It is not an easy task to outline the rights and the wrongs in a war. There will always be points of difference based on the situation and the position in which the speaker/writer is. Every murderer has a murder; in other words, the reasons for war are always well articulated, irrespective of the person responsible for such articulation. In the case of E.B. Sledge, there were a lot of conflicting emotions that crossed his mind, during the course of the war. For a person who lived out his career as a US Marine, in close proximity with the horrors of the battlefield, the justification of the atom bomb being dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima does not call for any form of debate, as far as he is concerned. For a man who was numbed by the scores of the soldier dead and dying before him, this only served to be a respite, more so a permanent one, from a horrendous military exercise. There are no fanciful descriptions of the war, nor is there a romanticizing of the situation in Japan. There is a pointed effort to present to the reader the reality of war in all its starkness and raw horror.
The life of US Marine, E.B. Sledge
In a desperate move to be inducted into the US Marine Corps, E.B. Sledge gave up an academic program and joined others like him. No amount of training and orientation would prepare him for the war that was being fought in Okinawa and Peleliu. It was a certain esprit de corps that kept these Marines together, fighting a common enemy and coming to terms with their own fears and inadequacies.
All his experiences on these battlefields have been chronicled in great gory detail. One such instance is of a fellow Marine stealing gold teeth from a Japanese soldier who is on the verge of death. Knowing full well that the soldier is still alive, a Marine plunges a knife to extract a gold tooth. Sled and a few other Marines shout out for him to stop, which he reluctantly does. The Japanese soldier is shot dead to relieve him of his pain, while the Marine expresses his displeasure for the humane gesture of Sledge and the other Marines (Sledge 120).
His career as a Marine required him to follow orders implicitly even if it meant having to dig a trench right through the corpse of a Japanese soldier! His description of the invasion and occupation of Okinawa leaves no doubt in the mind of the reader about the kind of motivation that was used to get soldiers like Sledge into the spirit of war. His view of the enemy, their strategies and warfare, the harshness of the terrain, and a lot more, make you feel like you are part of the World War II landscape.
Hiroshima and Nagasaki – a good end?
There is nothing just about war – this would be a cry from most pacifists who believe that justifications cannot be even contemplated when one talks of war. However, in the case of a war veteran like E.B. Sledge, there is a burning desire to bring the war to an end after being a past of carnage and bloodshed, which after a time, seems almost pointless. Like E.B. Sledge there are those like Paul Fussel who believe that only experience can make you take sides on how and when war should end. It is relatively easy to sit thousands of miles away from the war front debating on the ethical correctness of dropping the A-bomb compared to the likes of Sledge who want the carnage to end. People who have spent considerable hours on the battlefield and are intensely aware of the horrors of an invasion (whichever side they may be on) are in favor of a quick end to all suffering. The dropping of the A-bomb was therefore both “horrible and welcome” to Fussel, Sledge, and a host of other soldiers who looked forward to a reduction in the fast escalating losses on both sides.
Conclusion
To say that E.B. Sledge approved the dropping of the atom bomb would be a simplistic statement to make, devoid of any contextual and circumstantial support, that would make him out to be an ogre – something he is not. Knowing full well the scale of destruction that would have ensued, had the end not come when it did with the dropping of the A-bomb, soldiers like Sledge were thankful for the speedy end to the war. The only way to prevent further loss of lives on both sides was to bring the war to a dramatic close.
Much has been written about Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the justness of the A-bomb, and descriptions of the psyche of Japanese and American soldiers, had the bomb not been dropped. Though post-mortems are rarely of much use, there is no doubt that it is necessary to have various perspectives on such past issues in order to be able to comprehend the severity and complexities of present-day terrorism and genocide. As Victor Hanson, a Senior Fellow at Stanford University rightly puts it, “The truth, as we are reminded so often in this present conflict, is that usually in war there are no good alternatives, and leaders must select between a very bad and even worse choice. Hiroshima was the most awful option imaginable, but the other scenarios would have probably turned out even worse.” (2005). Sled could not have agreed more!
References
Sledge, E.B. With the Old Breed: At Peleliu and Okinawa. Ballantine Books. New York. 2007. p. 120.
Fussel, P. Thank God for the Atom Bomb and Other Essays. Summit Books. 1988.
Hanson, V.D. “60 Years later considering Hiroshima” National Review. 2005. Web.
On July 16, 1945, the first atomic explosion marked the arrival of the atomic era. Overwhelmed by dread and awe, William L. Laurence, a New York Times reporter, described the event as “the grand finale of a mighty symphony of the elements” (as cited in Thorpe 161). The enormous power of the bomb aroused in him almost religious feelings. However, that symphony was not part of an act of creation, revealing divine beauty; rather, it was an apocalyptic event bringing total annihilation. J. Robert Oppenheimer, director of the Manhattan Project, expressed his fascination at the ruinous and awful power of the explosion by paraphrasing a passage from the sacred Hindu text, Bhagavad Gita: “I Become Death, the Shatterer of Worlds” (as cited in Beal 159).
Witnessing the devastating, almost demonic power of the atomic bomb and feeling himself a part of it, Oppenheimer in his quote seems to be calling for moral responsibility. His poetic invocation expresses the dire meaning of humanity’s new weapon, its otherworldly nature, and its significance. It is as if a sense of guilt replaces the scientific curiosity that animated him throughout the entire project. Personalizing the devastating power of the atomic bomb, Oppenheimer makes an attempt at taking moral responsibility for its consequences for humanity.
President Truman’s Decision
President Truman’s decision to use the atomic bomb on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was a decision of unprecedented complexity and gravity and, without a doubt, the most difficult decision of his life. The assessment of several committees that were considering the possibility of achieving a victory by a sudden and devastating strike, the expectations of the American people, and a deteriorating relationship with the Soviet Union defined his perspective on the issue (Hamby par. 4).
There were numerous objections against the use of an atomic weapon in 1945. The main counterarguments stated that it was racist to bomb only Japan, that it would not help the war effort, and, most importantly, that it was an effort to make a political statement designed to resonate with the Soviet Union, which was another threat at the time. Those who were in favor of Truman’s decision believed that the number of U.S. casualties if there were an invasion of Japan without a preceding atomic strike, might reach one million combatants (Hamby par.6). It was also estimated that a four-month invasion would result in the death of almost three million Japanese (Skates 79).
Personal Opinion
If I were living in 1945, I would, most likely, support President Truman’s decision and go along with public opinion, which showed overwhelming support for the use of atomic weapons against the Japanese. In light of arguments presented to the American people, it seemed like a clear-cut issue and I, along with the majority of the voting public, would not question the wisdom of the president. On the contrary, the use of atomic weapons as a means to immediately destroy the remaining ally of Germany would seem to be a foregone conclusion.
As a student in 2016, I’m not advocating the decision to attack Japan with atomic weapons. I understand that the dazzling flash from the explosion over Hiroshima ushered in a new and terrifying era in world history—the era of nuclear weapons. It seems to me that, taking into consideration the grave consequences of the atomic strike and the ensuing Cold War, President Truman could have vetoed the use of the atomic bomb. However, in the words of historian David McCullough, “People living back then didn’t know they were living back then” (61).
References
Beal, Timothy K. Religion and Its Monsters. New York: Routledge, 2002. Print.
The Second World War represents the worst war that has ever been fought on the face on the earth. The war involved majority of the world’s nations and culminated into the death of over 50 million people. During the war, major world powers and resources were thrown to the war (Allen and Polmar 1995).
Towards the end of the war, the United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japan. This paper seeks to describe the reasons why the US used the atomic bomb against Japan. There are two main reasons that prompted the United States to use the atomic bomb against Japan; the refusal to surrender by Japan and the need for the US to assert itself.
Japan’s refusal to surrender
Japan was persistently stubborn during the Second World War and this can be regarded as the main reason why the US used the atomic bomb against it. The government of Japan refused to surrender and pull its troops back even after its forces had been significantly weakened.
By August 1945 Japan was on its knees as most if its industrial plants, air bases and harbors were destroyed. The country was also experiencing a severe short supply of food and raw materials and yet it continued to cling on most of the contested Islands.
The US had successfully tested the atomic bomb (fat boy) in July 1945, and together with the other members of the allied forces, issued the Potsdam Declaration on 26th July that called on the Government of Japan to proclaim the unconditional surrender of all of its armed forces. “The alternative was a prompt and utter destruction” (Harrison 1987).
On July 30th Japan gave its response- a total rejection of the ultimatum and at about the same time, began negotiations with the Soviet Union in hope of better terms. As a result, the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima in August 1945 followed by further calls for Japan to accept the Potsdam Declaration or face further ruin (Heina and Selden 1997). The Government of Japan still hesitated and on August 9th the second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. After further quibbling, Japan finally agreed to surrender on August 14.
The need for the US to assert it’s might
The use of the atomic bomb against Japan was widely discouraged by various advisers of President Truman due to the Bomb’s ability to cause mass destruction of civilian life. After Japan’s refusal to heed the calls stipulated in the Potsdam Declaration, a section of Truman’s advisers encouraged the demonstration of the power of the atomic bomb on a desert or barren Island to encourage Japan to surrender (Heina and Selden 1997).
Truman disagreed and insisted on the use of the Bomb against Japan. Many analysts have interpreted this as a move by the US to assert it and influence the course of war. This was particularly intended to display superiority against the backdrop of a growing disdain between the allied forces and the Soviet Union. This can be justified by the cold war that followed the Second World War.
Conclusion
This paper sought to describe the reasons why the United States used the atomic bomb against Japan. It has been established that the US used the atomic bomb to basically end Japan’s stubbornness and end the world, and to further assert its power against the backdrop of a looming confrontation with the Soviet Union.
Bibliography
Allen, Thomas, and Norman Polmar. Code-Name Downfall. New York. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995.
Harrison, Scott. History in the Making: World conflicts in the 20th century. London: Macmillan Education, 1987.
Heina, Laura, and Mark Selden. Living with the Bomb: American and Japanese Cultural Conflicts in the Nuclear Age. New York: E. Sharpe, 1997.
When it comes to discussing whether it was necessary to drop atomic bombs on Japan’s cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August of 1945, it is important to take into account the specifics of geopolitical situation in the world, at the time.
Nowadays, not many people aware of the fact that, prior to Germany’s attack on Soviet Union in 1941, the only purpose for Soviet state’s existence has been officially proclaimed spreading Communism all over the Earth. Right until USSR’s collapse in 1991, Soviet Constitution openly stated that it only the matter of time, before the rest of world’s countries would become Soviet republics.
Therefore, Truman’s decision to subject Japan to atomic bombing was not as much motivated by considerations of military necessity as it was motivated by President’s determination not to allow Soviet Union to qualify for having an occupation zone in this country, after the end of war.
According to Alperovitz (1996), throughout the summer of 1945, George Marshall never ceased stressing out namely the importance of intended bombing’s political implications: “[Marshall’s] insistence to me that whether we should drop an atomic bomb on Japan was a matter for the President to decide, not the Chief of Staff since it was not a military question…” (364).
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to suggest that there were no purely military considerations behind President’s final decision to proceed with subjecting Japan to an atomic bombing.
As the battles of Guadalcanal and Ivo Jima had shown, Japanese would very unlikely lay down their arms, even while facing the most impossible odds, associated with application of conventional warfare techniques. Therefore, occupying mainland Japan, in the manner that it was being done to Guadalcanal and Ivo Jima, would cost America dearly.
This became particularly clear to America’s officials, after they heard of Japan’s reaction to Potsdam proclamation: “Japan’s first reaction to the Potsdam Proclamation came from the Domei News Agency… ‘Japan will prosecute the war of Greater East Asia to the bitter end” (Hasegawa, 168).
Thus, at the time when Truman was making decision on whether to drop an atomic bomb on Japan, he was prompted to give the bombing go-ahead by consideration of preventing the spread of Communism into South Asia and by consideration of saving the lives of as many American soldiers as possible.
In the end, these considerations outweighed the consideration of sparing the lives of Japanese civilians, especially given the fact that, during the course of war in Pacific, Japanese had proven themselves as people who did not regard their personal lives as representing a particularly high value.
Therefore, given the qualitative essence of geopolitical realities at the time, Truman’s decision to proceed with the atomic bombing of Japan appears fully justified. If it was not up to this bombing, the war against Japan would have lasted for at least another year.
Soviet Union would have obtained a justification to partake in occupation of Japan, which would eventually lead to creation of ‘People’s Republic of Japan’ on Japanese territories, occupied by Soviets – just as it happened to Eastern European countries, in the aftermath of Germany’s capitulation. Moreover, many more Americans would have to die to bring about the victory over Japan.
It does not represent much of a challenge to criticize America’s atomic bombing of Japan because of its ‘barbarianism’. Yet, the fact that WW2 is being associated with high rate of casualties among civilians has very little to do with ‘bloodthirstiness’ of politicians and generals that played active part in it.
The explanation to this is rather banal – throughout the course of 19th and the first half of 20th century, Earth’s population tripled. And, the more people are being born, the more people will consequentially die – especially during the time of ‘total war’. Thus, let us conclude this paper by restating once again that America’s atomic bombing of Japan was indeed necessary.
References
Alperovitz, Gar. The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb. New York: Vintage, 1996.
Chappell, John. Before the bomb: How America approached the end of the Pacific War. Louisville: The University Press of Kentucky, 1997.
Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan. Harvard: Belknap Press, 2005.
The United States is widely recognized for ending World War II by dropping atomic bombs on two cities in Japan; however, they also caused incalculable human anguish difficult to justify. This action introduced new concerns and conceptions regarding how wars would be fought in the future, called into question whether the human race would survive much into the future and began a worldwide debate regarding whether the action was truly warranted.
Main text
Questions regarding the bombings are multifaceted. While it is often suggested that the atomic bomb was the only means available to secure Japanese surrender, Japan at the time was requesting only one concession from the West – that it be allowed to retain its emperor as head of state. Had this been done, could the wanton destruction of a predominantly civilian population be avoided? Considering this, it is necessary to question the true motivations of President Truman in his authorization of the bombs’ use. Was it actually to bring about a swift end to the protracted deadly conflict and ultimately intended to save lives, American and Japanese, that would be lost in an overland confrontation? Or was it, as has been suggested, more a decision based on keeping the Soviet Union from having any input regarding the division of post-war Asia as it had in dividing post-war Europe? Even if the first bomb, dropped on Hiroshima could be argued as justifiable, the widespread destruction and collateral damage was devastating enough that the second bomb, dropped on Nagasaki, should have been called back.
The primary reasoning given for the bombs’ use was that it would save thousands of American and Japanese lives by eliminating the need for an overland confrontation between the two opposing armies. While the battles for the Philippines and Okinawa were taking place, President Truman, who had become president following the death of Roosevelt, was considering an invasion of the Japanese mainland. By now, the U.S. Navy had ships stationed just off the Japanese coast while its submarines were deployed in the Sea of Japan. Because the battles at Iwo Jima and Okinawa were very fierce, it was estimated that half a million to a million soldiers would be killed if the scheduled November 1, 1945 invasion of Japan occurred (“Decision to Drop”, 2003). However, what fails to enter the discussion is the comparison of the types of victims involved – enlisted men or civilians. The first blast leveled more than half of Hiroshima. Seventy thousand of its citizens were instantaneously killed.
On August 9, another bomb destroyed Nagasaki (Truman, 1945). Deliberately attacking a civilian population is not considered morally acceptable regardless of any real or perceived outcomes. This view was and remains popularly held by both American civilians and the military. Even for those individuals who do not find it difficult to accept that the first bomb was necessary, though, the issue regarding the morality of the second bombing remains in dispute. The saving of lives was not at issue by the time the second bomb was dropped.
In addition to considering the overland attack, President Truman and his staff realized that if the Japanese would surrender prior to Soviet involvement in the Asian field, set for August 15, Russia could not demand a part in the post-war settlement. At the same time, by 1945, the U.S. was a country weary of war and its citizens had become deeply prejudiced against both the Japanese and Germans, believing that both types of peoples were inherently evil. Following the end of the war, a poll conducted by Fortune Magazine found that nearly a quarter of the American people thought that the U.S. should have used “many more” atomic bombs on the Japanese before that country had the opportunity to surrender (Dower, 1986: 54). These polling results accurately reflected the intense hatred that Americans directed towards the Japanese people during the conflict. President Truman himself was not immune to these feelings of resentment towards the Japanese. In July 1945, less than a week prior to the Hiroshima bombing, Truman wrote in his diary describing the Japanese people as “savages, ruthless, merciless, and fanatic” (Dower, 1986: 142). When America unleashed the atomic bomb on Japan, the act infuriated the Soviet Union because it wanted its say just as it had in the carving up of Eastern Europe.
In addition to unleashing catastrophic damage upon the people of Japan, the dropping of the bombs was the beginning of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the U.S.
Although Truman shared a similar bias against the Japanese as did the American public, his intent was not to drop such a devastating bomb on civilian areas. “We have discovered the most terrible bomb in the history of the world.
I have told the Secretary of War, Mr. [Henry] Stimson, to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children. The target will be a purely military one” (Truman, 1945). Both Hiroshima and Nagasaki were cities that produced military armaments but, of course, the devastation went well beyond military targets. It could be that the President and others did not realize the full power of the atomic bomb or simply did not care if the collateral damage went well beyond its intended target. No one will ever know and the answer can only be speculative. It is contingent on whether one relies on the written words of the President as proof of actual intent or one assumes that the bombing of civilians was justified by the President and/or Stimson given the excessively racist overtones that emanated throughout the country at that time. In addition to whatever personal feelings Truman had regarding the Japanese, he also had political consequences to consider in his decision to utilize the atomic bomb. The American public, according to polls taken at that time, supported by an overwhelming margin that the U.S. should only agree to an ‘unconditional surrender’ by Japan. This and the predominant anti-Japanese sentiment among most Americans assured that there would be little political backlash by ordering the bomb to be dropped.
Furthermore, Truman would have faced an uphill political battle attempting to explain to voters the reasoning for spending more than two billion dollars for creating a bomb that would not be used, particularly if many more American lives were lost had the war continued which, at the time was considered a very real possibility (Loebs, 1995: 8-9).
Also supporting the decision, the Japanese had amassed nine divisions comprised of 600,000 heavily equipped forces in southern Japan prior to the bombing of Hiroshima in preparation for a land attack. The speed at which this incredible number of troops and arms were assimilated deeply concerned Truman and the U.S. military who had previously expected far less resistance when planning Operation Olympic, the Japanese invasion force (Loebs, 1995). Surprised once by the continued determination and ability of the Japanese military, Truman did not want to be surprised yet again by an even larger resistance than was thought which the allies could encounter as it drove further north towards Tokyo. Truman considered the possibility that he could send many thousands of young Americans to their deaths in a final conflict that may not be winnable at all and could easily stretch out for many months or years. The Japanese not only had a large number of soldiers ready to defend their homeland, but they were also well-equipped and possessed strong supply lines so as to sustain a long-term attack. One can only imagine the carnage that would have ensued during a full-out battle of this magnitude had it occurred. The ferocious battles of Okinawa and Iwo Jima would have seemed as just a warm-up compared to a Japanese invasion.
Despite all these justifications, by the summer of 1945, the Japanese were in dire straits, militarily and economically. The U.S. had won great victories at Okinawa and Iwo Jima, killed hundreds of thousands of Japanese soldiers and had a full naval blockade of Japan’s mainland.
Shortages of everything, from oil for the machines to food supplies for the soldiers, had all but brought the Japanese empire to its knees, but its military showed no signs of quitting. In each battle, its soldiers fought ferociously to the last man in a victory or death mentality and suicide (kamikaze) missions were common. This led the American leaders to believe that an entire takeover of the Japanese island was necessary for final victory. The U.S. was well aware of the fanaticism displayed by the Japanese; therefore, military leaders were not anxious to encounter an entire population of a country that possessed this mentality and were militarized as well. The avoidance of this ensuing confrontation and the war-weariness of the American public is the common justifications for dropping the bombs. Finally, “it was the destruction of Hiroshima that finally brought Emperor Hirohito to confront the Japanese military and order the surrender of Japan” (Loebs, 1995: 10). Thus, it was and is argued that the atomic bombs ultimately saved many American and Japanese lives.
It has been argued that the decision to drop the atomic bomb actually gave little regard to the civilian population, was unnecessary and was based largely upon the Soviet’s aspirations in the region. The U.S. military had been unceasingly fire-bombing major cities in Japan including Tokyo for months leading up to the use of the atomic bomb. This massive bombing attack knowingly killed civilians by the hundreds of thousands and the tactic, along with the impenetrable naval blockade, would have eventually brought the war to an end without the need for a land assault. Of course this eventuality can only be argued because it can never be known if maintaining an attack with traditional bombing methods and a blockade of the seas would have forced the Japanese to surrender unconditionally. It is possible but many more Japanese civilians, probably numbering in the millions, would have been killed in the process. In addition, had the war been prolonged, the threat posed by the Soviets was imminent and daunting. Had they had a hand in postwar affairs in Asia, the boundaries of the world would be very different today. The Russian army had entered Korea a few days prior to August 6; the day of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima (Zimmerman, 2000). Within a short time, it would have conquered enough Korean territory to be able to claim a negotiating position at the post-war peace talks. Had this scenario occurred, the Soviets had plans in place to occupy both Japan and Korea to the familiar 38th parallel.
This would have been an offer the Allies couldn’t refuse because Soviet troops would already be occupying this territory. “The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki served three purposes: it terminated the conflict instantly, saving American lives; it insured a united Japan rather than leaving half of the country to the same fate as North Korea; and perhaps it provided an example which has deterred the use of nuclear arms for 55 years” (Zimmerman, 2000).
More than 60 years have elapsed since the atomic bomb was dropped, a long time to second guess and point out the flawed reasoning in that momentous decision. However, many prominent However, Americans at that time questioned the wisdom of using such a horrific weapon given the circumstances.
Top-level World War II military leaders such as Douglas MacArthur, William Halsey, William Leahy and Dwight Eisenhower amongst others, believed the bomb to be totally unnecessary from a military point of view (Takaki, 1995: 3-4, 30-31). The President of the Chiefs of Staff, Navy Admiral Leahy, in his address to the combined U.K. and U.S. Chiefs of Staff expressed his thoughts regarding the use of the atomic bomb. “The use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender. In being the first to use it, we adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages.
I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children” (Alperovitz, 2005: 3). In 1946, the Commander U.S. Third Fleet, Admiral Halsey Commander publicly announced that “The first atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment. It was a mistake to ever drop it. The scientists had this toy and they wanted to try it out, so they dropped it” (Alperovitz, 2005: 331). The Supreme Commander of the Pacific Fleet in World War II, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz stated at an address given on October 5 at the Washington Monument, “The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace before the atomic age was announced to the world with the destruction of Hiroshima and before the Russian entry into the war. The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely military standpoint, in the defeat of Japan” (Alperovitz, 2005: 329). Eisenhower was of the same opinion as to these other prominent commanders and vocally joined his colleges citing morality-based objections.
Summary
Japan was very close to surrendering by the time the atomic bombs were dropped on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Sixty of its larger cities had already been destroyed by the use of conventional bombing runs and the naval blockade had destroyed Japan’s economy. The Soviet Union was busy fighting the Japanese, but these battles were fought in China and were far from a mainland invasion as Russia had also been weakened following its war with Germany. If the U.S. would have allowed the Japanese to retain its Emperor, the country would have surrendered before the first bomb was dropped, a slight concession given the devastating consequences. A demonstration bombing in a remote area of Japan would have been sufficient to affect surrender without using it on a civilian population. The second bomb was entirely unnecessary even if the first could be justified. Simply put, the Japanese people were pawns used in a political power play, the first such power plays of the ‘Cold War’ between the U.S. and Soviet Union.
Works Cited
Alperovitz, Gar. “The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb.” (1st Ed.). New York: Routledge. (2005).
“(The) Decision to Drop.” National Atomic Museum. (2003). Web.
Dower, John W. “War Without Mercy.” New York: Pantheon Books. (1986).
Loebs, Bruce. “Hiroshima & Nagasaki: One Necessary Evil, One Tragic Mistake.” Commonweal Journal. LookSmart Articles. (1995). Web.
Takaki, Ronald. “Hiroshima: Why America Dropped the Atomic Bomb.” Boston: Little, Brown and Company. (1995).
The reason why the United States was compelled to employ the use of a more lethal weapon in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan has been at the heart of many scholarly writings. The question is, why did the United States decide to engage a deadly attack and yet there was a league of nations charged with conflict resolution?
The idealists came up with an international organization in the name of the League of Nations to address problems of war. The use of atomic bomb therefore was shaped by international variables such as scientific research and discoveries.
Causes to any phenomena are multi-dimensional meaning that they should be studied in a multi-disciplinary way such as geographically, psychologically, politically and economically. It therefore follows that causes to the use of atomic bomb in Japan should be divided into particular and profound causes.
Particular causes are those that are immediate while profound causes are underlying issues. Historians are interested with immediate causes of war while political scientists try to explore long-term causes but both will be dealt with in this study.1
Taylor examined that war is like a road accident because it has the immediate causes such as over speeding as well as long-term causes such as the nature roads. Scholars have been interested in both immediate and underlying causes for application of atomic bomb in Hiroshima.
The application of the strategy did not have a single cause because WWII had roots in the society and the then international system. Quency wright in his works about study of war vol.1 (1942) observed that war has multi-causal factors, arguing that war in reality results from a total situation involving ultimately almost everything that has happened to the human race up to the time war is realized.
Kennedy Wolfs in his works ‘Man, the State and war’ gives three images of war based on assumption that war results from human nature, internal nature of the state and anarchic nature of the international system.2
War is as old as human existence and characterizes the nature of human beings. A clear relationship exists between human nature and conflict. ST Augustine claimed that war is part of society and human life because of sin, man exhibits love for hurtful things and vain which constitutes the source of human conflict.
Benedict de Spinoza observes in a short article called political treatise that war occurs because man is led by passion not reason hence there is a conflict between passion and reason. Rein Niebuhr in his works ‘Beyond Tragedy’ argued that war comes from the dark unconsciousness sources of the human psyche.
Confucius on his part postulated that there is deceit and cunningness among human beings leading to war thus war is an innate factor in human beings. John Stoessinger claimed that people are victims of their own perceptional limitations because they are limited in their comprehension of natural phenomena and hence are bound to make wrong judgments.3
This paper examines the particular and profound causes that made the United States to utilize the atomic bomb in Japan. The leaders’ idiosyncrasies and the nature of societal variables such as natural resources and geographical territories are explored in detail.
Particular Causes
End of World War Two
The United States applied atomic bombs on Japan in order to force the Japanese officials to cease-fire. It invaded Japan because of the desire to subdue it and cut short the war. Japan made its own land a battlefield without taking into consideration the social welfare of its citizens.
The U.S. had to put to an end to what Japan was planning because if it went ahead with its plans, more than one million Americans and Britons would have lost their lives. Dropping of atomic bomb in Hiroshima is said to have solved many humanitarian problems because many people could have died could Japan have attacked the U.S.
There has been a heated debate over the American verdict of using a weapons of mass destruction on Hiroshima. President Truman never considered it a big issue.
Losses in an attack of Japan would have been great. Following the dropping of the atomic bombs, American public opinion in Fortune magazine in late 1945 and a 1944 opinion poll was supportive of Truman’s decision.
The Japanese who were referred to as “japs”, were depicted with unsophisticated racial stereotypes, and were seen as devious and definitely not to be trusted.4
Compel Japan to Bow Down
The bomb was meant to soften Japanese stance and make it to abandon war plans. Indeed the bomb-facilitated negotiations among Japanese officials since they noticed that war had more implications on them than any other person. Earlier attempts to put to an end the war by use of nuclear weapons had failed to bear fruits as Japanese military were not willing to back off the fight.
This forced the U.S. to use atomic bombs since it perceived that many lives would be lost if Japan continued with the war. It is believed that, President Harry Truman used atomic bombs on Japan as a way of intimidating Stalin so that he could keep him out of the war. However, the general officers did not approve this move and they denounced their commander-in-chief.5
Takaki, Ronald, in his book “Hurishima: Why American Dropped the Atomic Bomb” noted that by 1944, the war had noticeably turned against the Japanese. In late October, General MacArthur went back to the Philippine island of Layette.
The Japanese started to use kamikaze pilots in an anxious attempt to obliterate Allied ships. Quite a few more bloody battles waited ahead for American forces. Americas recorded more than twenty five thousand fatalities at the mêlée of Iwo Jima and another fifty thousand at the encounter of Okinawa. After these battles, though, nothing was left to stop an Allied invasion of Japan.6
These extremely bloody battles deeply disturbed military officials who were planning for an attack of Japan. Japanese resistance to such an attack would have been fervent. President Truman was informed about the new scientific development in 1944 after the death of Roosevelt in 1945.
Manhattan project was erected in 1942 specifically to develop an atomic bomb. The bomb was manufactured in Los Alamos, New Mexico with J. Robert Oppenheimer as the director. The effectiveness and efficiency of the weapon was first experienced in Mexico desert in 1945.
The bomb did not contribute much to the end of Japanese aggression since it only increased the speed of surrender because the officials had already begun engaging in surrender talks. Long before the dropping of the bombs, Japanese leaders were determined to surrender and were taking steps toward ending the war.
The U.S. leaders knew from marine aptitude interception of Japan’s to-secret codes. The United States secretary of war Stimson was much concerned with deliberations on the use of the bomb due its effects.
In 1947, at the urging of government officials worried about the growing number of people puzzled by the use of the bomb, Stimson wrote an article titled “The decision to use the atomic bomb”.7
He argued that the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima was made only after vigilant deliberation by Truman and his advisers of all the courses of action open to them to end the war at the lowest possible cost
Economic reasons
However, the question arose as to whether there was anything like a decision to use the bombs, or whether Truman and his advisers were carried along by events. John Lewis Gaddis in his book “The United States and the origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947,” Truman prearranged the dropping of the atomic bombs to give good reason for the cost resources used to build them.8
The bombs cost more than two billion dollars, and required the work of scores of top scientists, thousands of workers and several industrial firms. After all this time and spending, Truman had to use the atomic bombs at one time and the war proved to be the best time to use them.
Upon hearing of the victorious explosion over Hiroshima, Truman appeared relived and noted that, “We have spent two billion dollars on the greatest scientific gamble in history and won.”9
The dropping of the second bomb gave the impression of having its own momentum. Truman’s July 24 strike order authorized the use of the bomb as they were all set, and the technicians on Tinian Island worked agitatedly to drop the second bomb in response to the order.
Prevalent detestation of and vengeance against the Japanese for the bombing of Pearl Harbor may have produced the impetus for dropping the atomic bombs.
To many Americans, including Truman, it warranted almost any act against it in vengeance. Expressing his feeling of revenge, Truman said in a private letter written soon after the bombing of Nagasaki, that nobody was more bothered by the use of the atomic bombs than he was, but he was deeply troubled over the uncalled-for attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor.
Protect U.S dominance
Alperrovitz, Gar, in his book “Atomic Diplomacy: Hurishima and Potsdam: The use of the Atomic Bomb and the American confrontation with Soviet Power” argued that the United States dropped the atomic bombs not to overcome Japan but vigorously to protect U.S. dominance in the already brewing Soviet-American disagreement, which has, of course, prearranged the postwar worldwide order.10
Their analyses of planning for the postwar world, from 1942 forward, underline official description of the Soviet Union as the primary menace to U.S. primacy in world affairs.
Nonetheless, while the U.S. military had shattered Japan,’s capacity to fight violent war beyond her borders, distressed major cities, and blocked access to critical materials; it had neither secured Japan’s give up nor broken the will to battle of the Japanese military11.
There seems to be no motive to choose between analyses that view the bomb as a weapon to force Japan’s surrender and those that emphasize its value as a weapon to threaten the Soviet Union and establish U.S. hegemony, and both were sufficiently served by dropping the atomic bomb.12
The bombings precipitated the end to Second World War because leaders were shocked even though they were still reluctant to surrender. The deaths did not go down well with the emperor who took an extra step of urging political leaders to cease-fire and agree to talk with the rest of the world.
The emperor was respected because he was both a temporal and spiritual leader. He could be reached in the times of crisis to provide advices and directions.
Prestige and Security
Japan was reported to be preparing weapons of mass destruction such as chemical bombs. The weapons were on the wrong hands according to the United States government. Japan was an aggressive state that would use the weapons in unjustifiable ways such as revenging against innocent people.
The United States president, Truman, felt that Americans were going to be affected most and hence there was a reason to intervene before things got worse.
Americans had been casualties of Japanese recklessness and President Truman knew that anything was possible with Japan because they were determined to go on with war. The only way that would guarantee mass happiness in the United States and other allied states was to attack the destroyer before it could strike.
Many Americans had lost their lives and properties and the government was unhappy with that, it was its mandate to ensure that no more destruction could be carried out to its people.13
Natural Resources
The American government saw Japan as a threat to its quest for attaining natural resources in the region. The United States wanted to access the region but Japan was a threat because of conflicting interests. The World War II provided an opportunity that saw the United States weaken the competitor.
This was seen as territorial aggrandizement because the United States was unhappy with the way Japan controlled the territory full of natural resources. The only way to scare the enemy was to apply weapons of mass destruction to its citizens.14
The United States was not after making peace because the administrators of Japan were in Tokyo but the bombs were dropped kilometers away. Japan was forced to surrender and promised never to engage in military aggression.
The United States was trying to reduce its opponents in its pursuit to global domination. The Japanese could have worsened things could they have been left to go on with their weapon formation.
Self Determination and Nationalism
The United States is always known to be a self-glorious nation. The war provided a good opportunity for them to demonstrate to the whole world what they had achieved in the world of science. Talking about it alone could not be enough since other states such as Russia and China could not believe.
The war provided a good chance for them to apply practically whatever they had. Other states could believe in their allegations and live according to their wishes lest they experience the same. The bomb could be applied to any aggressor but Japan was chosen because it was a major competitor.
President Truman therefore opted for the bomb to achieve glory for Americans hence fostering nationalism. Americans today view themselves as the most united people mainly because of common history created by leaders such as Truman.
America had other means of stopping the war but they never thought about them since they saw application of the bomb to be serving a number of reasons. Application of the bomb therefore was meant to serve self-interests and wishes not the will of the majority; it only served the appetites of Americans not the whole world as it was thought.15
Profound Causes
At this point, long term issues are discussed such as the behavior of leaders both in the American government and Japanese government, the political climates in both states, societal variables such as ethnic composition, institutional structure of governments that is the roles played by various leaders and finally the international system.
We analyze how the variables contributed in the application of the atomic bomb to Hiroshima, Japan. The causes associated with these variables are observed over a particular time since they are not immediate.
Ideological Reasons
Some critics of the application of the bomb argue that United States was sending a message to communist states urging them to beware of what capitalists can do. The arguments are accurate to some extent because during preparation of the bomb, no communist state was involved instead it was only Canada and United Kingdom all of which are capitalists.
The United States could not have applied the bomb to an aggressive capitalist state. Japanese orientation to the economy was incompatible to that of capitalism since the government owned property. This did not go down well with Americans who wanted to build an Americana empire. It was estimated that Japan’s military power could be used to advance communist ideas hence the need to destroy it.
Idiosyncratic Causes
The focus is on behavior of individuals but not all individuals, only those concerned with foreign policy formulation. They are individuals whose behaviors have implications in international relations. We examine how age, physical health, childhood experience, educational level and belief system of leaders influenced the use of atomic bomb in Hiroshima, Japan.
The United States’ foreign affairs decision makers were associated with: recklessness, adventurism, innovativeness, impatience aggressiveness, experimentalism, revolutionary and were risk takers. The leaders wanted to introduce something new to the world without caring whether it could have more harm than good.16
The United States foreign affairs at the time had hawkish and highly opinionated ideas, which reflected in the country’s foreign relations. The leaders on the Japanese side had strong belief system that never allowed them to relent easily.
The leaders had troubled childhood experiences, which affected their decision-making processes. Japanese leaders at the time had little formal education, they had little knowledge about the nature of the international system hence their level of worldview was limited to Japanese environment.
Physical health played a role in the American-Japanese crisis because President Truman is said to have suffered from a Cardio-Vascular disease, which affected his level of concentration. At times, the president became intolerant to advice driving him to take extreme decisions.
These variables combined with the official positions occupied by leaders to cause profound effects to decisions made. The powers of the president in most cases are not easily challenged. When President Truman ordered the use of atomic bomb, no one dared to challenge him because the office he occupied was unchallengeable.
The powers and resources of the presidency office largely influenced the use of atomic bomb in Japan. The president had to use the prerogative powers provided by the constitution because it was believed that the lives of Americans were in danger.17
Governmental Politics
The factors looked into in this cause are types of governments and governmental structure. The leaders were more interested in self-interests rather than the wishes of majority. They prepared for war with other states without seeking people’s mandates.
Leaders who adhere to the provisions of the constitution do not practice things contract to the wishes of the majority. It is never the wish of people to engage in war because they fear for their lives and those of their families.
In weak democracies, people are not consulted before major decisions are taken. The United States wanted to contain the influence of Japanese leaders who wanted to take their citizens into unnecessary war.
International System
Factors that led to application of atomic bombs at this level are called systemic variables. They include polarity and the status of international law.
Polarity is distribution of power in the international system whereby it combines military strength, economic power, cultural influence, natural resource endowment and political/diplomatic power. The super power influences events in the world hence the use of atomic power was one way of demonstrating power globally.
Conclusion
The bringing into play of an atomic bomb had many causes, which ranged from socio-economic to political causes. The government of the United States could not sit back and watch Japan rise to becoming one of the world’s super powers. This forced it to come up with ways that could silence Japan.
The best way was to use deadly weapons of mass destruction. This is what has been discusses as profound causes. For the United States to be relevant to its people and the rest of the world, it had to end innocent killings and loss of property.
It had to cut short the Second World War by forcing Japan to surrender. Japan could not have surrendered were it not for the atomic bomb hence the United States is justified to have engage in the war for both personal interests and global interests. The United States achieved its goals because Japan agreed to negotiate and at the same time, it agreed not to be aggressive in future.
Bibliography
Alperrovitz, Gar. Atomic Diplomacy: Hurishima and Potsdam: The use of the Atomic Bomb and the American confrontation with Soviet Power. New York: Penguin, 1985.
Gaddis, Lewis. The United States and the origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972
Glantz, David. The Soviet Invasion of Japan: Quarterly Journal of Military History, vol. 7, no. 3, Spring 1995
Malcolm, McConnell. The Last Mission: The Secret Story of World War II’s Final Battle. New York: Broadway Books, 2002.
Skates, Ray. The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1994.
Stimson, Henry. “The decision to use the Atomic Bomb”. Harper’, February 1947.
Takaki, Ronald. Hurishima: Why American Dropped the Atomic Bomb. Boston: Little, Brown, 1995.
Wainstock, Dennis. The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996.
Footnotes
1 David, Glantz. The Soviet Invasion of Japan: Quarterly Journal of Military History, vol. 7, no. 3, Spring 1995
2 Ray, Skates. The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1994
3 McConnell, Malcolm. The Last Mission: The Secret Story of World War II’s Final Battle. New York: Broadway Books, 2002.
4 McConnell, Malcolm. The Last Mission: The Secret Story of World War II’s Final Battle. New York: Broadway Books, 2002.
5 Ray, Skates. The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1994.
6 Ronald, Takaki. Hurishima: Why American Dropped the Atomic Bomb. Boston: Little, Brown, 1995, p. 10
7 Henry, Stimson. “The decision to use the Atomic Bomb”. Harper’, February 1947, 2.
8 Lewis, Gaddis. The United States and the origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972.
9 Lewis, Gaddis. The United States and the origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 40
10 Gar, Alperrovitz. Atomic Diplomacy: Hurishima and Potsdam: The use of the Atomic Bomb and the American confrontation with Soviet Power. New York: Penguin, 1985.
11 Ibid. p. 385
12 David, Glantz. The Soviet Invasion of Japan: Quarterly Journal of Military History, vol. 7, no. 3, Spring 1995
13 Dennis, Wainstock. The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996.
14 Ray, Skates. The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1994.
15 Ray, Skates. The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1994.
16 Dennis, Wainstock. The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996.
17 McConnell, Malcolm. The Last Mission: The Secret Story of World War II’s Final Battle. New York: Broadway Books, 2002.
One of the most notable stains on America’s reputation, as the ‘beacon of democracy,’ has to do with the fact that the US is the only country in the world that had used the Atomic weapons against the predominantly civilian population of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which resulted in the deaths of more than 200.000 people. Therefore, it has always been crucially important for the country’s political establishment to apply a continual effort into trying to convince Americans that the nuclear bombing of Japan was unavoidable because it allowed saving the lives of thousands if not millions of American servicemen.
Henry Stimson initiated the tendency “(Without the nuclear bombing), the major fighting would not end until the latter part of 1946, at the earliest. I was informed that such operations might be expected to cost over a million casualties to American forces alone”.1 It is understood, of course, that America’s governmental officials never bothered to substantiate the estimated number of the would-be-saved Americans.
Neither did these individuals bother to explain why it was specifically through the summer of 1945 that they became so touchingly concerned with trying to save the lives of American soldiers – especially given the fact that the same people could not care less about the unbelievably high human cost of the famous Omaha Beach landing or the Operation Guadalcanal.
It is also commonly suggested that the nuclear bombing of Japan was supposed to take place in a much more ‘civilized’ manner, “We ought to designate a number of large manufacturing areas from which people would be warned to leave-telling the Japanese that we intended to destroy such centers2 However, the ‘Japs’ themselves made it impossible for the Americans to be giving too many thoughts to the idea of not killing innocent women and children.
After all, had the Japanese found out about the American plans to subject them to the nuclear holocaust, they would surely try to prevent it from happening. As Compton pointed out, “If during the final adjustments of the bomb the Japanese defenders should attack, a faulty move might easily result in some kind of failure… (it) would be much worse than if the attempt had not been made”. 3
Therefore, the Japanese should blame themselves for what had happened. During the time of war, there is no room for sentiments. President Truman himself used to endorse this point of view while publicly proclaiming that the Japanese are nothing short of ‘sub-humans’, and as such, they deserve to be treated accordingly, “When you have to deal with a beast you have to treat him as a beast. It is regrettable but nevertheless true”.4 Once an enemy proclaimed a ‘beast’, it is no longer necessary to conduct warfare in accordance with the applicable conventions of international law.
Many American scientists of the era came up with their own contribution towards legitimizing the idea that it is indeed thoroughly justified to drop a few nuclear bombs on Japan, at least in the utilitarian sense of this word. As it was noted in the Szilard Petition, “The war has to be brought speedily to a successful conclusion, and attacks by atomic bombs may very well be an effective method of warfare”.5 It would be quite impossible to disagree with the petition’s signatories – it is indeed the epitome of effectiveness achieving the complete destruction of an entire city by the mean of dropping a nuclear bomb on it.
In fact, it is specifically the ‘scientific’ consideration in favor of subjecting Japan to the nuclear bombardment that contains a hidden answer, as to why a positive decision was made, in this respect. It is important to understand that the cost of the Manhattan Project amounted to $2 billion – a rather unimaginable sum of money by the standards of the 1940s. Therefore, it represented the matter of crucial importance for the involved parties to be able to prove to citizens that the funds were not spent in vain. And, there was only one way to do it – to drop the bombs, as the ultimate mean of adding more ‘fuel’ to the patriotic fervor among the Americans.
It is understood, of course, that while authorizing the atrocity, Truman was fully aware that the would-be undertaken action does fit the definition of a war crime. After all, this idea appears to be subtly present in many analytical reports, reviewed by the President when he was deciding whether to ‘drop or not to drop’. For example, according to the Frank Report, “The military advantages and the saving of American lives, achieved by the sudden use of atomic bombs against Japan, may be outweighed by the ensuing loss of confidence and wave of horror and repulsion, sweeping over the rest of the world”. 6
However, since the US came as a winner out of WW2, there was no way on earth at the time for the country’s top-officials to consider the possibility that they may end up facing the charges of genocide. As the popular saying goes – ‘history is written by the victors’.
Apart from the fact that the Manhattan Project needed to be proven ‘feasible’, there was another important reason for Truman to rush with subjecting Japan to the nuclear bombardment – the fact that, according to the agreement reached between Roosevelt and Stalin during the 1945 Yalta Conference, the USSR was to attack Japan on August 15 of the same year. Then, it would only be a matter of days before Japan signs an unconditional capitulation.
However, this would put the Soviets in the position to demand the presence of their occupation-administration in defeated Japan – something that would stand in a striking contradiction to America’s plans for turning the country into its own ‘unsinkable air-carrier’- the role that Japan continues to play even today. Therefore, a sign needed to be given to the Soviets that they are no longer welcome to make landfall in Japan – two nuclear bombs that were in America’s possession at the time, came in rather handy, in this respect. They were rushed to Okinawa and dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as soon as the opportunity presented itself.
The pre-bombing history of the targeted cities serves as the best proof that there was nothing ‘spontaneous’ about Truman’s decision to nuke Japan – throughout the war’s entirety, Hiroshima and Nagasaki were kept exempted from the list of legitimate targets for conventional bombing by American B-29s. This was done so that it would be easier for the US intelligence-analysts assessing the scale of destruction that was yet to be brought upon these cities by the nuclear bombing. What it means is that the atrocity in question was well premeditated, which in turn serves as an additional indication that the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki should be discussed in terms of a war crime.
References
Compton, Arthur. “Recollection of Interim Commetee Meeting (1945)”.
Memorandum of Conversation with General Marshall (1945).
Stimson, Henry. “The Decision to use the Atomic Bomb”.
The Frank Report (1945).
The Szilard Petition (1945).
Truman, Harry. “Letter to Samuel Cavert (1945)”.
Footnotes
Henry Stimson. “The Decision to use the Atomic Bomb,” 369.
“Memorandum of Conversation with General Marshall (1945), 366.
Arthur Compton. “Recollection of Interim Committee Meeting (1945)”, 367.
Harry Truman. “Letter to Samuel Cavert (1945)”, 368.
During World War II, an American bomber detonated the world’s first operational atomic bomb over Hiroshima, Japan. A second bomber launched another attack on Nagasaki three days later. Generally, it is perceived that President Truman sanctioned the deployment of atomic bombs in an attempt to compel Japan’s capitulation during World War II. In turn, Leon Sigal provides a broader perspective of the events and politics that led to the dropping bombs decision. Sigal operates with a bureaucratic political approach that emphasizes internal state bargaining1. According to bureaucratic politics theory, policy results are the product of a game of negotiation among a limited, highly positioned set of governmental actors. Participants select tactics and policy objectives based on their perceptions of which best suits their organization’s and personal interests. Bargaining occurs per the game’s current rules and power dynamics among the participants. Since this process is not dominated by a single person and is unlikely to favor logical judgments, it may produce unsatisfactory results that fail to meet the aims of any of the participants involved.
Sigal’s interpretation of the reasoning behind the bombing emphasizes the role of several specific governmental organizations, one of which is the Manhattan Engineering District (MED). This information relates to the slide concerning atomic energy, which also advocates for the participation of the Manhattan Project’s researchers and policy-makers in the decision to atomic bombing during World War II. As such, the United States government supported the nuclear weapons development program of the Army Corps of Engineers, which is the Manhattan Project. The project’s leader consulted Strategic Air Forces and the Target Committee, the agency tasked with choosing targets for the bombing. Hence, MED provided bureaucratic authority to people with their own strategic goals. As a result, during the decision-making process, these agencies approved bombing. While some MED scientists objected, their opinions were not considered in the power game of bureaucratic actors.
Furthermore, Sigal’s account is somewhat supported by the film “Day After Trinity,” which contains interviews of people who were the participants in the Manhattan Project. As such, a scene with the account of a woman in charge of the office when the atomic bomb was tested in New Mexico deserves specific attention. Namely, the woman describes that the camp of the researchers was infiltrated by the presence of military officials and troops, leading to a pressuring atmosphere2. Similarly, Sigal argues that military offices intruded in decision-making per their bureaucratic power, influencing or taking over the judgment process. Hence, it is supported that agencies with no expertise in atomic energy had enough power to make decisions about its use.
Finally, the documentary helps one to understand the concept of the logic of war. As such, the video describes the meaning of technological advancements for war purposes, illustrating it with the atomic bomb development. Namely, the interviewees emphasize that they perceived the atomic weapon as a significant wartime advantage which use has been unexplored. Similarly, according to the logic of war, the strategic advantage might include novel methods which are perceived as too dangerous by the combating sides. As a result, the impact of such a weapon is viewed as efficient due to the factor of unexpectedness.
Bibliography
Sigal, Leon, “Bureaucratic Politics & Tactical Use of Committees: The Interim Committee & the Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb.” Polity 10, no. 3 (1978): 326-364.
Stirner’s Retrowave, “The Day After Trinity (1981) [Full Documentary].” 1995. The Voyager Company, 1:28. Web.
Footnotes
Leon Sigal, “Bureaucratic Politics & Tactical Use of Committees: The Interim Committee & the Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb,” Polity 10, no. 3 (1978): 326-364.
Stirner’s Retrowave, “The Day After Trinity (1981) [Full Documentary],” 1995, The Voyager Company, 1:28. Web.
In 2011, the Fukushima dai-ichi prefecture in Japan was impacted by a tsunami that severely damaged the nuclear power plant that was situated near the coast. Almost immediately there were fears of a potential nuclear explosion, with many residents fearing for their lives (Schwantes et al., 2012). While it may be true that there was a release of radioactive energy, in what is now known as the greatest industrial accident since Chernobyl, the fact remains that the rate of energy release and the means by which it affected the surrounding region is drastically different as compared to what normally occurs during the detonation of a nuclear bomb (Schwantes et al., 2012). The fact is that a nuclear reactor is not designed in the same way as an atomic bomb, as such, despite the abundance of material that could cause a nuclear explosion, the means by which this possible is simply not present.
Understanding How Atomic Bombs Detonate
Nuclear Fission
Nuclear fission is the basic principle behind an atomic explosion wherein vast amounts of energy are released all at once as a direct result of free neutrons impacting the nucleus of an atom (Stankunas, 2012). This creates a process known as “fission” (i.e. the nucleus of an atom splitting into two smaller atoms) which then subsequently releases another neutron which impacts another atom which then starts the process all over again (Stankunas, 2012). This occurs in a relatively short span of time until the fission process reaches a critical mass point (i.e. the point where there is a runaway cascade of enumerable nuclear fissions) resulting in a subsequent release of energy in the form of an atomic explosion.
Nuclear Material Needed
While nuclear reactors do contain “fissable” material (i.e. radioactive material that is decomposing into another type of matter), the fact remains that a certain degree of stability is required in the radioactive material needed in order to achieve a sufficient enough explosion (Gharpure, 2013). This often comes in the form of Uranium-235 which is enriched via centrifugal processes in order to have the necessary atomic density to create a large explosion (Gharpure, 2013).
Detonating a Nuclear Bomb
In order to get the radioactive material to release all its stored energy at once, it is necessary to setup a series of explosives around a nuclear core of radioactive material. Through the use of a timer, it is the job of the explosives to detonate in such a way that they compress the radioactive material together which causes the process of fission to begin (Salvatores, 2012). Without a means of sudden compression, it would be nearly impossible to cause even the most highly enriched uranium to detonate. You could use a hammer and hit it all you want without even causing anything even remotely resembling an explosion.
Design of Nuclear Reactors
Nuclear reactors are designed in such a way that they utilize the controlled release of energy from nuclear fuel rods in the form of heat energy to convert water into steam which is then expelled via high pressure valves through turbines which convert the mechanical energy into electrical energy (Nuclear fission, 2013). While it is possible for nuclear reactors to malfunction and produce excessive amounts of heat due to unstable reactions within the core, the resulting explosion is usually the result of heated steam escaping from the reactor. Energy is also released during such a process, however, it is not explosive nuclear energy instead it is merely the ambient heat energy released from the continuing nuclear fission process in the fuel rods. Background radiation is also released as a direct result of exposure of the fuel rods to the outside atmosphere (Jammes et al., 2010).
Conclusion
Based on what has been presented it can be seen that a nuclear reactor is simply not designed in the same way as an atomic bomb which prevents it from releasing energy in the same manner.
Reference List
Gharpure, Y. H. (2013). Nuclear Fission. Chemical Business, 27(6), 34.
Jammes, C. C., Filliatre, P. P., Geslot, B. B., Oriol, L. L., Berhouet, F. F., Villard, J. F., & Vermeeren, L. L. (2010). Research Activities in Fission Chamber Modeling in Support of the Nuclear Energy Industry. IEEE Transactions On Nuclear Science, 57(6), 3678-3682.
Nuclear fission. (2013). Chemical Business, 27(6), 40.
Salvatores, M. (2012). Neutronics for critical fission reactors and subcritical fission in hybrids. AIP Conference Proceedings, 1442(1), 79-92.
Schwantes, J. M., Orton, C. R., & Clark, R. A. (2012). Analysis of a Nuclear Accident: Fission and Activation Product Releases from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Facility as Remote Indicators of Source Identification, Extent of Release, and State of Damaged Spent Nuclear Fuel. Environmental Science & Technology, 46(16), 8621-8627.
Stankunas, G. (2012). Fractal model of fission product release in nuclear fuel. International Journal Of Modern Physics C: Computational Physics & Physical Computation, 23(9), -1.
The essay is a critical examination of the major factors that contributed to the non-use of nuclear weapons after they were first used back in 1945 in Japan’s two major cities Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The attacks were made by the United States of America in trying to make the Japanese surrender.
It is worth noting that the two attacks are the only ones where nuclear weapons were used in war upto date. Prior to this close to 70 cities in Japan were bombed by the U.S. All these attacks were due to failure of the Japan to surrender in Potsdam Declaration on 26 July 1945. ‘Little Boy’ and ‘Fat Man’ were dropped to Hiroshima and Nagasaki respectively under the direction of the then American President Harry Truman (Hogan, 1996).
It is worth noting that the effects were far beyond human imagination as within the first 2 to 4 months between 90,000 and 166,000 individuals in Hiroshima and between 60,000 and 80,000 in Nagasaki lost their lives. It has been estimated that 50% of these deaths occurred on the first day.
The deaths were attributed to flash and flames, falling debris/objects and other causes. The update of the bombing causalities as at august 2010 reveals that close to 450,000 individuals have so far lost their lives close to 270,000 in Hiroshima and 153,000 in Nagasaki (Pellegrino, 2010).
Despite the fact that the number of those who died is manipulated for political reasons, it is no doubt that the serious negative consequences of the nuclear use are evident. Harry is quoted as saying “It is terrible to order the use of something that …is so terribly destructive beyond anything we have ever had.
You got to understand that this is not a military weapon… it is used to wipe out women and children…” (Paul, 2009: 52). From this statements rest the foundation of nuclear weapon non use tradition.
It is worth noting that since 1945 the concept of non use of nuclear weapons have occupied the minds of scholars, the general public and have remain the most and single important issues in the age of nuclear. The tradition of non use of nuclear weapon begun during the times of Truman and Eisenhower thanks to the reluctance of using such weapons during times of crisis (Paul, 2009).
Factors contributed to the non use of nuclear weapons
Before engaging in addressing the factors that fostered the tradition of non use of nuclear weapons it will be rational to bring to light major characteristics of nuclear detonation. In the strictest sense nuclear bombs usually produce energy that is heavier in millions times as compared to conventional explosions, similarly it produces instantaneously a huge and very hot fireballs, produces electromagnetic pulse which interferes completely with electronic equipment, it also transmits very huge forms of energy (heat and light) within a shorter time resulting to burns as well as causing fires and it produces within the first few seconds a penetrating radiation which are harmful to human health (Pellegrino, 2010).
According to Paul, 2009 nuclear detonations can interfere with communication signals for a longer period of time, produces residual nuclear radiation over a long period of time, produces busts that can destroy underground structures as a result of shock waves and finally it creates air blasts wave that can lead to death especially when this occurs in lower atmosphere. Broadly speaking there are three categories of reasons that prompted the non use of nuclear weapon tradition since 1945. These include strategic/tactical, reputational and moral.
Moral factors
A closer examination of the then president statements is a clear indication that it stems from a moral background probably the Kant’s point of view. The philosopher held that we opt to do good things to the majority and there is no way a bad thing can be justifiable. He called for all human races to engage in activities that will help form a universal law. Moral call us not to do bad things (Tannenwald, 2007).
It is evident that Truman realized this only after giving a go ahead attack. He says that nuclear weapons are not military weapons but a tool to destroy women, children and the innocent civilians. In terms of international law, the use of nuclear weapon results indiscriminate mass murder leaving serious consequences for a very long time.
On the same note the descendants of the survivors of the attack did show genetic abnormalities and opt to be closely monitored. This made them to leave in anxiety for decade. Similarly, the notion that the weapon has no distinction between combatants and civilians, women and children its use is a clear infraction of human right based on international law (Pellegrino, 2010).
It is also worth noting that the need to conserve the environment played another role in contributing to reluctant use of nuclear weapons. As a super power to be by then, U.S had the obligation of showing the world that it deeply cared about the world’s environmental conditions. As held by Paul, 2009 the only way to do this in the most rational way was to stop using such weapons. On top of this majority of countries with such weapons constantly lived in a nuclear security dilemma. This in the views of the two presidents was to be done away with.
Strategic/tactical factors
Although scholars have convincingly argued that this factor was not as strong as the other two, it played some role in bringing about the non use tradition of nuclear weapons. After seeing the consequences of nuclear bombing America was worried of the same with the assumptions that other powerful countries can in the future use to attack her (Sherwin, 2003). For instance the Soviet Union with her foreign policies was restrained with America. The later saw the former through their potential natural aggressive impulses. This can be further seen when Kennedy rejected the approach of massive retaliation towards American enemy and in its place he brought in flexible response strategy (Paul, 2009).
Reputational factors
Another sound factor that contributed to the non use tradition of nuclear weapon is attributed to the country desire to have a good reputation in the eye of the public both locally and internationally. According to the then an official in the Department of Bureau of Far East Affairs Emerson John nuclear weapon is a monster that when used in whatever circumstance will be used to tarnish the country’s reputation.
He was referring to the period where U.S was contemplating to using such a weapon in Korea. He added that it will result to a disastrous loss of confidence from her European counterparts as well as a permanent damage to the moral position of the country (Paul, 2009).
In 1950 the Asian led by the then Indian prime minister were of the view that the west use of nuclear as well as atomic bombing was a clear indication of how the later despised the lives of Asians. This prompted Truman to rethink about coming up with strategies that will later help develop non use of nuclear weapons.
However in the reign of Eisenhower he threatened to use nuclear weapons but in most of the instance, he withdrew in the lasts minutes for instance Taiwan Straits crisis as well as the crisis in Indochina. Dulles who worked under the reign of Eisenhower pointed out that the views and opinions of the public was in full opposition of using nuclear weapons in conflicts seen to be local (Tannenwald, 2007). He added that if the country could continue using the weapon, then it will be seen in the eyes of the public to be a ruthless military power just like Germany was.
Conclusion
From the review of the non use of nuclear weapon since the first and the only such attack back in 1945 in Japan, there are three major categories of factors attributed to the same. These include moral factors, strategic/tactical factors and reputational factors. It is worth noting that both reputational and moral factors were the major contributory factors to the tradition of non use of such weapons.
References
Hogan, M. (1996). Hiroshima in History and Memory. Cambridge University: Cambridge University Press.
Paul, T. (2009). The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Pellegrino, C. (2010). The Last Train from Hiroshima: The Survivors Look Back. Henry Holt and Co.
Sherwin, M. (2003). A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and its Legacies. London: Stanford University Press.
Tannenwald, N. (2007). “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945” Cambridge Studies in International Relations, 1(87): 2-17.