No there were no faulty negotiations involved that led to the strike. The main cause of the strike was stormy relations between PATCO AND FAA. It was observed from the beginning that PATCO –Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization which was established in 1968 as a “professional society” of federal air traffic controllers had stormy relations form the beginning with FAA –Federal Aviation Administration.In two years PATCO staged a sick out and FAA responded by cancelling the organizations dues check off system.
The categorized relation between PATCO –FAA labor was even termed as “the worst in the federal sector” which was commissioned by the U.S. Department of transportation (DOT). Their relation even got worse when on March 25, 1970, PATCO called its first nationwide job action –a sick out which lasted for three weeks.
This was mainly caused by FAA transferring four of PATCO’S members who were engaged in organizing efforts in Baton Rouge, Louisiana and as result was considered a very serious mistake by PATCO. The end result of this was a result in union membership decline from more than 7,500 to less than 3,000 and near bankruptcy from a $100 million damage suit brought by the airlines (Kearney 245).
The Opinion of the Public and their Role
The public opinion played a role by 1st declining union membership which resulted in decline from more than 7,500 to less than 3,000 and caused near bankruptcy of $100 million damage suit brought by the airlines.
Public opinion also played a role when seventy five percent voted for a walk out form accumulating bitterness from hostile contract negotiations and waves of grievance filed under the various written agreements came to a head as the last contract expired in march 1981 and negotiations over a new contract reached an impasse.
The dispute involved PATCO’S demands concerning salaries, work hours, retirement programs, and other benefits which were to be granted, would require special treatment of the controllers somewhat similar to that accorded postal workers and when PATCO president Robert Poli polled his membership on whether to go out on strike the seventy five percent voted for a walk out and when he submitted the FAA’S last best offer to the rank and file, they rejected the package by a 20-to-1 margin.
Poli’s Different Approach
If Robert Poli had exercised hindsight he would have played his cards differently since he would read the public reactions to the strike and reacted to their demands. Secondly he should have publicized legitimate grievances including congested airways and would have expanded them which would as a result accommodate more flights and more jobs.
He could have also ensured that the flight controllers would be less strained and overworked by adding more staff onto the board and most of all improves on the technology at the control centre.
PATCO did not anticipate the strong the Reagan administration reaction to the strike and the government’s determination to ‘stick to its guns and as the as the chairman he should be able to come to terms to with the president regarding the country’s issues. Finally as the PATCO chairman he should have garnered support of other federal and private sector unions prior to the strike.
President Reagan’s Reaction to the Strike
President Reagan reacted so strongly to the air controller strike because he considered it a violation of several federal laws and their oath of office. This is even despite JF the controllers who thought that the president, a former head of the screen actors Guild and whom PATCO had endorsed for president would be sympathetic to their cause and in this they were sadly and fatally mistaken.
Reagan even went ahead and labeled them as “lawbreakers” and sought the imprisonment of strike leaders, and summarily dismissed from federal service all the strikers who refused to return to work within 48 hours. On top of that a federal judge also supported the president by imposing accelerating fines on the union that would total $1 million per day within 3 days.
To make matters worse if PATCO leaders were counting on public sympathy for the controllers to help encourage the FAA and the Reagan administration to compromise or back down, they were wrong again. His strong reaction was further demonstrated when he and the DOT secretary Drew Lewis declared the strike over because all strikers had been fired.
Role that could have been Played by Subsequent Presidents
Subsequent Presidents like (Bill Clinton and George W. Bush) might have handled the events differently from Reagan by reconciling the two organizations to work together and resolve the long stormy relations. This would have been able to solve the strategic errors of PATCO, unlike Reagan who ignored the public outcry and termed the strikers as offenders.
These two unions would then at the top of their agenda, work to accomplish their functions in fulfilling their duties to the public. They would also ensure that the airways are expanded to be able to accommodate more flights and as a result absorb more people into the industry as employees.
They would also ensure that the two bodies if they were incompetent would be dissolved and new ones formed which would work for the best of the national interest and not always in wrangles which would as result receive less public outcry. They should have also ensured that ensured that their international relations with other countries was not strained which would end up making flights in countries like Canada and Portugal and other international countries end up cancelling operation of flights in those countries.
They should also handle the situation in a manner that they enable organized labor in the United States which would not end up doing stuff like abandoning the strike controllers and as a solution be able to hear out their pleas and solve their issues. This would ensure that domestic union support will be stronger and would have not been brought to financial disaster that increased pressure on the administration settlements that was there previously when Reagan was the president.
Work Cited
Kearney, Richard. Public Administration: Labor Relations in the Public Sector. 4th ed. California: CRC Press, 2008.
In these articles, issues regarding Iran’s nuclear program have been discussed extensively. Iran is committed to establish nuclear program, which according to the government, the program is only meant to produce electricity (Leverett 2009, 1).
However, the US administration has opposed development of the nuclear program arguing that Iran intends to use the program to build nuclear weapons. Due to continued resistance by Iran, the US government has proposed negotiations with the Islamic nation in order to reach an amicable solution.
This move has been supported by several countries and as a result, Iran has agreed to negotiate with the US in order to establish good international relation.
With good international relation, Iran is hopeful that international community will support its plan to develop nuclear program (Leonard 2009, 1). In fact, Iran government has shown its willingness to cooperate if other countries will support it from international pressure.
In contrast, Israel has strongly opposed the proposed negotiations by the US saying that negotiations are not necessary. According to Israel, the ultimate solution to this crisis is suspension of all activities aimed at developing nuclear program in Iran, which is a threat to global security and peace (Leverett 2009, 1).
Israel has proposed the use of military force against Iran instead of negotiations, which will only postpone this issue further. Because Iran worships the past, it is a bit hesitant to give in to Americans request based on history (Ghaemi 2009, 1). In 1970s, Iran cooperated with international community but it ended up being a disappointed nation. The Islamic nations is worried that history may repeat itself (Leverett 2009, 1).
From these articles, it is evidently clear that the US and Iran are different in terms of ideas and culture. This difference may pose a big challenge in success of the negotiations. For instance, the US focuses on the future and that is why the government wants Iran to come clean about nuclear program to make the future better.
However, Iran focuses on past and that is why it is committed to develop the nuclear program to compensate the past. By proposing negotiations, the US is “compromising principle for results” while Iran is committed to develop the nuclear program by “willing to sacrifice results to principle” (Ghaemi 2009, 1).
From 1970s and during the whole period of tug-of-war between the US and Iran over the nuclear program, relationship between these two nations has been poor (Leonard 2009, 1).
In both cases, the US government has portrayed its self-interest and it has always pushed the Islamic nation to the corner by imposing tough sanctions, a move that has been considered unfriendly. In addition, experts have also argued that the US diplomacy is purely based on self-interest. This proves that there is a conflict of interest in this issue.
Due to self-interest and constant sanctions by the US government, the current policy may be affected negatively. If the US continues to impose more sanctions and portray self-interest, Iran will lose confidence in the US administration and this will definitely jeopardize negotiations. If disagreements persist over this issue between the US and Iran, it will be even more challenging to resolve the current crisis (Leverett 2009, 1).
In summary, Iran’s nuclear program has been a major global issue and it has contributed a big debate in the international community. To see an end to the debate regarding Iran’s nuclear program, the US has proposed negotiations to find an amicable solution, a move that has been opposed by Israel. Israel has argued that the ultimate solution to this issue is suspension of all activities aimed at developing nuclear program in Iran.
This memorandum is aimed at planning the forthcoming negotiations between India and Pakistan. It will discuss the way how the representatives of India can act during the negotiations, the applicable strategies to follow, the possible opportunities and obstacles for the negotiations. We hope that this briefing paper will be helpful in the preparation for the negotiations and will contribute to their effectiveness.
First of all, it should be said that the future negotiations between India and Pakistan can play an important role in the development of the history of the both countries.
In case the parties manage to find a consensus, the existing problems will be solved, and the war of interests that lasted for more than a century can finally end. This is a considerable motivation for arranging a sufficient negotiation strategy, which will be prolific and will let the both countries move forward from the standstill they appeared at.
Framework
Before discussing the opportunities that the negotiations can bring it is worth thinking of the pre-negotiation work that can be done by India. First of all, there is an undisputable need for social network to be done. In case of intractable conflicts management, it is vital to create a peace infrastructure, which will be responsible for preventing the military actions or violent attacks.
This infrastructure should better be represented by an independent organ, in order to be impartial in attitude to the parties. What is more, India may consider involving civil society of its own and of the confronting party, in this case of Pakistan, into the peace establishing program. Such network can serve as a profound basis for successful negotiations.
This is due to the fact that the studies have shown, that the introduction of unofficial third parties into the conflict can contribute significantly to its resolution (Chigas, 2008).
There is also an option of introducing an independent agent, who will be able to produce fresh views on the problem and offer some new solutions (Salacuse, 1999). In addition, the independent mediators can help to design a coherent political strategy for the parties (Crocker, 2003).
In addition, while the representatives of government have a power to negotiate and make decisions, there are some spheres which can only be controlled by the civil society (Saunders, 2001). For instance, only the citizens of Kashmir are able to establish certain attitudes towards Indian and Pakistani rules, and only the citizens of the opposing sides are able to be either tolerant or confront each other.
Therefore, in order to achieve the desired results at the negotiations, you need to consider the interests of the mentioned nations, which can both serve as a support for your ideas or prove an impediment to achieving agreement.
Opportunities of negotiations
Obviously, the representatives of India should be ready to present the ideas about what innovations can be implemented in the current policies. In order to produce these ideas, it is important to analyze the interests of the two parties. Lying on the surface are the opposed interests, which have been the reason of the multiple controversies between the countries.
For instance, both India and Pakistan are willing to take political control over the territory of Kashmir, and none of the parties is ready to give up this target. Each of the parties has a solid ground for its position, and it seems that there is no resolution that I going to meet the requirements of the both sides.
Therefore, at this point the negotiations can either leave the issue unresolved or lead to the acceptance of one of the party’s options. However, in case one of the sides weakens its position or expresses a will to compromise, there can appear new options for the conflict resolution. However, in order to do this, there have to be some stronger interests found.
For example, for both countries the interest above sharing Kashmir may be a will to establish peace and respect after more than 50 years of disagreement. Therefore, you need to know exactly what the hierarchical order of Indian interests is, in order to be able to define the primary and secondary ones during the negotiations.
There are also compatible interests; to be specific, on one side India demands the stop of the terrorist attacks, which, according to the country’s version, are being organized by Pakistani people. On the other side, Pakistani government has been trying to unite the Muslim professionists, which is impossible again because of Kashmiri conflict.
What is more, the both parties show impartiality in response to each other’s demands, and refuse to take the responsibility for the ongoing events. Indeed, Pakistan government rejects the fact that the terrorist attacks are organized or anyhow sponsored by them, stating that this is a choice of Kashmiri to take such measures (Cheema and Nuri, 2005).
Similarly, India denies the conflict of religions and expresses an opinion that the religious differences do not prevent Kashmiri people from peaceful coexistence with Indian citizens (EPDMA, 2007). In this case, the compatible interests are connected with the domino principle. This means that in case either of the parties refuses from its position, the other party will also have to give up.
Therefore, the possible options here for India are to agree with the division of population and territory according to the religious preferences, or to convince Pakistan to contribute to the preservation of peace on the territory of Kashmir.
The both variants exclude the need for terrorist attacks in future and can bring agreement on this level. Thus, your task is to decide in advance, how flexible, or, in contrast, how strong are you going to be in respect to this issue.
However, the negotiation theory states that “all-gain agreements an only be achieved when the parties stress the cooperative, and not just the competitive, aspects of their relationship” (Cruikshank, 1989). This, our task is to search for some common interests, if such exist. The deeper analysis of the struggle for Kashmir shows that the territorial distribution is not the ultimate purpose of the conflict.
In fact, both India and Pakistan express an opinion that the citizens of Kashmir should not have their rights violated. On one hand, Indian government states that Kashmiri will have their rights and liberties defended under Indian rule, motivating it by the contrast with Pakistani rule where human rights are being violated (Wirsing, 2007).
On the other hand, Pakistani government argues that the citizens of Kashmir should be able to choose the ruler for themselves; the representatives are deeply convinced that Kashmiri seek either to gain independence, or to become a part of Pakistan rather than be a part of India (PA, 2010).
Thus, despite the different points of view about the situation, both India and Pakistani are eager to protect the political and social rights and liberties of Kashmiri people. From this perspective, the interest of protecting the liberties of Kashmiri is common for both of the negotiations participants.
The last mentioned interest, shared by the two parties, increases the possibility of finding the zone of possible agreement (ZOPA). Indeed, there is a multitude of point where India and Pakistan agree, for example:
Kashmiri people should choose the government themselves
The citizens of Kashmir are free to confess any religion
It is essential that both India and Pakistan take part in helping to determine the development of Kashmiri politics, due to the history of the countries.
Taking into consideration the named arguments, it can be derived that the Kashmiri conflict can be weakened if not resolved by setting the ZOPA at the protection of rights and liberties of the Kashmiri people. With this purpose, you could offer Pakistani government to organize a set of activities, which will be supported by Pakistan and India, and will be aimed at helping the citizens of Kashmir to make their choice.
These activities can include creating a Constitution of Kashmir, offering the country the options like separating into an autonomic Republic, or dividing into pro-Indian and pro-Pakistani parts, etc. This approach will also need a series of studies and social investigations to be carried, and their costs can also be shared between the parties.
In this way, neither India nor Pakistan will have to give up their positions, and the resolution of the situation will be determined by Kashmiri people as by an impartial member.
However, the main point about ZOPA is helping Pakistani government to see it and to motivate them to reach it, as the consensual knowledge is vital for establishing agreement in negotiations (Hampson, 1999). You should keep in mind that the opposed site has a skeptical attitude to your offers, so it is important to prepare a solid foundation for your arguments.
The mentioned decision is only one of the options available for the negotiations. It is worth remembering that your task is to achieve joint gains, and for this purpose you will need to (a) be able to share information effectively; (b) be ready to deal with the new appearing problems, and (c) be eager to continue improving the decision during the negotiations (Brett, 1998).
These three factors can make the negotiations prolific and bring benefits to all its participants. However, you should remember that the mentioned joint gains need to be seen by Pakistani government, and if they are not, your task is to show them.
In order to do this, you have to be ready to present to the Pakistani government a list of advantages they would face in case of reaching the ZOPA. This will increase the chances for the negotiations to be successful.
Possible obstacles
Besides the mentioned above opportunities of the forthcoming negotiations, there is a number of factors, which can prevent the negotiations from being successful, in particular for India. These factors should be taken into consideration in order to be managed during the negotiations process.
The very first barrier to the negotiations progress is the general rule, which claims that “the prolonged nature of intractable conflict gives rise to self-reinforcing escalatory dynamics” (Chigas, ). In case of India-Pakistan conflict, which lasted for more than 60 years, this rule is likely to work.
The situation suggests that the absence of progress in the conflict has lead to the deep convictions of the both sides of their rightness and of the incontestability of their decisions. Due to this fact, there is a little chance for any party to weaken the opposing BATNA, or to prove the dominance of their own ones.
This inflexibility and unreadiness to accept another position increase the deep-rooted nature of the conflict and prevent it from being resolved with the negotiations.
As for the measures that can be taken in order to overcome this barrier, one of the options is to call for bringing the relations between the countries to a new level. You can demonstrate Pakistani representatives all the negative consequences of the long lasting conflict, and show them the promising perspectives of accepting a new, flexible position.
Another possible obstacle for the negotiations success is the divergence of ideology and belief systems of the two parties. This factor belongs to the ones that usually create additional conflicts and make it harder to settle the agreement (Hampson, 1999).
Besides the political conflicts, there is an underlying foundation of cultural peculiarities, which determine the religions, social attitudes, moral rules, norms of behavior, etc. In other words, what seems to be a perfect solution for Indian people, might be viewed as absolutely unacceptable by Pakistani people, and vice versa. Tolerating these differences is often hard because of their significance for each of the parties.
The ideology also affects the perception of the situation by the parties, suggesting that the war of interests is becoming even more intense. For instance, while India took a liberal position in attitude to Religion, for Pakistani people this issue is a matter of life. Indeed, it is known from the history that Muslims are famous for their devotion to faith, which is often proved by violent means.
Moreover, violent attacks are often seen as the only way to demonstrate one’s faith. In contrast, Hinduism rejects any form of violence, and treats the means of Muslims as unacceptable. Similarly, the differences in value systems affect the perception of Kashmir conflict by the parties, which suggests that there is an increased risk of misunderstanding in the negotiations.
Due to the two obstacles mentioned above, there appears another one, which is a mistrust between the parties. To be specific, Indian government accused Pakistan to sponsor the terrorist attacks for many times. However, Pakistani government keeps rejecting this version and in addition to this refuses to contribute to providing peace.
Thus, until the guilty ones are found, there will be a mistrust from the side of India, which can hinder the negotiations. In order to overcome this, Indian government has to do everything possible to make sure that Pakistan is not motivated to organize such kinds of attacks. It should also be noted that Pakistani government also has some bias towards Indian rule.
The reason of their distrust lies in the fact that Indian government failed to carry a referendum for Kashmir independence, promised more than 50 years ago (The Economist, 1999). In order to remove this condition, the government of India has to provide a guaranty of implementation of all the resolutions accepted at the negotiations; for example, with this purpose a corresponding contract can be signed.
In addition to the discussed impediments to reaching a compromise, there is one that can be decisive for the negotiations. This impediment is the existence of many official parties. You should take into consideration, that there is a number of fundamentalist groups, which are fighting either for Kashmir independence or its joining Pakistan. These groups will most possibly be used by Pakistani spokespersons to support their arguments.
The parties like US or China are also likely to support Pakistan, while the UN is on the side of Kashmiri and their right for independence. These multiple parties introduce the newer and newer views on the situation, which, as a result, hampers making one right decision at the negotiations.
With the addition of new interests, the task of the negotiations is not to finally resolve the Kashmir conflict in Pakistani or Indian way, but to meet all the requirements and leave nobody dissatisfied. The existence of multiple parties has always been one of the main barriers to decision making, and the more parties are there, the more complex the conflict becomes (Hampson, 1999).
What is more, even when the third party has a benevolent intention to help to resolve the conflict, it is often doomed to fail because of its inability to consider the non-objective factors (Chigas, ).
For instance, even though the UN tries to evaluate the situation objectively, it will never be able to realize the deepness of the cultural differences and values, which suggests that there is a very little chance for the UN to introduce a solution, satisfactory both for India and Pakistan.
It has to be utmost clear to the both parties that their conflict has a very deep and broad nature. Besides the Kashmir conflict, there is also a number of other problems of political, economical, social, religious character, which make the relations between the countries tense. Therefore, an expectation to resolve all the issues at once is rather unrealistic, and can bring above disappointment.
The main mistake here is the strong belief of each party that the successful negotiations are those which can meet all their requirements. Thus, in order to overcome this obstacle, you should be ready to accept a different negotiation scenario, which will suggest making quick decisions right at the place if it is needed.
After all, the experience of the composite dialogue of 2003-2005 suggests that the step-by-step problem resolution can be more effective than rapid efforts to introduce dramatic changes (Kux, 2006).
Strategy advice
Now that all the opportunities and obstacles of the negotiations have been discussed, and the needed framework was mentioned, it is important to plan the way of handling the negotiation process. In order to do this, you need to choose a negotiation strategy that would be appropriate for the situation.
Obviously, in the conditions of a prolonged and complicated struggle of interests, it is impossible to find one appropriate resolution for all the existing problems. However, several aspects can be considered, which can help to improve the general situation and increase the chances for the negotiations to be successful.
In case if your only task were to reach your aims at any costs, the appropriate strategy would be positional bargaining. However, in the modern world, where the civilized society suggests that there is a need to tolerate differences and compromise, this strategy is unacceptable. In addition, in case of conflict with Pakistan, positional bargaining would only aggravate it and cause the greater resistance from the opposing side. That is why, integrative bargaining is much more beneficial for both parties in this case.
The essence of integrative bargaining lies in searching for optimal decisions, which can fully or partially satisfy the needs of the two parties. One of the options for implementing this strategy is dividing the main interests into several minor interests, or trying to find a number of meanings in one idea. Thus, the will of both India and Pakistan to administer Kashmir covers a number of other wishes, such as:
gaining more territory
becoming a more powerful country
gaining political authority
resolving the religious issue
In this way, we can see that the controversial ideas often have some underlying motives, which have a chance to be conciliated. That is why, you can try to apply this method to India’s interests and offer Pakistan to do the same. This will make the situation more clear and increase the chances for finding a fresh solution for the two sides.
Try to show Pakistani spokespersons, that the interests of their country are being considered, and that the both positions are equally important in this situation. Your task is to remove the mistrust that has been existing for decades, and make the opponent open to new solutions.
In fact, there is a multitude of approaches which can be helpful to lead the negotiations in this way. They include the basic speech patterns, or the way in which your speech can be organized in order to sound more persuasive. Integrating politics with linguistics can be helpful, as the “critical thinking and interdisciplinary research” can contribute into the success of the negotiations (Eagle, 2009).
For instance, sometimes such tools, as ad hominem or bandwagon effect can be used, in case if they are relevant and supported by the facts, of course (Wright, 2001). You can also use an appeal to authority, for example by mentioning how the prominent countries of the world managed the similar conflicts.
In addition, one of the most persuasive strategies is putting the interests of the community before the interests of an individual. Thus, it is important to clarify that the India-Pakistan conflict is caused because of the citizens’ interests, and that its resolution should also be based on it.
One more good strategy is to postpone the denial, or, to be more specific, to agree before rejecting the opponent’s idea. Whatever is said at the negotiation, try to show understanding of the Pakistani position and respect for it, and only after that start to give opposing ideas. All these techniques can help you to achieve the desired goals and to make the negotiation results beneficial for India.
Apart from the mentioned strategy, you should consider organizing the requirements and needs of India in hierarchical order. In addition, the general advise is to start with the minor issues, and “put Kashmir on a back burner” (Kux, 2006). This approach is based on the idea that the aim of the negotiations is to improve the relations between the countries, make them less tense and more trustful.
That is why, a gradual approaching of the countries may serve as a basis for a natural Kashmir conflict resolution in the future. Of course the main points should be discussed; however, working on economical and social problems should be put first. This will also guarantee that the negotiations will bring at least some changes for better, even if the main issue will remain unresolved.
As for the decisions you are going to introduce, remember that all the ideas should be fair, efficient, and feasible (Cruikshank, 1989). Fairness means that it is necessary for the two parties to agree on the uprightness of the decision. What is more, such conclusion is not to be left for a third independent party; otherwise, the decision is to be worked out until the both parties accept it as fair.
The decision efficiency points at the fact that its implementation will satisfy all the parties. Here not only India and Pakistan should be taken into consideration; the other parties in the face of other countries and fundamentalist groups also should agree with the efficiency of the decision. Finally, the feasibility of the decision has to provide the possibility of its implementation.
Therefore, it is not advisory to show too much expectations about a certain decision, and count on its magic effect. For example, expecting that the next day after negotiations Pakistan and India will turn into the closest political and economical partners is far from feasible.
However, making steps in this direction and gradually improving the relations between the parties is a feasible expectation. Therefore, try to be realistic, and support this attitude in the opponent.
Concerning the approach to problem solution, it is obvious that the key point for you is to look for joint gains for India and Pakistan. It was proved that even in the settings of cultural divergence, the joint gains are able to unite the countries for achieving shared aims (Brett, 1998). Therefore, even in case of inability to find a compromise, finding joint gains can be helpful in conflict resolution.
What is more, your task is not only to find the joint gains, but also to present them as advantageous to the opposite side. This is due to the fact that the attitude of Pakistan to India is rather biased, and it would be irrational to count for their instantaneous support of all your ideas.
That is why, be ready to (a) find the new joint gains in the process of negotiation, and (b) show them to Pakistani spokesperson and motivate them to reach these gains together.
Conclusion
This memorandum contains the information needed for India spokesperson to lead successful negotiations. It discusses the possible opportunities and obstacles of the negotiations, and gives suggestions about the party’s behavior during the process of negotiations. The paper is based on numerous studies about negotiations and international relations, and thus will hopefully help India to gain satisfactory results at the negotiations.
Reference List
Brett, J, Adair, W (1998). Culture and Joint Gains in Negotiation. Negotiation Journal, 1(3): 61-86.
Cheema, P, Nuri, M (2005) The Kashmir Imbroglio: Looking Towards the Future. Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute.
Chigas, D (2005) Negotiating Intractable Conflicts: The Contributions of Unofficial Intermediaries. Ch. 6 in Crocker, C, Hampson, F & Aall, P.Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict. Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace.
Crocker, Ch, Aall, P (2003). Ready for Prime Time: The When, Who, and Why of International Mediation. Negotiation Journal, 7(1): 151-167.
Cruikshank, J. (1989). Breaking The Impasse: Consensual Approaches To Resolving Public Disputes. NY: Basic Books.
Eagle, C (2009). Optimal Behavior in International Negotiation. NY: Camp David.
External Publicity Division Ministry of External Affairs (EPDMA), Government of India (2007). Kashmir, the True Story. Web.
Hampson, F (1999) Multilateral Negotiations: Lessons from Arms Control, Trade, and the Environment. London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Kux, D (2006). India-Pakistan Negotiations: Is Past Still Prologue? Washington: US Institute of Peace.
Pakistan Army, (PA) (2010), Azad Kashmir Regiment. Web.
Salacuse, J (1999). Law and Power in Agency Relationships. In Mnookin & Susskind, Negotiating on Behalf of Others. NY: Sage.
Saunders, H (2001) Prenegotiations and Circum-negotiations: Arenas of the Peace Process. In Aall, P, Crocker, Ch. Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict Washington, D.C.: USIP.
The Economist (1999) The Valley of the shadow: struggle for Kashmir. The Economist, 351(8120).
Wirsing, R (2007) The Progress of Détente in India-Pakistan Relations: New Chapter or Strategic Charade? NY: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.
Wright, L (2001). Critical Thinking: An Introduction to Analytical Reading and Reasoning. London: Oxford University Press.
Empathy has always played a critical role in the domestic and foreign policy making processes in the American government. However, the US has always been inspired by the foreign policy making doctrine when making foreign decisions.
Research shows that a leader will always make decisions with empathy because of the human nature. Some scholars observe that the world would be a peaceful place in case political leaders employ empathy when making decisions.
However, others note that the world would be a dangerous place since people would be guided by emotions when electing leaders. Moreover, it would influence the leadership of the country because leaders would be making policies based on emotions and attitudes (Murray, 1998).
Apart from influencing the leadership styles of many policy makers, empathy would also be dangerous to the behavior and their reasoning. In the American society, empathy is never taken into consideration when making governmental policies and laws.
Some note that empathy is the better alternative as compared to the current decision making model. Empathy is about considering personal thoughts and feelings when making a decision, which means that the policy maker considers the effects of the decision before declaring it.
When making a policy, it is imperative to consider the views, thoughts, and the feelings of another person.
In many occasions, a policy maker would make decisions that favor his or her standpoint implying that he may not take into considerations the views of another person. In the American government, policy makers are not guided by empathy in making foreign decisions.
However, empathy is considered when formulating domestic policies. In other words, the government consults the public or it seeks public opinion before designing domestic policies. Foreign policy making is considered high politics or real politick, which should never seek the views of the public.
The United States engages in conflicts with other states in order to achieve its interests meaning that it does not take consider morality when formulating a foreign policy towards an aggressor (Mendus, 2000).
However, the case is different when the state is engaging in negotiations with the less threatening states such as India, Pakistan, and other countries of the third world. There have been examples of leaders who have engaged in negotiations with extremists by employing empathy.
The negotiation between Mandela De Klerk was an example of negotiation that employed empathy.
This article discusses the issue empathy in political negotiations in detail. The paper draws some of the examples from the previous negotiations between American foreign policy makers and the Pakistani authorities.
It is noted that some factors drive leaders to employ empathy when making political negotiations. These reasons are also discussed in detail.
Application of Empathy in Political Negotiations
Policy makers employ empathy in negotiations mainly because of issues related to safety and conflict resolution. They employ empathy as an alternative to arriving at certain resolutions.
Scholars such as Barcon-Cohen noted that there is a relationship between human capacity for empathy and human capacity for tranquility. Daniel Batson’s conclusion was that empathy is one of the ways through which political negotiations could be pursued.
In this case, political negotiators should be concerned with the welfare of others. The negotiations between Pakistan and India considered empathy because the state of affairs in the two countries was hurting the region’s economy.
The two countries were arguing over a piece of land in the Kashmir region yet leaders were reluctant to compromise their positions. Empathy forced the two countries to give ground. It was proved that empathy could be used as a better alternative to resolve issues as compared to the use of force.
Moreover, empathy is a valid alternative because it saves life. It is factual that empathy plays a critical role in political negotiations because policy makers consider the likely effect of the policy in their own political environment.
Empathy is an important variable because it encourages pro-social and encouraging behavior. Empathy does not give violence, revenge, and vengeance a chance, but instead it encourages harmonious coexistence whereby members would embrace the culture of amnesty and confidence.
In many cases, policy makers are tempted to stereotype and prejudice the decisions of other leaders because of cultural and religious differences (McEvoy, 2000). However, empathy prevents this behavior because the policy maker would understand the choice another policy maker from his or her perspective.
Through empathy, the two conflicting parties would live healthily, peacefully, and social links would be strengthened.
In the field of political science, the idea that empathy encourages peace and harmoniously coexistence is not taken embraced that easily. In other words, political scientists do not employ empathy quite often when making decisions in their day to day activities.
For political affairs, empathy does not matter so much because politics is all about competition and power. If an individual empathizes with his or her opponent, the chances of such an individual losing are high.
However, some political leaders employ it whenever it is observed that it is the only viable option in maintaining world peace. The modern society poses many challenges to policy makers, which forces them to employ various tools, models, and techniques in engaging in talks with friends and neighbors.
This implies that empathy has become an interpersonal skill, as well as a political tool. Through empathy, American policy makers have been able to reconnect with other members of society in oversees societies. The challenges of globalization do not allow one nation to boast of its resources and improve security.
The emergence of the global commons, such as terrorism environmental degradation, issues to do with inequality, and emergence of weapons of mass destruction, does not allow a state to take a firm standpoint (Mearsheimer, 1990).
One state should try as much as possible to understand the problems facing another state. Some of these global commons affect all nations, irrespective of the level of economic development, the geographic region, and the level of political development.
In international relations, empathy is not a concept that is of interest to many scholars because it is believed that it does not have any role to play. Much focus is placed on international relations theories and frameworks.
However, some scholars, particularly feminists, observe that empathy should be a factor to be considered when making foreign policy decisions. Empathy is a concept that cannot be explained in isolation meaning that is cannot be explained without the understanding of other concepts such as power and justice.
One of the reasons of employing empathy in political negotiations is that it guarantees peace. Before the end of the Cold War, the two centers of power were hotly involved in conflicts all over the world (Nye, 1990).
The two superpowers fought various proxy wars in other countries, especially developing countries whereby they funded various opposing groups in emerging economies. For over forty years, the two countries were able to maintain between themselves because of empathy.
In other words, the two countries could not engage in wars because they were mutual assured of destruction. They both possessed weapons of mass destruction, including the nuclear and biological power.
The war brought about various conflicts and crisis, including the Cuban Missile Crisis, the U-2 affair, and the construction of the Berlin Wall. States maintain peace mainly because they fear the impacts of the war. Similarly, a state would rarely attack another state because it is much aware of the effects of the war.
How Empathy Played a Role in the Negotiations between the US and Pakistan
The United States has engaged in various negotiations with the Pakistan since the time of Cold War. Pakistan has always been strategic to the interests of the US in the region. Recently, the US supported Pakistan in the establishment of a nuclear energy program mainly because of the threats faced by Pakistan in the region.
Apart from establishing s stable nuclear energy program, the US ensured that Pakistan is provided with a nuclear blanket, which prevents the effects of nuclear energy in the country (Oelsner, 2007). The US has been so supportive to Pakistan mainly because of the role that Pakistan played during the Cold War.
Pakistan served a military base for the American troops who were deployed in the region to check the influence and the power of the USSR. Pakistan became an enemy to many states, particularly the Middle East states because of its close ties with the US.
The US empathized with Pakistan because it has gone through various problems brought about by terrorism and extremisms. Terrorists and Islamic extremists have been targeting the US and its allies, including the western states.
Since the US understands that terrorists have no limits, it has always come up with foreign policy decisions that favor Pakistan in terms of defense and security.
If terrorists frustrate Pakistan, the US would be ridiculed since it is one of its allies in the region. Therefore, the US has to be empathetic when negotiating with Pakistan on matters touching on security.
Currently, the United States is in the process of withdrawing troops from Afghanistan meaning that Pakistan will continue being the major training base for its soldiers in Asia. In other words, Pakistan would play a critical role in supporting the American security interests in the region.
The interests, culture, principles and aspirations of Pakistan are very different from the aspirations of the US meaning that the two states have not been able to strike a deal that would see each state achieving its interests.
However, empathy has been a leading principle in formulating the common policies between the two states (McDermott, 2004). For instance, Pakistan has always urged the United States to understand that it was a peaceful and secure state before the United States took troops to its land.
In this regard, the US should understand that the issue of insecurity has been complicated by the presence of American troops. On the other hand, the US wants Pakistan to understand that the activities being carried out in the Middle East are meant to benefit all states in the world, including Pakistan.
References
McDermott, R. (2004). Political Psychology in International Relations. Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press.
McEvoy, S. (2000). Communities and Peace: Catholic Youth in Northern Ireland. Journal of Peace Research, 37(1), 85-103.
Mearsheimer, J. (1990). Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War. The Atlantic Monthly, 266(2), 35-50.
Mendus, S. (2000). Feminism and Emotion: Readings in Moral and Political Philosophy. New York: St, Martin Press.
Murray, G. (1998). John Hume and the SDLP. Dublin: Irish Academic Press.
Nye, J. (1990). Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: Basic Books.
Oelsner, A. (2007). Friendship, Mutual Trust and the Evolution of Regional Peace in the International System. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 10(2), 257-279.
The first major event in the history of Iran, in relation to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (“OPEC”), was the establishment of OPEC as a founding member (OPEC 1). The establishment of OPEC was made possible through the groundwork laid by Iran, and four other petroleum-exporting countries. OPEC was founded through an event called the Baghdad Conference. In the beginning there were five founding members, and this includes Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela (OPEC 1). OPEC was established on September 14,1960 (OPEC 1).
In the decade of the 70s Iran was one of the most dominant petroleum-exporting countries in the Middle East (Mina 1). Rivals in the oil production business such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia provided a counterbalance to the growing influence of Iran within OPEC. If not for the presence of the two countries Iran could have dictated terms that would have been detrimental to the rest of the oil consuming nations of the world. In other words, Iran could never control the OPEC and its members. However, Iran exerts tremendous influence over the organization.
On January 2006, the Western world, led by the United States of America began to make a formal protest with regards to Iran’s nuclear program (Hoyos & Dombey 1).There is no need to elaborate the implication of a nuclear program considering Iran’s past history and its ongoing struggle with Israel. The United States and the rest of the Western world were within their rights when they echoed the fears of the free world with regards to the possibility that a totalitarian regime is armed with a nuclear device.
After the United States filed its protest through diplomatic channels, Iran made an unusual move that was difficult to interpret. Iran requested the OPEC to cut the cartel’s oil production (Hoyos & Dombey 1). It was difficult to interpret Iran’s request to reduce oil output because it was unclear if the move was based on the need to stabilize global crude oil prices or an attempt to show the Western world that Iran was ready to use crude oil as a weapon against its detractors. Iran’s request may have been rooted in noble aspirations, such as to show the world that petroleum-exporting countries were sympathetic to the world’s needs. However, Iran’s request also demonstrated the fact that Iran and other oil exporters could compel other countries to follow their lead.
Four years later after the diplomatic row over Iran’s nuclear program, OPEC’s membership grew to include seven additional members. According to one report, “On October 13, 2010, Iran assumed the rotating presidency of the OPEC” (Voice of America 1). At this point, Iran did not offer any resolution to reduce tension within the international political scene and did not make any effort to develop a transparent nuclear program so that the whole world could see the extent of their scientific pursuits. At the same time, an Iranian national at the helm of OPEC means that Iran have greater leverage against the United States and its allies.
In 2011 the United States and the rest of the Western world reiterated their concern with regards to the growing nuclear capability of Iran (Turkish Weekly 1). The United States and its allies were ready to impose sanctions in order to create an effective deterrence against the creation of a nuclear weapon. But Iran said that the uranium enrichment program was for their energy needs and not to develop weapons of mass destruction (Turkish Weekly 1). The United States and key European nations were not convinced and demanded that Iran should dismantle the nuclear enhancement program that could lead to the creation of a nuclear warhead.
Five decades after Iran’s participation in the Baghdad Conference, the country faced a significant threat through the sanctions imposed by the Western world (Krukowska 1). On July 1, 2012 the sanctions against Iran was enforced and it was a tremendous blow to the economic conditions of Iran (Krukowska 1). As a consequence Iran could not import their products to America. There is no need to elaborate the economic impact if Iran could not export its products to major oil consumers around the world.
On July 11, 2012, Iranians saw their oil output tumble (Kent & Said 1). It was the lowest production level in twenty years. The low output was the direct result of sanctions imposed by the United States and European countries. One month later, on August 2012, there were news reports that Iraq surpassed Iran as the second largest producer of crude oil (Lashkari 1).
Iran’s low output made headlines all over the world. At the same time, the Iranian government made it known that it was not pleased with the report that made the claim that Iran was no longer the second biggest producer of oil (Reuters 1). In September of 2012, Iran’s OPEC governor issued a statement that Iran was still the second largest producer of oil, and that it is only behind Saudi Arabia in terms of crude oil production (Reuters 1).
In recent years Iran was seen as a primary mover when it comes to transforming the way OPEC does business with other countries. Iran’s desire to influence the whole OPEC should not be taken lightly. In addition, it is also important to realize that Iran has political clout within OPEC. Therefore, if Iran is determined to implement or block a particular policy, there is a great chance that Iran would succeed. Despite the sanctions imposed by the Western world, Iran was still active within OPEC and in June of 2012, Iran’s oil minister urged OPEC to take action amidst significant reductions in the price of crude oil in the world market (Tehran Times 1).
There are three things to consider when it comes to assessing the influence of Iran in the context of negotiations with OPEC. First, Iran is a founding member and it means that Iran carries something intangible called prestige. There is prestige linked to the fact that through the efforts of Iran, OPEC was established. In a way OPEC owes its existence to Iran.
The next factor that has to be considered is that Iran is one of the largest petroleum-exporting countries in the world. If one will combine this with the fact that the first oil well in the Middle East was established in Iran, then, it is easier to understand the fact that Iran is ahead of the other petroleum-exporting countries when it comes to the experience and maturity needed to deal with importers and traders of crude oil. In other words Iran is the ultimate insider when it comes to the international crude oil trade. As a result Iran continues to be dominant player and its decisions would continue to have a ripple effect in world markets.
The third and final factor to consider is Iran’s strategic location. The geographic boundaries of Iran allowed for easy access to Pakistan, Turkey, Iraq, and Turkmenistan. Therefore, if Iran wants to be uncooperative and decides to disrupt the crude oil trade, then, its actions would create a problem that may be difficult to overcome. The United States and its allies are aware of these complications. Thus, even if there is a need to impose sanctions, the United States is careful to address all issues through a diplomatic process.
Works Cited
Hoyos, Carola and Dan Dombey. “Iran’s Plan for Oil Cuts is Snubbed by OPEC”. The Financial Times. 2006. Web.
Kent, Sarah and Summer Said. “OPEC Sees Iran Output at 20-Year Low as Sanctions Bite”. The Wall Street Journal, 2012. Web.
Krukowska, Ewa. “Iran-Oil Sanctions Risk Biggest OPEC Export Loss Since Libya”. Bloomberg, 2012. Web.
Lashkari, Azad. “Iraq Beats Iran to Become OPEC’s Second Largest Producer“. RT News, 2012. Web.
Mina, Parviz. “Iran and OPEC”. Foundation of Iranian Studies, 32012. Web.
Environmental conservation talks represent a struggle of man against his actions. As Sjöstedt (2008) notes, environmental problems are largely anthropogenic. This means that the environmental degradation we witness today is a result of human activities, which include agriculture, industrial production, transportation, mining, heating of buildings, among others. Unfortunately, pollution does not only occur within the polluter’s borders but permeates to other countries. Often, this means that other countries in the region get to suffer the consequences of the positive economic values that a polluter country gains from emissions. Often, such issues breed conflict, and over the years governments and private actors have adopted negotiations as the ideal way to solve environmental conflicts (Sjöstedt, 2008).
To understand why successful outcomes to environmental negotiations are hard to achieve, one must first understand the special properties that characterize such negotiations. According to Sjöstedt (2008), environmental negotiations attract non-governmental organizations and various transnational actors who ostensibly represent public opinion in the negotiations1. However, the unique properties that call for negotiations usually include
international environmental conflicts;
negative consequences brought by an environmental issue;
manipulation or appropriation of scarce resources by governments, and
Human activities that drive respective governments to agree or disagree about working together to reduce the effects of the human activities on the environment.
The Main Reasons
According to Christer & Aggestam (2008), diplomacy is the international institution that follows specific fundamental norms for purposes of providing the procedure for intercourse between countries. Some of the norms upheld in diplomacy include:
Co-existence and reciprocity
Simply put, this is the understanding that allows countries to “live and let live”. As Christer & Aggestam (2008 quoting Mattingly,1955), aptly puts it, “unless people realize that they have to live together, indefinitely, in spite of their differences, diplomats have no place to stand” (p. 196). The acceptance by different countries that they are mutually dependent on each other as long as environmental decisions are concerned is significant. However, Christer & Aggestam (2008) notes that each participant in the negotiations process has an equal right to participate. This however does not always mean that the negotiating parties are all equal. The developing countries for example approach the negotiating table as equal negotiators, but it is common knowledge that their decisions cannot be influenced by the developing nations especially considering the influence that the industrialized nations have on international bodies like UNEP. Concerning reciprocity, Christer & Aggestam (2008) notes that negotiators usually expect the equivalent exchange of values.
Also, actions that different negotiators adopt after the negotiations are conditional to responses from other negotiators. This means that players in the international environmental debate expect reciprocal behavior that returns good or ill practices with the corresponding action from others. In cases where parties that negotiated in environmental matters feel that one party is not reciprocating good actions adopted by others, then they tend to act in a manner that will re-compensate the bad actions with equally bad actions. A case in point is the US-Canadian relations regarding cross border pollution. According to Hsu & Parrish (2007), Canada’s Ontario region suffers massive air pollution from stationary pollution sources from the US. Efforts to solve the pollution problem through diplomatic channels mainly pushed by Canada have failed in the past. In the meantime, the pollution costs Canada an excess of $5.2 billion annually in terms of environmental and health expenditure (Hsu & Parrish, 2007). As such, Canadians may have to look for a different way of handling the trans-boundary pollution issue, which does not diplomacy. Such a course of action by Canada would most likely involve the use of extraterritorial laws as a dispute resolving mechanism to bring trans-boundary civil litigation against the US polluters. Admittedly, however, though the trans-boundary may prove a viable resolution mechanism in the short term, it would be a poor substitute to the bilateral cooperation that was made possible by the federal involvement of the Canada-US governments.
A shared language and open communication channels
No one explains this well than Chsiter & Aggestam (2008) who quotes Tran (1987) stating, “Communication is to diplomacy what blood is to the human body. Whenever communication ceases, the body of international politics, the process of diplomacy, is dead and the result of violent conflict or atrophy (p. 8). Communication between negotiators has to be facilitated using a common language that is understood by the negotiating parties. Yet, one cannot rule out miscommunication even when a common language with common expressions and phrases is used on the negotiation table. Quoting Cohen (1981), Christer and Aggesten (2008) state that diplomatic communicators are often cautious of saying either too much or too little because every word or hint of omission is studied by other negotiators are given some meaning. When such is the case, omissions, understatements, and other controversial communication are given different meanings by different negotitaors thus making successful outcomes a hard thing to attain.
Commitment to environmental peace
Diplomats engaged in environmental negotiations are supposed to uphold the interest of the overall environmental good to the exclusion of the immediate and narrow interests of each of the countries they represent. Further, they are supposed to be bound by ethics which state that their actions should ensure the international environment improves in a sustainable manner (Christer & Aggestan, 2008). This however is not always the case especially in instances where the diplomats cannot approach the negotiating table without considering the interests of their respective nations.
Pacta sunt servanda rule
This rule is considered the cornerstone of diplomacy (Christer & Aggestam, 2008). Environmental negotiations usually come up with international treaties that require signatories of the same to uphold the content of the treaties mainly in good faith. The main shortcoming with such treaties is that they are not legally binding but are merely morally or politically binding. According to Klabbers (2006), the pacta sunt Servanda rule in international treaties are increasingly becoming negotiable. This means that the treaties can only be binding to the signatory countries for just as much as those countries are willing to obey the rules therein (Kratochwil, 1989). Rules that come up as a result of a consensual agreement between parties are mainly a result of compromise rather than mutual agreement.
According to Klabbers (2006), when the need for compromise is factored in diplomacy, substantial issues in the negotiations are usually vague. This mainly happens because negotiators cloud the issue through borrowed terms that have no clear or recognized meaning. A perfect example of such terms is “sustainable development”. According to Klabbers (2006), the term was coined to reconcile economic growth and environmental protection during the height of environmental concerns in the 1990s. However, no one can precisely state what the term means in concrete situations. As such, it could be true that contracts, treaties, and legislation formulated by environmental negotiators are not the result of “meeting of minds” but as some form of “reducing disagreement through writing” Allot (1999). When such is the case, this means that the enactment of treaties, legislation, or contracts does not stop disagreements on environment management from persisting.
A different outlook on why international treaties do not usually hold suggests that the diplomats who negotiate the environmental laws are typically strangers. This means that they have different perspectives about the environment and life at large. Their different approaches to the environment are affected by their different cultures, while their ethics towards the environment are influenced by political, social, and economic priorities in their respective countries. According to Honig (2001), when strangers negotiate, the mongrel results are not fully clear since the ‘strangers’ fail to understand what was in their different minds at the time of the negotiation.
Increased actors
Environmental negotiations are affected by the mere number of actors present in such talks. Unlike traditional diplomacy where nations were represented by a specific representative, environmental conservation attracts Non-governmental organizations, the media, and public opinion. Environmental experts also act in the background to advise the various diplomats on what to say do or refrain from. According to Sjöstedt (2008), although this has some advantages, it also serves to make the environmental process more cumbersome. It also makes the process more protracted this making it more difficult to reach an agreement.
Other reasons
As established herein, dialogue or communication plays an important role in diplomacy. However, it is notable that communication cannot occur if negotiators do not take some vital steps in the pre-negotiation phase. Key among them include:
Managing expectations
Often, negotiators start the environmental dialogue with the expectation that a goal must be reached. Often, the initiators of the dialogue fail to clarify that negotiations are just a means to the goal. According to Sjöstedt (2008), this happens when there are no clear objectives when the dialogue process is being initiated. As a result, people’s expectations are not met and this often leads to disappointment. In the run-up to the Copenhagen climate talks that commenced in December 2009 for example, the developing countries largely expected leading developing countries like the US to have succinct commitments towards the reduction of emissions, without which it was largely expected that the Copenhagen talks would only produce a frame work for environmental progress rather than a solution to the pollution problem (Moir, 2009). Considering that the United States had failed to ratify the Kyoto protocol that came into place in 1997, it came as no surprise to many observers that once again, the United States and other developed nations did not approach the negotiation table in Copenhagen with precise emission targets2. If they were enacted, the provisions in the Kyoto protocol could have laid a platform for the signatory countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by a five percent margin by the year 2012 (Moir, 2009). However, this would have cost the developed countries in terms of reduced economic production hence the reluctance to ratify the same.
Knowledge and information
International environmental matters are complex thus making analyzing or assessing them difficult. Negotiators usually lack enough knowledge and information to enable them to debate the issue and come up with realistic and acceptable solutions. As Sjöstedt (2008) observes the diplomats lack adequate issue-based knowledge necessary o solve environmental problems and bring for the binding commitments.
The US-Canada Case
Environmental relations between Canada and the US have been enviable by other countries in the world. Not only did the two countries seem to co-exist peacefully despite the many shared environmental resources, but they also seemed to acknowledge that disputes may arise between them. As such, they jointly set up dispute resolving mechanisms which include the International Joint Commission (IJC). IJC’s mandate was indicated as the provision of “trans-boundary oversight, research, and fact-finding for the US and Canadian governments” (IJC, 2009). To prevent trade and environmental conflicts between the two countries, the Commission of Environmental Cooperation (CEC) was formed. Over the years, IJC and CEC have played an important role in environment-related conflict resolution between the two North American countries. Recently, however, Hsu & Parrish (2007) notes that there has been a clear retreat from the bilateral cooperation that has existed between Canada and the US. As such, both the IJC and CEC influence of environmental matters affecting the two countries have drastically reduced (Hsu & Parrish, 2007). As a result, environmental disputes that were easily resolved between the two countries are nowadays taking a more difficult and protracted process (Sewell & Utton, 1986). As such, the two countries have had to initiate tough bargaining into the process which was previously resolved through harmonious deliberation and cooperation.
But what explains the sudden change of tact in the Canadian-US approach? One may ask. Well, according to Sewell ad Utton (1986) both administrations have gone through attitude transformation and have differing viewpoints regarding not only their shared environmental resources but the responsibility that each should shoulder for pollution that transcends their shared boundary.
According to Hsu & Parrish (2007), the declining cooperation between the two North American countries can simply be explained by the US federal government’s regard to international environmental policies and even other international laws. The US has been retreating not only from IJC and CEC but also from other International institutions, bilateral treaties, and agreements. The reason offered for this trend is that becoming a signatory of such internal laws will threaten the democratic sovereignty of the country (Hsu & Parrish, 2007). As a result, it notable that Canadians have become less enthusiastic about bilateral agreements with the US and are even less trusting of any environmental agreements negotiated by the political leaders often believing that such serve the American interests more than they do the Canadians (Nossal, 1981). Further, Hsu & Parrish (2007) envisage a situation in the future where Canadians mat embrace the extraterritoriality trend as used by Americans to solve problems between the two countries.
Notably, acid rain in parts of Ontario and Quebec are a result of emissions from US plants. Despite bilateral efforts to resolve the issue, it is widely thought that the United States doe not prioritize environmental matters as it should. More so, the quality of the Canadian air quality seems to be of little consequence to the United States. Unlike what was suggested earlier that countries in environmental negotiations may apply reciprocity, Canada seems to be doing the exact opposite of what the United States has done. According to Hsu & Parish (2007), Canada has started taking appropriate action to make its environment safer. The country’s appeal to the US to reduce its emission because Canadians especially those residing in Ontario were suffering negative consequences from the same however continuously falls on deaf years. This confirms what has been stated earlier in this essay that communication is core to any diplomacy; without proper communication, no agreement is possible and no outcomes can be attained.
Conclusion
Successful reasons for environmental negotiations are hard to achieve mainly because different countries have different economic, social, and political interests in the use of environmental resources. Simply, most countries especially in the developed world lack the political will necessary to negotiate successfully on environmental matters.
The complexities of the bargaining process also make the attainment of successful outcomes all the more challenging. With lobby groups, the media, and the diplomats coming from different cultures and fronting different environmental agenda’s, finding a middle ground even amid realities like global warming often proves to be a tall order. Overall, however, the distribution of negative values rather than positive environmental values looks like a major effect of the environmental negotiations. Even when negotiators come up with good policy statements, they remain useless pieces of writing which do nothing but gather dust if respective nations do not ratify them. The developed no doubt perceives the environmental deterioration as a cost that can be offset by the monies or values generated by environmental polluting activities.
References
Allot, P. (1999) The concept of International law. European Journal of International law, 10(1) 31-50.
Honig, B. (2001) Democracy and the Foreigner. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hsu, S. and Parrish, A. (2007) Litigating Canada-US trans-boundary Harm: International Environmental Lawmaking and the Threat of Extraterritorial reciprocity, Virginia Journal of International Law, 48(1), 1-64.
IJC (2009) Treaties and Agreements: About the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. [Online]. Web.
Jönsson, C. and Aggestam. K. (2008) Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution. The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution: SAGE Publications [Online]. 2008. Web.
Klabbers, J. (2006) The Meaning of Rules. [online]. Web.
Kratochwil, F.V. (1989) Rules, Norms, and Decisions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Moir, A. (2009) Managing Expectations: The Run-Up to Copenhagen Climate Talks: Environmental New Website. [Online]. Web.
Nossal, Kim, Richard (1981) The IJC in retrospect. In Spencer et al. (eds) The International Joint Commission seventy years on, Toronto, Centre for International Studies. Vol 9 (87-106).
Sewell, D. and Utton, A. (1986) “Getting to Yes” in United States-Canadian Water Disputes, Natural resources Journal, 201 (1), 201-205.
Sjöstedt, G. (2008) Resolving Ecological Conflicts: Typical and Special Circumstances. The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution: SAGE Publications. 2008. Web.
Footnotes
The involvement of different actors in environmental negotiations increases transparency reduces room for negotiators to make secret deals or maneuvers and increases the possibility for lobby groups and public opinions voiced through non-governmental organizations and the media to influence the negotiations. However, the many actors often increase the complexity of such negotiations thus making them more cumbersome, protracted, and make attaining the final agreement even more challenging.
The US opposes any agreement that requires it to participate in non-voluntary or mandatory measures on emission reduction. This has deepened divisions between it and developed countries that ratified the protocol, most notably Canada. In her Defence, the US states that it has a different strategy in handling emissions, which include placing emission limits from power plants in different states.
What, in your view, is the most important principle of negotiations? Why?
Negotiations as the approach to conflict resolution in international relations can be effective only when efficient negotiation strategies are used. According to Ross’s rules of negotiation, the main focus should be on the desired outcome, on developing relations of trust, on empathy, and on respecting the sides’ interests and backgrounds1. In this context, the most important principle of negotiations can be formulated as the orientation to the agreement or to the best solution that can respond to the interests and needs of all sides, as is indicated with references to the example of Tulia and Ibad23.
This principle is working because it is associated with the idea of achieving the best results at lesser costs, and it is supported by Ross’s first rule4. Furthermore, the clear orientation to the agreement contributes to minimizing the risks associated with ‘hard decisions’5.
Diplomats need to be oriented to achieving agreement connected with the concrete best resolution before starting the negotiations6. The collection of the information about the sides is important to understand backgrounds, interests, and motivation in order to formulate all the aspects of the desired agreement carefully. In this case, it is significant to use technologies and focus on each detail of the sides’ backgrounds7,8,9,10,11.
The achievement of the best solution is possible only when the negotiator is responsive and understands the peaceful character of negotiations12. To refer to less cost while achieving agreement, it is necessary to be able to formulate messages efficiently1314. From this point, the discussed principle is most important in the negotiation process because it is directly associated with conflict resolution.
What surprised you about the negotiation process and what would you do differently the next time around?
The negotiation is a challenging process, and in spite of the focus on the concrete details of the expected and desired agreement, it is necessary to be ready to the opposition from the other side. The arguments provided by supporters of different positions can be rather surprising because different aspects are taken into consideration, and one problem can be discussed from a lot of perspectives. Although the necessity of a cease-fire is obvious, the sides can support their positions while referring to unexpected arguments based on their backgrounds. That is why much attention should be paid to formulating the effective principles of the agreement that are based on the careful examination of the sides’ motivation and perspectives15.
In order to achieve higher results during the negotiation process and be able to reach the agreement earlier during the possible following negotiations, it is necessary to calculate all the risks and propose strategies for the conflict resolution only with references to the interests of the opposite sides in order to find those areas where their interests can be similar.
In this case, the concentration on achieving the win-win situation is relevant only when all possible variants of the conflict resolution are carefully analyzed and discussed with the focus on mutual benefits for the sides16. Referring to the experience in negotiations on the conflict between Tulia and Ibad, it is important to change the strategy regarding the choice of the paths to the agreement. The focus on interests for the sides can be more advantageous than the focus on threats because the sides need to know what they can win as a result of the agreement.
Bibliography
Bercovitch, Jacob. “Mediation in International Conflict: An Overview of Theory, A Review of Practice”. In Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques, edited by William Zartman and Lewis Rasmussen, 125-154. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997.
Foley, Sean. “The UAE: Political Issues and Security Dilemmas”.MERIA 3, no. 1 (1999): 33-40.
Freeman, Chas. Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy. Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1997.
Hocking, Brian, and Jan Melissen. Futures for Diplomacy:Report 1. Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2012.
Kane, Sean. Talking with the Taliban. Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2015.
Kissinger, Henry. World Order. New York: Penguin, 2014.
Legranzi, Matteo. The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf: Diplomacy, Security and Economic Coordination in a Changing Middle East. London: I.B. Tauris, 2011.
Mnookin, Robert. Bargaining with the Devil: When to Negotiate, When to Fight. New York: Scribe Publications, 2011.
Morgenthau, Hans. “Diplomacy”. In Diplomacy, edited by Christer Jonsson and Richard Langhorne, 50-74. New York: SAGE, 2004.
Ross, Dennis. Statecraft: And How to Restore America’s Standing in the World. New York: Macmillan, 2007.
Seib, Philip. Real-Time Diplomacy: Politics and Power in the Social Media Era. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
Yesilada, Birol and Ahmed Sozen. “Negotiating a Resolution to the Cyprus Problem: Is Potential European Union Membership a Blessing or a Curse?” International Negotiation 7, no. 2 (2002): 261–285.
Footnotes
Dennis Ross, Statecraft: And How to Restore America’s Standing in the World (New York: Macmillan, 2007), 175.
Brian Hocking and Jan Melissen, Futures for Diplomacy:Report 1 (Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2012), 2.
Dennis Ross, Statecraft, 176.
Ibid., 178.
Robert Mnookin, Bargaining with the Devil: When to Negotiate, When to Fight (New York: Scribe Publications, 2011), 10.
Birol Yesilada and Ahmed Sozen, “Negotiating a Resolution to the Cyprus Problem: Is Potential European Union Membership a Blessing or a Curse?” International Negotiation 7, no. 2 (2002): 262.
Hans Morgenthau, “Diplomacy”, in Diplomacy, ed.Christer Jonsson and Richard Langhorne (New York: SAGE, 2004): 67.
Henry Kissinger, World Order (New York: Penguin, 2014), 154.
Philip Seib, Real-Time Diplomacy: Politics and Power in the Social Media Era (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 356.
Sean Kane, Talking with the Taliban (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2015), 2.
Sean Foley, “The UAE: Political Issues and Security Dilemmas”, MERIA 3, no. 1 (1999): 34.
Jacob Bercovitch, “Mediation in International Conflict: An Overview of Theory, A Review of Practice”, in Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques, ed. William Zartman and Lewis Rasmussen (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 128.
Chas Freeman, Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 128.
Matteo Legranzi, The GCC and the International Relations of the Gulf: Diplomacy, Security and Economic Coordination in the Changing Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 12.
The Iranian coup d’etat of 1953 was a series of events leading to the overthrow of the country’s leader, Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh. The events were instigated, managed, and supported by the US and the UK, both of which had political and economic interests in the outcomes of the coup d’etat. One of Mosaddegh’s goals was the audit of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, a British corporation in control of a major segment of the country’s oil industry (Homaeefar 2017). In response, the British authorities initiated a boycott of Iranian oil while at the same time using Iranian agents to undermine the integrity of the government. The recently disclosed documents confirm the fact that the planning and execution of the coup were led by the CIA (Dehghan & Norton-Taylor 2013). These factors have resulted in the emergence of anti-US sentiment in the country, where all foreign powers were treated with suspicion and resentment.
The regime of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, who came to power after the coup, was becoming gradually more repressive over the years. At the same time, the destabilization of the global economy coupled with fluctuations in oil consumption undermined the country’s economic stability, leading to high inflation rates and the population’s buying power. The combination of these factors has contributed to the formation of a coordinated opposition and, by extension, the revolution of 1978.
One of the most significant events associated with the revolution is the Iranian Hostage Crisis, in which a group of Revolution supporters held 52 American citizens hostage for 444 days. After an unsuccessful military operation Eagle Claw, the crisis was resolved in negotiations. The crisis is considered the longest known hostage situation and a major factor in the relationships between the two countries.
USA: Carter and Administration
First, it is necessary to highlight the key figures in the Carter Administration. On the one hand, some of the individuals, such as the secretary of state Cyrus Vance and Vice President Water Mondale, criticized the realpolitik approach and argued in favor of an international-oriented solution (Office of the Historian n.d.). In addition, it is possible to suggest that Vance followed a liberal approach whereas Mondale supported the idea of resolution via military action. On the other hand, some of the administration members, such as the National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, argued that the realpolitik approach in the form of a confrontational stance was the most feasible option (Carden 2013). Simply put, the existence of two camps with opposing views within the Administration led to indecisiveness and created several conflicts of interests, further complicating matters.
Another important factor that supposedly aggravated the crisis was the indecisiveness of Jimmy Carter. President Carter was a prominent supporter of liberal ideas and international human rights proponents. Thus, his initial response to the hostage situation was a relatively ambiguous speech that did not specify the desired outcome and did not impose any sanctions on Iran. This step was seen by the electorate as a sign of weakness and a waste of time (Collins 2013). It is also important to understand that at the time, the crisis was portrayed in the U.S. media as a major violation of the rights of American citizens and a threat to national security. As a result, the dominant public opinion viewed the lack of specificity in Carter’s actions as a sign of his weakness (Rosenfield 2016). Finally, it is necessary to understand the significance of the event’s timing: the issues in the domestic economy combined with the ongoing pressure within the U.S. led to Raegan’s victory in the presidential elections. As can be seen, timing played at least some role in the development of the conflict.
Finally, it is necessary to recognize the impact of military action in the negotiations. Operation Eagle Claw had several flaws that led to its eventual failure. First, it did not take into account whether conditions, leading to damage and loss of military equipment. Second, it was poorly planned, managed, and coordinated (Farwell 2013). In response, President Carter ordered mission abort. Overall, the operation ran contrary to Carter’s liberal approach and alienated both sides of the conflict with its hostility and inefficiency.
Iran: External Factors
It is also necessary to understand the political climate in Iran at the time of the crisis. As was mentioned above, Carter preferred a liberal approach in politics. This has led to a popular perception that his indecisiveness and avoidance of confrontation were signs of his weakness as a leader. In addition, by the late 70s, the United States was already vilified in the eyes of the Iranians due to the country’s earlier involvement in Iran’s political struggle.
Next, it is important to note that, unlike the previous, Western-oriented monarchy, the revolutionaries embraced the theocracy-oriented, anti-Western agenda. In this light, the U.S. response to the hostage situation was inevitably demonized by Iran’s authorities. Social justice was firmly connected to faith, allowing to frame the U.S. as a malevolent force. Finally, it should be understood that a significant proportion of the Iranian population did not share the radical anti-American sentiment, leading to tensions within the country. This diversity was partially responsible for the readiness to negotiate with the United States, which can be considered an example of a pragmatic approach to diplomacy.
Tactics and Theories
The initial strategy employed by the Carter administration was a non-confrontational approach that would not compromise the already tense political and economic relationships between the two powers. This approach is consistent with the liberalist diplomatic approach, based on cooperation and negotiation. For instance, an attempt was made to obtain support from the Iranian government, which failed with the fall of the provisional government. Next, envoys were dispatched to Iran in order to negotiate the condition of hostage release. However, the envoys were unsuccessful in obtaining the agreement from the revolutionaries and were eventually barred from entering the country. This fact showed the decline of credibility of American politicians as a trusted actors (Larson 1982).
At the same time, attempts were made to gain a positive image on the international scale by going through the United Nations Security Council. While this move was partially successful, it did not lead to hostage release and polarized the views on the matter, leading to the escalation of the tension. In the same manner, two applications were filed to the International Court of Justice, resulting in a resolution favorable to the United States.
Finally, a number of trade sanctions were used, intended to create economic pressure. The effectiveness of this intervention was compromised by disrupted schedules. Nevertheless, it is generally considered to have a significant impact on the decision to release hostages.
Once the ineffectiveness of the liberal approach became apparent, the Carter Administration resorted to the realist approach based on confrontation using military powers. However, by this time the effectiveness of the approach deteriorated. In combination with the poorly planned and executed military rescue operation, the realist approach further aggravated the situation.
Conclusion
As can be seen, each of the strategies used in the Iranian Hostage conflict had the potential to resolve it. However, poor timing and improper utilization of some of the advantages led to the opposite result. Instead of establishing trust, Carter’s liberal stance created an image of indecisiveness and vagueness, compromising the subsequent realist-based military intervention. Thus, recognizing the window of opportunity and acting in a timely manner is crucial for diplomatic success.
Larson, DL 1982, ‘The American response to the Iranian hostage crisis: 444 days of decision’, International Social Science Review, vol. 57, no. 4, pp. 195-209.
The negotiation process is a test of wits and will for the involved parties navigating the intense and challenging discussions. As each side tries to develop a contract that will benefit it the most, the stakes and risks are high. While for an average person, the negotiations might revolve around simple contracts such as buying property, joining a company, or selling a prized item, contracts with the federal government demand a more careful approach. A well-designed contract can bring millions in saving or profit for the company. Meanwhile, a poorly planned negotiation can lead to years of unprofitable and unmanageable contractual obligations. Therefore, early preparations help organize the negotiation plan efficiently, thoughtfully, and carefully.
Negotiating within the Industry
When addressing other industry members during negotiations, the process becomes an even more complex matter. Skirting around the well-known issues or concerns would only lead to the other company feeling disrespected and possibly tricked (Geiger, 2017). The negotiating company must approach the discussion by demonstrating respect for the other side. Being clear on what the company wants to achieve and expect from them and showing trust and willingness to negotiate further are critically important during a negotiation process. That is not to say that no tactics could be used to turn the discussion in the company’s favor. Whether a company sells, buys, or offers services, the usual strategies function just as well as when negotiating with other companies. One should be willing to create a win-win situation without agreeing to the first proposals (Dawson, 2021). The difference lies in the acknowledgment that as members of the same industry field, the other company is likely just as informed in the field prices, costs, and issues as the company is. Underestimating the other side can lead to losing negotiating power, signing unbeneficial contracts, or even earning a negative reputation in the industry.
Federal Contracts
When a government signs a contract with a private company to partially or fully carry out a project or deliver goods, it falls into one of three primary categories. It can be Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF), Firm Fixed Price (FFP), or Time and Material (T&M) contract (Nash et al., 2021). The form of a contract decides which side takes the most financial risks and what techniques are used, affecting the project’s negotiation strategies. There must be a thorough preparation: depending on the form, the financial risk for the company may be moderately low or extremely high. When contractors decide the prices, they must present viable data to the federal representative. After the negotiations are done and fixed fees are calculated, the government is feasible for a post-award audit to ensure that the company has provided them with factual information regarding the costs. This falls under the Truth-In-Negotiations Act (TINA), which ensures that the contracting company discloses all the necessary expenses and prices (Nash et al., 2021). Should the governmental team uncover that the contractor did not disclose information that could lower the costs, they may ask for a money return of the sum.
Therefore, there are distinct differences between negotiating contracts with the federal government and personal negotiations. In the case of the former, the contracts can take three fixed terms, and any form of alteration from this format is limited by the regulatory mechanisms. In other words, under T&M and CPFF, all risks are carried by the government, whereas under FFP, the risks are transferred to a contractor. However, personal negotiations are mainly free of these restrictions, which is why risk distribution can be more even. Subsequently, the first major skill of negotiation in regards to the federal contracts is to establish a starting bid by requesting more than one really expected to acquire (Dawson, 2021). For example, when the risks are on a contractor, such as FFP contracts, one should demand more funds than the minimally needed to create a buffer for unexpected occurrences. The second important skill is to create a reasonably large negotiation range, where one can gradually compromise to a good point because it creates a distance to fall back when the opposing party applies pressure on the terms of a contract.
Conclusion
The negotiation process is challenging for any business venue, but it can be made accessible, efficient, and profitable with preparations and a thorough plan. Negotiations are more complicated when writing a contract with an industry insider or the federal government, each carrying unique risks and nuances. Nevertheless, there are ways to handle these challenges to ensure that the negotiated contract fulfills both sides’ demands, leaving everyone satisfied with the result.
References
Dawson, R. (2021). Secrets of power negotiating. Red Wheel/Weiser.
Nash, R. C., Schooner, S. L., O’Brien-DeBakey, K. R., & Edwards, V. J. (2021). The government contracts reference book: A comprehensive guide to the language of procurement. Wolters Kluwer.
The relationship between Gandhi and Jinnah started in their youth, when Jinnah was actively looking to mobilize Muslims to lobby for the development of a special relationship with the colonists so that they could develop an independent state (Dar 137). Gandhi, on the other hand, was looking to enhance his influence on the entire nation because he believed that both Muslims and Hindus had the potential to collaborate in forming an administration that would efficiently enhance the quality of life for everyone by engaging in economy building and setting up political systems to foster harmony in the society.
Jinnah’s youth was characterized with various attempts to increase his influence on the society. He encountered Gandhi in several occasions, but their political journeys diverged as Gandhi’s talent in leadership was polished by his father and the people around him. Gandhi was the man of the people, whereas Jinnah was looking to lure people into supporting his radical ideologies. The rivalry between the two leaders was a function of the different futuristic ideologies that they had, with respect to the relationship between Hindus and Muslims in the British colony (Parveen 134). Gandhi was always ready to help the nation to gain independence from the British, but Jinnah’s main focus was to have Muslims being separated from their counterparts to implement self-governance. The interpersonal relationship between the two leaders had an influence on the resultant relationship between India and Pakistan, whereby citizens of the respective states have always pursued partisan interests and engaged each other in minimal diplomatic negotiations because they are aware of the differences in their political ideologies.
The Mandate
Gandhi’s mandate entailed a proposal for the Muslim portion of the society to accept a provisional government given by the British for the nation to gain independence. After his release from prison on 5th May 1944, Gandhi made contact with Jinnah to talk about the prevailing conflict of interest between them. He presented the CR formula which would facilitate negotiations between the two parties. Gandhi rejected Jinnah’s opinion that the Indian Muslims constituted a separate country. He insisted that India was a family represented by many members of which Muslims were part and parcel.
Jinnah’s mandate revealed that he wanted the entire population to recognize that Muslims made up their state, and they deserved independence from both the British and India. Jinnah rejected the CR formula citing that the split up could not be actualized. He also indicated that he felt both Hindus and Muslims voting did not support the Muslims in their quest of establishing an independent state (Singh 285).
Gandhi suggested the formation of a treaty of separation to facilitate collaboration between the two societies in the future. The talks did not succeed in harmonizing the two communities. The ruling viceroy was convinced that Gandhi and Jinnah’s approach of uniting the Hindus and Muslims was not going to work (Parveen 142).
Stakeholders’ Relationship
Chakravarti Rajagopalachari was a very influential stakeholder in the political quest of both Gandhi and Jinnah. He was an ardent follower of Gandhi as well as a prominent Congress leader. He nevertheless contemplated the fact that Congress should not get opposed to the Muslim demand of partitioning of India. However, he faced severe opposition from the Congress which made him resign from Congress under the advice of Gandhi.
The Muslim league of 1906 that got established to protect the interest and aspirations of the Muslims was also a significant stakeholder in the negotiations. A disagreement between the league and the Congress led to a political conflict that further led to the formation of the Lahore resolution in 1940. Britain was also a high stakeholder as at the time India was under its rule (Guha 53). The British government was the primary external stakeholder because it had established its rule over India. Britain was looking toward granting independence to India, and it required the two political leaders to come to a consensus on the type of government to be formed after independence.
Relationship between Gandhi and Jinnah
Gandhi and Jinnah became integral parts of the quest for freedom for their followers, but they were different in many aspects. Gandhi was born in a prominent social environment because his father was a prime minister, but Jinnah was born in a normal family and only gained political power through protests. The two had met before the negotiation period, but they never agreed on each other’s quests and doctrines. It is apparent that the society viewed Jinnah as an extremist who was quite aggressive in his quest for political success, whereas Gandhi was portrayed as a compassionate leader. Jinnah made his political campaigns in the rural areas of India, whereas Gandhi was a state figure, owing to his background. Their first meeting was in 1915 in a ceremony where Gandhi was being welcomed from South Africa. Jinnah was the chairman of a committee set to welcome Gandhi. In his speech, Gandhi recognized the presence of a Muslim in his community, who was willing to take part in various political courses to enhance the quality of life for the people. Gandhi always showed that he subscribed to various stereotypes, with reference to religion, whereas Jinnah assumed a passive approach on the matter. This is one of the reasons that they two leaders were not compatible in negotiations.
Works Cited
Dar, Farooq Ahmad. “Jinnah and the Lahore Resolution.” Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan, vol. 52, no. 1, 2015, pp. 127-155.
Guha, Ramachandra. India after Gandhi. Pan Books, 2017.
Parveen, Kausar. “Nature of Indian politics before 1947.” Pakistan Vision, vol. 14, no. 1, 2013, pp. 130-182.
Singh, Amarjit. “Gandhi and the Muslims of India: A Study on the Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi.” European Scientific Journal, ESJ, vol. 13, no. 12, 2017, pp. 281-289.