Abdülmecid that was made in 1953 recognized collective independence on the foundation of equivalence; however, it abandoned the managerial features of an individual position, such as weddings and schooling, to the millets. This announcement correspondingly applied a scheme of tariff collection to all inhabitants, not just Christians and Jews and non-Sunni Muslims and non-Muslims, along with an obligatory armed forces provision for every citizen belonging to any social or ethnical group.

On the other hand, the history that occurred in practice was fairly not the same; most Christians and Jews answer to defense force restructurings was to recompense a particular tariff excusing them from armed forces obligation, instead of achieving the obligatory provision. As a consequence, in several circumstances, the millets appeared to be the managers of transformation in modernizing the Ottoman Empire; they implemented the role as the conduits or strainers of adjustment. In other cases, they were represented as the adversaries to improvement to defend their own welfares, for example, as in the situation of martial provision. According to Davison, “acceptance of certain modernization by non-Muslim millets also caused non-acceptance by Muslims on religious and anti-Western grounds. Although, it is important to remember Said’s Orientalist reconstructing of history on the basis of anti-Muslim prejudice when considering Davison’s claim.”⁷

The place of Christians and Jews and the non-Sunni Muslims and non-Muslims under Ottoman regulation could be disputed in the framework of the chronological concepts. As the spiritual connotation frequently established the communal position of inhabitants, spiritual subgroups were typically preserved with a rank of acceptance, which was not habitually appreciated by the subgroups under Christian regulation. On the other hand, it is imperative to summon up that the researchers may on no occasion accurately apprehend the place of components under the Muslim regulation in the Ottoman Empire as the historic clarifications repeatedly lead academics off course.

The current Western learning on the Ottoman historical events has not been supportive in explaining the uncertainties adjacent to the historic involvement of the empire’s cultural and spiritual subgroups. The historic researchers possess the knowledge in usually evaded themes, which assist in segregating the populaces of the Ottoman Empire into uniform, vertically created, denominational societies. The instinct originates in incomplete reply to the party-political handling of dutiful individualities by the Western authorities in the Ottoman early command, also called the Eastern Question, throughout the nineteenth century.

Marxian simulations, which provide chief to session over substitute community characteristics, have enthused additional reassessment. More lately, the sermon of post-colonialism and the cutting assessment flattened by Edward Said in contradiction of the conventions and outline of the recognized Western studentship on the Middle East, also known as Orientalism, have denounced the inscription of Ottoman past with what is supposed to be an unjustified importance of spiritual alterations.

The disparagement of the misappropriations of the Orientalism in the role of an educational discipline, and those concepts prejudiced by it, has been both considerate and functional. Even though Westerners were not completely accountable for the upsurge of sectarian hostilities in the Middle East, the Western spectators confined plentiful of the initial nonfiction on sectarian dealings and the reasons for it in the Ottoman Empire. They were naturally prejudiced in contradiction of Muslims and their images and questions repeatedly changed the veracity of the complication of the relations that connected Muslims, Christians, and Jews in the dusk of the domain.

As a result, the established Western past history on the circumstances under which the spiritual subgroups in the Ottoman Empire existed is contaminated and necessitates maintenance while referred. In addition, some of the people who have conducted the research on the subject more lately have completed it in order to improve the party-political rights of one cultural municipality over another. “In response to the political manipulation of research agenda surrounding the Ottoman Empire’s religious minorities, many of those who would deconstruct the Orient avoid religion as a category of identity in their historical analyses altogether. To write or not to write about the history of non-Muslims living in Muslim states has become, and perhaps always was, all too often a political act.”⁸

The majority of the European and North American academics that research Ottoman Imperia have selected not to set apart the Christians for singular consideration if deliberately ensuing the Arab separatist archetype or not. The similar fact could be stated for the researchers who are investigating the past of Egypt and Iraq. There are several prominent exclusions; however, these examples assist in reminding the researchers how much exploration needs to be done on the subject of non-Sunni Muslims and non-Muslims in the Ottoman outlying areas and their connection to the sectarianism.

Bibliography

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Davison, Roderic. The Millets as Agents of Change in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire. Teaneck: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982.

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Footnotes

1. “Sectarianism.” Web.
2. Ma’oz, Moshe. Middle Eastern Minorities: Between Integration and Conflict (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001), 5-9.
3. Said, Edward. Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 17.
4. Masters, Bruce. Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 31.
5. Benjamin Braude. Foundation Myths of the Millet System (Teaneck: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982), 69.
6. Davison, Roderic. The Millets as Agents of Change in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire (Teaneck: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982), 319.
7. Tsimhoni, Daphne. The Tanzimat: Ottoman Reforms and the Millets (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 99.
8. Rogan, Eugene. The Arabs: A History (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 411.

Introduction

The fate of the Ottoman Empire was one of the main issues in the international politics of the Middle East during the period following World War I. Western countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany, Russia, and France strived to gain maximum advantages out of the defeat and subsequent division of the Ottoman Empire, which before the outbreak of the war had been one of the largest powers of the epoch and had covered a territory of nearly 1.7 million square kilometers, including such modern states as Turkey, Palestine, Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon.

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire

There were many prerequisites for the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. The weakness of the economic and industrial sectors made the Ottoman Porte increasingly dependent on the large European powers, a dependence that continued to grow in the context of shifting international relations in the region. Since the end of the 17th century when a decline in military strength had become apparent, the Ottoman state had to take a defensive stand more often (Cleveland and Bunton 47).

As a result, in the 18th century, it started to turn into the object of a diplomatic struggle between European countries for economic and political influence. During that time, England, France, and Austria all pressed for the empire’s involvement in political and military conflicts, even though participation in them would not have served the state’s interests. Taking advantage of the corruption and materialism of the High Porte’s bureaucracy, the European representatives sought to create unions in the ruling class (Cleveland and Bunton 258).

In this way, many dignitaries of the Ottoman Empire acted to the detriment of the state during diplomatic negotiations. Similarly, the Ottoman Empire became involved in World War I under the influence of Germany, which regarded Porte’s participation in the conflict as an opportunity to block Russia’s access to the Turkish Channels (Cleveland and Bunton 141).

In the fall of 1918, the defeat of the German troops forced the Ottoman army to surrender as well. Although it was this defeat that provoked the ultimate disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, it is possible to say that this process had started a few years earlier. Due to the weakening of the Ottoman Empire during the war, in 1915, France and the United Kingdom began secret negotiations on the division of the Arab lands that had strategically important geographical locations and were rich in resources. Russia, and later Italy, also joined in the plans to partition the empire. The agreement is now known by the names of the diplomats who played a key role in its preparation: Englishman Sir Mark Sykes and Frenchman Francois Georges-Picot (Cleveland and Bunton 152).

The Sykes-Picot agreement divided the Ottoman territories into zones that were subject to direct annexation or had to be given under the protectorate. According to the plan, the southeast part of modern-day Turkey, northern Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon were to be passed to France (Cleveland and Bunton 207), while Britain was to gain control over the southern and central regions of present-day Iraq.

The territory between the French and British zones was to be made into an Arab kingdom under a British-French protectorate, and virtually the entire area of Palestine, including Jerusalem, was subject to the international management area. Russia had no claim to the Arab territories but hoped to gain control over the straits of Bosporus and Dardanelles. According to the Constantinople Agreement made in 1915 by Britain, France, and Russia, the Turkish Straits were to be passed under Russian control, and Constantinople was to become a free port (Cleveland and Bunton 151).

Additionally, in 1918, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson proclaimed the principles of the Empire’s partitioning, which aimed to ensure the provision of sovereignty for the Turkish part of the state, to support safety and autonomous development for all non-Turkish nations, and to guarantee the opening of the straits for all vessels according to international regulations (Cleveland and Bunton 164).

However, it was easier to proclaim than to realize these ideas—indeed, there were significant controversies between France and Britain regarding the partitioning of the Near East, while the British also had obligations to the Arabic leaders who had supported the Allies in their fight against the Ottomans. For instance, the Sharif of Mecca, Husayn ibn Ali, expected the Allies to recognize him as the caliph of an independent Arab state (Cleveland and Bunton 149). Moreover, Greeks, Armenians, and Ottoman Turks all had their requirements. In this way, the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire was stimulated by three conflicting plans of the parties involved in the issue: the independence movements, the French mandates, and the British mandates.

Conclusion

The agreements included in the Sykes-Picot Agreement did not come into effect but rather laid the foundation for further negotiations between the parties. Along with the creation of the new states, the treaty set the stage for many regional conflicts. For example, one of the central points of the agreement was the issue of control over Palestine, which London had made more complicated by promising to both Arabs and Zionists. Due to the multiple controversies associated with the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire, for over a century, the Sykes-Picot Agreement has remained a symbol of Western intervention in the affairs of the Middle East.

Works Cited

Cleveland, William L., and Martin Bunton. A History of the Modern Middle East. 6th ed. 2016. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Web.

Egypt as a guarantee of the British position

It is almost impossible to examine the issue of Russia and the Ottoman Empire without mentioning the position that Egypt assumed during this period. Egypt played an important role in Britain’s scramble to gain and maintain its territories during the 19th-century. It acted as the source of security for the British Empire in India and due to its strategic location between the two regions. Egypt had a strong relationship with the Indian empire.

As a result, the East of Suez became an important route that helped to facilitate the implementation of the British policy. Imperial India became Greater India and the sub-empire compared to the other Asian countries. This sub-empire, which extended from Aden to Burma, had its influence extended to the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Tibet. The coast of East Africa was also known to be part of the greater India.

From an economic perspective, the disbursement made to the Indian army that purely consisted of British soldiers largely relied on the agrarian income. India also witnessed the establishment of the largest ports and railway networks outside the western world. Therefore, “its merchants, migrants and laborers, its British-owned banks and agency-houses, and its strategic position on the marine trunk road to East Asia made up the engine of Anglo-Indian expansion, an enterprise under both British and Indian management” (Darwin, 9-10).

Roles which Egypt plays

Egypt played two important roles in the British Empire during this period. Firstly, it was important for the empire’s position in the Mediterranean region. Secondly, it was integrated into Britain’s plan for the African scramble, a move that was purely meant to safeguard its old India-based empire, including its wealth in Australia. Hence, Britain purposed to secure a huge portion of West and East Africa since it had easier access through the East (Judd, 127).

Following its opening in the late 1860s, the Suez Canal also offered an inexpensive means for the Anglo-Indian business compared to the extensive and conventional sea route that involved moving around the Cape of Good Hope. India also offered an affordable military backup for the British Empire. Specifically, Britain did not incur any expenses to cater for the army. The British Empire used the army in its campaigns in China, Persia, Abyssinia, Egypt, Nyasaland, Sudan, and other territories (Judd, 77-78).

An obstacle for the Ottoman Empire

Hence, from the above expositions, “The value of India as the second center of British world power became more than ever an axiom of British thinking…without India as one of its four grand components, the British world system would have been without some of the vital sources of its security, stability and cohesion” (Darwin, 181). As a result, Egypt stood out as among the most precious and complex assets that the British Empire could boast of in the 19th century.

It was strategically positioned to serve the interests of British people. For instance, it was positioned in the northeastern part of Africa and across from the Arabic countries of the Persian Gulf. British occupied Egypt because the latter country’s location favored the interests of the former.

The Ottomans faced significant challenges when trying to uphold the morals of their lands. With minorities such as Greece calling for their sovereignty from the Ottoman regime and Australian and Russian interests in Balkan, the Ottomans grew weaker by the day, hence enabling Britain to prevent them from oppressing the challenged classes of people. After stopping the Ottomans, the British army targeted to deploy the old kingdom to be in charge of the French and the Russian interests, hence getting hold of the routes to India via the Ottoman Empire (Levine, 89-90).

Conclusion

Britain’s virtual occupation of Egypt was contrary to the laid down imperialist expansion policies. “Egypt was an exposed salient on the rim of Europe, a great hostage to diplomatic fortune.” With the failure of the Ottoman kingdom, the eastern Mediterranean now turned to be the center of clashes concerning European politics. Ottoman kingdom had close relations with Egypt. They both shared the same interests as far as the British Empire was concerned. Hence, it was in the best interest of Britain to use diplomatic means, for instance, by incorporating Turkey, to defend its territorial share, which was comparable to the size of Egypt. Starting from 1885 up to 1890, Britain had deployed six unparalleled warships to secure its Mediterranean region (Darwin, 75-77).